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-@ARTICLE{Illich-abc-en,
-  author = {: Ivan Illich, Barrie Sanders},
-  title = {ABC - The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind},
-  year = {abc/},
-  date = {1969},
-  origdate = {1969},
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-abc-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich and Barrie Sanders},
+  title = {ABC: The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind},
+  year = {1985},
+  date = {1985},
+  origdate = {1985},
   language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
   translator = {},
-  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/abc:index}
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/abc:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
 }
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+---
+  title: "ABC: The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind"
+  author: "Ivan Illich; Barrie Sanders"
+  date: "1985"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
+
+
+# Epistola Prima
+
+an Ranulphum de Mauricio.
+
+_Quod charitas nunquam excidit_.
+
+Dilecto fratri R. HUGO peccator.
+
+_Charitas nunquam excidit_ (_I Cor_. XIII). Audieram hoc et sciebam quod verum erat. Nunc autem, frater charissime, experimentum accessit, et scio plane quod charitas nunquam excidit. Peregre profectus eram, et veni ad vos in terram alienam; et quasi aliena non erat, quoniam inveni amicos ibi: sed nescio an prius fecerim, an factus sim. Tamen inveni illic charitatem, et dilexi eam; et non potui fastidire, quia dulcis mihi erat; et implevi sacculum cordis mei, et dolui quod augustus inventus est, et non valuit capere totam: tamen implevi quantum potui. Totum implevi quod habui, sed totum capere non valui quod inveni. Accepi ergo quantum capere potui, et onustus pretio pretioso pondus non sensi, quoniam sublevabat me sarcina mea. Nunc autem longo itinere confecto, adhuc sacculum meum plenum reperio, et non excidit quidquam ex eo, quoniam _charitas nunquam excidit_. Illic ergo, frater charissime, inter cætera memoria tui primum inventa est, et signavi ex ea litteras istas, cupiens te sanum esse et salvum in Domino. Tu ergo vicem repende dilectionis, et ora pro me. Dominus
+
+Jesus Christus tecum sit. Amen.
+
+
+
+
+# Preface
+
+This book gives shape to a series of discussions that took place as we were each other's guests in Claremont and Mexico. The continuing theme in our conversations was medieval paleography. From our discussion of the impact of the written word on the mind of the laity in the late twelfth century, we strayed to speculations on two late-twentieth-century issues: the impact of literacy campaigns on the increasing number of people who remain functionally illiterate; and the impact that communication theory has had on our colleagues' perceptions of reality, turning the English language into no more than a code. Our efforts to understand the effect that parchment and seal, ink and pen had on worldview eight hundred years ago led us to the discovery of a paradox: literacy is threatened as much by modern education as by modern communication--and yet, adverse as the side effects of compulsory literacy have been for most of our contemporaries, literacy is still the only bulwark against the dissolution of language into "information systems."
+
+We decided to retrace the route by which we had arrived at this paradox. We wrote for our own consolation and the pleasure we found in exchanging notes. When our notes turned into chapters, we agreed to make our reflections public. Since we have reached no conclusions and want to make no recommendations, we have only described a history that has jolted us into our new understanding. We cannot speculate about a future that, at least for the two of us, does not exist.
+
+As students of the Middle Ages we have traveled two separate paths: one starts from Hugh of Saint Victor's discovery that the supreme form of reading consists in the "silent contemplation of the text"; the other leads from Geoffrey Chaucer and his outspoken, even overspoken Wife of Bath to Huckleberry Finn, whose words cannot be contemplated silently.
+
+We are both "lettered," that is, creatures of the book, and _not_ simply because we know how to write or decipher books. In the society that has come into existence since the Middle Ages, one can always avoid picking up a pen, but one cannot avoid being described, identified, certified, and handled--like a text. Even in reaching out to become one's own "self," one reaches out for a text.
+
+We are prejudiced in favor of history in trying to understand when and how this society came into existence. The techniques that have constituted alphabetic writing--consonants, vowels, breaks between words, paragraphs, titles--developed historically to become what they are today. Certain constructs that cannot exist without reference to the alphabet--thought and language, lie and memory, translation, and particularly the self--developed parallel to these writing techniques.
+
+If these categories had a historical beginning then they can also come to an end. Our keen awareness of literacy as a historic construction whose first emergence we can describe deepens our sense of responsibility to preserve it. Standing firmly on the _terra_ of literacy, we can see two epistemological chasms. One of these chasms cuts us off from the domain of orality. The other, which moves like smog to engulf us, equates letters with bits of information, degrading reading and writing.
+
+We discuss this impending degradation only at the end of this book. Uwe Poerksen examines it in detail elsewhere. He is one of five friends--three of whom are finishing their own manuscripts--whose contributions aided our work. Poerksen is a medievalist and a linguist, known for his history of vernacular language as used in science, when Latin was abandoned as the only scientific tongue. In his new book he deals with the "mathematization" of ordinary speech: what we refer to in chapter seven as _amoeba words_. The fourth friend, Majid Rahnema, left a high United Nations position to call for the redefinition of major development goals rather than the redesign of institutional or technical means. He analyzes the unwanted side effects of literacy programs, while we limit ourselves to the history of the categories out of which these programs are constructed. The fifth friend is Barbara Duden. Her subject is the sociogenesis of the modern human body. In the light of historical studies, she shows that the result of the self's possessive description (or should we say, the possessive self-description) is to make the body into a layer cake of superimposed texts, each "text" lettered by a different profession to define a separate set of needs that only that profession can meet. The body thus appears as the incarnation of "texts."
+
+In view of this community of collaborators, the reading guide at the end of this book has a narrow scope. It leads to the starting point of our conversations: the alphabetization of the twelfth-century popular mind.
+
+
+# Words and History
+
+_History becomes possible only when the Word turns into words. Only verbatim traditions enable the historian to reconstruct the past. Only where words that were lost can be found again does the historiographer replace the storyteller. The historian's home is on the island of writing. He furnishes its inhabitants with subject matter about the past. The past that can be seized is related to writing_.
+
+_Beyond the island's shores, memories do not become words. Where no words are left behind, the historian finds no foundations for his reconstructions. In the absence of words, artifacts are silent. We have often felt frustrated, but we accept that prehistory cannot be read. No bridge can be constructed to span this chasm_.
+
+History remains a strict discipline only when it stops short, in its description, of the nonverbal past. The critical historian, reading Herodotus or Homer, observes and admires the very creation of Greek words, for the word is a creature of the alphabet and has not always existed. If the historian tries to describe wordless societies, he soon becomes a natural historian, an anthropologist like Aristotle, whose _anthroplogein_ can only be translated as "idle talk" or "tattle tales."
+
+Herodotus knew how far the writ of the historiographer ran. A thousand years after the death of Polycrates, he wrote that the tyrant of Samos "was the first to set out to control the sea, apart from Minos of Knossos and possibly others who may have done so as well. Certainly Polycrates was the first of those whom we call the human race." Herodotus did not deny the existence of Minos, but for him Minos was not a human being in the literal sense. He let the architect of the labyrinth live on as the father-in-law of the Minotaur. He believed in gods and myths, but he excluded them from the domain of events that could be described historically. His ability cheerfully to place historical truth alongside the qualitatively different truth of myth stemmed from his having set limits on historiography. He did not see it as his job to decipher a core of describable truths in myth, to explain the sacrifice of Athenian boys to Minos as a tribute to please some lecherous Oriental potentate, as later Greek and Roman historians did. Like Plato, he retained the ability to see the myths as stories that spoke to the illiterate, to children, poets, and old women.
+
+Prior to history, Plato says, there is a narrative that unfolds, not in accordance with the rules of art and knowledge, but out of divine enthusiasm and deep emotion. Corresponding to this prior time is a different truth--namely, myth. In this truly oral culture, before phonetic writing, there can be no words and therefore no text, no original, to which tradition can refer, no subject matter that can be passed on. A new rendering is never just a new version, but always a new song. Thinking itself takes wing; inseparable from speech, it is never there but always gone, like a bird in flight. The storyteller spins his threads, on and on, never repeating himself word for word. No variants can ever be established. This is often overlooked by those who engage in the "reading" of the prehistorical mind, whether their reading is literary, structuralist, or psychoanalytic. They turn Minos into a person, the Minotaur into a dream, and the Labyrinth into a symbol.
+
+Memories of this prehistory become a historical source, a verbatim tradition, only through historiography. Only the historian, writing it down, freezes the source material for his descendants, as Flavius Josephus stresses in his _Jewish War_: "My task is to write down what I have been told, not to believe everything; and what I am saying here applies to my entire work." Only the original text gives simultaneous rise to source and history.
+
+Every original text is the record of something heard. Some scribe of genius listened to Homer and the result was the one _Iliad_. Bernardo de Sahagun, the sixteenth-century Franciscan missionary in Mexico, and a pupil of Erasmus, took down hundreds of Aztec songs. He tried to apply the rules of textual criticism to several songs on the same theme all attributed to Prince Netzalhuacoyotl, but failed to reconstruct an original. In their deceptive similarity, each song, when written down, was not a variant but an original. Anthropologists become hunters chasing unwritten materials; tape recorders in hand, they descend on blacks, women, peasants--anyone on whose lips they sense prehistory. Folklorists sieve sagas and legends for fragments of oral phraseology. It is the task of the historian to develop the tools for recognizing which of these records are original sources, that is to say, texts that are not based on other texts, but represent the first fixing of speech. For those records are the flotsam from the oral realm that have washed up on the historiographer's shore, dicta for the first time broken down into words, sung rhythms strung in verses.
+
+Writing is not the only technique we know of for making the flow of speech coagulate and for carrying clots of language along intact for tens or even hundreds of years. When melody, meter, and rhythm combine with a proverb, the result is often an indestructible nugget of language. The drummers of the Lokele who live in the jungle of Zaire, not far from the former Congo River, still know the sayings that fit their tom-tom rhythms. In fact they need the sayings in order to drum the rhythms. But no one now remembers what they mean--or whether they ever "said" anything.
+
+In certain rituals practiced in the Isthmus of Panama, sequences of sounds are used, in which rhythm, melody, and articulation form a three-dimensional counterpoint. The counterpoint effectively prevents any change from creeping in, the chants acting as mummified dicta from a forgotten, prehistoric age. Legal maxims, oaths, spells, benedictions and curses, elements of genealogy, the stock epithets attaching to the name of a god, a hero, or a place, are all very often secured against corruption in this way. The utterance can also be tied to a thing. The tally stick that the Maori orator holds in front of him and to which he hitches his solemn oration, the quipu, or knotted bundle of threads that enables the Incan runner to reel off his news like a rosary, the sequence of pictures drawn on a wall, can support the unchanged repetition of sounds that might make no sense to the speaker. The caste organization of preliterate India can be understood as the social organization of a mnemonic device that enables the Brahmins to preserve the Vedas unchanged. Gestures that coalesce with the liturgical murmurs in a sacrificial ceremony fix language to body movements. Through all these techniques, nuggets of frozen speech can be carried along in an oral culture.
+
+But it would be a grave mistake to view the alphabet primarilyas an immense improvement over these mnemonic devices. Only the alphabet has the power to create "language" and "words," for the word does not emerge until it is written down. Neither the songs of the poets, nor the invocations of the priests, nor the dictates of rulers from prehistoric times are sequences of words. Their immense yet evanescent power eludes description, and those who uttered them were unable, for all their oral skill, to see their own speech as a string on which words are the beads. Prehistory knows nothing of these mono- or polysyllabic atoms of language whose semantic fields we plot with our dictionaries. What prehistory perceives as units can have only _audible_ contours. The sequences of sounds between pauses that characterize speech are not words but syllables, phrases, strophes. It is to these measures of speech alone that the original _word_ or Logos relates. This meaning has become secondary today, although we invoke it when we "give" or "go back on" our word, or when we "have a word" with someone. For us the "real" meaning of _word_ is _grammatical building block_, before and after which our pen breaks contact with the paper. Plato's slayers, barbarians, and children still live in a prelogical, that is, a "word-less" society.
+
+The historian misreads prehistory when he assumes that "language" can be spoken in that word-less world. In the oral beyond, there is no "content" distinct from the winged word that always rushes by before it has been fully grasped, no "subject matter" that can be conceived of, entrusted to teachers, and acquired by pupils (hence no "education," "learning," and "school"). For it is the record in phonetic writing that first carries what is heard across a chasm separating two heterogenous eras of speech. The alphabetic scribe carries what is spoken from the ever-passing moment and sets down what he has heard in the permanent space of language. Only with this act can knowledge, separate from speech, be born.
+
+As literates, we think of speech as the use of language, and we think of this language as outliving speech, as leaving traces--if not on paper, then in our selves. Before the concept of recording sounds through the alphabet had come into being, speech could not be imagined to leave such a trail. Without a listener (who might be an angel or God), speech could not be perceived as anything but madness, because speech courts attention. And before this sound-recording through the alphabet, a listener could not be perceived as a recorder. The nod indicated that the other person had understood, not that he had recorded the message, accepted the information.
+
+How different speech is from language is made clear by the fact that language is always neuter, while speech is always gendered. With every utterance, the speaker refers back to himself and his gender. It is always the total quality of speech that refers the listener to the speaker's gender, not the grammatical gender of the pronoun "I." (Nowhere, with the possible exception of the oasis of Hadramut, does the personal pronoun have grammatical gender.) In a culture, what sounds feminine and what sounds masculine is determined by convention, and not by the biological nature of the vocal cords. The way men and women speak contrasts in many ways: linguists, anthropologists, and sociologists recognize about two dozen criteria describing these contrasts. In no two places is their configuration the same. The gender contrast in speech is just as fundamental as the contrast in phonemes, but it has barely been remarked. At the very best, recently, linguists have examined the discrimination against women in the so-called "use" of language, which is genderless.
+
+This gender contrast in speech is lost when it congeals as language on the page. It does not survive the jump from pure time of speech into the permanent, spatial dimension of script. To return to Herodotus: The historian's task starts "with those whom we call the human race" that script has brought into being; with men and women when they begin to speak the same language. (We have been tempted to speculate that the story of the Tower of Babel tells of this event.)
+
+
+If alphabetic writing can be spoken of as bringing the human race into existence, it is only because this kind of writing is unique, as a study of the history and phenomenology of phonetic writing will reveal. Pure, mature phonetic writing, which was discovered only once, albeit in stages, is an oddity among writing systems in the same way that the loudspeaker is an oddity among trumpets. The alphabet records only sounds, and it is only through sounds that it provides meaning. The alphabet does exactly the opposite of what most hieroglyphics and ideograms and, most importantly, what Semitic letters were created to do.
+
+In writing systems using hieroglyphics and ideograms, the reader is expected to speak; the ideogram itself is silent. The statement "1 × 1" says "once one," or "one times one," or even "multiplication table." But it can equally be read "jedan put jedan." In all these scripts the reader must find the spoken expression from recollecting what has been said before: Mayan hieroglyphics, for example, provide the clues so that the reader may speak aloud from memory. Through landmarks that are more than just pictograms, they help him find his way orally along an often-traveled path. Ideograms, too, originally point toward utterance. They presuppose that the reader is familiar with the content of ideas whose individual elements are strung in a row before him to be named. Reading thus means retelling the familiar content depicted in accordance with more or less precise rules. Even when--as in the third millennium B.C.--the individual Egyptian hieroglyph or Mesopotamian ideograph become logograms, so that from that point on they had to be named with one and only one word, the word presents itself to the reader without any indication about its sound; the ending and inflection that make it audible must be supplied by the reader.
+
+The early part of the second millennium B.C. saw a series of faltering attempts here and there in the Middle East to bind speech more closely to writing. Convention came to dictate that a particular pictogram or ideogram, which had become a logogram, could be used as a syllable sign. The reader put aside any recognizable meaning of the word and read it into the text for its sound only. As a syllable sign it came to be placed beside the thing sign, making it easier to decipher. Reading became somewhat like solving a rebus. Nowhere, however, did a true syllabary evolve out of this custom--the Indian syllabic alphabet is of considerably more recent origin than the Greek. It is an admirable system of phonetic notation that grew out of the Greek invention.
+
+Quite suddenly, around 1400 B.C., an entirely new kind of script made its appearance on the border between the Egyptian hieroglyphic tradition and the cuneiform of Mesopotamia. This North Semitic alphabet was the first to have signs for sounds only, and only one sign for each group of sounds. Some archaeologists have speculated on a single inventor for this alphabet, so completely does it accomplish both requirements for script from the first moment of its appearance: the universe of heard sounds--an almost infinite variety of sounds in every language, with men and women, children and dotards, singers and ragmen all sounding different--is reduced to a limited number, each of which is then labeled.
+
+However, this Byblos alphabet whose letters stand only for sounds does not have any letters for vowels. The freely voiced qualities of breathing are not indicated, only the consonants, the harsh or soft obstacles the breath encounters. Its script does not yet transform the page into a mirror of speech, but is rather a burial ground for the skeleton of language. Being a purely phonetic notation, it differs radically from all previous scripts, but it can still be read only by someone trained for a special kind of analysis. Only a person who has developed the ability to recognize within the uninterrupted string of consonants groups of two to five elements that act as "roots" can breathe those roots into life. The roots grow into words only when the reader makes them resound according to the semantic function they ought to play in the environment in which they stand.
+
+In a prophetic vision, Ezekiel describes the process: "The hand of the Lord carried me out ... in the midst of a valley which was full of bones that, lo, were very dry ... and I prophesied as I was commanded, and the bones came together: bone to bone ... but there was as yet no breath in them ... and the Lord said, 'Breathe upon the slain [literally: Give thy soul, _nefesh_, to them] that they may live' ... and as I did, they stood upon their feet" (Ezek. 37:1-10). It is astounding with what audacity a clutch of pastoral tribes in Canaan claimed the invention as their own. As Exodus relates, Israel overcame "Egypt" intellectually and emotionally with the invention of phonetic writing. The mummies in their tombs are supplanted by roots. No longer is it only priests who can promise the continuation of life after death by deciphering the hieroglyphs. The invention of the Semitic script makes possible a new relationship to the life and death of Osiris.
+
+From now on the written character rescues a sequence of sounds from ephemerality; and living speech is dismembered by the scribe, who as he listens to dictation ponders the speech, examines it for its inaudible roots, determines the (usually) three consonants that compose it, and engraves these into a clay tablet. The letters he has buried tell what roots have been read into the recorded utterance, and these letters can be resurrected at any time alphabetically by the reader.
+
+Greek merchants acquired the string of Semitic consonants from Syrian traders on the coast of Asia Minor. They left the sequence of letters undisturbed, with their shapes recognizable and their names unchanged, but they perverted the use of these letters. While for the Semite _beth_ had a semantic association, because for him it means "house," for the Greek it is merely the name of a letter that stands for a sound. Four of the Semitic letters were not needed by the Greeks: To the Greek ear they stood for barbaric noises. The Greeks of the eighth century used them to indicate vowels. The consonants are now placed between vocals, the entire word now lies on the page. No more does the reader have to recognize naked bones that must be properly assembled by the eye and then fleshed out only by breathing life into them. The page has become a record of sounds.
+
+Phonetic script could now do the opposite of what the string of consonants had so far done. While the consonants had been used to record units of meaning that the scribe had picked from the flow of speech, the Greeks froze the flow of speech itself onto the page. The scroll had been sounded thus far through an act of interpretation of the letters; alphabetic recording that fixed sound on the page brings an utterance from the past into the present, to which the reader can listen, interpreting what he hears. The Jew searches with his eyes for inaudible roots in order to flesh them out with his breath. The Greek picks the sound from the page and searches for the invisible ideas in the sounds the letters command him to make.
+
+The transformations brought about by Greek literacy are well symbolized by the appearance of Sybil, who replaces her older sister, the Pythia, as the model of the prophetess. Her story is told by Heraclitus, a Pythagorean who, through Cratylus, could claim Plato as a pupil. He was the first to distinguish the consonants (which he divided into the unvoiced _aphthonga_ and the sonant _aphona_) from the vowels. Plutarch has conserved the passage from Heraclitus in which the Sybil makes her first appearance. In the image of the alphabet, she wrests utterance from its temporal context and turns prophecy into a literary genre: "Sybil, in her mania, makes the oracle of the god ring out a whole millennium, joyless, odorless, and unadorned..." She spells out the future. For the Sybil first writes her oracle on leaves, then later on tablets. She brings stone slabs to King Tarquinas, who reigned over the Campagne, south of Rome--over Etruscan towns through which the Romans got their alphabet. No one need strain anymore to hear the ominous murmurings of the Delphic Pythia. The menacing future can now be read.
+
+
+# Memory
+
+_At the time when heaven still embraced the earth, when Uranus still lay with full-hipped Gaia, an aeon before the Olympian gods, the Titans were born and with them, memory, or Mnemosyne. In the_ Hymns to Hermes, _she is called the Mother of the Muses. She is the earliest of the goddesses, preceding even Apollo with his lyre. Hesiod mentions her as the goddess of the first hour of the world and describes her flowing hair as she stretches out beside Zeus on his couch, there to beget the rest of her nine daughters, the Muses. It is she who adopts the son of Maya, the "shamefaced" or "awful" nymph, and thus makes him the son of two mothers. She provides Hermes with two unique gifts: a lyre and a "soul." When the god Hermes plays to the song of the Muses, its sound leads both poets and gods to Mnemosyne's wellspring of remembrance. In her clear waters float the remains of past lives, the memories that Lethe has washed from the feet of the departed, turning dead men into mere shadows. A mortal who has been blessed by the gods can approach Mnemosyne and listen to the Muses sing in their several voices what is, what was, and what will be. Under the protection of Mnemosyne, he may recollect the residues that have sunk into her bosom by drinking from her waters. When he returns from his visit to the spring--from his dream or vision--he can tell what he has drawn from this source. Philo says that by taking the place of a shadow the poet recollects the deeds that a dead man has forgotten. In this way, the world of the living constantly makes contact with the world of the dead_.
+
+The modern _memory_ does not derive from the older _Mnemosyne_, but from another, later Latin word, _memoria_. Like words and text, memory is a child of the alphabet. Only after it had become possible to fix the flow of speech in phonetic transcription did the idea emerge that knowledge--information--could be held in the mind as in a store. Today, we take this idea so completely for granted that it is hard for us to reconstruct an age when recollection was not conceived as a trip into the cellar to pick up stores, or a look into a ledger to verify an entry. Since the fourth century B.C., memory has been conceived as such a deposit that can be opened, searched, and used. Philosophers have disputed where this deposit is located--in the heart, the brain, the community, or perhaps in God, but in all these discussions memory has remained a bin, a wax tablet, or a book.
+
+For turning this idea topsy-turvy, Milman Parry ranks close to Einstein, although it took much longer before the implications of Parry's achievement were grasped, since humanists, as a rule, are much more conservative than physicists. Thanks to research done in the 1930s by this young Harvard classicist and his assistant Albert Lord, it is now clear that a purely oral tradition knows no division between recollecting and doing. The pre-alphabetic bard does not, like his medieval counterpart, draw on a storehouse of memories in order to compose a poem. Rather, he dips into a grab bag of phrases and adjectives and, driven by the rhythms of the lyre, spins the yarn of a tale.
+
+Parry's thesis, submitted to the Sorbonne in 1928, argued that the _Iliad_ could only have come into being through oral recitation and in the rhythm of spoken hexameters. According to Parry's hypothesis, there are two heterogenous processes by which social continuity is preserved: the flow of prehistoric epic tales that are never repeated word for word; and history that is built on the bedrock of words. In a purely oral tradition, songs, epics, and sayings do not hover above life. That life is a delicate, complex tissue steeped in epic recollections. As soon as the stream of recollections becomes even potentially visible as a narrative, this stream clots and turns into an authority, a point of reference, a socially disembedded rule, the excrement of lived wisdom that a new kind of wise man, called the scribe, can shape.
+
+This epistemological heterogeneity between history and prehistory only gradually gained acceptance. It contradicts the assumption made by the sciences that categories exist to describe human experience _tout court_. Parry's hypothesis stood up only because the question whether a particular text represents the direct, firsthand transcription of a preliterate tradition can be answered according to strict rules.
+
+The new field of research Parry marked out makes it possible today to determine with certainty whether a particular text is, in the strict sense, prehistoric--whether it is the faithful record of a preliterate improvisation, or the line of a speaker who uses language or memory to compose a text. During the last fifty years Parry's pupils have applied phonologically governed linguistics to the criticism of literary works and the study of oral tradition. In the course of their research, they observed that surviving elements of oral tradition often complemented the detailed study of the linguistic peculiarities of certain major Greek texts and subsequently of epics in other languages as well. They have developed, tested, and refined a number of criteria that make it possible to distinguish oral poetry from every kind of written compositionwith impressive consistency. Their criteria are the best way we know to evoke the elusive activity of preliterate recollecting in the time before _scripta_ of information, originals, or copies emerged.
+
+To begin with Parry's thesis about the _Iliad_: The _Iliad_ reveals a mastery in self-limitation within given patterns that cannot be imitated self-conscious literacy. What Eric Havelock calls the "variation within the same" has never been approximated by any poet. Only texts that exhibit five forms of self-limitation simultaneously may be regarded as genuine, firsthand written records of oral improvisation: First, in Greek epics, the hexameters are composed of standard word groups. Second, those word groups are mutually attracted to one another during oral recitation. Purely statistically, there is an increasing probability of finding the same formulae in the same section of the epic. Third, the line usually coincides with a syntactic unit: Many lines could be ended with a full stop or a comma because at least the meaning comes to an end there. Fourth, a uniform--though complicated--pattern occurs at the level of the phoneme; combinations of sounds that fall outside the pattern inevitably point to written composition rather than oral improvisation. Finally, this quantitatively verifiable self-limitation relates even to the pattern of the story as a whole: The return of the hero, for example, is always, in oral improvisation, told in the same phrases within the same culture.
+
+According to Parry, the question of the origin of Homeric epics had remained unsolved for so long because it had been wrongly framed. Even today much Homeric research is directed toward looking for an author. Who was the parent of those twenty-seven thousand hexameters? Was he an editor of songs that he had collected from people who knew them by heart? Was he a she? Or was he a godlike poet who composed them himself? Did he write them down, or did he get someone else to do it? Or did others learn them from him, memorizing them, so that much later, after the invention of the alphabet, like a Greek Samizdat, they could be written down?
+
+For Parry, both hypotheses--that of the editor and that of the poet--were equally untenable. Neither learning by heart nor composing were possible in prehistoric times. Before writing, there was no text that could have been internalized and later reproduced like a film script or a part in a play. Not until there was a text could there be a recitation. In Plato's day, there were already people who knew the Homeric epic by heart--in the _Ion_, Plato describes Socrates' dialogue with such a mnemonist. Xenophon also tells of such a rhapsode who knew all of Homer's work by heart and was admired for it. But that very admiration is already Classical, providing proof that the rhapsode's act of memory was regarded as an extraordinary achievement. No oral society supplies accounts of an epic poet being admired for feats of recollection. They were neither prodigies nor super-Brahmanic mnemonists.
+
+But neither was Homer a man of letters--for the simple reason that there were no letters. The lines of the _Iliad_ do not consist of a series of words. Those who sang it were driven by the rhythm of the lyre. In the twenty-seven thousand hexameters, we can find twenty-nine thousand repetitions of phrases with two or more words. Homer sang as a prehistoric rhapsode--the Greek _rhapsodein_ meaning to stitch together, a linguistic connection that is shared with the _Sutras_, stitched (sutured) together. Homer's art consisted of stitching together a series of stock words and phrases.
+
+We are so used to drawing a distinction between speaking (and the language that we speak) and thinking (and the language in which it is clothed) that we are no longer capable of composing aloud by improvisation. This difficulty did not exist for the bard: He was composing and reciting simultaneously. As easily as he handles the Greek verb in the rhythm of speech, he finds the first stock word in the poetic vocabulary that leads him on to the next one that will fit in the hexameter. Choosing the one correct verbal inflection from the limited group of forms is as easy for him as selecting the phonetically and syntactically right formula from the vast, but after all finite, group of such formulae in the poetic vocabulary of _his_ time.
+
+In making his choice, the rhapsode was not so much concerned with the actual meaning of the particular adjective selected. It is therefore a mistake to judge these epics according to the aesthetic canon of the Classical Age. Homer, in contrast with Virgil, was not only word-less, but also languageless. The singer of the _Iliad_, carried along by the beat of the hexameters, was able to locate and use the wonderfully precise nuances of the Greek verb forms and to choose from the enormous store of "winged words." No object remains from this performance. The art of Homer consisted of fluent improvisation within strictly limited means: the art of Classicism gives poetic originality free rein. That originality consists of the deliberate recasting of a given text; that is to say it was based on improving imitation--the mimesis praised by Aristotle. For Virgil, the _Aeneid_ was a work of art: It was an object that he continued improving by changing a word here and there--until, on his deathbed, he wanted to burn it in frustration. The _Aeneid_ allows itself to be paraphrased. In contrast, Homer can only be rendered--the word cannot be pried from the meaning.
+
+Parry's theory remained mere speculation until he managed to observe the singing of living traditional rhapsodes. In the 1930s, he and his pupil Albert Lord traveled to Serbia, where they made the acquaintance of a number of folksingers who still had their roots in the epic traditions of the Balkans. In Turkish coffeehouses and at peasant weddings they sang all night, telling stories to the rhythms of the _gusla_. Using the complicated equipment of pre-war days, Parry recorded their epics on metal discs in order to check his theory by observation.
+
+No _guslar_ ever repeated the same epic word for word. Every performance was, as Parry expected, a fresh attiring of the old story. For many years after Parry's death, Lord continued the research. He was able to observe the process whereby a youngster became a _guslar_. First, the young man spent years listening to the master singing. While tending his herds, he practiced using the stock formulae and so gradually became familiar with the poetic vocabulary. With growing assurance he was able, accompanied by the strum of the _gusla_, to fall back more and more upon those set pieces; but only a small number of skilled bards could draw, even in their maturity, upon the full repertoire of rhythmic fragments. The deeper his active mastery of the wealth of formulae, the clearer his understanding of the content of the songs he heard. Once this faculty was fully developed, he needed only one night's listening to a song he did not know in order to be able to reproduce that song himself a week later. No one could do it on the same day: The _guslari_ say that a story needs time to ferment in the bard--at least a day and a night.
+
+Parry's theory enables us to understand that so complex a structure as the _Iliad_ was sung in a single draft--without the aid of written notes, plans, or drafts. According to Lord's observations in Serbia, it is entirely possible that a single bard assembled from formulae and sang tens of thousands of verses in one outpouring. The riddle of how such work is written down is also solved, according to Lord. In Serbia, he attempted, without tape recorders, to get an accurate written record of long epics. It emerged that collaboration between a clever town clerk and a mature _guslar_ produced surprisingly good results.
+
+At the start, the bard felt annoyed and uneasy about having to pause repeatedly in his singing and rely on plucking his _gusla_ to keep him in time. Soon, however, the _guslar_ began to enjoy this leisure and to use the additional time to utter the proper formula. And in the clerk he found a listener who allowed him to spin out his material at his own discretion until it was exhausted. The writing down of the _Iliad_ could have taken place under similar circumstances, and Homer probably had the same attitude toward the text as the _guslari_: not one of them was the least bit interested in having so much as a line of the written record read back to him for checking.
+
+The knowledge gained from this comparison of the Serbian _guslar_ and Homer has proved helpful over the past fifty years in the study of cultures that have persisted beyond the reach of records. It has come to form one of the foundations of scholarly discussion of the epic in the Anglo-Saxon world and has led to entirely new insights in the study of the medieval epic.
+
+Oral transmission of epics ceases with writing, and with it, at the dawn of history, fades the idea of memory as the goddess of immortal recollection. For the Classical poet of Greece no longer has need of recollections from a "beyond." No longer is each utterance like a piece of driftwood the speaker fished from a streamful of treasures, something cast off in the beyond that had just then washed up onto the beaches of the mind. No longer are thought and memory intertwined in every statement with no distinction between thought and speech.
+
+When epic tradition becomes a recorded one and custom is transmogrified into written law, the poet's sources are frozen into the texts. He can follow the lines of a written text; the river that feeds its own source is remembered no more. Not one Greek city has preserved an altar dedicated to Mnemosyne. Her name became a technical term for "memory" now imagined as a page: the water of memory turns into the fluency of a writer and a reader. Fixed words on clay tablets acquire authority over the re-evocation of fluid speech.
+
+Plato, in the early fourth century B.C., stands on the threshold between the oral and written cultures of Greece. The earliest epigraphic and iconographic indications of young boys being taught to write date from Plato's childhood. In his day, people had already been reciting Homer from the text for centuries, but the art of writing was still primarily a handicraft. From the seventh until well into the sixth century B.C., reading and writing were confined, in Greece, to very narrow circles. In the fifth century B.C., craftsmen began to acquire the art of carving or engraving letters of the alphabet. But writing was still not a part of recognized instruction: The most a person was expected to be able to write and spell was his own name. The taking of dictation and the fluent reading of written materials were not yet part of knowledge used for control and education. Until the fifth century B.C., schooling in Athens was purely oral, musical, and gymnastic. _Mousike_ stood at the core of the Greek curriculum: Poems were recited and improvised, rhythmic rhetoric was practiced, pupils learned stringed and wind instruments, singing and dancing. The few pictures in which a teacher is represented with a stylus in his hand show that the alphabet now made it possible for the teacher to read out to the pupils the poems to be learned. Thus a full century before the stylus was imposed on pupils, they were able to learn the texts by heart. That is to say, they gained an understanding of a fixed text that could be listened to, and a respect for the sound of its words, long before they were required to write or read fluently.
+
+Plato's was the time of great change from instruction in elevated, rhythmic public speech to the predominance of prose speech. What formerly could only be recited or sung, can now be pinned down, penned down. The script can be copied, one copy serving as the source for another. The scroll can freeze "materials" for a teacher. It is not the speech but the language of the past that can be made present. Plato heard the Pythagoreans and Socrates. He does not claim to have dictation from them, but he does boast about his faculty of recollection. He is not a traitor like Hippias, who disclosed the orally transmitted secret teachings of Pythagoras. He is already a writer--however anachronistic that may sound. His dialogues are literary prose. He created the model--never surpassed--of the written dialogue that imitates speech. His literary oeuvre forms a counterpart to the record of Homeric song from prehistoric times.
+
+Plato was not Greece's first author. But he was the first uneasy man of letters. He was the first to write with the conviction of the superiority of thought unrelated to writing. He was anguished by the effect the alphabet was exerting on his pupils. Their reliance on silent, passive texts could not but narrow the stream of their remembrance, making it shallow and dull. Earlier, this mistrust of the alphabet had been reflected in Aeschylus' _Prometheus Bound_: Zeus punished Prometheus for bringing the alphabet--"the combining of letters, creative mother of the Muses' art, wherewith to hold all things in memory"--to mankind. Zeus had engendered his daughters in the pond of Mnemosyne so that they might bubble and flow, not be locked up in script.
+
+Plato, who saw writing as a threat to the meditative search, kept coming back to the question of Mnemosyne: memory/recollection. How do we bring the past into the present? He answers the question through Diotima in the _Symposium_, after he has been extolling Eros: "To what does the word _meditation_ refer if not to knowledge that is past? When we forget, knowledge escapes us. Meditation then brings us to new knowledge and gives it the appearance of still being the same."
+
+Diotima describes the search for truth in terms that very closely parallel the process by which the Serbian _guslar_ repeatedly retrieves the same material from oblivion and spins it into a new song. Plato's intellectual path, his access to truth and ideas, is an epic one. This becomes clearer when we read further in Diotima's speech: It forms part of her answer to Socrates, who wants her to teach him about the secrets of Eros. For Diotima, "meditating" is an expression or form of creative love, which in its search for the immortal is always giving itself anew and always withdrawing. Eros longs for what is permanent, and it takes shape when we meditate on the immortal truth, on _eidos_. Only this kind of loving meditation can lead to wisdom. Plato sees this search for the springs of truth as being threatened by a polymathy based on writing.
+
+To give form to that threat, Plato "fabricates," as Phaidros puts it, the story of Theuth, the inventor of letters. Theuth seeks to "sell" the letters to King Thamus of Thebes as a _pharmakon_, a medicine to strengthen the power of recollection and intellect of his subjects. The word _pharmakon_ carries a suggestion of magic and the vegetable kingdom. It can be translated as "drug"--either a healing potion or a poison, depending on how it is used. Which of the two was meant was decided by the epithet: In some sayings _pharmakon_ means "boon," in others "mischief." Theuth not only presents himself as the inventor of a new means, he also presents a new kind of end.
+
+Thamus thanks him, but he refuses. "O skillful Theuth," he says, "being the inventor of an art is different from being the person who has to decide what advantages and disadvantages that art will bring to those who employ it. You stand before me as the father of letters. With a father's favor, you attribute to letters a fortune that they cannot possess. This facility will make souls forgetful because they will no longer school themselves to meditate. They will rely on letters. Things will be recollected from outside by means of alien symbols; they will not remember on their own. What you are offering me is a drug for recollection, not for memory... Your instruction will give them only a semblance of truth, not the truth itself. You will train ignorant know-alls, nosey know-nothings, boring wiseacres."
+
+Thus in the Classical period memory became divided into two sorts: The natural--that which was born simultaneously with thought--and the artificial--that which could be improved, through precise techniques, or devices, and exercises. The Classical teacher of rhetoric still viewed recollection as the result of a journey, but not to the shore of a river to pick up a piece of driftwood that Plato called "similar" to another piece that had been lost beyond recall. The trip now led to a storage room, as Aristotle says, "to recover knowledge through previous sensations _held_ in one's memory."
+
+Each of the three primary works of rhetoric (the anonymous _Rhetorica Ad Herennium_ [82–81 B.C.], on which later Western traditions of memory training were based and which was attributed to Tullius; Cicero's _De Oratore_ [55 B.C.]; and Quintillian's _Instituto oratoria_ [first century A.D.]) describes essentially the same mnemonic technique. A person tries to imprint on his memory the interior of a building, preferably a spacious one, visualizing each location--stores, attics, stairs, fore-and antechambers--complete with accessories, such as furniture, paintings, and sculpture. The person then equates the ideas to be remembered with certain images (_imagines agentes_); Quintillian uses the example of an anchor and weapon, perhaps to signify ships and war. These _imagines agentes_ are mentally placed into various _loci_ within the building. When the person wishes to "recollect" certain facts, he merely revisits these pre-designated places in the building, and gathers them up once again.
+
+The construction of a memory palace met the needs of the rhetorical arts. To deliver a convincing speech, the speaker must remember it in a planned order; and to prepare for arguments, he must remember points that he has previously connected. (The idea of a planned order would have been, of course, alien to the epic poet, the story unfolding as inevitably as each note followed the next on his musical instrument.) The "palace" of memories provides not only the recollected facts, but also the shape, essential to a well-constructed rhetorical argument.
+
+These architectonic images are suited to the shift from the aural to the visual emphasis that a script culture, like Greece by the end of the fifth century B.C., demands. In fact, Plutarch mentions that Simonides of Ceos, who was believed to have invented the "artificial" mnemonic devices, called painting "silent poetry," equating the visual aspect of the two arts that Horace summarizes as _ut pictura poesis_. For the writers of the three Latin memory texts, memory is a signet ring leaving its impression on wax. Aristotle, in his _De Memoria et reminiscentia_, puts down the old waters of Mnemosyne using virtually the same image: "Some men in the presence of considerable stimulus cannot remember owing to disease or age, just as if a stylus or a seal were impressed on flowing water."
+
+Martianus Capella, a contemporary of Augustine, goes even further. It is Capella who once and for all replaces the cut stone of a sealing ring with the stylus, the image impressed on the wax of memory by letters traced on an invisible tablet. The three-dimensional pictogram of Classical memory thus appears as the arrangement of logograms on the slate of the mind. Capella's _Marriage of Philology to Mercury_ was read in the Middle Ages; the monastic curriculum built around the seven liberal arts has been shaped in part by Capella's fanciful summary of antique learning. He served as one of the bridges between Cicero and Alcuin, to Aquinas, over which the conception of memory as a store has reached us.
+
+And while in antiquity this image of memory as an archive referred primarily to a device used by the rhetor, scholasticism made of memory a faculty of every soul, like will and intelligence. Thus, each soul was also burdened with a conscience--a record of its own doings that could be read and examined by clergy and laity, literate and illiterate alike. The rhetorical device provided the foundation for a new activity, confession, the verbal manifestation of a secret kept in one's own heart. And not only deeds left traces that could be admitted; past words and even past thoughts that inspired the deeds could soon be read in an examination of conscience.
+
+
+# Text
+
+_The Lindisfarne Gospel, painted and lettered around 697  A.D., brings into sight the watershed that separates the oral from the de scriptive mind. Opposite the beginning of each Gospel in the Lindisfarne Book stands a wordless ornamental page, decorated in the style of Irish and Saxon sword handles, silver cups, and fibulae, that balances the lettered page to the right. The initial letter of the text appears on the ornamental page, but it also both frames and penetrates the strings of uncial letters on the lettered page. It looks as if the calligraphic outpourings of one capital had the task of weaving the texture that supports the sentences. Occasionally the interwoven colored lines take the appearance of elongated dogs or birds, only to dissolve again into infinitely prolonged tongues, tails, and ears. Only the portraits of the four Evangelists rise from this painted warp and written woof: not symbols but strong individuals shown in the style of late antique coins rendered in sharp, northern lines_.
+
+_In the Book of Kells, written one hundred years later, it is easier to speak separately of its lettering and drawings. The form of the letters reveals its date: no longer roman capitals and not yet medieval minuscules. Historians are still in disagreement about the place at which it was written and the origin of the stylistic elements it com bines. Around 1185, Geraldus Cambrensis was still impressed by its beauty: The designs are "so deliberate and subtle, so exact and compact, so full of knots and links, with colors so fresh and vivid, that you might say that all this was the work of an angel and not of a man."_
+
+_Art historians have talked about barbaric instincts surfacing on these "Baroque" pages, which react against the reforms attempted by Charlemagne. We should say: The book talks as if literacy had not yet settled in. It talks through the style of its meandering threads. They challenge the reader to weave the one story of Christ's life out of four tales, thereby fleshing out the "Word of God," the Gospel Truth. Seen in this way, the Book of Kells is a kind of "Homeric page" in which, at an early date in England, oral storytelling has been for a moment visibly frozen in the cadence of knot and link that punctuates the series of letters--just as the strum of the lyre punctuates the utterance of the singer. The Good News becomes visible. Like a stream of fiber s that is drawn from the distaff, twisted between the fingers and turned into a yarn, so the Good News is embodied in the spinning out of a yarn, knitting up of a tale, weaving the tales into a story. The metaphors of narration are taken from yarn and spindle and loom, used by oral societies to embody and share their unspeakable perception. Even today the Navajos and Aymara women weave each tribe's cosmography into one reality with its social geography. Both in the mesas and in the Andes the seeds must be brought to the field in kerchiefs that tell the unspoken story of the spot at which they will grow. During the final years of intense oral tradition in the north of the British Islands, the pages of the Book of Kells make a wordless tale of this kind visible, even to the unlettered. But for the reader, what is on the page is not the same as what is in the book. The letters and the lines tell the same story in dissymmetric, mutually untranslatable ways. The knotted lines that occasionally spawn figures are not yet illustrations to the text, for the texture of the lettered rows has not yet arranged itself to be perceived by the eyes as a visible "text."_
+
+_The idea of the "text" that is_ in the book _could not come about without major changes in the elements that are visible_ on the page. _By pointing to the arrangement of lines and colors on the page, the emergence of a "text" can be followed, even by a modern illiterate--one who cannot decipher the insular majuscule in which the Book of Kells is written, or who cannot understand a single sentence in Latin. The transformation of the manuscript page during the eight hundred years that precede Gutenberg illustrates the steps through which the mind of the West has come into being_.
+
+It was not until the Middle Ages that letters ushered in a new type of society. The role played by letters in the birth of this new kind of society can be studied on two levels. On one level, new ways of doing business, nourishing prayer life, and administering justice all became feasible through the written preservation of words. In the twelfth century neither the heresies nor the new orders, neither the new towns nor their universities could be understood without the new and broad spread of the word that was now not only said but read.
+
+The second way letters changed a society--by their own symbolism getting under a culture's skin and changing social perception in terms of the written word--has been much less studied and is much more difficult to talk about. The reason for this research lacuna is probably that all the categories by which we talk about past societies have been acquired by reading. By their very nature they serve to _describe_. They are directly suited to saying things about a society in which social relations are governed by a reliance on written language. Even as poets, we are men of letters. What we call science originates from description. Absurdly, we speak of the surviving body of oral traditions as "oral literature," which literally means "oral writing." Consequently, it is very difficult to convey how society was turned inside out by the spread of writing in the Middle Ages.
+
+In the part of Europe lying north of the Alps, between the middle of the twelfth century and the end of the thirteenth, an unprecedented change occurred in the nature of social relations: Trust, power, possession, and everyday status were henceforth functions of the alphabet. The use of documents, together with a new way of shaping the written page, turned writing, which in the Early and High Middle Ages had been extolled and honored as a mysterious embodiment of the Word of God, into a constituent element in the mediation of mundane relations.
+
+So long as literacy was confined to minorities, as was the case until the High Middle Ages, power was exercised in the form of foreign rule. Relying on his _Calendarium_, in 1186--scarcely four years after his election--Abbot Samson, a foreigner, knew every bushel owed on every hide of St. Edmund's land. Even though the tenant knew no letters--the Abbot's means of recollection was as foreign to him as the book of the Day of Judgement--writing had left an impression on his soul as if it were a whip. He was now under the coercion of writing to pay those debts that he did not care to remember.
+
+As literacy became more general and, by the end of the medieval period, embraced large sections of society, changes began to seep into everyone's everyday life. Without obliterating social relations based on orality in a uniform way, it engendered a growing tension between custom and legality.
+
+In the committing of oaths to writing, we can trace the shift of trust from the validly given word to a document exerting legal force. An oath is a ceremonial giving of one's word, a spoken promise. This kind of emphatic utterance seems to occur among all peoples. An oath swears to a given word. The truth or intention of the thing sworn to is reinforced by a ritual association between word and gesture, both traditional in form. The latter invests the former with a peculiar power. Oaths are among the forms of utterance most carefully guarded against change. Their formulation in terms of rhythm, alliteration, and repetition keeps them from falling into oblivion, like unforgettable fragments of a forgotten past. Often the form of the oath was recited to the person making it--in the Germanic world with the oath stick held out. While taking the oath, the swearer laid his hand on the temple stele, on a clod of earth, or on his sword, or he raised his weapon skyward and placed a foot on a stone. "By the ship's side and the shield's rim, by the sword's edge and the horse's thigh" was how the Danes swore fealty. The swearing of an oath took place in the open air--in eighteenth-century Polish courtrooms, oaths were still sworn by an open window--in order to make the oath manifest to the gods, the spirits, or the dead. While swearing to fulfill his oath, the swearer raised his sword or raised three fingers or laid them against his beard or testicles, and in many places he sullied himself with the blood of a sacrificed animal. Women swore with different gestures than men, laying a hand on their breast or braids or belly.
+
+A man who makes an oath pronounces a conditional curse against himself; he asks to be maimed, withered, or blinded, if he is pronouncing a falsehood or should ever break his word. He swears his own body, his limbs, his eyes, his honor, even his descendents, by putting them up as a pledge. Through the medium of co-jurors, he physically makes his whole tribe a party to his oath, involving them all in his pledge. May lightning strike them, may the devil take them, may his wife bear him a crippled child if he is lying.
+
+For the onlookers, the unity of word and gesture has something of the effect of a sacrament. The swearing of an oath makes the word visible--not on paper, but in the living body of the person concerned. It incarnates the veracity of what he is saying. In the context of orality, truth is inseparable from veracity. The oath reveals an epiphany of this unity of form and content that captures the essence of the oral mentality.
+
+The oath survived tenaciously in written law despite being in fundamental contradiction to the nature of the letter. Written law seeks to legitimatize itself by controlling the oath, which it does by monopolizing it. When strict laws were passed against oath taking and cursing outside the courts, the oath's function was reversed, as can be seen in medieval records.
+
+When the splendidly bound Book of the Gospels replaced the oath-taker's own beard, the rim of his shield, or the pommel of his sword in solemnifying the oath, a new relationship began between the oath and writing: The book as object was incorporated into the gestures accompanying the self-curse, while its contents, oddly enough, remained outside the wording of the oath. What makes this even more peculiar is the fact that Matthew 5:33-36 contains an unqualified prohibition of oaths of any kind: "You have learned that they were told, 'Do not break your oath,' and 'Oaths sworn to the Lord must be kept.' But what I tell you is this: You are not to swear at all--not by heaven, for it is God's throne, nor by earth, for it is His footstool, nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King, nor by your own head..." In spite of this unambiguous passage in the Sermon on the Mount, Emperor Justinian's legal reforms require those taking oaths to place a hand on the Gospels.
+
+This innovation is all the more instructive for the fact that the reform by the Christian Byzantine Emperor, in 528 A.D., first elevated the oath in Roman law to the status of a general obligation in legal proceedings. Missionaries then introduced the oath with the Gospels to traditional courts north of the Alps. Litigants in these courts were no longer to swear on a ring that had been dipped in the blood of a sacrificial animal, but on the cross, on relics, on the altar--and on the Gospels. This was required by the Lex Ribuaria in 803. The Church assumed the divine task of punishing the breaking of an oath.
+
+The use of the book in the pantomime of legal gesture soon led to the form of words used in the ceremony being committed to writing. The traditional cursing of oneself was replaced by an ingenious formula. In England it had become so complicated and strange that the plaintiff preferred to grasp the red-hot iron of ordeal rather than take the Gospels in his hand. He knew that he could never repeat the formula without making a mistake, and that would have been tantamount to a breach of oath.
+
+Not only the oath but also broad areas of everyday life that had previously been governed by oral usage were made subject to a new formal and legal kind of literacy in the Middle Ages. A large section of the population discovered in this period that, before objects could be owned or rights made use of, they first had to be described, and held on a parchment: trust shifted from the given word to a sealed document.
+
+Objects could now properly be "held" rather than possessed. The world that the theologians had represented as a book, the Book of God that man must decipher, now through the document became an object that only description could appropriate. Thousands of topographical descriptions have come down to us from this period; boundaries became effective through these descriptions: "From the old oak tree along the stream as far as the big rock and thence in a straight line uphill to the wall..." This appropriative description of reality began as a jurisprudential method before it became the foundation of natural sciences.
+
+M.T. Clanchy, on whose work we shall draw, estimates that in twelfth-century England, not more than thirty thousand charters were drawn up. In the period 1250–1350, by contrast, several million were made out in England alone--that amounts to almost five charters for each piece of describable property. Accompanying this change, writing materials increased ten-to twenty-fold in this period. The consumption of sealing wax at the royal chancery in England rose from three pounds per week in 1226, to thirteen pounds in 1256, and thirty-one pounds just ten years later in 1266. More sheep had to give up their skins as parchments for the purposes of documentation during a royal court hearing. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was a matter of a few dozen. For a perfectly ordinary session in Suffolk in 1283, over five hundred were skinned.
+
+Not only the charters but also the _breve_, or brief, and the "letter" came into more common use. This can be shown by the number of such royal mandates that have come down to us from the period 1080–1180: For French kings this rose from 3 to 60; for English kings, from 25 to 115; and for popes, from 22 to 180. After 1180, the growth rate skyrocketed. From the reign of Innocent III (1198–1215), 280 survive; from that of Innocent IV (1243–54), 730; and from that of Boniface VIII (1294–1303), 50,000.
+
+In the twelfth century, the chancery was an exclusive attribute of the sovereign. Chancellor Becket already had an army of clerks to do his paperwork: Sixteen different hands can be distinguished under his control in the years 1155–1158. But then, beginning around 1200, individual bishops and princes began to join in. They could not manage any longer occasionally summoning a curate to read to them or to write for them. By 1350 the chancery was an essential element of spiritual and temporal dominion. Writing rooms multiplied even faster than mills, first widely used at this time for pumping, crushing, hammering, and darning. In the eleventh century, pieces of writing and articles of jewelry had been preserved in reliquaries as treasures next to the bones of saints. The overflow of charters, briefs, and copies thereof flushed these treasures out of their arks. What had been an heirloom was now an instrument of proof.
+
+Into the twelfth century, the letter was often the visible indication of the importance, the weight, that attached to the news brought by the messenger. The letter became necessary only when the messenger was unworthy of the sender: When Jaufre Rubel sent a song to his lady by his own court jester, he insisted that he sing without handing her the piece of parchment. Some twelfth-century love letters are works of scholarship or works of art that refer the reader to the messenger for interpretation.
+
+Only slowly did the missive become a memorial of a promise that the sender places in the hand of the recipient. In 1142, Heloise's letter to Abbot Peter the Venerable clearly implies this. Abelard, her husband and castrated lover, had died as an exemplary monk in Cluny. Abbot Peter had him cooked and boned and the dry remains conveyed to the Paraclete for burial in a grave where Heloise could later join him. With the remains he sent Heloise a deeply moving letter of admiration for Abelard, and of praise for her. But she was not content. In her answer she requests from Abbot Peter a written promise that the monks at Cluny will forever honor and remember her dead husband. In addition to Peter's note having the nature of a sign, she requests an instrument on which the future demands of the recipient are to be based.
+
+This becomes quite clear in testaments. A person's last will is no longer expressed through the presentation of a symbol, for example, a handful of heritable soil, a key, or a sword. A sealed document now takes the place of the thing. The inheritance is no longer determined by the witnesses of a person's last words spoken from his deathbed, but by a charter. The document itself becomes an instrument of witness.
+
+"In witness whereof" signified an action, a gesture accompanied by words, an oath, coupled with the transmission of an object, by which sovereignty, or title, or rights of property were ceded. Leaving a dagger or a goblet might serve as a sign for the bequest of a piece of land. Later, the object sometimes bore an inscription. On the pommel of a whip in the possession of St. Albans Abbey we find the words to the effect that "this is a gift of four mares by Gilbert of Novo Castello." In this way the word, in conjunction with a tangible sign, was "witness." In the thirteenth century, word and sign collapsed into a written statement. In an initial step it was a paper record of a past event. In a second step, the preparing of the parchment itself became the event described. Lawyers by 1180 insist that the instrument of witness should record a past agreement, _in perfectum_. One's word, through the signature, constituted assent to a written text.
+
+Good faith being committed to a written document in this way made it important for the person issuing it and the recipient to have a copy of it. Otherwise, the scriptorium of the monastery that the sovereign had endowed with a gift could turn out unlimited numbers of instruments, attributed to his predecessors, which the sovereign's chancellor would have to honor. Nowadays if one attempted to acquire rights by producing written confirmation of fabricated promises, it would be understood as forgery. This was not so in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; the legal way of conferring rights substantiated by instruments of witness--not just incidentally supported by a memorial--was too new a concept. "Documentation," and the necessity for the issuer to keep a precise copy of the instrument, represent technical discoveries of the late twelfth century. The regest, the catalogue, the copy, the seal, the date, and the signature, are decisive elements of the new technique.
+
+The making of regests, which are registers of the dictates of the sovereign, was already known to Roman lawyers. One or two popes had practiced it in the fourth century. From Innocent III on, it was the rule in the Roman Curia, but it was not until the fourteenth century that it became established in the chancellory of the Holy Roman Empire. Cataloguing techniques lagged behind the manufacture of copy instruments until well into the fifteenth century. Monastery libraries in the High Middle Ages had monks who remembered where to find manuscripts but as yet had no catalogues. Monks in the older monasteries in particular knew better than their patrons what the latter held in their archives and thus were able to produce forgeries easily.
+
+The first known _scrutinium_ of a monastery library, a catalogue intended to serve as the annual inventory, dates from around 1170. With this invention, the book became dislocated from the sacristy. The book repository became an archive, pure and simple--a library. A report by a Dominican in 1260 tells of books being set out on shelves so the brothers might consult them _in promptu_--in readiness. It became important to verify the quotation from a theological authority, much as the described border of a forest had to be authenticated by reference to written evidence. In the thirteenth century, the making of catalogues of books owned and the making of regests, or registers, or charters granted proceeded in parallel.
+
+There was a fundamental difference, however, between making a copy of a book in a monastery scriptorium and making a copy of a charter in a chancellory. The original of the book stayed in the monastery, while the original of the charter left the chancellory. The chancellor was responsible for the copy that remained _iden_--that is, the same as, _identical_ to the original.
+
+Making exact copies called not only for twice as much writing work but also for correction of the copy. In 1283, Cambridge established the first _beneficium_ for a paid corrector. His job was to check documents according to form (_ratio_), legibility (_lettera_), word order (_dictio_), and spelling (_sillibo_). Two documents being identical thus became a new criterion of their legal validity. Two hundred years before Gutenberg, archives gave rise to the intellectual prototype of printed matter: an original (that might not exist anymore) from which a number of identical copies had been produced and written. In fourteenth-century depictions of a law-court clerk, the corrector is often shown looking over the shoulder of a secretary and a copyist to verify and certify the identity of two documents. The issue of a notary's certificate attesting to the identity of two texts became a flourishing business. Even people now required identification. As early as 1248, Goliards in Burgundy were obliged to carry written credentials: the first step toward the "identification" of a person as an "individual."
+
+To keep the individual charter identifiable forever, it must not only be vouched for by a copy, but also firmly placed in space and in a new kind of time. The place of issuance is already indicated on most eleventh-century documents. When the documents indicated time, this was usually related to events significant enough to stick in the memory of witnesses to the proceedings described. The document was drawn up on the Feast of St. Severinus, on a market day, at the vigil of a wedding, on the anniversary of the foundation of a monastery, or perhaps on the occasion of a visitation by the sovereign. It was not until some time in the thirteenth century that notaries ventured to place so trivial a proceeding as a change of ownership of a piece of farmland in direct relation to the birth of the Lord and thus to the course of the history of human salvation. Through this method, the history of salvation was chartered as the history of the world.
+
+As a result of this dating, time through the text became something new: no more the subjective experience of a relative distance in the course of the world or the pilgrimage of the writer, but an axis for absolute reference on which charters could be nailed like labels. By the end of the fourteenth century, the date on a charter could even be tied to the mechanical tower-clock. "Circiter nona pulsatione horologi," announced the contract, and at nine o'clock the document was signed. Memory grew a new dimension. Memories could now be shelved behind each other, not according to their importance or affinity, but according to the date from which they issue. And in the Dance of Death, the skeleton man begins to appear with an hourglass: By the fifteenth century, he insists that time is scarce.
+
+The signature also changed its function in this transition from the description of an event to the production of an instrument that was essential to the event, because the signature helped render individual will "visible," and thus helped fix it in a universal grid. The swearer's resounding name no longer leaves an impression.
+
+In the twelfth century, documents still spoke aloud: "The letters are symbols of things and have such power that they bring the speech of the person present to our ear without his voice." So said John of Salisbury (d. 1180), sometime secretary to Thomas à Becket, a sarcastic and elegant writer who with this definition harks back to Isidore of Seville, whose letters "indicate figures speaking with sounds." Until it had been promulgated (by a herald, "heard"), a legislative act had no legal validity. The written copy was as yet no more than a record of that oral promulgation.
+
+So long as the document was conceived only as a reminder of something proclaimed, its sealing with a signet ring or a signature was an emphatic confirmation of the oral event it described; but not yet its authentication. Because he was not concerned with authentication, the same person arbitrarily used a different signature each time. This changed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when documents became legally effective instruments. Courts concerned themselves with the question of authenticity. _Vellum_ (calfskin) was replaced by _membranum_ (sheepskin), which was thinner, did not easily permit erasures, and prevented forgeries. Signed documents were now required to stand as a guarantee.
+
+The old Frankish _wera_, the old French _warandir_, "guarantor," slowly turned into a written warranty that drew its force from being signed. The seal became a mark of the power of writing. Even a man who could not himself write was empowered by the seal to take legally valid action on his own behalf by issuing documents. If his word was invalid, he could speak through the document, thus exercising his power by taking legal action. In the thirteenth century, even villeins, free peasants, occasionally carried their own seals and so could obtain a description of their property drawn up by a notary. In the twelfth century, the seal was still regarded by its owner much like any other object--a dagger, a chalice, or a whip. Like the St. Albans' whip pommel that stood for four mares, the sealed wax was the object through which a piece of property might change hands. If a document was at all attached to the sealed wax, which sometimes weighed more than a pound, this parchment was mainly a further inscription on the seal, analogous to the inscription scratched on the pommel of the whip. Only slowly did the seal change from a thing (a _res_) into the substitute for a person's handwritten signature. The text itself overshadowed its material vehicle, and threw this shadow deep into the daily life of everyone who purchased, inherited, sold, or lost property. Just as in the transition from orality to literacy, language became detached from the speaker, so the text was no longer viewed as an extension of the event but assumed its own authenticity separate from the event.
+
+Representations of the Last Judgement appear at this time in the arched spaces above many church doors that show how the book has separated from its writer. The Archangel Michael weighs the soul to establish if it may ascend into Paradise or must be cast into Hell. And, on quite a few of these reliefs, the Judge Himself holds the book, in which every deed and desire, nay every word and thought of the dead has been written down. Without ever having touched a pen or held a book, without ever having dictated a line or sealed a charter, every time he enters the church door the faithful is reminded that, even with his most secret thought, he _writes_ the text of his life, by which he will be judged on that ominous day.
+
+To write, however, at the time when the Book of Life gained prominence in Christian preaching did not yet mean to clutch a pen and draw letters on a parchment. What it meant to write can be well documented from the manner in which Bernard's scriptorium was organized. Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux in the early twelfth century, does not write with his hand. Like Cicero, the Abbot spoke emphatically in the presence of a scribe. He spoke clearly, but slower than the Roman, because unlike the latter's slave Tiro, Bernard's amanuensis (his secretary: literally, he who lends him his hand) did not know how to take shorthand. Some of Bernard's dictations survive in two versions that textual criticism is unable to reduce to a single original. These are undoubtedly two different secretaries' notes of the same sermon of which different fair copies were made from a wax tablet. Many of the old texts were prepared by secretaries in this way from statements by their dictators. Once a fair copy had been made of his dictation, Bernard occasionally might have had it read back to him for checking. But there was no question as yet, for him, of a correction from a manuscript.
+
+Some half dozen technical innovations in writing had to become commonplace before the author himself could become a writer. In this period the usual method of writing, both for copying and for originals, was and remained dictation.
+
+In the Republican period of ancient Rome, to dictate meant to speak in the elevated, rhythmic manner of the _ductus_; _scribere_ meant the physical act of writing as well as composing. In the Middle Ages the frontier between the two meanings was located quite differently. _Dictate_ referred to the act of creating a text, and _scribere_ simply to the work done with writing materials. It was suggested occasionally that, when he was alone in his cell, a monk could dictate. Up until the twelfth century, the _ars dictaminis_ was the art of reading and composing rather than that of reading and writing. The art of writing was _one_ of the many arts necessary for a manuscript to come into being. The skinner and the parchment maker, the beekeeper who produced the wax tablet, and the painter for the miniatures, were all as necessary as the bookbinder and the lector, or reader, in the copying room. This changed with the division of lines into words. When the copyist saw words in front of him, he was able to copy the original himself, word for word. There is some evidence that in the thirteenth century people who could not read were used for copying because they could copy more accurately.
+
+In Antiquity, even after the great grammarians such as Varro and Quintillian had mastered the word intellectually and were able to teach its forms and functions in the sentence, writing was still pure _grammatika_: a continuous series of letters. Words were strung together without any physical definition. Not until the sequence of letters was read aloud was it possible to grasp the words of the text. The author might in theory dictate a sequence of words; but for the scribe they became an unbroken series of letters. From that series of letters the ear had to extract not only the words but also the elevated rhythm of polished speech.
+
+A very timid beginning at dividing up words was made by Jerome. He interrupted his sequence of letters with _cola_ and _commata_ in order to make legible some of his translations from the Hebrew that would otherwise have been almost meaningless in Latin. The first strict division of sentences into separate words occurs in the titles of an early manuscript of the _Etymologiae_ of Isadore. Division into words first came into common use in the seventh century. It happened at the northern frontiers of the known world, where Celtic "ignoramuses" had to prepare for the priesthood and needed to be taught Latin. Division into words was thus introduced as a means of teaching Latin to barbarians as a foreign language. Like the new pronunciation of Latin, it came to the Continent by way of Tours through Alcuin in the late eighth century. Unlike the new pronunciation, however, which was quickly rejected, the innovation of the word as a visual unit in writing won general acceptance. The ninth century provides us with the first reports of schools beginning to observe _distinctiones_, the spaces between words.
+
+The new graphics of the separated word had an immediate effect on the copying room. Until the eighth century, the writing room was depicted by artists as a dictating room. Then, from the early eighth century, we have a picture of a writing room for which there are no precedents. The scribe sits in front of long strips from which he is copying, although the most usual method of copying was still that of the copier dictating to himself. As early as the ninth century, artists occasionally represented the inspiration of an author--even that of the Evangelists--by showing an angel holding a tome before the writer at his desk; nonetheless, it was not until the thirteenth century that the really radical change occurred.
+
+The writer depicted in early thirteenth-century miniatures no longer holds a knife in his left hand. Instead of writing on the hard leather membrane that had to be smoothed by scraping and sometimes even nailed to the desk with the point of a knife, he now writes on thin parchment and is even beginning to write on paper. His posture is much more relaxed. Writing is no longer strenuous work. His right hand, too, now has an easier job. The writing surface is smooth, the _ductus_ flows, and at last the Middle Ages has produced its own cursive script--something that had been forgotten since late Antiquity. The master can now become a writer himself. He is shown with a quill in his hand and not, as he had been for centuries, as a dictator.
+
+Thomas Aquinas, in the middle of the thirteenth century, already had newer writing materials--parchment, penknife, reed, and ink--at his disposal. Drafts in his own hand have come down to us, in the new Gothic cursive which, in its first generation of use, was insufficiently standardized: The master did not yet think that a secretary could copy from his notes. Copying from the master's handwriting by pupils became possible only in the next generation. Thomas still had to dictate in class from his arranged notes, creating his lectures from his written sources. He did not need to limit his notes to a small number of wax tablets. Thomas used notes to assist his trained memory: he drew up a schema of the arguments he was going to deal with. And in many instances, he first dictated his schema and then the execution of it. Earlier teachers did not speak from notes, and they could not check most of their sources.
+
+When Bernard referred to a source he did so from memory. Albertus Magnus and Thomas, two generations later, were the first to have reference books at hand. They quoted verbatim, and after their death, their own works lay chained to library desks, having become reference books in their turn. The new technique of "reference" enables the thirteenth-century author to check his quotations from sources. He can dictate while looking up a passage. The dictator began to have random access to a memory that was laid out before him. Chaucer obviously had before him the text of Boccaccio's _Il Teseide_, as his source, his _auctoritas_, for "The Knight's Tale." The mnemonic devices the rhetorician taught the pupil to build up in his own imagination had taken shape, hundreds of years later, on the page. The Lindisfarne Gospel comes with sixteen pages of canon tables constructed under decorated arches. In the Book of Kells, the fourth-century Eusabian Tables stand at the beginning and suggest to the reader that Matthew, Luke, Mark, and John can be read as one story, since they provide an inkling of the parallels between the four tales. But only in the late twelfth century is this memory device externalized. Any reader can return to any book he has read whenever he wants to do so. And soon it was no longer the works of one's own monastery that the students could reach: the first Union Catalogue came into being shortly after the foundation of the Sorbonne.
+
+Much more significant than the creation of accessible library shelves, however, was the new way of arranging written matter within the book. The art of going back to the exact location of a source of Divine Revelation was from the beginning a necessity that distinguished the Christian from the pagan author. This makes it surprising that the techniques to do so took hundreds of years to be shaped. For a thousand years Holy Scripture was not referred to indirectly, but always _quoted_ directly. Saint Augustine had experimented with a device meant to help the readers of the _City of God_ find their way about his vast treatise. For this purpose he prepared a _brevicus_ as a summary to each of the books. Cassiodorus had experimented in the sixth century with the use of key words as glosses: He extracted them from the text and placed them into the margins as he dictated. Isidore of Seville, just before the Arabs established themselves in southern Spain, first provided his vast _Etymologiae_ with chapter headings. But only very slowly did the division of the Bible into chapters become standardized; the division into verses came even more slowly. Gradually the New Testament began to be cited by chapter and verse. Such citation--without the need of quotation--became possible for the Old Testament only after 1200. And then, quite suddenly at the end of the twelfth century, the devices to use the book as a reference tool were there: a subject index to the whole of Holy Scripture. Thus, some 250 years before printing made it possible to refer to the text by page number, a network of grids was laid over the book--a method that had nothing at all to do with the content itself.
+
+During the twelfth century, written texts were visibly fixed in spatial relations to each other. With this text certain elements were made to stand out: Quotations were now written in a different color. The reader's eye, accustomed by the gloss to move from the body to the margin, had to be trained to move from the index to the page, and from one book to the other. Now the eye encompassed not simply the lines, but the entire text. Quite possibly, some of these techniques were developed under Arabic influence. The Moslems, who were not allowed to draw naturalistic pictures, sought to address the eye through the arrangement of letters alone. As a result, Arabic scribes developed a greater variety of colors and diversity of letter arrangements than contemporary Latin books. Certainly the influx of translations from the Arabic--often prepared by Jews from Toledo and Montpellier--inspired some of the new techniques used by the thirteenth-century monks. But Western bookmaking did not become iconoclastic. Precisely as the new methods allowed the text to take visible shape, this text entered into a new relationship to the painted margin and miniatures. Text and illumination are no longer interwoven in the ambiguous manner of Lindisfarne: the patterns do no more than intrude into the lines of the letters, as in the Book of Kells. To describe and to paint have come to be separate tasks often executed by different hands. And yet, the union of illustration and writing during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries gave rise to the great synthesis of the Western manuscript.
+
+The world now lay described before the reader's eye. The book is now arbitrarily accessible; the reader can enter at will, wherever the index refers him. He sees what is written, and the illustration assists him in this task of visualization. His authorities are perceived as writers rather than as teachers: The "ipse dixit" is replaced by the "ipse scripsit." The pupils now sit in front of their teacher with their eyes fixed on his text, which lies on their knees. They are no more asked to recall the sound of their teacher's words, but to grasp the architecture of his argument, which they must impress on their minds. By the end of the thirteenth century, students in Paris can borrow manuscripts from lending libraries to read with their teachers in class. Libraries become places of silence.
+
+Now truly the reader can say what Hugh of St. Victor had said in 1128: "_Trimodium est lectionis genus: docentis, discentis vel per se inspicientis_" (I can read [aloud] to you, you can read [aloud] to me, and I can read contemplatively to myself). Now reading as an activity of the teacher--in other words, reading aloud--and reading as a listening activity are complemented by a third, silent type of reading: contemplative study of the book.
+
+
+# Translation and Language
+
+_In wordless speech there is no word-for-word reproduction of meaning. Writing had fixed neither the language frontier nor the mono lingual dependence on translation_.
+
+_One often forgets that the translator is a frontiersman in more than one sense: He creates the very frontier over which he brings his booty. He is like a ferryman whose boat turns the wild beyond of the barbarous babble into the "other" bank. The translator does not exist in orality. In that world there is neither the dragoman, who hangs about the offices of the Turkish Khadi, nor the_ Dolmetscher, _who sees to it that two texts correspond, nor the "simultaneous parrot" at the United Nations. All these are artisans of the text. They start from the assumption that a person who speaks is, by implication, dictating. It is immaterial whether that dictation is then written down or not because the product of it is in any case a "text" Translation today means turning one text into another. The notion that lies behind it is that texts have a content that is capable of being poured from one vessel--with its own lexical, grammatical, phonetic, and con textual peculiarities--into another_.
+
+One obstacle most modern readers face when they want to study the history of "language" is their belief in monolingual man. From Saussure to Chomsky, "homo monolinguis" is posited as the man who uses language--the man who speaks. This idea had no place in early Greece, or in the Middle Ages; even today it is alien to many people. In their daily life in Java or in the Sahel, a great number of people still feel at home in several kinds of discourse, each of which, to the modern perception, is conducted in a distinct language. But those other people--the Javanese--perceive things differently. They still say "I cannot understand you," rather than "I do not know your language." They are concerned with grasping what the other person has to say by explanation, gesture, or summary; they do not want a translation of that person's statements. As in early Greece, the borders between these cultures, which we moderns are taught to see as "languages," have remained fluid. The idea of "translation" has not yet erected those frontiers that the translator, and only the translator, may bridge.
+
+The eleventh-century cleric who takes down the witness's testimony in the language of the court--who, for example, writes in Latin what the witness says in Swabian--is a scribe. He has no intention to translate. Neither is the bishop translating who reads out the homily in accordance with the rules of the Council of Tours: He teaches by announcing the word of God and interpreting it. He is helping people understand. But that is a long way from translating.
+
+Even today, we often say: "Help me, would you--I'd like to understand what the old man or the scientist is saying." Surely, we are not seeking a translator, but someone to help us understand--an interpreter. We rely on the intermediary who understands the mutterings of an old woman, the dialect of Lower Bavaria, scientific language, or Chinese. The question "What did he say?" contains the request "Tell me what he is trying to tell me." We do not even expect our companion to have understood word for word; we only want to understand what _he_ has understood. This understanding of explanations, coupled with the ability to explain what one has understood, is basic to oral discourse.
+
+For the idealistic language inmate of a language prison this type of intercourse has become either inconceivable or irritating. He finds it hard to accept that the phenomenon to which he refers by the term "language" has a history--that it was once socially created and may also pass away. Just as the word assumed its present form through writing, so did "language" assume its present form through the translation of texts.
+
+According to George Steiner, translation did not become an issue in the period before Christ. The few literate people were usually bilingual, and for the others, what was said in one language could be retold, summed up, reported, or commented on in the other. Cicero and Horace were among the first to refer to translation as an art. The Greek work was not to be turned into Latin _verbum pro verbo_. Instead, the meaning was to be detached from the words of one language and made to reappear in another; content, stripped of its form, was to be preserved. Theories about translation changed very little--translation was described as an attempt to divulge the secrets of one language into another--until the hermeneutics of the 1950s. Only then did the study of translation as applied linguistic theory become separated from literary theory. In the end, we would agree with Borges: "Ningún problema tan consustancial con las letras y con su modesto misterio como el que propone una traducción" (Translation reflects what is most uncanny about literacy).
+
+The absence of theory did not hamper the Middle Ages from growing into an age of translation. The age of transiation begins, not only with the Christian desire to preach the Gospel to all people, but to appropriate its Hebrew and Greek books into the culture of late Antiquity, which, in the West with Augustine, became monolingual. Saint Jerome defined his activity as translator in an image to which the monks of Reichenau made allusion: "Quasi captivos sensus in suam linguam victoris iure transposuit" ("As the victor deports his prisoners under the rule of war, so (the translator] carries meaning over into his own language"). And precisely because Jerome was aware of the violence done to the text by translation, he called for limits to be set to the process. He preferred to tolerate meaningless sequences of words in his Latin Bible than have what he regarded as something inexpressible obscured by interpretation: "Alioquin et multa alia quae ineffabilia sunt, et humanus animus capere non potest, hac licentia delebuntur."
+
+Translation in the Middle Ages carried a unique significance because of the unique status of Latin--the only language used in writing. Latin became the only vessel out of which divine revelation could be drawn. By the time of Charlemagne, it had joined Greek and Hebrew as a holy language out of which translation could be made.
+
+Monks in the ninth century began to fashion _theotisc_ into a vessel into which they would dare to pour the content of Latin scripture. To enable translations to be made from the now holy Latin language, in Murbach and on the island of Reichenau, the shaping of the German language became an object of scholarly attention. Within less than a generation, these monks had fashioned a German vocabulary that bore comparison with that of Latin, in order to translate their Benedictine Rule. Glossaries were composed in order to find verbalcounterparts for "the last filtration of Latin thought and literary discipline." Through considered new coinings, through precise definition of new fields of meaning, through loan syntax or paronymous new coinings, something entirely new came into being: From German tongues there crystallized a German language that could be regarded as an equivalent of Latin.
+
+From the middle of the ninth century, a single document written in the Romance language has come down to us, and it happens to be an oath. This Romance text is included in a chronicle written by Nithard in what for the period is unusually good Latin. Nithard, who succeeded his father as Abbot of St. Riquier, was a grandson of Charlemagne through his mother Berta. He served another grandson of Charlemagne, Charles the Bald. He wrote his chronicle at the age of nineteen--two years before his death in battle in 844. In lively terms he describes things that he himself experienced. He complains about the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and that particular year's poor weather. We know from his chronicle that in 841 Charles the Bald and Louis the German conspired against their brother Lothar. Nithard wrote down the oaths of both the rulers and their men by which this conspiracy was effected. Each ruler took an oath on behalf of himself and his men in the other's language.
+
+Both vernacular oaths were based on an ingenious Latin original that may possibly have been drawn up by Nithard for his master and cousin, but that has not survived. These two versions, known as the Strasbourg Oaths, played crucial though very different roles in the history of the French and German languages.
+
+The text in _romana lingua_ is the earliest alphabetic representationof colloquial speech in France. For something like a thousand years a dialect had been spoken in France that lent itself perfectly to notation in Latin characters but was never written.
+
+The "vulgar" living speech of tradesmen, craftsmen, women, and public officials that survived in France for thirty generations is unknown to us. Like Latin, it had come from Italy, but it took root earlier and remained far longer than Latin. However, as in Lombardy and on the Iberian Peninsula, it was neither distinguished from Latin as a separate "language," nor was it ever written down.
+
+Precise analysis of the Romance text of the Strasbourg Oaths shows beyond any doubt that Nithard's text is not a transcription of a spoken language. It constitutes an attempt to take a carefully worked-out formula, written and conceived in Latin, and to adapt it phonetically and syntactically to the Alsatian mode of expression. The text is a remarkable example of an already developed juridical terminology in learned and complex syntax, with a stilted technical vocabulary, that corresponds exactly to the Latin oaths of Carolingian princes that have come down to us. The conspiracy of the Carolingian princes here became an opportunity to have an army solemnly repeat a text that had been read aloud to them in a facsimile of their own dialect.
+
+The dialect was not a "Latin" dialect. Even by the time of the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 A.D., the Romans were no longer speaking the way Latin was spelled. The volcanic ash preserved graffiti that people had daubed on the walls of their houses. The word structure of these uneducated scrawls shows signs of shifts that, up until recently, philologists assumed took place a thousand years later. In words ending with _m_, for instance, the final _m_ is often dropped. Probably the _m_ was either not pronounced at all or was fused with the preceding vowel to form a nasal--as occurs in present-day Portuguese. Many researchers believe that this gap between language as it was spoken and language as it was spelled was by no means confined to the poorer classes. The Classical poetry of the period takes on a fresh charm when the _m_ is swallowed--as in Brazilian. And, in 841--seven hundred years after Vesuvius--the Romance spoken in Gaul, like that spoken in Iberia, had moved much farther away from Latin word structure. What was read approximated the local form of _lingua romana_. For the reader, word structure was determined by grammar, and pronunciation by the landscape. In many places, Latin pronunciation was probably as far removed from orthography as is modern English.
+
+Among the aims of the Carolingian reform had been to have Latin read--and consequently also spoken--in a uniform manner throughout the empire. Charlemagne wished to match the existing unity of spelling with a unity of sound. Such an objective would today tend to be regarded as a call for mutual understanding. But such a change was certainly not necessary for mutual understanding at the time. Every monk learned the Latin pronunciation of his own monastery. If he walked from Subiaco to Fulda, his feet bore him no faster than his ear was able to adjust itself to new pronunciations, just as today's Indian pilgrim still finds his ear adjusting to the landscape with every step he takes. Moreover, despite big differences in accents--today we should say languages--people's readiness to listen and to understand is far greater in a traditional society than present-day schoolteachers imagine. For more than a thousand years, in some sense, Latin lived.
+
+Charlemagne and his circle of educated monks--Peter the Grammarian, from whom the adult emperor would have liked to learn to write; Paulinus, whose hymns are today still sung in the chancel office; Paul the Deacon, the court historian; the Spaniard, West-Goth Theodolf, wit and art expert; the layman Einhard, Charlemagne's biographer--all of these men together had no less an aim than to mold all the peoples of the empire into a univocal congregation. Sovereignty was interpreted as a gift from God in the service of the Church. Visible unification and standardization of all spheres of life had a symbolic rather than a practical purpose: to correct ingrained habits according to the original text. Mythical "ur-texts" were sought for the Latin Bible, for canon law, for the liturgy, and for monastic life. The plan to standardize Latin pronunciation needs to be seen in the same context, that is to say, as a theologically motivated attempt to create a symbolically effective, uniform, imperial, dead "language"--not to improve a "means of communication."
+
+On the Continent, no one would have carried out such a plan. The idea that a uniform written language demanded a uniform pronunciation contradicted a basic belief of the Church. The Book of Revelation was one, and had to be understood by all people, each in his own tongue; in the daily performance of this feat, the miracle of Pentecost was constantly repeated. This "miracle" could be performed everywhere in England except in those areas where Romance had never been used as the vernacular, which made it possible for the "correct" pronunciation of written Latin to become a research subject in the eighth century. The Venerable Bede wrote a treatise on orthography. Alcuin the Scot--born in the year of Bede's death (736) and raised among his pupils--was summoned to Charlemagne's court as schoolmaster and placed in charge of the school in Tours. He came from a tradition in which Classical education was rooted, not in the continuity of the _lingua romana_, but in the continuity that stemmed from the systematic adoption of Latin in the monastery and in the liturgy.
+
+Charlemagne relied on Alcuin to unify the pronunciation of Latin. Unlike his Continental brothers, when Alcuin read a text, he pronounced it as a dead language. He trained his pupils to read Latin the way he had learned to read it in York, with each letter being given its correct value--that is to say, pronounced with the same sound each time. This concern for uniform pronunciation was even reflected in the contractions that appeared in the new, standard Carolingian handwriting. Repeatedly, only that part of a word is written that the Franks would otherwise have stressed insufficiently or swallowed altogether. Forty years before the Strasbourg Oaths, then, Alcuin's school was deliberately trying to make the "reading" of Latin incomprehensible to the vernacular ear. Only in this context can one understand how it could have occurred to Nithard to write _lingua romana_ phonetically.
+
+Alcuin's phonetic reform was meant to breathe new life into Latin. The immediate consequence, however, was that Latin became incomprehensible to the listener when read aloud. The Carolingian _renovatio_ constituted an obstacle to the Church's preaching. A year before Charlemagne's death the Church's rejection of his unhistorical concept of correct pronunciation found expression at the Council of Tours--the very town in which Alcuin had taught only a few years before. It forbade priests to use the new way of reading during services. The Council enjoins the celebrant to read from this book written in Latin, but to strive in the process to speak in the Romance or _theotisc_ vernacular. Priests in the province of Tours were to continue doing what they had always done without criticism. On the basis of the Latin texts, they were to read out what their congregations could understand.
+
+The argument between advocates of a revived Latin and the Church's priests hinged on the interpretation of what kind of activity "reading" should be--should it be the spelling out of the letters that correspond to the sounds of a long-dead language, or should it be the transformation of the lines into their own living speech? With this canon, the Council of Tours was reacting against putting a lower limit on standard literary language. Alcuin's idea of Latin implied one formal set of phonetics for the entire Empire. That new phonetics posed a threat to the function of Latin writing, which was to serve all peoples (_gentes_).
+
+"Easdem omelias quisque aperte transferre studeat in rusticam romanam linguam aut theotiscam, quo facilius possint intellegere quae dicuntur," proclaimed the bishops assembled at Tours. The council wished to hold the door open for congregations to understand the text (_quo facilius possint intellegere_). It therefore required the reader to take pains (_studeat_) to pronounce what he was reading (_quae dicuntur_) in such a way that the collection of Latin texts (_omeliae_) intended to help elucidate the scriptures came across in a manner people could understand (_aperte transferre_ ... _in rusticam linguam_), no matter if that "language" in which the Latin text is read out of is German or French. The emphasis here is on the _rusticam_: The reader was to do his reading in a vernacular, rustic manner. Two such tongues (_linguae_) are mentioned: _romana_ and _theotisca_. Thus, by changing pronunciation (tongue), one could change the Latin, read aloud, into German or French.
+
+Contemporary usage suggests an opposition between German and French because we think in terms of "languages" as self-contained systems of communication that may be compared one with another, but only in the context of their separateness. Neither this modern notion of a neatly defined language, nor that of equivalent language can be projected into a ninth-century text. The _aut_ between _romana_ and _theotisca_ has much more to do with a polarity than with an either/or sense of exclusion. In the same way as the Council opposed the cultivation of a contradiction between the reading aloud of Latin and a generally comprehensible manner of speaking, this canon is talking, not about a translation process, but about a reading process. Reading aloud comprehensibly--however the book is written--is something different from translating Latin into Old French or Old High German.
+
+This can be elucidated by considering the word _theotisc_. It was not until shortly before 800 that this word started to become remolded from "popular" to "of German origin," and _theotisca lingua_ from "people's speech" to "Germanic." The efforts of the monks at Reichenau, Fulda, and in Alsace to create the rudiments of a German language gave rise to the idea that _theotisc_ was a language distinct from Latin, potentially equivalent to but heterogenous from it, out of and into which it was possible to translate. However, this idea had not yet won general acceptance. And vernacular languages were still far from being the separate and distinct cages in which we today think we are locked.
+
+Up until the time of the earliest vernacular grammars--in other words, up until the late fifteenth century--_lingua_ or _tongue_ or _habla_ was less like one drawer in a bureau than one color in a spectrum. The comprehensibility of speech was comparable to the intensity of a color. Just as one color may appear with greater or lesser intensity, may bleed into its neighbor, just as landscapes merge into one another, so it is with the Council's _aut_ in relation to _romanam_ and _theotiscam_. Latin stands in contrast to both "tongues" because it is an orthographic "language." But so long as there was no compulsion to read aloud in an orthophonetic manner, the reader was free to paint the meaning of what he was reading in any color of the rainbow. And it was on this Christian tradition of a logogrammatical reading of a text written in phonetic notation that the canons of Tours insisted.
+
+By determining the nature of reading in this way, Christianity dissociated itself from the temple at an early stage. As reported by a first-century Jewish source--the Megillah Teanith (The Fasting Scroll)--three days of darkness came over the earth on the day the seventy wise Jews completed their Greek translation of the Torah, the Septuagint. Even today the Koran may not be translated from the Arabic. Christian preaching consists precisely of the fact that every foreigner in Jerusalem was able to hear the Hebrew message in his own native language. Public, vocal meditation during reading is of the essence to the Christian message. The modulation on each syllable that characterizes Gregorian plainchant and the vernacular annunciation of the Gospel are the two extreme forms. Without an appreciation for Mnemosyne it is impossible either to understand the Christian concepts of devout reading, or to grasp what it means that God became the Word that unfolds in Scripture. In the context of these multiple forms of reading, the doctrine of the four-fold interpretation of the sacred text reached its height.
+
+According to the evidence of the Strasbourg Oaths, however, ideogrammatical reading since the ninth century effected precisely the opposite result. The text that Nithard has preserved does not render what anyone had actually said. The work of a wily chaplain, this cunningly devised chunk of speech became the language in which the chancellory took possession of ancient forms of oath. Alliteration and strong words make the army pay due heed to an unaccustomed vow. Every fighting man was to repeat those sentences after a verbatim recital by a cleric. The sentence structure and phraseology of the Romance version show clearly that this intrusion of stilted Latin formulae into the Romance vernacular was not new in Nithard's day; some set forms of its wording give the impression of having been already polished by chancery use. The oaths provide an example of the manner in which letters can shape people, not only before anyone can trace or decipher them, but before a single song or statement has been written in that people's vernacular. The oath is just one of several ways in which the unwritten literature of popular culture was learned by heart. The memorization of prayers was probably much more effective. Even in the thirteenth century, confession still served as a means for the clergy to see if individuals knew the Pater and the Creed by heart.
+
+The medieval clergy's habit of taking depositions in the vernacular and writing them down in Latin, and reading Latin oaths, creeds, and statements by formulating them in vernacular utterances that the people had to repeat, throws light on why epic poetry so rarely came to be written down as it was sung. Unlike the Greek scribe who wrote down what he heard "Homer" sing, the Roman cleric wrote down in Latin what he had understood. And when, on occasion, he wrote it down in the vernacular, the literate scribe was trained to "improve" the version as he wrote it down.
+
+
+Another landmark in the history of language occurred on August 18, 1492--just fifteen days after Columbus had set sail--when a Spaniard named Elio Antonio de Nebrija published the first grammar in any modern European language, the _Gramática Castellana_, which attempted to reduce a vernacular tongue to rules of grammar. Nebrija goes beyond the Carolingian scribe, who listened to Frankish depositions and wrote them down in Latin. He demands that Spanish be made into a language that is not spoken, but that serves to record speech.
+
+The six-page introduction to the _Gramática_ presents a concise and powerful argument why the new age, dawning when Columbus departed, called for the replacement of the vernacular speech of the people by a language--an "artifact"--that all people must henceforth be taught. At this time the Spanish monarchs were engaged in transforming the idea of government. They replaced the old aristocratic advisory bodies by organizations of well-lettered officials. Just recently, and only for a few years, the Crown had seized the Inquisition from the Church, thereby acquiring the power needed to dislodge the sword-carrying nobility who were to be replaced by men of the pen. The conception of government as the machinery that guarantees the execution of the monarch's utterance was now reshaped into one that prepares texts for his signature. The state governed by the management of texts--that is, the modern bureaucratic state--was taking shape. And, under the Hapsburgs, in the late sixteenth century, the transformation became ritually visible. "Ministeriales," high-level scribes, were assigned ritual roles in the court ceremonial of processions and liturgies, often outranking the men of the sword. Nebrija addresses this new secular balance between _armas y letras_. He argues with the queen for a new pact between sword and book and proposes a covenant between two spheres--both within the secular realm of the Crown--a covenant distinct from the medieval pact between Emperor and Pope, which had been a covenant bridging the secular and the sacred.
+
+Very astutely, Nebrija reminds the queen that a new union of _armas y letras_, complementary to that of Church and State, was essential for gathering and joining the scattered pieces of Spain into a single absolute kingdom:
+
+> This unified and sovereign body will be of such shape and inner cohesion that centuries will be unable to undo it. Now that the Church has been purified, and we are thus reconciled to God, now that the enemies of the Faith have been subdued by our arms, now that just laws are being enforced, enabling us all to live as equals, what else remains but the flowering of the peaceful arts. And among the arts, foremost are those of language, which sets us apart from the wild animals; language, which is the unique distinction of man, the means for the kind of understanding which can be surpassed only by contemplation.
+
+Continuing to develop his petition, Nebrija introduces the crucial element of his argument: _La lengua suelta y fuera de regla_--the unbound and ungoverned speech in which people actually live and manage their lives has become a challenge to the Crown. Nebrija thus interprets an unproblematic historical fact as a problem for the architects of a new kind of polity--the modern state:
+
+> Your majesty, it has been my constant desire to see our nation become great, and to provide the men of my tongue with books worthy of their leisure. Presently, they waste their time on novels and fancy stories full of lies.
+
+An argument for standardized language is also made today, but the end is now different. Our contemporaries believe that standardized language is a necessary condition to teach people to read, indispensable for the distribution of printed books. Nebrija argues just the opposite: He was upset because people who spoke in dozens of distinct vernacular tongues in 1492 had become the victims of a reading epidemic. They wasted their leisure on books that circulated outside of any possible bureaucratic control. Manuscripts had been so rare and precious that authorities could often suppress the work of an author by literally seizing _all_ the copies, burning them and extirpating the text. Not so books. Even with the small edition of two hundred to a thousand copies--typical for the first generation of print--it was never possible to confiscate an entire run. Printed books called for the exercise of censorship through an _Index of Forbidden Books_. Books could only be proscribed, not destroyed. But Nebrija's proposal appeared more than fifty years before the first _Index_ was published in 1599. And he wished to achieve control over the printed word on a much deeper level than that later attempted by the Church. He wanted to replace the people's vernacular with the grammarian's language. The humanist proposes the standardization of colloquial language to remove the new technology of printing from the vernacular domain--to prevent people from printing and reading in the various languages that, up to that time, they had only spoken. By this monopoly over an official and taught language, he proposes to suppress wild, untaught vernacular reading.
+
+To grasp the full significance of Nebrija's argument--that compulsory education in a standardized national mother tongue is necessary to prevent people from wanton, pleasureful reading--one must remember the status of print at that time. Nebrija was born before the appearance of moveable type. He was thirteen when the first moveable stock came into use. His conscious adult life coincides with the incunabula. When printing was in its twenty-fifth year, he published his Latin grammar; in its thirty-fifth, he published his Spanish grammar. Nebrija could recall the time before print--as many of us can recall the time before television. Nebrija's text was by coincidence published the year William Caxton died.
+
+The last paragraph of Nebrija's introduction exudes eloquence. Evidently, the teacher of rhetoric knew what he taught. Nebrija has explained his project; given the queen logical reasons to accept it; frightened her with what would happen if she were not to heed him. Finally, like Columbus, he appeals to her sense of a manifest destiny:
+
+> Now, Your Majesty, let me come to the last advantage that you shall gain from my grammar. For the purpose, recall the time when I presented you with a draft of this book earlier this year in Salamanca. At this time, you asked me what end such a grammar could possibly serve. Upon this, the Bishop of Avila interrupted to answer in my stead. What he said was this: "Soon Your Majesty will have placed her yoke upon many barbarians who speak outlandish tongues. By this, your victory, these people shall stand in a new need; the need for the laws the victor owes to the vanquished, and the need for the language we shall bring with us." My grammar shall serve to impart them the Castilian tongue, as we have used grammar to teach Latin to our young.
+
+We can attempt a reconstruction of what happened at Salamanca when Nebrija handed the queen a draft of his forthcoming book. The queen praised the humanist for having provided the Castilian tongue with what had been reserved to the languages of Scripture, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. But while Isabella was able to grasp the achievement of her _letrado_--the description of a living tongue as rules of grammar--she was unable to see any practical use for such an undertaking. For her, grammar was an instrument designed solely for use by teachers. She believed, moreover, that the vernacular simply could not be taught. In her royal view of linguistics, every subject of her many kingdoms was so made by nature that during his lifetime he would reach perfect dominion over his own tongue _on his own_. In this version of "majestic linguistics" the vernacular is the _subject's_ domain. By the very nature of things, the vernacular is beyond the reach of the ruler's authority.
+
+Isabella's initial rejection of Nebrija's proposal underscores its originality. Nebrija argued against a traditional and typically Iberian prejudice of Isabella--the notion that the Crown cannot encroach on the variety of customs in the kingdoms--and called up the image of a new, universal mission for a _modern_ Crown. Nebrija overcame Isabella's prejudices by promising to serve her mystical mission. First, he argued that the vernacular must be replaced by an _artificio_ to give the monarch's power increased range and duration; then, to cultivate the arts by decision of the court; also to guard the established order against the threat presented by wanton reading and printing. But he concluded his petition with an appeal to the "Grace of Granada," the queen's destiny, not just to conquer, but to civilize the entire world.
+
+Both Columbus and Nebrija offered their services to a new kind of empire builder. But Columbus proposed only to use the recently created caravels to the limit of their range for the expansion of royal power in what would become New Spain. Nebrija's appeal was more basic--he argued the use of his grammar for the expansion of the Queen's power in a totally new sphere that he proposed to create through the act of conquest itself. He intended the creation of the sphere of a taught mother tongue--the first invented part of universal education.
+
+Columbus was to open the way to the New World; Nebrija devised a way to control Spanish subjects by providing a way to standardize their language.
+
+
+# The Self
+
+_The practical concern in the thirteenth century with the_ identity _of two charters and the spiritual concern with the_ individuality _of each person reflect the new ability to distinguish what is in the book and what is on the page. The word_ individual _itself comes from Antiq uity . In Porphyry's_ Commentaries _on Aristotelian categories, the word carries the meaning of " unambiguousness"; it has a deictic or demonstrative character. It means an ultimately indivisible_ (a-tomos) _something, the subject of which something is predicated--for example, Socrates, to whom we can point as the "bearded, garrulous, son of so-and-so." In this sense,_ in-dividuum _(Cicero's translation of_ a-tomos) _was carried over the bridge of Isidore of Seville's_ Etymologiae _into the Middle Ages. Abelard used the word in the same deictic sense. Albert the Great took the "individual" beyond Classical Antiquity when he grasped the difference between the_ individuum vaguum _and the_ individuum certum, _the frog whose croaking woke him up last night, as opposed to this particular croaker that I catch and am able to skewer_.
+
+The self is as much an alphabetic construct as word and memory, thought and history, lie and narration. Narration and the self in the twentieth century have become as inseparable as the epos and its singer in oral times: The writer spins the story as part of his self. The twentieth-century citizen sees himself through the eyes of various sciences as a layer cake of texts. From the eighteenth century on, the state has become a corporation of selves that letters examine.
+
+No language can get by without a first person singular, which in some languages is demonstrative--for example, the Hebrew _ani_ that acts like a finger turned backwards--and in other languages sets the speaker off from the rest. But, unlike the "I," most epochs got along without a self. There was no self in epic times. According to Bruno Snell, there was not even a body: heroes refer to their arm or their "thymos," but do not contextualize these into the kind of body we now have. In oral cultures, one may retain an imge of what has been--yesterday, at the time of the full moon, or last spring, but the person then or now exists only in the doing or the telling, as the suffix comes to life only when it modifies a verb. Like a candle, the "I" lights up only in the activity and is extinguished at other times. But not dead. With the retelling of the story, the candle comes to glow again. No pilot light gives continuity to the first person singular between one story and the next. The "I" can exist only in the act of speaking out loud--or to oneself.
+
+The idea of a self that continues to glimmer in thought or memory, occasionally retrieved and examined in the light of day, cannot exist without the text. Where there is no alphabet, there can neither be a memory conceived as a storehouse nor the "I" as its appointed watchman. With the alphabet both text and self became possible, but only slowly, and they became the social construct on which we found all our perceptions as literate people.
+
+Writing the history of the self is as difficult as writing the history of the text. The self is a cloth we have been weaving over centuries in confessions, journals, diaries, memories, and in its most literate incarnation, the autobiography, to tailor the dress in which we see our first person singular. _Beowulf_ dates from the life of Bede (671–735), the time that the Christian alphabet came to England; its hero, Beowulf, has nothing of what we moderns call "self." But by the fourteenth century it is clear that to the two books delineated by someone like St. Bonaventure--the Book of Creation and the Scriptures--has been added a third: the Book of the Self. Hugh of St. Cher refers to the Book of the Heart, which, at the end of time, Hugh declares, Christ will open to reveal all "things secret." Alanus de Insulis calls man's conscience a book hiding things of the soul. These secrets too will be revealed on the Day of Judgement. And in the next several centuries, the self becomes an established literary phenomenon that can be read in popular accounts such as Benvenuto Cellini's supposed autobiography, Rousseau's _Confessions_, and the interminable memoirs of Casanova. At virtually the same moment that James Boswell is lionizing his friend Samuel Johnson, through the biography, Benjamin Franklin is doing the same thing for himself, in his autobiography--though he uses the old term, _memoir_. It is also in America that the newly constituted self quietly reaches its crisis, with Henry Adams.
+
+We cannot conceive facing each other except as selves. The image of the self that we have inherited seems to us fundamental for western culture. But we notice that some of our students are bred on electronic text composers. "Text" means something entirely different for them than it does for us. And thus we sense its extreme fragility at this moment. We fear that the image of the self made in the image of the text could fade from society, together with the self-destruction of the text. Retracing the sociogenesis of our perception, we want to point to its historical nature.
+
+
+In three thousand lines, _Beowulf_ describes the wondrous adventures of Beowulf, whose patronymic translates as Bee-Wolf, or simply Bear. Like a bear, Beowulf swims vigorously, runs swiftly, and fights fiercely. He possesses the strength of thirty men in his right hand. A mighty animal is his model; though he is quasi-human, the hero is not inarticulate. Indeed, he is adept at reconstructing his genealogical roots: he does so in over fifty lines of well-shaped verse. With deftness he tells the story of his prodigious three-day swimming contest with Breca. The same story about the contest with Breca is told by Unferth completely differently. What to us looks like a contradiction in the two stories never becomes a "problem" for Beowulf and is never "resolved." Unferth's diverging story merely shows Beowulf in another light. Beowulf knows no hesitation, he cannot lie, but neither can he take inventory of his life. He seems incapable of remembering. He suffers no pangs of conscience, no regrets. Larger than life, he is also far removed from it.
+
+However, during the last hours of _Beowulf_ on the third and final day of his struggle with the dragon, a kink occurs in the story; for eight and one-half lines there is talk of a kind of shame or guilt or causality--what we would not know how to call anything but "conscience." Less than one hundred lines from the end of the poem a young warrior, named Wiglaf, the sole survivor of an ancient tribe called the Waegmundings, sounds this new and discordant note. He chides his comrades for not aiding their king, who has kept them secure for so many years, in his own time of need in this fatal fight with the dragon.
+
+The death of Beowulf signals more than the simple end of a ruler; it marks the passing away of the heroic way of life and the spirit of _comitatus_ (community) that holds that life together. Young Wiglaf represents the new order in the poem. Perhaps Wiglaf is a Christian interpolation by some monastic scribe, but nonetheless his voice is a new one in English. He wants those cowardly old men to feel bad, and he wants them to carry that feeling around with them. So he scolds:
+
+
+```
+                                Wergendra tō lȳt
+        þrong ymbe þēoden,      þā hyne sīo þrāg becwōm.
+        Nū sceal sinc-þego      ond swyrd-gifu,
+        eall ēð el-wyn      ēowrum cynne,
+        lufen ālicgean;      lond-rihtes mōt
+        þǣre mǣg-burge      monna ǣghwylc
+        īdel hweorfan,      syððan ǣðelingas
+        feorran gefricgean      flēam ēowerne,
+        dōm-lēasan dǣd.      Dēað bið sēlla
+        eorla gehwylcum      þonne edwīt-līf.
+
+                                (Too few defenders
+        pressed round the king      when his worst time came.
+        Now all treasure,      giving and receiving,
+        all home-joys,      ownership, comfort,
+        shall cease for your kin;      deprived of their rights
+        each man of your families      will have to be exiled,
+        once nobles afar      hear of your flight,
+        a deed of no glory.      Death is better
+        for any warrior      than a shameful life!)
+```
+
+-----
+
+
+|                                Wergendra tō lȳt
+
+|        þrong ymbe þēoden,       þā hyne sīo þrāg becwōm.
+
+|        Nū sceal sinc-þego       ond swyrd-gifu,
+
+|        eall ēð el-wyn       ēowrum cynne,
+
+|        lufen ālicgean;       lond-rihtes mōt
+
+|        þǣre mǣg-burge       monna ǣghwylc
+
+|        īdel hweorfan,       syððan ǣðelingas
+
+|        feorran gefricgean       flēam ēowerne,
+
+|        dōm-lēasan dǣd.       Dēað bið sēlla
+
+|        eorla gehwylcum       þonne edwīt-līf.
+
+|  
+
+|                                   (Too few defenders
+
+|        pressed round the king      when his worst time came.
+
+|        Now all treasure,      giving and receiving,
+
+|        all home-joys,      ownership, comfort,
+
+|        shall cease for your kin;      deprived of their rights
+
+|        each man of your families      will have to be exiled,
+
+|        once nobles afar      hear of your flight,
+
+|        a deed of no glory.      Death is better
+
+|        for any warrior      than a shameful life!)
+
+|  
+
+
+Embarrassed and ashamed--and still too frightened to fight--they do the only thing left to them: skulk off to the woods.
+
+But Wiglaf will not allow the Waegmundings to forget their betrayal. He wants those warriors to be stuck with their guilt or their shame--or both. Wiglaf implies that each of those men possesses something like a self whose voice is his conscience. He sends a messenger to court to foretell the horror of the feuds that will be caused by their cowardly inaction. For the first and only time in the entire poem, past action is presented as the cause of future grief. Wiglaf interprets the history of feuding tribes as the result of the guilt of forebears.
+
+Beowulf is then set on a barge, along with all his treasures. Set afire, the barge drifts off to some unknown destination. Women bewail a past epoch and keen over the king. The future looms in grim detail. Wiglaf has erased the present. Warriors are helpless to undo the past while they prepare for what is to come. For the present they can only lament and hide.
+
+
+James Cox, a literary critic concerned with autobiography, argues convincingly that autobiography is not only an American invention, but one that flourishes, as nowhere else, in America. Franklin, the Ur-American portrait of success--founder of a university, a hospital, a library, a philosophical society, the postal system; inventor of the stove, the smokeless street lamp, bifocals, electrical conduction, and the glass harmonica, among other things--"at the age of sixty-five embarked upon what one wants to call his great invention--the invention of himself, not as a fiction, but as a fact and in history." Thus, in Franklin we are not reading some fictional character like Lancelot, or some product of romantic longing like Casanova, but a fictional fact.
+
+In the _Confessions_, Augustine realizes that hubris must inevitably end in failure; he must, therefore, eschew the things of this world. But autobiography is born out of hubris, it requires that the self be woven into the very design of material society. In Franklin's case, his autobiography grows out of the hubris of America's emerging power--its myths and ideals--a power that actually thrives on mistakes. One merely seizes upon them, as Franklin makes clear, and turns them into substantial financial success. Autobiography amplifies that power: Since a person is literally creating a new being, he can smooth out the rough transitions in his life, clean up the mistakes, to produce a polished and attractive literary self. The writer presents his life as he thinks it should have been. Thus, every autobiography is in some ways a declaration of independence, as the writer bids farewell to his baggy historical self, embracing a new, tidy, authorized, and public one. It marks an act of willful liberation. No wonder, then, the number of powerful American black autobiographies, such as the _Narrative of Frederick Douglass, The Autobiography of Malcolm X_, the story of George Washington Carver, and the _Confessions of Nat Turner_. How fitting that Franklin, so concerned with autobiography, should have been one of the framers of the Declaration of Independence. He was also President of the Executive Council of Pennsylvania, as well as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. And in his _Autobiography_ Franklin continually measures himself against that singularly American founding document, the constitution.
+
+_Constitution_ is a word that had been in use for only a hundred or a hundred and fifty years by 1771, the year Franklin began writing his memoirs, to mean the composition of some body or some thing; and Franklin borrows the idea to help enact the "constitution of his own self." This self should not be seen as a mere literary fabrication, Franklin implies, but in some substantive way "constituted" out of the homely virtues of honesty, sobriety, moderation, frugality, and perseverance. A self so constituted knows no limits to its accomplishments: Like everyone else, Franklin pursued life, liberty, and happiness and he shows that hard work pays off in enormous success.
+
+Franklin's _Autobiography_ charts his climb from raggedy beginnings, in the guise of the frugal and industrious Poor Richard (Saunders), through an encyclopedic and disparate series of selves, to the birth of that star, the Great Doctor Franklin. While the _Autobiography_ breaks off its narration in 1757, the moment that Franklin's career really takes off, John Adams points out that when Franklin began writing the _Autobiography_ he was already an international celebrity: "There was scarcely a citizen who was not familiar with his name and who did not consider him a friend to human kind."
+
+Poor Richard, it turns out, is rich in wisdom, which he expresses in pithy sayings and maxims. Franklin sprinkles them throughout the _Autobiography:_ A penny saved is a tuppence clear; God helps those who help themselves; A word to the wise is enough. Collected and sold in little pamphlets, Richard's advice became a commodity easily dispensed and digested, a constant reminder of the importance of practical application. Those apothegms helped to mask the real-life Franklin, a sometimes untidy, spendthrift man, at loose ends with his own finances. But more than that, Richard Saunders sired Ben Franklin, a _brand_-new self--we still refer to _Franklin_ stoves, _Franklin_ glasses, _Franklin_ lightning rods. (Franklin patented none of his inventions, saying that "as we enjoy great advantage from the inventions of others, we should be glad of an opportunity to serve others by any invention of ours." Curiously enough, American patent law derives from a provision in the Constitution empowering Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing ... to inventors the exclusive right to their ... discoveries.") A public self like Franklin's is essential for the full-time pursuit of success. The question may be: How long can the pursuit be sustained?
+
+The answer is delivered in the next century, with _The Ed ucation of Henry Adams_, considered by most historians to be the first autobiography, one in which we can actually experience a self crystallizing around the act of writing. We see the struggles and the mistakes; we are present at the moment of crisis. Franklin writes from a position of solid success; he's already made it, and from this position of assuredness glances over his shoulder to document its history. Adams writes out of failure.
+
+_The Education of Henry Adams_ involves a dialogue between the failed Adams, who hopes to learn from his mistakes, and some other Adams. To make this clear, Adams adopts a curious literary stance: _The Education_ is the life of Henry Adams told by Henry Adams, but narrated in the third person. We are thus made to experience two Adamses: the previous one--actually Adams as a young man--and the new Adams--the writer as an older man. Not only are there two Adamses, however, but more curiously, the young Adams, the literary creation being remembered, or recollected, takes on its own life and begins to educate the new Adams.
+
+Here is a truly extraordinary development: The literary creation of the self has assumed enough life of its own to instruct and educate its creator. This third-person golem must be disposed of, dealt with, or, ideally, incorporated back into the first person. The young Adams in fact controls the situation so strongly that he turns the old Adams, the writer, into a ghostly fictional character. Adams must figure out how to take back his life. So these two selves travel the entire meandering path of the book as master/pupil; they stand together at the moment of crisis in Paris on April 15, 1900, at the largest exhibition ever held in Europe, the Great Exposition.
+
+Ben Franklin ransacked his soul to uncover there the multifarious parts of his soul--artist, printer, inventor, educator, designer, statesman, scientist, and so on. Some powerful invisible force drove Franklin toward success. At the Great Exposition, Adams saw that force updated and made concrete in one grand contraption: the forty-foot-high dynamos displayed in the Gallery of Machines.
+
+For Adams, the Virgin represented the great religious symbol of the twelfth century; for the twentieth century, that symbol was the dynamo. Both stand as "revelations of a mysterious energy like that of the Cross; they were what in terms of medieval science were called immediate modes of the divine substance," symbols of a continuing divine force that has driven the history of man. Just like the Virgin, the dynamo was capable of attracting untold numbers of followers. Puzzling over the connection between these two disparate centuries, Adams begins to perceive the possibilities of education anew; indeed, a hazardous one: "The knife-edge along which he must crawl, like Sir Lancelot in the twelfth century, divided two kingdoms of force which had nothing in common but attraction."
+
+The new Adams learns from the old Adams that the great invisible force of the twentieth century--producing electricity, X rays, and radium--has been around forever, just like the force of Christianity. At times, this force becomes visible. The Virgin represented a form of faith still felt at Lourdes, at the Louvre, and at Chartres. There, as he knew by the record of work he still could see, existed "the highest energy ever known to man, the creator of four-fifths of his noblest art, exercising vastly more attraction over the human mind than all the steam-engines and dynamos ever dreamed of; and yet this energy was unknown to the American mind. An American virgin would never dare command; an American Venus would never dare exist." Through the dynamo, Adams reckons, the American mind would finally be able to grasp the immensity of a divine force. America tottered on the verge of momentous change, which Adams, in his excitement, can only equate with other revolutionary moments: "Copernicus and Galileo had broken many professional necks about 1600; Columbus had stood the world on its head towards 1500; but the nearest approach to the revolution of 1900 was that of 310, when Constantine set up the Cross."
+
+In yet another reversal in _The Education_, Adams understands as he actually stands under this dynamo the great lesson of his education: he is a failure. Not that Adams was not born of the proper Brahman, New England stock, not that he had failed to attend the correct schools, or that he had not created elegant and influential works of literature, like the wonderfully seductive _Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres_, but that he had failed in the invisible world of the spirit.
+
+Ironically, Adams had created his self with so much clarity and precision--the young Adams had been too much of a literary success--that his current state of failure becomes painfully clear to him. Adams has interpreted the self, analyzed it, and what he finds the literary self telling him is the opposite of what it seems to say. After more than fifty years of study, he was still an ignoramus. The modern way of describing this is to say that Adams psychoanalyzes his soul to determine what it feels or what it means. After all, the therapeutic experience is essentially a literary one: A person is expected to think, reconstruct, maneuver--narrate with shape and interest--his old self to a listening doctor/auditor. A rich imagination is as useful as a sharp memory. Only when this old self is fully understood, in all its complexities and contradictions, the theory goes, can the patient be deemed healthy.
+
+Adams would have described Franklin's life as wrong-headed, for he desires an inner search, not an outward pursuit. Franklin fixed on success, from the Latin _succedere_--ascending, mounting. As a failure, Adams had plummeted--into himself. He realizes how he must climb back out, and he presents it in the most curious turn taken in _The Education_. He decides to trace the history of force and power from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the twentieth century. In the midst of writing his autobiography he tells us that he must take up writing! Not only has self spawned self, but text has given rise to another, inner text. If the self is a reflexive phenomenon, and its history can be unraveled in writing, then why not a reflexive text as well. These intricacies--self doubling back on self, text on text, first person talking as third--make it appear as if the Book of Kells had provided the pattern for Adams's autobiography. In Adams's words: "In such labyrinths, the staff is a force almost more necessary than the legs; the pen becomes a sort of blind-man's dog, to keep him from falling into the gutters. The pen works for itself, and acts like a hand, modelling the plastic materials over and over again to the form that suits it best. The form is never arbitrary, but is a sort of growth like crystallization, as any artist knows too well; for often the pencil or the pen runs into side-paths and shapelessness, loses its relations, stops or is bogged. Then it has to return on its trail, and recover, if it can, its line of force. The result of a year's work depends more on what is struck out than on what is left in; on the sequence of the main lines of thought, than on their play or variety."
+
+A chief obstacle to writing a modern autobiography is its ending. How can it end, really, reach its final conclusion, until the writer is dead? Franklin's _Autobiography_ breaks off in his fifty-first year; he dies before its completion. Adams solves the problem by killing off the young Adams, the instructor. Or, perhaps in a more accurate literary image, the two Adamses come together, both holding a single pen. So the end of _The Education_ is in some sense the birth of the Old Adams, complete with a new self.
+
+After incorporating the idea of force into his writing by developing what he calls the Dynamic Theory of History, he arrives at the last chapter, appropriately titled "Nunc Age," (Now Go). He is ready to reenter the world. But before he does, he pauses to realize that he had accomplished the goal he set for himself in the Preface (which Adams signs as Henry Cabot Lodge): to complete Augustine's _Confessions_. Self-satisfied, Adams no longer needs to talk to himself. He can finally confess, quoting Shakespeare but recalling Augustine, that "the rest is silence."
+
+
+# Untruth and Narration
+
+_Both literary and moral feigning depend on the author's ability to reshape (in Latin_ fingere, _whence "fiction") his own thoughts of untruth, which in the late Middle Ages is called narration. Only when I have gotten used to thinking as the silent tracing of words on the parchment of my memory, can I detach thought from speech and contra-dict it. A full-blown lie presupposes a self that thinks before it says what it has thought. Only when memory is perceived as a text can thought become a material to be shaped, reshaped, and transformed . Only a self that has thought what it does say, can say_something that it does not think. Neither such a thought as distinct from speech, nor such a thinking self as distinct from the speaker can exist without speech having been transmogrified and frozen into thought that is stored in the literate memory_.
+
+Like the Text, Untruth also has a history. The Old Testament knows of infidelity, broken promises, betrayals, and perjury. It knows of slander, false witness and, what is worse, false prophecy and the abominable service of false gods. Neither these detestable forms of deceit nor the skillful ruse of a patriarch imply that opposition to an abstract "truth" that is essential to what we today call a lie. Neither the Greek _psuedos_ (used both for the "liar" and the "lie") nor the Latin _mendacium_ (referring also to the emendation of a line on a wax tablet) in Classical times comes close to our idea of the untruthful. Both languages lack the words that could oppose the _Oxford English Dictionary's_ "false statement made with the intent to deceive" to a flight of fancy or feigning. The Classical languages barely contain the seed for the full-fledged Western lie and the full-blown Western fiction.
+
+The early Greeks took a sporting attitude toward duplicity. George Steiner presents an exchange between Athena and Odysseus as an example: "...mutual deception, the swift saying of 'things that are not,' need be neither evil nor a bare technical constraint. Gods and chosen mortals can be virtuosos of mendacity, contrivers of elaborate untruths for the sake of the verbal craft..." And "untruth" is always the telling of _things_ that are not, not of _thoughts_ that are contradicted! The patron of this cunning craft was Hermes, the trickster, the thief and the inventor of the lyre that urges the singer further into the epos. And the hero of that art is the shrewd and wily, generous and noble Odysseus, who according to Plato _(Hippias Minor)_ is powerful and prudent, knowing and wise in those things about which he is false.
+
+In the realm of orality one cannot dip twice into the same wave, and therefore the lie is a stranger. My word always travels alongside yours; I stand for my word, and I swear by it. My oath is my truth until well into the twelfth century: The oath puts an end to any case against a freeman. Only in the thirteenth century does Continental canon law make the judge into a reader of the accused man's conscience, an inquisitor into truth, and torture the means by which the confession of truth is extracted from the accused. Truth ceases to be displayed in surface action and is now perceived as the outward expression of inner meaning accessible only to the self.
+
+In the fifth century Augustine had created a concept that breaks with pagan and Christian antiquity by defining every lie as an assault on truth. Intellectual errors of fact are not a moral issue for him in his treatise _On the Lie_. Only the person who says something with the intent of misleading violates the truth. The offense lies in the _voluntas fallendi_: words used with the intent to contradict the truth that is enshrined in the speaker's heart. Even a statement that is factually correct can turn into an assault on truth if it is proffered with the intent to deceive. Augustine moved the lie into the neighborhood of blasphemy: an act of contempt of God as the only Creator and Author.
+
+For the next eight hundred years whatever truly exists is there because God has willed it to be. All things man can speak about issue from His creative Word or command. He has brought things into being because He wanted them to be and not because there is something in them that makes it necessary for them to exist. Adam is His "fiction." He molded, shaped, fashioned him out of the virgin soil of Paradise. The world is therefore _contingent_ on God's authorship. By every lie a creature usurps authorship reserved to the Creator. Even in the thirteenth century, a cleric who writes down stories has to state that he is not the story's actual source (_fons ejus_), but only its channel (_canalis_). Likewise, the person who had dictated the story to the scribe must state that he has not "sucked it from his finger" (_ex suo digito suxit_)--that is, has not _invented_ it. The dictator's disclaimer lays bare the connection between fiction and _fingere_.
+
+Augustine's ban on the arrogation of truth matured, during the Middle Ages, into the new duty to make truth manifest. In the many-tiered, God-willed order of the twelfth century, to be true in word and in deed came to be perceived as a moral debt. The late patristic prohibition against deceiving the listener was turned by the early Scholastics into the moral obligation to reveal the truth. Only against this background can it be understood what it means to say that the Age of European Literacy is the World of Fiction.
+
+As much as the full-fledged lie, _narratio_ presupposes an author and a text that is contingent on his self--his or her creation. Neither the epic bard, nor the later storyteller, nor even the highly literate poet are fully authors: They do not pretend to create a world that by the standards of the early Middle Ages would be untrue. Chaucer, Defoe, and Twain provide us with landmarks in the history of the author who weaves "lies" into the convincing untruth of fiction.
+
+
+Chaucer, in _The Canterbury Tales_ (1386), is the first English author who recognizes the emerging literate mindset of his courtly audience. Defoe, in the _Journal of the Plague Year_ (1772), takes into account that the mind of his middle-class readership has been shaped by journals and magazines, and writes the first English "novel." And Twain publishes the first great work of fiction from Democratic America, _The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn_, in 1885, just two years after the _New England Journal of Education_ had coined that curious Americanism, "literacy."
+
+Modern readers take for granted that _The Canterbury Tales_ is a standard book; after all, it is neatly printed and housed between solid boards. Moreover, its pages are filled with stories--eccentric characters involved in dramatic action. And that is, of course, exactly proper activity for books that are intended to be held in our hands and read to ourselves. But medievalists have been compiling convincing textual evidence since the mid thirties to prove that, while Chaucer's poem was written down by a number of scribes, it was in all likelihood delivered orally.
+
+
+Which means that Chaucer's audience was prepared to listen to a long poem, presumably something they had done many times before. The majority of them, in fact, could probably not have read the poem, even if they so desired. Strangely enough, however, the opening lines of _The Canterbury Tales_ demand a sophisticated literacy. Chaucer begins his poem with one of the most difficult syntactic forms for the listener to grasp, the subordinate clause, which requires the listener to hold the sense of the dependent clause steadily in mind, suspending the fulfillment of meaning that the independent clause promises to deliver. Chaucer compounds this highly literate construction--one that never appears in oral formulaic poetry--by beginning "The General Prologue" to _The Canterbury Tales_ with not one but two consecutive subordinate clauses: the first from lines one to four, the second from lines five through eleven. He holds back the independent clause, "Thanne longen folk to goon on pilgrimages"--and hence leaves dangling the meaning of the early part of the poem--until line twelve.
+
+By line twelve, however, Chaucer's audience would probably have forgotten what came before, or at best retained only a vague sense of it. His audience could only have felt uncomfortable, perhaps even irritated. To use a medieval designation, he has made them feel like _ignoramuses_. It is one thing to recite a poem using oral devices--formulaic constructions, repetitions--so that the audience can keep abreast and understand, but quite another to present the same information through highly literate techniques--in Chaucer's case, by using two sets of subordinate clauses and so forcing his audience to forget. By causing his audience to forget, however, Chaucer introduces one of the major concerns of the poem: the imposition of literacy upon an inherently oral activity--the composition and delivery of poetry.
+
+If forgetting enables Chaucer to turn his audience into auditor/readers--in a sense, they must envision the page as they hear it aloud--it enables him to turn from storyteller into writer. And so he also points to his own ability to forget. Chaucer the narrator begins by telling us what he remembers about some thirty-three pilgrims with whom he sat one evening at the Tabard Inn and with whom he set out on the road to Canterbury. What is more astonishing, he intends to tell us, before he forgets it all, the four stories those pilgrims told on their round trip, "as it remembreth me," in the distinct voice of each of the pilgrims, utilizing their exact metaphor, image, color of language, and idea. All told, Chaucer will retell this entire event in over eighteen thousand lines, for the most part meticulously rhymed and metered--certainly a prodigious feat.
+
+Prodigious or not, Chaucer employed this strategy knowing that his medieval audience would have believed him--but only up to a point. Indeed, if, as historians argue, Chaucer was probably educated at the Inns of Court, he would have learned some mnemonic system--his own Man of Laws learns "every statute...plein by rote"--and so would have been able to retell from memory a large amount of detail. But this is not Homer's Mnemosyne, that great treasure bag of phrases and images, into which one could dip, threading now one and now another on his marvelous loom. Chaucer's is a literate memory; many of the stories have been "sucked from his finger." And he boasts of remembering such minutiae that an audience--medieval or modern--is forced to conclude that he must be lying to them. No one could possibly remember that much detail with that much precision--mnemonic devices or not. As auditors, then, they would have been pulled up short.
+
+Thus Chaucer deliberately undercuts his own demands for believability by presenting a new textual memory. No other writer--not Dante, or Gower, or Boccaccio--had used memory as such a storehouse for fiction. His audience would have been alert to a ploy, for in Chaucer they found such a revolutionary form. In a deliberate way, then, Chaucer focuses his audience's attention, not on his memory, but on forgetting.
+
+Chaucer is composing his poem at a time when England is making its transition from an oral to a literate culture. And the poem reflects this uneasy shift. Chaucer presents us with details that he says he has overheard; but by the end of the fourteenth century, hearsay, at least in courts of law, was already being supplanted by written testimony. So while Chaucer roots his poem in oral tradition, he does so in such an overblown way that few if any of his contemporary listeners could have taken his boast seriously. Chaucer's strategy is simply to push the limits of orality to absurdity. He forces his medieval audience to hear _The Canterbury Tales_ as a work of _literature_.
+
+By getting them to think about their own literacy, as well as their own connections with the oral tradition, he has brought them face to face with the process of writing fiction. For if Chaucer could not possibly have remembered all that he says he has, he must be making it up, embellishing and shaping his initial information. He must be telling a story, inventing a tale. That is, he must be writing fiction. Chaucer is forging a working definition of the medieval idea of _auctor_, which he must of absolute necessity separate from the divine _auctoritee_. By assigning to himself the capacity to remember every scrap and nuance, every blink and titter of all thirty-three pilgrims, he sets himself up as a liar: a teller who intends to deceive with fibs and fables. Only by placing himself in this category can he become a mundane author. In any other category of literary creation, Chaucer would be usurping divine authorship.
+
+Chaucer here becomes entangled in an important philosophical/theological idea of the Middle Ages--the question of "contingency." From Augustine to the end of the thirteenth century, the principle of contingency became the necessary cause for all creation. Contingency represents the state of an essence or nature that admits of, but does not demand, actualization. St. Thomas translated the idea to mean "that which can be and can not be," which he used as the basis for the demonstration of the existence of God. Since the essence of the contingent being does not itself contain its existence, the reason for its existence must be found in an extrinsic efficient cause. Antecedent causes must, likewise, find the reason for _their_ existence in some other antecedent cause. Ultimately, the argument goes, one reaches a first cause whose existence is underived--that is, whose essence includes existence. But only one thing is both necessary and absolute: God.
+
+This theological idea impinges on literary creation: The Canterbury pilgrims are dependent on Chaucer for their "existence"; he appears to be their absolute and necessary cause--though of course Chaucer's own existence is a contingent one. Still, the question arises: Is it proper in this fuzzy literary area to call Chaucer a creator? Literary creations must be seen, at least in part, as mirror images of heavenly creation. Chaucer falls into a literary trap: If the existence of the world is contingent on the grace of the Word in "divine authorship," then Chaucer can only escape blasphemy by undercutting that singular, tremendous power that enables him to create--literacy.
+
+Chaucer's task is thus a complicated one. He needs to have his Canterbury story taken as truth--for this is the way readers come to enter into any fictional dream. He gains this sense of verisimilitude in several ways. By making himself one of the traveling group of pilgrims, Chaucer has to tell one of the proposed hundred and thirty or so tales, "The Tale of Sir Thopas," which he uses to further undercut his own literate power by telling a story so dull that the hosts beg him to stop. He adds even more of a sense of realism by drawing some of the other pilgrims--Harry Bailly the Host, for example--from actual citizenry of fourteenth-century London. Finally, there is no better way to imply that all this stuff is real than to say, "I was there, and I remember. I saw all this, I heard them all speak, and let me tell you what they said and did."
+
+But while he needs to give his poem a sense of realism, for theological reasons he must also see to it that his audience experiences the poem as made up. It is inevitable, then, that the subject of his poem should be--at least in part--the paradoxical nature of literacy. The written word is the authorized version, the authenticated truth. But too much truth can get Chaucer into theological trouble; he must move his creation into another category, into untruth. And he can do this best by letting his audience think of him as a liar. And so the muse for Chaucer can no longer be Mnemosyne, the Goddess of Recollecting, but some other unnamed Goddess--of Forgetting.
+
+
+Fiction reaches its first flowering in the _novel_--a word used initially to stand in opposition to the stuff of romances--when literacy broadened to include more of the middle class of English society in the late eighteenth century. The first successful London daily newspaper, the _Daily Courant_, appeared March 11, 1702. The word _magazine_ was first used to designate a popular literary journal with the publication of the _Gentleman 's Magazine_ in 1704. In this context, the most literate genre, the novel, begins to take shape through the efforts of Daniel Defoe, a man who in 1704 printed his own weekly newspaper, the _Review_. His _Journal of the Plague Year_ is usually referred to as England's first novel.
+
+Like Chaucer, Defoe needs to establish the veracity of a new form. While Defoe's audience may be more used to reading than Chaucer's, and, in particular, used to reading fictional narratives like romances, the novel is, as its name implies, _new_. Like Chaucer, Defoe wants his story to be taken as true, and so he needs to fabricate a believable lie, which he does by presenting his narrative as ajournal kept by one H. F., who purportedly lived during the plague year of 1665. This H. F. gives an eye- and ear-witness account; in fact, the subtitle of the book reads: "Being observations or memorials of the most remarkable occurences, as well publik as private, which happened in London during the last great visitation in 1665. Written by a citizen who continued all the while in London. Never made publik before." Thus, H. F.'s account derives from what he saw (observations) and remembers (memorials), all of which, he assures us, is true (happened in London).
+
+Defoe's premise differs from Chaucer's in that the former admits to writing down events daily in a journal and finally making the journal public--that is, publishing his evidence. Between Chaucer and Defoe the printing press has intervened, and it turns out that Defoe's real subject is the bureaucratization of the word, authenticated through the reality of type, and spread like contagion, in hundreds and hundreds of copies, directly from the platen of the press. The printed word impresses its own version of reality.
+
+Defoe opens his journal by conjecturing on the origin of the plague, surprised that it might have come from Holland, but suggesting that no one really knows, since "we had no such thing as printed newspapers in those days to spread rumors and reports of things..." News traveled by "word of mouth," but the truth of the plague cannot be gotten in that manner. In time, however, as the _Journal_ makes clear, the Secretaries of State "got knowledge of it," and took on the responsibility of determining the truth and making it known to the citizens--a bureaucratic process that will reach its final goal in publication.
+
+First, the State sends out professionals, two physicians and a surgeon, as certified agents, to examine the corpses of two recently dead Frenchmen. Through an undisclosed procedure, they determine that the Frenchmen both died of the plague. They render their opinion to the parish clerk, who turns over their positive findings to city hall. The last step toward truth involves making public--publishing--the doctors' decisions in the weeky Bill of Mortality: "Plague, 2. Parishes infected, 1." The plague has thus begun, its reality contained in the first Bill of Plague posted at various places around the parish. From this point on, no rumor, no piece of information transmitted orally can counter the truth of the written reports.
+
+Few people dare question the physicians' verdicts, for these men are certified professionals. Their published reports become automatic testimony in the bureaucratization of the word. And their word helps create the reality of the plague; indeed, as the news travels by the Plague Bill, so does the infection, for people act on the printed reality. Spreading the plague by word of mouth, they close themselves in, huddling closer together, unwittingly serving to infect each other. "Facts" matter very little. The narrator of the _Journal_ actually sees very few dead bodies; he merely reprints the body counts from the weekly Plague Bill. The citizens of London learn that the plague is getting worse or getting better by the numbers of people reported in the weekly Bill. The reality of the plague resides in these figures; the shadow of the medical "truth" of the plague lies somewhere else--in rats or in fleas, or in some other theory. But these "medical facts" interest no one but the historian of disease, or the medical scientist.
+
+Defoe's narrative account mimics this social construction of the plague. Defoe himself was four years old during the plague--hardly an eye-or ear-witness. That doesn't matter. For he knows he is free to make up the facts, or at least to play with them, keeping only the barest remnant of historical accuracy and molding the rest to fit his aesthetic needs. Defoe invents events, plays with statistics. Compare Defoe's account with other "historical" accounts of the plague and the numbers all differ. Knowing that he is writing both fiction and history, Defoe can call into question the notion of truth.
+
+His literary task is in some ways more difficult, in some ways easier, than Chaucer's. He knows, for instance, that people firmly believe in the veracity of the _news_--as it is presented in the dailies, in magazines, or now in novels. (Both _news_ and _novel_ thrive on the freshness of the word; each ultimately derives from Latin _nova_, "new.") It is in this period that the idea of story begins to separate itself from history: What constitutes "untruth" and "fact" take separate paths. And _news_ helps forge that separation. Defoe takes advantage of this confusion between story and history: in his own story, he shows us that what people lose faith in are forms of oral discourse. Old wives' tales, rumors, forecasts by astrologers--all of these are stuff, Defoe alleges, of the deluded minds of the common people in eighteenth-century London. Some of these illiterates, Defoe tells us, were even silly enough to run "about the streets with their oral predictions," publishing them as best they could. But he is reporting all of this, of course, in a skillfully made-up work of _fiction_. Thus, like Chaucer, he undercuts a growing reliance on literate forms--testimony, records, numbers--with a literate form, the novel.
+
+In the _Journal_, literacy impresses itself more and more deeply into the text, crowding out virtually every oral locution. In the early part of the _Journal_, Defoe uses phrases like "it was about the beginning of September, 1664," "some said," "pretty much," "about six weeks," "others said it was brought from Canada; others from Cyprus." These terms of vague approximation are slowly extinguished and replaced by precise numbers. The supposition, of course, is that numbers carry accuracy, precision, and hence the truth. These are things we can believe in and act on.
+
+Gradually, as we read the _Journal_, we begin to realize that we are being infected--or rather that Defoe's _Journal_, his attempt at establishing the scientific veracity of the plague, is infecting us. He makes us believe, with his reportorial, exact mind, that "oral discourse" does not have the capacity for carrying the truth; oral discourse does not allow for the power of critical analysis. For that, one must have writing, or better yet, the authority of print. One must be able to "think" about the problem through discursive prose. The sentences must stand still, an impossibility with oral discourse. Those who remain outside this literate circle will thus remain incapable of thinking.
+
+Prose is not democratic. Not everyone can read. But neither is the plague--Defoe tells us that it affects the poor in greater numbers than the wealthy. The irony of this book begins to become apparent. While the majority of Londoners will survive the plague, they will not survive the new literacy. For the plague, this crisis of the State, has been met with the best weapon the State has at its disposal: certification through the word. Through it, in fact, the State has managed to concentrate, solidify, and expand its power. It is one thing to create civil servants, but an entirely other thing both to invest them with power and to coerce the population to believe in that power.
+
+But we must once again understand the literary trick: Defoe makes his readers fall for the power of the printed word. He not only says he was there--so were a lot of other people--but he wrote all this down. And that is why he now stands in the privileged position of passing on the truth. Where Chaucer was careful to work out a limited sense of his own power as an author, walking a fine line with the ultimate authorial power, Defoe has already assumed the power of the word to create his own historical fabrication with it. But we should note that, as with Chaucer, the trick is two-edged. For at the same time that he establishes the validity of the word, he also distrusts it, and so undercuts it by associating it metaphorically with the plague. This might have been more apparent for an eighteenth-century reader than for a modern one, far removed from the event of the plague. By 1667, there were at least a dozen contemporary accounts of the plague, including the authoritative eight-volume _Loimologia sine pestis nuperae apud populum londinensem narratio_ by Quincey, published in 1720. And Defoe's facts and figures are at best shaky. Not because he is a sloppy historian, but because he understands the true nature of history: That it is a narrative in the best sense of the word and that the "facts" must therefore be constructed.
+
+
+In _The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn_, Mark Twain lays for his readers the nineteenth-century equivalent of this trap of literacy. At the same time that literacy opens the lid a crack to the treasure trove of white, received society--one that is, of course, closed to the Negro Jim--it also exacts a high price, and so Huck flees it.
+
+_Huckleberry Finn_ is a book about a book. And we won't know about the literary character Huck, Huck himself tells us in the opening line, "without you have read a book by the name of _The Adventures of Tom Sawyer_." Here is a literary creation telling us to read about his past in another book--the genealogy of the Homeric epic transformed into literary pedigree. We have come a long way: Twain achieves his verisimilitude by coming clean, by laying bare the literary lie--this is only a book, these are only characters playing out their parts. Having established Huck's literary credentials, Twain has Huck follow what is now a familiar pattern: He undercuts that literary importance. "But that aint no _matter_," Huck insists, immediately after telling us to read _Tom Sawyer_, pulling off a wonderfully literate pun. It doesn't make any difference is one sense of Huck's line; but it can also mean that books are without substance, _materia_--without matter.
+
+Huck probably means both things. But we must be more on guard with Twain than with any other author, for he is so disarmingly honest--or rather, his confederate, Huck, tells us his creator is so honest. He's so honest, in fact, Huck confesses, that in his other books "Mister Twain told us the truth, mainly. There was things which he stretched, but mainly he told the truth."
+
+Standing inside a formal literary tradition, this semiliterate begins his story by telling about his early days with the Widow Douglas and her sister, Miss Watson, who both set out to civilize Huck by teaching him the rules. They do it principally by reading to him from Miss Watson's book about "Moses and the bulrushers." When this fails to impress its mark on Huck, Miss Watson escalates to a spelling book.
+
+In this emerging world of literacy, correct spelling offers the key to the correct look of literacy, the visual check on a person's education, in much the same way that skin color is a key in this book to freedom or slavery. A person usually knows enough grammar to sound literate; and speech betrays no errors of punctuation or spelling, only mispronunciations. So, for example, Huck speaks the word _civilization_, but in writing the book he spells it _sivilization_. In the twelfth century, Huck would have been classed as a _rustico more_, someone who communicates in an unlearned tongue for which there exists no written counterpart bound by grammatical rules.
+
+Huck's misspellings are common to the illiterate, who pay more attention to what they hear, without recognizing on the page the words they frequently use. We know what Huck means, but that "aint no matter." And here we step into the first part of Twain's trap. What Huck says takes a secondary position to the _way_ Huck presents--"writes"--it. Anyone who is able to read _Huck Finn_ is obviously literate, literate enough to harbor the impulse to correct Huck's mistakes, for the mistakes loom as boulders impeding the smooth and steady flow of the reader's fluency. To borrow the central image of the book: We need to transform Huck's babbling stream of speech into a smooth flowing river of prose.
+
+This book forces us to read in an aristocratic way, in a modern obverse of Hugh of Saint Victor's, in which the critic, the inner self that sits in judgement, silently corrects Huck's speech. This is not the reading of contemplative silence, but the busy-ness of critical judging. Twain has made us not only into readers, but editors; and our laughter at Huck's mannerisms must sound haughty--in the sense of high and lofty--as we elevate ourselves over that poor, unlettered boy. Twain provokes that judgement in part because the book seems to be a reproduction of the spoken and not the written word. In precisely the manner that a medieval scribe recorded what he heard in _ductus_, Twain creates the illusion that Huck dictated this novel and that what we have as a result is a raw medieval manuscript, which we read out of literate training as modern critics. After all our years of education about and knowledge of the rules of grammar and syntax and spelling, we simply cannot allow him his sloppy freedom. We need to correct him, keep him in check--even against our wills--as strongly as the Widow Douglas and Miss Watson.
+
+Twain makes us feel superior to Huck's mistakes. Even though he speaks--and even though he tells us that he has written this book--we can only conclude that he is dumb. In early use, in Old High German, the word _dumb_ meant one who was both mute _and_ stupid. Perhaps the logic went something like this: Because we don't hear what the person knows or understands, we assume he knows nothing. Only saints and sages are assumed in their silence to be wise. In Huck's case, we assume he is dumb precisely because we _see, verbum ad_verbum_, what he is _saying_. In a poignant way, he has been "silenced" by prose. His words have undergone no _re_-vision. He says what he thinks at first glance. And since his story is not, in a traditional sense, authored, what he writes cannot be taken as authority. Even in nineteenth-century society, he might as well be mute. For in his illiterate ignorance, he is as disenfranchised from society as his Negro friend Jim.
+
+Twain drives home just how strongly we are chained to our own literacy through Huck's illiterate silence. While he allows Huck to live comfortably in orality, he prevents us from entering that world. _The Canterbury Tales_ begs to be read aloud--one can hear it in the easy rhythms of "The General Prologue" and in Chaucer's hilarious rhymes, for instance when he undercuts the romantic _kisse_ in "The Miller's Tale" with the earthy _pisse_. It may not matter if Defoe's _Journal_ is read aloud or not. A journal is a fairly private affair, but one can easily imagine it read aloud to a group of close friends. At any rate, Defoe's subject is a public one.
+
+There is no question about the way _The Adventures of Huck leberry Finn_ must be read. If the book is not read silently on the page, it loses its meaning. Huck's illiterate phonetic prose ties us to our own literacy. For if we want to get all of the humor Twain intends, we must _see_ Huck's sentences and not _hear_ them. For example, when we read Huck's _sivilization_ aloud, we miss the irony of the mistake. If Twain makes Huck dumb, then he makes us mute.
+
+Twain shocks us with his anachronistic linguistics: He would have us think that there is only one language--the spoken one that through writing or printing is made visible on the page. And he has pulled this illiterate kid out of the woods to embody this irony, twenty years after the War for Emancipation--that is, the struggle for wholesale American democracy. It is ironic, for, of course, there are two languages--the one that we freely speak and the one, orthographically and grammatically correct, that appears on the printed page. And they are radically different in what they convey. We might expect Huck's brand of speaking from someone like Jim, not yet fully integrated into the educational scheme, but certainly not from Huck, a young white adolescent. He should know better; and Twain forces us, the literate readers, to teach him. To use Hugh of Saint Victor once more as an example, it is as if his comment-- _per se inspectiones_--had become a curse, transforming forever speech into words never to fly free from the text again.
+
+A text imprisoned in the page also cannot be successfully translated. Huck's idiom and jargon, his mispronunciations and misspellings will not convert in any way to another language. So Twain's text is frozen fast. The second part of Twain's trap snaps on this idea. We may feel smug about correcting that dumb kid's spelling, or dismissing Jim's spells. But in his loose and sloppy jargon, that dumb boy has given us one of the greatest novels in America. This may be the boldest lie in all of American fiction. Huck has created something grander than most of his readers are capable of doing--in their educated prose. God knows what Jim is capable of doing. Aren't we all, Twain may be asking, the ones enslaved by our mannered language, ordered and ruled and in which it may be more difficult to write about freedom and the great meandering Mississippi than in Huck's dialect?
+
+Twain asks for a broad reading of slavery. For Huck is just as removed, just as cut off from society as Jim. Jim is even more radically illiterate than Huck, but for him every inch of the world is animate--the weather, the fog, the river. His reality breathes strongly through superstition and spells; his knowledge is still gained from what lies around him. Tom Sawyer has developed his perceptions from reading Arthurian romances, and in the course of the novel he passes this on to Huck. Tom's solutions to problems are intricate and complicated, Jim's are immediate. When this book was written, slaves had already been granted their legal freedom; when the narrative begins, Jim has already been granted his by his owner. Twain lumps Huck and Jim together: they both appear to be fugitives; they float on the same raft; they are friends who speak the same sort of dialect. If Huck is stupid, then so is Jim. But if we can appreciate the language--and we do partly because we enjoy the book so much--then we must grant to Huck great brilliance, and we must allow that same possibility for Jim. In a sense, we must see them both as "articulate" human beings. We must grant them their freedom. By stepping into Twain's linguistic trap, we are forced into being abolitionists. We have to come to appreciate the richness and the power and the beauty of that oral culture--both black and white. Freed from rules and regulations, their language unites them: Huck and Jim learn from each other.
+
+Civilization in this novel resides on the riverbanks--the world of Miss Polly and Widow Douglas and Judge Thatcher. The raft is an island of orality on which these two characters float along, separated from the land. Facts and details from the riverbank fade into metaphor and image on the raft. Like Chaucer and Defoe, Twain is struggling with the phenomenon of literacy. Chaucer adopts a fictional stance--his prodigious memory--that undercuts itself so that his audience can accept a made-up story. Defoe too presents us with a literate form--the journal--and then proceeds to undercut it by showing us that the plague exists in great part only in authorized descriptions on the page, and that perhaps the true victims are those unfortunates who remain illiterate, and who, as a result, will be left behind by the march of progress. In Twain, the process is more complicated, for by presenting us with an illiterate but brilliant character he forces his readers to undercut their _own_ literacy.
+
+Chaucer is still writing for an audience that is essentially illiterate. He is concerned with the coming of literacy, only to the extent that it forces him to confront what it means to write fiction. For Defoe, literacy is a perceptual problem: How does print affect the way people understand the world? For Twain, in nineteenth-century America, literacy is a problem of the highest political and social order. It gets at the heart of democratic America. Let us understand, he seems to say, that two languages mean two Americas--in terms of the novel, two classes: the Judge Thatchers and the Jims and the Hucks. If we applaud Huck at the end of the novel, then we must also clap our hands for Jim. And if we allow Huck to light out for the territory at the end of the book, then we must set Jim free.
+
+Thus, Twain brings into focus the trap of literacy. There is a whole world in _Huck Finn_ that is closed to those without literacy. They can't, for ironic example, read this marvelous work, _The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn_. And yet we must recognize a world rich with superstition and folklore, with adventure and beauty, that remains closed to those who are too tightly chained to letters. But Twain forces us also to look forward, for by the end of the nineteenth century, very little territory remained. Only small pockets of orality still survive in the country--mostly rural, mostly poor, mostly black. The rest is literate in the most sweeping way. By 1885 the _New England Journal of Education_ was already conducting surveys to determine levels of literacy in Cambridge, Massachusetts. No one would have thought in the nineteenth century that we would be hanging fast to literacy, as we see it too vanishing: People now becoming enslaved to the power of a machine in their pursuit of computer literacy. So long as we remain as aware as Twain, we have lost nothing.
+
+
+# From Taught Mother Tongue to Newspeak and Uniquack
+
+_The language that we hear spoken today is full of words of a special type: These words we will call amoeba-words, and the vocabulary that they constitute, Uniquack. Amoeba-words all possess at least three fields of usage; let "energy" serve as an example of such a word. "Energy" has an initial meaning that is traditional. According to the_ Oxford English Dictionary, _in 1599, it means "vigor of expression," and later the impressive capacity of an utterance or of organ music. The term energy is still widely used in this first sense of vigor. During the nineteenth century, energy also became a technical term. At first, it was used quite generally by physicists to denote the body's ability to perform work. Then, precisely at the same time that Marx ascribed "labor force" to the proletariat, several German physicists ascribed to Nature a general potential to perform work, and called it "energy." For the last hundred years, the term has been used in physics to verbalize an increasingly abstract alternative energy, or energy needs. We must be forever conscious of the fact that we do not know what those terms mean. We use the words like words from Scripture, like a gift from above. Furthermore, we gratefully transfer the power to define their meaning to an expertocratic hierarchy to which we do not belong. The word "energy" in this context is used neither with common sense, nor with the senseless precision of science, but almost like a sublinguistic grunt--a nonsense word. Energy, like sexuality, transportation, education, communication, information, crisis, problem, solution, role, and dozens of other words, belong, in this sense, to the same class_.
+
+When Orwell wrote about Newspeak, no computer language had as yet been named or published. Our theme therefore will not be computer language, but Orwell's attempt to caricature what happens when speakers of ordinary language treat it as if it can be reduced to a code. This perception of Newspeak is not made by Orwell, of course, but by a pair of latecomers, who see the unfolding of a cipher Orwell created over thirty-five years ago.
+
+Newspeak and Uniquack are two-egged twins. In the fifties, when the computer was a novelty and UNIVAC the trade name of the only machine that could be purchased, James Reston created Uniquack in an editorial aside. We adopted the term Uniquack for the jelly formed of amoeba-words, words that are neither "significant and binding for certain activities" nor "indicative of certain forms of thought"--the two characteristics that together determine Raymond Williams' choice of Key-Words, although like Williams' Key-Words, amoeba-words are often strong and difficult and persuasive in everyday language, and serve to indicate wider areas of experience. As the years went by, Newspeak and Uniquack became useful to name two characteristics that make late twentieth-century, everyday English, French, or German, alike and distinct from ordinary languages in former times.
+
+Newspeak is a transparent neologism. For Orwell, it is the fictional portrait of the deliberate distortion of an Oldspeak that never was. In this age of computers, which Orwell did not live to see, his Newspeak is an ominous parody of the intent to use English as a "medium of communication." This tendency is fostered by the spread of Uniquack: the degradation that results from the fallout of scientific discourse into ordinary speech. Newspeak thus refers--in our usage--primarily to an attitude of the speaker toward what he does, while Uniquack refers to the predominance of a special kind of vocabulary in his speech. By using the two terms in conjunction when speaking about certain features of contemporary language, we hope to escape the objections that literal-minded professors have raised repeatedly against Orwell: Namely, that we engage in shallow and uncritical linguistics. It is not our intention to oppose a paranoiac vision of today's communication to the romantic utopia of a virgin vernacular that mirrors a factual truth.
+
+Newspeak and Uniquack are neologisms of very different status. As a foundling, Uniquack can be adopted to our purposes. Newspeak is well-worn. Orwell conceived it as a caricature of his own abandoned belief in a world language and used it as a literary device to make a fable stick. Since his death, it has become the label for a muddled complex of beliefs. Today, it is mostly used to promote the nonsensical belief that language has become useless.
+
+Orwell used the term on two different levels--as a parody and as an element of his world of 1984. The two main sources for his linguistic parody are Basic English, proposed by Ogden, and Interglossa, conceived by Hogben--both of which had their heyday in the early thirties. Both are attempts to create a world language based on English and containing less than 850 words. In 1939, Ezra Pound praised Basic as "a magnificent system for measuring extant works ... an instrument for the diffusion of ideas ... with advantages ... obvious to any man of intelligence." In the 1940s no less a person than William Empson praised Basic as an instrument to understand poetry and as a vocabulary for pithy poetic creation. Winston Churchill had the British government purchasethe copyright to Basic. And H. G. Wells, in _The Shape of Things to Come_, pictures a utopia in which the rapid diffusion of Basic as the _lingua franca_ of the world is "one of the un-anticipated achievements of the twenty-first century."
+
+Orwell describes the world that Wells saw coming as a "vision of humanity, liberated by the machine, a race of enlightened sunbathers, whose sole topic of conversation is their own superiority to their ancestors." If he too had once believed in Basic, his parody of it is part of Orwell's lampoon, as Wells describes it, of a "glittering, strangely sinister world, in which the privileged classes live a life of shallow, gutless hedonism, and the workers ... toil like troglodytes in caverns underground."
+
+The satirical force with which Orwell used Newspeak to serve as his portrait of one of those totalitarian ideas that he saw taking root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere can be understood only if we remember that he speaks with shame about a belief that he formerly held. Just as he had to go to Spain, to Catalonia, to be disabused of his left-wing do-goodism, he had to join the BBC to promote Basic before he understood that it could only be used as a deadly, mechanical substitute for thought.
+
+From 1942 to 1944, working as a colleague of William Empson's, he produced a series of broadcasts to India written in Basic English, trying to use its programmed simplicity, as a _Tribune_ article put it, "as a sort of corrective to the oratory of statesmen and publicists." Only during the last year of the war did he write "Politics and the English Language," insisting that the "defense of the English language has nothing to do with the setting up of a Standard English."
+
+Basic is an ultimate effort to standardize speech according to a written model: To put "language," which has come into existence by recording speech sounds through the alphabet, and which then has been corrected by the grammarian, back into the mouths of the people in this new form. The attempt to make people use this artifact whenever they speak has a history. At this point, it seems helpful to look back at this origin. Orwell stumbled on the title for his novel by reversing the date, 1948, when he had completed writing. Taking an Orwellian liberty with 1942, the year that Orwell began broadcasting Basic English on the BBC, we arrive at 1492, the year that Nebrija suggested to the Spanish royalty that they might control their subjects through the use of a taught mother tongue. Six years before the publication of _1984_, Orwell found a descendent of Nebrija's monster in Ogden's Basic English, which he could broadcast through the BBC. The image is one of Orwell setting sail for the Brave New World. Finally, he dropped Basic for its parody in Newspeak. From Nebrija to Orwell: From Spaniards who would speak taught mother tongue, to Proles who are tongue-tied.
+
+In this movement from the parody of Basic English to the parable of the speechless horror of meaningless utterances, Orwell reveals a new dimension in writings on the future. Orwell was steeped in the genre of Utopian literature; from his own statements, it is clear that he was well aware of the place that Utopian writers had assigned to language. Swift has the people of Laputa fed by their "political projectors" with "invented, simplified language, [who] write books by machines and educate their pupils by inscribing the lesson on wafers ... causing them to swallow it." In the year that he left the BBC, Orwell comments that the "one aim of intellectual totalitarianism cannot but be to make people less conscious." Jack London, whose imagery surfaces frequently in _1984_, describes his "proles" (Orwell uses the same term) as "phrase-slaves" who consider the coinage of such Utopian phrases as "an honest dollar" or "a full dinner pail" strokes of genius. London too has loudspeakers establish and anchor the regime. All the isolated elements out of which Orwell constructed the parable called Newspeak he took either from Ogden or the Utopians.
+
+What is unique about Newspeak is the same thing that makes the whole of _1984_ into a new kind of horror story. To quote Herbert Read: "_1984_ is a Utopia in reverse: Not an _Erewhon_, which is utopia upside down. _Erewhon_ is still written after the ameliorative pattern of utopia itself: You may paradoxically be punished for being ill, but the ideal is health. In _1984_ the pattern is malevolent..." The malevolence of this pattern is implicit in the existing state and does not result from abuse or the self-serving manipulation by an elite. In Jack London's _Iron Heel_, as in Zamyatin's _Zero_, power is still a means; in _1984_ the power implicit in the State is the ultimate reason for everything that happens. And the State has turned into a book that is constantly rewritten. Power is no longer at the service of the elite; the elite itself is at the service of power, which is a book. The worst that H. G. Wells could imagine was inequality--albeit a monstrous kind. According to Orwell, Wells "was too sane to understand the modern world."
+
+Orwell's predecessors who wrote upside-down utopias invented horrible abuses of language. Orwell describes communication that takes place after the extinction of language itself. Newspeak is not the language of dystopia, but of the speechless utterances of Kakitopia 1984. Orwell created the parable of human beings compelled to communicate--mostly through organized hatred--and to do so without human language.
+
+Literary critics and those who use Newspeak as an English word in ordinary conversation usually mean either the corrupt English of propagandists and the ambiguous language of politicians and broadcasters, or the neologisms coined by the adversary. In this imprecise fashion they imply terminological inflation, effective sloganeering, or the antonym of English before the Fall. Orwell's Newspeak, however, is something more sinister than the proliferating _idiotikon_ of technical terms that make conversations in the real 1984, and after, so "noisy." We see Newspeak as a cipher for something that is now called "interpersonal communication‚" for the belief that the terms by which we describe the operations of computers are fit to tell what is going on between you and me. By Newspeak we mean one particular way of thinking and speaking about language--an approach or an attitude that treats language as a system and a code.
+
+
+The equation between man and machine was not entirely unknown to Orwell. He knew Mary Shelley's _Frankenstein_ (1816) and probably also T. H. Huxley's hypothesis that animals are automata (1874). But the new wave, according to which digital-analog computers meaningfully model human "brains" did not hit the press until Orwell was dead. As a novelist, he invented a parable for a scientific hypothesis that hovered in the air. He created the idea of communication without sense or meaning, before he could use the computer to model it on. O'Brian from the Thought Police says to Smith, whom he tortures: "we do not merely destroy our enemies, we change them ... we convert, we shape them ... We make our enemy one of ourselves before we kill him ... make the brain perfect before we blow it out ... the command of old despotisms was 'thou art' ... what happens to you here is forever...." Smith, the novel's antihero, still believes that what happens makes sense to O'Brian. He has to accept that O'Brian's world is senseless and that he must join O'Brian in this powerful nonsense. "There is learning, there is understanding, and there is acceptance. It is time for you [Smith] to enter upon the second stage ... tell me, why we cling to power ... speak." Strapped to the rack, Winston answers: "You are ruling over us for our own good." He gives the answer that would have satisfied Dostoyevski's Grand Inquisitor: "You believe that human beings are not fit to govern themselves and therefore..." As his only response, O'Brian turns the lever to thirty-three degrees of torture. A pang of pain contorts Winston. And then O'Brian instructs Winston: "We seek power entirely for its own sake." And the State, which O'Brian represents, creates and recreates Winston's human nature, according to its own text, and allows Winston to exist only in the context of the State.
+
+Today, we would say that O'Brian _programs_ Winston for his _role_ in _1984_. Orwell knew these two words only in their theatrical sense: The schedule of performance sold by an attendant, and the text studied by an actor. "To program" was first used in 1945 for the act of expressing an operation in the terms appropriate for the performance of a computer. And "role theory" was then a new trend in sociology. Neither word had fallen from its specialized orbit into ordinary speech to become amoeba-words. Turing's idea of an algorithm that adapts its state according to the outcome of its last calculation was well understood by Wiener and Neumann, who created a machine that made such a formula autonomous from human calculation, but the general public still saw in the computer nothing but a more perfect adding machine. The concept of "role" had been introduced in the same year as Turing's idea by independent publications of Margaret Mead, Ralph Linton, and Murdock, and by 1950 was considered basic to all sociology by Parsons and Merton; but its implied assumption that all social relations can be reduced to power or the interchange of information between individual role-players had certainly never occurred to George Orwell. And yet, as a novelist, he has O'Brian force Winston to become what role-theory and the cybernetic model of human communication assume as "human nature." Kakitopia fits these assumptions: "Power is (precisely) in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing," O'Brian says to his pupil. Newspeak assumes the existence of plastic human individuals who can be written and rewritten into any role. Thus the Kakitopia of Newspeak, the exchange of communication between nonhuman entities, and the reduction of social action to mere exchanges became thinkable about the same time.
+
+The proponents of a cybernetic model of social analysis assume that human beings fit their assumptions, but Orwell knows that to fit, each one has to accept what is done to him. And O'Brian knows that no one can perform this acceptance for you. Winston, who had worked in the Ministry of Truth, knew what Newspeak was. Under torture, he understood what nonhuman communication was: mere know-"how" without meaning or "why." O'Brian asked him to understand his message, not him, to abandon the urge to understand what he, the speaker, meant and to let his mind be dictated to--and to be nothing but the result of this dictation. The reduction of an encounter with another person into an exchange of information between two elements of a system--what we today call "system-theory"--Orwell called "collective solipsism."
+
+Winston understood what O'Brian asked him to do, and he tried hard to do it: He learned to register how things were supposed to be and to spell them out without asking "why," but he did not accept being part of the system, not until he had gone through Room 101. Only there he accepts himself as part of "a fantasy world in which things happen as they should"--namely, on a blank page, that is, as dictation. And to accept being a part of this fantasy of pure senseless power, Winston had to erase his self. But no violence that he inflicted on himself could break his common sense--which Orwell often calls "decency." To turn himself into non-sense he has to betray his love. Not torture, but only self-betrayal could make him like O'Brian. In O'Brian's words, Winston's own acts are "the things from which you could not recover. Something is killed in your breast: burnt out, cauterized out." And this is what Winston does to himself when he has to face the rats in Room 101 and he begs his torturers: "Do it to Julia." This betrayal transformed his habit of Doublethink into a conditioned reflex. Later on, he and Julia meet again, as two burnt-out hulls, knowing that in Room 101 they had both meant what they had said. Self-betrayal was the last thing that Winston _meant_. By becoming the torturer of his last love, in his own mind Winston had become as self-less as O'Brian. Henceforth, the unique mutual intimacy between the executioner and the victim integrated both him and Julia into the system, the solipsism of meaningless communication.
+
+What we are retelling and commenting on here is a fable, not a mere parody of Esperanto, or a cautionary tale, or linguistic theory dressed up in metaphor. This fable shows a society that survives the radical renunciation of language on the part of its members. We shall not be seduced by Orwell's journalistic genius to take it as something that could happen, or that he himself thought could happen. Newspeak remains an "ideal type," a cipher for language that never could be because its speakers would be totally unlike the men and women we know. And yet, Newspeak has the power to evoke a strange sense of deja vu, because it is modeled not only on Basic English, which has never been spoken, but also on the language of science, which also stands for something that never could be.
+
+When a physicist writes "_E_" on the blackboard, he proves himself one of the boys. He shows off his competence in using an algorithm, which over several generations, has incorporated all the rules according to which it may be put into a formula. When "_E_" is used this way, it has no meaning outside the context of theoretical physics. The physicist's ability to pronounce the written "_E_" as energy, however, is not the result of a conspiracy, but of careful training, part of which consists in keeping the formalism of theoretical physics apart from the meanings of ordinary life. The difference between the two has often been compared with bilingual existence; but this comparison fosters a mistake. Spoken English, Japanese, and Kwakiutl--all three are meaningful in everyday, sensual life. The so-called "language" of physics is a code, a system of signs, a formal theory, an analytic tool that derives part of its value from its near-independence from ordinary speech. A physicist limited to the use of his technical vocabulary would be totally speechless in a bedroom or kitchen, but his gibberish would not be Newspeak. The tour de force accomplished by Orwell consists in the invention of a malevolent conspiracy that imposes the use of that kind of code in everyday life. Paranoiac assumptions are essential to Orwell's cipher. If we were to call the language of physics a form of Newspeak, that would only frustrate our attempt to reserve this term as the name for an attitude toward ordinary speech.
+
+There is, however, an important, indirect way by which the proliferation of special codes contributes to our growing tendency to speak at dinner as if we were in the psychology or sociology lab. We increasingly use ordinary words that have been picked up by one or several "codes" and to which technical meanings have been attached. And we tend to use them indiscriminately, giving the impression that their technical meaning is somehow connoted in our use of the term. While we mean to say "screw," we say "having sex" and we imply "sexuality," a scientific construct we had no intention of implying. Good strong words used in this technical way in ordinary speech generate a following of amoeba-words, which can be made to mean anything, like a mathematician's "_E_." And this fallout then fosters the attitude toward language that we have called Newspeak. These waste products from technical word-factories are akin to pollution. Just as the unintended by-products of industry have penetrated, reshaped, and degraded most anything that we see, touch, breathe, or eat, so have these waste products of terminologies affected ordinary language. Much of this terminological waste merely generates noise in everyday conversation and can be compared with the dull expanses of cement that economic growth has produced. But within this waste, many terms are potential amoeba, blown up with hot air, brandished, and loaded with ominous connotations, while losing all denotation. The prudent person who wishes to make sense is often forced to declare a moratorium on their use.
+
+Again, we are speaking in terms that hardly could have been Orwell's. "Pollution" was as unknown to him as the vocabulary of the computer. Its meaning was "seminal emission apart from coition." The counterpurposive effects of technical decisions were not discussed in the forties. Rachel Carson had not yet published her _Silent Spring_. "Fallout" meant the deferred effects of the Hiroshima bomb, and not the exhaust from belching chimneys. Though he wrote an upside-down utopia, Orwell, like Wells or Huxley or Zamyatin, was still primarily concerned with the intentional misuse of the new powerful means. He went beyond these predecessors because, unlike them, he deciphered and lampooned a new logic inherent in the intellectual project that generated computer, bomb, role-theory. He explored the destructive implications of high-sounding ideals; his witches were intellectual do-gooders and their totalitarian projects. His originality lay in the parody of their intent. He was a prophet, in the Hebrew sense--one who sees clearly into the present--because he discovered the forties. He could not foresee that in the eighties so many people--without having passed through Room 101--would try to convince themselves that they "communicate"--and, in addition, mostly in Uniquack.
+
+
+# Postscript: Silence and the We
+
+_George Steiner closes_ After Babel, _"in which the problem of Babel and of the nature of language is so insistently examined‚" with the statement that the Kabbalah "knows of a day of redemption on which translation will no longer be necessary. All human tongues will have re-entered the translucent immediacy of that primal, lost speech shared by God and Adam...  But the Kabbalah also knows of a more esoteric possibility. It records the conjecture, no doubt heretical, that there shall come a day when translation is not only unnecessary but inconceivable. Words will rebel against man. They will shake off the servitude of meaning. They will 'become only them selves, and as dead stones in our mouths.' In either case, men and women will have been freed forever from the burden and the splendour of the ruin at Babel. But which, one wonders, will be the greater silence?"_
+
+Just as much as the word, silence is a creature of the alphabet: the pause between word and word, the silent contemplation of the text, the silence of meditative thought, are all forms of alphabetical silence. Even in our silence we are lettered men, at home on the island of history in the alphabetic domain. Most of us have, at best, only an inkling of the silence before words; and many of us have gone the opposite way, converting silence into something mechanical, into the no that separates beep from beep.
+
+Genesis I:6–7 tells of the beginning of silence, silence before it became the stuff of history: When He hammered out the first gold foil (a word usually translated as the "firmament"), He separated the roaring waters below from the thundering waters above. With a three inch shard, or a glittering foil, silence began as an interstice, keeping the voices of Heaven and those of the Abyss apart. Silence was the first creature on the Earth. "Earth" grew from it. And that is the silence out of which, later, history took shape, as human voices made it vibrate.
+
+This silence has vanished from the burnt-out world of Orwell's cipher. The "zero" that separates beeps has replaced it. And this one-zero-one, not silence, is the stuff from which the interface between Winston and Julia is made. After the self-betrayal of Room 101, these two post-humans are not only beyond words, they are also beyond "silence," and equally beyond the ability to refer to their co-presence with the personal pronoun "we." They have turned into an interactive assembly of two. The new Adam and Eve are the critters of a computer.
+
+The conversation we had begun on the history of the spelled-out word ended for us as the search for the history of both "silence" and the "we." At each stage the "alphabetization of silence" precedes that of speech. Its genesis is the first character of the beta-bet, the Aleph.
+
+The power of the silence that precedes utterance is described by an eighteenth-century rabbi, Mendel Torum of Rymanov, who asks what the Children of Israel could have actually heard, and what they in fact did hear, when they received the Ten Commandments. Some rabbis maintained that all the Commandments were spoken directly to the Children in the Divine Voice. Others said that the Israelites heard only the first two Commandments--"I am the Lord thy God" and "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me"--before being overwhelmed, no longer able to endure the Divine Voice, obliged to receive the remaining Commandments through Moses.
+
+Mendel believed that not even the first two Commandments were delivered to the Children, but only silence. They heard only the _aleph_, the Hebrew character with which the first Commandment begins, the _aleph_ of the word _ani_ or _anokhi_: "I." Gershom Scholem comments on this theory: "The consonant _aleph_ represents nothing more than the position taken by the larynx when a word begins with a vowel. Thus the _aleph_ may be said to denote the source of all articulate sound." The _aleph_, then, the first character in the Hebrew phonetic system, itself stands for no sound, but instead commands the mouth to open, fixing the position of the lips for the next sound. The Kabbalists regard the _aleph_ as the spiritual root of all the other characters, and out of that opening of the mouth, that utter silence, springs all human intercourse. Thus, as Scholem tells us, Rabbi Mendel transforms the revelation on Mount Sinai into an event pregnant with infinite meaning, but devoid of any specific meaning.
+
+In Semitic script, silence cannot be recorded. No rabbi would ask his students to spell out a word; he wants them to know what the root looks like. Only the alphabet can conjure up silence and situate it on the page. First silence creeps between the letters and makes it feasible to spell instead of to read. Then Roman monks in charge of teaching Latin to the Irish put interstices between words. Sentences are literally anatomized, disjointed into their individual words. Silence, recorded as an interval, does for language what the knife will do for the anatomist. It creates books made up of words rather than lines. Utterances, which the ear hears as a whole, are disarticulated into _lemas_, just as physicians in the late Middle Ages dismember bodies to make their organs visible. Like a knife, silence, when it is made visible, creates a text that is suited for the eye. And this is a precondition to grasp the text at one glance--to contemplate it in silence rather than to hear it at the rhythm of speech. Just as the "text" of the thirteenth century emerges from the visual perception of the order among parts of speech, some centuries later the modern organism will come into existence as the (conceptual) result of the physiological order between the path of a dissected organism.
+
+Having pushed itself between parts of speech, silence now removes the ear from the page. It first created "words," now it creates a new kind of standoffish reader. This new reader looks at the page on the desk in the same attitude in which he looks at his own conscience during the confession that the Fourth Lateran Council exacts every year. The autobiographer engages in self-inquisition: He scrupulously tortures his conscience to give up its stubborn silence. Centuries later even the subconscious has to be brought to light on the couch. All by himself, this modern individual delves into a text written in the past by another, or sets out on the ever more lonely journey into the text that the past has left beneath the surface of his conscious self.
+
+The alphabetization of silence has brought about the new loneliness of the "I," and of an analytic _we. We_ is now one line in a text brought into being by communication. Not the silence before words but the absence of messages in a chaos of noises precedes the establishment of an interactive pattern. The pretextual _we_ of orality, the "ethnic" _we_ that has been transcended through conscience, has disappeared from reality. We know that the history of silence is reflected in the transition from the ethnic to the analytic _we_.
+
+The _we_ that we have used emphatically in this book is morphologically an English plural. Semantically, however, it is close to a dual, for which English, some time during the Anglo-Saxon period, has lost a special form. Other Indo-Germanic languages--for instance, the Slavonic ones--have preserved this form. And, like thought and the word, like narration and the lie, _we_ has a history.
+
+The _we_ on which we want to reflect is not the dual of these two authors, but the personal pronoun, with which he who speaks refers to the first person in the plural. Now, what is that first person? The answer is rather easy when we deal with person in the singular: "I," the first person, speaks to "you," the second person. In doing so, I tell you something about a third, who neither is speaking nor is being addressed. By addressing a person whom I designate "you," I make that person at that moment unique to me--and distinguish that "you" from any third: person or thing. Thus, _you_ is almost as unique as _I_. Even abuse will not detract from the power intrinsic to the spoken _you_ to establish this exquisite bond. Some people who have been tortured report that not pain, but the address of the policeman has broken them. In exact opposition to the tightly bound _you_, the third person has enormous scope. The third person includes whatever the first chooses to tell the second about. Every _you_ contains the germ of a response--not so _her, him_, or _it_.
+
+The first person usually does not call itself by its name. The first person uses a pro-noun, a word used instead of a name or noun. All languages have such a pronoun by which the speaker refers to himself, though the coloring implied--the gesture associated with the utterance--is different here and there. In Armenian or Iroquoian, the _I_ is like an arrow by which the speaker points at him-or herself; in other languages, the _I_ gives more the impression of a retreat, an act of assuming distance.
+
+Etymologically, the _I_ can be brazen, as it is in English, but it can just as well be hazy, as in Japanese, in which _I_ is _watakusi domo_, which best translates: Yours Faithfully. But semantically both forms--the direct one and the euphemism--are equally clear self-references by the speaker. Proud or humble, aggressive or meek, depending on status, age, mood, or custom, the pronoun for the first person singular is unequivocal as no other term: It says, "He Who Speaks."
+
+This univocal precision of the _I_ is a condition for the formation of plurals. In fact, with almost the same directness with which all languages oppose the addressing _I_ with a _you_ who is addressed, they also provide some kind of _we_. Quite arguably, the opposition of _I_ and _we_ is a more fundamental category than the opposition of singular and plural. For the English speaker, it seems natural that the existence of a third person singular--the _he-she-it_--requires that there be a third person plural--a _they_. But this is just not so in all languages. The Turk feels nothing natural in learning the English plural. His noun designates a form of existence, primarily a quality and only then a thing that can be counted. The noun in Turkish turns into an object, in our sense, only when it is qualified by a term indicating enumeration. For the Turk the important difference lies between "dwelling space" and two, five, or even one "house." When he speaks to someone about something, he stresses the difference between essentials and that which can be numbered--not as we do: number one as opposed to any other number. Even in Turkish, however, the difference between the _I_ and the _we_ is clear. No language seems to lack a pronoun that says, "I and..."
+
+Yet, this "I and..." can contrast in many ways with the _I_. This is true even morphologically: The opposition of two different roots--"ego/no; I/we; ich/wir; ja/mi"--is by no means universal. On every continent there are languages in which the plural of _I_ is *I'*s. From Southeast Asia to the Far East to Finland, to Alaska and to the Great Plains, there are people who have a morphological plural for the _I'_, and often they use it next to another pronoun, derived from a different root. Languages with such a morphologically double _we_ art very common, and frequently the two words are semantically distinct. There may be one pronoun that says, "I, you, and possibly others," and another that says, "I and others, but not you." A language as simple as Malay creates insuperable difficulties for some English speakers, because they cannot get used to this duplicity in the _we_. Kwakiutl seems to have still another _we_, one that excludes _you_ because it stresses our tribe's cohesion--including its dead members.
+
+The simplest way for the English speaker to get a sense of this semantic proliferation within the first person plural is to look at Neo-Melanesian, as Pidgin English is now proudly called. Pidgin is a "creole" language: its syntax has remained Malayo-Polynesian but most of its words are English. Mi, that's me; you, that's you; yu-pela, that's you and your fellow; mi-pela, that's me and my fellow, my peer--me and those like me, in contrast with yu-pela, you and those like you. Yumi, that's you and me, used when the speaker includes you-others, but wants to stress his tie to you, to keep distance from the fellows. Otherwise, he could just say what comes easiest: yumipela, you people with me and my fellows, all together. But, of course, he could also just pick you, me, and one other, and say yu-mi-tripela, and exclude any others who happen to be within earshot.
+
+Various languages even draw a time dimension into their _we_. Some Bantu tongues (the N'kosa for example) distinguish between the _we_ that has already come into being, and the _we_ that is hoped for. It can be argued that the Mongols and the Ewe in Dahomey can place the dimension of hope into the pronoun. They seem to have distinct ways of expressing _we_ that depend on _you_ having a chance to be our clansman, or being informed that we will not accept you as an in-law. The _thou_ can thus become a budding _we_.
+
+As we wrote this book we were aware of the semantic poverty of our pronoun. The modern _we_ tells nothing about the intention of those who are the collective subject. Only in Spanish, men and women still remain distinct as _nosotros y nosotras_, but when men speak, they feel free to include women in _nosotros_. The modern _we_ says nothing about our limits: If _we_ are some, many, or innumerable. Our _we_ reveals nothing to the person we address--if he is a part of us, expected to join us, recognized as a third person, seen as a stranger. And, finally, most importantly, our _we_ is unable to state if each one ought to be taken as the subject of the sentence; or if _we_ are all of us together: _We_ form a subject.
+
+This plastic _we_ does not tell you who we are. This is the _we_ of propaganda, which can create any subject and demand that the person addressed identify with it; which says "you ought to be one of us"; and which is used by the missionary, the humanist, and the salesman. This impoverished, borderless _we_ enables _us_ to say that _we_ (today) feel, think, and do certain things. A voracious _we_, it incorporates the speaker--even against his will. Publicity presupposes this kind of _we_. This _we_ allows the user to dispense with us, to manage us. It is the _we_ of the normal, of those who fit.
+
+As the two of us wrote this book, the literary _we_ constantly silenced us, a deafening silence that makes it impossible for the reader to know anything about the writer. Using this contemporary _we_, the speaker engages in semantic violence, incorporating groups, whose way of formulating the _we_ is heterogeneous to that of the observer, and thus driving them into silence.
+
+We are not fools enough to propose, even as a joke, to return to ethnic silence, the silent co-presence before words, language, and text came into being. We are children of the book. But in our sadness we are silly enough to long for the one silent space that remains open in our examined lives, and that is the silence of friendship.[^n01]
+
+[^n01]: _For a definition of friendship, see the epigraph to this book_.
+
diff --git a/contents/book/abc/en.txt b/contents/book/abc/en.txt
index aa1c43d..27758eb 100644
--- a/contents/book/abc/en.txt
+++ b/contents/book/abc/en.txt
@@ -1 +1,1588 @@
-# ABC - The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind
+# ABC: The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind
+
+
+## Epistola Prima
+
+an Ranulphum de Mauricio.
+
+_Quod charitas nunquam excidit_.
+
+Dilecto fratri R. HUGO peccator.
+
+_Charitas nunquam excidit_ (_I Cor_. XIII). Audieram hoc et sciebam quod verum erat. Nunc autem, frater charissime, experimentum accessit, et scio plane quod charitas nunquam excidit. Peregre profectus eram, et veni ad vos in terram alienam; et quasi aliena non erat, quoniam inveni amicos ibi: sed nescio an prius fecerim, an factus sim. Tamen inveni illic charitatem, et dilexi eam; et non potui fastidire, quia dulcis mihi erat; et implevi sacculum cordis mei, et dolui quod augustus inventus est, et non valuit capere totam: tamen implevi quantum potui. Totum implevi quod habui, sed totum capere non valui quod inveni. Accepi ergo quantum capere potui, et onustus pretio pretioso pondus non sensi, quoniam sublevabat me sarcina mea. Nunc autem longo itinere confecto, adhuc sacculum meum plenum reperio, et non excidit quidquam ex eo, quoniam _charitas nunquam excidit_. Illic ergo, frater charissime, inter cætera memoria tui primum inventa est, et signavi ex ea litteras istas, cupiens te sanum esse et salvum in Domino. Tu ergo vicem repende dilectionis, et ora pro me. Dominus
+
+Jesus Christus tecum sit. Amen.
+
+
+
+
+## Preface
+
+This book gives shape to a series of discussions that took place as we were each other's guests in Claremont and Mexico. The continuing theme in our conversations was medieval paleography. From our discussion of the impact of the written word on the mind of the laity in the late twelfth century, we strayed to speculations on two late-twentieth-century issues: the impact of literacy campaigns on the increasing number of people who remain functionally illiterate; and the impact that communication theory has had on our colleagues' perceptions of reality, turning the English language into no more than a code. Our efforts to understand the effect that parchment and seal, ink and pen had on worldview eight hundred years ago led us to the discovery of a paradox: literacy is threatened as much by modern education as by modern communication--and yet, adverse as the side effects of compulsory literacy have been for most of our contemporaries, literacy is still the only bulwark against the dissolution of language into "information systems."
+
+We decided to retrace the route by which we had arrived at this paradox. We wrote for our own consolation and the pleasure we found in exchanging notes. When our notes turned into chapters, we agreed to make our reflections public. Since we have reached no conclusions and want to make no recommendations, we have only described a history that has jolted us into our new understanding. We cannot speculate about a future that, at least for the two of us, does not exist.
+
+As students of the Middle Ages we have traveled two separate paths: one starts from Hugh of Saint Victor's discovery that the supreme form of reading consists in the "silent contemplation of the text"; the other leads from Geoffrey Chaucer and his outspoken, even overspoken Wife of Bath to Huckleberry Finn, whose words cannot be contemplated silently.
+
+We are both "lettered," that is, creatures of the book, and _not_ simply because we know how to write or decipher books. In the society that has come into existence since the Middle Ages, one can always avoid picking up a pen, but one cannot avoid being described, identified, certified, and handled--like a text. Even in reaching out to become one's own "self," one reaches out for a text.
+
+We are prejudiced in favor of history in trying to understand when and how this society came into existence. The techniques that have constituted alphabetic writing--consonants, vowels, breaks between words, paragraphs, titles--developed historically to become what they are today. Certain constructs that cannot exist without reference to the alphabet--thought and language, lie and memory, translation, and particularly the self--developed parallel to these writing techniques.
+
+If these categories had a historical beginning then they can also come to an end. Our keen awareness of literacy as a historic construction whose first emergence we can describe deepens our sense of responsibility to preserve it. Standing firmly on the _terra_ of literacy, we can see two epistemological chasms. One of these chasms cuts us off from the domain of orality. The other, which moves like smog to engulf us, equates letters with bits of information, degrading reading and writing.
+
+We discuss this impending degradation only at the end of this book. Uwe Poerksen examines it in detail elsewhere. He is one of five friends--three of whom are finishing their own manuscripts--whose contributions aided our work. Poerksen is a medievalist and a linguist, known for his history of vernacular language as used in science, when Latin was abandoned as the only scientific tongue. In his new book he deals with the "mathematization" of ordinary speech: what we refer to in chapter seven as _amoeba words_. The fourth friend, Majid Rahnema, left a high United Nations position to call for the redefinition of major development goals rather than the redesign of institutional or technical means. He analyzes the unwanted side effects of literacy programs, while we limit ourselves to the history of the categories out of which these programs are constructed. The fifth friend is Barbara Duden. Her subject is the sociogenesis of the modern human body. In the light of historical studies, she shows that the result of the self's possessive description (or should we say, the possessive self-description) is to make the body into a layer cake of superimposed texts, each "text" lettered by a different profession to define a separate set of needs that only that profession can meet. The body thus appears as the incarnation of "texts."
+
+In view of this community of collaborators, the reading guide at the end of this book has a narrow scope. It leads to the starting point of our conversations: the alphabetization of the twelfth-century popular mind.
+
+
+## Words and History
+
+_History becomes possible only when the Word turns into words. Only verbatim traditions enable the historian to reconstruct the past. Only where words that were lost can be found again does the historiographer replace the storyteller. The historian's home is on the island of writing. He furnishes its inhabitants with subject matter about the past. The past that can be seized is related to writing_.
+
+_Beyond the island's shores, memories do not become words. Where no words are left behind, the historian finds no foundations for his reconstructions. In the absence of words, artifacts are silent. We have often felt frustrated, but we accept that prehistory cannot be read. No bridge can be constructed to span this chasm_.
+
+History remains a strict discipline only when it stops short, in its description, of the nonverbal past. The critical historian, reading Herodotus or Homer, observes and admires the very creation of Greek words, for the word is a creature of the alphabet and has not always existed. If the historian tries to describe wordless societies, he soon becomes a natural historian, an anthropologist like Aristotle, whose _anthroplogein_ can only be translated as "idle talk" or "tattle tales."
+
+Herodotus knew how far the writ of the historiographer ran. A thousand years after the death of Polycrates, he wrote that the tyrant of Samos "was the first to set out to control the sea, apart from Minos of Knossos and possibly others who may have done so as well. Certainly Polycrates was the first of those whom we call the human race." Herodotus did not deny the existence of Minos, but for him Minos was not a human being in the literal sense. He let the architect of the labyrinth live on as the father-in-law of the Minotaur. He believed in gods and myths, but he excluded them from the domain of events that could be described historically. His ability cheerfully to place historical truth alongside the qualitatively different truth of myth stemmed from his having set limits on historiography. He did not see it as his job to decipher a core of describable truths in myth, to explain the sacrifice of Athenian boys to Minos as a tribute to please some lecherous Oriental potentate, as later Greek and Roman historians did. Like Plato, he retained the ability to see the myths as stories that spoke to the illiterate, to children, poets, and old women.
+
+Prior to history, Plato says, there is a narrative that unfolds, not in accordance with the rules of art and knowledge, but out of divine enthusiasm and deep emotion. Corresponding to this prior time is a different truth--namely, myth. In this truly oral culture, before phonetic writing, there can be no words and therefore no text, no original, to which tradition can refer, no subject matter that can be passed on. A new rendering is never just a new version, but always a new song. Thinking itself takes wing; inseparable from speech, it is never there but always gone, like a bird in flight. The storyteller spins his threads, on and on, never repeating himself word for word. No variants can ever be established. This is often overlooked by those who engage in the "reading" of the prehistorical mind, whether their reading is literary, structuralist, or psychoanalytic. They turn Minos into a person, the Minotaur into a dream, and the Labyrinth into a symbol.
+
+Memories of this prehistory become a historical source, a verbatim tradition, only through historiography. Only the historian, writing it down, freezes the source material for his descendants, as Flavius Josephus stresses in his _Jewish War_: "My task is to write down what I have been told, not to believe everything; and what I am saying here applies to my entire work." Only the original text gives simultaneous rise to source and history.
+
+Every original text is the record of something heard. Some scribe of genius listened to Homer and the result was the one _Iliad_. Bernardo de Sahagun, the sixteenth-century Franciscan missionary in Mexico, and a pupil of Erasmus, took down hundreds of Aztec songs. He tried to apply the rules of textual criticism to several songs on the same theme all attributed to Prince Netzalhuacoyotl, but failed to reconstruct an original. In their deceptive similarity, each song, when written down, was not a variant but an original. Anthropologists become hunters chasing unwritten materials; tape recorders in hand, they descend on blacks, women, peasants--anyone on whose lips they sense prehistory. Folklorists sieve sagas and legends for fragments of oral phraseology. It is the task of the historian to develop the tools for recognizing which of these records are original sources, that is to say, texts that are not based on other texts, but represent the first fixing of speech. For those records are the flotsam from the oral realm that have washed up on the historiographer's shore, dicta for the first time broken down into words, sung rhythms strung in verses.
+
+Writing is not the only technique we know of for making the flow of speech coagulate and for carrying clots of language along intact for tens or even hundreds of years. When melody, meter, and rhythm combine with a proverb, the result is often an indestructible nugget of language. The drummers of the Lokele who live in the jungle of Zaire, not far from the former Congo River, still know the sayings that fit their tom-tom rhythms. In fact they need the sayings in order to drum the rhythms. But no one now remembers what they mean--or whether they ever "said" anything.
+
+In certain rituals practiced in the Isthmus of Panama, sequences of sounds are used, in which rhythm, melody, and articulation form a three-dimensional counterpoint. The counterpoint effectively prevents any change from creeping in, the chants acting as mummified dicta from a forgotten, prehistoric age. Legal maxims, oaths, spells, benedictions and curses, elements of genealogy, the stock epithets attaching to the name of a god, a hero, or a place, are all very often secured against corruption in this way. The utterance can also be tied to a thing. The tally stick that the Maori orator holds in front of him and to which he hitches his solemn oration, the quipu, or knotted bundle of threads that enables the Incan runner to reel off his news like a rosary, the sequence of pictures drawn on a wall, can support the unchanged repetition of sounds that might make no sense to the speaker. The caste organization of preliterate India can be understood as the social organization of a mnemonic device that enables the Brahmins to preserve the Vedas unchanged. Gestures that coalesce with the liturgical murmurs in a sacrificial ceremony fix language to body movements. Through all these techniques, nuggets of frozen speech can be carried along in an oral culture.
+
+But it would be a grave mistake to view the alphabet primarilyas an immense improvement over these mnemonic devices. Only the alphabet has the power to create "language" and "words," for the word does not emerge until it is written down. Neither the songs of the poets, nor the invocations of the priests, nor the dictates of rulers from prehistoric times are sequences of words. Their immense yet evanescent power eludes description, and those who uttered them were unable, for all their oral skill, to see their own speech as a string on which words are the beads. Prehistory knows nothing of these mono- or polysyllabic atoms of language whose semantic fields we plot with our dictionaries. What prehistory perceives as units can have only _audible_ contours. The sequences of sounds between pauses that characterize speech are not words but syllables, phrases, strophes. It is to these measures of speech alone that the original _word_ or Logos relates. This meaning has become secondary today, although we invoke it when we "give" or "go back on" our word, or when we "have a word" with someone. For us the "real" meaning of _word_ is _grammatical building block_, before and after which our pen breaks contact with the paper. Plato's slayers, barbarians, and children still live in a prelogical, that is, a "word-less" society.
+
+The historian misreads prehistory when he assumes that "language" can be spoken in that word-less world. In the oral beyond, there is no "content" distinct from the winged word that always rushes by before it has been fully grasped, no "subject matter" that can be conceived of, entrusted to teachers, and acquired by pupils (hence no "education," "learning," and "school"). For it is the record in phonetic writing that first carries what is heard across a chasm separating two heterogenous eras of speech. The alphabetic scribe carries what is spoken from the ever-passing moment and sets down what he has heard in the permanent space of language. Only with this act can knowledge, separate from speech, be born.
+
+As literates, we think of speech as the use of language, and we think of this language as outliving speech, as leaving traces--if not on paper, then in our selves. Before the concept of recording sounds through the alphabet had come into being, speech could not be imagined to leave such a trail. Without a listener (who might be an angel or God), speech could not be perceived as anything but madness, because speech courts attention. And before this sound-recording through the alphabet, a listener could not be perceived as a recorder. The nod indicated that the other person had understood, not that he had recorded the message, accepted the information.
+
+How different speech is from language is made clear by the fact that language is always neuter, while speech is always gendered. With every utterance, the speaker refers back to himself and his gender. It is always the total quality of speech that refers the listener to the speaker's gender, not the grammatical gender of the pronoun "I." (Nowhere, with the possible exception of the oasis of Hadramut, does the personal pronoun have grammatical gender.) In a culture, what sounds feminine and what sounds masculine is determined by convention, and not by the biological nature of the vocal cords. The way men and women speak contrasts in many ways: linguists, anthropologists, and sociologists recognize about two dozen criteria describing these contrasts. In no two places is their configuration the same. The gender contrast in speech is just as fundamental as the contrast in phonemes, but it has barely been remarked. At the very best, recently, linguists have examined the discrimination against women in the so-called "use" of language, which is genderless.
+
+This gender contrast in speech is lost when it congeals as language on the page. It does not survive the jump from pure time of speech into the permanent, spatial dimension of script. To return to Herodotus: The historian's task starts "with those whom we call the human race" that script has brought into being; with men and women when they begin to speak the same language. (We have been tempted to speculate that the story of the Tower of Babel tells of this event.)
+
+
+If alphabetic writing can be spoken of as bringing the human race into existence, it is only because this kind of writing is unique, as a study of the history and phenomenology of phonetic writing will reveal. Pure, mature phonetic writing, which was discovered only once, albeit in stages, is an oddity among writing systems in the same way that the loudspeaker is an oddity among trumpets. The alphabet records only sounds, and it is only through sounds that it provides meaning. The alphabet does exactly the opposite of what most hieroglyphics and ideograms and, most importantly, what Semitic letters were created to do.
+
+In writing systems using hieroglyphics and ideograms, the reader is expected to speak; the ideogram itself is silent. The statement "1 × 1" says "once one," or "one times one," or even "multiplication table." But it can equally be read "jedan put jedan." In all these scripts the reader must find the spoken expression from recollecting what has been said before: Mayan hieroglyphics, for example, provide the clues so that the reader may speak aloud from memory. Through landmarks that are more than just pictograms, they help him find his way orally along an often-traveled path. Ideograms, too, originally point toward utterance. They presuppose that the reader is familiar with the content of ideas whose individual elements are strung in a row before him to be named. Reading thus means retelling the familiar content depicted in accordance with more or less precise rules. Even when--as in the third millennium B.C.--the individual Egyptian hieroglyph or Mesopotamian ideograph become logograms, so that from that point on they had to be named with one and only one word, the word presents itself to the reader without any indication about its sound; the ending and inflection that make it audible must be supplied by the reader.
+
+The early part of the second millennium B.C. saw a series of faltering attempts here and there in the Middle East to bind speech more closely to writing. Convention came to dictate that a particular pictogram or ideogram, which had become a logogram, could be used as a syllable sign. The reader put aside any recognizable meaning of the word and read it into the text for its sound only. As a syllable sign it came to be placed beside the thing sign, making it easier to decipher. Reading became somewhat like solving a rebus. Nowhere, however, did a true syllabary evolve out of this custom--the Indian syllabic alphabet is of considerably more recent origin than the Greek. It is an admirable system of phonetic notation that grew out of the Greek invention.
+
+Quite suddenly, around 1400 B.C., an entirely new kind of script made its appearance on the border between the Egyptian hieroglyphic tradition and the cuneiform of Mesopotamia. This North Semitic alphabet was the first to have signs for sounds only, and only one sign for each group of sounds. Some archaeologists have speculated on a single inventor for this alphabet, so completely does it accomplish both requirements for script from the first moment of its appearance: the universe of heard sounds--an almost infinite variety of sounds in every language, with men and women, children and dotards, singers and ragmen all sounding different--is reduced to a limited number, each of which is then labeled.
+
+However, this Byblos alphabet whose letters stand only for sounds does not have any letters for vowels. The freely voiced qualities of breathing are not indicated, only the consonants, the harsh or soft obstacles the breath encounters. Its script does not yet transform the page into a mirror of speech, but is rather a burial ground for the skeleton of language. Being a purely phonetic notation, it differs radically from all previous scripts, but it can still be read only by someone trained for a special kind of analysis. Only a person who has developed the ability to recognize within the uninterrupted string of consonants groups of two to five elements that act as "roots" can breathe those roots into life. The roots grow into words only when the reader makes them resound according to the semantic function they ought to play in the environment in which they stand.
+
+In a prophetic vision, Ezekiel describes the process: "The hand of the Lord carried me out ... in the midst of a valley which was full of bones that, lo, were very dry ... and I prophesied as I was commanded, and the bones came together: bone to bone ... but there was as yet no breath in them ... and the Lord said, 'Breathe upon the slain [literally: Give thy soul, _nefesh_, to them] that they may live' ... and as I did, they stood upon their feet" (Ezek. 37:1-10). It is astounding with what audacity a clutch of pastoral tribes in Canaan claimed the invention as their own. As Exodus relates, Israel overcame "Egypt" intellectually and emotionally with the invention of phonetic writing. The mummies in their tombs are supplanted by roots. No longer is it only priests who can promise the continuation of life after death by deciphering the hieroglyphs. The invention of the Semitic script makes possible a new relationship to the life and death of Osiris.
+
+From now on the written character rescues a sequence of sounds from ephemerality; and living speech is dismembered by the scribe, who as he listens to dictation ponders the speech, examines it for its inaudible roots, determines the (usually) three consonants that compose it, and engraves these into a clay tablet. The letters he has buried tell what roots have been read into the recorded utterance, and these letters can be resurrected at any time alphabetically by the reader.
+
+Greek merchants acquired the string of Semitic consonants from Syrian traders on the coast of Asia Minor. They left the sequence of letters undisturbed, with their shapes recognizable and their names unchanged, but they perverted the use of these letters. While for the Semite _beth_ had a semantic association, because for him it means "house," for the Greek it is merely the name of a letter that stands for a sound. Four of the Semitic letters were not needed by the Greeks: To the Greek ear they stood for barbaric noises. The Greeks of the eighth century used them to indicate vowels. The consonants are now placed between vocals, the entire word now lies on the page. No more does the reader have to recognize naked bones that must be properly assembled by the eye and then fleshed out only by breathing life into them. The page has become a record of sounds.
+
+Phonetic script could now do the opposite of what the string of consonants had so far done. While the consonants had been used to record units of meaning that the scribe had picked from the flow of speech, the Greeks froze the flow of speech itself onto the page. The scroll had been sounded thus far through an act of interpretation of the letters; alphabetic recording that fixed sound on the page brings an utterance from the past into the present, to which the reader can listen, interpreting what he hears. The Jew searches with his eyes for inaudible roots in order to flesh them out with his breath. The Greek picks the sound from the page and searches for the invisible ideas in the sounds the letters command him to make.
+
+The transformations brought about by Greek literacy are well symbolized by the appearance of Sybil, who replaces her older sister, the Pythia, as the model of the prophetess. Her story is told by Heraclitus, a Pythagorean who, through Cratylus, could claim Plato as a pupil. He was the first to distinguish the consonants (which he divided into the unvoiced _aphthonga_ and the sonant _aphona_) from the vowels. Plutarch has conserved the passage from Heraclitus in which the Sybil makes her first appearance. In the image of the alphabet, she wrests utterance from its temporal context and turns prophecy into a literary genre: "Sybil, in her mania, makes the oracle of the god ring out a whole millennium, joyless, odorless, and unadorned..." She spells out the future. For the Sybil first writes her oracle on leaves, then later on tablets. She brings stone slabs to King Tarquinas, who reigned over the Campagne, south of Rome--over Etruscan towns through which the Romans got their alphabet. No one need strain anymore to hear the ominous murmurings of the Delphic Pythia. The menacing future can now be read.
+
+
+## Memory
+
+_At the time when heaven still embraced the earth, when Uranus still lay with full-hipped Gaia, an aeon before the Olympian gods, the Titans were born and with them, memory, or Mnemosyne. In the_ Hymns to Hermes, _she is called the Mother of the Muses. She is the earliest of the goddesses, preceding even Apollo with his lyre. Hesiod mentions her as the goddess of the first hour of the world and describes her flowing hair as she stretches out beside Zeus on his couch, there to beget the rest of her nine daughters, the Muses. It is she who adopts the son of Maya, the "shamefaced" or "awful" nymph, and thus makes him the son of two mothers. She provides Hermes with two unique gifts: a lyre and a "soul." When the god Hermes plays to the song of the Muses, its sound leads both poets and gods to Mnemosyne's wellspring of remembrance. In her clear waters float the remains of past lives, the memories that Lethe has washed from the feet of the departed, turning dead men into mere shadows. A mortal who has been blessed by the gods can approach Mnemosyne and listen to the Muses sing in their several voices what is, what was, and what will be. Under the protection of Mnemosyne, he may recollect the residues that have sunk into her bosom by drinking from her waters. When he returns from his visit to the spring--from his dream or vision--he can tell what he has drawn from this source. Philo says that by taking the place of a shadow the poet recollects the deeds that a dead man has forgotten. In this way, the world of the living constantly makes contact with the world of the dead_.
+
+The modern _memory_ does not derive from the older _Mnemosyne_, but from another, later Latin word, _memoria_. Like words and text, memory is a child of the alphabet. Only after it had become possible to fix the flow of speech in phonetic transcription did the idea emerge that knowledge--information--could be held in the mind as in a store. Today, we take this idea so completely for granted that it is hard for us to reconstruct an age when recollection was not conceived as a trip into the cellar to pick up stores, or a look into a ledger to verify an entry. Since the fourth century B.C., memory has been conceived as such a deposit that can be opened, searched, and used. Philosophers have disputed where this deposit is located--in the heart, the brain, the community, or perhaps in God, but in all these discussions memory has remained a bin, a wax tablet, or a book.
+
+For turning this idea topsy-turvy, Milman Parry ranks close to Einstein, although it took much longer before the implications of Parry's achievement were grasped, since humanists, as a rule, are much more conservative than physicists. Thanks to research done in the 1930s by this young Harvard classicist and his assistant Albert Lord, it is now clear that a purely oral tradition knows no division between recollecting and doing. The pre-alphabetic bard does not, like his medieval counterpart, draw on a storehouse of memories in order to compose a poem. Rather, he dips into a grab bag of phrases and adjectives and, driven by the rhythms of the lyre, spins the yarn of a tale.
+
+Parry's thesis, submitted to the Sorbonne in 1928, argued that the _Iliad_ could only have come into being through oral recitation and in the rhythm of spoken hexameters. According to Parry's hypothesis, there are two heterogenous processes by which social continuity is preserved: the flow of prehistoric epic tales that are never repeated word for word; and history that is built on the bedrock of words. In a purely oral tradition, songs, epics, and sayings do not hover above life. That life is a delicate, complex tissue steeped in epic recollections. As soon as the stream of recollections becomes even potentially visible as a narrative, this stream clots and turns into an authority, a point of reference, a socially disembedded rule, the excrement of lived wisdom that a new kind of wise man, called the scribe, can shape.
+
+This epistemological heterogeneity between history and prehistory only gradually gained acceptance. It contradicts the assumption made by the sciences that categories exist to describe human experience _tout court_. Parry's hypothesis stood up only because the question whether a particular text represents the direct, firsthand transcription of a preliterate tradition can be answered according to strict rules.
+
+The new field of research Parry marked out makes it possible today to determine with certainty whether a particular text is, in the strict sense, prehistoric--whether it is the faithful record of a preliterate improvisation, or the line of a speaker who uses language or memory to compose a text. During the last fifty years Parry's pupils have applied phonologically governed linguistics to the criticism of literary works and the study of oral tradition. In the course of their research, they observed that surviving elements of oral tradition often complemented the detailed study of the linguistic peculiarities of certain major Greek texts and subsequently of epics in other languages as well. They have developed, tested, and refined a number of criteria that make it possible to distinguish oral poetry from every kind of written compositionwith impressive consistency. Their criteria are the best way we know to evoke the elusive activity of preliterate recollecting in the time before _scripta_ of information, originals, or copies emerged.
+
+To begin with Parry's thesis about the _Iliad_: The _Iliad_ reveals a mastery in self-limitation within given patterns that cannot be imitated self-conscious literacy. What Eric Havelock calls the "variation within the same" has never been approximated by any poet. Only texts that exhibit five forms of self-limitation simultaneously may be regarded as genuine, firsthand written records of oral improvisation: First, in Greek epics, the hexameters are composed of standard word groups. Second, those word groups are mutually attracted to one another during oral recitation. Purely statistically, there is an increasing probability of finding the same formulae in the same section of the epic. Third, the line usually coincides with a syntactic unit: Many lines could be ended with a full stop or a comma because at least the meaning comes to an end there. Fourth, a uniform--though complicated--pattern occurs at the level of the phoneme; combinations of sounds that fall outside the pattern inevitably point to written composition rather than oral improvisation. Finally, this quantitatively verifiable self-limitation relates even to the pattern of the story as a whole: The return of the hero, for example, is always, in oral improvisation, told in the same phrases within the same culture.
+
+According to Parry, the question of the origin of Homeric epics had remained unsolved for so long because it had been wrongly framed. Even today much Homeric research is directed toward looking for an author. Who was the parent of those twenty-seven thousand hexameters? Was he an editor of songs that he had collected from people who knew them by heart? Was he a she? Or was he a godlike poet who composed them himself? Did he write them down, or did he get someone else to do it? Or did others learn them from him, memorizing them, so that much later, after the invention of the alphabet, like a Greek Samizdat, they could be written down?
+
+For Parry, both hypotheses--that of the editor and that of the poet--were equally untenable. Neither learning by heart nor composing were possible in prehistoric times. Before writing, there was no text that could have been internalized and later reproduced like a film script or a part in a play. Not until there was a text could there be a recitation. In Plato's day, there were already people who knew the Homeric epic by heart--in the _Ion_, Plato describes Socrates' dialogue with such a mnemonist. Xenophon also tells of such a rhapsode who knew all of Homer's work by heart and was admired for it. But that very admiration is already Classical, providing proof that the rhapsode's act of memory was regarded as an extraordinary achievement. No oral society supplies accounts of an epic poet being admired for feats of recollection. They were neither prodigies nor super-Brahmanic mnemonists.
+
+But neither was Homer a man of letters--for the simple reason that there were no letters. The lines of the _Iliad_ do not consist of a series of words. Those who sang it were driven by the rhythm of the lyre. In the twenty-seven thousand hexameters, we can find twenty-nine thousand repetitions of phrases with two or more words. Homer sang as a prehistoric rhapsode--the Greek _rhapsodein_ meaning to stitch together, a linguistic connection that is shared with the _Sutras_, stitched (sutured) together. Homer's art consisted of stitching together a series of stock words and phrases.
+
+We are so used to drawing a distinction between speaking (and the language that we speak) and thinking (and the language in which it is clothed) that we are no longer capable of composing aloud by improvisation. This difficulty did not exist for the bard: He was composing and reciting simultaneously. As easily as he handles the Greek verb in the rhythm of speech, he finds the first stock word in the poetic vocabulary that leads him on to the next one that will fit in the hexameter. Choosing the one correct verbal inflection from the limited group of forms is as easy for him as selecting the phonetically and syntactically right formula from the vast, but after all finite, group of such formulae in the poetic vocabulary of _his_ time.
+
+In making his choice, the rhapsode was not so much concerned with the actual meaning of the particular adjective selected. It is therefore a mistake to judge these epics according to the aesthetic canon of the Classical Age. Homer, in contrast with Virgil, was not only word-less, but also languageless. The singer of the _Iliad_, carried along by the beat of the hexameters, was able to locate and use the wonderfully precise nuances of the Greek verb forms and to choose from the enormous store of "winged words." No object remains from this performance. The art of Homer consisted of fluent improvisation within strictly limited means: the art of Classicism gives poetic originality free rein. That originality consists of the deliberate recasting of a given text; that is to say it was based on improving imitation--the mimesis praised by Aristotle. For Virgil, the _Aeneid_ was a work of art: It was an object that he continued improving by changing a word here and there--until, on his deathbed, he wanted to burn it in frustration. The _Aeneid_ allows itself to be paraphrased. In contrast, Homer can only be rendered--the word cannot be pried from the meaning.
+
+Parry's theory remained mere speculation until he managed to observe the singing of living traditional rhapsodes. In the 1930s, he and his pupil Albert Lord traveled to Serbia, where they made the acquaintance of a number of folksingers who still had their roots in the epic traditions of the Balkans. In Turkish coffeehouses and at peasant weddings they sang all night, telling stories to the rhythms of the _gusla_. Using the complicated equipment of pre-war days, Parry recorded their epics on metal discs in order to check his theory by observation.
+
+No _guslar_ ever repeated the same epic word for word. Every performance was, as Parry expected, a fresh attiring of the old story. For many years after Parry's death, Lord continued the research. He was able to observe the process whereby a youngster became a _guslar_. First, the young man spent years listening to the master singing. While tending his herds, he practiced using the stock formulae and so gradually became familiar with the poetic vocabulary. With growing assurance he was able, accompanied by the strum of the _gusla_, to fall back more and more upon those set pieces; but only a small number of skilled bards could draw, even in their maturity, upon the full repertoire of rhythmic fragments. The deeper his active mastery of the wealth of formulae, the clearer his understanding of the content of the songs he heard. Once this faculty was fully developed, he needed only one night's listening to a song he did not know in order to be able to reproduce that song himself a week later. No one could do it on the same day: The _guslari_ say that a story needs time to ferment in the bard--at least a day and a night.
+
+Parry's theory enables us to understand that so complex a structure as the _Iliad_ was sung in a single draft--without the aid of written notes, plans, or drafts. According to Lord's observations in Serbia, it is entirely possible that a single bard assembled from formulae and sang tens of thousands of verses in one outpouring. The riddle of how such work is written down is also solved, according to Lord. In Serbia, he attempted, without tape recorders, to get an accurate written record of long epics. It emerged that collaboration between a clever town clerk and a mature _guslar_ produced surprisingly good results.
+
+At the start, the bard felt annoyed and uneasy about having to pause repeatedly in his singing and rely on plucking his _gusla_ to keep him in time. Soon, however, the _guslar_ began to enjoy this leisure and to use the additional time to utter the proper formula. And in the clerk he found a listener who allowed him to spin out his material at his own discretion until it was exhausted. The writing down of the _Iliad_ could have taken place under similar circumstances, and Homer probably had the same attitude toward the text as the _guslari_: not one of them was the least bit interested in having so much as a line of the written record read back to him for checking.
+
+The knowledge gained from this comparison of the Serbian _guslar_ and Homer has proved helpful over the past fifty years in the study of cultures that have persisted beyond the reach of records. It has come to form one of the foundations of scholarly discussion of the epic in the Anglo-Saxon world and has led to entirely new insights in the study of the medieval epic.
+
+Oral transmission of epics ceases with writing, and with it, at the dawn of history, fades the idea of memory as the goddess of immortal recollection. For the Classical poet of Greece no longer has need of recollections from a "beyond." No longer is each utterance like a piece of driftwood the speaker fished from a streamful of treasures, something cast off in the beyond that had just then washed up onto the beaches of the mind. No longer are thought and memory intertwined in every statement with no distinction between thought and speech.
+
+When epic tradition becomes a recorded one and custom is transmogrified into written law, the poet's sources are frozen into the texts. He can follow the lines of a written text; the river that feeds its own source is remembered no more. Not one Greek city has preserved an altar dedicated to Mnemosyne. Her name became a technical term for "memory" now imagined as a page: the water of memory turns into the fluency of a writer and a reader. Fixed words on clay tablets acquire authority over the re-evocation of fluid speech.
+
+Plato, in the early fourth century B.C., stands on the threshold between the oral and written cultures of Greece. The earliest epigraphic and iconographic indications of young boys being taught to write date from Plato's childhood. In his day, people had already been reciting Homer from the text for centuries, but the art of writing was still primarily a handicraft. From the seventh until well into the sixth century B.C., reading and writing were confined, in Greece, to very narrow circles. In the fifth century B.C., craftsmen began to acquire the art of carving or engraving letters of the alphabet. But writing was still not a part of recognized instruction: The most a person was expected to be able to write and spell was his own name. The taking of dictation and the fluent reading of written materials were not yet part of knowledge used for control and education. Until the fifth century B.C., schooling in Athens was purely oral, musical, and gymnastic. _Mousike_ stood at the core of the Greek curriculum: Poems were recited and improvised, rhythmic rhetoric was practiced, pupils learned stringed and wind instruments, singing and dancing. The few pictures in which a teacher is represented with a stylus in his hand show that the alphabet now made it possible for the teacher to read out to the pupils the poems to be learned. Thus a full century before the stylus was imposed on pupils, they were able to learn the texts by heart. That is to say, they gained an understanding of a fixed text that could be listened to, and a respect for the sound of its words, long before they were required to write or read fluently.
+
+Plato's was the time of great change from instruction in elevated, rhythmic public speech to the predominance of prose speech. What formerly could only be recited or sung, can now be pinned down, penned down. The script can be copied, one copy serving as the source for another. The scroll can freeze "materials" for a teacher. It is not the speech but the language of the past that can be made present. Plato heard the Pythagoreans and Socrates. He does not claim to have dictation from them, but he does boast about his faculty of recollection. He is not a traitor like Hippias, who disclosed the orally transmitted secret teachings of Pythagoras. He is already a writer--however anachronistic that may sound. His dialogues are literary prose. He created the model--never surpassed--of the written dialogue that imitates speech. His literary oeuvre forms a counterpart to the record of Homeric song from prehistoric times.
+
+Plato was not Greece's first author. But he was the first uneasy man of letters. He was the first to write with the conviction of the superiority of thought unrelated to writing. He was anguished by the effect the alphabet was exerting on his pupils. Their reliance on silent, passive texts could not but narrow the stream of their remembrance, making it shallow and dull. Earlier, this mistrust of the alphabet had been reflected in Aeschylus' _Prometheus Bound_: Zeus punished Prometheus for bringing the alphabet--"the combining of letters, creative mother of the Muses' art, wherewith to hold all things in memory"--to mankind. Zeus had engendered his daughters in the pond of Mnemosyne so that they might bubble and flow, not be locked up in script.
+
+Plato, who saw writing as a threat to the meditative search, kept coming back to the question of Mnemosyne: memory/recollection. How do we bring the past into the present? He answers the question through Diotima in the _Symposium_, after he has been extolling Eros: "To what does the word _meditation_ refer if not to knowledge that is past? When we forget, knowledge escapes us. Meditation then brings us to new knowledge and gives it the appearance of still being the same."
+
+Diotima describes the search for truth in terms that very closely parallel the process by which the Serbian _guslar_ repeatedly retrieves the same material from oblivion and spins it into a new song. Plato's intellectual path, his access to truth and ideas, is an epic one. This becomes clearer when we read further in Diotima's speech: It forms part of her answer to Socrates, who wants her to teach him about the secrets of Eros. For Diotima, "meditating" is an expression or form of creative love, which in its search for the immortal is always giving itself anew and always withdrawing. Eros longs for what is permanent, and it takes shape when we meditate on the immortal truth, on _eidos_. Only this kind of loving meditation can lead to wisdom. Plato sees this search for the springs of truth as being threatened by a polymathy based on writing.
+
+To give form to that threat, Plato "fabricates," as Phaidros puts it, the story of Theuth, the inventor of letters. Theuth seeks to "sell" the letters to King Thamus of Thebes as a _pharmakon_, a medicine to strengthen the power of recollection and intellect of his subjects. The word _pharmakon_ carries a suggestion of magic and the vegetable kingdom. It can be translated as "drug"--either a healing potion or a poison, depending on how it is used. Which of the two was meant was decided by the epithet: In some sayings _pharmakon_ means "boon," in others "mischief." Theuth not only presents himself as the inventor of a new means, he also presents a new kind of end.
+
+Thamus thanks him, but he refuses. "O skillful Theuth," he says, "being the inventor of an art is different from being the person who has to decide what advantages and disadvantages that art will bring to those who employ it. You stand before me as the father of letters. With a father's favor, you attribute to letters a fortune that they cannot possess. This facility will make souls forgetful because they will no longer school themselves to meditate. They will rely on letters. Things will be recollected from outside by means of alien symbols; they will not remember on their own. What you are offering me is a drug for recollection, not for memory... Your instruction will give them only a semblance of truth, not the truth itself. You will train ignorant know-alls, nosey know-nothings, boring wiseacres."
+
+Thus in the Classical period memory became divided into two sorts: The natural--that which was born simultaneously with thought--and the artificial--that which could be improved, through precise techniques, or devices, and exercises. The Classical teacher of rhetoric still viewed recollection as the result of a journey, but not to the shore of a river to pick up a piece of driftwood that Plato called "similar" to another piece that had been lost beyond recall. The trip now led to a storage room, as Aristotle says, "to recover knowledge through previous sensations _held_ in one's memory."
+
+Each of the three primary works of rhetoric (the anonymous _Rhetorica Ad Herennium_ [82–81 B.C.], on which later Western traditions of memory training were based and which was attributed to Tullius; Cicero's _De Oratore_ [55 B.C.]; and Quintillian's _Instituto oratoria_ [first century A.D.]) describes essentially the same mnemonic technique. A person tries to imprint on his memory the interior of a building, preferably a spacious one, visualizing each location--stores, attics, stairs, fore-and antechambers--complete with accessories, such as furniture, paintings, and sculpture. The person then equates the ideas to be remembered with certain images (_imagines agentes_); Quintillian uses the example of an anchor and weapon, perhaps to signify ships and war. These _imagines agentes_ are mentally placed into various _loci_ within the building. When the person wishes to "recollect" certain facts, he merely revisits these pre-designated places in the building, and gathers them up once again.
+
+The construction of a memory palace met the needs of the rhetorical arts. To deliver a convincing speech, the speaker must remember it in a planned order; and to prepare for arguments, he must remember points that he has previously connected. (The idea of a planned order would have been, of course, alien to the epic poet, the story unfolding as inevitably as each note followed the next on his musical instrument.) The "palace" of memories provides not only the recollected facts, but also the shape, essential to a well-constructed rhetorical argument.
+
+These architectonic images are suited to the shift from the aural to the visual emphasis that a script culture, like Greece by the end of the fifth century B.C., demands. In fact, Plutarch mentions that Simonides of Ceos, who was believed to have invented the "artificial" mnemonic devices, called painting "silent poetry," equating the visual aspect of the two arts that Horace summarizes as _ut pictura poesis_. For the writers of the three Latin memory texts, memory is a signet ring leaving its impression on wax. Aristotle, in his _De Memoria et reminiscentia_, puts down the old waters of Mnemosyne using virtually the same image: "Some men in the presence of considerable stimulus cannot remember owing to disease or age, just as if a stylus or a seal were impressed on flowing water."
+
+Martianus Capella, a contemporary of Augustine, goes even further. It is Capella who once and for all replaces the cut stone of a sealing ring with the stylus, the image impressed on the wax of memory by letters traced on an invisible tablet. The three-dimensional pictogram of Classical memory thus appears as the arrangement of logograms on the slate of the mind. Capella's _Marriage of Philology to Mercury_ was read in the Middle Ages; the monastic curriculum built around the seven liberal arts has been shaped in part by Capella's fanciful summary of antique learning. He served as one of the bridges between Cicero and Alcuin, to Aquinas, over which the conception of memory as a store has reached us.
+
+And while in antiquity this image of memory as an archive referred primarily to a device used by the rhetor, scholasticism made of memory a faculty of every soul, like will and intelligence. Thus, each soul was also burdened with a conscience--a record of its own doings that could be read and examined by clergy and laity, literate and illiterate alike. The rhetorical device provided the foundation for a new activity, confession, the verbal manifestation of a secret kept in one's own heart. And not only deeds left traces that could be admitted; past words and even past thoughts that inspired the deeds could soon be read in an examination of conscience.
+
+
+## Text
+
+_The Lindisfarne Gospel, painted and lettered around 697  A.D., brings into sight the watershed that separates the oral from the de scriptive mind. Opposite the beginning of each Gospel in the Lindisfarne Book stands a wordless ornamental page, decorated in the style of Irish and Saxon sword handles, silver cups, and fibulae, that balances the lettered page to the right. The initial letter of the text appears on the ornamental page, but it also both frames and penetrates the strings of uncial letters on the lettered page. It looks as if the calligraphic outpourings of one capital had the task of weaving the texture that supports the sentences. Occasionally the interwoven colored lines take the appearance of elongated dogs or birds, only to dissolve again into infinitely prolonged tongues, tails, and ears. Only the portraits of the four Evangelists rise from this painted warp and written woof: not symbols but strong individuals shown in the style of late antique coins rendered in sharp, northern lines_.
+
+_In the Book of Kells, written one hundred years later, it is easier to speak separately of its lettering and drawings. The form of the letters reveals its date: no longer roman capitals and not yet medieval minuscules. Historians are still in disagreement about the place at which it was written and the origin of the stylistic elements it com bines. Around 1185, Geraldus Cambrensis was still impressed by its beauty: The designs are "so deliberate and subtle, so exact and compact, so full of knots and links, with colors so fresh and vivid, that you might say that all this was the work of an angel and not of a man."_
+
+_Art historians have talked about barbaric instincts surfacing on these "Baroque" pages, which react against the reforms attempted by Charlemagne. We should say: The book talks as if literacy had not yet settled in. It talks through the style of its meandering threads. They challenge the reader to weave the one story of Christ's life out of four tales, thereby fleshing out the "Word of God," the Gospel Truth. Seen in this way, the Book of Kells is a kind of "Homeric page" in which, at an early date in England, oral storytelling has been for a moment visibly frozen in the cadence of knot and link that punctuates the series of letters--just as the strum of the lyre punctuates the utterance of the singer. The Good News becomes visible. Like a stream of fiber s that is drawn from the distaff, twisted between the fingers and turned into a yarn, so the Good News is embodied in the spinning out of a yarn, knitting up of a tale, weaving the tales into a story. The metaphors of narration are taken from yarn and spindle and loom, used by oral societies to embody and share their unspeakable perception. Even today the Navajos and Aymara women weave each tribe's cosmography into one reality with its social geography. Both in the mesas and in the Andes the seeds must be brought to the field in kerchiefs that tell the unspoken story of the spot at which they will grow. During the final years of intense oral tradition in the north of the British Islands, the pages of the Book of Kells make a wordless tale of this kind visible, even to the unlettered. But for the reader, what is on the page is not the same as what is in the book. The letters and the lines tell the same story in dissymmetric, mutually untranslatable ways. The knotted lines that occasionally spawn figures are not yet illustrations to the text, for the texture of the lettered rows has not yet arranged itself to be perceived by the eyes as a visible "text."_
+
+_The idea of the "text" that is_ in the book _could not come about without major changes in the elements that are visible_ on the page. _By pointing to the arrangement of lines and colors on the page, the emergence of a "text" can be followed, even by a modern illiterate--one who cannot decipher the insular majuscule in which the Book of Kells is written, or who cannot understand a single sentence in Latin. The transformation of the manuscript page during the eight hundred years that precede Gutenberg illustrates the steps through which the mind of the West has come into being_.
+
+It was not until the Middle Ages that letters ushered in a new type of society. The role played by letters in the birth of this new kind of society can be studied on two levels. On one level, new ways of doing business, nourishing prayer life, and administering justice all became feasible through the written preservation of words. In the twelfth century neither the heresies nor the new orders, neither the new towns nor their universities could be understood without the new and broad spread of the word that was now not only said but read.
+
+The second way letters changed a society--by their own symbolism getting under a culture's skin and changing social perception in terms of the written word--has been much less studied and is much more difficult to talk about. The reason for this research lacuna is probably that all the categories by which we talk about past societies have been acquired by reading. By their very nature they serve to _describe_. They are directly suited to saying things about a society in which social relations are governed by a reliance on written language. Even as poets, we are men of letters. What we call science originates from description. Absurdly, we speak of the surviving body of oral traditions as "oral literature," which literally means "oral writing." Consequently, it is very difficult to convey how society was turned inside out by the spread of writing in the Middle Ages.
+
+In the part of Europe lying north of the Alps, between the middle of the twelfth century and the end of the thirteenth, an unprecedented change occurred in the nature of social relations: Trust, power, possession, and everyday status were henceforth functions of the alphabet. The use of documents, together with a new way of shaping the written page, turned writing, which in the Early and High Middle Ages had been extolled and honored as a mysterious embodiment of the Word of God, into a constituent element in the mediation of mundane relations.
+
+So long as literacy was confined to minorities, as was the case until the High Middle Ages, power was exercised in the form of foreign rule. Relying on his _Calendarium_, in 1186--scarcely four years after his election--Abbot Samson, a foreigner, knew every bushel owed on every hide of St. Edmund's land. Even though the tenant knew no letters--the Abbot's means of recollection was as foreign to him as the book of the Day of Judgement--writing had left an impression on his soul as if it were a whip. He was now under the coercion of writing to pay those debts that he did not care to remember.
+
+As literacy became more general and, by the end of the medieval period, embraced large sections of society, changes began to seep into everyone's everyday life. Without obliterating social relations based on orality in a uniform way, it engendered a growing tension between custom and legality.
+
+In the committing of oaths to writing, we can trace the shift of trust from the validly given word to a document exerting legal force. An oath is a ceremonial giving of one's word, a spoken promise. This kind of emphatic utterance seems to occur among all peoples. An oath swears to a given word. The truth or intention of the thing sworn to is reinforced by a ritual association between word and gesture, both traditional in form. The latter invests the former with a peculiar power. Oaths are among the forms of utterance most carefully guarded against change. Their formulation in terms of rhythm, alliteration, and repetition keeps them from falling into oblivion, like unforgettable fragments of a forgotten past. Often the form of the oath was recited to the person making it--in the Germanic world with the oath stick held out. While taking the oath, the swearer laid his hand on the temple stele, on a clod of earth, or on his sword, or he raised his weapon skyward and placed a foot on a stone. "By the ship's side and the shield's rim, by the sword's edge and the horse's thigh" was how the Danes swore fealty. The swearing of an oath took place in the open air--in eighteenth-century Polish courtrooms, oaths were still sworn by an open window--in order to make the oath manifest to the gods, the spirits, or the dead. While swearing to fulfill his oath, the swearer raised his sword or raised three fingers or laid them against his beard or testicles, and in many places he sullied himself with the blood of a sacrificed animal. Women swore with different gestures than men, laying a hand on their breast or braids or belly.
+
+A man who makes an oath pronounces a conditional curse against himself; he asks to be maimed, withered, or blinded, if he is pronouncing a falsehood or should ever break his word. He swears his own body, his limbs, his eyes, his honor, even his descendents, by putting them up as a pledge. Through the medium of co-jurors, he physically makes his whole tribe a party to his oath, involving them all in his pledge. May lightning strike them, may the devil take them, may his wife bear him a crippled child if he is lying.
+
+For the onlookers, the unity of word and gesture has something of the effect of a sacrament. The swearing of an oath makes the word visible--not on paper, but in the living body of the person concerned. It incarnates the veracity of what he is saying. In the context of orality, truth is inseparable from veracity. The oath reveals an epiphany of this unity of form and content that captures the essence of the oral mentality.
+
+The oath survived tenaciously in written law despite being in fundamental contradiction to the nature of the letter. Written law seeks to legitimatize itself by controlling the oath, which it does by monopolizing it. When strict laws were passed against oath taking and cursing outside the courts, the oath's function was reversed, as can be seen in medieval records.
+
+When the splendidly bound Book of the Gospels replaced the oath-taker's own beard, the rim of his shield, or the pommel of his sword in solemnifying the oath, a new relationship began between the oath and writing: The book as object was incorporated into the gestures accompanying the self-curse, while its contents, oddly enough, remained outside the wording of the oath. What makes this even more peculiar is the fact that Matthew 5:33-36 contains an unqualified prohibition of oaths of any kind: "You have learned that they were told, 'Do not break your oath,' and 'Oaths sworn to the Lord must be kept.' But what I tell you is this: You are not to swear at all--not by heaven, for it is God's throne, nor by earth, for it is His footstool, nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King, nor by your own head..." In spite of this unambiguous passage in the Sermon on the Mount, Emperor Justinian's legal reforms require those taking oaths to place a hand on the Gospels.
+
+This innovation is all the more instructive for the fact that the reform by the Christian Byzantine Emperor, in 528 A.D., first elevated the oath in Roman law to the status of a general obligation in legal proceedings. Missionaries then introduced the oath with the Gospels to traditional courts north of the Alps. Litigants in these courts were no longer to swear on a ring that had been dipped in the blood of a sacrificial animal, but on the cross, on relics, on the altar--and on the Gospels. This was required by the Lex Ribuaria in 803. The Church assumed the divine task of punishing the breaking of an oath.
+
+The use of the book in the pantomime of legal gesture soon led to the form of words used in the ceremony being committed to writing. The traditional cursing of oneself was replaced by an ingenious formula. In England it had become so complicated and strange that the plaintiff preferred to grasp the red-hot iron of ordeal rather than take the Gospels in his hand. He knew that he could never repeat the formula without making a mistake, and that would have been tantamount to a breach of oath.
+
+Not only the oath but also broad areas of everyday life that had previously been governed by oral usage were made subject to a new formal and legal kind of literacy in the Middle Ages. A large section of the population discovered in this period that, before objects could be owned or rights made use of, they first had to be described, and held on a parchment: trust shifted from the given word to a sealed document.
+
+Objects could now properly be "held" rather than possessed. The world that the theologians had represented as a book, the Book of God that man must decipher, now through the document became an object that only description could appropriate. Thousands of topographical descriptions have come down to us from this period; boundaries became effective through these descriptions: "From the old oak tree along the stream as far as the big rock and thence in a straight line uphill to the wall..." This appropriative description of reality began as a jurisprudential method before it became the foundation of natural sciences.
+
+M.T. Clanchy, on whose work we shall draw, estimates that in twelfth-century England, not more than thirty thousand charters were drawn up. In the period 1250–1350, by contrast, several million were made out in England alone--that amounts to almost five charters for each piece of describable property. Accompanying this change, writing materials increased ten-to twenty-fold in this period. The consumption of sealing wax at the royal chancery in England rose from three pounds per week in 1226, to thirteen pounds in 1256, and thirty-one pounds just ten years later in 1266. More sheep had to give up their skins as parchments for the purposes of documentation during a royal court hearing. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was a matter of a few dozen. For a perfectly ordinary session in Suffolk in 1283, over five hundred were skinned.
+
+Not only the charters but also the _breve_, or brief, and the "letter" came into more common use. This can be shown by the number of such royal mandates that have come down to us from the period 1080–1180: For French kings this rose from 3 to 60; for English kings, from 25 to 115; and for popes, from 22 to 180. After 1180, the growth rate skyrocketed. From the reign of Innocent III (1198–1215), 280 survive; from that of Innocent IV (1243–54), 730; and from that of Boniface VIII (1294–1303), 50,000.
+
+In the twelfth century, the chancery was an exclusive attribute of the sovereign. Chancellor Becket already had an army of clerks to do his paperwork: Sixteen different hands can be distinguished under his control in the years 1155–1158. But then, beginning around 1200, individual bishops and princes began to join in. They could not manage any longer occasionally summoning a curate to read to them or to write for them. By 1350 the chancery was an essential element of spiritual and temporal dominion. Writing rooms multiplied even faster than mills, first widely used at this time for pumping, crushing, hammering, and darning. In the eleventh century, pieces of writing and articles of jewelry had been preserved in reliquaries as treasures next to the bones of saints. The overflow of charters, briefs, and copies thereof flushed these treasures out of their arks. What had been an heirloom was now an instrument of proof.
+
+Into the twelfth century, the letter was often the visible indication of the importance, the weight, that attached to the news brought by the messenger. The letter became necessary only when the messenger was unworthy of the sender: When Jaufre Rubel sent a song to his lady by his own court jester, he insisted that he sing without handing her the piece of parchment. Some twelfth-century love letters are works of scholarship or works of art that refer the reader to the messenger for interpretation.
+
+Only slowly did the missive become a memorial of a promise that the sender places in the hand of the recipient. In 1142, Heloise's letter to Abbot Peter the Venerable clearly implies this. Abelard, her husband and castrated lover, had died as an exemplary monk in Cluny. Abbot Peter had him cooked and boned and the dry remains conveyed to the Paraclete for burial in a grave where Heloise could later join him. With the remains he sent Heloise a deeply moving letter of admiration for Abelard, and of praise for her. But she was not content. In her answer she requests from Abbot Peter a written promise that the monks at Cluny will forever honor and remember her dead husband. In addition to Peter's note having the nature of a sign, she requests an instrument on which the future demands of the recipient are to be based.
+
+This becomes quite clear in testaments. A person's last will is no longer expressed through the presentation of a symbol, for example, a handful of heritable soil, a key, or a sword. A sealed document now takes the place of the thing. The inheritance is no longer determined by the witnesses of a person's last words spoken from his deathbed, but by a charter. The document itself becomes an instrument of witness.
+
+"In witness whereof" signified an action, a gesture accompanied by words, an oath, coupled with the transmission of an object, by which sovereignty, or title, or rights of property were ceded. Leaving a dagger or a goblet might serve as a sign for the bequest of a piece of land. Later, the object sometimes bore an inscription. On the pommel of a whip in the possession of St. Albans Abbey we find the words to the effect that "this is a gift of four mares by Gilbert of Novo Castello." In this way the word, in conjunction with a tangible sign, was "witness." In the thirteenth century, word and sign collapsed into a written statement. In an initial step it was a paper record of a past event. In a second step, the preparing of the parchment itself became the event described. Lawyers by 1180 insist that the instrument of witness should record a past agreement, _in perfectum_. One's word, through the signature, constituted assent to a written text.
+
+Good faith being committed to a written document in this way made it important for the person issuing it and the recipient to have a copy of it. Otherwise, the scriptorium of the monastery that the sovereign had endowed with a gift could turn out unlimited numbers of instruments, attributed to his predecessors, which the sovereign's chancellor would have to honor. Nowadays if one attempted to acquire rights by producing written confirmation of fabricated promises, it would be understood as forgery. This was not so in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; the legal way of conferring rights substantiated by instruments of witness--not just incidentally supported by a memorial--was too new a concept. "Documentation," and the necessity for the issuer to keep a precise copy of the instrument, represent technical discoveries of the late twelfth century. The regest, the catalogue, the copy, the seal, the date, and the signature, are decisive elements of the new technique.
+
+The making of regests, which are registers of the dictates of the sovereign, was already known to Roman lawyers. One or two popes had practiced it in the fourth century. From Innocent III on, it was the rule in the Roman Curia, but it was not until the fourteenth century that it became established in the chancellory of the Holy Roman Empire. Cataloguing techniques lagged behind the manufacture of copy instruments until well into the fifteenth century. Monastery libraries in the High Middle Ages had monks who remembered where to find manuscripts but as yet had no catalogues. Monks in the older monasteries in particular knew better than their patrons what the latter held in their archives and thus were able to produce forgeries easily.
+
+The first known _scrutinium_ of a monastery library, a catalogue intended to serve as the annual inventory, dates from around 1170. With this invention, the book became dislocated from the sacristy. The book repository became an archive, pure and simple--a library. A report by a Dominican in 1260 tells of books being set out on shelves so the brothers might consult them _in promptu_--in readiness. It became important to verify the quotation from a theological authority, much as the described border of a forest had to be authenticated by reference to written evidence. In the thirteenth century, the making of catalogues of books owned and the making of regests, or registers, or charters granted proceeded in parallel.
+
+There was a fundamental difference, however, between making a copy of a book in a monastery scriptorium and making a copy of a charter in a chancellory. The original of the book stayed in the monastery, while the original of the charter left the chancellory. The chancellor was responsible for the copy that remained _iden_--that is, the same as, _identical_ to the original.
+
+Making exact copies called not only for twice as much writing work but also for correction of the copy. In 1283, Cambridge established the first _beneficium_ for a paid corrector. His job was to check documents according to form (_ratio_), legibility (_lettera_), word order (_dictio_), and spelling (_sillibo_). Two documents being identical thus became a new criterion of their legal validity. Two hundred years before Gutenberg, archives gave rise to the intellectual prototype of printed matter: an original (that might not exist anymore) from which a number of identical copies had been produced and written. In fourteenth-century depictions of a law-court clerk, the corrector is often shown looking over the shoulder of a secretary and a copyist to verify and certify the identity of two documents. The issue of a notary's certificate attesting to the identity of two texts became a flourishing business. Even people now required identification. As early as 1248, Goliards in Burgundy were obliged to carry written credentials: the first step toward the "identification" of a person as an "individual."
+
+To keep the individual charter identifiable forever, it must not only be vouched for by a copy, but also firmly placed in space and in a new kind of time. The place of issuance is already indicated on most eleventh-century documents. When the documents indicated time, this was usually related to events significant enough to stick in the memory of witnesses to the proceedings described. The document was drawn up on the Feast of St. Severinus, on a market day, at the vigil of a wedding, on the anniversary of the foundation of a monastery, or perhaps on the occasion of a visitation by the sovereign. It was not until some time in the thirteenth century that notaries ventured to place so trivial a proceeding as a change of ownership of a piece of farmland in direct relation to the birth of the Lord and thus to the course of the history of human salvation. Through this method, the history of salvation was chartered as the history of the world.
+
+As a result of this dating, time through the text became something new: no more the subjective experience of a relative distance in the course of the world or the pilgrimage of the writer, but an axis for absolute reference on which charters could be nailed like labels. By the end of the fourteenth century, the date on a charter could even be tied to the mechanical tower-clock. "Circiter nona pulsatione horologi," announced the contract, and at nine o'clock the document was signed. Memory grew a new dimension. Memories could now be shelved behind each other, not according to their importance or affinity, but according to the date from which they issue. And in the Dance of Death, the skeleton man begins to appear with an hourglass: By the fifteenth century, he insists that time is scarce.
+
+The signature also changed its function in this transition from the description of an event to the production of an instrument that was essential to the event, because the signature helped render individual will "visible," and thus helped fix it in a universal grid. The swearer's resounding name no longer leaves an impression.
+
+In the twelfth century, documents still spoke aloud: "The letters are symbols of things and have such power that they bring the speech of the person present to our ear without his voice." So said John of Salisbury (d. 1180), sometime secretary to Thomas à Becket, a sarcastic and elegant writer who with this definition harks back to Isidore of Seville, whose letters "indicate figures speaking with sounds." Until it had been promulgated (by a herald, "heard"), a legislative act had no legal validity. The written copy was as yet no more than a record of that oral promulgation.
+
+So long as the document was conceived only as a reminder of something proclaimed, its sealing with a signet ring or a signature was an emphatic confirmation of the oral event it described; but not yet its authentication. Because he was not concerned with authentication, the same person arbitrarily used a different signature each time. This changed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when documents became legally effective instruments. Courts concerned themselves with the question of authenticity. _Vellum_ (calfskin) was replaced by _membranum_ (sheepskin), which was thinner, did not easily permit erasures, and prevented forgeries. Signed documents were now required to stand as a guarantee.
+
+The old Frankish _wera_, the old French _warandir_, "guarantor," slowly turned into a written warranty that drew its force from being signed. The seal became a mark of the power of writing. Even a man who could not himself write was empowered by the seal to take legally valid action on his own behalf by issuing documents. If his word was invalid, he could speak through the document, thus exercising his power by taking legal action. In the thirteenth century, even villeins, free peasants, occasionally carried their own seals and so could obtain a description of their property drawn up by a notary. In the twelfth century, the seal was still regarded by its owner much like any other object--a dagger, a chalice, or a whip. Like the St. Albans' whip pommel that stood for four mares, the sealed wax was the object through which a piece of property might change hands. If a document was at all attached to the sealed wax, which sometimes weighed more than a pound, this parchment was mainly a further inscription on the seal, analogous to the inscription scratched on the pommel of the whip. Only slowly did the seal change from a thing (a _res_) into the substitute for a person's handwritten signature. The text itself overshadowed its material vehicle, and threw this shadow deep into the daily life of everyone who purchased, inherited, sold, or lost property. Just as in the transition from orality to literacy, language became detached from the speaker, so the text was no longer viewed as an extension of the event but assumed its own authenticity separate from the event.
+
+Representations of the Last Judgement appear at this time in the arched spaces above many church doors that show how the book has separated from its writer. The Archangel Michael weighs the soul to establish if it may ascend into Paradise or must be cast into Hell. And, on quite a few of these reliefs, the Judge Himself holds the book, in which every deed and desire, nay every word and thought of the dead has been written down. Without ever having touched a pen or held a book, without ever having dictated a line or sealed a charter, every time he enters the church door the faithful is reminded that, even with his most secret thought, he _writes_ the text of his life, by which he will be judged on that ominous day.
+
+To write, however, at the time when the Book of Life gained prominence in Christian preaching did not yet mean to clutch a pen and draw letters on a parchment. What it meant to write can be well documented from the manner in which Bernard's scriptorium was organized. Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux in the early twelfth century, does not write with his hand. Like Cicero, the Abbot spoke emphatically in the presence of a scribe. He spoke clearly, but slower than the Roman, because unlike the latter's slave Tiro, Bernard's amanuensis (his secretary: literally, he who lends him his hand) did not know how to take shorthand. Some of Bernard's dictations survive in two versions that textual criticism is unable to reduce to a single original. These are undoubtedly two different secretaries' notes of the same sermon of which different fair copies were made from a wax tablet. Many of the old texts were prepared by secretaries in this way from statements by their dictators. Once a fair copy had been made of his dictation, Bernard occasionally might have had it read back to him for checking. But there was no question as yet, for him, of a correction from a manuscript.
+
+Some half dozen technical innovations in writing had to become commonplace before the author himself could become a writer. In this period the usual method of writing, both for copying and for originals, was and remained dictation.
+
+In the Republican period of ancient Rome, to dictate meant to speak in the elevated, rhythmic manner of the _ductus_; _scribere_ meant the physical act of writing as well as composing. In the Middle Ages the frontier between the two meanings was located quite differently. _Dictate_ referred to the act of creating a text, and _scribere_ simply to the work done with writing materials. It was suggested occasionally that, when he was alone in his cell, a monk could dictate. Up until the twelfth century, the _ars dictaminis_ was the art of reading and composing rather than that of reading and writing. The art of writing was _one_ of the many arts necessary for a manuscript to come into being. The skinner and the parchment maker, the beekeeper who produced the wax tablet, and the painter for the miniatures, were all as necessary as the bookbinder and the lector, or reader, in the copying room. This changed with the division of lines into words. When the copyist saw words in front of him, he was able to copy the original himself, word for word. There is some evidence that in the thirteenth century people who could not read were used for copying because they could copy more accurately.
+
+In Antiquity, even after the great grammarians such as Varro and Quintillian had mastered the word intellectually and were able to teach its forms and functions in the sentence, writing was still pure _grammatika_: a continuous series of letters. Words were strung together without any physical definition. Not until the sequence of letters was read aloud was it possible to grasp the words of the text. The author might in theory dictate a sequence of words; but for the scribe they became an unbroken series of letters. From that series of letters the ear had to extract not only the words but also the elevated rhythm of polished speech.
+
+A very timid beginning at dividing up words was made by Jerome. He interrupted his sequence of letters with _cola_ and _commata_ in order to make legible some of his translations from the Hebrew that would otherwise have been almost meaningless in Latin. The first strict division of sentences into separate words occurs in the titles of an early manuscript of the _Etymologiae_ of Isadore. Division into words first came into common use in the seventh century. It happened at the northern frontiers of the known world, where Celtic "ignoramuses" had to prepare for the priesthood and needed to be taught Latin. Division into words was thus introduced as a means of teaching Latin to barbarians as a foreign language. Like the new pronunciation of Latin, it came to the Continent by way of Tours through Alcuin in the late eighth century. Unlike the new pronunciation, however, which was quickly rejected, the innovation of the word as a visual unit in writing won general acceptance. The ninth century provides us with the first reports of schools beginning to observe _distinctiones_, the spaces between words.
+
+The new graphics of the separated word had an immediate effect on the copying room. Until the eighth century, the writing room was depicted by artists as a dictating room. Then, from the early eighth century, we have a picture of a writing room for which there are no precedents. The scribe sits in front of long strips from which he is copying, although the most usual method of copying was still that of the copier dictating to himself. As early as the ninth century, artists occasionally represented the inspiration of an author--even that of the Evangelists--by showing an angel holding a tome before the writer at his desk; nonetheless, it was not until the thirteenth century that the really radical change occurred.
+
+The writer depicted in early thirteenth-century miniatures no longer holds a knife in his left hand. Instead of writing on the hard leather membrane that had to be smoothed by scraping and sometimes even nailed to the desk with the point of a knife, he now writes on thin parchment and is even beginning to write on paper. His posture is much more relaxed. Writing is no longer strenuous work. His right hand, too, now has an easier job. The writing surface is smooth, the _ductus_ flows, and at last the Middle Ages has produced its own cursive script--something that had been forgotten since late Antiquity. The master can now become a writer himself. He is shown with a quill in his hand and not, as he had been for centuries, as a dictator.
+
+Thomas Aquinas, in the middle of the thirteenth century, already had newer writing materials--parchment, penknife, reed, and ink--at his disposal. Drafts in his own hand have come down to us, in the new Gothic cursive which, in its first generation of use, was insufficiently standardized: The master did not yet think that a secretary could copy from his notes. Copying from the master's handwriting by pupils became possible only in the next generation. Thomas still had to dictate in class from his arranged notes, creating his lectures from his written sources. He did not need to limit his notes to a small number of wax tablets. Thomas used notes to assist his trained memory: he drew up a schema of the arguments he was going to deal with. And in many instances, he first dictated his schema and then the execution of it. Earlier teachers did not speak from notes, and they could not check most of their sources.
+
+When Bernard referred to a source he did so from memory. Albertus Magnus and Thomas, two generations later, were the first to have reference books at hand. They quoted verbatim, and after their death, their own works lay chained to library desks, having become reference books in their turn. The new technique of "reference" enables the thirteenth-century author to check his quotations from sources. He can dictate while looking up a passage. The dictator began to have random access to a memory that was laid out before him. Chaucer obviously had before him the text of Boccaccio's _Il Teseide_, as his source, his _auctoritas_, for "The Knight's Tale." The mnemonic devices the rhetorician taught the pupil to build up in his own imagination had taken shape, hundreds of years later, on the page. The Lindisfarne Gospel comes with sixteen pages of canon tables constructed under decorated arches. In the Book of Kells, the fourth-century Eusabian Tables stand at the beginning and suggest to the reader that Matthew, Luke, Mark, and John can be read as one story, since they provide an inkling of the parallels between the four tales. But only in the late twelfth century is this memory device externalized. Any reader can return to any book he has read whenever he wants to do so. And soon it was no longer the works of one's own monastery that the students could reach: the first Union Catalogue came into being shortly after the foundation of the Sorbonne.
+
+Much more significant than the creation of accessible library shelves, however, was the new way of arranging written matter within the book. The art of going back to the exact location of a source of Divine Revelation was from the beginning a necessity that distinguished the Christian from the pagan author. This makes it surprising that the techniques to do so took hundreds of years to be shaped. For a thousand years Holy Scripture was not referred to indirectly, but always _quoted_ directly. Saint Augustine had experimented with a device meant to help the readers of the _City of God_ find their way about his vast treatise. For this purpose he prepared a _brevicus_ as a summary to each of the books. Cassiodorus had experimented in the sixth century with the use of key words as glosses: He extracted them from the text and placed them into the margins as he dictated. Isidore of Seville, just before the Arabs established themselves in southern Spain, first provided his vast _Etymologiae_ with chapter headings. But only very slowly did the division of the Bible into chapters become standardized; the division into verses came even more slowly. Gradually the New Testament began to be cited by chapter and verse. Such citation--without the need of quotation--became possible for the Old Testament only after 1200. And then, quite suddenly at the end of the twelfth century, the devices to use the book as a reference tool were there: a subject index to the whole of Holy Scripture. Thus, some 250 years before printing made it possible to refer to the text by page number, a network of grids was laid over the book--a method that had nothing at all to do with the content itself.
+
+During the twelfth century, written texts were visibly fixed in spatial relations to each other. With this text certain elements were made to stand out: Quotations were now written in a different color. The reader's eye, accustomed by the gloss to move from the body to the margin, had to be trained to move from the index to the page, and from one book to the other. Now the eye encompassed not simply the lines, but the entire text. Quite possibly, some of these techniques were developed under Arabic influence. The Moslems, who were not allowed to draw naturalistic pictures, sought to address the eye through the arrangement of letters alone. As a result, Arabic scribes developed a greater variety of colors and diversity of letter arrangements than contemporary Latin books. Certainly the influx of translations from the Arabic--often prepared by Jews from Toledo and Montpellier--inspired some of the new techniques used by the thirteenth-century monks. But Western bookmaking did not become iconoclastic. Precisely as the new methods allowed the text to take visible shape, this text entered into a new relationship to the painted margin and miniatures. Text and illumination are no longer interwoven in the ambiguous manner of Lindisfarne: the patterns do no more than intrude into the lines of the letters, as in the Book of Kells. To describe and to paint have come to be separate tasks often executed by different hands. And yet, the union of illustration and writing during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries gave rise to the great synthesis of the Western manuscript.
+
+The world now lay described before the reader's eye. The book is now arbitrarily accessible; the reader can enter at will, wherever the index refers him. He sees what is written, and the illustration assists him in this task of visualization. His authorities are perceived as writers rather than as teachers: The "ipse dixit" is replaced by the "ipse scripsit." The pupils now sit in front of their teacher with their eyes fixed on his text, which lies on their knees. They are no more asked to recall the sound of their teacher's words, but to grasp the architecture of his argument, which they must impress on their minds. By the end of the thirteenth century, students in Paris can borrow manuscripts from lending libraries to read with their teachers in class. Libraries become places of silence.
+
+Now truly the reader can say what Hugh of St. Victor had said in 1128: "_Trimodium est lectionis genus: docentis, discentis vel per se inspicientis_" (I can read [aloud] to you, you can read [aloud] to me, and I can read contemplatively to myself). Now reading as an activity of the teacher--in other words, reading aloud--and reading as a listening activity are complemented by a third, silent type of reading: contemplative study of the book.
+
+
+## Translation and Language
+
+_In wordless speech there is no word-for-word reproduction of meaning. Writing had fixed neither the language frontier nor the mono lingual dependence on translation_.
+
+_One often forgets that the translator is a frontiersman in more than one sense: He creates the very frontier over which he brings his booty. He is like a ferryman whose boat turns the wild beyond of the barbarous babble into the "other" bank. The translator does not exist in orality. In that world there is neither the dragoman, who hangs about the offices of the Turkish Khadi, nor the_ Dolmetscher, _who sees to it that two texts correspond, nor the "simultaneous parrot" at the United Nations. All these are artisans of the text. They start from the assumption that a person who speaks is, by implication, dictating. It is immaterial whether that dictation is then written down or not because the product of it is in any case a "text" Translation today means turning one text into another. The notion that lies behind it is that texts have a content that is capable of being poured from one vessel--with its own lexical, grammatical, phonetic, and con textual peculiarities--into another_.
+
+One obstacle most modern readers face when they want to study the history of "language" is their belief in monolingual man. From Saussure to Chomsky, "homo monolinguis" is posited as the man who uses language--the man who speaks. This idea had no place in early Greece, or in the Middle Ages; even today it is alien to many people. In their daily life in Java or in the Sahel, a great number of people still feel at home in several kinds of discourse, each of which, to the modern perception, is conducted in a distinct language. But those other people--the Javanese--perceive things differently. They still say "I cannot understand you," rather than "I do not know your language." They are concerned with grasping what the other person has to say by explanation, gesture, or summary; they do not want a translation of that person's statements. As in early Greece, the borders between these cultures, which we moderns are taught to see as "languages," have remained fluid. The idea of "translation" has not yet erected those frontiers that the translator, and only the translator, may bridge.
+
+The eleventh-century cleric who takes down the witness's testimony in the language of the court--who, for example, writes in Latin what the witness says in Swabian--is a scribe. He has no intention to translate. Neither is the bishop translating who reads out the homily in accordance with the rules of the Council of Tours: He teaches by announcing the word of God and interpreting it. He is helping people understand. But that is a long way from translating.
+
+Even today, we often say: "Help me, would you--I'd like to understand what the old man or the scientist is saying." Surely, we are not seeking a translator, but someone to help us understand--an interpreter. We rely on the intermediary who understands the mutterings of an old woman, the dialect of Lower Bavaria, scientific language, or Chinese. The question "What did he say?" contains the request "Tell me what he is trying to tell me." We do not even expect our companion to have understood word for word; we only want to understand what _he_ has understood. This understanding of explanations, coupled with the ability to explain what one has understood, is basic to oral discourse.
+
+For the idealistic language inmate of a language prison this type of intercourse has become either inconceivable or irritating. He finds it hard to accept that the phenomenon to which he refers by the term "language" has a history--that it was once socially created and may also pass away. Just as the word assumed its present form through writing, so did "language" assume its present form through the translation of texts.
+
+According to George Steiner, translation did not become an issue in the period before Christ. The few literate people were usually bilingual, and for the others, what was said in one language could be retold, summed up, reported, or commented on in the other. Cicero and Horace were among the first to refer to translation as an art. The Greek work was not to be turned into Latin _verbum pro verbo_. Instead, the meaning was to be detached from the words of one language and made to reappear in another; content, stripped of its form, was to be preserved. Theories about translation changed very little--translation was described as an attempt to divulge the secrets of one language into another--until the hermeneutics of the 1950s. Only then did the study of translation as applied linguistic theory become separated from literary theory. In the end, we would agree with Borges: "Ningún problema tan consustancial con las letras y con su modesto misterio como el que propone una traducción" (Translation reflects what is most uncanny about literacy).
+
+The absence of theory did not hamper the Middle Ages from growing into an age of translation. The age of transiation begins, not only with the Christian desire to preach the Gospel to all people, but to appropriate its Hebrew and Greek books into the culture of late Antiquity, which, in the West with Augustine, became monolingual. Saint Jerome defined his activity as translator in an image to which the monks of Reichenau made allusion: "Quasi captivos sensus in suam linguam victoris iure transposuit" ("As the victor deports his prisoners under the rule of war, so (the translator] carries meaning over into his own language"). And precisely because Jerome was aware of the violence done to the text by translation, he called for limits to be set to the process. He preferred to tolerate meaningless sequences of words in his Latin Bible than have what he regarded as something inexpressible obscured by interpretation: "Alioquin et multa alia quae ineffabilia sunt, et humanus animus capere non potest, hac licentia delebuntur."
+
+Translation in the Middle Ages carried a unique significance because of the unique status of Latin--the only language used in writing. Latin became the only vessel out of which divine revelation could be drawn. By the time of Charlemagne, it had joined Greek and Hebrew as a holy language out of which translation could be made.
+
+Monks in the ninth century began to fashion _theotisc_ into a vessel into which they would dare to pour the content of Latin scripture. To enable translations to be made from the now holy Latin language, in Murbach and on the island of Reichenau, the shaping of the German language became an object of scholarly attention. Within less than a generation, these monks had fashioned a German vocabulary that bore comparison with that of Latin, in order to translate their Benedictine Rule. Glossaries were composed in order to find verbalcounterparts for "the last filtration of Latin thought and literary discipline." Through considered new coinings, through precise definition of new fields of meaning, through loan syntax or paronymous new coinings, something entirely new came into being: From German tongues there crystallized a German language that could be regarded as an equivalent of Latin.
+
+From the middle of the ninth century, a single document written in the Romance language has come down to us, and it happens to be an oath. This Romance text is included in a chronicle written by Nithard in what for the period is unusually good Latin. Nithard, who succeeded his father as Abbot of St. Riquier, was a grandson of Charlemagne through his mother Berta. He served another grandson of Charlemagne, Charles the Bald. He wrote his chronicle at the age of nineteen--two years before his death in battle in 844. In lively terms he describes things that he himself experienced. He complains about the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and that particular year's poor weather. We know from his chronicle that in 841 Charles the Bald and Louis the German conspired against their brother Lothar. Nithard wrote down the oaths of both the rulers and their men by which this conspiracy was effected. Each ruler took an oath on behalf of himself and his men in the other's language.
+
+Both vernacular oaths were based on an ingenious Latin original that may possibly have been drawn up by Nithard for his master and cousin, but that has not survived. These two versions, known as the Strasbourg Oaths, played crucial though very different roles in the history of the French and German languages.
+
+The text in _romana lingua_ is the earliest alphabetic representationof colloquial speech in France. For something like a thousand years a dialect had been spoken in France that lent itself perfectly to notation in Latin characters but was never written.
+
+The "vulgar" living speech of tradesmen, craftsmen, women, and public officials that survived in France for thirty generations is unknown to us. Like Latin, it had come from Italy, but it took root earlier and remained far longer than Latin. However, as in Lombardy and on the Iberian Peninsula, it was neither distinguished from Latin as a separate "language," nor was it ever written down.
+
+Precise analysis of the Romance text of the Strasbourg Oaths shows beyond any doubt that Nithard's text is not a transcription of a spoken language. It constitutes an attempt to take a carefully worked-out formula, written and conceived in Latin, and to adapt it phonetically and syntactically to the Alsatian mode of expression. The text is a remarkable example of an already developed juridical terminology in learned and complex syntax, with a stilted technical vocabulary, that corresponds exactly to the Latin oaths of Carolingian princes that have come down to us. The conspiracy of the Carolingian princes here became an opportunity to have an army solemnly repeat a text that had been read aloud to them in a facsimile of their own dialect.
+
+The dialect was not a "Latin" dialect. Even by the time of the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 A.D., the Romans were no longer speaking the way Latin was spelled. The volcanic ash preserved graffiti that people had daubed on the walls of their houses. The word structure of these uneducated scrawls shows signs of shifts that, up until recently, philologists assumed took place a thousand years later. In words ending with _m_, for instance, the final _m_ is often dropped. Probably the _m_ was either not pronounced at all or was fused with the preceding vowel to form a nasal--as occurs in present-day Portuguese. Many researchers believe that this gap between language as it was spoken and language as it was spelled was by no means confined to the poorer classes. The Classical poetry of the period takes on a fresh charm when the _m_ is swallowed--as in Brazilian. And, in 841--seven hundred years after Vesuvius--the Romance spoken in Gaul, like that spoken in Iberia, had moved much farther away from Latin word structure. What was read approximated the local form of _lingua romana_. For the reader, word structure was determined by grammar, and pronunciation by the landscape. In many places, Latin pronunciation was probably as far removed from orthography as is modern English.
+
+Among the aims of the Carolingian reform had been to have Latin read--and consequently also spoken--in a uniform manner throughout the empire. Charlemagne wished to match the existing unity of spelling with a unity of sound. Such an objective would today tend to be regarded as a call for mutual understanding. But such a change was certainly not necessary for mutual understanding at the time. Every monk learned the Latin pronunciation of his own monastery. If he walked from Subiaco to Fulda, his feet bore him no faster than his ear was able to adjust itself to new pronunciations, just as today's Indian pilgrim still finds his ear adjusting to the landscape with every step he takes. Moreover, despite big differences in accents--today we should say languages--people's readiness to listen and to understand is far greater in a traditional society than present-day schoolteachers imagine. For more than a thousand years, in some sense, Latin lived.
+
+Charlemagne and his circle of educated monks--Peter the Grammarian, from whom the adult emperor would have liked to learn to write; Paulinus, whose hymns are today still sung in the chancel office; Paul the Deacon, the court historian; the Spaniard, West-Goth Theodolf, wit and art expert; the layman Einhard, Charlemagne's biographer--all of these men together had no less an aim than to mold all the peoples of the empire into a univocal congregation. Sovereignty was interpreted as a gift from God in the service of the Church. Visible unification and standardization of all spheres of life had a symbolic rather than a practical purpose: to correct ingrained habits according to the original text. Mythical "ur-texts" were sought for the Latin Bible, for canon law, for the liturgy, and for monastic life. The plan to standardize Latin pronunciation needs to be seen in the same context, that is to say, as a theologically motivated attempt to create a symbolically effective, uniform, imperial, dead "language"--not to improve a "means of communication."
+
+On the Continent, no one would have carried out such a plan. The idea that a uniform written language demanded a uniform pronunciation contradicted a basic belief of the Church. The Book of Revelation was one, and had to be understood by all people, each in his own tongue; in the daily performance of this feat, the miracle of Pentecost was constantly repeated. This "miracle" could be performed everywhere in England except in those areas where Romance had never been used as the vernacular, which made it possible for the "correct" pronunciation of written Latin to become a research subject in the eighth century. The Venerable Bede wrote a treatise on orthography. Alcuin the Scot--born in the year of Bede's death (736) and raised among his pupils--was summoned to Charlemagne's court as schoolmaster and placed in charge of the school in Tours. He came from a tradition in which Classical education was rooted, not in the continuity of the _lingua romana_, but in the continuity that stemmed from the systematic adoption of Latin in the monastery and in the liturgy.
+
+Charlemagne relied on Alcuin to unify the pronunciation of Latin. Unlike his Continental brothers, when Alcuin read a text, he pronounced it as a dead language. He trained his pupils to read Latin the way he had learned to read it in York, with each letter being given its correct value--that is to say, pronounced with the same sound each time. This concern for uniform pronunciation was even reflected in the contractions that appeared in the new, standard Carolingian handwriting. Repeatedly, only that part of a word is written that the Franks would otherwise have stressed insufficiently or swallowed altogether. Forty years before the Strasbourg Oaths, then, Alcuin's school was deliberately trying to make the "reading" of Latin incomprehensible to the vernacular ear. Only in this context can one understand how it could have occurred to Nithard to write _lingua romana_ phonetically.
+
+Alcuin's phonetic reform was meant to breathe new life into Latin. The immediate consequence, however, was that Latin became incomprehensible to the listener when read aloud. The Carolingian _renovatio_ constituted an obstacle to the Church's preaching. A year before Charlemagne's death the Church's rejection of his unhistorical concept of correct pronunciation found expression at the Council of Tours--the very town in which Alcuin had taught only a few years before. It forbade priests to use the new way of reading during services. The Council enjoins the celebrant to read from this book written in Latin, but to strive in the process to speak in the Romance or _theotisc_ vernacular. Priests in the province of Tours were to continue doing what they had always done without criticism. On the basis of the Latin texts, they were to read out what their congregations could understand.
+
+The argument between advocates of a revived Latin and the Church's priests hinged on the interpretation of what kind of activity "reading" should be--should it be the spelling out of the letters that correspond to the sounds of a long-dead language, or should it be the transformation of the lines into their own living speech? With this canon, the Council of Tours was reacting against putting a lower limit on standard literary language. Alcuin's idea of Latin implied one formal set of phonetics for the entire Empire. That new phonetics posed a threat to the function of Latin writing, which was to serve all peoples (_gentes_).
+
+"Easdem omelias quisque aperte transferre studeat in rusticam romanam linguam aut theotiscam, quo facilius possint intellegere quae dicuntur," proclaimed the bishops assembled at Tours. The council wished to hold the door open for congregations to understand the text (_quo facilius possint intellegere_). It therefore required the reader to take pains (_studeat_) to pronounce what he was reading (_quae dicuntur_) in such a way that the collection of Latin texts (_omeliae_) intended to help elucidate the scriptures came across in a manner people could understand (_aperte transferre_ ... _in rusticam linguam_), no matter if that "language" in which the Latin text is read out of is German or French. The emphasis here is on the _rusticam_: The reader was to do his reading in a vernacular, rustic manner. Two such tongues (_linguae_) are mentioned: _romana_ and _theotisca_. Thus, by changing pronunciation (tongue), one could change the Latin, read aloud, into German or French.
+
+Contemporary usage suggests an opposition between German and French because we think in terms of "languages" as self-contained systems of communication that may be compared one with another, but only in the context of their separateness. Neither this modern notion of a neatly defined language, nor that of equivalent language can be projected into a ninth-century text. The _aut_ between _romana_ and _theotisca_ has much more to do with a polarity than with an either/or sense of exclusion. In the same way as the Council opposed the cultivation of a contradiction between the reading aloud of Latin and a generally comprehensible manner of speaking, this canon is talking, not about a translation process, but about a reading process. Reading aloud comprehensibly--however the book is written--is something different from translating Latin into Old French or Old High German.
+
+This can be elucidated by considering the word _theotisc_. It was not until shortly before 800 that this word started to become remolded from "popular" to "of German origin," and _theotisca lingua_ from "people's speech" to "Germanic." The efforts of the monks at Reichenau, Fulda, and in Alsace to create the rudiments of a German language gave rise to the idea that _theotisc_ was a language distinct from Latin, potentially equivalent to but heterogenous from it, out of and into which it was possible to translate. However, this idea had not yet won general acceptance. And vernacular languages were still far from being the separate and distinct cages in which we today think we are locked.
+
+Up until the time of the earliest vernacular grammars--in other words, up until the late fifteenth century--_lingua_ or _tongue_ or _habla_ was less like one drawer in a bureau than one color in a spectrum. The comprehensibility of speech was comparable to the intensity of a color. Just as one color may appear with greater or lesser intensity, may bleed into its neighbor, just as landscapes merge into one another, so it is with the Council's _aut_ in relation to _romanam_ and _theotiscam_. Latin stands in contrast to both "tongues" because it is an orthographic "language." But so long as there was no compulsion to read aloud in an orthophonetic manner, the reader was free to paint the meaning of what he was reading in any color of the rainbow. And it was on this Christian tradition of a logogrammatical reading of a text written in phonetic notation that the canons of Tours insisted.
+
+By determining the nature of reading in this way, Christianity dissociated itself from the temple at an early stage. As reported by a first-century Jewish source--the Megillah Teanith (The Fasting Scroll)--three days of darkness came over the earth on the day the seventy wise Jews completed their Greek translation of the Torah, the Septuagint. Even today the Koran may not be translated from the Arabic. Christian preaching consists precisely of the fact that every foreigner in Jerusalem was able to hear the Hebrew message in his own native language. Public, vocal meditation during reading is of the essence to the Christian message. The modulation on each syllable that characterizes Gregorian plainchant and the vernacular annunciation of the Gospel are the two extreme forms. Without an appreciation for Mnemosyne it is impossible either to understand the Christian concepts of devout reading, or to grasp what it means that God became the Word that unfolds in Scripture. In the context of these multiple forms of reading, the doctrine of the four-fold interpretation of the sacred text reached its height.
+
+According to the evidence of the Strasbourg Oaths, however, ideogrammatical reading since the ninth century effected precisely the opposite result. The text that Nithard has preserved does not render what anyone had actually said. The work of a wily chaplain, this cunningly devised chunk of speech became the language in which the chancellory took possession of ancient forms of oath. Alliteration and strong words make the army pay due heed to an unaccustomed vow. Every fighting man was to repeat those sentences after a verbatim recital by a cleric. The sentence structure and phraseology of the Romance version show clearly that this intrusion of stilted Latin formulae into the Romance vernacular was not new in Nithard's day; some set forms of its wording give the impression of having been already polished by chancery use. The oaths provide an example of the manner in which letters can shape people, not only before anyone can trace or decipher them, but before a single song or statement has been written in that people's vernacular. The oath is just one of several ways in which the unwritten literature of popular culture was learned by heart. The memorization of prayers was probably much more effective. Even in the thirteenth century, confession still served as a means for the clergy to see if individuals knew the Pater and the Creed by heart.
+
+The medieval clergy's habit of taking depositions in the vernacular and writing them down in Latin, and reading Latin oaths, creeds, and statements by formulating them in vernacular utterances that the people had to repeat, throws light on why epic poetry so rarely came to be written down as it was sung. Unlike the Greek scribe who wrote down what he heard "Homer" sing, the Roman cleric wrote down in Latin what he had understood. And when, on occasion, he wrote it down in the vernacular, the literate scribe was trained to "improve" the version as he wrote it down.
+
+
+Another landmark in the history of language occurred on August 18, 1492--just fifteen days after Columbus had set sail--when a Spaniard named Elio Antonio de Nebrija published the first grammar in any modern European language, the _Gramática Castellana_, which attempted to reduce a vernacular tongue to rules of grammar. Nebrija goes beyond the Carolingian scribe, who listened to Frankish depositions and wrote them down in Latin. He demands that Spanish be made into a language that is not spoken, but that serves to record speech.
+
+The six-page introduction to the _Gramática_ presents a concise and powerful argument why the new age, dawning when Columbus departed, called for the replacement of the vernacular speech of the people by a language--an "artifact"--that all people must henceforth be taught. At this time the Spanish monarchs were engaged in transforming the idea of government. They replaced the old aristocratic advisory bodies by organizations of well-lettered officials. Just recently, and only for a few years, the Crown had seized the Inquisition from the Church, thereby acquiring the power needed to dislodge the sword-carrying nobility who were to be replaced by men of the pen. The conception of government as the machinery that guarantees the execution of the monarch's utterance was now reshaped into one that prepares texts for his signature. The state governed by the management of texts--that is, the modern bureaucratic state--was taking shape. And, under the Hapsburgs, in the late sixteenth century, the transformation became ritually visible. "Ministeriales," high-level scribes, were assigned ritual roles in the court ceremonial of processions and liturgies, often outranking the men of the sword. Nebrija addresses this new secular balance between _armas y letras_. He argues with the queen for a new pact between sword and book and proposes a covenant between two spheres--both within the secular realm of the Crown--a covenant distinct from the medieval pact between Emperor and Pope, which had been a covenant bridging the secular and the sacred.
+
+Very astutely, Nebrija reminds the queen that a new union of _armas y letras_, complementary to that of Church and State, was essential for gathering and joining the scattered pieces of Spain into a single absolute kingdom:
+
+> This unified and sovereign body will be of such shape and inner cohesion that centuries will be unable to undo it. Now that the Church has been purified, and we are thus reconciled to God, now that the enemies of the Faith have been subdued by our arms, now that just laws are being enforced, enabling us all to live as equals, what else remains but the flowering of the peaceful arts. And among the arts, foremost are those of language, which sets us apart from the wild animals; language, which is the unique distinction of man, the means for the kind of understanding which can be surpassed only by contemplation.
+
+Continuing to develop his petition, Nebrija introduces the crucial element of his argument: _La lengua suelta y fuera de regla_--the unbound and ungoverned speech in which people actually live and manage their lives has become a challenge to the Crown. Nebrija thus interprets an unproblematic historical fact as a problem for the architects of a new kind of polity--the modern state:
+
+> Your majesty, it has been my constant desire to see our nation become great, and to provide the men of my tongue with books worthy of their leisure. Presently, they waste their time on novels and fancy stories full of lies.
+
+An argument for standardized language is also made today, but the end is now different. Our contemporaries believe that standardized language is a necessary condition to teach people to read, indispensable for the distribution of printed books. Nebrija argues just the opposite: He was upset because people who spoke in dozens of distinct vernacular tongues in 1492 had become the victims of a reading epidemic. They wasted their leisure on books that circulated outside of any possible bureaucratic control. Manuscripts had been so rare and precious that authorities could often suppress the work of an author by literally seizing _all_ the copies, burning them and extirpating the text. Not so books. Even with the small edition of two hundred to a thousand copies--typical for the first generation of print--it was never possible to confiscate an entire run. Printed books called for the exercise of censorship through an _Index of Forbidden Books_. Books could only be proscribed, not destroyed. But Nebrija's proposal appeared more than fifty years before the first _Index_ was published in 1599. And he wished to achieve control over the printed word on a much deeper level than that later attempted by the Church. He wanted to replace the people's vernacular with the grammarian's language. The humanist proposes the standardization of colloquial language to remove the new technology of printing from the vernacular domain--to prevent people from printing and reading in the various languages that, up to that time, they had only spoken. By this monopoly over an official and taught language, he proposes to suppress wild, untaught vernacular reading.
+
+To grasp the full significance of Nebrija's argument--that compulsory education in a standardized national mother tongue is necessary to prevent people from wanton, pleasureful reading--one must remember the status of print at that time. Nebrija was born before the appearance of moveable type. He was thirteen when the first moveable stock came into use. His conscious adult life coincides with the incunabula. When printing was in its twenty-fifth year, he published his Latin grammar; in its thirty-fifth, he published his Spanish grammar. Nebrija could recall the time before print--as many of us can recall the time before television. Nebrija's text was by coincidence published the year William Caxton died.
+
+The last paragraph of Nebrija's introduction exudes eloquence. Evidently, the teacher of rhetoric knew what he taught. Nebrija has explained his project; given the queen logical reasons to accept it; frightened her with what would happen if she were not to heed him. Finally, like Columbus, he appeals to her sense of a manifest destiny:
+
+> Now, Your Majesty, let me come to the last advantage that you shall gain from my grammar. For the purpose, recall the time when I presented you with a draft of this book earlier this year in Salamanca. At this time, you asked me what end such a grammar could possibly serve. Upon this, the Bishop of Avila interrupted to answer in my stead. What he said was this: "Soon Your Majesty will have placed her yoke upon many barbarians who speak outlandish tongues. By this, your victory, these people shall stand in a new need; the need for the laws the victor owes to the vanquished, and the need for the language we shall bring with us." My grammar shall serve to impart them the Castilian tongue, as we have used grammar to teach Latin to our young.
+
+We can attempt a reconstruction of what happened at Salamanca when Nebrija handed the queen a draft of his forthcoming book. The queen praised the humanist for having provided the Castilian tongue with what had been reserved to the languages of Scripture, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. But while Isabella was able to grasp the achievement of her _letrado_--the description of a living tongue as rules of grammar--she was unable to see any practical use for such an undertaking. For her, grammar was an instrument designed solely for use by teachers. She believed, moreover, that the vernacular simply could not be taught. In her royal view of linguistics, every subject of her many kingdoms was so made by nature that during his lifetime he would reach perfect dominion over his own tongue _on his own_. In this version of "majestic linguistics" the vernacular is the _subject's_ domain. By the very nature of things, the vernacular is beyond the reach of the ruler's authority.
+
+Isabella's initial rejection of Nebrija's proposal underscores its originality. Nebrija argued against a traditional and typically Iberian prejudice of Isabella--the notion that the Crown cannot encroach on the variety of customs in the kingdoms--and called up the image of a new, universal mission for a _modern_ Crown. Nebrija overcame Isabella's prejudices by promising to serve her mystical mission. First, he argued that the vernacular must be replaced by an _artificio_ to give the monarch's power increased range and duration; then, to cultivate the arts by decision of the court; also to guard the established order against the threat presented by wanton reading and printing. But he concluded his petition with an appeal to the "Grace of Granada," the queen's destiny, not just to conquer, but to civilize the entire world.
+
+Both Columbus and Nebrija offered their services to a new kind of empire builder. But Columbus proposed only to use the recently created caravels to the limit of their range for the expansion of royal power in what would become New Spain. Nebrija's appeal was more basic--he argued the use of his grammar for the expansion of the Queen's power in a totally new sphere that he proposed to create through the act of conquest itself. He intended the creation of the sphere of a taught mother tongue--the first invented part of universal education.
+
+Columbus was to open the way to the New World; Nebrija devised a way to control Spanish subjects by providing a way to standardize their language.
+
+
+## The Self
+
+_The practical concern in the thirteenth century with the_ identity _of two charters and the spiritual concern with the_ individuality _of each person reflect the new ability to distinguish what is in the book and what is on the page. The word_ individual _itself comes from Antiq uity . In Porphyry's_ Commentaries _on Aristotelian categories, the word carries the meaning of " unambiguousness"; it has a deictic or demonstrative character. It means an ultimately indivisible_ (a-tomos) _something, the subject of which something is predicated--for example, Socrates, to whom we can point as the "bearded, garrulous, son of so-and-so." In this sense,_ in-dividuum _(Cicero's translation of_ a-tomos) _was carried over the bridge of Isidore of Seville's_ Etymologiae _into the Middle Ages. Abelard used the word in the same deictic sense. Albert the Great took the "individual" beyond Classical Antiquity when he grasped the difference between the_ individuum vaguum _and the_ individuum certum, _the frog whose croaking woke him up last night, as opposed to this particular croaker that I catch and am able to skewer_.
+
+The self is as much an alphabetic construct as word and memory, thought and history, lie and narration. Narration and the self in the twentieth century have become as inseparable as the epos and its singer in oral times: The writer spins the story as part of his self. The twentieth-century citizen sees himself through the eyes of various sciences as a layer cake of texts. From the eighteenth century on, the state has become a corporation of selves that letters examine.
+
+No language can get by without a first person singular, which in some languages is demonstrative--for example, the Hebrew _ani_ that acts like a finger turned backwards--and in other languages sets the speaker off from the rest. But, unlike the "I," most epochs got along without a self. There was no self in epic times. According to Bruno Snell, there was not even a body: heroes refer to their arm or their "thymos," but do not contextualize these into the kind of body we now have. In oral cultures, one may retain an imge of what has been--yesterday, at the time of the full moon, or last spring, but the person then or now exists only in the doing or the telling, as the suffix comes to life only when it modifies a verb. Like a candle, the "I" lights up only in the activity and is extinguished at other times. But not dead. With the retelling of the story, the candle comes to glow again. No pilot light gives continuity to the first person singular between one story and the next. The "I" can exist only in the act of speaking out loud--or to oneself.
+
+The idea of a self that continues to glimmer in thought or memory, occasionally retrieved and examined in the light of day, cannot exist without the text. Where there is no alphabet, there can neither be a memory conceived as a storehouse nor the "I" as its appointed watchman. With the alphabet both text and self became possible, but only slowly, and they became the social construct on which we found all our perceptions as literate people.
+
+Writing the history of the self is as difficult as writing the history of the text. The self is a cloth we have been weaving over centuries in confessions, journals, diaries, memories, and in its most literate incarnation, the autobiography, to tailor the dress in which we see our first person singular. _Beowulf_ dates from the life of Bede (671–735), the time that the Christian alphabet came to England; its hero, Beowulf, has nothing of what we moderns call "self." But by the fourteenth century it is clear that to the two books delineated by someone like St. Bonaventure--the Book of Creation and the Scriptures--has been added a third: the Book of the Self. Hugh of St. Cher refers to the Book of the Heart, which, at the end of time, Hugh declares, Christ will open to reveal all "things secret." Alanus de Insulis calls man's conscience a book hiding things of the soul. These secrets too will be revealed on the Day of Judgement. And in the next several centuries, the self becomes an established literary phenomenon that can be read in popular accounts such as Benvenuto Cellini's supposed autobiography, Rousseau's _Confessions_, and the interminable memoirs of Casanova. At virtually the same moment that James Boswell is lionizing his friend Samuel Johnson, through the biography, Benjamin Franklin is doing the same thing for himself, in his autobiography--though he uses the old term, _memoir_. It is also in America that the newly constituted self quietly reaches its crisis, with Henry Adams.
+
+We cannot conceive facing each other except as selves. The image of the self that we have inherited seems to us fundamental for western culture. But we notice that some of our students are bred on electronic text composers. "Text" means something entirely different for them than it does for us. And thus we sense its extreme fragility at this moment. We fear that the image of the self made in the image of the text could fade from society, together with the self-destruction of the text. Retracing the sociogenesis of our perception, we want to point to its historical nature.
+
+
+In three thousand lines, _Beowulf_ describes the wondrous adventures of Beowulf, whose patronymic translates as Bee-Wolf, or simply Bear. Like a bear, Beowulf swims vigorously, runs swiftly, and fights fiercely. He possesses the strength of thirty men in his right hand. A mighty animal is his model; though he is quasi-human, the hero is not inarticulate. Indeed, he is adept at reconstructing his genealogical roots: he does so in over fifty lines of well-shaped verse. With deftness he tells the story of his prodigious three-day swimming contest with Breca. The same story about the contest with Breca is told by Unferth completely differently. What to us looks like a contradiction in the two stories never becomes a "problem" for Beowulf and is never "resolved." Unferth's diverging story merely shows Beowulf in another light. Beowulf knows no hesitation, he cannot lie, but neither can he take inventory of his life. He seems incapable of remembering. He suffers no pangs of conscience, no regrets. Larger than life, he is also far removed from it.
+
+However, during the last hours of _Beowulf_ on the third and final day of his struggle with the dragon, a kink occurs in the story; for eight and one-half lines there is talk of a kind of shame or guilt or causality--what we would not know how to call anything but "conscience." Less than one hundred lines from the end of the poem a young warrior, named Wiglaf, the sole survivor of an ancient tribe called the Waegmundings, sounds this new and discordant note. He chides his comrades for not aiding their king, who has kept them secure for so many years, in his own time of need in this fatal fight with the dragon.
+
+The death of Beowulf signals more than the simple end of a ruler; it marks the passing away of the heroic way of life and the spirit of _comitatus_ (community) that holds that life together. Young Wiglaf represents the new order in the poem. Perhaps Wiglaf is a Christian interpolation by some monastic scribe, but nonetheless his voice is a new one in English. He wants those cowardly old men to feel bad, and he wants them to carry that feeling around with them. So he scolds:
+
+
+```
+                                Wergendra tō lȳt
+        þrong ymbe þēoden,      þā hyne sīo þrāg becwōm.
+        Nū sceal sinc-þego      ond swyrd-gifu,
+        eall ēð el-wyn      ēowrum cynne,
+        lufen ālicgean;      lond-rihtes mōt
+        þǣre mǣg-burge      monna ǣghwylc
+        īdel hweorfan,      syððan ǣðelingas
+        feorran gefricgean      flēam ēowerne,
+        dōm-lēasan dǣd.      Dēað bið sēlla
+        eorla gehwylcum      þonne edwīt-līf.
+
+                                (Too few defenders
+        pressed round the king      when his worst time came.
+        Now all treasure,      giving and receiving,
+        all home-joys,      ownership, comfort,
+        shall cease for your kin;      deprived of their rights
+        each man of your families      will have to be exiled,
+        once nobles afar      hear of your flight,
+        a deed of no glory.      Death is better
+        for any warrior      than a shameful life!)
+```
+
+-----
+
+
+|                                Wergendra tō lȳt
+
+|        þrong ymbe þēoden,       þā hyne sīo þrāg becwōm.
+
+|        Nū sceal sinc-þego       ond swyrd-gifu,
+
+|        eall ēð el-wyn       ēowrum cynne,
+
+|        lufen ālicgean;       lond-rihtes mōt
+
+|        þǣre mǣg-burge       monna ǣghwylc
+
+|        īdel hweorfan,       syððan ǣðelingas
+
+|        feorran gefricgean       flēam ēowerne,
+
+|        dōm-lēasan dǣd.       Dēað bið sēlla
+
+|        eorla gehwylcum       þonne edwīt-līf.
+
+|  
+
+|                                   (Too few defenders
+
+|        pressed round the king      when his worst time came.
+
+|        Now all treasure,      giving and receiving,
+
+|        all home-joys,      ownership, comfort,
+
+|        shall cease for your kin;      deprived of their rights
+
+|        each man of your families      will have to be exiled,
+
+|        once nobles afar      hear of your flight,
+
+|        a deed of no glory.      Death is better
+
+|        for any warrior      than a shameful life!)
+
+|  
+
+
+Embarrassed and ashamed--and still too frightened to fight--they do the only thing left to them: skulk off to the woods.
+
+But Wiglaf will not allow the Waegmundings to forget their betrayal. He wants those warriors to be stuck with their guilt or their shame--or both. Wiglaf implies that each of those men possesses something like a self whose voice is his conscience. He sends a messenger to court to foretell the horror of the feuds that will be caused by their cowardly inaction. For the first and only time in the entire poem, past action is presented as the cause of future grief. Wiglaf interprets the history of feuding tribes as the result of the guilt of forebears.
+
+Beowulf is then set on a barge, along with all his treasures. Set afire, the barge drifts off to some unknown destination. Women bewail a past epoch and keen over the king. The future looms in grim detail. Wiglaf has erased the present. Warriors are helpless to undo the past while they prepare for what is to come. For the present they can only lament and hide.
+
+
+James Cox, a literary critic concerned with autobiography, argues convincingly that autobiography is not only an American invention, but one that flourishes, as nowhere else, in America. Franklin, the Ur-American portrait of success--founder of a university, a hospital, a library, a philosophical society, the postal system; inventor of the stove, the smokeless street lamp, bifocals, electrical conduction, and the glass harmonica, among other things--"at the age of sixty-five embarked upon what one wants to call his great invention--the invention of himself, not as a fiction, but as a fact and in history." Thus, in Franklin we are not reading some fictional character like Lancelot, or some product of romantic longing like Casanova, but a fictional fact.
+
+In the _Confessions_, Augustine realizes that hubris must inevitably end in failure; he must, therefore, eschew the things of this world. But autobiography is born out of hubris, it requires that the self be woven into the very design of material society. In Franklin's case, his autobiography grows out of the hubris of America's emerging power--its myths and ideals--a power that actually thrives on mistakes. One merely seizes upon them, as Franklin makes clear, and turns them into substantial financial success. Autobiography amplifies that power: Since a person is literally creating a new being, he can smooth out the rough transitions in his life, clean up the mistakes, to produce a polished and attractive literary self. The writer presents his life as he thinks it should have been. Thus, every autobiography is in some ways a declaration of independence, as the writer bids farewell to his baggy historical self, embracing a new, tidy, authorized, and public one. It marks an act of willful liberation. No wonder, then, the number of powerful American black autobiographies, such as the _Narrative of Frederick Douglass, The Autobiography of Malcolm X_, the story of George Washington Carver, and the _Confessions of Nat Turner_. How fitting that Franklin, so concerned with autobiography, should have been one of the framers of the Declaration of Independence. He was also President of the Executive Council of Pennsylvania, as well as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. And in his _Autobiography_ Franklin continually measures himself against that singularly American founding document, the constitution.
+
+_Constitution_ is a word that had been in use for only a hundred or a hundred and fifty years by 1771, the year Franklin began writing his memoirs, to mean the composition of some body or some thing; and Franklin borrows the idea to help enact the "constitution of his own self." This self should not be seen as a mere literary fabrication, Franklin implies, but in some substantive way "constituted" out of the homely virtues of honesty, sobriety, moderation, frugality, and perseverance. A self so constituted knows no limits to its accomplishments: Like everyone else, Franklin pursued life, liberty, and happiness and he shows that hard work pays off in enormous success.
+
+Franklin's _Autobiography_ charts his climb from raggedy beginnings, in the guise of the frugal and industrious Poor Richard (Saunders), through an encyclopedic and disparate series of selves, to the birth of that star, the Great Doctor Franklin. While the _Autobiography_ breaks off its narration in 1757, the moment that Franklin's career really takes off, John Adams points out that when Franklin began writing the _Autobiography_ he was already an international celebrity: "There was scarcely a citizen who was not familiar with his name and who did not consider him a friend to human kind."
+
+Poor Richard, it turns out, is rich in wisdom, which he expresses in pithy sayings and maxims. Franklin sprinkles them throughout the _Autobiography:_ A penny saved is a tuppence clear; God helps those who help themselves; A word to the wise is enough. Collected and sold in little pamphlets, Richard's advice became a commodity easily dispensed and digested, a constant reminder of the importance of practical application. Those apothegms helped to mask the real-life Franklin, a sometimes untidy, spendthrift man, at loose ends with his own finances. But more than that, Richard Saunders sired Ben Franklin, a _brand_-new self--we still refer to _Franklin_ stoves, _Franklin_ glasses, _Franklin_ lightning rods. (Franklin patented none of his inventions, saying that "as we enjoy great advantage from the inventions of others, we should be glad of an opportunity to serve others by any invention of ours." Curiously enough, American patent law derives from a provision in the Constitution empowering Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing ... to inventors the exclusive right to their ... discoveries.") A public self like Franklin's is essential for the full-time pursuit of success. The question may be: How long can the pursuit be sustained?
+
+The answer is delivered in the next century, with _The Ed ucation of Henry Adams_, considered by most historians to be the first autobiography, one in which we can actually experience a self crystallizing around the act of writing. We see the struggles and the mistakes; we are present at the moment of crisis. Franklin writes from a position of solid success; he's already made it, and from this position of assuredness glances over his shoulder to document its history. Adams writes out of failure.
+
+_The Education of Henry Adams_ involves a dialogue between the failed Adams, who hopes to learn from his mistakes, and some other Adams. To make this clear, Adams adopts a curious literary stance: _The Education_ is the life of Henry Adams told by Henry Adams, but narrated in the third person. We are thus made to experience two Adamses: the previous one--actually Adams as a young man--and the new Adams--the writer as an older man. Not only are there two Adamses, however, but more curiously, the young Adams, the literary creation being remembered, or recollected, takes on its own life and begins to educate the new Adams.
+
+Here is a truly extraordinary development: The literary creation of the self has assumed enough life of its own to instruct and educate its creator. This third-person golem must be disposed of, dealt with, or, ideally, incorporated back into the first person. The young Adams in fact controls the situation so strongly that he turns the old Adams, the writer, into a ghostly fictional character. Adams must figure out how to take back his life. So these two selves travel the entire meandering path of the book as master/pupil; they stand together at the moment of crisis in Paris on April 15, 1900, at the largest exhibition ever held in Europe, the Great Exposition.
+
+Ben Franklin ransacked his soul to uncover there the multifarious parts of his soul--artist, printer, inventor, educator, designer, statesman, scientist, and so on. Some powerful invisible force drove Franklin toward success. At the Great Exposition, Adams saw that force updated and made concrete in one grand contraption: the forty-foot-high dynamos displayed in the Gallery of Machines.
+
+For Adams, the Virgin represented the great religious symbol of the twelfth century; for the twentieth century, that symbol was the dynamo. Both stand as "revelations of a mysterious energy like that of the Cross; they were what in terms of medieval science were called immediate modes of the divine substance," symbols of a continuing divine force that has driven the history of man. Just like the Virgin, the dynamo was capable of attracting untold numbers of followers. Puzzling over the connection between these two disparate centuries, Adams begins to perceive the possibilities of education anew; indeed, a hazardous one: "The knife-edge along which he must crawl, like Sir Lancelot in the twelfth century, divided two kingdoms of force which had nothing in common but attraction."
+
+The new Adams learns from the old Adams that the great invisible force of the twentieth century--producing electricity, X rays, and radium--has been around forever, just like the force of Christianity. At times, this force becomes visible. The Virgin represented a form of faith still felt at Lourdes, at the Louvre, and at Chartres. There, as he knew by the record of work he still could see, existed "the highest energy ever known to man, the creator of four-fifths of his noblest art, exercising vastly more attraction over the human mind than all the steam-engines and dynamos ever dreamed of; and yet this energy was unknown to the American mind. An American virgin would never dare command; an American Venus would never dare exist." Through the dynamo, Adams reckons, the American mind would finally be able to grasp the immensity of a divine force. America tottered on the verge of momentous change, which Adams, in his excitement, can only equate with other revolutionary moments: "Copernicus and Galileo had broken many professional necks about 1600; Columbus had stood the world on its head towards 1500; but the nearest approach to the revolution of 1900 was that of 310, when Constantine set up the Cross."
+
+In yet another reversal in _The Education_, Adams understands as he actually stands under this dynamo the great lesson of his education: he is a failure. Not that Adams was not born of the proper Brahman, New England stock, not that he had failed to attend the correct schools, or that he had not created elegant and influential works of literature, like the wonderfully seductive _Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres_, but that he had failed in the invisible world of the spirit.
+
+Ironically, Adams had created his self with so much clarity and precision--the young Adams had been too much of a literary success--that his current state of failure becomes painfully clear to him. Adams has interpreted the self, analyzed it, and what he finds the literary self telling him is the opposite of what it seems to say. After more than fifty years of study, he was still an ignoramus. The modern way of describing this is to say that Adams psychoanalyzes his soul to determine what it feels or what it means. After all, the therapeutic experience is essentially a literary one: A person is expected to think, reconstruct, maneuver--narrate with shape and interest--his old self to a listening doctor/auditor. A rich imagination is as useful as a sharp memory. Only when this old self is fully understood, in all its complexities and contradictions, the theory goes, can the patient be deemed healthy.
+
+Adams would have described Franklin's life as wrong-headed, for he desires an inner search, not an outward pursuit. Franklin fixed on success, from the Latin _succedere_--ascending, mounting. As a failure, Adams had plummeted--into himself. He realizes how he must climb back out, and he presents it in the most curious turn taken in _The Education_. He decides to trace the history of force and power from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the twentieth century. In the midst of writing his autobiography he tells us that he must take up writing! Not only has self spawned self, but text has given rise to another, inner text. If the self is a reflexive phenomenon, and its history can be unraveled in writing, then why not a reflexive text as well. These intricacies--self doubling back on self, text on text, first person talking as third--make it appear as if the Book of Kells had provided the pattern for Adams's autobiography. In Adams's words: "In such labyrinths, the staff is a force almost more necessary than the legs; the pen becomes a sort of blind-man's dog, to keep him from falling into the gutters. The pen works for itself, and acts like a hand, modelling the plastic materials over and over again to the form that suits it best. The form is never arbitrary, but is a sort of growth like crystallization, as any artist knows too well; for often the pencil or the pen runs into side-paths and shapelessness, loses its relations, stops or is bogged. Then it has to return on its trail, and recover, if it can, its line of force. The result of a year's work depends more on what is struck out than on what is left in; on the sequence of the main lines of thought, than on their play or variety."
+
+A chief obstacle to writing a modern autobiography is its ending. How can it end, really, reach its final conclusion, until the writer is dead? Franklin's _Autobiography_ breaks off in his fifty-first year; he dies before its completion. Adams solves the problem by killing off the young Adams, the instructor. Or, perhaps in a more accurate literary image, the two Adamses come together, both holding a single pen. So the end of _The Education_ is in some sense the birth of the Old Adams, complete with a new self.
+
+After incorporating the idea of force into his writing by developing what he calls the Dynamic Theory of History, he arrives at the last chapter, appropriately titled "Nunc Age," (Now Go). He is ready to reenter the world. But before he does, he pauses to realize that he had accomplished the goal he set for himself in the Preface (which Adams signs as Henry Cabot Lodge): to complete Augustine's _Confessions_. Self-satisfied, Adams no longer needs to talk to himself. He can finally confess, quoting Shakespeare but recalling Augustine, that "the rest is silence."
+
+
+## Untruth and Narration
+
+_Both literary and moral feigning depend on the author's ability to reshape (in Latin_ fingere, _whence "fiction") his own thoughts of untruth, which in the late Middle Ages is called narration. Only when I have gotten used to thinking as the silent tracing of words on the parchment of my memory, can I detach thought from speech and contra-dict it. A full-blown lie presupposes a self that thinks before it says what it has thought. Only when memory is perceived as a text can thought become a material to be shaped, reshaped, and transformed . Only a self that has thought what it does say, can say_something that it does not think. Neither such a thought as distinct from speech, nor such a thinking self as distinct from the speaker can exist without speech having been transmogrified and frozen into thought that is stored in the literate memory_.
+
+Like the Text, Untruth also has a history. The Old Testament knows of infidelity, broken promises, betrayals, and perjury. It knows of slander, false witness and, what is worse, false prophecy and the abominable service of false gods. Neither these detestable forms of deceit nor the skillful ruse of a patriarch imply that opposition to an abstract "truth" that is essential to what we today call a lie. Neither the Greek _psuedos_ (used both for the "liar" and the "lie") nor the Latin _mendacium_ (referring also to the emendation of a line on a wax tablet) in Classical times comes close to our idea of the untruthful. Both languages lack the words that could oppose the _Oxford English Dictionary's_ "false statement made with the intent to deceive" to a flight of fancy or feigning. The Classical languages barely contain the seed for the full-fledged Western lie and the full-blown Western fiction.
+
+The early Greeks took a sporting attitude toward duplicity. George Steiner presents an exchange between Athena and Odysseus as an example: "...mutual deception, the swift saying of 'things that are not,' need be neither evil nor a bare technical constraint. Gods and chosen mortals can be virtuosos of mendacity, contrivers of elaborate untruths for the sake of the verbal craft..." And "untruth" is always the telling of _things_ that are not, not of _thoughts_ that are contradicted! The patron of this cunning craft was Hermes, the trickster, the thief and the inventor of the lyre that urges the singer further into the epos. And the hero of that art is the shrewd and wily, generous and noble Odysseus, who according to Plato _(Hippias Minor)_ is powerful and prudent, knowing and wise in those things about which he is false.
+
+In the realm of orality one cannot dip twice into the same wave, and therefore the lie is a stranger. My word always travels alongside yours; I stand for my word, and I swear by it. My oath is my truth until well into the twelfth century: The oath puts an end to any case against a freeman. Only in the thirteenth century does Continental canon law make the judge into a reader of the accused man's conscience, an inquisitor into truth, and torture the means by which the confession of truth is extracted from the accused. Truth ceases to be displayed in surface action and is now perceived as the outward expression of inner meaning accessible only to the self.
+
+In the fifth century Augustine had created a concept that breaks with pagan and Christian antiquity by defining every lie as an assault on truth. Intellectual errors of fact are not a moral issue for him in his treatise _On the Lie_. Only the person who says something with the intent of misleading violates the truth. The offense lies in the _voluntas fallendi_: words used with the intent to contradict the truth that is enshrined in the speaker's heart. Even a statement that is factually correct can turn into an assault on truth if it is proffered with the intent to deceive. Augustine moved the lie into the neighborhood of blasphemy: an act of contempt of God as the only Creator and Author.
+
+For the next eight hundred years whatever truly exists is there because God has willed it to be. All things man can speak about issue from His creative Word or command. He has brought things into being because He wanted them to be and not because there is something in them that makes it necessary for them to exist. Adam is His "fiction." He molded, shaped, fashioned him out of the virgin soil of Paradise. The world is therefore _contingent_ on God's authorship. By every lie a creature usurps authorship reserved to the Creator. Even in the thirteenth century, a cleric who writes down stories has to state that he is not the story's actual source (_fons ejus_), but only its channel (_canalis_). Likewise, the person who had dictated the story to the scribe must state that he has not "sucked it from his finger" (_ex suo digito suxit_)--that is, has not _invented_ it. The dictator's disclaimer lays bare the connection between fiction and _fingere_.
+
+Augustine's ban on the arrogation of truth matured, during the Middle Ages, into the new duty to make truth manifest. In the many-tiered, God-willed order of the twelfth century, to be true in word and in deed came to be perceived as a moral debt. The late patristic prohibition against deceiving the listener was turned by the early Scholastics into the moral obligation to reveal the truth. Only against this background can it be understood what it means to say that the Age of European Literacy is the World of Fiction.
+
+As much as the full-fledged lie, _narratio_ presupposes an author and a text that is contingent on his self--his or her creation. Neither the epic bard, nor the later storyteller, nor even the highly literate poet are fully authors: They do not pretend to create a world that by the standards of the early Middle Ages would be untrue. Chaucer, Defoe, and Twain provide us with landmarks in the history of the author who weaves "lies" into the convincing untruth of fiction.
+
+
+Chaucer, in _The Canterbury Tales_ (1386), is the first English author who recognizes the emerging literate mindset of his courtly audience. Defoe, in the _Journal of the Plague Year_ (1772), takes into account that the mind of his middle-class readership has been shaped by journals and magazines, and writes the first English "novel." And Twain publishes the first great work of fiction from Democratic America, _The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn_, in 1885, just two years after the _New England Journal of Education_ had coined that curious Americanism, "literacy."
+
+Modern readers take for granted that _The Canterbury Tales_ is a standard book; after all, it is neatly printed and housed between solid boards. Moreover, its pages are filled with stories--eccentric characters involved in dramatic action. And that is, of course, exactly proper activity for books that are intended to be held in our hands and read to ourselves. But medievalists have been compiling convincing textual evidence since the mid thirties to prove that, while Chaucer's poem was written down by a number of scribes, it was in all likelihood delivered orally.
+
+
+Which means that Chaucer's audience was prepared to listen to a long poem, presumably something they had done many times before. The majority of them, in fact, could probably not have read the poem, even if they so desired. Strangely enough, however, the opening lines of _The Canterbury Tales_ demand a sophisticated literacy. Chaucer begins his poem with one of the most difficult syntactic forms for the listener to grasp, the subordinate clause, which requires the listener to hold the sense of the dependent clause steadily in mind, suspending the fulfillment of meaning that the independent clause promises to deliver. Chaucer compounds this highly literate construction--one that never appears in oral formulaic poetry--by beginning "The General Prologue" to _The Canterbury Tales_ with not one but two consecutive subordinate clauses: the first from lines one to four, the second from lines five through eleven. He holds back the independent clause, "Thanne longen folk to goon on pilgrimages"--and hence leaves dangling the meaning of the early part of the poem--until line twelve.
+
+By line twelve, however, Chaucer's audience would probably have forgotten what came before, or at best retained only a vague sense of it. His audience could only have felt uncomfortable, perhaps even irritated. To use a medieval designation, he has made them feel like _ignoramuses_. It is one thing to recite a poem using oral devices--formulaic constructions, repetitions--so that the audience can keep abreast and understand, but quite another to present the same information through highly literate techniques--in Chaucer's case, by using two sets of subordinate clauses and so forcing his audience to forget. By causing his audience to forget, however, Chaucer introduces one of the major concerns of the poem: the imposition of literacy upon an inherently oral activity--the composition and delivery of poetry.
+
+If forgetting enables Chaucer to turn his audience into auditor/readers--in a sense, they must envision the page as they hear it aloud--it enables him to turn from storyteller into writer. And so he also points to his own ability to forget. Chaucer the narrator begins by telling us what he remembers about some thirty-three pilgrims with whom he sat one evening at the Tabard Inn and with whom he set out on the road to Canterbury. What is more astonishing, he intends to tell us, before he forgets it all, the four stories those pilgrims told on their round trip, "as it remembreth me," in the distinct voice of each of the pilgrims, utilizing their exact metaphor, image, color of language, and idea. All told, Chaucer will retell this entire event in over eighteen thousand lines, for the most part meticulously rhymed and metered--certainly a prodigious feat.
+
+Prodigious or not, Chaucer employed this strategy knowing that his medieval audience would have believed him--but only up to a point. Indeed, if, as historians argue, Chaucer was probably educated at the Inns of Court, he would have learned some mnemonic system--his own Man of Laws learns "every statute...plein by rote"--and so would have been able to retell from memory a large amount of detail. But this is not Homer's Mnemosyne, that great treasure bag of phrases and images, into which one could dip, threading now one and now another on his marvelous loom. Chaucer's is a literate memory; many of the stories have been "sucked from his finger." And he boasts of remembering such minutiae that an audience--medieval or modern--is forced to conclude that he must be lying to them. No one could possibly remember that much detail with that much precision--mnemonic devices or not. As auditors, then, they would have been pulled up short.
+
+Thus Chaucer deliberately undercuts his own demands for believability by presenting a new textual memory. No other writer--not Dante, or Gower, or Boccaccio--had used memory as such a storehouse for fiction. His audience would have been alert to a ploy, for in Chaucer they found such a revolutionary form. In a deliberate way, then, Chaucer focuses his audience's attention, not on his memory, but on forgetting.
+
+Chaucer is composing his poem at a time when England is making its transition from an oral to a literate culture. And the poem reflects this uneasy shift. Chaucer presents us with details that he says he has overheard; but by the end of the fourteenth century, hearsay, at least in courts of law, was already being supplanted by written testimony. So while Chaucer roots his poem in oral tradition, he does so in such an overblown way that few if any of his contemporary listeners could have taken his boast seriously. Chaucer's strategy is simply to push the limits of orality to absurdity. He forces his medieval audience to hear _The Canterbury Tales_ as a work of _literature_.
+
+By getting them to think about their own literacy, as well as their own connections with the oral tradition, he has brought them face to face with the process of writing fiction. For if Chaucer could not possibly have remembered all that he says he has, he must be making it up, embellishing and shaping his initial information. He must be telling a story, inventing a tale. That is, he must be writing fiction. Chaucer is forging a working definition of the medieval idea of _auctor_, which he must of absolute necessity separate from the divine _auctoritee_. By assigning to himself the capacity to remember every scrap and nuance, every blink and titter of all thirty-three pilgrims, he sets himself up as a liar: a teller who intends to deceive with fibs and fables. Only by placing himself in this category can he become a mundane author. In any other category of literary creation, Chaucer would be usurping divine authorship.
+
+Chaucer here becomes entangled in an important philosophical/theological idea of the Middle Ages--the question of "contingency." From Augustine to the end of the thirteenth century, the principle of contingency became the necessary cause for all creation. Contingency represents the state of an essence or nature that admits of, but does not demand, actualization. St. Thomas translated the idea to mean "that which can be and can not be," which he used as the basis for the demonstration of the existence of God. Since the essence of the contingent being does not itself contain its existence, the reason for its existence must be found in an extrinsic efficient cause. Antecedent causes must, likewise, find the reason for _their_ existence in some other antecedent cause. Ultimately, the argument goes, one reaches a first cause whose existence is underived--that is, whose essence includes existence. But only one thing is both necessary and absolute: God.
+
+This theological idea impinges on literary creation: The Canterbury pilgrims are dependent on Chaucer for their "existence"; he appears to be their absolute and necessary cause--though of course Chaucer's own existence is a contingent one. Still, the question arises: Is it proper in this fuzzy literary area to call Chaucer a creator? Literary creations must be seen, at least in part, as mirror images of heavenly creation. Chaucer falls into a literary trap: If the existence of the world is contingent on the grace of the Word in "divine authorship," then Chaucer can only escape blasphemy by undercutting that singular, tremendous power that enables him to create--literacy.
+
+Chaucer's task is thus a complicated one. He needs to have his Canterbury story taken as truth--for this is the way readers come to enter into any fictional dream. He gains this sense of verisimilitude in several ways. By making himself one of the traveling group of pilgrims, Chaucer has to tell one of the proposed hundred and thirty or so tales, "The Tale of Sir Thopas," which he uses to further undercut his own literate power by telling a story so dull that the hosts beg him to stop. He adds even more of a sense of realism by drawing some of the other pilgrims--Harry Bailly the Host, for example--from actual citizenry of fourteenth-century London. Finally, there is no better way to imply that all this stuff is real than to say, "I was there, and I remember. I saw all this, I heard them all speak, and let me tell you what they said and did."
+
+But while he needs to give his poem a sense of realism, for theological reasons he must also see to it that his audience experiences the poem as made up. It is inevitable, then, that the subject of his poem should be--at least in part--the paradoxical nature of literacy. The written word is the authorized version, the authenticated truth. But too much truth can get Chaucer into theological trouble; he must move his creation into another category, into untruth. And he can do this best by letting his audience think of him as a liar. And so the muse for Chaucer can no longer be Mnemosyne, the Goddess of Recollecting, but some other unnamed Goddess--of Forgetting.
+
+
+Fiction reaches its first flowering in the _novel_--a word used initially to stand in opposition to the stuff of romances--when literacy broadened to include more of the middle class of English society in the late eighteenth century. The first successful London daily newspaper, the _Daily Courant_, appeared March 11, 1702. The word _magazine_ was first used to designate a popular literary journal with the publication of the _Gentleman 's Magazine_ in 1704. In this context, the most literate genre, the novel, begins to take shape through the efforts of Daniel Defoe, a man who in 1704 printed his own weekly newspaper, the _Review_. His _Journal of the Plague Year_ is usually referred to as England's first novel.
+
+Like Chaucer, Defoe needs to establish the veracity of a new form. While Defoe's audience may be more used to reading than Chaucer's, and, in particular, used to reading fictional narratives like romances, the novel is, as its name implies, _new_. Like Chaucer, Defoe wants his story to be taken as true, and so he needs to fabricate a believable lie, which he does by presenting his narrative as ajournal kept by one H. F., who purportedly lived during the plague year of 1665. This H. F. gives an eye- and ear-witness account; in fact, the subtitle of the book reads: "Being observations or memorials of the most remarkable occurences, as well publik as private, which happened in London during the last great visitation in 1665. Written by a citizen who continued all the while in London. Never made publik before." Thus, H. F.'s account derives from what he saw (observations) and remembers (memorials), all of which, he assures us, is true (happened in London).
+
+Defoe's premise differs from Chaucer's in that the former admits to writing down events daily in a journal and finally making the journal public--that is, publishing his evidence. Between Chaucer and Defoe the printing press has intervened, and it turns out that Defoe's real subject is the bureaucratization of the word, authenticated through the reality of type, and spread like contagion, in hundreds and hundreds of copies, directly from the platen of the press. The printed word impresses its own version of reality.
+
+Defoe opens his journal by conjecturing on the origin of the plague, surprised that it might have come from Holland, but suggesting that no one really knows, since "we had no such thing as printed newspapers in those days to spread rumors and reports of things..." News traveled by "word of mouth," but the truth of the plague cannot be gotten in that manner. In time, however, as the _Journal_ makes clear, the Secretaries of State "got knowledge of it," and took on the responsibility of determining the truth and making it known to the citizens--a bureaucratic process that will reach its final goal in publication.
+
+First, the State sends out professionals, two physicians and a surgeon, as certified agents, to examine the corpses of two recently dead Frenchmen. Through an undisclosed procedure, they determine that the Frenchmen both died of the plague. They render their opinion to the parish clerk, who turns over their positive findings to city hall. The last step toward truth involves making public--publishing--the doctors' decisions in the weeky Bill of Mortality: "Plague, 2. Parishes infected, 1." The plague has thus begun, its reality contained in the first Bill of Plague posted at various places around the parish. From this point on, no rumor, no piece of information transmitted orally can counter the truth of the written reports.
+
+Few people dare question the physicians' verdicts, for these men are certified professionals. Their published reports become automatic testimony in the bureaucratization of the word. And their word helps create the reality of the plague; indeed, as the news travels by the Plague Bill, so does the infection, for people act on the printed reality. Spreading the plague by word of mouth, they close themselves in, huddling closer together, unwittingly serving to infect each other. "Facts" matter very little. The narrator of the _Journal_ actually sees very few dead bodies; he merely reprints the body counts from the weekly Plague Bill. The citizens of London learn that the plague is getting worse or getting better by the numbers of people reported in the weekly Bill. The reality of the plague resides in these figures; the shadow of the medical "truth" of the plague lies somewhere else--in rats or in fleas, or in some other theory. But these "medical facts" interest no one but the historian of disease, or the medical scientist.
+
+Defoe's narrative account mimics this social construction of the plague. Defoe himself was four years old during the plague--hardly an eye-or ear-witness. That doesn't matter. For he knows he is free to make up the facts, or at least to play with them, keeping only the barest remnant of historical accuracy and molding the rest to fit his aesthetic needs. Defoe invents events, plays with statistics. Compare Defoe's account with other "historical" accounts of the plague and the numbers all differ. Knowing that he is writing both fiction and history, Defoe can call into question the notion of truth.
+
+His literary task is in some ways more difficult, in some ways easier, than Chaucer's. He knows, for instance, that people firmly believe in the veracity of the _news_--as it is presented in the dailies, in magazines, or now in novels. (Both _news_ and _novel_ thrive on the freshness of the word; each ultimately derives from Latin _nova_, "new.") It is in this period that the idea of story begins to separate itself from history: What constitutes "untruth" and "fact" take separate paths. And _news_ helps forge that separation. Defoe takes advantage of this confusion between story and history: in his own story, he shows us that what people lose faith in are forms of oral discourse. Old wives' tales, rumors, forecasts by astrologers--all of these are stuff, Defoe alleges, of the deluded minds of the common people in eighteenth-century London. Some of these illiterates, Defoe tells us, were even silly enough to run "about the streets with their oral predictions," publishing them as best they could. But he is reporting all of this, of course, in a skillfully made-up work of _fiction_. Thus, like Chaucer, he undercuts a growing reliance on literate forms--testimony, records, numbers--with a literate form, the novel.
+
+In the _Journal_, literacy impresses itself more and more deeply into the text, crowding out virtually every oral locution. In the early part of the _Journal_, Defoe uses phrases like "it was about the beginning of September, 1664," "some said," "pretty much," "about six weeks," "others said it was brought from Canada; others from Cyprus." These terms of vague approximation are slowly extinguished and replaced by precise numbers. The supposition, of course, is that numbers carry accuracy, precision, and hence the truth. These are things we can believe in and act on.
+
+Gradually, as we read the _Journal_, we begin to realize that we are being infected--or rather that Defoe's _Journal_, his attempt at establishing the scientific veracity of the plague, is infecting us. He makes us believe, with his reportorial, exact mind, that "oral discourse" does not have the capacity for carrying the truth; oral discourse does not allow for the power of critical analysis. For that, one must have writing, or better yet, the authority of print. One must be able to "think" about the problem through discursive prose. The sentences must stand still, an impossibility with oral discourse. Those who remain outside this literate circle will thus remain incapable of thinking.
+
+Prose is not democratic. Not everyone can read. But neither is the plague--Defoe tells us that it affects the poor in greater numbers than the wealthy. The irony of this book begins to become apparent. While the majority of Londoners will survive the plague, they will not survive the new literacy. For the plague, this crisis of the State, has been met with the best weapon the State has at its disposal: certification through the word. Through it, in fact, the State has managed to concentrate, solidify, and expand its power. It is one thing to create civil servants, but an entirely other thing both to invest them with power and to coerce the population to believe in that power.
+
+But we must once again understand the literary trick: Defoe makes his readers fall for the power of the printed word. He not only says he was there--so were a lot of other people--but he wrote all this down. And that is why he now stands in the privileged position of passing on the truth. Where Chaucer was careful to work out a limited sense of his own power as an author, walking a fine line with the ultimate authorial power, Defoe has already assumed the power of the word to create his own historical fabrication with it. But we should note that, as with Chaucer, the trick is two-edged. For at the same time that he establishes the validity of the word, he also distrusts it, and so undercuts it by associating it metaphorically with the plague. This might have been more apparent for an eighteenth-century reader than for a modern one, far removed from the event of the plague. By 1667, there were at least a dozen contemporary accounts of the plague, including the authoritative eight-volume _Loimologia sine pestis nuperae apud populum londinensem narratio_ by Quincey, published in 1720. And Defoe's facts and figures are at best shaky. Not because he is a sloppy historian, but because he understands the true nature of history: That it is a narrative in the best sense of the word and that the "facts" must therefore be constructed.
+
+
+In _The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn_, Mark Twain lays for his readers the nineteenth-century equivalent of this trap of literacy. At the same time that literacy opens the lid a crack to the treasure trove of white, received society--one that is, of course, closed to the Negro Jim--it also exacts a high price, and so Huck flees it.
+
+_Huckleberry Finn_ is a book about a book. And we won't know about the literary character Huck, Huck himself tells us in the opening line, "without you have read a book by the name of _The Adventures of Tom Sawyer_." Here is a literary creation telling us to read about his past in another book--the genealogy of the Homeric epic transformed into literary pedigree. We have come a long way: Twain achieves his verisimilitude by coming clean, by laying bare the literary lie--this is only a book, these are only characters playing out their parts. Having established Huck's literary credentials, Twain has Huck follow what is now a familiar pattern: He undercuts that literary importance. "But that aint no _matter_," Huck insists, immediately after telling us to read _Tom Sawyer_, pulling off a wonderfully literate pun. It doesn't make any difference is one sense of Huck's line; but it can also mean that books are without substance, _materia_--without matter.
+
+Huck probably means both things. But we must be more on guard with Twain than with any other author, for he is so disarmingly honest--or rather, his confederate, Huck, tells us his creator is so honest. He's so honest, in fact, Huck confesses, that in his other books "Mister Twain told us the truth, mainly. There was things which he stretched, but mainly he told the truth."
+
+Standing inside a formal literary tradition, this semiliterate begins his story by telling about his early days with the Widow Douglas and her sister, Miss Watson, who both set out to civilize Huck by teaching him the rules. They do it principally by reading to him from Miss Watson's book about "Moses and the bulrushers." When this fails to impress its mark on Huck, Miss Watson escalates to a spelling book.
+
+In this emerging world of literacy, correct spelling offers the key to the correct look of literacy, the visual check on a person's education, in much the same way that skin color is a key in this book to freedom or slavery. A person usually knows enough grammar to sound literate; and speech betrays no errors of punctuation or spelling, only mispronunciations. So, for example, Huck speaks the word _civilization_, but in writing the book he spells it _sivilization_. In the twelfth century, Huck would have been classed as a _rustico more_, someone who communicates in an unlearned tongue for which there exists no written counterpart bound by grammatical rules.
+
+Huck's misspellings are common to the illiterate, who pay more attention to what they hear, without recognizing on the page the words they frequently use. We know what Huck means, but that "aint no matter." And here we step into the first part of Twain's trap. What Huck says takes a secondary position to the _way_ Huck presents--"writes"--it. Anyone who is able to read _Huck Finn_ is obviously literate, literate enough to harbor the impulse to correct Huck's mistakes, for the mistakes loom as boulders impeding the smooth and steady flow of the reader's fluency. To borrow the central image of the book: We need to transform Huck's babbling stream of speech into a smooth flowing river of prose.
+
+This book forces us to read in an aristocratic way, in a modern obverse of Hugh of Saint Victor's, in which the critic, the inner self that sits in judgement, silently corrects Huck's speech. This is not the reading of contemplative silence, but the busy-ness of critical judging. Twain has made us not only into readers, but editors; and our laughter at Huck's mannerisms must sound haughty--in the sense of high and lofty--as we elevate ourselves over that poor, unlettered boy. Twain provokes that judgement in part because the book seems to be a reproduction of the spoken and not the written word. In precisely the manner that a medieval scribe recorded what he heard in _ductus_, Twain creates the illusion that Huck dictated this novel and that what we have as a result is a raw medieval manuscript, which we read out of literate training as modern critics. After all our years of education about and knowledge of the rules of grammar and syntax and spelling, we simply cannot allow him his sloppy freedom. We need to correct him, keep him in check--even against our wills--as strongly as the Widow Douglas and Miss Watson.
+
+Twain makes us feel superior to Huck's mistakes. Even though he speaks--and even though he tells us that he has written this book--we can only conclude that he is dumb. In early use, in Old High German, the word _dumb_ meant one who was both mute _and_ stupid. Perhaps the logic went something like this: Because we don't hear what the person knows or understands, we assume he knows nothing. Only saints and sages are assumed in their silence to be wise. In Huck's case, we assume he is dumb precisely because we _see, verbum ad_verbum_, what he is _saying_. In a poignant way, he has been "silenced" by prose. His words have undergone no _re_-vision. He says what he thinks at first glance. And since his story is not, in a traditional sense, authored, what he writes cannot be taken as authority. Even in nineteenth-century society, he might as well be mute. For in his illiterate ignorance, he is as disenfranchised from society as his Negro friend Jim.
+
+Twain drives home just how strongly we are chained to our own literacy through Huck's illiterate silence. While he allows Huck to live comfortably in orality, he prevents us from entering that world. _The Canterbury Tales_ begs to be read aloud--one can hear it in the easy rhythms of "The General Prologue" and in Chaucer's hilarious rhymes, for instance when he undercuts the romantic _kisse_ in "The Miller's Tale" with the earthy _pisse_. It may not matter if Defoe's _Journal_ is read aloud or not. A journal is a fairly private affair, but one can easily imagine it read aloud to a group of close friends. At any rate, Defoe's subject is a public one.
+
+There is no question about the way _The Adventures of Huck leberry Finn_ must be read. If the book is not read silently on the page, it loses its meaning. Huck's illiterate phonetic prose ties us to our own literacy. For if we want to get all of the humor Twain intends, we must _see_ Huck's sentences and not _hear_ them. For example, when we read Huck's _sivilization_ aloud, we miss the irony of the mistake. If Twain makes Huck dumb, then he makes us mute.
+
+Twain shocks us with his anachronistic linguistics: He would have us think that there is only one language--the spoken one that through writing or printing is made visible on the page. And he has pulled this illiterate kid out of the woods to embody this irony, twenty years after the War for Emancipation--that is, the struggle for wholesale American democracy. It is ironic, for, of course, there are two languages--the one that we freely speak and the one, orthographically and grammatically correct, that appears on the printed page. And they are radically different in what they convey. We might expect Huck's brand of speaking from someone like Jim, not yet fully integrated into the educational scheme, but certainly not from Huck, a young white adolescent. He should know better; and Twain forces us, the literate readers, to teach him. To use Hugh of Saint Victor once more as an example, it is as if his comment-- _per se inspectiones_--had become a curse, transforming forever speech into words never to fly free from the text again.
+
+A text imprisoned in the page also cannot be successfully translated. Huck's idiom and jargon, his mispronunciations and misspellings will not convert in any way to another language. So Twain's text is frozen fast. The second part of Twain's trap snaps on this idea. We may feel smug about correcting that dumb kid's spelling, or dismissing Jim's spells. But in his loose and sloppy jargon, that dumb boy has given us one of the greatest novels in America. This may be the boldest lie in all of American fiction. Huck has created something grander than most of his readers are capable of doing--in their educated prose. God knows what Jim is capable of doing. Aren't we all, Twain may be asking, the ones enslaved by our mannered language, ordered and ruled and in which it may be more difficult to write about freedom and the great meandering Mississippi than in Huck's dialect?
+
+Twain asks for a broad reading of slavery. For Huck is just as removed, just as cut off from society as Jim. Jim is even more radically illiterate than Huck, but for him every inch of the world is animate--the weather, the fog, the river. His reality breathes strongly through superstition and spells; his knowledge is still gained from what lies around him. Tom Sawyer has developed his perceptions from reading Arthurian romances, and in the course of the novel he passes this on to Huck. Tom's solutions to problems are intricate and complicated, Jim's are immediate. When this book was written, slaves had already been granted their legal freedom; when the narrative begins, Jim has already been granted his by his owner. Twain lumps Huck and Jim together: they both appear to be fugitives; they float on the same raft; they are friends who speak the same sort of dialect. If Huck is stupid, then so is Jim. But if we can appreciate the language--and we do partly because we enjoy the book so much--then we must grant to Huck great brilliance, and we must allow that same possibility for Jim. In a sense, we must see them both as "articulate" human beings. We must grant them their freedom. By stepping into Twain's linguistic trap, we are forced into being abolitionists. We have to come to appreciate the richness and the power and the beauty of that oral culture--both black and white. Freed from rules and regulations, their language unites them: Huck and Jim learn from each other.
+
+Civilization in this novel resides on the riverbanks--the world of Miss Polly and Widow Douglas and Judge Thatcher. The raft is an island of orality on which these two characters float along, separated from the land. Facts and details from the riverbank fade into metaphor and image on the raft. Like Chaucer and Defoe, Twain is struggling with the phenomenon of literacy. Chaucer adopts a fictional stance--his prodigious memory--that undercuts itself so that his audience can accept a made-up story. Defoe too presents us with a literate form--the journal--and then proceeds to undercut it by showing us that the plague exists in great part only in authorized descriptions on the page, and that perhaps the true victims are those unfortunates who remain illiterate, and who, as a result, will be left behind by the march of progress. In Twain, the process is more complicated, for by presenting us with an illiterate but brilliant character he forces his readers to undercut their _own_ literacy.
+
+Chaucer is still writing for an audience that is essentially illiterate. He is concerned with the coming of literacy, only to the extent that it forces him to confront what it means to write fiction. For Defoe, literacy is a perceptual problem: How does print affect the way people understand the world? For Twain, in nineteenth-century America, literacy is a problem of the highest political and social order. It gets at the heart of democratic America. Let us understand, he seems to say, that two languages mean two Americas--in terms of the novel, two classes: the Judge Thatchers and the Jims and the Hucks. If we applaud Huck at the end of the novel, then we must also clap our hands for Jim. And if we allow Huck to light out for the territory at the end of the book, then we must set Jim free.
+
+Thus, Twain brings into focus the trap of literacy. There is a whole world in _Huck Finn_ that is closed to those without literacy. They can't, for ironic example, read this marvelous work, _The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn_. And yet we must recognize a world rich with superstition and folklore, with adventure and beauty, that remains closed to those who are too tightly chained to letters. But Twain forces us also to look forward, for by the end of the nineteenth century, very little territory remained. Only small pockets of orality still survive in the country--mostly rural, mostly poor, mostly black. The rest is literate in the most sweeping way. By 1885 the _New England Journal of Education_ was already conducting surveys to determine levels of literacy in Cambridge, Massachusetts. No one would have thought in the nineteenth century that we would be hanging fast to literacy, as we see it too vanishing: People now becoming enslaved to the power of a machine in their pursuit of computer literacy. So long as we remain as aware as Twain, we have lost nothing.
+
+
+## From Taught Mother Tongue to Newspeak and Uniquack
+
+_The language that we hear spoken today is full of words of a special type: These words we will call amoeba-words, and the vocabulary that they constitute, Uniquack. Amoeba-words all possess at least three fields of usage; let "energy" serve as an example of such a word. "Energy" has an initial meaning that is traditional. According to the_ Oxford English Dictionary, _in 1599, it means "vigor of expression," and later the impressive capacity of an utterance or of organ music. The term energy is still widely used in this first sense of vigor. During the nineteenth century, energy also became a technical term. At first, it was used quite generally by physicists to denote the body's ability to perform work. Then, precisely at the same time that Marx ascribed "labor force" to the proletariat, several German physicists ascribed to Nature a general potential to perform work, and called it "energy." For the last hundred years, the term has been used in physics to verbalize an increasingly abstract alternative energy, or energy needs. We must be forever conscious of the fact that we do not know what those terms mean. We use the words like words from Scripture, like a gift from above. Furthermore, we gratefully transfer the power to define their meaning to an expertocratic hierarchy to which we do not belong. The word "energy" in this context is used neither with common sense, nor with the senseless precision of science, but almost like a sublinguistic grunt--a nonsense word. Energy, like sexuality, transportation, education, communication, information, crisis, problem, solution, role, and dozens of other words, belong, in this sense, to the same class_.
+
+When Orwell wrote about Newspeak, no computer language had as yet been named or published. Our theme therefore will not be computer language, but Orwell's attempt to caricature what happens when speakers of ordinary language treat it as if it can be reduced to a code. This perception of Newspeak is not made by Orwell, of course, but by a pair of latecomers, who see the unfolding of a cipher Orwell created over thirty-five years ago.
+
+Newspeak and Uniquack are two-egged twins. In the fifties, when the computer was a novelty and UNIVAC the trade name of the only machine that could be purchased, James Reston created Uniquack in an editorial aside. We adopted the term Uniquack for the jelly formed of amoeba-words, words that are neither "significant and binding for certain activities" nor "indicative of certain forms of thought"--the two characteristics that together determine Raymond Williams' choice of Key-Words, although like Williams' Key-Words, amoeba-words are often strong and difficult and persuasive in everyday language, and serve to indicate wider areas of experience. As the years went by, Newspeak and Uniquack became useful to name two characteristics that make late twentieth-century, everyday English, French, or German, alike and distinct from ordinary languages in former times.
+
+Newspeak is a transparent neologism. For Orwell, it is the fictional portrait of the deliberate distortion of an Oldspeak that never was. In this age of computers, which Orwell did not live to see, his Newspeak is an ominous parody of the intent to use English as a "medium of communication." This tendency is fostered by the spread of Uniquack: the degradation that results from the fallout of scientific discourse into ordinary speech. Newspeak thus refers--in our usage--primarily to an attitude of the speaker toward what he does, while Uniquack refers to the predominance of a special kind of vocabulary in his speech. By using the two terms in conjunction when speaking about certain features of contemporary language, we hope to escape the objections that literal-minded professors have raised repeatedly against Orwell: Namely, that we engage in shallow and uncritical linguistics. It is not our intention to oppose a paranoiac vision of today's communication to the romantic utopia of a virgin vernacular that mirrors a factual truth.
+
+Newspeak and Uniquack are neologisms of very different status. As a foundling, Uniquack can be adopted to our purposes. Newspeak is well-worn. Orwell conceived it as a caricature of his own abandoned belief in a world language and used it as a literary device to make a fable stick. Since his death, it has become the label for a muddled complex of beliefs. Today, it is mostly used to promote the nonsensical belief that language has become useless.
+
+Orwell used the term on two different levels--as a parody and as an element of his world of 1984. The two main sources for his linguistic parody are Basic English, proposed by Ogden, and Interglossa, conceived by Hogben--both of which had their heyday in the early thirties. Both are attempts to create a world language based on English and containing less than 850 words. In 1939, Ezra Pound praised Basic as "a magnificent system for measuring extant works ... an instrument for the diffusion of ideas ... with advantages ... obvious to any man of intelligence." In the 1940s no less a person than William Empson praised Basic as an instrument to understand poetry and as a vocabulary for pithy poetic creation. Winston Churchill had the British government purchasethe copyright to Basic. And H. G. Wells, in _The Shape of Things to Come_, pictures a utopia in which the rapid diffusion of Basic as the _lingua franca_ of the world is "one of the un-anticipated achievements of the twenty-first century."
+
+Orwell describes the world that Wells saw coming as a "vision of humanity, liberated by the machine, a race of enlightened sunbathers, whose sole topic of conversation is their own superiority to their ancestors." If he too had once believed in Basic, his parody of it is part of Orwell's lampoon, as Wells describes it, of a "glittering, strangely sinister world, in which the privileged classes live a life of shallow, gutless hedonism, and the workers ... toil like troglodytes in caverns underground."
+
+The satirical force with which Orwell used Newspeak to serve as his portrait of one of those totalitarian ideas that he saw taking root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere can be understood only if we remember that he speaks with shame about a belief that he formerly held. Just as he had to go to Spain, to Catalonia, to be disabused of his left-wing do-goodism, he had to join the BBC to promote Basic before he understood that it could only be used as a deadly, mechanical substitute for thought.
+
+From 1942 to 1944, working as a colleague of William Empson's, he produced a series of broadcasts to India written in Basic English, trying to use its programmed simplicity, as a _Tribune_ article put it, "as a sort of corrective to the oratory of statesmen and publicists." Only during the last year of the war did he write "Politics and the English Language," insisting that the "defense of the English language has nothing to do with the setting up of a Standard English."
+
+Basic is an ultimate effort to standardize speech according to a written model: To put "language," which has come into existence by recording speech sounds through the alphabet, and which then has been corrected by the grammarian, back into the mouths of the people in this new form. The attempt to make people use this artifact whenever they speak has a history. At this point, it seems helpful to look back at this origin. Orwell stumbled on the title for his novel by reversing the date, 1948, when he had completed writing. Taking an Orwellian liberty with 1942, the year that Orwell began broadcasting Basic English on the BBC, we arrive at 1492, the year that Nebrija suggested to the Spanish royalty that they might control their subjects through the use of a taught mother tongue. Six years before the publication of _1984_, Orwell found a descendent of Nebrija's monster in Ogden's Basic English, which he could broadcast through the BBC. The image is one of Orwell setting sail for the Brave New World. Finally, he dropped Basic for its parody in Newspeak. From Nebrija to Orwell: From Spaniards who would speak taught mother tongue, to Proles who are tongue-tied.
+
+In this movement from the parody of Basic English to the parable of the speechless horror of meaningless utterances, Orwell reveals a new dimension in writings on the future. Orwell was steeped in the genre of Utopian literature; from his own statements, it is clear that he was well aware of the place that Utopian writers had assigned to language. Swift has the people of Laputa fed by their "political projectors" with "invented, simplified language, [who] write books by machines and educate their pupils by inscribing the lesson on wafers ... causing them to swallow it." In the year that he left the BBC, Orwell comments that the "one aim of intellectual totalitarianism cannot but be to make people less conscious." Jack London, whose imagery surfaces frequently in _1984_, describes his "proles" (Orwell uses the same term) as "phrase-slaves" who consider the coinage of such Utopian phrases as "an honest dollar" or "a full dinner pail" strokes of genius. London too has loudspeakers establish and anchor the regime. All the isolated elements out of which Orwell constructed the parable called Newspeak he took either from Ogden or the Utopians.
+
+What is unique about Newspeak is the same thing that makes the whole of _1984_ into a new kind of horror story. To quote Herbert Read: "_1984_ is a Utopia in reverse: Not an _Erewhon_, which is utopia upside down. _Erewhon_ is still written after the ameliorative pattern of utopia itself: You may paradoxically be punished for being ill, but the ideal is health. In _1984_ the pattern is malevolent..." The malevolence of this pattern is implicit in the existing state and does not result from abuse or the self-serving manipulation by an elite. In Jack London's _Iron Heel_, as in Zamyatin's _Zero_, power is still a means; in _1984_ the power implicit in the State is the ultimate reason for everything that happens. And the State has turned into a book that is constantly rewritten. Power is no longer at the service of the elite; the elite itself is at the service of power, which is a book. The worst that H. G. Wells could imagine was inequality--albeit a monstrous kind. According to Orwell, Wells "was too sane to understand the modern world."
+
+Orwell's predecessors who wrote upside-down utopias invented horrible abuses of language. Orwell describes communication that takes place after the extinction of language itself. Newspeak is not the language of dystopia, but of the speechless utterances of Kakitopia 1984. Orwell created the parable of human beings compelled to communicate--mostly through organized hatred--and to do so without human language.
+
+Literary critics and those who use Newspeak as an English word in ordinary conversation usually mean either the corrupt English of propagandists and the ambiguous language of politicians and broadcasters, or the neologisms coined by the adversary. In this imprecise fashion they imply terminological inflation, effective sloganeering, or the antonym of English before the Fall. Orwell's Newspeak, however, is something more sinister than the proliferating _idiotikon_ of technical terms that make conversations in the real 1984, and after, so "noisy." We see Newspeak as a cipher for something that is now called "interpersonal communication‚" for the belief that the terms by which we describe the operations of computers are fit to tell what is going on between you and me. By Newspeak we mean one particular way of thinking and speaking about language--an approach or an attitude that treats language as a system and a code.
+
+
+The equation between man and machine was not entirely unknown to Orwell. He knew Mary Shelley's _Frankenstein_ (1816) and probably also T. H. Huxley's hypothesis that animals are automata (1874). But the new wave, according to which digital-analog computers meaningfully model human "brains" did not hit the press until Orwell was dead. As a novelist, he invented a parable for a scientific hypothesis that hovered in the air. He created the idea of communication without sense or meaning, before he could use the computer to model it on. O'Brian from the Thought Police says to Smith, whom he tortures: "we do not merely destroy our enemies, we change them ... we convert, we shape them ... We make our enemy one of ourselves before we kill him ... make the brain perfect before we blow it out ... the command of old despotisms was 'thou art' ... what happens to you here is forever...." Smith, the novel's antihero, still believes that what happens makes sense to O'Brian. He has to accept that O'Brian's world is senseless and that he must join O'Brian in this powerful nonsense. "There is learning, there is understanding, and there is acceptance. It is time for you [Smith] to enter upon the second stage ... tell me, why we cling to power ... speak." Strapped to the rack, Winston answers: "You are ruling over us for our own good." He gives the answer that would have satisfied Dostoyevski's Grand Inquisitor: "You believe that human beings are not fit to govern themselves and therefore..." As his only response, O'Brian turns the lever to thirty-three degrees of torture. A pang of pain contorts Winston. And then O'Brian instructs Winston: "We seek power entirely for its own sake." And the State, which O'Brian represents, creates and recreates Winston's human nature, according to its own text, and allows Winston to exist only in the context of the State.
+
+Today, we would say that O'Brian _programs_ Winston for his _role_ in _1984_. Orwell knew these two words only in their theatrical sense: The schedule of performance sold by an attendant, and the text studied by an actor. "To program" was first used in 1945 for the act of expressing an operation in the terms appropriate for the performance of a computer. And "role theory" was then a new trend in sociology. Neither word had fallen from its specialized orbit into ordinary speech to become amoeba-words. Turing's idea of an algorithm that adapts its state according to the outcome of its last calculation was well understood by Wiener and Neumann, who created a machine that made such a formula autonomous from human calculation, but the general public still saw in the computer nothing but a more perfect adding machine. The concept of "role" had been introduced in the same year as Turing's idea by independent publications of Margaret Mead, Ralph Linton, and Murdock, and by 1950 was considered basic to all sociology by Parsons and Merton; but its implied assumption that all social relations can be reduced to power or the interchange of information between individual role-players had certainly never occurred to George Orwell. And yet, as a novelist, he has O'Brian force Winston to become what role-theory and the cybernetic model of human communication assume as "human nature." Kakitopia fits these assumptions: "Power is (precisely) in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing," O'Brian says to his pupil. Newspeak assumes the existence of plastic human individuals who can be written and rewritten into any role. Thus the Kakitopia of Newspeak, the exchange of communication between nonhuman entities, and the reduction of social action to mere exchanges became thinkable about the same time.
+
+The proponents of a cybernetic model of social analysis assume that human beings fit their assumptions, but Orwell knows that to fit, each one has to accept what is done to him. And O'Brian knows that no one can perform this acceptance for you. Winston, who had worked in the Ministry of Truth, knew what Newspeak was. Under torture, he understood what nonhuman communication was: mere know-"how" without meaning or "why." O'Brian asked him to understand his message, not him, to abandon the urge to understand what he, the speaker, meant and to let his mind be dictated to--and to be nothing but the result of this dictation. The reduction of an encounter with another person into an exchange of information between two elements of a system--what we today call "system-theory"--Orwell called "collective solipsism."
+
+Winston understood what O'Brian asked him to do, and he tried hard to do it: He learned to register how things were supposed to be and to spell them out without asking "why," but he did not accept being part of the system, not until he had gone through Room 101. Only there he accepts himself as part of "a fantasy world in which things happen as they should"--namely, on a blank page, that is, as dictation. And to accept being a part of this fantasy of pure senseless power, Winston had to erase his self. But no violence that he inflicted on himself could break his common sense--which Orwell often calls "decency." To turn himself into non-sense he has to betray his love. Not torture, but only self-betrayal could make him like O'Brian. In O'Brian's words, Winston's own acts are "the things from which you could not recover. Something is killed in your breast: burnt out, cauterized out." And this is what Winston does to himself when he has to face the rats in Room 101 and he begs his torturers: "Do it to Julia." This betrayal transformed his habit of Doublethink into a conditioned reflex. Later on, he and Julia meet again, as two burnt-out hulls, knowing that in Room 101 they had both meant what they had said. Self-betrayal was the last thing that Winston _meant_. By becoming the torturer of his last love, in his own mind Winston had become as self-less as O'Brian. Henceforth, the unique mutual intimacy between the executioner and the victim integrated both him and Julia into the system, the solipsism of meaningless communication.
+
+What we are retelling and commenting on here is a fable, not a mere parody of Esperanto, or a cautionary tale, or linguistic theory dressed up in metaphor. This fable shows a society that survives the radical renunciation of language on the part of its members. We shall not be seduced by Orwell's journalistic genius to take it as something that could happen, or that he himself thought could happen. Newspeak remains an "ideal type," a cipher for language that never could be because its speakers would be totally unlike the men and women we know. And yet, Newspeak has the power to evoke a strange sense of deja vu, because it is modeled not only on Basic English, which has never been spoken, but also on the language of science, which also stands for something that never could be.
+
+When a physicist writes "_E_" on the blackboard, he proves himself one of the boys. He shows off his competence in using an algorithm, which over several generations, has incorporated all the rules according to which it may be put into a formula. When "_E_" is used this way, it has no meaning outside the context of theoretical physics. The physicist's ability to pronounce the written "_E_" as energy, however, is not the result of a conspiracy, but of careful training, part of which consists in keeping the formalism of theoretical physics apart from the meanings of ordinary life. The difference between the two has often been compared with bilingual existence; but this comparison fosters a mistake. Spoken English, Japanese, and Kwakiutl--all three are meaningful in everyday, sensual life. The so-called "language" of physics is a code, a system of signs, a formal theory, an analytic tool that derives part of its value from its near-independence from ordinary speech. A physicist limited to the use of his technical vocabulary would be totally speechless in a bedroom or kitchen, but his gibberish would not be Newspeak. The tour de force accomplished by Orwell consists in the invention of a malevolent conspiracy that imposes the use of that kind of code in everyday life. Paranoiac assumptions are essential to Orwell's cipher. If we were to call the language of physics a form of Newspeak, that would only frustrate our attempt to reserve this term as the name for an attitude toward ordinary speech.
+
+There is, however, an important, indirect way by which the proliferation of special codes contributes to our growing tendency to speak at dinner as if we were in the psychology or sociology lab. We increasingly use ordinary words that have been picked up by one or several "codes" and to which technical meanings have been attached. And we tend to use them indiscriminately, giving the impression that their technical meaning is somehow connoted in our use of the term. While we mean to say "screw," we say "having sex" and we imply "sexuality," a scientific construct we had no intention of implying. Good strong words used in this technical way in ordinary speech generate a following of amoeba-words, which can be made to mean anything, like a mathematician's "_E_." And this fallout then fosters the attitude toward language that we have called Newspeak. These waste products from technical word-factories are akin to pollution. Just as the unintended by-products of industry have penetrated, reshaped, and degraded most anything that we see, touch, breathe, or eat, so have these waste products of terminologies affected ordinary language. Much of this terminological waste merely generates noise in everyday conversation and can be compared with the dull expanses of cement that economic growth has produced. But within this waste, many terms are potential amoeba, blown up with hot air, brandished, and loaded with ominous connotations, while losing all denotation. The prudent person who wishes to make sense is often forced to declare a moratorium on their use.
+
+Again, we are speaking in terms that hardly could have been Orwell's. "Pollution" was as unknown to him as the vocabulary of the computer. Its meaning was "seminal emission apart from coition." The counterpurposive effects of technical decisions were not discussed in the forties. Rachel Carson had not yet published her _Silent Spring_. "Fallout" meant the deferred effects of the Hiroshima bomb, and not the exhaust from belching chimneys. Though he wrote an upside-down utopia, Orwell, like Wells or Huxley or Zamyatin, was still primarily concerned with the intentional misuse of the new powerful means. He went beyond these predecessors because, unlike them, he deciphered and lampooned a new logic inherent in the intellectual project that generated computer, bomb, role-theory. He explored the destructive implications of high-sounding ideals; his witches were intellectual do-gooders and their totalitarian projects. His originality lay in the parody of their intent. He was a prophet, in the Hebrew sense--one who sees clearly into the present--because he discovered the forties. He could not foresee that in the eighties so many people--without having passed through Room 101--would try to convince themselves that they "communicate"--and, in addition, mostly in Uniquack.
+
+
+## Postscript: Silence and the We
+
+_George Steiner closes_ After Babel, _"in which the problem of Babel and of the nature of language is so insistently examined‚" with the statement that the Kabbalah "knows of a day of redemption on which translation will no longer be necessary. All human tongues will have re-entered the translucent immediacy of that primal, lost speech shared by God and Adam...  But the Kabbalah also knows of a more esoteric possibility. It records the conjecture, no doubt heretical, that there shall come a day when translation is not only unnecessary but inconceivable. Words will rebel against man. They will shake off the servitude of meaning. They will 'become only them selves, and as dead stones in our mouths.' In either case, men and women will have been freed forever from the burden and the splendour of the ruin at Babel. But which, one wonders, will be the greater silence?"_
+
+Just as much as the word, silence is a creature of the alphabet: the pause between word and word, the silent contemplation of the text, the silence of meditative thought, are all forms of alphabetical silence. Even in our silence we are lettered men, at home on the island of history in the alphabetic domain. Most of us have, at best, only an inkling of the silence before words; and many of us have gone the opposite way, converting silence into something mechanical, into the no that separates beep from beep.
+
+Genesis I:6–7 tells of the beginning of silence, silence before it became the stuff of history: When He hammered out the first gold foil (a word usually translated as the "firmament"), He separated the roaring waters below from the thundering waters above. With a three inch shard, or a glittering foil, silence began as an interstice, keeping the voices of Heaven and those of the Abyss apart. Silence was the first creature on the Earth. "Earth" grew from it. And that is the silence out of which, later, history took shape, as human voices made it vibrate.
+
+This silence has vanished from the burnt-out world of Orwell's cipher. The "zero" that separates beeps has replaced it. And this one-zero-one, not silence, is the stuff from which the interface between Winston and Julia is made. After the self-betrayal of Room 101, these two post-humans are not only beyond words, they are also beyond "silence," and equally beyond the ability to refer to their co-presence with the personal pronoun "we." They have turned into an interactive assembly of two. The new Adam and Eve are the critters of a computer.
+
+The conversation we had begun on the history of the spelled-out word ended for us as the search for the history of both "silence" and the "we." At each stage the "alphabetization of silence" precedes that of speech. Its genesis is the first character of the beta-bet, the Aleph.
+
+The power of the silence that precedes utterance is described by an eighteenth-century rabbi, Mendel Torum of Rymanov, who asks what the Children of Israel could have actually heard, and what they in fact did hear, when they received the Ten Commandments. Some rabbis maintained that all the Commandments were spoken directly to the Children in the Divine Voice. Others said that the Israelites heard only the first two Commandments--"I am the Lord thy God" and "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me"--before being overwhelmed, no longer able to endure the Divine Voice, obliged to receive the remaining Commandments through Moses.
+
+Mendel believed that not even the first two Commandments were delivered to the Children, but only silence. They heard only the _aleph_, the Hebrew character with which the first Commandment begins, the _aleph_ of the word _ani_ or _anokhi_: "I." Gershom Scholem comments on this theory: "The consonant _aleph_ represents nothing more than the position taken by the larynx when a word begins with a vowel. Thus the _aleph_ may be said to denote the source of all articulate sound." The _aleph_, then, the first character in the Hebrew phonetic system, itself stands for no sound, but instead commands the mouth to open, fixing the position of the lips for the next sound. The Kabbalists regard the _aleph_ as the spiritual root of all the other characters, and out of that opening of the mouth, that utter silence, springs all human intercourse. Thus, as Scholem tells us, Rabbi Mendel transforms the revelation on Mount Sinai into an event pregnant with infinite meaning, but devoid of any specific meaning.
+
+In Semitic script, silence cannot be recorded. No rabbi would ask his students to spell out a word; he wants them to know what the root looks like. Only the alphabet can conjure up silence and situate it on the page. First silence creeps between the letters and makes it feasible to spell instead of to read. Then Roman monks in charge of teaching Latin to the Irish put interstices between words. Sentences are literally anatomized, disjointed into their individual words. Silence, recorded as an interval, does for language what the knife will do for the anatomist. It creates books made up of words rather than lines. Utterances, which the ear hears as a whole, are disarticulated into _lemas_, just as physicians in the late Middle Ages dismember bodies to make their organs visible. Like a knife, silence, when it is made visible, creates a text that is suited for the eye. And this is a precondition to grasp the text at one glance--to contemplate it in silence rather than to hear it at the rhythm of speech. Just as the "text" of the thirteenth century emerges from the visual perception of the order among parts of speech, some centuries later the modern organism will come into existence as the (conceptual) result of the physiological order between the path of a dissected organism.
+
+Having pushed itself between parts of speech, silence now removes the ear from the page. It first created "words," now it creates a new kind of standoffish reader. This new reader looks at the page on the desk in the same attitude in which he looks at his own conscience during the confession that the Fourth Lateran Council exacts every year. The autobiographer engages in self-inquisition: He scrupulously tortures his conscience to give up its stubborn silence. Centuries later even the subconscious has to be brought to light on the couch. All by himself, this modern individual delves into a text written in the past by another, or sets out on the ever more lonely journey into the text that the past has left beneath the surface of his conscious self.
+
+The alphabetization of silence has brought about the new loneliness of the "I," and of an analytic _we. We_ is now one line in a text brought into being by communication. Not the silence before words but the absence of messages in a chaos of noises precedes the establishment of an interactive pattern. The pretextual _we_ of orality, the "ethnic" _we_ that has been transcended through conscience, has disappeared from reality. We know that the history of silence is reflected in the transition from the ethnic to the analytic _we_.
+
+The _we_ that we have used emphatically in this book is morphologically an English plural. Semantically, however, it is close to a dual, for which English, some time during the Anglo-Saxon period, has lost a special form. Other Indo-Germanic languages--for instance, the Slavonic ones--have preserved this form. And, like thought and the word, like narration and the lie, _we_ has a history.
+
+The _we_ on which we want to reflect is not the dual of these two authors, but the personal pronoun, with which he who speaks refers to the first person in the plural. Now, what is that first person? The answer is rather easy when we deal with person in the singular: "I," the first person, speaks to "you," the second person. In doing so, I tell you something about a third, who neither is speaking nor is being addressed. By addressing a person whom I designate "you," I make that person at that moment unique to me--and distinguish that "you" from any third: person or thing. Thus, _you_ is almost as unique as _I_. Even abuse will not detract from the power intrinsic to the spoken _you_ to establish this exquisite bond. Some people who have been tortured report that not pain, but the address of the policeman has broken them. In exact opposition to the tightly bound _you_, the third person has enormous scope. The third person includes whatever the first chooses to tell the second about. Every _you_ contains the germ of a response--not so _her, him_, or _it_.
+
+The first person usually does not call itself by its name. The first person uses a pro-noun, a word used instead of a name or noun. All languages have such a pronoun by which the speaker refers to himself, though the coloring implied--the gesture associated with the utterance--is different here and there. In Armenian or Iroquoian, the _I_ is like an arrow by which the speaker points at him-or herself; in other languages, the _I_ gives more the impression of a retreat, an act of assuming distance.
+
+Etymologically, the _I_ can be brazen, as it is in English, but it can just as well be hazy, as in Japanese, in which _I_ is _watakusi domo_, which best translates: Yours Faithfully. But semantically both forms--the direct one and the euphemism--are equally clear self-references by the speaker. Proud or humble, aggressive or meek, depending on status, age, mood, or custom, the pronoun for the first person singular is unequivocal as no other term: It says, "He Who Speaks."
+
+This univocal precision of the _I_ is a condition for the formation of plurals. In fact, with almost the same directness with which all languages oppose the addressing _I_ with a _you_ who is addressed, they also provide some kind of _we_. Quite arguably, the opposition of _I_ and _we_ is a more fundamental category than the opposition of singular and plural. For the English speaker, it seems natural that the existence of a third person singular--the _he-she-it_--requires that there be a third person plural--a _they_. But this is just not so in all languages. The Turk feels nothing natural in learning the English plural. His noun designates a form of existence, primarily a quality and only then a thing that can be counted. The noun in Turkish turns into an object, in our sense, only when it is qualified by a term indicating enumeration. For the Turk the important difference lies between "dwelling space" and two, five, or even one "house." When he speaks to someone about something, he stresses the difference between essentials and that which can be numbered--not as we do: number one as opposed to any other number. Even in Turkish, however, the difference between the _I_ and the _we_ is clear. No language seems to lack a pronoun that says, "I and..."
+
+Yet, this "I and..." can contrast in many ways with the _I_. This is true even morphologically: The opposition of two different roots--"ego/no; I/we; ich/wir; ja/mi"--is by no means universal. On every continent there are languages in which the plural of _I_ is *I'*s. From Southeast Asia to the Far East to Finland, to Alaska and to the Great Plains, there are people who have a morphological plural for the _I'_, and often they use it next to another pronoun, derived from a different root. Languages with such a morphologically double _we_ art very common, and frequently the two words are semantically distinct. There may be one pronoun that says, "I, you, and possibly others," and another that says, "I and others, but not you." A language as simple as Malay creates insuperable difficulties for some English speakers, because they cannot get used to this duplicity in the _we_. Kwakiutl seems to have still another _we_, one that excludes _you_ because it stresses our tribe's cohesion--including its dead members.
+
+The simplest way for the English speaker to get a sense of this semantic proliferation within the first person plural is to look at Neo-Melanesian, as Pidgin English is now proudly called. Pidgin is a "creole" language: its syntax has remained Malayo-Polynesian but most of its words are English. Mi, that's me; you, that's you; yu-pela, that's you and your fellow; mi-pela, that's me and my fellow, my peer--me and those like me, in contrast with yu-pela, you and those like you. Yumi, that's you and me, used when the speaker includes you-others, but wants to stress his tie to you, to keep distance from the fellows. Otherwise, he could just say what comes easiest: yumipela, you people with me and my fellows, all together. But, of course, he could also just pick you, me, and one other, and say yu-mi-tripela, and exclude any others who happen to be within earshot.
+
+Various languages even draw a time dimension into their _we_. Some Bantu tongues (the N'kosa for example) distinguish between the _we_ that has already come into being, and the _we_ that is hoped for. It can be argued that the Mongols and the Ewe in Dahomey can place the dimension of hope into the pronoun. They seem to have distinct ways of expressing _we_ that depend on _you_ having a chance to be our clansman, or being informed that we will not accept you as an in-law. The _thou_ can thus become a budding _we_.
+
+As we wrote this book we were aware of the semantic poverty of our pronoun. The modern _we_ tells nothing about the intention of those who are the collective subject. Only in Spanish, men and women still remain distinct as _nosotros y nosotras_, but when men speak, they feel free to include women in _nosotros_. The modern _we_ says nothing about our limits: If _we_ are some, many, or innumerable. Our _we_ reveals nothing to the person we address--if he is a part of us, expected to join us, recognized as a third person, seen as a stranger. And, finally, most importantly, our _we_ is unable to state if each one ought to be taken as the subject of the sentence; or if _we_ are all of us together: _We_ form a subject.
+
+This plastic _we_ does not tell you who we are. This is the _we_ of propaganda, which can create any subject and demand that the person addressed identify with it; which says "you ought to be one of us"; and which is used by the missionary, the humanist, and the salesman. This impoverished, borderless _we_ enables _us_ to say that _we_ (today) feel, think, and do certain things. A voracious _we_, it incorporates the speaker--even against his will. Publicity presupposes this kind of _we_. This _we_ allows the user to dispense with us, to manage us. It is the _we_ of the normal, of those who fit.
+
+As the two of us wrote this book, the literary _we_ constantly silenced us, a deafening silence that makes it impossible for the reader to know anything about the writer. Using this contemporary _we_, the speaker engages in semantic violence, incorporating groups, whose way of formulating the _we_ is heterogeneous to that of the observer, and thus driving them into silence.
+
+We are not fools enough to propose, even as a joke, to return to ethnic silence, the silent co-presence before words, language, and text came into being. We are children of the book. But in our sadness we are silly enough to long for the one silent space that remains open in our examined lives, and that is the silence of friendship.[^n01]
+
+[^n01:] _For a definition of friendship, see the epigraph to this book_.]
+
+
+## Select Bibliography
+
+> "...while utilizing and including these texts, I do not depart from the conviction that a work of synthesis must rest mainly upon facts already gathered and critically digested by the relevant specialists: In other words upon what, from the standpoint of scholars hip, must be classed as secondary sources. Those who are suspicious of this foundation show a distaste for the function of interpretation rather than a rationally grounded distrust of the method. All general views are, of course, open to correction, both as to fact and as to interpretation..."
+
+> Lewis Mumford, _The Culture of Cities_
+
+_This bibliography contains mainly two types of books: the kind that will enable the reader to deepen and widen his knowledge of the subject, and those which, though not covering specifically the field of the present volume, have been drawn upon for special documentation_.
+
+- Abernethy, Seonaid. "The Decisions Themselves: China, Vernacular Procedures; Japan, Vernacular Agreements." Unpublished typescript, 1985.
+
+- Adamson, J. W. "The Extent of Literacy in England in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries." _The Library_ 10, no. 2 (September 1929): 163.
+
+  | In 1489, the rule concerning the "benefit of the clergy" was changed; it was a privilege that laymen who could read had enjoyed with the clergy. By 1489, so many laymen had become literate that a distinction was drawn between them and the ordained clergy.
+
+- Altaner, Berthold. "Die Heransbildung eines einheimischen Klerus in der Mission des 13. and 14. Jahrhunderts." _Zeitschrift für Missionswissenshaft_ 18 (1928): 193–208.
+
+- ------. "Sprachstudien und Sprachkenntnisse im Dienste der Mission des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts." _Zeitschrift für Missions - Wissenschaft_ 21 (1931): 113–36.
+
+- ------. "Die fremdsprachliche Ausbildung der Dominikanermissionare während des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts." _Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft_ 23 (1933): 233–71.
+
+- ------. "Raymundus Lullus und der Sprachenkanon (can. 11) des Konzils von Vienne (1312)." _Historisches Jahrbuch_ 53 (1933): 190–219.
+
+- ------. "Zur Kenntnis des Arabischen im 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts." _Orientalia Christiana Periodica_ (Rome) 2 (1936): 437–52.
+
+  | See Steiner.
+
+- Amelotti, M., and G. Costamagna. "Alle origini del notariato italiano." _Studi storici sul notariato italiano_ 2 (Rome) (1975).
+
+  | See Clanchy.
+
+- Asensio, Eugenio. "La lengua compañera del imperio: Historia de una idea de Nebrija en España y Portugal." _Revista de Filología Española_ 43 (1960): 399–413.
+
+  | See Heisig.
+
+- Auerbach, Erich. "Dante's Address to the Reader." _Romance Philology 7_ (1954): 268–78.
+
+- ------. _Li teratursprache und Publikum in der lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter_. Bern: 1958.
+
+- Bahner, Werner. "Beitrag zum Sprachbewusstsein in der spanischen Literature des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts." _Neue Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft_. Berlin: Rüttner, 1956.
+
+  | See Heisig.
+
+- Balogh, Joseph. "Voces paginorum." _Philologus_ 82 (1926/27): 84–109 and 202–40.
+
+  | See Saenger.
+
+- Battisti, Carlo. "Secoli Illetterati. Appunti sulla crisi del Latino prima delia riforma carolingia." _Studi Medievali_ (1960): 369–96.
+
+- Bauml, Franz. "Der Uebergang muendlicher zur artes-bestimmten Literatur des Mittelalters. Gedanken und Bedenken." _Fach literatur des Mittelalters: Festschrift für Gerhard Eis_, 1–10. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1968.
+
+- ------. "Varieties and Consequences of Medieval Literacy and Illiteracy." _Speculum_ 55, no. 2 (1980): 237–65.
+
+- Bauml, Franz, and Edda Spielmann. "From Illiteracy to Literacy: Prologomena to a Study of the Nibelungenlied." In Duggan, _Oral Literature_, 62–73.
+
+- Bayer, Hans. "Zur Soziologie des mittelalterlichen Individualisie-rungsprosesses: Ein Beitrag zu einer wirklichkeitsbezogenen Geistesgeschichte." _Archiv fuer Kulturgeschichte_ 58 (1976): 115–53.
+
+  | See Morris.
+
+- Beardsley, Monroe C. "Aspects of Orality: A Short Commentary." _New Literary History_ 8, no. 3 (1977): 521–34.
+
+- Belting, Hans. _Das Bild und sein Publikum im Mittelalter Form und Funktion früher Bildtafeln der Passion Gebr_. Reihe: Mann Studio, 1981.
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- Benson, Larry D. "The Literary Character of Anglo-Saxon Formulaic Poetry." _Publication of the Modern Language Association_ 81 (1966): 334–41.
+
+- Berman, Harold J. "The Background of the Western Legal Tradition in the Folklaw of the Peoples of Europe." _University of Chicago Law Review_ 45, no. 3 (Spring 1978): 553–97.
+
+  | Deals with the _disembedding_ of the law, through codification, since the late eleventh century: "There was a time, prior to the late eleventh century when the peoples of Western Europe were not conscious of any clear distinction between legal institutions and other institutions of social coherence..."
+
+  | See Watkins.
+
+- Berthold, Luise. "Mittelalterliche Sprachwörter und das moderne Mundartwörterbuch." _Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde_ 39(1940): 64–67.
+
+  | Many proverbs for which we have evidence from medieval sources are carried almost unchanged into contemporary dialects as dialectological dictionaries will show.
+
+  | See Ohly.
+
+- Best, Edward E. "Attitudes Toward Literacy Reflected in Petronius." _Transactions of the American Philosophical Association_ 81 (1955): 112–39.
+
+  | Tries to take an intermediary position between Frederick G. Kenyon, _Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951, 2d ed.), who believed that few people read to themselves, and Helen Tanzer, _The Common People of Pompeii: A Study of the Graffiti_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1939), who after examining 15,000 such graffiti came to believe that almost everyone could read and write.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Betz, Werner. _Deutsch und lateinische: Die Lehnbildungen der althochdeutschen Benediktinerregel_. Bonn: Bouvier, 1965.
+
+  | Examines the ninth-century translation of St. Benedict's Rule into Old German, focusing attention on the German expressions that had to be coined or reinterpreted in the process. With much more detail, Ibach and Schwarz follow the same events in the formation of Frankish.
+
+- Bien, G. "Lüge." _Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie_. Eds. Joachim Ritter and K. Grunder. Vol. 5. Basel: Schwabe, 1980.
+
+  | See Furhmann.
+
+- Bischoff, Bernard. _Die südostdeutschen Schreib schulen and Bibliothek en in der Karolingerzeit_. Vols. 1 and 2. Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1940.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- ------. "The Study of Foreign Languages in the Middle Ages." _Speculum_ 36, no. 2 (April 1961): 209–24.
+
+  | See Steiner.
+
+- ------. "Elementarunterricht und probationes pennae in der ersten Hälfte des Mittelalters." _Mittelalteriche Studien_ 1 (1966): 74–87.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- ------. _Paläographie des römischen Altertums und des abendlän dischen Mittelalters. Grundlagen der Germanistik 24_. Berlin: Eric Schmidt, 1979.
+
+  | See Wattenbach.
+
+- Bischoff, Bernard, and Joseph Hoffman. _Libri Sancti Kyliani: die Würzburger Schreibschule und die Dombibliothek im 8. und 9. Jahr hunderts_. Würzburg: Schonigh, 1952.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Blidstein, Gerald. "Maimonides on 'Oral Law.'" _The Jewish Law Annual_ 1 (1978): 108–22.
+
+  | See Watkins.
+
+- Bloch, R. Howard. _Etymologies and Genealogies: A Literary Anthro pology of the French Middle Ages_. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
+
+- Bonaventure, Brother. "The Teaching of Latin in Later Medieval England." _Mediaeval Studies_ 23 (1961): 1–20.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Borst, Arno. _Der Turmbau von Babel: Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker_. 4 vols. Stuttgart: Hierseman, 1957–63.
+
+  | The commentary on the Genesis story about the Tower of Babel has given rise to a vast and rich outpouring of opinion about language. In an encyclopedic fashion, the author gathers and orders the issues discussed: Is language a gift from God or a creation of man? Did Adam speak Hebrew or some tongue like German? What relationship is there between a people and a tongue? What does the multiplicity of tongues "mean"? A complementary question is treated by Pinborg: the thirteenth-century philosophical theories about the "modes of meaning."
+
+- Bossong, Georg. _Probleme der Übersetzung wissenschaftlicher Werke aus dem Arabischen in das Altspanische zur Zeit Alfons des Weisen_. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1979.
+
+  | See Steiner.
+
+- Bowra, C. M. _Heroic Poetry_. London: Macmillan, 1951.
+
+- ------. _In General and Particular_. Clayton Memorial Lecture Delivered Before the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959.
+
+- Boyd, Beverly. _Chaucer and the Medieval Book_. San Marino: The Huntington Library Publications, 1973.
+
+- Brach, Carla Casetti. "Donne copiste nella leggenda di Bisanzio." _Orientalia Christiana Periodica_ 39 (1973): 478–89.
+
+  | See Grundmann.
+
+- Braybrooke, E. K. "Custom as a Source of English Law." _Michigan Law Review_ 50, no. 1 (1951): 71–94.
+
+  | See Watkins.
+
+- Bresslau, Harry. _Handbuch der Urkundlenlehre für Deutschland und Italien_. 2 vols. Leipzig: Veit and Company, 1912.
+
+  | Remains the fundamental handbook for all studies of medieval literacy.
+
+  | See Wattenbach.
+
+- Brincken, Anna Dorothee von den. "Zur Universalkarthographie des Mittelalters." _Miscellanea Mediaevalia_ 7 (1970): 249–78.
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- ------. "Tabula alphabetica: von den Anfängen alphabetische Registerarbeiten zu Geschichtswerken." In _Festschrift für Her mann Heimpel_. Max Planck Institut für Geschichte. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972.
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- Bynum, David E. "The Generic Nature of Oral Epic Poetry." _Genre_ Five, 2, no. 3 (September 1969): 236–58.
+
+  | For Homer and much of pre-Platonic Greece _aoide_ means both the art of epic singing and the song itself. Where the song does not survive the singing, no distinction between the two can be made. And _epos_ means "words" or "utterances." Using the term in this sense, the "epic" and the "oral" tradition coincide. Parry's criteria to recognize the epic nature of a text directly apply only to one small segment of the world's epic treasures: those which, like Homer, can be classified with Aristotle as having a simple meter and unlimited narration. Bynum argues that the epic tradition is much wider than that, has been accumulated by different hands, for over 150 years, by different methods, belongs to different genres, with some appearing here, others only there. No one specialist can know more than one of the other languages in which it has been noted down.
+
+- ------. _The Daemon in the Wood: A Study of Oral Narrative Patterns_. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. Published by the Center for the Study of Oral Literature.
+
+  | This study represents a search for the kind of ideas that find their expression in oral tradition, and the web of their concatenations. It is interested in the narrative per se, and not as a vehicle reflecting social structure, manifesting dynamics of character, reinforcing custom or law. Discovers "a protean ability of one finite complex of oral traditional fictions to conform with any mode of action or being that men have adopted." Bynum searches for these ideas also in puzzles, sayings, and tales.
+
+- Carpenter, Rhys. "The Antiquity of the Greek Alphabet." _American Journal of Anthropology_ 37 (1933): 8–29.
+
+- Certeau, Michel de, Dominique Julia, and Jacques Revel. _Une Politique de la langue: la Révolution française et les patois: L'enquête de Grégoire_. Paris: Gallimard, 1975.
+
+  | Between 1792 and 1794, the unification of the French language had top priority within the Revolution. Abbé Grégoire was charged with a national survey of vernaculars, and the attitudes toward them are analyzed by the authors: "La langue française et plus faite pour prier le Créateur suprême et chanter ses langages." The French language is much better suited than the dialects to sing the praises of the supreme creator ... it is necessary to sacrifice these on the altar of the Revolution ... one can feel that the "patois" is too heavy, too rough and too dull: not quite worthy of God. The patois encourages laziness, superstition, and inquisition. Its destruction can only be agreeable to God and politics will not lose anything by it.
+
+  | See Heisig.
+
+- Chaytor, H. J. "The Medieval Reader and Textual Criticism." _Bulletin of the John_ (Rylands University Library) 26 (1941): 49–56.
+
+  | See Saenger.
+
+- ------. _From Script to Print: An Introduction to Medieval Vernacular Literature_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945.
+
+Pages 5–21 develop his previously stated idea that the invention of printing was the main factor leading from loud to silent reading.
+
+  | See Saenger.
+
+- Cheney, Christopher Robert. _Notaries Public in England in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries_. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. See Clanchy.
+
+- Chenu, Marie Dominique. _L'éveil de la conscience dans la civilisation médiévale_. Conference Albert-Le-Grand 1968. Montreal: Institut d'études médiévales, 1969.
+
+  | See Clanchy.
+
+- Christin, Anne-Marie, ed. _Ecriture: systèmes idéographiques et pratique expressive_. Paris: Le Sycamore, 1982.
+
+- Clanchy, M. T. "Remembering the Past and the Good Old Law." _History_ 40 (1970): 165–76.
+
+- ------. _From Memory to Written Record: England 1 066–1307_. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.
+
+  | Reviews what we know of growing literacy in the West during a 250-year period from a new point of view, stressing not what it contributed to literature and "science," but the way it changed (or reflected a change) in self-perception and the perception of society. The conversation that started _ABC_ grew out of our attempt to bring insights, acquired from the school of Milman Parry, into the questions asked by Clanchy. For the history of the notaries who did much of the writing, see Cheney and Amelotti. Sheehan focuses on just one of their major tasks: the alphabetization of the last will. Franklin observes a rapid increase of lay literacy between 1050 and 1200 in Russia, even though charters have much less importance there than in the West. Vollrath looks at the vernacular records of Anglo-Saxon laws. She believes that effective legislation was to a large extent independent from the written record, which was often made much later. She points to the difficulties of reconstructing from Latin records the Germanic expression behind the Latin formula that is preserved. In Paravicini, volume 5, pages 71–116 deal with the impact of increasing literary activity on the style of administration in the Middle Ages.
+
+- Classen, Peter, ed. _Recht und Schrift im Mittelalter_. Vorträge und Forschungen 23 . Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1977.
+
+  | See Watkins.
+
+- Constable, Giles. _The Letters of Peter the Venerable_. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.
+
+- Contamine, Philippe. "L'écrit et l'oral en France à la fin du Moyen Age." In Paravicini, pp. 102–115.
+
+  | See Clanchy.
+
+- Cormier, Raymond J. "The Problem of Anachronism: Recent Scholarship on the French Medieval Romances of Antiquity." _Philological Quarterly_ 53 (1974): 145–57.
+
+- Cox, James M. "Autobiography and America." _The Virginia Quarterly Review_ 47, no. 2 (Spring 1971): 252–77.
+
+- Cressy, David, _Literacy and the Social Order: Reading and Writing in Tudor and Stuart England_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
+
+- Crosby, Ruth. "Oral Delivery in the Middle Ages." _Speculum_ 11, no. 1 (January 1936): 88–110.
+
+  | Points out that the direct address to the _reader_ as opposed to the _listener_ first becomes popular in literature in the fifteenth century; with Lydgate's Troy Book.
+
+- ------. "Chaucer and the Custom of Oral Delivery." _Speculum_ 13, no. 4 (October 1938): 413–32.
+
+- Culley, Robert C. _Oral-Formulaic Language in the Biblical Psalms_. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1967.
+
+- Curshmann, Michael. "Oral Poetry in Medieval English, French, and German Literature: Some Notes on Recent Research." _Speculum_ 42 (1967): 36–52.
+
+- ------. "The Concept of Oral Formula as Impediment to Our Understanding of Medieval Oral Poetry." _Medievalia et Humanistica_. New Series 8: 63–76.
+
+- Curtius, Ernst Robert. _European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages_. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
+
+  | He covers the book, page, and letters as symbols in Western culture up to the thirteenth century. Much more detail and quotations can be found in Koep, Rauch, and Rothacker. Nobis presents a short survey. Weinerich analyzes the metaphors used for "remembrance," and finds two ideal types: the storage room and the wax tablet.
+
+  | Meier examines the symbols used by Hildegard von Bingen to speak of "forgetting"; mainly man forgetting God and God forgetting man.
+
+  | However, Meier's article is the best critical guide to research on such symbols in the Middle Ages for remembrance and forgetting in general. Harms focuses only on nature insofar as it "speaks," mainly through the voice of God's writing that speaks to illiterate and literate alike. Nobis addresses the contrast between de-ciphering the Creator's handwriting in nature and the description of nature that constitutes modern science and turns the "book" topsy-turvy. Krafft, Schilling, and Ohly pursue the literary use of the book as symbol and as emblematic element during the following centuries. The use of the book as a symbol for spiritual reality can be found in Leclercq and Kretzenbacher. That God has revealed himself not only through letters but also through ruler and circle is a point made by Ohly (_Deus Geometra_). Meier ("Verhaeltnis") studies the relationship between the text of Hildegard and the miniatures by which it is illustrated.
+
+- Daly, L. W., and B. A. Daly. "Some Techniques in Mediaeval Latin Lexicography." _Speculum_ 39 (1964): 231–39.
+
+  | Isidore of Seville in his _Etymologiae_ had already tried an alphabetic arrangement by first and second letters. But only in 1053 did Papias begin to arrange entries in his dictionary in a fully alphabetic order; for quotations he used abbreviations indicated in a table at the beginning of his work. Brincken deals with the first alphabetic indices starting in the early thirteenth century. Rouse, pp. 29–40, provides a full introduction to the history of the chapter and the verse in the Bible, and reference methods in the late Middle Ages; his work is complemented by Halporn. Rouse ("Early Library") reports on the origins of random access to library books, and Goetz on the appearance of encyclopedias. The world map might be considered as a particular form of random access description (see Brincken). On library buildings, see Knowles. For the contents of a private library (1271), belonging to Gérard d'Abéville, the adversary of Thomas Aquinas, see Grabmann, pp. 16ff.
+
+- D'Angelo, Frank J. "Luria and Literacy: The Cognitive Consequences of Reading and Writing." In _Literacy as a Human Problem_, ed. James C. Raymond.
+
+- David, M. "Le serment du sacre du IXe au XVe siècle. Contribution à l'étude des limites juridiques de la souveraineté." _Revue du moyen âge Latin_ 6 (1950): 5–272.
+
+- Davison, J. A. "Literature and Literacy in Ancient Greece." _Phoenix_ 16 (1962): 141–56 and 219–33.
+
+- De Ghellinck, S. _L'essort de la litterature latine au 12. siècle_. Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954.
+
+  | See Leclercq.
+
+- Diamond, Stanley. "The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom." In _The Rule of Law_, ed. R. P. Wolf. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971.
+
+  | This article comments on the distinction made by Paul Gohannan that law has no essence, but only a definable historical nature. Compare this with the comment of Paul Radin: "A custom is in no sense a part of our properly functioning culture. It belongs definitely to the past. At best it is moribund."
+
+  | See Watkins.
+
+- Diringer, David. _The Alphabet: A Key to the History of Mankind_. 2d ed., rev. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953.
+
+- Duby, Georges. "Structures de parente et noblesse dans la France du Nord au Xle et Xlle siècles." In _Hommes et structures du Moyen Âge_, ed. Georges Duby. Paris: Mouton, 1973.
+
+  | See pp. 282–83 for notion of restructuring and reordering of aristocratic lineage from horizontal to vertical due to influence of the _text_.
+
+- Duggan, Joseph, ed. _Oral Literature. Seven Essays_. Edinburgh and London: Scottish Academic Press, 1975.
+
+- Duggan, Joseph J. _The Song of Roland: Formulaic Style and Poetic Craft_. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
+
+- Eickelman, Dale E. "The Art of Memory: Islamic Education and its Social Reproduction." _Comparative Studies in Society and History_ 20 (1978): 485–516.
+
+- Eisenstein, Elisabeth. _The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Com munications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe_. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
+
+  | The author was upset by the oracular style with which McLuhan raised an obviously important and so far little understood event: the effect of printing on written records, and on the views of elites. Her theme is not the shift from an oral to a literate culture, but the shift from one kind of literate culture to another during the fifteenth century: the move from "scribal" or "chirographic" to print or typographic culture.
+
+  | On the way in which scribal procedures and the changing appearance of the handwritten page affected twelfth-to-fourteenth-century literature, see Chaytor. The most brilliantly illustrated history showing the development of writing styles, binding, illustrations, and reference methods, the changing role of the unprinted book in the monastery, university, and in general culture, its relation to lay piety and enjoyment and self-perception are the pages devoted to the manuscript in Martin.
+
+  | See also Steinberg.
+
+- Ernout, A. "Dictáre, 'dicter,' allem, dichten." _Revue des Etudes La tines_ 29 (1951): 155–61.
+
+- Ewert, A. "Dante's Theory of Language." _Modern Language Review_ 35 (1940): 355–65.
+
+- Febvre, Lucien, and Henry-Jean Martin. _L' Apparition du Livre_. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1958.
+
+- Feigl, Helmuth. "Von der mundlichen Rechtsweisung zur Aufzeichnung. Die Entstehung der Weistumer und verwandter Quellen." In Classen, _Recht und Schrift_. See Watkins.
+
+- Felder, Hilarin. _Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franzis kanerorden b is um die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts_. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1904.
+
+  | See Steiner.
+
+- Finnegan, Ruth, ed. _A World Treasury of Oral Poetry_. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.
+
+- Foley, John Miles. "The Traditional Oral Audience." _Balkan Studies_ 18 (1977): 145–53.
+
+- ------. "Oral Literature: Premises and Problems." _Choice_ 18 (1980): 487–96.
+
+  | This article is written primarily with the acquisition librarian of a college library in mind, and includes a list of easily available sound recordings of oral texts. For orientation on the ramifications of studies generated by Parry's history of controversies and progress. For partly unpublished research on oral traditions around the globe, see Lord ("Perspectives"). The footnotes in Peabody are an excellent introduction to the state of knowledge.
+
+- Fraenger, Wilhelm. _Der Bauernbruegel and das deutsche Sprichwort_. Munich and Leipzig: E. Rentsch, 1923.
+
+  | Analyzes a painting in which Peter Brueghel the Elder in 1559 has preserved a dozen sayings about the world upside down.
+
+  | See Ohly.
+
+- Franklin, Simon. "Literacy and Documentation in Early Medieval Russia." _Speculum_ 60, no. 1 (1985): 1–38.
+
+  | See Clanchy.
+
+- Fry, Donald K. "Themes and Type-Scenes in Elene: 1–113." _Speculum_ 44 (1969): 34–45.
+
+Hypothesizes a survival of formulaic techniques in written poetry from an earlier tradition.
+
+- Frye, Northrop. _The Great Code: The Bible and Literature_. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982.
+
+- Fuhrmann, Horst. "Die Fälschungen im Mittelalter: Überlegungen zum mittelalterlichen Wahrheitsbegriff." _Historische Zeitschrift_ 197 (1963): 529–34.
+
+  | Forgeries abound during the Middle Ages--not only forgeries of charters, but those of relics and of "authorships." Many works are ascribed to Augustine, Ambrose, and Cicero that they could not have written. This raises two questions: What is the motive for these forgeries, and why were they accepted? The author sees this mainly as a result of the medieval desire to correct the "order of things" to fit the forger's opinion of how the order should be. The increase of documents during the twelfth century lends itself particularly to this corrective enterprise. For a short introduction to the history of _falsiloquium_ and _mendacium_ see Bien; and for more extensive historical documentation see Müller. About Herodotus on lying, see Hartog.
+
+- Galbraith, Vivian Hunter. "The Literacy of the Medieval English Kings." Raleigh Lecture on History 10 July 1935. In _Proceedings of the British Academy_, XXI (1935): 201–38.
+
+- Gannim, John M. _Style and Consciousness in Middle English Narrative_. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
+
+- Ganshof, François L. "Charlemagne et l'usage de l'écrit en matière administrative." _Le Moyen Age_ 57 (1951): 1–25.
+
+  | See Clanchy.
+
+- Gellrich, Jesse M. _The Idea of the Book in the Middle Ages: Language Theory, Mythology, and Fiction_. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.
+
+- Giesecke, Michael. "'Volkssprache' und 'Verschriftlichung des Lebens' im Spätmittelalter--am Beispiel der Genese der ged-rukten Frachprosa in Deutschland." In Gumbrecht, _Literatur_, 39–67.
+
+- Gilson, Etienne. _Heloise and Abelard_. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960.
+
+- Glauche, Günther. "Schullektüren im Mittelalter. Entstehung und Wandlung des Lektürenkanons bis 1200 an Quellen dargestellt." _Muenchner Beiträge zur Medievistik und Renaissanceforschung_ 5. Munich, 1970.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Goetz, Walter. "Die Enzyklopädien des 13. Jahrhundert: Ein Beitrag zur Entstehung der Laienbildung." _Zeitschrift fuer deutsche Geistesgeschichte_ 2, no. 6 (1936): 227–50.
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- Goody, Jack. "The Consequences of Literacy." In Jack Goody, ed. _Literacy in Traditional Societies_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
+
+- ------. _The Domestication of the Savage Mind_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
+
+- ------, ed. _Literacy in Traditional Societies_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
+
+- Grabmann, Martin. _Mittelalterliches Geistesleben_. Munich: Huebner, 1926.
+
+  | Reconstructs the library of an adversary of Thomas A. Gerard d' Abéville, who donated his library in 1271. A catalogue was made in 1338.
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- Graff, Harvey J. _The Literacy Myth: Literacy and Social Structure in the Nineteenth Century_. New York, San Francisco, and London: Academic Press, 1979.
+
+- ------, ed. _Literacy and Social Development in the West_. Cambridge Studies in Oral and Literate Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
+
+- Greenfield, Kathleen. "Changing Emphasis in English Vernacular Homiletic Literature." _Journal of Medieval History_ 7, no. 3 (1981): 283–97.
+
+- Grundmann, Herbert. "Die Frauen und die Literatur im Mittelalter. Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach der Entstehung des Schrifttums in der Volkssprache." _Archiv fuer Kulturgeschichte_ 26 (1935): 129–61.
+
+- ------. "Litteratus--illiteratus. Der Wandel einer Bildungsnorm vom Altertum zum Mittelalter." _Archiv fuer Kulturgeschi chte_ 40 (1958): 1–65.
+
+- ------. _Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter. Untersuchungen über die geschichtlichen Zusammenhänge zwischen der Ketzerei, den Bettelorden und der religiösen Frauenbewegung im 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts und über die geschichtlichen Grundlagen der Deutschen Mystik_. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftel Buchges, 1970.
+
+  | The spread of literacy in the twelfth century cannot be separated from the religious movements, especially among the laity. Grundmann strongly reacts against interpretations that explain these movements stressing predominantly social and economic causes; for him Church-bound and heretic movements are ultimately motivated by the desire to effect religious reform based on the reading of scriptures. In the course of this movement, the relationship between clerical status and literacy changed in a complex fashion.
+
+  | See Grundmann (_Litteratus_) and Thompson on the possibility of combining lay-status with emerging literacy, versus Clanchy, part II, 7 and Gilson's discussion of Abelard's status. _I Laici_ contains several papers referring to this point; see in particular, Huyghebaert on the status of women, and Grundmann (_Frauen_) on the contribution of women toward literacy in the vernacular tongues. Also, in Eastern Europe, Franklin notices the increase in lay literacy, and Brach notices the increase of women scribes--at least in the legends of Byzantium.
+
+- Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich. _Literatur in der Gesellschaft des Spätmit telalters_. (Grundriss der romanischen Literaturen des Mittelalters), Vol. 1. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1980.
+
+  | See Clanchy.
+
+- Hajdu, Helga. _Das Mnemotechnische Schrifttum des Mittelalters_. Amsterdam: E. J. Bonset, 1967.
+
+- Hajnal, István. _L' Enseignement de l'écriture aux universités médiévales_. Budapest: Academia ScientiarumHungarica Budapestini, 1954.
+
+- Halporn, J. W. "Methods of Reference in Cassiodorus." _Journal of Library History_ 16 (1981): 71–91.
+
+- Hanning, R. W. _The Individual in the Twelfth-Century Romances_. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
+
+- Harms, Wolfgang, and Heimo Reinitzer. _Natura Loquax: Natur kunde und allegorische Naturdeutung vom Mittelalter bis zur f ruehen Neuzeit_. Mikrokosmos: Beitraege zur Literatur-wissenschaft und Bedeutungsforschung Bd. 7. Frankfort: Lang, 1981.
+
+  | Nature speaks; in fact, Nature might be chatty. But how to learn Nature's language? And who are those who can understand its language and make it understandable?
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Hartog, François. _Le miroir d'Hérodote: Essai sur la représentation de l'autre_. Paris: Gallimard, 1980.
+
+  | Cicero (_Laws_ I, 1, 5) calls Herodotus both the Father of History, and a Liar: "Quamquam et apud Herodtum, patrem Historiae ... sunt innumerabilis fabulae..." Hartog retraces the histographic stages in which "Herodotus' lies" were differently understood: as a propagandist, a plagiarist, and only slowly as a maturing author, as he has been known for three successive generations since the mid-nineteenth century.
+
+  | Veyne, however, might be more correct: the father of history was in no way bound by history's supposed rules. Herodotus still _knows_ equally well what he has seen, been told of, or has understood. Somewhat like Plato, he sits on the watershed at which our kind of "lie" starts as a tiny brook.
+
+- Harvey, David. "Greeks and Romans Learn to Write." In Havelock and Hershbell, _Communication Arts_, 63–80.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Harvey, F. D. "Literacy in the Athenian Democracy." _Revue des Études Grecques_ 79 (1966): 585–635.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Harvey, L. P. "Oral Composition and the Performance of Novels of Chivalry in Spain." In Duggan, _Oral Literature_, 84–100.
+
+- Hatcher, Elisabeth R. "The Moon and Parchment: Paradiso II, 73–78." _Dante Studies_ 89 (1971): 55–60.
+
+- Havelock, Eric. _Preface to Plato_. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
+
+  | Suggests that even after the waning of the epic tradition, and the rise of specific literary forms of poetry, oral culture substantially prevailed until Plato, whose "war against the poets" in _The Republic_ is to be explained as an attack on the bases of the older civilization of the spoken word by the greatest representative of the new age of prose, science, abstract thought, and writing. Havelock goes far beyond Parry, who could not have admitted that an "oral culture" could exist without the living tradition of oral poetry which determines its character.
+
+- ------. "Prologue to Greek Literacy." In _Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Sample. University of Cincinnati Classical Studies_, vol. 2. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973: 331–91.
+
+- ------. "The Preliteracy of the Greeks." _New Literary History_ 8, no. 3 (1977): 369–91.
+
+- ------. "The Ancient Art of Oral Poetry." _Philosophy and Rhetoric_ 12, no. 3 (Summer 1979): 187–202.
+
+- ------. _The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences_. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
+
+- Havelock, Eric A., and Jackson P. Hershbell, eds. _Communication Arts in the Ancient World_. Humanistic Studies in the Communication Arts. New York: Hastings House, 1978.
+
+- Haymes, Edward R. _A Bibliography of Studies Relating to Parry's and Lord's Oral Theory_. Publications of the Milman Parry Collection. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.
+
+  | See Foley.
+
+- Heck, Philipp. _Uebersetzungsprobleme im fruehen Mittelalter_. Tübingen: Mohr, 1931.
+
+  | Analyzes early medieval Latin texts in which Germanic vernacular custom or law has been codified. Searches for the vernacular expressions that may have given rise to the use of the Latin formulas, an activity in which Heck has to engage in order to interpret the text. Insists, however, on sticking to the Latin terminology when translating this text into German, fully aware that some other Germanic expression than the one he has guessed at might have been lying behind the Latin term.
+
+- Hedwig, Klaus. _Sphaera Lucis. Studien zur Intelligibilität des seienden im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Lichtspekulation_. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters NF Bd. 18. Munster: Aschendorf, 1980.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Heer, Friedrich. _The Medieval World: Europe 1100–1500_. New York and Toronto: New American Library, 1961.
+
+  | See Morris.
+
+- Heisig, Karl. "Muttersprache: ein romanistischer Beitrag zur Genesis eines deutschen Wortes und zur Entstehung der deutsch-franzoesischen Sprachgrenze." _Muttersprache_ 22, no. 3 (1954): 144–74.
+
+  | The connection between "mother" and "tongue" is first made in Lorraine in the tenth century, at the time of a retreat of the Frankish and the advance of neo-Latin speaking populations. Monks of the reform abbey of Gorz used it in opposition to _patrius sermo. Lingua materna_ appealed to the women to maintain their speechform. It appears in Latin sermon notes meant to be delivered in vernacular tongues. During the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, the term--if used--was opposed to Latin, used to designate a lower type of language. In the fourteenth century, it was used only in the business language of the Hansa. Asensio examines Nebrija's idea of the national language being a camp follower. Weissberger retraces the rise of the idea of "mother tongue" in European cultures. Josten and Bahner give easy access to source material on the subject. We know of not one attempt to retrace the history of the corresponding idea: that _homo_ is naturally _monolinguis_.
+
+- Hilty, G. "Die Romanisierungen in den Strassburger Eiden." _Vox Romanica_ 25 (1966): 227–35.
+
+  | See Schmidt-Wiegand.
+
+- Hoekstra, A. _Homeric Modifications of Formulaic Prototypes, Studies in the Development of Greek Epic Diction_. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1965.
+
+- Holoka, James P. "Homeric Originality: A Survey." _Classical World_ 66, no. 5 (1973): 257–93. See Foley.
+
+- Horner, Winifred Bryan, ed. _The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric_. Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1983.
+
+  | See Chapter 2, "The Middle Ages," by James J. Murphy.
+
+- Howard, Donald R. "The Canterbury Tales: Memory and Form." _English Language History_ 38 ( 1971 ): 319–28.
+
+- ------. _The Idea of the Canterbury Tales_. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976.
+
+- Huyghebaert, Nicolas. "Les femmes laïques dans la vie religieuse des 11e et 12e siècles dans la province Ecclésiastique de Reims." In _I Laici nella Societas Christiana_, 345–95.
+
+  | See Grundmann.
+
+- Ibach, Helmut. "Zu Wortschatz und Begriftswelt der althochdeutschen Benediktinerregel." _Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur_ (Halle). 78 (1956): 1"110; 79 (1957): 106–85; 80 (1958): 190–271; 81 (1959): 123–73; 82 (1960):
+
+  | See Betz.
+
+- _I Laici nella Societas Christiana_. De sec. 11 and 12. Atti della terza Settimana internazionale di studio, Mendola agosto 1965. Publicazioni dell Universitá Cattolica del Sacro uore, ser. III, varia 5. Milan, 1966.
+
+  | See Grundmann.
+
+- Inter Documentation Publishing Company. _Emblem Books_. 354 Titles on microfiche. Zurich, 1983.
+
+  | See Ohly.
+
+- Jaeger, Werner. _Platos Stellung Aufbau der griechischen Bildung_. Berlin, 1928.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Jarecki, Walter. _Signa Loquendi. Die cluniscensischen Signa-Listen eingeleitet und herausgegeben_. Saecula Spiritalia Bd. 4. Baden-Baden: Korner, 1981.
+
+  | Monastic sign language of the High Middle Ages.
+
+- Jeggrey, David. _By Things Seen: Reference and Recognition in Medieval Thought_. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979.
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- Josten, Dirk. _Sprachvorbild und Sprachnorm im Urteil des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts. Sprachlandschertliche Prioritäten, Sprachautoritäten, Sprachimmanente Argumentation_. Europ. Hochschulschriften R 1, 152. Bern: Frankfurt, 1976.
+
+  | Critical and annotated collection of opinions expressed by German poets and savants--see Heisig.
+
+- Jousse, Marcel. _Le Style oral rhythmique et mnémotechnique chez les Verbomoteurs_. Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1925.
+
+- Kailaspathy, K. _Tamil Heroic Poetry_. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
+
+- Kelber, Werner. _The Oral and the Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition: Mark, Paul and Q_. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984.
+
+- Kirschbaum, Engelbert. _Lexikon der Christlichen Ikonographie_. ("Art," "Bildnis" und "Evangelisten") Bd. 1. Rome: Herder, 1968. 301, 696ff.
+
+  | See Leclercq.
+
+- Klinkenberg, Hans Martin. "Der Verfall des Quadriviums im frühen Mittelalter." _Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mit telalters_ 5 (1959): 1–32.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Knowles, Dom David. _The Monastic Order in England. A History of Its Development from the Times of St. Dunstan to the Fourth Lateran Council, 943–1216_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Koep, Leo. _Das himmlische Buch in Antike und Christentum_. Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1952.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Krafft, F. "Der Naturwissenschaftler und das Buch der Renaissance." In _Das Verhältnis der Humanisten zum Buch_, eds. F. Krafft and D. Wuttke, 23–41. Boppard: Boldt, 1977.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Kretzenbacher, L. _Versoehnung im Jenseits. Zur Widerspiegelung des Apokatastasis-Denkens in Glaube, Hochdichtung und Legende_. Sitzungsbericht der Akademie. Munich: Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Kuhn, Alvin. "Schriftsprache und Dialekt." _Cultura Neolatina_ 16 (1956), fasc. 1: 35–51.
+
+- Ladner, Gerhart B. _The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers_. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.
+
+- Lain Entralgo, Pedro. _The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity_. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.
+
+- Lanza, Diego. _Lingua e discorso nell'Atene delle professioni_. Naples: Liguori, 1979.
+
+  | Shows the slow penetration of documentation into the different circles of Athens during the fifth century.
+
+- Lares, Micheline-Maurice. "Types et optiques de traductions et adaptions de l'ancien Testament en Anglais du Haut Moyen Age." In _Bible and Medieval Culture_, ed. W. Lourdaux, 70ff. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1979.
+
+  | See Betz.
+
+- Leclercq, Jean. "Saint Bernhard et ses secrétaires." _Revue Bene dectine_ 61 (1951): 208–29.
+
+  | Leclercq possesses an encyclopedic knowledge of the meaning given by twelfth-century monks to their gestures and words (_Otia_ and _Vocabulaire_). On the habits of composing and dictating, see _l'amour_, especially pages 21ff. and 164ff., as well as De Ghellinck, _L'essort_, pp. 270ff. On the etymology of "dictation," see the linguist Ernout. Kirschbaum notices the transformation in the representation of Evangelists: from secretaries who listen to the voice of God frequently represented by a bird speaking in their ear, into secretaries copying from a scroll that descends from heaven. Dictation remained the only form of copying (Skeat) until word-division made silent copying possible (Saenger).
+
+- ------. _Étude sur le vocabulaire monastique du Moyen Age_. Rome: Herder, 1961.
+
+- ------. _L'amour des lettres et le désir de Dieu_. Paris: Aubier, 1963.
+
+- ------. _Otia monastica: étude sur le vocabulaire de la contemplation au moyen âge_. Freiburg: Herder, 1963.
+
+- ------. "Aspects spirituels de la symbolique du livre au XIIe siècle." In _L'homme devant Dieu II_, 63ff. Mélanges de Lubac. Paris: Aubier, 1964.
+
+- Lesky, A. "Homeros II: Oral Poetry; III: Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit." In Pauy's _Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft_, ed. Wilhelm Kroll, 693–709. Supplementband XI, Stuttgart: 1968.
+
+- Lohmann, Johannes. "Verhältnis des abendländischen Menschen zur Sprache (Bewusstsein und unbewusste Form der Rede)." _Lexisi_ 3 (1953): 5–49.
+
+  | The Greeks had no language, but only a way of life. Thought was embedded in the Logos. Classical science was critical but not yet judgmental. Truth still in the presence of Being. The two begin to separate only with Cicero: thought separates from language. However, the thinker remains argumentative; he does not become immediately judgmental. Only with nominalism does thought move away from language. It is only during the thirteenth century that language can be conceived of as a tool, an instrument that designates outside things. Rhetoric takes the place of logic. Modern language appears, a form for content. Language has changed from an organ of reflection into a sign of thought. Now with structuralism, the cycle is complete: language operates in persons.
+
+- Lord, Albert. "Homer, Parry and Huso." _American Journal of Archaeology_ 53 (1948): 34–44.
+
+- ------. _The Singer of Tales_. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
+
+- ------. "Perspectives on Recent Work on Oral Literature." In Duggan, _Oral Literature_, 1–24.
+
+- Luria, Aleksandr Romanovich. _Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations_. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.
+
+- Lynd, Helen Merrill. _On Shame and the Search for Identity_. New York: Science Editions, 1958.
+
+- Magoun, Francis Peabody. "The Oral Formulaic Character of Anglo-Saxon Narrative Poetry." _Speculum_ 28 (1953): 446–67. The first to apply Parry to _Beowulf_; challenged by Benson.
+
+- Manzaneres de Cirre, Manuela. _Arabistas españolas del siglo XIX_. Madrid: Instituto Hispano-Árabe de Cultura, 1971.
+
+  | Pages 7–15 provide a good introduction to the literature on Arabic translation in the thirteenth century.
+
+- Marrou, Henri Irenée. _A History of Education in Antiquity_. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- ------. _Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique_. 4th ed. Paris: Ed. Boccard, 1958.
+
+  | Augustine is not only the first major thinker who no longer writes in Greek, he is also the first whose entire philosophical formation was Latin. And it is a particular Latin, marked by the rhetoric of the late empire and its philosophers, full of enthusiastic diatribe, and technical artifices particularly attractive to the age. But his Latin remains in many ways the same kind of language for all antiquity: Reading is done out loud, and more often than not the author listens to a lector reading back to him what he has dictated. The scroll and the book--when it comes into existence--by their very nature prevent the reader from returning to a passage already read, and make scanning or leafing impossible.
+
+  | During the sixth and seventh centuries, dialects have a strong influence on the written "Latin." Battisti and Wright oppose the often-voiced opinion "that Latin and Romance co-existed as spoken forms since Imperial times and were mutually unintelligible by the year 813" as untenable. Since the time of Augustine, the letters ceased to reflect the sounds--Väänänen. Menéndez speaks of neo-Latin speech forms during the whole first millennium (pp. 1–5). Norberg explores its relations to the text of the Strasbourg Oaths. Pulgram speaks of the Council of Tours as a "resigned recognition that you cannot talk to people in a language that they have long ago ceased to speak nor thereby save their souls"--by the year 1000 the spoken Latin word had ceased to influence the orthography of Latin. Latin had become a historically quite unique language (Steiner and also Bischoff). Mohrmann gives an encyclopedic access to Latin's unique characteristics, and the history of its perception.
+
+- Martin, Henri-Jean, Roger Chartier, and Jean-Pierre Vivet. _His torie de l'édition française_. Tome I. _Le Livre conquérant du moyen âge au milieu du XVII siècle_. Paris: Promodis Français, 1984.
+
+  | Many pages devoted to the manuscript, with many illustrations, which show the development of writing styles, binding, illustration, indices, and reference systems. Explores the changing role of the book in monastery, university, and in general culture. Also explores relations of lay piety to the book, written text, silent reading, and private study--all leading to individualism.
+
+- McKeon, Richard. "The Organization of Sciences and the Relation to Cultures in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries." In _The Cultural Context of Learning and Thinking_, ed. Michael Cole, 151–92. New York: Basic Books, 1971.
+
+- McLuhan, Marshall. _The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man_. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1962.
+
+- Meier, Christl. "Vergessen, Erinnern, Gedächtnis im Gott-Mensch Bezug: zu einem Grenzbereich der Allegorese bei Hildegard von Bingen und anderen Autoren des Mittelalters." In _Verbum et Signum_, ed. Hans Fromm, Wolfgang Harms, Uwe Ruberg, 143–94. Munich: W. Fink, 1975.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- ------. "Zu Verhaeltnis von Text und Illustration bei Hildegard von Bingen." In _Hildegard von Bingen 1179–1979_, ed. A. Bruek, 159–69. Festschrift zum 800. Mainz: Todestag, 1979.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- ------, ed. _Text und Bild. Aspekte des Zusammenwirkens Zweir Kuenste im Mittelalter und Frueher Neuzeite_. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1980.
+
+- Menéndez Pidal, Ramón. _Manual de gramática histórica española_. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1958.
+
+- Mezey, Laszló, ed. _L'enseignement de l'écriture aux universités médiévales_. 2d ed. Budapest: Academie des Sciences de Hongrie, 1959.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Momiglianó, A. "The Historians of the Classical World and Their Audiences." _Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa_ 8, no. 1 (1057): 59–75.
+
+  | Underlines the dissynchronicity of cultural alphabetization. After Herodotus, historians quickly adopted mental conventions that devalued hearsay against documented evidence. But the readers much more slowly asked for proof supporting those statements.
+
+- Morris, Collin. _The Discovery of the Individual 1050–1200_. The Church Historical Society. London: SPVC, 1972.
+
+  | Without recourse to the apparatus of learned study, the author has mapped recent scholarship on the theme in an authoritative manner. He highlights (especially pp. 64–68) the relationship between various forms of self-description and the new style of self-perception. Chenu points with great competence to the decisive step in the discovery of the self (le sujet de soi-même) in Abelard: That intention determines the value of the act and therefore its sinfulness. The Church discipline demanding penance for the action had to be replaced by the confession of the evil intention: Each one had to learn to examine his own conscience, perceived as a book. Though the author is mainly concerned with the later fourteenth century, the historian Tentler documents the page-like perception of conscience. On the reflection of Individualism in literature, see Hanning and _Typus und Individudlitaet_.
+
+- Müller, Gregor. _Die Wahrhaftigkeitspflicht und die Problematik der Lüge_. Freiburg: Herder, 1962.
+
+  | See Fuhrmann.
+
+- Murphy, James J. _Medieval Rhetoric: A Select Bibliography_. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971.
+
+- ------. _Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from St. Augustine to the Renaissance_. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
+
+- Naveh, Joseph. _Early History of the Alphabet: An Introduction to West Semitic Epigraphy and Paleography_. Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1982.
+
+- Nelson, H. L. W. "Die Latinisierungen in den Strassburger Eiden." _Vox Romanica_ 25 (1966): 193–226.
+
+- _New Literary History. Aspects of Orality_: Vol. 8, no. 3 (1977). _Oral and Written Traditions in the Middle Ages_: Vol. 16, no. 1 (1984).
+
+- Nilgen, U. "Evangelisten." In Kirschbaum, _Lexikon_.
+
+- Nobis, H. M. "Die Umwandlung der mittelalterlichen Naturvorstellung. Ihre Ursachen and ihre Wissenschaftsgeschichten Folgen." _Archiv fuer Begriffsgeschichte_ 13 (1960): 34–57.
+
+  | Stresses the contrast between de-ciphering the Creator's handwriting in nature, and the de-scription of nature, which constitutes modern science. The metaphor is turned topsy-turvy in the transition from contemplation to description.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Norberg, Dag. "A quelle époque a-t-on cessé de parler latin en Gaule?" _Annales Economies Sociétés Civilizations_ 21(1966): 346–55.
+
+- Notopoulos, James A. "Mnemosyne in Oral Literature." _Translations of the American Philosophical Association_ 69 (1938): 465–93.
+
+- O'Connor, Michael Patrick. _Hebrew Verse Structure_. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1980.
+
+- Oediger, F. W. _Über die Bildung der Geistlichen im späten Mittelalter_. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters. Cologne: Brill, 1953.
+
+  | See Riché.
+
+- Ohly, Friedrich. "Vom Sprichwort im Leben eines Dorfes." In _Volk, Sprache, Dichtung_, ed. Karl Bischoff and Lutz Röhrich, 276–93. Festgabe fuer Kurt Wagner, 1960.
+
+  | Ohly's major intellectual influence lies in the field of medieval metaphor and semantics. In one exceptional paper ("Vom Sprichwort"), Ohly explicates the form and use of sayings as formulas in everyday village life--even today--and the delicate way in which variation from valley to valley contributes to the sense of local community.
+
+  | Schmidt-Wiegand ("Rechtssprichwörter") examines the illustrations of legal proverbs in one of the earliest Germanic collections, and through her comments introduces the literature of the oral maxim. An attempt to classify the conversion of speech into equivalent sounds observed in many parts of the world is made by the linguist Stern. Ong's "Talking Drums" is interesting here. Taylor has made the proverb and its transmission into his life's work. While languages change, proverbs are often carried unchanged over centuries, as can be seen from a comparison of medieval sources with modern dialect-dictionaries (Berthold). This might be due to their formulaic character (Rothstein). They inspire artistic imagination, as Fraenger shows by analyzing a painting in which Peter Brueghel the Elder in 1559 has preserved about a dozen sayings that refer to the "world upside down." The Baroque use of sayings and proverbs in the creation of emblems, however, can be considered much more an "alphabetization" of these oral formulas than its interpretation. _InterDocumentation Company_ now gives access to these. The riddle has a formulaic character that can be compared with that of the proverb and is part of every oral culture known (Taylor). Röhrich is an excellent critical introduction to the current state of "paroemiology"--the scientific study of proverbs. See there especially pages 75–77, an international bibliography on the study of legal maxims and their transmission.
+
+- ------. "Das Buch der Natur bei Jean Paul." Studien zur Goethezeit. Erich Trunz zum 75. Geburtstag. _Beihefte zu Euphorion_ 18, 177–232. Heidelberg, 1981.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- ------. "Deus Geometra: Skizzen zur Geschichte einer Vorstellung von Gott." _Tradition als historische Kraft_. Festschrift Karl Hauk. Berlin, 1981.
+
+- Cassiodorus, _Institutiones_ II, 5, 11: "geometra, quae est descriptio contemplativa formarum, documentum etiam visibile philosophorum."
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Ong, Walter J. _Ramus: Method, and the Decay of Dialogue_. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.
+
+- ------. _The Presence of the Word_. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967.
+
+- ------. _Romance and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture_. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1971.
+
+- ------. "African Talking Drums and Oral Poetics." _New Literary History_ 8, no. 3 ( 1972): 411–29.
+
+
+- ------. "The Writer's Audience Is Always a Fiction." _Publications of the Modern Language Association_ 90 (1975): 9–21.
+
+- ------. _Interfaces of the Word_. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1977.
+
+- ------. _Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word_. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1982.
+
+  | The best book on this subject.
+
+- ------. "Reading, Technology and Human Consciousness." In _Literacy as a Human Problem_, Raymond, 17–201.
+
+- Paravicini, Werener, and Karl Ferdinand Werner, eds. _Histoire comparée de l'administration (4e–18 siècles). Actes du 14 colloque his torique franco-allemand_. Beihefte der Francia Vol. 9. Munich: Artemis, 1980.
+
+  | See Clanchy.
+
+- Parry, Adam, ed. _The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry_. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971.
+
+- Peabody, Berkley. _The Winged Word: A Study in the Technique of Ancient Greek Oral Composition as Seen Principally Through Hesiod's_ Works and Days. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975.
+
+- Percival, W. Keith. "The Applicability of Kuhn's Paradigm to the History of Linguistics." _Language_ 52 (1976): 285–94.
+
+- Pinborg, Jan. _Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter_. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Bd. 42, Heft 2. Aschendorff im Verbindung mit dem Verlag. Arne Frost-Hansen, Munster and Copenhagen, 1967.
+
+  | See Borst.
+
+- Pörkesen, Uwe. _Der Erzähler im mittelhochdeutschen Epos. Formen seines Herrortretens bei Lamprecht, Konrad, Hartmann, in Worlframs Willehalm und in den "Spielmannseper."_ Berlin: Schmidt, 1971.
+
+  | "The medieval story-teller in many ways interrupts his story to tell us what he is doing: He gives a bird's-eye view of what he will be telling, tries to make people curious, insists on the importance of the subject he will deal with. He refers to authorities that make him believable. Gets himself into the act. He is not afraid of preaching and being didactic. He praises his heroes, is sympathetic with them, berates them... Nothing of the kind happens in the novel. To find a comparison we must turn today to a scientific paper. There the author tells us how important and unsolved the problem is, gives a summary, indicates connections, puts authorities into footnotes, thanks the teachers and colleagues..."
+
+- Pulgram, E. "Spoken and Written Latin." _Language_ 26 (1950): 458–66.
+
+- Quinn, William A., and Audrey S. Hall. _Jongleur: A Modified Theory of Oral Improvisation and Its Effects on the Performance and Transmission of Middle English Romances_. Washington: University Press of America, 1982.
+
+- Rabinowitz, Isaak. "Word and Literature in Ancient Greece." _New Literary History_ 4 (1974): 119–39.
+
+- Radding, Charles M. "Evolution of Medieval Mentalities: A Cognitive-Structural Approach." _The American Historical Review_ 83 (1978): 577–97.
+
+  | In the transition from government by custom to government by law (written) during the twelfth century, increasingly the intention of the self was taken into account: the _mens rea_ became of interest to the judge.
+
+  | See Watkins.
+
+- Rassow, P. "Die Kanzlei St. Bernhards von Clairvaux." _Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktiner-Ordens und seiner Zweige_ 34 (1913): 63–103 and 243–93.
+
+  | See Leclercq.
+
+- Rauch, Winthir. _Das Buch Gottes_. Munich: M. Hueber, 1961.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Raymond, James C, ed. _Literacy as a Human Problem_. Mobile, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1982.
+
+- Redlich, Oswald. "Die Privaturkunden des Mittelalters." In _Urkundenlehre_, eds. Wilhelm Erben, L. Schmitz-Kallenberg, and O. Redlich. Munich and Berlin: Verlag Oldenbourg, 1911.
+
+  | See Wattenbach.
+
+- Riché, Pierre. _Éducation et culture dans l'Occident barbare. 6. -8. siècles_. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962.
+
+  | Encyclopedic orientation to the theme.
+
+- ------. _Écoles et enseignement dans le Haute Moyen Age_. Paris: Aubier, 1976.
+
+- ------. _Les écoles et l'enseignement dans l'Occident chrétien de la fin du 10 siècle au milieu du 11 siècle_. Paris: Aubier, 1979.
+
+- ------. "La Formation des scribes dans le monde merovingien et carolingien." In Paravicini and Werner, _Histoire_, 75–80.
+
+- ------. "Recherches sur l'instruction des laies du 9 au 12 siècle." In _Instruction et vie religieuse dans le Haut Moyen Age_. Section 10. Paris: Variorum Reprints, 1981.
+
+  | Riché's work has become the standard handbook on education throughout the Middle Ages with reference also to elementary instruction in reading and writing--of course--mostly in Latin. For literacy among the Greeks, see F. D. Harvey. For the ideal of growing up, see the Classicist Jaeger (_Paideia_), and for the transformation of this ideal through growing literacy, see Marrou (_A History_) and Marrou (_Augustine_, the last chapter), in comparison with Jaeger (_Plato_). The latter two items introduce the transformation of early Classical Paideia into the Roman and then the Christian ideal of education. Best introduces the controversy about the spread of reading and writing abilities in Pompeii; see also Väänänen. Bischoff (_Schreibschule_) provides a detailed picture of elementary education in the Carolingian period in one area: Southeast Germany. See also in this same context Riché (_La Formation des scribes_). Bonaventura has some additional details on the method of teaching Latin, the only language in which writing was possible. Oediger gives easy access to texts relating to medieval clerical formation, and Glauche to the change in "textbooks."
+
+- Richter, Michael. "Latina Lingua--Sacra seu Vulgaris?" In _The Bible and Medieval Culture_, eds. W. Lourdaux and D. Verheles, 16–34. Leuven, 1979.
+
+  | Deals with spoken Italian. See both Ewert and Steiner.
+
+- ------. _Sprache und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter: Untersuchungen zur mundlichen Kommunikation in England von der Mitte des elften bis zum Beginn des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts_. Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, Band 18. Stuttgart: Hiersmann, 1979.
+
+  | He argues that the attempt to reconstruct the spoken language cannot be left solely to philologists. As a historian, Richter attempts to sieve the sources for evidence of spoken language.
+
+  | See Steiner.
+
+- Röhrich, Lutz, and Wolfgang Mieder. _Sprichwort_. Sammlung Metzler Bd. 154. Realien zur Literatur, 1977.
+
+  | See Ohly.
+
+- Roncaglia, Martiniano. "I frati minori e lo studio delia lingue orientali nel secolo 13." _Studi Francescani_ 25 (1953): 169–84.
+
+  | See Steiner.
+
+- Rothacker, E. _Das "Buch" der Natur. Materialien und Grund sätzliches zur Metapherngeschichte. Aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von Wilhelm Perpeet_. Bonn: Grundmann, 1979.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+  | Rothstein, Robert A. "The Poetics of Proverbs." In _Studies Presented to Professor Roman Jakobson by His Students_, ed. Charles E. Gribble, 265–74. Cambridge: Slavica Publishers, 1968.
+
+  | Examines the formulaic character of sayings.
+
+  | See Ohly.
+
+- Rouse, Richard H. "The Early Library of the Sorbonne." _Scriptorium_ 21 (1967): 42–71 and 227–52. See Daly.
+
+- Rouse, Richard H., and Mary A. Rouse. _Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons: Studies on the "Manipulus florum" of Thomas of Ireland_. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1979.
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- Ruberg, Uwe. "Mappae Mundi des Mittelalters im Zusammenwirken von Text und Bild." In C. Meier, _Text und Bild_, 550–92. 1980.
+
+- Russo, Joseph A. "A Closer Look at Homeric Formulas." _Trans actions of the American Philosophical Association_ 94 (1963): 235–47.
+
+- Saenger, Paul. "Silent Reading: Its Impact on Late Medieval Script and Society." _Viator_ 13 (1982): 367–414.
+
+  | A brilliant summary with 274 footnotes leading to whatever is known about reading and writing activities, techniques and styles used, and the relationship of cultural history to the written page. Also useful to find representations of reading and writing activities during the period. For texts describing these activities, see Crosby and Scholz. Balogh very early argued that contemplative monks since the seventh century had tried to engage in the silent contemplation of pages. On the other hand, Chaytor (as McLuhan) holds to the idea that the invention of printing was the main factor that led to silent reading. The same idea is held from a Marxist point of view by Hajnal who marshals a rich array of sources. Some of the seeming contradictions might be due to the difficulty of defining what constitutes "silent" reading. Certainly silence was kept in the scriptorium of Cluny (Constable). Sign language was highly developed (Jarecki). For literature on the difference between composing and tracing the letters on the page, see Leclercq. Scholz analyzes vernacular literature, and not only in the Middle High German--of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries--but for all references to the _perception of a text:_ read, hear, search, pick up, see. Believes that many texts were written for readers rather than listeners. The value of this work is its huge bibliographic coverage of the subject.
+
+- Schiller, A. Arthur. "Custom in Classical Roman Law." _Virginia Law Review_ 24 (1938): 268–82.
+
+  | A pithy introduction to the shifting meaning in Classical antiquity of the difference between custom/law; _nomos egraphos/nomos agraphos; mos-consuetudo/lex;_ and so on.
+
+  | See Watkins.
+
+- Schilling, Michael. _Imagines Mundi. Metaphorische Darstellung der Welt in der Emblematik_. Mikrokosmos 4. Frankfurt/Cirencester, England: Lang, 1979.
+
+  | Deals with representations of the world as a book; especially pp. 71–81.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Schmidt-Wiegand, Ruth. "Eid und Gelöbnis, Formel und Formular im mittelalterlichen Recht." In Classen, _Recht und Schrift_. A thoroughly documented study on the transition from oral to recorded oaths. One of the several texts commented on is the oaths of Strasbourg; for these, see also Hilty, Nelson, and David.
+
+- ------. "Rechtssprichwörter und ihre Wiedergabe in dem Bildhandschriften des Sachsenspiegels." In C. Meier, _Text und Bild_, 593–629.
+
+  | See Ohly.
+
+- Scholz, Manfred Gunter. _Horen und Lesen. Studien zur primaren Rezeption der Literatur im 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts_. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980.
+
+- Schwarz, Alexander. "Die Bibel und die Grundlegung einer fränkischen Literatur." In _The Bible and Medieval Culture_, ed. W. Lourdaux and D. Verhelst. Mediaevalis Lovaniensia, Series I, Studia VII, 58–69. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1979.
+
+  | See Betz.
+
+- Sheehan, M. M. _The Will in Medieval England. From the Conversion of the Anglo-Saxons to the End of the Thirteenth Century_. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and Texts, Vol. 6. Toronto, 1963.
+
+- Skeat, T. C. "The Use of Dictation in Ancient Book Production." _Proceedings of the British Academy_ 42 (1956).
+
+  | See Leclercq.
+
+- Spence, Jonathan D. _The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci_. New York: Viking Penguin Publishers, Inc., 1984.
+
+  | Matteo Ricci is a sixteenth-century Jesuit missionary who journeyed to China with ancient Greek memory systems--to aid Chinese in learning the Bible.
+
+- Steinberg, S. H. _Five Hundred Years of Printing_. 3d ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975.
+
+  | See Steiner.
+
+- Steinen, W. von den. "Das mittelalterliche Latein als historisches Phaenomen." _Schweizer Zeitschrift für Geschichte_ 7 (1957): 1–27.
+
+- Steiner, George. _Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature , and the Inhuman_. New York: Atheneum, 1970.
+
+- ------. _After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation_. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
+
+  | "List Saint Jerome, Luther, Dryden, Hölderlin, Novalis, Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Ezra Pound, Valéry, MacKenna, Franz Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin, Quine--and you have very nearly the sum total of those who have said anything fundamental or new about translation. The range of theoretic ideas, as distinct from the wealth of pragmatic notation, remains very small..."-- _Babel_, p. 269. "Translation" presupposes two "languages": One of them, during the twelfth century, was always Latin. The majority of the population was ignorant of Latin, incapable of translating, but whoever learned Latin became a member of the European community (Grundmann, _Litteratus_). Literature translated from provençal into German was first turned into Latin, then into Mittelhochdeutsch (Pörkesen). During the twelfth century, new "languages" (that is, languages besides Hebrew, Greek, and Latin) move onto the horizon from several directions (Bischoff). German, for instance, "created" during the ninth and tenth centuries (see Borst) like Provençal, Catalan, and Italian, acquired the status of language.
+
+  | Franciscans, during the first half of the thirteenth century, began to prepare missionaries for Islamic countries (Altaner, Manzaneres). Arabic was discovered as a language equivalent to Latin and Greek (Bossong). Finally, pilgrimage and crusade gave rise to the first guidebooks on elementary "language instructions." On the attempt to translate German customs in legal Latin, see Heck. On the Middle High German poet as "reteller," rather than translator, see Lofmark.
+
+- Stock, Brian. _The Implications of Literacy. Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries_. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
+
+- Strauss, Leo. _Persecution and the Art of Writing_. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959.
+
+- Talbot, C. H. "The Universities and the Medieval Library." In _The English Library before 1700_, ed. Francis Wormald and C. E. Wright, 76–79. London: The Athlone Press, 1958.
+
+  | Suggests that Friars were the force behind making books smaller, since they needed to travel, and were also expected to be well read.
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- Taylor, Archer. _Selected Writings on Proverbs_. Ed. Wolfgang Mieder. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1975.
+
+  | See Ohly.
+
+- Taylor, C. H., ed. _Anniversary Essays in Medieval History_. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929.
+
+  | See especially Chapter One, "Libraries in the Twelfth Century: Their Catalogs and Contents."
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- Thompson, James Westfall. _The Literacy of the Laity in the Middle Ages_. University of California Publications in Education. Volume 9\. New York: Burt Franklin, 1960.
+
+  | See Grundmann.
+
+- Thomson, R. M. "The Library of Bury St. Edmunds in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries." _Speculum_ 47 (1972): 617–45.
+
+  | This library was built up--through gifts and purchases and by copying in the _scriptorium_--by one abbot, Anselm, between 1121 and 1148. By the end of the twelfth century, Bury contained bibles and liturgical books, texts of the main Church Fathers, pagan Latin classics, histories (Bede, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle), twelfth-century scholastic textbooks in divinity and law, and some "modern" Latin literature, such as the poems of Walter of Châtillon.
+
+  | See Daly.
+
+- _Typus und Individualitaet im Mittelalter_. Report on a Conference About Middle-High German Literature. Munich: Fink, 1983.
+
+  | See Morris.
+
+- Väänänen, Eva. _Le Latin vulgaire des Inscriptions Pompeiiennes_. Berlin: Auflage, 1966.
+
+- Vale, Malcolm Graham Allen. _Piety, Charity and Literacy Among the Yorkshire Gentry 1370–1480_. Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, Borthwick Papers number 50. York: St. Anthony's Press, 1976.
+
+- Veyne, Paul. _Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes? Essai sur l'imagination constituante_. Paris: Du Sueil, 1983.
+
+  | The author maintains that even today historians mainly tell not what is true, but what is interesting, or what they succeed in making sound so. Classical historians do not quote their sources, because they are convinced that they themselves constitute one. In a source, what happened and what could not but have happened fuse (p. 21) in the _Word_ of the author. The author constitutes a mirror. He can neither lie nor be wrong.
+
+- Vinogradoff, Paul. "Customary Law." In _Legacy of the Middle Ages_, ed. C. G. Crump, 287–319. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927.
+
+  | Men's conduct is regulated by two forces: by their habits of mind and by compulsion from outside authority--"laws" require generally a measure of support from the union and habit of people... Charlemagne and other rulers were powerless so far as systematic legislation was concerned, although they left many traces in the form of particular institutions. Again in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, writers on law explained that they had to deal mainly with customs and not with rules established by express legislation and embodied in an official code.
+
+  | Medieval judges had to a great extent to discover the customary views and arrangements prevailing among the people; it became necessary to ascertain the nature and details of customs by applying for information to representatives or experts belonging to the community where the custom was in use. Judges settled disputes and rulers issued statutes in accordance with professional training, but their operations had to conform in one way or another to the customs of the folk.
+
+  | See Watkins.
+
+- Vollrath, Hanna. "Gesetzgebung und Schriftlichkeit: Das Beispiel der angelsächsische Gesetze." _Historisches Jahrbuch_ 99 (1979): 8–54.
+
+- Wang, Ching-Hsien. _Bell and Drum: A Study of Shi-Ching as Formulaic Language_. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. Analysis of the formulaic content of pre-Confucian lyrical poetry.
+
+- Watkins, Calvert. "Studies in Indo-European Legal Language, Institutions and Mythology." _Indo-European and Indo-Europeans: Papers Presented at the Third Indo-European Conference at the University of Pennsylvania, 1966_. Ninth Publication in the Haney Foundation Series. Ed. by George Cardona, et al., 321–45. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968.
+
+  | Legal texts are often among the earliest documents preserved. Their conservatism has been long recognized. However, the implications of this for the study of oral traditions has hardly been realized. Nuggets of "epic" formulation about customs are often carried unchanged through successive textual reformulation. Vinogradoff, long ago, pointed out that human conduct is regulated by two forces: habits and authority. In oral societies, habits can no more be separated from their perception as custom, than the rule they imply can be separated from the onetime concrete statement about it. A legislator like Charlemagne was powerless to shape behavior through statutes, even if he could leave some traces on particular institutions.
+
+  | Even during what we here call the period of "intensive alphabetization"--during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries--writers on law explained that they had to deal mainly with customs. Judges settled disputes according to the law, but the reality conformed to nondescribable folk custom. During the twelfth century, folk customs were increasingly mis-represented as local "law" that was nonwritten. On the difference between unwritten law and custom, see Braybrooke and Diamond. Codification not only misread the nature of custom: retroactively, it "disembedded" the law.
+
+  | Berman says, "There was a time prior to the late eleventh century when the peoples of Western Europe were not conscious of any clear distinction between legal institutions and other institutions of social coherence." The jurist is he who imputes this distinction to them: Schiller deals with this distinction in Roman law. The legal historian Michaud points out that the legal, written creation of an institution that results from a sworn pact among citizens (the corporation) of the twelfth century representsa significant step beyond the concept of a "moral person" present in the text of Ulpian quoted in Gratian's _Decretum_.
+
+  | Classen is a source of valuable contributions on the impact of writing on the law of the Middle Ages.
+
+- Wattenbach, Wilhelm. _Das Schriftwesen im Mittelalter_. Leipzig: Auflage, 1896.
+
+  | After four generations, this is still the reference manual for medieval script, as Bresslau and Redlich are on charters, and the much more recent Bischoff (1979) is on paleography.
+
+- Weinerich, H. "Typen der Gedaechtnismetaphorik." _Archiv fuer Begriffsgeschichte_ (1964): 106–19.
+
+  | Focuses on two key metaphors: The storage room and the Wax Tablet.
+
+  | See Curtius.
+
+- Weissberger, L. "Ist Muttersprache eine germanische oder eine romantische Wortpraegung," _PBB_ 62 (1938): 428–37.
+
+- Whitman, Cedric M. _Homer and the Homeric Tradition_. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.
+
+  | "Geometrie" structure of the _Iliad_.
+
+- Wolf, Ferdinand. _Über die Lais, Sequenzen und Leiche. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rythmischen Formen und Singweisen des Volksliedes und volksmassigen Kirchen und Kunstlieder im Mittelalter_. Original 1841. Reprinted Osnabruck: Zeller, 1965.
+
+- Wright, Roger. "Speaking, Reading and Writing Late Latin and Early Romance." _Neophilologus_ 60, no. 17 (1976): 178–89.
+
+- Yates, Francis. _The Art of Memory_. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.
+
+  | The principal text on Ancient Mnemo-technical devices.
+
+- Zwettler, Michael J. _The Oral Tradition of Classical Arabic Poetry_. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1977.
diff --git a/contents/book/abc/es.bib b/contents/book/abc/es.bib
index 51999ea..55252b7 100644
--- a/contents/book/abc/es.bib
+++ b/contents/book/abc/es.bib
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-@ARTICLE{Illich-abc-es,
-  author = {: Ivan Illich, Barrie Sanders},
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-abc-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich and Barrie Sanders},
   title = {ABC - La alfabetización de la Mente Popular},
-  year = {abc/},
-  date = {1969},
-  origdate = {1969},
+  year = {1985},
+  date = {1985},
+  origdate = {1985},
   language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
   translator = {},
-  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/abc:index}
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/abc:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
 }
diff --git a/contents/book/abc/es.md b/contents/book/abc/es.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4ef507
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/abc/es.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+  title: "ABC - La alfabetización de la Mente Popular"
+  author: "Ivan Illich; Barrie Sanders"
+  date: "1985"
+  lang: ""
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+  titlepage: true
+---
diff --git a/contents/book/abc/index b/contents/book/abc/index
index f778841..576e2e8 100644
--- a/contents/book/abc/index
+++ b/contents/book/abc/index
@@ -1,9 +1,6 @@
 * **#@LANG_textfull@#:** [[.:text|Online]]
 * **#@LANG_titleorig@#:** _ABC - The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind_
-* **#@LANG_publicationdate@#:** 1969
-* ** #@LANG_authors@#**: Ivan Illich, Barrie Sanders
+* **#@LANG_publicationdate@#:** 1985
+* **#@LANG_authors@#**: Ivan Illich; Barrie Sanders
 * **#@LANG_comments@#:**
 * **#@LANG_langorig@#:** #@LANG_lang_en@#
-
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diff --git a/contents/book/abc/tags b/contents/book/abc/tags
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0f07e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/abc/tags
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+compilation
diff --git a/contents/book/awareness/en.bib b/contents/book/awareness/en.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c385a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/awareness/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-awareness-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Celebration of Awareness},
+  year = {1969},
+  date = {1969},
+  origdate = {1969},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/awareness:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/awareness/en.md b/contents/book/awareness/en.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f25c5d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/awareness/en.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1007 @@
+---
+  title: "Celebration of Awareness"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1969"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
+
+# Introduction
+
+There is no need for an introduction of the following papers or of their author. If, nevertheless, Dr. Illich has honored me by the invitation to write such an introduction, and if I gladly accepted, the reason in both our minds seems to be that this introduction offers an occasion that permits clarifying the nature of a common attitude and faith, in spite of the fact that some of our views differ considerably. Even the author's own views today are not always the same as those he held at the time he wrote these papers, on different occasions, over the course of the years. But he has remained true to himself in the very core of his approach and it is this core that we share.
+
+It is not easy to find the proper word to describe this core. How can a fundamental approach to life be caught in a concept without distorting and twisting it? Yet since we need to communicate with words, the most adequate —or rather, the least inadequate—term seems to be "humanist radicalism."
+
+What is meant by radicalism? What does humanist radicalism imply?
+
+By radicalism I do not refer primarily to a certain set of ideas, but rather to an attitude, to an "approach," as it were. To begin with this approach can be characterized by the motto: de omnibus dubitandum; everything must be doubted, particularly the ideological concepts which are virtually shared by everybody and have consequently assumed the role of indubitable common-sensical axioms.
+
+To "doubt" in this sense does not imply a psychological state of inability to arrive at decisions or convictions, as is the case in obsessional doubt, but the readiness and capacity for critical questioning of all assumptions and institutions which have become idols under the name of common sense, logic, and what is supposed to be "natural." This radical questioning is possible only if one does not take the concepts of one's own society or even of an entire historical period—like Western culture since the Renaissance—for granted, and furthermore if one enlarges the scope of one's awareness and penetrates into the unconscious aspects of one's thinking. Radical doubt is an act of uncovering and discovering; it is the dawning of the awareness that the Emperor is naked, and that his splendid garments are nothing but the product of one's phantasy.
+
+Radical doubt means to question; it does not necessarily mean to negate. It is easy to negate by simply positing the opposite of what exists; radical doubt is dialectical inasmuch as it comprehends the process of the unfolding of oppositions and aims at a new synthesis which negates and affirms.
+
+Radical doubt is a process; a process of liberation from idolatrous thinking; a widening of awareness, of imaginative, creative vision of our possibilities and options. The radical approach does not occur in a vacuum. It does not start from nothing, but it starts from the roots, and the root, as Marx once said, is man. But to say "the root is man" is not meant in a positivistic, descriptive sense. When we speak of man we speak of him not as a thing but as a process; we speak of his potential for developing all his powers; those for greater intensity of being, greater harmony, greater love, greater awareness. We also speak of man with a potential to be corrupted, of his power to act being transformed into the passion for power over others, of his love of life degenerating into the passion to destroy life.
+
+Humanistic radicalism is radical questioning guided by insight into the dynamics of man's nature; and by concern for man's growth and full unfolding. In contrast to contemporary positivistic thinking it is not "objective," if objectivity means theorizing without a passionately held aim which impels and nourishes the process of thinking. But it is exceedingly objective if it means that every step in the process of thinking is based on critically sifted evidence, and furthermore if it takes a critical attitude toward common-sensical premises. All this means that humanist radicalism questions every idea and every institution from the standpoint of whether it helps or hinders man's capacity for greater aliveness and joy. This is not the place to give lengthy examples for the kind of common-sensical premises that are questioned by humanist radicalism. It is not necessary to do so either, since Dr. Illich's papers deal precisely with such examples as the usefulness of compulsive schooling, or of the present function of priests. Many more could be added, some of which are implied in the author's papers. I want to mention only a few like the modern concept of "progress," which means the principle of ever-increasing production, consumption, timesaving, maximal efficiency and profit, and calculability of all economic activities without regard to their effect on the quality of living and the unfolding of man; or the dogma that increasing consumption makes man happy, that the management of large-scale enterprises must necessarily be bureaucratic and alienated; that the aim of life is having (and using), not being; that reason resides in the intellect and is split from the affective life; that the newer is always better than the older; that radicalism is the negation of tradition; that the opposite of "law and order" is lack of structure. In short, that the ideas and categories that have arisen during the development of modern science and industrialism are superior to those of all former cultures and indispensable for the progress of the human race.
+
+Humanistic radicalism questions all these premises and is not afraid of arriving at ideas and solutions that may sound absurd. I see the great value in the writings of Dr. Illich precisely in the fact that they represent humanistic radicalism in its fullest and most imaginative aspect. The author is a man of rare courage, great aliveness, extraordinary erudition and brilliance, and fertile imaginativeness, whose whole thinking is based on his concern for man's unfolding—physically, spiritually, and intellectually. The importance of his thoughts in this as well as his other writings lies in the fact that they have a liberating effect on the mind by showing entirely new possibilities; they make the reader more alive because they open the door that leads out of the prison of routinized, sterile, preconceived notions. By the creative shock they communicate —except to those who react only with anger at so much nonsense—they help to stimulate energy and hope for a new beginning.
+
+Erich Fromm
+
+# Foreword
+
+Each chapter in this volume records an effort of mine to question the nature of some certainty. Each therefore deals with deception—the deception embodied in one of our institutions. Institutions create certainties, and taken seriously, certainties deaden the heart and shackle the imagination. It is always my hope that my statements, angry or passionate, artful or innocent, will also provoke a smile, and thus a new freedom—even though the freedom comes at a cost.
+
+Shortly after original publication most of these papers became notorious. This was not accident. Each essay was written in a different language, addressed to a different group of believers, meant to hit home at a particular crisis of confidence. Each rubbed some well-established bureaucrats the wrong way, at the moment the latter were finding it difficult to rationalize a "business as usual" position.
+
+These pieces were, therefore, literally written for the moment. The passage of time since some of them appeared has qualified an occasional detail: statistics, or the situation discussed—even my own attitude—may have altered since, in some manner or degree. But I have purposely not, in the journalistic phrase, "updated" the articles for presentation in this book form. They constitute a point of view on a phenomenon of a time, and should stand thus. Their compilation has also inevitably resulted in some repetitive statements of fact and some
+
+duplications of expressions. These too I leave as stated, for emphasis and for the record—though I would have avoided them had I thought originally that one day I would gather my occasional writings under one cover.
+
+Ivan D. Illich
+
+Cuernavaca, Morelos Mexico 1970
+
+# A call to celebration
+
+This "call to celebration" was a manifesto jointly enunciated by and reflecting the mood of a group of friends in 1967, among them Robert Fox and Robert Theobald. It was written at the time of the March on the Pentagon. This call to face facts, rather than deal in illusions—to live change, rather than rely on engineering-is an attempt to re-introduce the word "celebration into ordinary English.
+
+I and many others known and unknown to me call upon you
+
+— to celebrate our joint power to provide all human beings with the food, clothing, and shelter they need to delight in living;
+
+— to discover, together with us, what we must do to use mankind's power to create the humanity, the dignity, and the joyfulness of each one of us;
+
+— to be responsibly aware of your personal ability to express your true feelings and to gather us together in their expression.
+
+We can only live these changes: we cannot think our way to humanity. Every one of us, and every group with which we live and work, must become the model of the era which we desire to create. The many models which will develop should give each one of us an environment in which we can celebrate our potential—and discover the way into a more humane world.
+
+We are challenged to break the obsolete social and economic systems which divide our world between the overprivileged and the underprivileged. All of us, whether governmental leader or protester, businessman or worker, professor or student share a common guilt. We have failed to discover how the necessary changes in our ideals and our social structures can be made. Each of us, therefore, through our ineffectiveness and our lack of responsible awareness, causes the suffering around the world.
+
+All of us are crippled—some physically, some mentally, some emotionally. We must therefore strive cooperatively to create the new world. There is no time left for destruction, for hatred, for anger. We must build, in hope and joy and celebration. Let us meet the new era of abundance with self-chosen work and freedom to follow the drum of one's own heart. Let us recognize that a striving for self-realization, for poetry and play, is basic to man once his needs for food, clothing, and shelter have been met—that we will choose those areas of activity which will contribute to our own development and will be meaningful to our society.
+
+But we must also recognize that our thrust toward self-realization is profoundly hampered by outmoded, industrial age structures. We are presently constrained and driven by the impact of man's ever growing powers. Our existing systems force us to develop and accept any weaponry system which may be technologically possible; our present systems force us to develop and accept any improvement in machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies which will increase production and lower costs; our present systems force us to develop and accept advertising and consumer seduction.
+
+In order to persuade the citizen that he controls his destiny, that morality informs decisions, and that technology is the servant rather than the driving force, it is necessary today to distort information. The ideal of informing the public has given way to trying to convince the public that forced actions are actually desirable actions.
+
+Miscalculations in these increasingly complex rationalizations and consequent scandal, account for the increasing preoccupation with the honesty of both private and public decision makers. It is therefore tempting to attack those holding roles such as national leader, administrator, manager, executive, labor leader, professor, student, parent. But such attacks on individuals often disguise the real nature of the crisis we confront: the demonic nature of present systems which force man to consent to his own deepening self-destruction.
+
+We can escape from these dehumanizing systems. The way ahead will be found by those who are unwilling to be constrained by the apparently all-deterrnining forces and structures of the industrial age. Our freedom and power are determined by our willingness to accept responsibility for the future.
+
+Indeed the future has already broken into the present. We each live in many times. The present of one is the past of another, and the future of yet another. We are called to live, knowing and showing that the future exists and that each one of us can call it in, when we are willing, to redress the balance of the past.
+
+In the future we must end the use of coercive power and authority: the ability to demand action on the basis of one's hierarchical position. If any one phrase can sum up the nature of the new era, it is the end of privilege and license.
+
+We must abandon our attempt to solve our problems through shifting power balances or attempting to create more efficient bureaucratic machines.
+
+We call you to join man's race to maturity, to work with us in inventing the future. We believe that a human adventure is just beginning: that mankind has so far been restricted in developing its innovative and creative powers because it was overwhelmed by toil. Now we are free to be as human as we will.
+
+The celebration of man's humanity through joining together in the healing expression of one's relationships with others, and one's growing acceptance of one's own nature and needs, will clearly create major confrontations with existing values and systems. The expanding dignity of each man and each human relationship must necessarily challenge existing systems.
+
+The call is to live the future. Let us join together joyfully to celebrate our awareness that we can make our life today the shape of tomorrow's future.
+
+
+# Violence a mirror for americans
+
+The compulsion to do good is an innate American trait. Only North Americans seem to believe that they always should, may, and actually can choose somebody with whom to share their blessings. Ultimately this attitude leads to bombing people into the acceptance of gifts.
+
+In early 19681 tried with insistence to make some of my friends understand this image of the American overseas. I was speaking mainly to resisters engaged in organizing the march on the Pentagon. I wanted to share with them a profound fear: the fear that the end of the war in Vietnam would permit hawks and doves to unite in a destructive war on poverty in the Third World.
+
+The qualified failure of the war on poverty, with its fruits of urban riots, has begun to open the eyes of Americans to the reasons for the failure of the Alliance for Progress, with its fruits of threatened rebellion. Both are related to the failure to win the hearts and minds of the people of Asia by an outpouring of money and human lives that Americans perceive as an expression of heroic generosity, in the defense of South Vietnam. Failure in Harlem, Guatemala, and Vietnam has a common root. All three have miscarried because the United States gospel of massive material achievement lacks credibility for the world's overwhelming majorities. I believe that insight into the meaning of United States good will as perceived by Latin Americans or Asians would enable Americans to perceive the meaning of the problem of their own slums; it could even lead to the perception of a new and more effective policy.
+
+I have had the opportunity to observe this growing awareness of a common root of failure in my contacts with students at Cuernavaca. There, at the Center of Inter-cultural Documentation, for the past two years we have offered a sequence of workshops to compare the experience of poverty in capital-rich and capital-starved societies. We have witnessed the initial shock in many Americans dedicated to the war against poverty, when they observed and studied Latin America and realized for the first time that there is a link between minority marginality at home and mass marginatum overseas. Their emotional reaction is usually more acute than the intellectual insight that produces it. We have seen more than one man lose his balance as he suddenly lost the faith that for him had previously supported that balance, the faith that says: "The American way is the solution for all." For any good man, whether he is a social worker in Watts or a missioner on his way to Bolivia, it means pain and panic to realize that he is seen by 90 per cent of mankind as the exploiting outsider who shores up his privilege by promoting a delusive belief in the ideals of democracy, equal opportunity, and free enterprise among people who haven't a remote possibility of profiting from them.
+
+At this stage of the war in Vietnam the violent symptoms are too horrible to permit a lucid analysis of the causes that produce them. It is therefore more important to focus United States attention on the other two programs, the war on poverty and the Alliance for Progress: one, a war conducted by social workers; the other, an alliance that has maintained or swept into power military regimes in two-thirds of the Latin American countries. Both originated in the name of good will; both are now seen as pacification programs; both are pregnant with violence.
+
+The war on poverty aims at the integration of the so-called underprivileged minorities of the United States into the mainstream of the American way of life; the Alliance for Progress aims at the integration of the so-called underdeveloped countries of Latin America into the community of industrialized nations. Both programs were designed to have the poor join in the American dream. Both programs failed. The poor refused to dream on command. The order to dream and the money they got only made them rambunctious. Huge funds were appropriated to start the United States minorities and the Latin American majorities on the way of integration into a United States-style middle class: the world of college attendance, universal consumer credit, the world of household appliances and insurance, the world of church and movie attendance. An army of generous volunteers swarmed through New York ghettos and Latin American jungle canyons, pushing the persuasion that makes America tick.
+
+The frustrated social worker and the former Peace Corps volunteer are now among the few who explain to mainline America that the poor are right in rejecting forced conversion to the American gospel. Only seven years after the majority missionary enterprise of the Alliance was launched, riot squads at home, military governments in Latin America, and the army in Vietnam keep asking for more funds. But now it can be seen that the money is needed not for the uplift of the poor, but to protect the frail beachhead into the middle class that has been gained by the few converts who have benefited here or there by the American way of life.
+
+Comparison of these three theaters of United States missionary effort and war will help bring home a truism: the American society of achievers and consumers, with its two-party system and its universal schooling, perhaps befits those who have got it, but certainly not the rest of the world. A 15 per cent minority at home who earn less than $3,000 a year, and an 80 per cent majority abroad who earn less than $300 a year are prone to react with violence to the schemes by which they are fitted into coexistence with affluence. This is the moment to bring home to the people of the United States the fact that the way of life they have chosen is not viable enough to be shared. Eight years ago I told the late Bishop Manuel Larrain, the president of the Conference of Latin American Bishops, that I was prepared if necessary to dedicate my efforts to stop the coming of missionaries to Latin America. His answer still rings in my ears: "They may be useless to us in Latin America, but they are the only North Americans whom we will have the opportunity to educate. We owe them that much."
+
+At this moment, when neither the allure of money nor the power of persuasion nor control through weapons can efface the prospect of violence, during the summer in the slums and throughout the year in Guatemala, Bolivia, or Venezuela, we can analyze the analogies in the reactions to United States policy in the three main theaters of its defensive war: the war by which it defends its quasi-religious persuasion in Watts, Latin America, and Vietnam. Fundamentally this is the same war fought on three fronts; it is the war to "preserve the values of the West." Its origin and expression are associated with generous motives and a high ideal to provide a richer life for all men. But as the threatening implications of that ideal begin to emerge, the enterprise grinds down to one compelling purpose: to protect the style of life and the style of death that affluence makes possible for a very few; and since that style cannot be protected without being expanded, the affluent declare it obligatory for all. "That they may have more" begins to be seen in its real perspective: "That I may not have less."
+
+In all three theaters of war the same strategies are used: money, troopers, teachers. But money can benefit only a few in the ghettos, and a few in Latin America, and a few in Vietnam; and the consequent concentration of imported benefits on a few requires their ever tighter protection against the many. For the majority of marginal people, the economic growth of their surroundings means rising levels of frustration. On all three frontiers of affluence, therefore, the gun becomes important to protect the achiever. Police reinforcements go hand in hand with bands of armed citizens in the United States. In Guatemala the recently murdered military attache of the United States had just admitted that the American Embassy had to assist in arming right-wing goon squads because they are more efficient in maintaining order (and certainly more cruel) than the army.
+
+Next to money and guns, the United States idealist turns up in every theater of the war; the teacher, the volunteer, the missioner, the community organizer, the economic developer. Such men define their role as service. Actually they frequently wind up numbing the damage done by money and weapons, or seducing the "underdeveloped" to the benefits of the world of affluence and achievement. They especially are the ones for whom "ingratitude" is the bitter reward. They are the personifications of Good Old Charlie Brown: "How can you lose when you are so sincere?"
+
+I submit that, if present trends continue, from now on the violence in Harlem, in Latin America, in Asia, will increasingly be directed against the foreign and native "persuasion pusher" of this kind. Increasingly the "poor" will slam the door in the face of salesmen for the United States system of politics, education, and economics as an answer to their needs. This rejection goes hand in hand with a growing loss of faith in his own tenets on the part of the salesman of United States social consensus. Disaffection, helplessness, and the response of anger at the United States have undermined the thrust of the formerly guileless enthusiast of the American way and American methods.
+
+I submit that foreign gods (ideals, idols, ideologies, persuasions, values) are more offensive to the "poor" than the military or economic power of the foreigner. It is more irritating to feel seduced to the consumption of overpriced sugar-water called Coca-Cola than to submit helplessly to doing the same job an American does, only at half the pay. It angers a person more to hear a priest preach cleanliness, thrift, resistance to socialism, or obedience to unjust authority, than to accept military rule. If I read present trends correctiy, and I am confident I do, during the next few years violence will break out mostly against symbols of foreign ideas and the attempt to sell these. And I fear that this violence, which is fundamentally a healthy though angry and turbulent rejection of alienating symbols, will be exploited and will harden into hatred and crime. The recent violence in Detroit, Washington, and Cincinnati after the murder of Martin Luther King shows how the impatience of the ghetto dwellers in the United States can erupt into violence and vandalism at the slightest spark.
+
+Violence, therefore, covers a broad spectrum of experience: from the explosion of frustrated vitality to the fanatical rejection of alienating idols. It is important to stress this distinction. But as United States thinkers are horrified by the heartless slaughter in Vietnam, and fascinated by the inability of a white majority to suppress the life of a people, it is not easy to keep the distinction clear. The emotional involvement of the average United States student with Vietnam and the ghettos is so deep, it is almost taboo to call his attention to the distinction. For this reason we must welcome any educational effort that allows United States students to perceive reactions to the United States way of life in the third theater of the war against poverty: Latin America.
+
+In the mirror of Latin America, violence in American ghettos and on the borders of China can be seen in its new meaning, as a rejection of American values. From experience of years in Cuernavaca, dealing with United States "idea salesmen," I know this insight is costly to come by. There is no exit from a way of life built on $5,000-plus per year, and there is no possible road leading into this way of life for nine out of ten men in our generation and the next. And for the nine it is revolting to hear a message of economic and social salvation presented by the affluent that, however sincerely expressed, leads the "poor" to believe that it is their fault that they do not fit into God's world as it should be and as it has been decreed that it should be around the North Atlantic.
+
+It is not the American way of life lived by a handful of millions that sickens the billions, but rather the growing awareness that those who live the American way will not tire until the superiority of their quasi-religious persuasion is accepted by the underdogs. Living violence always breaks out against the demand that a man submit to idols. Planned violence is then promoted as justified by the need to reduce a man or a people to the service of the idol they threaten to reject. Francisco Juliao, the peasant leader from Northeast Brazil who now lives in exile in Cuernavaca, recently made a statement that clarifies these principles. "Never," he said, "but never put weapons into the hands of the people. Whosoever puts weapons into the hands of the people destroys. Weapons put into the hands of the people will always be used against them. Weapons always defeat the poor who receive them. Only the brick and the stick a man picks up in anger will not defile him as a man."
+
+In this light it is important for the North American citizen to learn from the insight gained these years by Latin American thinkers. Let him look at Colombia where there are bandits who kill for gain, and soldiers and guerrilleros who kill each other for the sake of discipline or in the service of a flag, and there is the angry man who kills in a mob that erupts in riot; and finally there is the witness, like Camilo Torres, who purposefully withdraws to the mountains to demonstrate his ability to survive in the face of an oppressive regime and thus wants to prove its illegitimacy. Soldier and bandit can organize; riots can be incited and their frustrated vitality can go stale or be channeled with deadly rationality into the service of some "ideal." Testimony will always remain a lonely task that ends up on a hill like Calvary. True testimony of profound nonconformity arouses the fiercest violence against it, but I do not see how such witness could ever be organized or institutionalized.
+
+The study of violence in Latin America deeply touches the life of the United States observer, but—for a moment still—allows him to stay disengaged. It is always easier to see the illusions in one's neighbor's eyes than the delusions in one's own. A critical examination of the effect that intense social change has on the intimacy of the human heart in Latin America is a fruitful way to insight into the intimacy of the human heart in the United States. In the capital-starved economies of Latin America, a great majority live excluded, now and forever, from the benefits of a thriving United States-style elite middle class. In the immensely rich economy of the United States, a small minority clamors that, in the same way, it is excluded from the mass of the middle class. The comparison should enable the United States observer to understand the world-wide growth of two societies, separate and unequal, and to appreciate the dynamics that provoke violence between them.
+
+# Not foreigners yet foreign
+
+From 1951 to 1956 I lived as a priest in Incarnation Parish on the West Side of New York's Manhattan. Puerto Ricans were then being crowded into the walk-ups between Amsterdam Avenue and Broadway. They were displacing many families who had moved a generation earlier straight from Ireland to this area. I became involved in the inevitable conflict between these peoples and also in the controversy about its meaning.
+
+As a newcomer to the United States I was surprised to see how New Yorkers, from druggist to mayor, fell back upon ready stereotypes to guide their policy decisions. Whatever was worth understanding about Puerto Ricans, they apparently felt, could be explained in old categorical terms coined for preceding groups of immigrants. That which had served for the Poles or Italians should fit the Puerto Ricans.
+
+At that time I tried to obtain recognition of the fact that, at least for the Roman Catholic Church, the Puerto Rican immigration represented a phenomenon without precedent. Amazingly, I found an inquisitive listener to my opinion in Cardinal Spellman.
+
+After the introduction of the quota system in 1924, it seemed that the melting process in New York City was finally about to catch up with the number of people tossed into the pot. Then in the late forties, the city was presented with a novel challenge, an invasion of American-born "foreigners," the Puerto Ricans. In Vito Marcantonio's heyday (1943) there were less than thirty-five thousand Puerto Ricans in New York; at present (1956) there are more than half a million, and indications are that the migration has not yet reached its peak.
+
+These Puerto Ricans are not foreigners, and yet they are more foreign than most of the immigrants who preceded them. About this seeming paradox the well-meaning should be well-informed, since to be received kindly merely because one is a foreigner is a cold kind of condescension: the chances are that the man who thus receives you is determined never really to know you.
+
+If on the one hand a man consistently designates you a foreigner, he usually precludes any possibility of appreciating that which is unique to your group—besides the fact that it is not his own. If on the other hand, misunderstanding St. Paul's instruction to make himself Jew with the Jews and Greek with the Greeks, he approaches you with an exegesis such as "We are all Americans," he denies your right, and his, to a heritage, to be human, with roots reaching back in history.
+
+This fallacy is at the bottom of the attitude of many well-meaning people toward the Puerto Rican immigrants: let them do what the Irish or Italians did, or let them attempt what the Jews attempted; let them grow gradually through their own national parishes, territorial ghettos, and political machines to full "Americanization"; let them vociferously assert that they are as good Americans as the man next door. These attitudes are very common in New York, where the arrival of successive migratory waves is taken for granted. It is too often gratuitously assumed that the future novel about the Puerto Rican journey will be fashioned after either The Last Hurrah or Marjorie Morningstar, or will be a combination of both.
+
+The welfare investigator who says to Jose Rivera, "My parents went through the same experience," neither lies nor expresses xenophobia—he just misunderstands, like the politician who tries again to use methods which worked when Italian was spoken in Harlem.
+
+When the Irish and the Germans came here a century ago, New York City was faced with a challenge of a kind never experienced before and of a size never to be duplicated. In 1855 one-third of the city's population (500,000) consisted of immigrants who had arrived in the previous decade; against this proportion the one-fifteenth of the city's population which in 1955 consisted of recently arrived Puerto Ricans (again 500,000) seems insignificant.
+
+In the days of the heavy influx to America, wave after wave of immigrants arrived, settled, and became accustomed to new patterns of life. The newcomers spoke different languages, worshiped in different churches, came from different climates, wooed in different fashions, ate different dishes, sang different songs. But under these apparent differences they had much in common. They came from the Old Continent and arrived as refugees or settlers to become Americans and to stay for good. They brought their own clergy-rabbi, priest, or minister—and the symbols of past millennia which were their own, Saint Patrick, the Mafia, or Loretto, no less than the Turnverein. They settled in special sections of the city and kept to themselves for years before they ventured to take part in that experience new to all of diem: life in a pluralistic society. They fell into a common pattern, and it is no wonder that those who had been here long enough to consider themselves part of a settled stratum fell into the habit of assuming a priori that each new incoming group would be analogous to theirs. This assumption, in fact, proved to be true until after World War II, with the exception of two groups, the Orientals and the Southern Negroes.
+
+Then suddenly the Puerto Ricans arrived en masse. New York had never before known such an invasion, an invasion of Americans who came from an older part of the New World into New York, which by the way had been part of the diocese of San Juan long before Henry Hudson discovered Manhattan. And New York had never had to deal with born American citizens who in their schools had learned English as a foreign language.
+
+These strange Americans were sons of a Catholic country where for centuries slaves had found refuge, where the population of a little over two million is overwhelmingly white but where a difference in the shade of the skin is no impediment, either to success or to marriage. Yet theirs was the first sizable group coming from overseas into New York to be tagged by many as "colored," much less because of the racial heredity of some than for the vaguely sensed great difference between them and former new arrivals.
+
+This was a new type of immigrant: not a European who had left home for good and strove to become an American, but an American citizen, who could come here for the time between one harvest and another and return home for vacation with a week's salary spent on an air coach ticket. This was not the fugitive from racial or religious persecution in his own country, but the child of "natives" in a Spanish colony or perhaps the descendant of a Spanish official in the colonial service; not a man accustomed to be led by men of his own stock—priest, politician, rebel, or professor—but for four hundred years a subject in a territory administered by foreigners, first Spanish, then American, only recently come into its own.
+
+The new arrival from Puerto Rico was not the Christian in his own right who received the Faith from the sons of his own neighbors, but the fruit of missionary labor typical of the Spanish Empire. He was a Catholic, born of parents who were also Catholics, yet he received the Sacraments from a foreigner because the government was afraid that to train native priests might be to train political rebels.
+
+Even the physical configuration of the world from which he came was different. He was a man from an island where nature is provident and a friend, where field labor means much more harvesting than planting. When nature rebels every few decades, he is powerless; in the hurricanes he cannot but see the finger of God.
+
+Until recently nobody in Puerto Rico built a house with the idea that it should survive the elements or withstand the climate by air conditioning. What a difference from the Pole and the Sicilian, both of whom built houses to withstand nature, climate, and time, both of whom built houses to separate their lives from that of nature. One might have come from the Russian steppe or the ghetto and the other from an olive grove on the coast, but both knew what winter meant; they knew that a house was there to protect them from the cold, a place within which to make a home. It was easy for the Pole and the Sicilian to settle in tenements and to live confined there. But the new immigrant from the tropics knew no winter, and the home he left was a hut in which you slept but around which you lived with your family. The hut was the center of his day's activities, not their limit. To come to a tenement, to need heat, to need glass in your windows, to be frowned on for tending to live beyond your doors—this was all contrary to the Puerto Rican's traditional habits, and as surprising to him as it is for the New Yorker to realize that for any immigrants these basic assumptions of his life should be surprising.
+
+The new Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico of 1956, is studded with concrete houses and opens a new factory every day. It is a proving ground for the most advanced forms of community organizations, and it has the fastest-declining rate for illiteracy and the fastest-falling mortality in the world. Yet these facts must not make us think that the traditional outlook of its people has changed or will change tomorrow. These material improvements are the outcome of the first decade of Munoz Marin's administration, but they do not wipe out the Island's past nor are they intended to make of San Juan a suburb of New York.
+
+The differences between the Puerto Rican migration and the influx of Europeans are fundamental. Indeed, in the shortness of its history Puerto Rico is more foreign to Europe than to America. These differences account for much of the distinctive behavior characteristics of Puerto Ricans in New York, and the lack of knowledge of these differences accounts for many misunderstandings on the part of old New Yorkers.
+
+Many a Puerto Rican does not leave the Island with a clear plan of settling on the mainland. How can a man who leaves on the spur of the moment, planning to make a fast dollar in New York and be back as soon as he has enough to buy a store, take roots in New York? I remember one woman who was in despair because her husband had disappeared on his way to the cane fields, carrying his machete. She thought, of course, that a rival had grabbed him from her. And then, after a week, she got a money order from Chicago. On the way to the cane field he had run into a hiring gang and decided to try his luck—and that was the reason he neglected to come home for dinner. In a case like this, in which a man "drops in" on New York, with no intentions of staying but of eventually commuting "home," how can the transient have the same effect on his neighborhood in New York as the old immigrant who came to stay? Yet the statistical curve of emigration from the Island is in exact correlation with the curve of employment on the mainland. If employment is scarce, the reflux increases correspondingly. Many, even after years in New York, feel they got stuck there because of money.
+
+With the arrival of hundreds of thousands from Puerto Rico and the other Central American states (it is estimated that more than one-fourth of New York's Spanish-American population is not Puerto Rican), not only a new language but a new pattern of living has been added to the city. Instead of the strangers speaking only a foreign tongue who formerly arrived exhausted from the long journey, American citizens, all of whom know some basic English, arrive in airplanes within six hours of leaving their tropical island.
+
+The old immigrants settled in national neighborhoods; the new transatlantic commuter spreads out all over the city; ten years after the beginning of the Puerto Rican mass influx Spanish has already become ubiquitous in New York. Unlike European immigrants, all Puerto Ri-cans know some English, and this helped, but there is another factor that has contributed to Latin Americans spreading to all quarters of the city. In former times when a neighborhood became a center for the newest immigrant group, it was either a slum or tended to become one. And once a neighborhood had deteriorated it hardly ever was redeemed. The great immigration from Puerto Rico started after World War II, due to such factors as cheap air transportation, acquaintance with the mainland acquired by many during service in the army, rising education under the new political order on the island, and, last but not least, the growing pressure of a population which has more than doubled since the beginning of the century. At that same time the city was embarking on its great slum clearance program and the first blocks to be torn down were almost invariably those where the newest and poorest immigrant had just settled. As a result, the Puerto Ricans began to be resettled all around town in new projects and on a non-discriminatory basis.
+
+Considering this dispersal and the tendency to commute to the Island, it is no wonder that there are hardly any Puerto Rican national neighborhoods in the traditional sense in New York. One result is that it is difficult for Puerto Ricans to develop local grass-roots leadership within their own group; either their concentration per city block is too thin, or the intention to stick to the neighborhood is absent, or the necessity to organize in association with their own is weak because all are citizens who at least understand some English and have official "protection" from the Commonwealth government labor office-the first instance of something like a "Consulate for American Nationals." And there is no doubt that another factor contributing to the relative lack of leadership is caused by hundreds of years of colonial administration.
+
+Thus Puerto Ricans in New York find it more difficult than groups which came before them to form their own in-group leadership, if they do not find it completely impossible. This fact gives them a very real advantage over former migrations in one sense, because it almost forces them into an active participation in the established community. On the other hand, the sudden challenge of having to participate in a settled New York community proves too arduous for many who might have been able to become leaders in their own cliques.
+
+A lack of consideration on the part of New York civic leaders for the distinctive character of this new Puerto Rican migration, as compared to previous immigrant experiences, can do real damage to the community by either retarding or injuring the new pattern of assimilation which will have to form. If this lack of understanding should be present in the leaders of the Catholic Church, it can seriously damage souls.
+
+One-third of the baptized Catholics in Manhattan and the lower Bronx are Spanish-Americans at this moment. The Puerto Ricans are the first group of Catholics with a distinctly non-European tradition of Catholicism to come to the East Coast. The lack of native priests, due to the colonial and imperialistic atmosphere of more than four hundred years of the Island's history, and also the special approaches due to missionary conditions, have profoundly molded the behavior of Puerto Ricans as Catholics.
+
+Notwithstanding the very recent trend toward rapid urbanization, the majority of Puerto Ricans are dispersed over the steep hills of the interior, living in huts in the midst of small clearings among bananas and flamboyants, with magnificent views, but too far from church to attend Mass every Sunday. Traditionally, they take the Sacraments on those rare occasions when the priest comes to visit them in the chapel in their barrio—but for generations they have had to baptize their own children because the priest came so seldom. Under such circumstances regular attendance at Sunday Mass is not a confirmed element of Catholic practice. Living habits of the tropics, feudal-colonial social organization, and the confluence of Indian, African, and European cultures played their part. The Church's law declaring a marriage between two Catholics valid even when not entered into before a priest, if a priest could not be available in less than a month, made people forget the need for a priest. It had an adverse effect on the frequency of marriages in church, and still has today.
+
+"Bad habits" like these are not a sign of lack of Catholic spirit, but rather the effects of a peculiar ecclesiastical history. Many United States Catholics are used to a wide variety of national customs in national parishes and a great difference in practices among various ethnic groups; when faced with the lack of "practice" of their faith by Puerto Ricans, they might be tempted to identify them with some other foreign group in whom the effects of a different background show up in similar behavior, or might even deny altogether that Puerto Ricans are Catholic. But for anybody who has ever breathed the atmosphere of the Island there is no doubt that theirs is a Catholic folk-culture: children who might never make their First Communion will regularly ask their parents' blessing before leaving the house; people who might never have been taught the catechism will devotedly invoke the names of Our Lord or the Virgin and plaster their homes with holy pictures and sign themselves with the Cross before leaving home. Even the fact that a man refuses to get married in church sometimes testifies for rather than against his Catholicity; he does not want to bind himself forever by a Church marriage.
+
+In Puerto Rico God's house extends from the church into the plaza. Not only do the processions or posedas require the out-of-doors as a continuation of the church, but also the church is often too small, and throngs attend Mass by looking through doors and windows. Unless his neighbor on the mainland understands the different meaning "family," "church," or "home" has for a man from the tropics, he will not understand why Jose plays the guitar on his doorstep, or why Maria walks from statue to statue during Mass for a little chat with the saints or perhaps enters church only after service, because she is repelled by the formality of the ushers.
+
+All of this points toward the need the Puerto Ricans have to win some respect for their background. What they need is not more help but less categorization according to previous schemes, and more understanding. Only thus will they be able to make the unique cultural, political, and economic contribution for which they seem destined: Spanish-Christian tradition, a Catholicism in which is taken for granted an eminently Christian attitude toward the mixing of races, a freshness and simplicity of outlook proper to the tropics, a new pattern of political freedom in association with the United States, a bridge between the hemispheres politically and culturally no less than economically—these are only a few of the assets that the mass migration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland can contribute to New York and the United States.
+
+
+# The eloquence of silence
+
+Five years on the streets of New York made me aware of the need for some method of bringing native New Yorkers to friendship with Puerto Ricans. Minister, teachers, social workers, all were submerged in a Spanish-speaking crowd. They needed to learn the language, but even more they needed to attune their ears and open their hearts to the anguish of a people who were lonely, frightened, and powerless.
+
+Quite evidently the mere study of Spanish was not enough. The man who can construct sentences with words and grammar may be much further from reality than he who knows that he does not speak a language. I saw how intensely Puerto Ricans rejected the Americano who studied them for the purpose of "integrating them" in the city. They even refused to answer in Spanish, because behind his benevolence they sensed the condescension, and often the contempt. A program was needed to help native New Yorkers to enter into the spirit of poverty.
+
+In 1956 I became Vice Rector of the Catholic University of Puerto Rico and this gave me a chance to prepare people for work in the Spanish ghettos. We offered workshops combining the very intensive study of spoken Spanish with field experience and with the academic study of Puerto Rican poetry, history, songs, and social reality. Many of my students came at great personal sacrifice. More than half were priests, mostly below the age of thirty-five. They had decided to spend their lives among the poor in the inner city. It is now difficult to remember how the Catholic clergy then felt about its duty. It was hard to convince an Irish-American pastor to permit his curate to spend his time on people who never came to church. The Spanish language was a potent tool for curates who wanted to use their time and the resources of the Church for work among the poor. Because—presumably—the Spanish language identified those poor who were born Catholics, and to whom the Church under no circumstances could deny an equal share of its ministry. When seven years later the war on poverty broke out, a substantial number of recognized leaders and critics were these men who had met each other in Puerto Rico. With this group of students I could explore the deeper meaning involved in the learning of a foreign language. In fact, I believe that properly conducted language learning is one of the few occasions in which an adult can go through a deep experience of poverty, of weakness, and of dependence on the good will of another. Every evening we gathered for an hour of silent prayer. At the beginning of the hour one of us would offer points for meditation. The following is one of the sessions recorded by a participant.
+
+The science of linguistics has brought into view new horizons in the understanding of human communications. An objective study of the ways in which meanings are transmitted has shown that much more is relayed from one man to another through and in silence than in words. Words and sentences are composed of silences more meaningful than the sounds. The pregnant pauses between sounds and utterances become luminous points in an incredible void: as electrons in the atom, as planets in the solar system. Language is as a cord of silence with sounds the knots-as nodes in a Peruvian quipu, in which the empty spaces speak. With Confucius we can see language as a wheel. The spokes centralize, but the empty spaces make the wheel.
+
+It is thus not so much the other man's words as his silences which we have to learn in order to understand him. It is not so much our sounds which give meaning, but it is through the pauses that we will make ourselves understood. The learning of a language is more the learning of its silences than of its sounds. Only the Christian believes in the Word as coeternal Silence. Among men in time, rhythm is a law through which our conversation becomes a yang-yin of silence and sound.
+
+To learn a language in a human and mature way, therefore, is to accept the responsibility for its silences and for its sounds. The gift a people gives us in teaching us their language is more a gift of the rhythm, the mode, and the subtleties of its system of silences than of its system of sounds. It is an intimate gift for which we are accountable to the people who have entrusted us with their tongue. A language of which I know only the words and not the pauses is a continuous offense. It is as the caricature of a photographic negative.
+
+It takes more time and effort and delicacy to learn the silence of a people than to learn its sounds. Some people have a special gift for this. Perhaps this explains why some missioners, notwithstanding their efforts, never come to speak properly, to communicate delicately through silences. Although they "speak with the accent of natives" they remain forever thousands of miles away. The learning of the grammar of silence is an art much more difficult to learn than the grammar of sounds.
+
+As words must be learned by listening and by painful attempts at imitation of a native speaker, so silences must be acquired through a delicate openness to them. Silence has its pauses and hesitations, its rhythms and expressions and inflections; its durations and pitches, and times to be and not to be. Just as with our words, there is an analogy between our silence with men and with God. To learn the full meaning of one, we must practice and deepen the other.
+
+First among the classification of silences is the silence of the pure listener, of womanly passivity; the silence through which the message of the other becomes "he in us," the silence of deep interest. It is threatened by another silence—the silence of indifference, the silence of disinterest which assumes that there is nothing I want or can receive through the communication of the other. This is the ominous silence of the wife who woodenly listens to her husband relating the little things he so earnestly wants to tell her. It is the silence of the Christian who reads the gospel with the attitude that he knows it backward and forward. It is the silence of the stone—dead because it is unrelated to life. It is the silence of the missioner who never understood the miracle of a foreigner whose listening is a greater testimony of love than that of another who speaks. The man who shows us that he knows the rhythm of our silence is much closer to us than one who thinks that he knows how to speak.
+
+The greater the distance between the two worlds, the more this silence of interest is a sign of love. It is easy for most Americans to listen to chitchat about football; but it is a sign of love for a Midwesterner to listen to the jai alai reports. The silence of the city priest on a bus listening to the report of the sickness of a goat is a gift, truly the fruit of a missionary form of long training in patience.
+
+There is no greater distance than that between a man in prayer and God. Only when this distance dawns on consciousness can the grateful silence of patient readiness develop. This must have been the silence of the Virgin before the Ave which enabled her to become the eternal model of openness to the Word. Through her deep silence the Word could take Flesh.
+
+In the prayer of silent listening, and nowhere else, can the Christian acquire the habit of this first silence from which the Word can be born in a foreign culture. This Word conceived in silence is grown in silence too.
+
+A second great class in the grammar of silence is the silence of the Virgin after she conceived the Word—the silence from which not so much the Fiat as the Magnificat was born. It is the silence which nourishes the Word conceived rather than opening man to conception. It is the silence which closes man in on himself to allow him to prepare the Word for others. It is the silence of syntony; the silence in which we await the proper moment for the Word to be born into the world.
+
+This silence too is threatened, not only by hurry and by desecration of multiplicity of action, but by the habit of verbal confection and mass production which has no time for it. It is threatened by the silence of cheapness which means that one word is as good as another and that words need no nursing.
+
+The missioner, or foreigner, who uses words as they are in the dictionary does not know this silence. He is the man who looks up English words in himself when he wants to find a Spanish equivalent, rather than seeking the word which would syntonize; rather than finding the word or gesture or silence which would be understood, even if it has no equivalent in his own language or culture or background; the man who does not give the seed of a new language time to grow on the foreign soil of his soul. This is a silence before words, or between them; the silence within which words live or die. It is the silence of the slow prayer of hesitation; of prayer in which words have the courage to swim in a sea of silence. It is diametrically opposed to other forms of silence before words —the silence of the artificial flower which serves as a remembrance of words which do not grow, the pause in between repetition. It is the silence of the missioner who waits for the dispensation of the next memorized platitude because he has not made the effort to penetrate into the living language of others. The silence before words is also opposed to the silence of brewing aggression which can hardly be called silence—this too an interval used for the preparation of words, but words which divide rather than bring together. This is the silence to which the missioner is tempted who clings to the idea that in Spanish nothing means what he wants to say. It is the silence in which one verbal aggression — even though veiled — prepares the other.
+
+The next great class in the grammar of silence we will call the silence beyond words. The farther we go, the farther apart does good and bad silence grow in each classification. We now have reached the silence which does not prepare any further talk. It is the silence which has said everything because there is nothing more to say. This is the silence beyond a final yes or a final no. This is the silence of love beyond words, as well as the silence of no, forever; the silence of heaven or of hell. It is the definite attitude of a man who faces the Word which is Silence, or the silence of a man who has obstinately turned away from Him.
+
+Hell is this silence, deadly silence. Death in this silence is neither the deadness of a stone, indifferent to life, nor the deadness of a pressed flower, memory of life. It is the death after life, a final refusal to live. There can be noise and agitation and many words in this silence. It has only one meaning which is common to the noises it makes and the gaps between them. No.
+
+There is a way in which this silence of hell threatens missionary existence. In fact with the unusual possibilities of witnessing through silence, unusual ability to destroy through it are open to the man charged with the Word in a world not his own. Missionary silence risks more: it risks becoming a hell on earth.
+
+Ultimately missionary silence is a gift, a gift of prayer —learned in prayer by one infinitely distant, infinitely foreign and experienced in love for men, much more distant and foreign ever than men at home. The missioner can come to forget that his silence is a gift, a gift in its deepest sense gratuitously given, a gift concretely transmitted to us by those who are willing to teach us their language. If the missioner forgets this and attempts to conquer by his own power that which only others can bestow, then his existence begins to be threatened. The man who tries to buy the language like a suit, the man who tries to conquer the language through grammar so as to speak it "better than the natives around here," the man who forgets the analogy of the silence of God and the silence of others and does not seek its growth in prayer, is a man who tries basically to rape the culture into which he is sent, and he must expect the corresponding reactions. If he is human at all he will realize that he is in a spiritual prison, but he will not admit that he has built it around himself; rather he will accuse others of being his jailers. The wall between himself and those to whom he was sent will become ever more impenetrable. As long as he sees himself as "missioner" he will know that he is frustrated, that he was sent but got nowhere; that he is away from home but has never landed anywhere; that he left his home and never reached another.
+
+He continues to preach and is ever more aware that he is not understood, because he says what he thinks and speaks in a foreign farce of his own language. He continues to "do things for people" and considers them ungrateful because they understand that he does these things to bolster his ego. His words become a mockery of language, an expression of the silence of death.
+
+It requires much courage at this point to return to the patient silence of interest or to the delicacy of the silence within which words grow. Out of numbness, muteness has grown. Often out of the fear of facing the difficulty late in life of trying again to learn a language, a habit of despair is born. The silence of hell—a typically missionary version of it has been born in his heart.
+
+At the pole opposed to despair there is the silence of love, the holding of hands of the lovers. The prayer in which the vagueness before words has given place to the pure emptiness after them. The form of communication which opens the simple depth of the soul. It comes in flashes and it can become a lifetime—in prayer just as much as with people. Perhaps it is the only truly universal aspect of language, the only means of communication which was not touched by the curse of Babel. Perhaps it is the one way of being together with others and with the Word in which we have no more foreign accent.
+
+There is still another silence beyond words, but the silence of the Pieta. It is not a silence of death but the silence of the mystery of death. It is not the silence of active acceptance of the will of God out of which the Fiat is born nor the silence of manly acceptance of Geth-semane in which obedience has its roots. The silence you as missioners seek to acquire in this Spanish course is the silence beyond bewilderment and questions; it is a silence beyond the possibility of an answer, or even reference to a word which preceded. It is the mysterious silence through which the Lord could descend into the silence of hell, the acceptance without frustration of a life, useless and wasted on Judas, a silence of freely willed powerless-ness through which the world was saved. Born to redeem the world, Mary's Son had died at the hands of His people, abandoned by His friends and betrayed by Judas whom He loved but could not save—silent contemplation of the culminating paradox of the Incarnation which was useless for the redemption of at least one personal friend. The opening of the soul to this ultimate silence of the Pieta is the culmination of the slow maturing of the three previous forms of missionary silence.
+
+# Seamy side of charity
+
+In 1960 Pope John XXIII enjoined all United States and Canadian religious superiors to send, within ten years, 10 per cent of their effective strength in priests and nuns to Latin America. This papal request was interpreted by most United States Catholics as a call to help modernize the Latin American Church along the lines of the North American model The continent on which half of all Catholics live had to be saved from "Castro-Communism."
+
+I was opposed to the execution of this order: I was convinced that it would do serious damage to those sent, to their clients, and to their sponsors back home. I had learned in Puerto Rico that there are only a few people who are not stunted, or wholly destroyed, by lifelong work "for the poor" in a foreign country. The transfer of United States living standards and expectations could only impede the revolutionary changes needed, and the use of the gospel in the service of capitalism or any other ideology was wrong. Finally 1 knew that while the United States needed much information about all aspects of Latin America, "missionaries" would only hamper its collection: the feedback from missionaries is notoriously bizarre. The projected crusade had to be stopped.
+
+With two friends, Miss Feodora Standoff and Brother Gerry Morris, I set up a center in Cuernavaca. (We chose this spot because of its climate, location, and logistics.) Upon the opening of our center I stated two of the purposes of our undertaking. The first was to help diminish the damage threatened by the papal order. Through our educational program for missionaries we intended to challenge them to face reality and themselves, and either refuse their assignments or-if they accepted-to be a little bit less unprepared. Secondly, we wanted to gather sufficient influence among the decision-making bodies of mission-sponsoring agencies to dissuade them from implementing the plan.
+
+Throughout the 1960s our experience and reputation in the intensive training of foreign professionals for assignment to South America, and the fact that we continued to be the only center specializing in this type of education, ensured a continuing flow of students through our center—notwithstanding our stated, basically subversive purposes.
+
+By 1966, instead of the 10 per cent called for in 1960, barely 0.7 per cent of United States and Canadian clergy had moved south. Among the educated groups within the United States Church serious doubts had arisen about the desirability of the entire enterprise. But among bishops and the great majority of uneducated Catholics the lachrymose feedback from Latin America and an intense public relations campaign conducted from Washington continued to raise enthusiasm for the "Help Save Latin America" cause. Under these circumstances public and intensive controversy had to be sponsored, and for that purpose I wrote the following article for the Jesuit magazine America in January 1967. It was deliberate timing: I knew that at the end of that month three thousand churchmen—Catholic and Protestant, from the United States and Latin America—would meet in Boston to give new impetus to their programs, and that Ramparts was about to publish its expose on Central Intelligence Agency help to student movements, especially in Latin America.
+
+Five years ago, United States Catholics undertook a peculiar alliance for the progress of the Latin American church. By 1970, 10 per cent of more than 225,000 priests, brothers, and sisters would volunteer to be shipped south of the border. In those five years the combined United States male and female "clergy" in South America has increased by only 1,622. Halfway is a good time to determine whether a program launched is still sailing on course, and more importantly, if its destination still seems worth while. Numerically, the program was certainly a flop. Should this fact be a source of disappointment or relief?
+
+The project relied on an impulse supported by uncritical imagination and sentimental judgment. A pointed finger and a "call for 20,000" convinced many that "Latin America needs You." Nobody dared state clearly why, though the first published propaganda included several references to the "Red danger" in four pages of text. The Latin America Bureau of the National Catholic Welfare Conference attached the word "papal" to the program, the volunteers, and the call itself.
+
+A campaign for more funds is now being proposed. This is the moment, therefore, at which the call for 20,000 persons and the need for millions of dollars should be re-examined. Both appeals must be submitted to a public debate among United States Catholics, from bishop to widow, since they are the ones asked to supply the personnel and pay the bill. Critical thinking must prevail. Fancy and colorful campaign slogans for another collection, with their appeal to emotion, will only cloud the real issues. Let us coldly examine the American Church's outburst of charitable frenzy which resulted in the creation of "papal" volunteers, student "mission crusades," the annual Catholic Inter-American Cooperation Program mass assemblies, numerous diocesan missions, and new religious communities.
+
+I will not focus on details. The above programs themselves continually study and revise minutiae. Rather I dare to point out some fundamental facts and implications of the so-called papal plan-part of the many-faceted effort to keep Latin America within the ideologies of the West. Church policy makers in the United States must face up to the sociopolitical consequences involved in their well-intentioned missionary ventures. They must review their vocation as Christian theologians and their actions as Western politicians.
+
+Men and money sent with missionary motivation carry a foreign Christian image, a foreign pastoral approach, and a foreign political message. They also bear the mark of North American capitalism of the 1950s. Why not, for once, consider the seamy side of charity; weigh the inevitable burdens foreign help imposes on the South American Church; taste the bitterness of the damage done by our sacrifices? If, for example, United States Catholics would simply turn from the dream of "10 per cent," and do some honest thinking about the implication of their help, the awakened awareness of intrinsic fallacies could lead to sober, meaningful generosity.
+
+But let me be more precise. The unquestionable joys of giving and the fruits of receiving should be treated as two distinctly separate chapters. I propose to delineate only the negative results that foreign money, men, and ideas produce in the South American Church, in order that the future United States program may be tailored accordingly.
+
+During the past five years, the cost of operating the Church in Latin America has multiplied many times. There is no precedent for a similar rate of increase in Church expenses on a continental scale. Today one Catholic university, mission society, or radio chain may cost more to operate than the whole country's Church a decade ago. Most of the funds for this kind of growth came from outside and flowed from two types of sources. The first is the Church itself, which raised its income in three ways:
+
+1\. Dollar by dollar, appealing to the generosity of the faithful, as was done in Germany and the Low Countries by Adveniat, Misereor, and Oostpriesterhulp. These contributions reach more than twenty-five million dollars a year.
+
+2\. Through lump sum contributions, made by individual churchmen-such as Cardinal Cushing, the outstanding example; or by institutions-such as the National Catholic Welfare Conference, transferring one million dollars from the home missions to the Latin America Bureau.
+
+3\. By assigning priests, religious and laymen, all trained at considerable cost and often backed financially in their apostolic undertakings.
+
+This kind of foreign generosity has enticed the Latin American Church into becoming a satellite to North Atlantic cultural phenomena and policy. Increased apostolic resources intensified the need for this continued flow and created islands of apostolic well-being, each day further beyond the capacity of local support. The Latin American Church flowers anew by returning to what the Conquest stamped her: a colonial plant that blooms because of foreign cultivation. Instead of learning how to get along with less money or else close up shop, bishops are being trapped into needing more money now and bequeathing an institution impossible to run in the future. Education, the one type of investment that could give long-range returns, is conceived mostly as training for bureaucrats who will maintain the existing apparatus.
+
+Recently I saw an example of this in a large group of Latin American priests who had been sent to Europe for advanced degrees. In order to relate the Church to the world, nine-tenths of these men were studying teaching methods—catechetics, pastoral theology, or canon law— and thereby not directly advancing their knowledge of either the Church or the world. Only a few studied the Church in its history and sources, or the world as it is.
+
+It is easy to come by big sums to build a new church in a jungle or a high school in a suburb, and then to staff the plants with new missioners. A patently irrelevant pastoral system is artificially and expensively sustained, while basic research for a new and vital one is considered an extravagant luxury. Scholarships for non-ecclesiastical humanist studies, seed money for imaginative pastoral experimentation, grants for documentation and research to make specific constructive criticism all run the frightening risk of threatening our temporal structures, clerical plants, and "good business" methods.
+
+Even more surprising than churchly generosity for churchly concern is a second source of money. A decade ago the Church was like an impoverished grande dame trying to keep up an imperial tradition of almsgiving from her reduced income. In the more than a century since Spain lost Latin America, the Church has steadily lost government grants, patrons' gifts, and, finally, the revenue from its former lands. According to the colonial concept of charity, the Church lost its power to help the poor. It came to be considered a historical relic, inevitably the ally of conservative politicians.
+
+By 1966 almost the contrary seems true—at least, at first sight. The Church has become an agent trusted to run programs aimed at social change. It is committed enough to produce some results. But when it is threatened by real change, it withdraws rather than permit social awareness to spread like wildfire. The smothering of the Brazilian radio schools by a high Church authority is a good example.
+
+Thus Church discipline assures the donor that his money does twice the job in the hands of a priest. It will not evaporate, nor will it be accepted for what it is: publicity for private enterprise and indoctrination to a way of life that the rich have chosen as suitable for the poor. The receiver inevitably gets the message: the "padre" stands on the side of W. R. Grace and Company, Esso, the Alliance for Progress, democratic government, the AFL-CIO, and whatever is holy in the Western pantheon.
+
+Opinion is divided, of course, on whether the Church went heavily into social projects because it could thus obtain funds "for the poor," or whether it went after the funds because it could thus contain Castroism and assure its institutional respectability. By becoming an "official" agency of one kind of progress, the Church ceases to speak for the underdog who is outside all agencies but who is an ever growing majority. By accepting the power to help, the Church necessarily must denounce a Camilo Torres, who symbolizes the power of renunciation.
+
+Money thus builds the Church a "pastoral" structure beyond its means and makes it a political power.
+
+Superficial emotional involvement obscures rational thinking about American international "assistance." Healthy guilt feelings are repressed by a strangely motivated desire to "help" in Vietnam. Finally, our generation begins to cut through the rhetoric of patriotic "loyalty." We stumblingly recognize the perversity of our power politics and the destructive direction of our warped efforts to impose unilaterally "our way of life" on all. We have not yet begun to face the seamy side of clerical manpower involvement and the Church's complicity in stifling universal awakening too revolutionary to lie quietly within the "Great Society."
+
+I know that there is no foreign priest or nun so shoddy in his work that through his stay in Latin America he has not enriched some life; and that there is no missioner so incompetent that through him Latin America has not made some small contribution to Europe and North America. But neither our admiration for conspicuous generosity, nor our fear of making bitter enemies out of lukewarm friends, must stop us from facing the facts. Missioners sent to Latin America can make (1) an alien Church more foreign, (2) an overstaffed Church priest-ridden, and (3) bishops into abject beggars. Recent public discord has shattered the unanimity of the national consensus on Vietnam. I hope that public awareness of the repressive and corruptive elements contained in "official" ecclesiastical assistance programs will give rise to a real sense of guilt: guilt for having wasted the lives of young men and women dedicated to the task of evangelization in Latin America.
+
+Massive, indiscriminate importation of clergy helps the ecclesiastical bureaucracy survive in its own colony, which every day becomes more foreign and comfortable. This immigration helps to transform the old-style hacienda of God (on which the people were only squatters) into the Lord's supermarket, with catechisms, liturgy, and other means of grace heavily in stock. It makes contented consumers out of vegetating peasants, demanding clients out of former devotees. It lines the sacred pockets, providing refuge for men who are frightened by secular responsibility.
+
+Churchgoers, accustomed to priests, novenas, books, and culture from Spain (quite possibly to Franco's picture in the rectory), now meet a new type of executive, administrative, and financial talent promoting a certain type of democracy as the Christian ideal. The people soon see that the Church is distant, alienated from them—an imported, specialized operation, financed from abroad, which speaks with a holy, because foreign, accent.
+
+This foreign transfusion—and the hope for more—gave ecclesiastical pusillanimity a new lease on life, another chance to make the archaic and colonial system work. If North America and Europe send enough priests to fill the vacant parishes, there is no need to consider laymen—unpaid for part-time work—to fulfill most evangelical tasks; no need to re-examine the structure of the parish, the function of the priest, the Sunday obligation and clerical sermon; no need to explore the use of the married diaconate, new forms of celebration of the Word and Eucharist, and intimate familial celebrations of conversion to the gospel in the milieu of the home. The promise of more clergy is like a bewitching siren. It makes the chronic surplus of clergy in Latin America invisible and it makes it impossible to diagnose this surplus as the gravest illness of the Church. Today, this pessimistic evaluation is slightly altered by a courageous and imaginative few—non-Latins among them—who see, study, and strive for true reform.
+
+A large proportion of Latin American Church personnel are presently employed in private institutions that serve the middle and upper classes and frequently produce highly respectable profits; this on a continent where there is a desperate need for teachers, nurses, and social workers in public institutions that serve the poor. A large part of the clergy are engaged in bureaucratic functions, usually related to peddling sacraments, sacramentals, and superstitious "blessings." Most of them live in squalor. The Church, unable to use its personnel in pastorally meaningful tasks, cannot even support its priests and the 670 bishops who govern them. Theology is used to justify this system, canon law to administer it, and foreign clergy to create a world-wide consensus on the necessity of its continuation.
+
+A healthy sense of values empties the seminaries and the ranks of the clergy much more effectively than does a lack of discipline and generosity. In fact, the new mood of well-being makes the ecclesiastical career more attractive to the self-seeker. Bishops turn servile beggars, become tempted to organize safaris, and hunt out foreign priests and funds for constructing such anomalies as minor seminaries. As long as such expeditions succeed, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to take the emotionally harder road: to ask ourselves honestly if we need such a game.
+
+Exporting Church employees to Latin America masks a universal and unconscious fear of a new Church. North and South American authorities, differently motivated but equally fearful, become accomplices in maintaining a clerical and irrelevant Church. Sacralizing employees and property, this Church becomes progressively more blind to the possibilities of sacralizing person and community.
+
+It is hard to help by refusing to give alms. I remember once having stopped food distribution from sacristies in an area where there was great hunger. I still feel the sting of an accusing voice saying: "Sleep well for the rest of your life with the death of dozens of children on your conscience." Even some doctors prefer aspirins to radical surgery. They feel no guilt having the patient die of cancer, but fear the risk of applying the knife. The courage needed today is that expressed by Daniel Berrigan, S.J., writing of Latin America: "I suggest we stop sending anyone or anything for three years and dig in and face our mistakes and find out how not to canonize them."
+
+From six years' experience in training hundreds of foreign missioners assigned to Latin America, I know that real volunteers increasingly want to face the truth that puts their faith to the test. Superiors who shift personnel by their administrative decisions but do not have to live with the ensuing deceptions are emotionally handicapped facing these realities.
+
+The United States Church must face the painful side of generosity: the burden that a life gratuitously offered imposes on the recipient. The men who go to Latin America must humbly accept the possibility that they are useless or even harmful, although they give all they have. They must accept the fact that a limping ecclesiastical assistance program uses them as palliatives to ease the pain of a cancerous structure, the only hope being that the prescription will give the organism enough time and rest to initiate a spontaneous healing. It is far more probable that the pharmacist's pill will both stop the patient from seeking a surgeon's advice and addict him to the drug.
+
+Foreign missioners increasingly realize that they heeded a call to plug the holes in a sinking ship because the officers did not dare launch the life rafts. Unless this is clearly seen, men who obediently offer the best years of then-lives will find themselves tricked into a useless struggle to keep a doomed liner afloat as it limps through uncharted seas.
+
+We must acknowledge that missioners can be pawns in a world ideological struggle and that it is blasphemous to use the gospel to prop up any social or political system. When men and money are sent into a society within the framework of a program, they bring ideas that live after them. It has been pointed out, in the case of the Peace Corps, that the cultural mutation catalyzed by a small foreign group might be more effective than all the immediate services it renders. The same can be true of the North American missioner—close to home, having great means at his disposal, frequently on a short-term assignment— who moves into an area of intense United States cultural and economic colonization. He is part of this sphere of influence and, at times, intrigue. Through the United States missioner, the United States shadows and colors the public image of the Church. The influx of United States missioners coincides with the Alliance for Progress, Camelot, and CIA projects and looks like a baptism of all three. The Alliance appears directed by Christian justice and is not seen for what it is: a deception designed to maintain the status quo, albeit variously motivated. During the program's first five years, the net capital leaving Latin America has tripled. The program is too small to permit even the achievement of a threshold of sustained growth. It is a bone thrown to the dog, that he remain quiet in the backyard of the Americas.
+
+Within these realities, the United States missioner tends to fulfill the traditional role of a colonial power's lackey chaplain. The dangers implicit in Church use of foreign money assume the proportion of caricature when this aid is administered by a "gringo" to keep the "underdeveloped" quiet. It is, of course, too much to ask of most Americans that they make sound, clear, and outspoken criticisms of United States sociopolitical aggression in Latin America, even more difficult that they do so without the bitterness of the expatriate or the opportunism of the turncoat.
+
+Groups of United States missioners cannot avoid projecting the image of "United States outposts." Only individual Americans mixed in with local men could avoid this distortion. The missioner of necessity is an "undercover" a sent—albeit unconscious—for United States so-cial and political consensus. But, consciously and purposely, he wishes to bring the values of his Church to South America; adaptation and selection seldom reach the level of questioning the values themselves.
+
+The situation was not so ambiguous ten years ago, when in good conscience mission societies were channels for the flow of traditional United States Church hardware to Latin America. Everything from the Roman collar to parochial schools, from United States catechisms to Catholic universities, was considered salable merchandise in the new Latin American market. Not much salesmanship was needed to convince the Latin bishops to give the "Made in U.S.A." label a try.
+
+In the meantime, however, the situation has changed considerably. The United States Church is shaking from the first findings of a scientific and massive self-evaluation. Not only methods and institutions, but also the ideologies that they imply, are subject to examination and attack. The self-confidence of the American ecclesiastical salesman is therefore shaky. We see the strange paradox of a man attempting to implant, in a really different culture, structures and programs that are now rejected in the country of their origin. (I recently heard of a Catholic grammar school being planned by United States personnel in a Central American city parish where there are already a dozen public schools.)
+
+There is an opposite danger, too. Latin America can no longer tolerate being a haven for United States liberals who cannot make their point at home, an outlet for apostles too "apostolic" to find their vocation as competent professionals within their own community. The hardware salesman threatens to dump second-rate imitations of parishes, schools, and catechisms—outmoded even in the United States-all around the continent. The traveling escapist threatens further to confuse a foreign world with his superficial protests, which are not viable even at home. The American Church of the Vietnam generation finds it difficult to engage in foreign aid without exporting either its solutions or its problems. Both are prohibitive luxuries for developing nations. Mexicans, to avoid offending the sender, pay high duties for useless or unasked-for gifts sent them by well-meaning American friends. Gift givers must think not of this moment and of this need, but in terms of a full generation of the future effects. Gift planners must ask if the global value of the gift in men, money, and ideas is worth the price the recipient will ultimately have to pay for it. As Father Berrigan suggests, the rich and powerful can decide not to give; the poor can hardly refuse to accept. Since almsgiving conditions the beggar's mind, the Latin American bishops are not entirely at fault in asking for misdirected and harmful foreign aid. A large measure of the blame lies with the underdeveloped ecclesiology of United States clerics who direct the "sale" of American good intentions.
+
+The United States Catholic wants to be involved in an ecclesiologically valid program, not in subsidiary political and social programs designed to influence the growth of developing nations according to anybody's social doctrine, be it even described as the Pope's. The heart of the discussion is therefore not how to send more men and money, but rather why they should be sent at all. The Church, in the meantime, is in no critical danger. We are tempted to shore up and salvage structures rather than question their purpose and truth. Hoping to glory in the works of our hands, we feel guilty, frustrated, and angry when part of the building starts to crumble. Instead of believing in the Church, we frantically attempt to construct it according to our own cloudy cultural image. We want to build community, relying on techniques, and are blind to the latent desire for unity that is striving to express itself among men. In fear, we plan our Church with statistics, rather than trustingly search for the living Church which is right among us.
+
+# The vanishing clergyman
+
+I drafted this paper in 1959 and published it, at the request of a friend, in The Critic of Chicago, in 1967.
+
+Great changes must take place in the structure of the Catholic Church if it is to survive. I believe that such changes will come about and, moreover, that they can now be visualized in terms consistent with the most radically traditional theology. Nevertheless, such changes would thoroughly upset the idea of the Catholic Church deeply imbedded in the imagination of Catholics and non-Catholics alike.
+
+One could have spoken about these changes in abstract terms. 1 preferred to illustrate my general thesis by indicating what, in my opinion, will happen to the "clergyman," to his status, his role, his self-image, his professional standing. 1 wanted to raise a question, clearly and simply. But I had further reasons for making my statement through a concrete example.
+
+For one, I did not want to say anything theologically new, daring, or controversial.
+
+Only a spelling-out of the social consequences would make a thesis as orthodox as mine sufficiently controversial to be discussed within the overwhelming conservative majority of the Church.
+
+A second reason for my decision to focus on the clergy was the attempt to render the discussion relevant to the "Catholic left." Suggestions for a reform of the Catholic priesthood abounded in these quarters in the mid-sixties. The majority of these suggestions seemed neither sufficiently revolutionary to be worth while {a married clergy, priests engaged in social action or revolution) nor sufficiently faithful to fundamental traditional positions—which I would not like to see compromised (such as the value of freely chosen celibacy, the episcopal structure of the Church, the permanence of priestly ordination).
+
+The Roman Church is the world’s largest non-governmental bureaucracy. It employs 1.8 million full-time workers—priests, brothers, sisters, and laymen. These employees work within a corporate structure which an American business consultant firm rates as among the most efficiently operated organizations in the world. The institutional Church functions on a par with the General Motors Company and the Chase Manhattan Bank. Recognition of this fact is accepted, sometimes, with pride. But to some, the machine-like smoothness itself seems to discredit the Church. Men suspect that it has lost its relevance to the gospel and to the world. Wavering, doubt, and confusion reign among its directors, functionaries, and employees. The giant begins to totter before it collapses.
+
+Some church personnel react to the breakdown with pain, anguish, and fright. Some make heroic efforts and tragic sacrifices to prevent it. Some, regretfully or joyfully, interpret the phenomenon as a sign of the disappearance of the Roman Church itself. I would like to suggest that we welcome the disappearance of institutional bureaucracy in a spirit of deep joy. In this essay, I shall describe some aspects of what is taking place in the Church, and suggest ways in which the Church could seek a radical reorganization in some of its structures. I am not recommending essential changes in the Church; even less do I suggest its dissolution. The complete disappearance of its visible structure would contradict sociological law and divine mandate. But change does entail much more than drastic amendment or updating reform if the Church is to respond to God’s call and contemporary man. I shall outline certain possible changes, solidly rooted in the origins of the Church, and boldly reaching out to the necessities of tomorrow’s society. Acceptance of this kind of reform will require the Church to live the evangelical poverty of Christ. At the same time, the Church, sensitive to the process of the world’s progressive socialization, will come to have a deep respect for, and joyful acceptance of, this phenomenon.
+
+The institutional Church is in trouble. The very persons on whose loyalty and obedience the efficiency structure depends increasingly abandon it. Until the early sixties, the “ defections ” were relatively rare. Now they are common. Tomorrow they may be the pattern. After a personal drama played out in the intimacy of conscience, more and more ecclesiastical employees will decide to sacrifice the emotional, spiritual, and financial security which the system benevolently provided for them. I suspect that within this generation these persons will have become a majority of the Church’s personnel.
+
+The problem lies not with the “spirit” of the world, nor with any failure in generosity among the “defectors,” but rather with the structure itself. This can be taken as an almost aprioristic conclusion, since the present structures developed as a response to past situations vastly different from our own. Further, our world continually accelerates its rapid changes of societal structures , in the context of which the Church must carry out its real functions. To see the situation more clearly, I shall focus my attention on the nature and function of ministry, the complex channel through which the Church touches the world. We can thus gain some insight into the Church of tomorrow.
+
+It seems evident that basic and accepted concepts of ministry in the Church are clearly inadequate. Quantitatively, for example , the Church really does not need the present number of full-time employees who work in its operational structure. More fundamentally, the situation suggests the need for a deep reappraisal of the elements which make up. the current idea of the priest as the Church’s basic representative in the world—a concept still maintained in the conciliar decrees. Specifically there is need for a re-examination of the relation between sacramental ministry and full-time personnel, between ministry and celibacy, and between ministry and theological education.
+
+Today it is assumed that most if not all of the Church’s ministerial operations must be carried out by full-time underpaid employees who possess a kind of theological education and who accept an ecclesiastical law of celibacy. In order to begin a search for new directions which are more evangelically and sociologically relevant, I shall discuss separately four aspects of the problem : the radical reduction in the number of persons dependent on the Church for their livelihood; the ordination to sacramental ministry of men independently employed in the world; the special and unique renunciation implied in perpetual celibacy ; the relation between sacramental ministry and theological education.
+
+## The clergy desire for more and need for less
+
+The Church’s personnel enjoy remarkable privileges. Every teenager who seeks employment among the clergy is almost automatically guaranteed a status which confers a variety of personal and social benefits, most of which come with advancing age, not because of competence or productivity. His rights to social and economic security are more far-reaching than plans for the guaranteed income.
+
+Ecclesiastical employees live in comfortable Church-owned housing, are assured preferential treatment in Church-owned and operated health services, are mostly trained in ecclesiastical educational institutions, and are buried in hallowed ground—after which they are prayed for. The habit or collar, not competent productivity, assures one’s status and living. An employment market, more diversified than any existing corporation, caters to the employee, discriminating against laymen who do not share his ritual initiation. Laymen who work in the ecclesiastical structure are recognized as possessing some few “civil rights,” but their careers depend principally on their ability to play the role of Uncle Toms.
+
+Recently the Roman Church has followed the example of some Protestant churches in shifting more of its employees from parish work to paper pushing. At the same time, the traditional demand for increased personnel at the parish level and the simultaneously burgeoning process of overinflated bureaucratic machinery masks the increasing irrelevance of both these aspects of the structure. Organizational explosion results in a feverish search for more personnel and money. We are urged to beg God to send more employees into the bureaucratic system and to inspire the faithful to pay the cost. Personally, I cannot ask God for these “benefits.” The inherently self-perpetuating expansion of Church personnel operates well enough without additional help, and only serves to make an already overstaffed Church more priest-ridden, thereby debilitating the Church’s mission in today’s world.
+
+The Vatican itself best illustrates the complex problem. Post-conciliar   administrative growth supersedes and supplants the old machinery. Since the end of the Council, the twelve venerable curial congregations have been increased by the addition of numerous intermeshing and overlapping post-conciliar organs—commissions, councils, consultative bodies, committees, assemblies , synods. This bureaucratic maze becomes ungovernable. Good. Perhaps this will help us to see that principles of corporate government are not applicable to the Body of Christ. It is even less appropriate to see His Vicar as the chief executive of a corporation than as a Byzantine king. Clerical technocracy is even further from the gospel than priestly aristocracy. And we may come to recognize that efficiency corrupts Christian testimony more subtly than power.
+
+At a time when even the Pentagon seeks to reduce its manpower pool by contracting specific jobs in the open market of industry and research, the Vatican launches a drive toward greater self-contained institutional diversification and proliferation . The central administration of this top-heavy organizational giant passes out of the hands of the “venerable congregations” staffed by Italian career priests into those of clerical specialists recruited from all over the world. The Pontifical Curia of the Middle Ages becomes a contemporary corporation’s planning and administrative headquarters.
+
+One of the paradoxical aspects of today’s structure is that the organization priest is also a member of the aristocracy of the only feudal power left in the Western world—a power whose sovereign status was recognized in the Lateran conventions. Further, this same power increasingly uses a diplomatic structure —one originally developed to represent the Church’s interests vis-à-vis other sovereign states—in order to offer services to the emerging international agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, UNESCO, and to the United Nations itself. This development demands more and more employees for a wider range of jobs, requiring even more specialized education for the recruits. The hierarchy, accustomed to absolute control over its employees, seeks to staff these positions with captive clergy. But the big push on more intensive recruitment runs head-on into a strong and contrary trend: yearly almost as many trained personnel leave as are recruited. Hence we see the reluctant acceptance of submissive and obedient laymen to fill the gap.
+
+Some individuals explain clerical “defections” as the elimination of undesirable elements. Others blame the various contemporary mystiques of the world. The institution instinctively attempts to explain this loss and the concomitant vocation “crisis” in terms flattering to itself. Then too one needs strong justification for the enthusiastic and emotional drives for more “ vocations .” Few wish to admit that the collapse of an overextended and disproportionate clerical framework is a clear sign of its irrelevance. Fewer see that the Pope himself would grow in evangelical stature and fidelity in proportion as his power to affect social issues in the world and his administrative command in the Church decline.
+
+Changes on the institutional periphery are as faithful to “Parkinson’s Law” as changes in Rome: work grows with available personnel. Since the end of the Council, attempts at collegial decentralization have resulted in a wildly uncontrolled growth of bureaucracy reaching to the local level. Latin America offers a grotesque example. A generation ago Latin American bishops traveled to Rome about every ten years to report to the Pope. Their only other contacts with Rome were the stylized petitions for indulgences of dispensations, channeled through the Nuncio, and occasional Curial Visitators. Today a complex Roman Commission for Latin America coordinates subcommissions of European and American bishops in the power balance with the Latin American Bishops’ Assembly. This is organized in a board ( Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano ) and numerous commissions , secretariats, institutes, and delegations. CELAM itself is the crown of sixteen national bishops’ conferences, some of which are even more complex in bureaucratic organization. The entire structure is designed to facilitate occasional consultations among bishops, in order that, returning to their dioceses, they might act with greater independence and originality. The real results are rather different. The bishops develop the bureaucratic mentality necessary to keep up with the merry-go-round character of the increasingly frequent meetings. The newly created organisms absorb large numbers of trained grass-roots personnel into clerical staff and planning services. Restrictive and unimaginative central control replaces creative and fresh approaches in the local churches.
+
+In the entire Church a clergy survives partly because priestly service at the altar is united with clerical power and privilege. This union helps to maintain the existing structure. Church-employed priests assure a personnel supply to fill places in the corporate structure. Priest-clerics assure the continuance and abundance of career-minded churchmen. The ordination of self-supporting laymen to sacramental functions would eventually destroy the bureaucracy. But men whose mentality and security have been formed and maintained by the system instinctively fear the ordination of persons who remain in secular employment. The diocesan chancellor, the Catholic Charities director, and the pastor feel as much threatened by declericalization as the Catholic university president, the supplier of ecclesiastical finery and furnishings, and such civic leaders as Saul Alinsky. In different ways all are supported by, or depend upon, the power and prestige of the clergy. Nevertheless, the ordination of secularly employed men may be one of the Church’s great advances.
+
+Today, some clerics begin to see that they are smothered in a scandalous and unnecessary security combined with restrictive and unacceptable controls. A priest, well-trained in theology, is assured life-long support, but it may be as an accountant, and not as a theologian, if he has been caught reading certain “ suspect ” foreign authors. Conversely, a Latin American bishop may send a priest for sociological studies in Europe and then decide to create a diocesan department of research to use the new talent he has acquired.
+
+Some priests are dissatisfied with their work, either because their freedom to do a good job is curtailed, or because they feel unprepared for the specific task assigned them. In the first instance , better job descriptions are proposed as a remedy; in the second, better education for the jobholder. Both solutions are no more than misguided palliatives. The question must be asked: Should not this job be dropped from Church control, and the cleric either fired or challenged to compete for it—under secular control and conditions? Of course if we continue the present system , we are still stuck with our problem: the dissatisfied cleric.
+
+Therefore the next five years will see a proliferation of retraining programs for the clergy. The outmoded product of novitiate and seminary needs different skills and attitudes to fit into the “new” Church: a multiplying growth of specialized commissions , bureaus, and secretariats. But it’s going to be a problem, selling the programs. The men themselves are beginning to say: Perhaps I need training to move into the secular world, to support myself as other men in society, to act as an adult in the world.
+
+Dioceses and religious congregations increasingly use business consultants, whose criteria of success are taken from the American Management Association, and whose premise is that the present structure must be maintained. The resulting clergy in-service training is essentially repressive, ideologically biased, and directed toward efficient Church growth. Present ecclesiastical training improves a man’s ability to operate a more complex machine. A retreat only serves to confirm a man’s per sonal commitment to the structure. An adult formation concept is needed, one which would lead men to search for the right questions. Is this structure rooted in routine or revelations? Should I, a man totally at the service of the Church, stay in the structure in order to subvert it, or leave in order to live the model of the future? The Church needs men seeking this kind of conscious and critical awareness—men deeply faithful to the Church, living a life of insecurity and risk, free from hierarchical control, working for the eventual “disestablishment” of the Church from within. The very few such groups in existence today are branded as disloyal and dangerous by the clerical mentality.
+
+A good example of such subversive education is provided by the Sister Formation Movement in the United States. This movement acts as a major factor working toward the secularization of the American Church from within. In the mid-fifties, a group of sisters set up a lobby to pressure for advanced professional education of religious. When this had been achieved, and the brothers and sisters returned to their communities with Ph.D.s, they were competent to apply for academic jobs anywhere. They no longer had to rely on preferential treatment traditionally accorded in Church institutions to religious, irrespective of their talent or professional training.
+
+Many of these trained persons become conscious of ridiculous restrictions imposed upon them and their institutions by the clerical mind and ecclesiastical control. Some saw themselves facing the necessity of leaving their communities in order to live a meaningful and relevant career. Others chose to work for the liberation of their institutions from repressive and destructive Church control. The former were branded as defectors and the latter as subversives. Finally, religious congregations began to allow their members to seek temporary or permanent employment of their own choice in the open market, while remaining members of the community. This will lead to the persons themselves choosing their companions, places of residence, and form of community living.
+
+Many superiors of religious women have recently begun to understand the signs of the times. Suddenly they see the possibility that the era of religious congregations might be over. Bishops are not yet aware that an analogous movement is at work among the clergy. But this movement is weaker and less sophisticated , because of the retarded nature of the American clergy. For several generations they have been pampered into unquestioning submission by their middle-class comfort and security.
+
+Today some priests believe that they might be better ministers if they worked at secular jobs that entail real social and economic responsibility. A priest-artist, for example, questions the bishop’s right to employ him as a scribe, or to suspend him if he seeks real work in Greenwich Village. These trends produce a double effect among the clergy. The committed man is moved to renounce his clerical privileges, thereby risking suspension, and the mediocre man is moved to clamor for more fringe benefits and less adult responsibility, thereby settling down more comfortably in his clerical security.
+
+Seeing the evangelical and social contradictions in the bureaucracy , some courageously face the possible alternatives. I know many who desire full-time jobs in poverty programs, as community organizers, teachers, researchers, professional men. They desire to earn their livings and live as celibate laymen, while exercising their ministerial functions on a part-time basis in the service of the faithful, and under the bishop’s authority. They ask if the system is sensitive enough to the real society to evolve a new form of radical and personal declericalization which would entail neither suspension from orders nor dispensation from celibacy.
+
+Of course, such radical secularization threatens the existing parochial system. It would encourage the imaginative and generous to strike out on their own and thereby leave the clerical and outdated ecclesiastical structure in the hands of those who choose security and routine. It would frighten both bureaucratic bishops and rebellious DuBays. The bishops desire more clerics, but reject any demands for employee privileges, especially the notion of unionized power. The attitudes of both the bishops and the DuBays necessarily imply the furtherance of the clerical system.
+
+Men in secular society sometimes recognize a real hypocrisy in this system. Groups founded for social protest and revolutionary action find the clergy suspect. The former, when they act, freely risk their careers for a cause to which their conscience impels them. The priest or nun who suddenly becomes aware that a real world exists and belatedly joins such actions risks a gentle reprimand at most Usually the more enlightened superior is quite pleased and happy with his “courageous” subject. It is much cheaper to permit a few naïve protesters, rather than face the frightening price of Christian institutional testimony to society.
+
+To begin the task of giving this testimony, may we pray for an increase of priests who choose “radical” secularization? For priests who leave the Church in order to pioneer the church of the future? For priests who, faithfully dedicated to and loving the Church, risk misunderstanding and suspension? For priests, full of hope, capable of such actions without becoming hard and embittered? For extraordinary priests, willing to live today the ordinary life of tomorrow’s priest?
+
+## The shape of the future ministry
+
+An adult layman, ordained to the ministry, will preside over the “normal” Christian community of the future. The ministry will be an exercise of leisure rather than a job. The “diaconia” will supplant the parish as the fundamental institutional unit in the church. The periodic meeting of friends will replace the Sunday assembly of strangers. A self-supporting dentist, factory worker, professor, rather than a church-employed scribe or functionary , will preside over the meeting. The minister will be a man mature in Christian wisdom through his lifelong participation in an intimate liturgy, rather than a seminary graduate formed professionally through “theological” formulae. Marriage and the education of growing children, rather than the acceptance of celibacy as a legal condition for ordination, will confer responsible leadership on him.
+
+I foresee the face-to-face meeting of families around a table, rather than the impersonal attendance of a crowd around an altar. Celebration will sanctify the dining room, rather than consecrated buildings the ceremony. This does not mean that all churches will be converted into theaters or real estate white elephants. For example, the Bishop of Cuernavaca believes that Latin American tradition requires the existence of the cathedral church as a kind of testimony in stone, whose beauty and majesty reflect the splendor of Christian truth.
+
+Present pastoral structures have been largely determined by ten centuries of a clerical and celibate priesthood. In 1964 the Council took a suggestive step toward changing this pattern when it approved a married diaconate. The decree is ambiguous, since it could lead to a proliferation of second-rate clergy without making any significant change in present structures. But it can also lead to the ordination of adult, self-supporting men. The danger would be in developing a clerical church-supported diaconate, thereby delaying the necessary and inevitable secularization of the ministry.
+
+The “ordinary” future priest, earning his living outside the church, will preside over a weekly meeting of a dozen deacons in his house. Together they will read the Scripture, then study and comment upon the bishop’s weekly instruction. After the meeting, when it includes Mass, each deacon will take the Sacrament to his own home, where he will keep it with his crucifix and Bible. The priest will visit his various “diaconias” and preside at their occasional Mass. At times a number of the “diaconias” will meet for a more solemn Mass in a rented hall or in a cathedral.
+
+Freed of present executive and administrative duties, both the bishop and his priests will have time for occasional celebrations . The bishop will be able to prepare and circulate his weekly selection from the Fathers and the outline for discussion. He and his priests will together prepare the home liturgy for the “diaconias.” These changes will require a different attitude toward weekly Mass obligation as well as a re-evaluation of present ritual practices of penance.
+
+Present canon law provides for the ordination of those whose lifelong livelihood has been guaranteed by the Church, and of those whose own estate is sufficient to support them. To restrict ordination to this kind of economic independence seems anomalous , if not revolting, in today’s society. Today, a man supports himself by working at a job in the world, not by performing a role in a hierarchy. It is certainly not contrary to the purposes of canon law to consider professional ability or earned social security as sufficient sign of independence for ordination.
+
+The sacramental ministry of ordained laymen will open our eyes to a completely new understanding of the traditional “ opposition ” between pastor and layman in the Church. As we move beyond both these concepts, we shall clearly see their transitory character. The Council, summarizing a historical development of the last hundred years, attempted to define the clerical priest and the unordained layman in two separate documents . But the future will achieve, from the apparent antithesis, a new synthesis which transcends present categories.
+
+The current ecclesiastical imagination is still inadequate for defining this new function—the lay priest, Sunday priest, part-time or secularized minister, ordained non-cleric. Principally he will be the minister of sacrament and word, not the jack-of- all-trades , superficially responding to a bewildering variety of social and psychological roles. With his emergence the Church will finally free itself from the restrictive system of benefices. More importantly the Church will have abandoned the complex series of services which have resulted in the minister becoming an artificial appendix to established social functions. The ordained layman will make the Catholic parson pastorally superfluous.
+
+The Church awakens anew in the city. Traditional pastoral analogies become anomalies in the asphalt, steel, and concrete context of city life. Urban renewal and new experiences of community call for another look at older terminology. Kings, crowns, and staffs have lost their meaning. Men are not subjects of sovereigns , and they impatiently question how they can be sheep led by a shepherd. The Church’s community-creating functions break down when supported by symbols whose driving force lies in an authority structure. Sophisticated urban Catholics do not seek authoritative guidance for community action from a pastor. They know that social action is ecumenical and secular in motive, method, and goal. The Protestant minister or the secularist professional can possess better credentials of leadership.
+
+Theologically literate persons no longer seek moral guidance from a priest. They themselves think. Frequently, they have long ago surpassed the priest in theological formation. Parents with a good liberal education are increasingly skeptical of entrusting their children to the clerical system of “professional” cate-chesis . If children can be evangelized, parents see that they are called to the task, and possess the knowledge and faith to carry it out.
+
+No thinking Catholic questions accepting the ritual which recognizes that a man has received divine power to moderate a meeting of Christians or preside over the celebration of a sacrament . But men begin to reject the claims of a pastor who, because of his ordination or consecration, feigns competency to deal with any problem of his heterogeneous congregation, be it the parish, the diocese, or the world.
+
+The reorganization of contemporary life frees men to accept a vocation for part-time ministerial functions. Leisure time increases with reduced working hours, early retirement, and more inclusive social security benefits—time available for the preparation and exercise of Christian ministry in a pluralistic and secular society.
+
+It is apparent that many objections can be raised. The lay priest or deacon might wish to withdraw from the ministry, he might publicly sin, he or his wife might become divisive factors in the Christian community. Present canon law implicitly contains the solution—let him be “suspended” from his functions. Suspension must become an option for both the man and the community, not just a punishment reserved to the bishop. The ordained minister might feel called to take a controversial position on some secular matter in society, and thereby cease to be a fitting symbol of sacramental unity. He might in conscience feel that he must become a sign of contradiction, not only to the world, but also in the world. Let him or the community freely seek suspension. The community which has recognized his charism and presented him to the bishop, can also respect his liberty of conscience and allow him to act accordingly. He himself , as minister, has no special benefits, income, or status to defend . His daily life has not been determined by his priesthood. Rather, the latter has been characterized by his secular commitment .
+
+## Ministry and celibacy
+
+Man finds it difficult to separate what habit or custom has united. The union of the clerical state, holy orders, and celibacy in the life of the Church has confused the understanding of the individual realities involved and prevented us from seeing the possibility of their separation. The clergy have stood on their socioeconomic status and power, defending their exclusive right to the priesthood. We seldom see theological arguments directed against the ordained laymen, except perhaps in reference to the inadequacy of the term itself. Only Catholic clerics who wish to marry, and married Protestant ministers who fear to lose their clerical status, defend the extension of ecclesiastical social security to a married minister.
+
+The link between celibacy and priestly orders now comes under heavy attack, in spite of authoritative statements defending it Exegetical, pastoral, and social arguments are marshaled against it. By their action, increasing numbers of priests not only deny it, but also abandon both celibacy and the ministry. The problem is admittedly complex, since two realities of faith— sacramental ministry of priesthood and the personal mystery of extraordinary renunciation—meet. Our secular language breaks down in the delicate analysis of their mutual relationships. The formulation and discussion of three separate questions may help us to see the proper distinctions and lead us to understand the nature of the relationships involved. The choice of voluntary celibacy, the institution of religious communities, and the legal prescription of a celibate priesthood must be seen separately.
+
+At all times in the Church, men and women have freely renounced marriage “for the sake of the kingdom.” Consistent with such an action, they simply “explain” their decision as a personal realization of an intimate vocation from God. This mysterious experience of vocation must be distinguished from the discursive formulation of reasons to “justify” such a decision. To many, such arguments appear meaningless. This conclusion leads men to abandon their commitment to celibacy. The defenders of celibacy frequently interpret this action as manifesting a poor or weak faith among contemporary Catholics. On the contrary, it may just as well be evidence of the purification of their faith. Men now see through the alleged motives—sociological, psychological , and mythological—for celibacy, and recognize their irrelevance to true Christian renunciation. Renunciation of marriage is not economically necessary for service to the poor, nor legally a condition for the ordained ministry, nor significantly convenient for higher studies. Persons who acted on these motives now fail to see their value and relevance. Celibacy can no longer enlist social approval in its defense.
+
+Psychological motives formerly invoked to justify the superiority of sexual abstinence are hardly acceptable today. Many celibates now see that they initially refused marriage because they were repelled, afraid, unprepared, or simply not attracted. Now they choose marriage, either because of a more mature understanding of themselves, or to prove their original feelings wrong. They no longer see themselves as heroes to their parents, because they are “faithful,” nor as pariahs, because they “defect.”
+
+Comparative studies in religion reveal many “reasons” for sexual renunciation throughout human history. These may be reduced to ascetical, magical, and mystical motives. Oftentimes they are “religious,” but hardly related to the Christian faith. The ascetic renounces marriage for freedom to pray; the magician, to “save” a Chinese baby through his sacrifice; the mystic, to seek exclusive bridal intimacy with “the All.” Contemporary man knows that sexual renunciation does not make prayer more intimate , love more ardent, or graces received more abundant.
+
+Today the Christian who renounces marriage and children for the kingdom’s sake seeks no abstract or concrete reason for his decision. His choice is pure risk in faith, the result of the intimate and mysterious experience of his heart. He chooses to live now the absolute poverty every Christian hopes to experience at the hour of death. His life does not prove God’s transcendence ; rather, his whole being expresses faith in it. His decision to renounce a spouse is as intimate and incommunicable as another’s decision to prefer his spouse over all others.
+
+The Church has evolved two devices to control an evangelical charism: the social and juridical organization of religious communities , and the ritual celebration of vows. Religious orders provide a community structure within which the member is supposed to deepen his baptismal commitment to sanctity, and make himself available for the manpower pool controlled by his superior. This captive personnel force enabled the religious congregations to conduct benevolent and business enterprises. Now it appears that these institutional works will disappear even faster than parish, diocesan, and curial structures, as more and more members leave to fulfill their vocations in the open job market.
+
+Christians desiring to live evangelical celibacy see fewer reasons for joining the established, juridical communities—even secular institutes—but they do recognize the necessity to band together with others of like mind, temporarily or permanently, to seek mutual support in their common and difficult spiritual adventure. Those established religious communities which remain in existence will maintain houses of intensive prayer, available as retreat houses, spiritual training centers, monasteries, or deserts. To arrive at this kind of Christian poverty and witness , the congregations legislate their impending demise by approving shortened skirts, changing prayer schedules, and experimenting in social action. Perhaps this legislative sniping at superficialities will serve to diminish the pain of those in the dying structure, easing their stay to the bitter end.
+
+As the traditionally accepted reasons for maintaining the present juridical communities evaporate, other means of making a lifelong vow will be explored. The Church has traditionally accepted the possibility of the private vow. Less and less shall we see this in exclusively legal terms. As living a vow moves from clerical structures to a life of renunciation in the secular world, it seems more appropriate to signify the joyful acceptance of this kind of commitment not through a juridical act creating legal obligations but through a liturgical celebration of a mystical fact. The Church moves in this direction as vows become less public, solemn, and binding. Today any religious receives his dispensation when he states that he does not intend to keep his vow. Formerly vows were treated as public renunciations of rights; now they seem more like public statements of conditional intentions. The religious makes much ado of the fact that he is not married and that he will not marry—unless, of course, he changes his mind. We move from a religious “state” to a religious “stage.” This confusion and pharisaic legalism is a sorry testimony to the world.
+
+The celebration of a vow should be a rite established by the Church, publicly testifying to belief in the authenticity of a particular Christian vocation and charism. Only exceptional persons, after many years of living their renunciation in secular life, should be admitted to such a liturgical celebration. The Church thereby publicly manifests its willingness to entrust the testimony of a mystery to the fidelity of these new “monks.” Only then shall we return to the real and close analogy between Christian marriage and renunciation. Both sacraments will celebrate the Christian’s full awareness of the depth and totality of a commitment he has established and lived in the real society of men.
+
+A large segment of the thinking Church questions the tie between celibacy and the priesthood. The Pope insists on their connection. Neither doctrine nor tradition gives definitive support to his position. I believe that the emergence of a new pastoral Church depends largely on compliance with his directive during our generation. His position helps assure the speedy death of the clergy.
+
+To counteract the trends of declining vocations and clerical dropouts, many solutions are proposed: married clergy, sisters and laymen in pastoral tasks, brighter appeals in vocation campaigns , world-wide distribution of existing clergy. All are simply so many pusillanimous attempts to rejuvenate a dying structure.
+
+During our generation, at least, there is no need to consider the ordination of married men to the priesthood. We have more than enough unmarried ones. Ordaining married priests would slow up any real pastoral reform. But there is a second, and more delicate, reason for this decision. Thousands of priests now reject celibacy, and present the painful spectacle of men trained for sexual abstinence groping belatedly into big-risk marriage. The Church dispenses them secretly, arbitrarily, and awkwardly . They are forbidden further exercise of their orders. Having chosen marriage, they could still exercise priestly functions, but they would cease to be models—except perhaps to others like themselves.
+
+The real need here is to clarify and liberalize the process by which the Church allows a priest to marry. Further, all must see that the good of the Church requires the “ex-priest” to abandon both clerical security and ministerial function. This is as difficult for the priest who “wants out” without accepting the concomitant consequences, as it is for the bishop who wants to “hang onto” his priest at all costs. The clerical mass exodus will only last as long as the present clerical system exists. During this time ordination of married men would be a sad mistake. The resulting confusion would only delay needed radical reforms.
+
+The one institution which has no future in the Church and which is at the same time most impervious to any radical reform, today loses an increasing number of its men because of the legislation of celibacy. The over-all seriousness of the seminary crisis, of itself, forces us to probe much more deeply into the entire question of ministerial education in the Church.
+
+## Sacramental ministry and theological education
+
+Since Trent the Church has insisted on forming and educating its ministers in its own professional academies. It hoped that this process would continue through the minister’s personal initiative, within his structured and clerical life. The Church trained its ministers for a life it rigidly controlled. But the further recruitment of young and generous men in order to shape them in the mold of clerical life as it is still described by the Vatican Council will soon border on the immoral. At the moment it seems highly irresponsible to continue the preparation of men for a disappearing profession.
+
+This does not mean that Christian ministry will require less intellectual formation. But this latter can develop only on the condition of a better and more general Christian education. The problem here is that this term has become confusingly all-inclusive and thereby lost its precise meaning. It must be redefined . Personal maturity, theological precision, contemplative prayer, and heroic charity are not specifically Christian. Atheists can be mature; non-Catholics, theologically precise; Buddhists, mystics, and pagans heroically generous. The specific result of Christian education is the sensus ecclesiae, “the sense of the Church.” The man joined to this is rooted in the living authority of the Church, lives the imaginative inventiveness of the faith, and expresses himself in terms of the gifts of the Spirit.
+
+This “sense” is the result of reading the sources of authentic Christian tradition, of participation in the prayerful celebration of the liturgy, of a distinct way of life. It is the fruit of experiencing Christ and the measure of prayer’s real depth. It follows upon penetration of the faith’s content through the light of intelligence and the force of will. When choosing an adult for the diaconate or priesthood, we shall look for this “sense” in him, rather than accept theology credits or time spent in retreat from the world. We shall not look for professional competence to teach the public, but prophetic humility to moderate a Christian group.
+
+I assume that weekly preparation through readings for liturgical celebration is a better formation for the exercise of ministry than specialization in theological studies. In saying this, I do not intend to underrate the importance of rigorous theological study. I only want to put it in its proper place. Ultimately, the function of theology is to clarify a contemporary statement, or verify its fidelity to revealed truth. The contemporary expression of revealed truth is only the result of the Church’s faith. The function of theological science, therefore, is analogous to that of literary criticism. The lectio divina is akin to the savoring of literature itself. Theology verifies our fidelity; spiritual reading nourishes our faith. As the social sciences become more complex and specialized in response to the problems of technological society, so the fidelity of the Christian community increasingly depends on its competence to express the faith in a language new to the Christian, who lives in a situation never before interpreted in the light of the gospel. The Church will grow in the child-like simplicity of its faith and in the intellectual depth of its theology.
+
+Nearly all of what is now considered theological science will pass out of the exclusive competence of the Church. Already most of the subjects of the seminary curriculum are competently taught in secular universities by men of all faiths. With the closing of the seminary the omnicompetent theological generalist will disappear . The study of theology will become oriented toward specialized research and teaching, rather than toward all-round professional performance. Christian professors who possess this “sense” of the Church will orient students toward a biblical and ecclesial unity in their studies, a task never really accomplished by ecclesiastical curriculums.
+
+Theological study will also become more widespread. The Christian college graduate, desiring to participate more actively in his weekly small group liturgy, will seek intellectual analysis in systematic theological reading and studies. He will have the time to do so because of the increase of leisure time in our society . Those who will have combined the asceticism leading to sexual renunciation with their years of study and liturgical participation will be uniquely fitted for the episcopacy. The Christian community will not hesitate or err in recognizing their charism.
+
+Increasingly the Church’s teaching function will cease to express itself in pastoral letters condemning abortion and encyclicals advocating social justice. The Church will discover new faith and power in the revealed word. It will teach through a living and intimate liturgy centered around this word. Small Christian communities will be nourished in its joyful celebration.
+
+The Spirit, continually re-creating the Church, can be trusted. Creatively present in each Christian celebration, He makes men conscious of the kingdom which lives in them. Whether composed of a few persons around the deacon, or of the Church’s integral presence around the bishop, the Christian celebration renews the whole Church, the whole of humanity. The Church will clearly manifest the Christian faith as the progressively joyful revelation of love’s personal meaning—the same love which all men celebrate.
+
+
+# The powerless church
+
+In April of 1967 the secretaries for social action of the Anglican church met for a consultation. I   was invited to attend. Dozens of social issues were on the table, and on some there was more than one conflicting position. I had the impression that on each issue the assembly made an effort to determine which position could he labeled the Christian one, and if this failed, tried at least to designate one as more Christian than the other.
+
+One of my contributions to this conference was the address which follows. It concerns the role of the church in social change and development.
+
+It is my thesis that only the church can “reveal” to us the full meaning of development. To live up to this task the church must recognize that she is growing powerless to orient or produce development. The less efficient she is as a power the more effective she can be as a celebrant of the mystery.
+
+This statement, if understood, is resented equally by the hier-arch who wants to justify collections by increasing his service to the poor, and by the rebel priest who wants to use his collar as an attractive banner in agitation. Both make a living off the social service the church renders. In my mind both symbolize obstacles to the specific function of the church: the annunciation of the gospel.
+
+This specific function of the church must be a contribution to development which could not be made by any other institution. I believe that this contribution is faith in Christ. Applied to development faith in Christ means the revelation that the development of humanity tends toward the realization of the kingdom, which is Christ already present in the church. The church interprets to modem man development as a growth into Christ. She introduces him to the contemplation of this mystery in prayer and to its celebration in her liturgy.
+
+I believe that the specific task of the church in the modern world is the Christian celebration of the experience of change. In order to fulfill this task the church will have to renounce progressively the “power to do good” she now has, and see this power pass into the hands of a new type of institution: the voluntary and ever controversial embodiments of secular religion.
+
+Later I will explain what I mean by the progressive renunciation of power and the growth of secular religion. Here I wish to explain what I mean by the celebration of change.
+
+We have ceased to live against a rigid framework. All-enveloping , penetrating change is the fundamental experience of our age, which comes as a shock to those brought up in a different age.
+
+In the past the same experience was exceptional and had many appearances: exile … migration … imprisonment … overseas assignment … education … hospitalization. All these traditionally represent the sudden loss of the environment which had given form to a man’s feelings and concepts. This experience of change is now faced as a lifelong process by every individual in technological society.
+
+In Cuernavaca we have set up a center at which we train persons to feel with others what change means to their hearts. What happens to the intimacy of a person when his familiar surroundings suddenly disappear, and with them the symbols he reveres? What happens when the words into which he was taught to pour the stream of his life lose their accustomed meaning?
+
+What happens to the feelings of a mountain Indian thrown into a factory? What anguish does the Chicago missionary feel when he is suddenly exposed to the mountains of Bolivia, and finds himself used as a cover-up for napalm bombs? What happens to the heart of a nun who leaves the convent?
+
+These questions are precise and elusive: each must be fitted to the one heart it opens.
+
+What threat and what challenge does social change represent to this individual or to that social group? How does this heart or that common mood react to a change in setting? We speak about threat and about challenge because the reaction to transition is very ambiguous. It can allow for new insights, can open new perspectives and therefore confront the person with new awareness of choice. In other words, development can be a setting for salvation which leads to resurrection. But also transition can reduce a bewildered individual to a defensive self-centeredness, to dependence and aggression; it can lead into the agony of a lived destruction of life, straight into hell.
+
+Neither efficiency nor comfort nor affluence is a criterion for the quality of change. Only the reaction of the human heart to change indicates the objective value of that change. All measures of change which disregard the response of the human heart are either evil or naïve. Development is not judged against a rule but against an experience. And this experience is not available through the study of tables but through the celebration of shared experience: dialogue, controversy, play, poetry—in short, self-realization in creative leisure.
+
+The church teaches us to discover the transcendental meaning of this experience of life. She teaches us in liturgical celebration to recognize the presence of Christ in the growing mutual relatedness which results from the complexity and specialization of development . And she reveals to us the personal responsibility for our sins: our growing dependence, solitude, and cravings which result from our self-alienation in things and systems and heroes. She challenges us to deeper poverty instead of security in achievements; personalization of love (chastity) instead of depersonalization by idolatry; faith in the other rather than prediction.
+
+Thus the church does not orient change, or teach how to react to it. It opens a new dimension of specific faith to an ecumenical experience of transcendent humanism. All men experience life—the Christian believes he has discovered its meaning.
+
+What the church contributes through evangelization is like the laughter in the joke. Two hear the same story—but one gets the point. It is like the rhythm in the phrase which only the poet catches.
+
+The new era of constant development must not only be enjoyed , it must be brought about. What is the task of the church in the gestation of the new world?
+
+The church can accelerate time by celebrating its advent, but it is not the church’s task to engineer its shape. She must resist that temptation. Otherwise she cannot celebrate the wondrous surprise of the coming, the advent.
+
+The future has already broken into the present. We each live in many times. The present of one is the past of another, and the future of yet another. We are called to live knowing that the future exists, and that it is shared when it is celebrated. The change which has to be brought about can only be lived. We cannot plan our way to humanity. Each one of us and each of the groups with which we live and work must become a model of the era we desire to create. The many models which will develop should give to each one of us an environment in which we celebrate our creative response to change with others who need us.
+
+Let the church be courageous enough to lead us in the celebration by highlighting its depth. Let the church discern the spirit of God wherever charismatic gifts call the future into the present and thus create a model to live.
+
+Let the church be mater et magistra of this play—accentuate its beauty; let her teach us to live change because it is enriching and joyful, and not just produce it because it is useful.
+
+Awareness of change heightens the sense of personal responsibility to share its benefits. Awareness of change therefore does not only lead to a call to celebration but also to a call to work; to the elimination of obstacles which make it impossible for others to free themselves from toil and illusion.
+
+Social change always implies a change of social structure, a change of formalized values, and finally a change of social character . These three factors constrain invention and creativity, and action against these constraints becomes a responsibility of those who experience them as shackles. Hence, social change involves a triple reaction:
+
+* The reorganization of social structure, which is felt as subversion or revolution.
+* The attempt to get beyond public illusions which justify structures, which implies the ridicule of ideologies and is felt as ungodliness or as education.
+* The emergence of a new “social character,” which is experienced by many with utter confusion and anguish.
+
+Throughout history the church has participated constantly in the shaping of social change: either as a force of conservation or as a force of social promotion. She has blessed governments and condemned them. She has justified systems and declared them as unholy. She has recommended thrift and bourgeois values and declared them anathema.
+
+We believe that now the moment has come for the church to withdraw from specific social initiative—taken in the name of church structure. Let us follow the example of the Pope: have the courage to allow churchmen to make statements so ephemeral that they could never be construed as being the church’s teaching.
+
+This withdrawal is very painful. The reason is precisely that the church still has so much power—which has so often been used for evil. Some now argue that, given the power, it should now be used to make amends.
+
+If the church at present in Latin America does not use the power she has accumulated for fundamental education, labor organization, cooperative promotion, political orientation, she leaves herself open to criticism—from without, of creating a power vacuum; and from within, in the terms of “if anybody, the church can bear having power, because she is self-critical enough to renounce its abuse!”
+
+But if the church uses the power basis she has—for example, in the field of education—then she perpetuates her inability to witness to that which is specific in her mission.
+
+Social innovation is becoming an increasingly complex process. Innovative action must be taken with increasing frequency and sophistication. This requires men who are courageous, dedicated, willing to lose their careers. I believe that this innovative action will increasingly be taken by groups committed to radically humanist ideals, and not gospel authority, and should therefore not be taken by churches.
+
+The modern humanist does not need the gospel as a norm; the Christian wants to remain free to find through the gospel a dimension of effective surprise beyond and above the humanistic reason which motivated social action.
+
+The social-action group needs operational freedom: the freedom to let convenience or opportunism dictate the choice of priorities of objectives, tactics, and even strategy. The same social goal might be intended by two opposed groups, one choosing violence as a method, the other non-violence.
+
+Social action by necessity divides tactical opponents. But if organized around deeply held, radically human, ideological tenets, it also acts as a powerful catalyst for new forms of secular ecumenicism: the ecumenicism of action springing from common radical conviction.
+
+Ideological tenets generate secular-religious, civic-religious ideas. Social action organized around such ideas, therefore, frees the church from the age-old dilemma of risking its unity in the celebration of faith in favor of its service to controversial charity.
+
+The Christian response has been deeply affected by the acceleration of time; by change, development, by growth having become normal and permanence the exception. Formerly the king could be at the opposite pole from the priest, the sacred from the profane, the churchly from the secular, and we could speak about the impact which one would have on the other.
+
+We stand at the end of a century-long struggle to free man from the constraint of ideologies, persuasions, and religions as guiding forces in his life. A non-thematic awareness of the significance of the incarnation emerges: an ability to say one great “Yes” to the experience of life.
+
+A new polarity emerges: a day-by-day insight into the tension between the manipulation of things and the relationship to persons.
+
+We become capable of affirming the autonomy of the ludicrous in face of the useful, of the gratuitous as opposed to the purposeful , of the spontaneous as opposed to the rationalized and planned, of creative expression made possible by inventive solution .
+
+We will need ideological rationalizations for a long time to achieve purposefully planned inventive solutions to social problems . Let consciously secular ideology assume this task.
+
+I want to celebrate my faith for no purpose at all.
+
+# The futility of schooling
+
+To provide every citizen in the United States with a level of schooling now enjoyed by the well-off one-third would require the addition of forty billion dollars per year to the present cost of elementary and secondary education in the United States, which is about thirty-seven billion. This sum exceeds the present expenditure for the war in Vietnam. Evidently the United States is too poor to provide compensatory education on this scale. And yet it is politically inexpedient and intellectually disreputable to question the elusive goal of providing equal educational opportunities for all citizens by giving them access to an equd number of years in school.
+
+One man ’ s illusions are often best recognized in the light of another man ’ s delusions. My discussion of the futility of schooling in the Third World— published as a magazine article in 1968—may help to demonstrate the general futility of world-wide educational institutions.
+
+For the past two decades, demographic considerations have colored all discussion about development in Latin America. In 1950 some 200 million people occupied the area extending from Mexico to Chile. Of these, 120 million lived directly or indirectly on primitive agriculture. Assuming both effective population controls and the most favorable possible results from programs aimed at the increase of agriculture, by 1985 forty million people will produce most of the food for a total population of 360 million. The remaining 320 million will be either marginal to the economy or will have to be incorporated somehow into urban living and industrial production.
+
+During these same past twenty years, both Latin American governments and foreign technical assistance agencies have come to rely increasingly on the capacity of grammar, trade, and high schools to lead the non-rural majority out of its marginality in shanty towns and subsistence farms into the type of factory, market, and public forum which corresponds to modern technology . It was assumed that schooling would eventually produce a broad middle class with values resembling those of highly industrialized nations, despite the economy of continued scarcity.
+
+Accumulating evidence now indicates that schooling does not and cannot produce the expected results. Some years ago the governments of the Americas joined in an Alliance for Progress, which has, in practice, served mainly the progress of the middle classes in the Latin nations. In most countries the Alliance has encouraged the replacement of a closed, feudal, hereditary elite by one which is supposedly “meritocratic” and open to the few who manage to finish school. Concomitantly, the urban service proletariat has grown at several times the rate of the traditional landless rural mass and has replaced it in importance. The marginal majority and the schooled minority grow ever further apart. One old feudal society has brought forth two classes, separate and unequal.
+
+This development has led to educational research focused on the improvement of the learning process in schools and on the adaptations of schools themselves to the special circumstances prevailing in underdeveloped societies. But logic would seem to require that we do not stop with an effort to improve schools; rather that we question the assumption on which the school system itself is based. We must not exclude the possibility that the emerging nations cannot be schooled, that schooling is not a viable answer to their need for universal education. Perhaps this type of insight is needed to clear the way for a futuristic scenario in which schools as we know them today would disappear.
+
+The social distance between the growing urban mass and the new elite is a new phenomenon, unlike the traditional forms of discrimination known in Latin America. This new discrimination is not a transitory thing which can be overcome by schooling . On the contrary: I submit that one of the reasons for the awakening frustration in the majorities is the progressive acceptance of the “liberal myth,” the assumption that schooling is an assurance of social integration.
+
+The solidarity of all citizens based on their common graduation from school has been an inalienable part of the modern, Western self-image. Colonization has not succeeded in implanting this myth equally in all countries, but everywhere schooling has become the prerequisite for membership in a managerial middle class. The constitutional history of Latin America since its independence has made the masses of this continent particularly susceptible to the conviction that all citizens have a right to enter—and, therefore, have some possibility of entering—their society through the door of a school.
+
+More than elsewhere, in Latin America the teacher as missionary for the school-gospel has found adherents at the grassroots . Only a few years ago many of us were happy when finally the Latin American school system was singled out as the area of privileged investment for international assistance funds. In fact, during the past years, both national budgets and private investment have been stimulated to increase educational allocations. But a second look reveals that this school system has built a narrow bridge across a widening social gap. As the only legitimate passage to the middle class, the school restricts all unconventional crossings and leaves the underachiever to bear the blame for his marginality.
+
+This statement is difficult for Americans to understand. In the United States, the nineteenth-century persuasion that free schooling ensures all citizens equality in the economy and effective participation in the society survives. It is by no means certain that the result of schooling ever measured up to this expectation, but the schools certainly played a more prominent role in this process some hundred years ago.
+
+In the United States of the mid-nineteenth century, six years of schooling frequently made a young man the educational superior of his book. In a society largely dominated by unschooled achievers, the little red schoolhouse was an effective road to social equality. A few years in school for all brought most extremes together. Those who achieved power and money without schooling had to accept a degree of equality with those who achieved literacy and did not strike it rich. Computers, television , and airplanes have changed this. Today in Latin America, in the midst of modern technology, three times as many years of schooling and twenty times as much money as was then spent on grammar schools will not produce the same social result. The dropout from the sixth grade is unable to find a job even as a punch card operator or a railroad hand.
+
+Contemporary Latin America needs school systems no more than it needs railroad tracks. Both—spanning continents—served to speed the now-rich and established nations into the industrial age. Both, if now handled with care, are harmless heirlooms from the Victorian period. But neither is relevant to countries emerging from primitive agriculture directly into the jet age. Latin America cannot afford to maintain outmoded social institutions amid modern technological processes.
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+By “school,” of course, I do not mean all organized formal education. I use the term “school” and “schooling” here to designate a form of child care and a rite de passage which we take for granted. We forget that this institution and the corresponding creed appeared on the scene only with the growth of the industrial state. Comprehensive schooling today involves year-round, obligatory, and universal classroom attendance in small groups for several hours each day. It is imposed on all citizens for a period of ten to eighteen years. School divides life into two segments, which are increasingly of comparable length. As much as anything else, schooling implies custodial care for persons who are declared undesirable elsewhere by the simple fact that a school has been built to serve them. The school is supposed to take the excess population from the street, the family, or the labor force. Teachers are given the power to invent new criteria according to which new segments of the population may be committed to a school. This restraint on healthy, productive, and potentially independent human beings is performed by schools with an economy which only labor camps could rival.
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+Schooling also involves a process of accepted ritual certification for all members of a “schooled” society. Schools select those who are bound to succeed and send them on their way with a badge marking them fit. Once universal schooling has been accepted as the hallmark for the in-members of a society, fitness is measured by the amount of time and money spent on formal education in youth rather than ability acquired independently from an “accredited” curriculum.
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+A first important step toward radical educational reform in Latin America will be taken when the educational system of the United States is accepted for what it is: a recent, imaginative social invention perfected since World War II and historically rooted in the American frontier. The creation of the all-pervasive school establishment, tied into industry, government, and the military, is an invention no less original than the guild-centered apprenticeship of the Middle Ages, or the doctrina de los índios and the reductión of Spanish missionaries in Mexico and Paraguay , respectively, or the lycée and les grandes écoles in France. Each one of these systems was produced by its society to give stability to an achievement; each has been heavily pervaded by ritual to which society bowed; and each has been rationalized into an all-embracing persuasion, religion, or ideology. The United States is not the first nation that has been willing to pay a high price to have its educational system exported by missionaries  to all corners of the world. The colonization of Latin America by the catechism is certainly a noteworthy precedent.
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+It is difficult now to challenge the school as a system because we are so used to it. Our industrial categories tend to define results as products of specialized institutions and instruments. Armies produce defense for countries. Churches procure salvation in an afterlife. Binet defined intelligence as that which his tests test. Why not, then, conceive of education as the product of schools? Once this tag has been accepted, unschooled education gives the impression of something spurious, illegitimate, and certainly unaccredited.
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+For some generations, education has been based on massive schooling, just as security was based on massive retaliation and, at least in the United States, transportation on the family car. The United States, because it industrialized earlier, is rich enough to afford schools, the Strategic Air Command, and the car—no matter what the toll. Most nations of the world are not that rich; they behave, however, as if they were. The example of nations which “made it” leads Brazilians to pursue the ideal of the family car—just for a few. It compels Peruvians to squander on Mirage bombers—just for a show. And it drives every government in Latin America to spend up to two-fifths of its total budget on schools, and to do so unchallenged.
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+Let us insist, for a moment, on this analogy between the school system and the system of transportation based on the family car. Ownership of a car is now rapidly becoming the ideal in Latin America—at least among those who have a voice in formulating national goals. During the past twenty years, roads, parking facilities, and services for private automobiles have been immensely improved. These improvements benefit overwhelmingly those who have their own cars—that is, a tiny percentage. The bias of the budget allocated for transportation thus discriminates against the best transportation for the greatest number—and the huge capital investments in this area ensure that this bias is here to stay. In some countries, articulate minorities now challenge the family car as the fundamental unit of transportation in emerging societies. But everywhere in Latin America it would be political suicide to advocate radical limitations on the multiplication of schools. Opposition parties may challenge at times the need for superhighways or the need for weapons which will see active duty only in a parade. But what man in his right mind would challenge the need to provide every child with a chance to go to high school?
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+Before poor nations could reach this point of universal schooling , however, their ability to educate would be exhausted. Even ten or twelve years of schooling are beyond 85 per cent of all men of our century if they happen to live outside the tiny islands where capital accumulates. Nowhere in Latin America do 27 per cent of any age group get beyond the sixth grade, nor do more than 1 per cent graduate from a university. Yet no government spends less than 18 per cent of its budget on schools, and many spend more than 30 per cent. Universal schooling, as this concept has been defined recently in industrial societies, is obviously beyond their means. The annual cost of schooling a United States citizen between the ages of twelve and twenty-four equals as much as most Latin Americans earn in two or three years.
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+Schools will stay beyond the means of the developing nations: neither radical population control nor maximum reallocations of government budgets nor unprecedented foreign aid would end the present unfeasibility of school systems aimed at twelve years of schooling for all. Population control needs time to become effective when the total population is as young as that of tropical America. The percentage of the world’s resources invested in schooling cannot be raised beyond certain levels, nor can this budget grow beyond foreseeable maximal rates. Finally, foreign aid would have to increase to 30 per cent of the receiving nation’s national budget to provide effectively for schooling, a goal not to be anticipated.
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+Furthermore, the per capita cost of schooling itself is rising everywhere as schools accept those who are difficult to teach, as retention rates rise, and as the quality of schooling itself improves. This rise in cost neutralizes much of the new investments. Schools do not come cheaper by the dozen.
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+In view of all these factors, increases in school budgets must usually be defended by arguments which imply default In fact, however, schools are untouchable because they are vital to the status quo. Schools have the effect of tempering the subversive potential of education in an alienated society because, if education is confined to schools, only those who have been schooled into compliance on a lower grade are admitted to its higher reaches. In capital-starved societies not rich enough to purchase unlimited schooling, the majority is schooled not only into compliance but also into subservience.
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+Since Latin American constitutions were written with an eye on the United States, the ideal of universal schooling was a creative utopia. It was a condition necessary to create the Latin American nineteenth-century bourgeoisie. Without the pretense that every citizen has a right to go to school, the liberal bourgeoisie could never have developed; neither could the middle-class masses of present-day Europe, the United States, and Russia , nor the managerial middle elite of their cultural colonies in South America. But the same school which worked in the last century to overcome feudalism has now become an oppressive idol which protects those who are already schooled. Schools grade and, therefore, they degrade. They make the degraded accept his own submission. Social seniority is bestowed according to the level of schooling achieved. Everywhere in Latin America more money for schools means more privilege for a few at the cost of most, and this patronage of an elite is explained as a political ideal. This ideal is written into laws which state the patently impossible : equal scholastic opportunities for all.
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+The number of satisfied clients who graduate from schools every year is much smaller than the number of frustrated dropouts who are conveniently graded by their failure for use in a marginal labor pool. The resulting steep educational pyramid defines a rationale for the corresponding levels of social status. Citizens are “schooled” into their places. This results in politically acceptable forms of discrimination which benefit the relatively few achievers.
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+The move from the farm to the city in Latin America still frequently means a move from a world where status is explained as a result of inheritance into a world where it is explained as a result of schooling. Schools allow a head start to be rationalized as an achievement. They give to privilege not only the appearance of equality but also of generosity: should somebody who missed out on early schooling be dissatisfied with the status he holds, he can always be referred to a night or trade school. If he does not take advantage of such recognized remedies, his exclusion from privilege can be explained as his own fault. Schools temper the frustrations they provoke.
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+The school system also inculcates its own universal acceptance . Some schooling is not necessarily more education than none, especially in a country where every year a few more people can get all the schooling they want while most people never complete the sixth grade. But much less than six years seems to be sufficient to inculcate in the child the acceptance of the ideology which goes with the school grade. The child learns only about the superior status and unquestioned authority of those who have more schooling than he has.
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+Any discussion of radical alternatives to school-centered formal education upsets our notions of society. No matter how inefficient schools are in educating a majority, no matter how effective schools are in limiting the access to the elite, no matter how liberally schools shower their non-educational benefits on the members of this elite, schools do increase the national income. They qualify their graduates for more economic production. In an economy on the lower rungs of development toward United States-type industrialization, a school graduate is enormously more productive than a dropout. Schools are part and parcel of a society in which a minority is on the way to becoming so productive that the majority must be schooled into disciplined consumption . Schooling therefore—under the best of circumstances—helps to divide society into two groups: those so productive that their expectation of annual rise in personal income lies far beyond the national average, and the overwhelming majority whose income also rises, but at a rate clearly below the former’s. These rates, of course, are compounded and lead the two groups further apart.
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+Radical innovation in formal education presupposes radical political changes, radical changes in the organization of production , and radical changes in man’s image of himself as an animal which needs school. This is often forgotten when sweeping reforms of the schools are proposed and fail because of the societal framework we accept. For instance, the trade school is sometimes advocated as a cure-all for mass schooling. Yet it is doubtful that the products of trade schools would find employment in a continuously changing, ever more automated economy. Moreover the capital and operating costs of trade schools, as we know them today, are several times as high as those for a standard school of the same grade. Also, trade schools usually take in sixth graders, who, as we have seen, are already the exception. Trade schools pretend to educate by creating a spurious facsimile of the factory within a school building.
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+Instead of the trade school, we should think of a subsidized transformation of the industrial plant. It should be possible to obligate factories to serve as training centers during off-hours, for managers to spend part of their time planning and supervising this training, and for the industrial process to be so redesigned that it has educational value. If the expenditures for present schools were partly allocated to sponsor this kind of educational exploitation of existing resources, then the final results—both economic and educational—might be incomparably greater. If, further, such subsidized apprenticeship were offered to all who ask for it, irrespective of age, and not only to those who are destined to be employees in the particular plant, industry would have begun to assume an important role now played by school. We would be on the way to disabuse ourselves of the idea that manpower qualification must precede employment, that schooling must precede productive work. There is no reason for us to continue the medieval tradition in which men are prepared for the “secular world” by incarceration in a sacred precinct, be it monastery , synagogue, or school.
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+A second, frequently discussed, remedy for the failure of schools is fundamental, or adult, education. It has been proved by Paulo Freire in Brazil that those adults who can be interested in political issues of their community can be made literate within six weeks of evening classes. The program teaching such reading and writing skills, of course, must be built around the emotion-loaded key words of the adults’ political vocabulary. Understandably this fact has gotten Freire’s program into trouble. It has also been suggested that the dollar-cost of ten separate months of adult education is equal that of one year of early schooling, and can be incomparably more effective than schooling at its best.
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+Unfortunately, “adult education” now is conceived principally as a device to give the “underprivileged” a palliative for the schooling he lacks. The situation would have to be reversed if we wanted to conceive of all education as an exercise in adulthood . We should consider a radical reduction of the length of the formal, obligatory school sessions to only two months each year—but spread this type of formal schooling over the first twenty or thirty years of a man’s life.
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+While various forms of in-service apprenticeship in factories and programmed math and language teaching could assume a large proportion of what we have previously called “instruction,” two months a year of formal schooling should be considered ample time for what the Greeks meant by scholē—leisure for the pursuit of insight. No wonder we find it nearly impossible to conceive of comprehensive social changes in which the educational functions of schools would thus be redistributed in new patterns among institutions we do not now envisage. We find it equally difficult to indicate concrete ways in which the non-educational functions of a vanishing school system would be redistributed. We do not know what to do with those whom we now label “children” or “students” and commit to school.
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+It is difficult to foresee the political consequences of changes as fundamental as those proposed, not to mention the international consequences. How should a school-reared society coexist with one which has gone “off the school standard,” and whose industry, commerce, advertising, and participation in politics is different as a matter of principle? Areas which develop outside the universal school standard would lack the common language and criteria for respectful coexistence with the schooled. Two such worlds, such as China and the United States, might almost have to seal themselves off from each other.
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+Rashly, the school-bred mind abhors the educational devices available to these worlds. It is difficult mentally to “accredit” Mao’s party as an educational institution which might prove more effective than the schools are at their best—at least when it comes to inculcating citizenship. Guerrilla warfare in Latin America is another education device much more frequently misused or misunderstood than applied. Che Guevara, for instance, clearly saw it as a last educational resort to teach a people about the illegitimacy of their political system. Especially in unschooled countries, where the transistor radio has come to every village, we must never underrate the educational functions of great charismatic dissidents like Dom Helder Camara in Brazil or Camilo Torres in Colombia. Castro described his early charismatic harangues as “teaching sessions.”
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+The schooled mind perceives these processes exclusively as political indoctrination, and their educational purpose eludes its grasp. The legitimation of education by schools tends to render all non-school education an accident, if not an outright misdemeanor . And yet it is surprising with what difficulty the school-bred mind perceives the rigor with which schools inculcate their own presumed necessity, and with it the supposed inevitability of the system they sponsor. Schools indoctrinate the child into the acceptance of the political system his teachers represent, despite the claim that teaching is non-political.
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+Ultimately the cult of schooling will lead to violence, as the establishment of any religion has led to it. If the gospel of universal schooling is permitted to spread in Latin America, the military’s ability to repress insurgency must grow. Only force will ultimately control the insurgency inspired by the frustrated expectation that the propagation of the school-myth enkindles.
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+The maintenance of the present school system may turn out to be an important step on the way to Latin American fascism. Only fanaticism inspired by idolatry of a system can ultimately rationalize the massive discrimination which will result from another twenty years of grading a capital-starved society by school marks.
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+The time has come to recognize the real burden of the schools in the emerging nations, so that we may become free to envisage change in the social structure which now makes schools a necessity . I do not advocate a sweeping utopia like the Chinese commune for Latin America. But I do suggest that we plunge our imagination into the construction of scenarios which would allow a bold reallocation of educational functions among industry, politics, short scholastic retreats, and intensive preparation of parents for providing early childhood education. The cost of schools must be measured not only in economic, social, and educational terms, but in political terms as well. Schools, in an economy of scarcity invaded by automation, accentuate and rationalize the coexistence of two societies, one a colony of the other.
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+Once it is understood that the cost of schooling is not inferior to the cost of chaos, we might be on the brink of courageously costly compromise. Today it is as dangerous in Latin America to question the myth of social salvation through schooling as it was three hundred years ago to question the divine rights of the Catholic kings.
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+# School the sacred cow
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+Only if we understand the school system as the central myth-making ritual of industrial societies can we explain the deep need for it, the complex myth surrounding it, and the inextricable way in which schooling is tied into the self-image of contemporary man. A graduation speech at the University of Puerto Rico in Rio Piedras provided me with an opportunity to probe this relationship.
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+This is a time of crisis in the institution of the school, a crisis which may mark the end of the “age of schooling” in the Western world. I speak of the “age of schooling” in the sense in which we are accustomed to speak of the “feudal age” or of the “ Christian era.” The “age of schooling” began about two hundred years ago. Gradually the idea grew that schooling was a necessary means of becoming a useful member of society. It is the task of this generation to bury that myth.
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+Your own situation is paradoxical. At the end and as a result of your studies, you are enabled to see that the education your children deserve, and will demand, requires a revolution in the school system of which you are a product.
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+The graduation rite that we solemnly celebrate today confirms the prerogatives which Puerto Rican society, by means of a costly system of subsidized public schools, confers upon the sons and daughters of its most privileged citizens. You are part of the most privileged 10 per cent of your generation, part of that minuscule group which has completed university studies. Public investment in each of you is fifteen times the educational investment in the average member of the poorest 10 per cent of the population, who drops out of school before completing the fifth grade.
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+The certificate you receive today attests to the legitimacy of your competence. It is not available to the self-educated, to those who have acquired competence by means not officially recognized in Puerto Rico. The programs of the University of Puerto Rico are all duly accredited by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.
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+The degree which the university today confers upon you implies that over the last sixteen years or more your elders have obliged you to submit yourselves, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the discipline of this complex scholastic rite. You have in fact been daily attendants, five days a week, nine months a year, within the sacred precinct of the school and have continued such attendance year after year, usually without interruption. Governmental and industrial employees and the professional associations have good reasons to believe that you will not subvert the order to which you have faithfully submitted in the course of completing your “rites of initiation.”
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+Much of your youth has been spent within the custody of the school. It is expected that you will now go forth to work, to guarantee to future generations the privileges conferred upon you.
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+Puerto Rico is the only society in the Western Hemisphere to devote 30 per cent of its governmental budget to education. It is one of six places in the world which devote between 6 and 7 per cent of national income to education. The schools of Puerto Rico cost more and provide more employment than any other public sector. In no other social activity is so large a proportion of the total population of Puerto Rico involved.
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+A huge number of people are observing this occasion on television . Its solemnity will, on the one hand, confirm their sense of educational inferiority and, on the other, raise their hopes, largely doomed to disappointment, of one day themselves receiving a university degree.
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+Puerto Rico has been schooled. I don’t say educated but, rather, schooled. Puerto Ricans can no longer conceive of life without reference to the school. The desire for education has actually given way to the compulsion of schooling. Puerto Rico has adopted a new religion. Its doctrine is that education is a product of the school, a product which can be defined by numbers. There are the numbers which indicate how many years a student has spent under the tutelage of teachers, and others which represent the proportion of his correct answers in an examination. Upon the receipt of a diploma the educational product acquires a market value. School attendance in itself thus guarantees inclusion in the membership of disciplined consumers of the technocracy —just as in past times church attendance guaranteed membership in the community of saints. From governor to jíbaro, Puerto Rico now accepts the ideology of its teachers as it once accepted the theology of its priests. The school is now identified with education as the church once was with religion.
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+Today’s agencies of accreditation are reminiscent of the royal patronage formerly accorded the Church. Federal support of education now parallels yesterday’s royal donations to the Church. The power of the diploma has grown so rapidly in Puerto Rico that the poor blame their misery on precisely the lack of that which assures to you, today’s graduates, participation in society’s privileges and powers.
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+Research shows that twice as many high school graduates in Puerto Rico as in the States want to pursue university studies; while the probability of graduating from college for the Puerto Rican high school graduate is much lower than it would be in the States. This widening discrepancy between aspirations and resources can result only in a deepening frustration among the inhabitants of the Island.
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+The later a Puerto Rican child drops out of school the more keenly does he feel his failure. Contrary to popular opinion, increasing emphasis on schooling has actually increased class conflict in Puerto Rico, and has also increased the sense of inferiority which Puerto Ricans suffer in relation to the United States.
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+Upon your generation falls the obligation of developing for Puerto Rico an educational process radically different from that of the present and independent of the example of other societies. It is yours to question whether Puerto Rico really wants to transform itself irrevocably into a passive product of the teaching profession. It is yours to decide whether you will subject your children to a school that seeks respectability in North American accreditation, its justification in the qualification of the labor force, and its function in permitting the children of the middle class to keep up with the Joneses of Westchester County, New York.
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+The real sacred cow in Puerto Rico is the school. Proponents of commonwealth, statehood, and independence all take it for granted. Actually, none of these political alternatives can liberate a Puerto Rico which continues to put its primary faith in schooling. Thus, if this generation wants the true liberation of Puerto Rico, it will have to invent educational alternatives which put an end to the “age of schooling.” This will be a difficult task. Schooling has developed a formidable folklore. The begowned academic professors whom we have witnessed today evoke the ancient procession of clerics and little angels on the day of Corpus Christi. The Church, holy, catholic, apostolic, is rivaled by the school, accredited, compulsory, untouchable, universal . Alma Mater has replaced Mother Church. The power of the school to rescue the denizen of the slum is as the power of the Church to save the Muslim Moor from hell. (Gehenna meant both slum and hell in Hebrew.) The difference between Church and school is mainly that the rites of the school have now become much more rigorous and onerous than were the rites of the Church in the worst days of the Spanish Inquisition.
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+The school has become the established church of secular times. The modern school had its origins in the impulse toward universal schooling, which began two centuries ago as an attempt to incorporate everyone into the industrial state. In the industrial metropolis the school was the integrating institution. In the colonies the school inculcated the dominant classes with the values of the imperial power and confirmed in the masses their sense of inferiority to this schooled elite. Neither the nation nor the industry of the precybernetic era can be imagined without universal baptism into the school. The dropout of this era corresponds to the lapsed marrano of eleventh-century Spain.
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+We have, I hope, outlived the era of the industrial state. We shall not live long, in any case, if we do not replace the anachronism of national sovereignty, industrial autarchy, and cultural narcissism—which are combined into a stew of leftovers by the schools. Only within their sacred precincts could such old potage be served to young Puerto Ricans.
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+I hope that your grandchildren will live in an Island where the majority give as little importance to attending class as is now given to attending the Mass. We are still far from this day and I hope that you will take the responsibility for bringing it to pass without fear of being damned as heretics, subversives, or ungrateful creatures. It may comfort you to know that those who undertake the same responsibility in socialist lands will be similarly denounced.
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+Many controversies divide our Puerto Rican society. Natural resources are threatened by industrialization, the cultural heritage is adulterated by commercialization, dignity is subverted by publicity, imagination by the violence which characterizes the mass media. Each of these is a theme for extensive public debate. There are those who want less industry, less English, and less Coca-Cola, and those who want more. All agree that Puerto Rico needs many more schools.
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+This is not to say that education is not discussed in Puerto Rico. Quite the contrary. It would be difficult to find a society whose political and industrial leaders are as concerned with education . They all want more education, directed toward the sector which they represent. These controversies merely serve, however , to strengthen public opinion in the scholastic ideology which reduces education to a combination of classrooms, curricula , funds, examinations, and grades.
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+I expect that by the end of this century, what we now call school will be a historical relic, developed in the time of the railroad and the private automobile and discarded along with them. I feel sure that it will soon be evident that the school is as marginal to education as the witch doctor is to public health.
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+A divorce of education from schooling is, in my opinion, already on the way, speeded by three forces: the Third World, the ghettos, and the universities. Among the nations of the Third World, schooling discriminates against the majority and disqualifies the self-educated. Many members of the “black” ghettos see the schools as a “whitening” agent. Protesting university students tell us that school bores them and stands between them and reality. These are caricatures, no doubt, but the mythology of schooling makes it difficult to perceive the underlying realities.
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+The criticism today’s students are making of their teachers is as fundamental as that which their grandfathers made of the clergy. The divorce of education from schooling has its model in the demythologizing of the church. We fight now, in the name of education, against a teaching profession which unwillingly constitutes an economic interest, as in times past the reformers fought against a clergy which was, often unwillingly, a part of the ancient power elite. Participation in a “production system ,” of no matter what kind, has always threatened the prophetic function of the Church as it now threatens the educational function of the school.
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+School protest has deeper causes than the pretexts enunciated by its leaders. These, although frequently political, are expressed as demands for various reforms of the system. They would never have gained mass support, however, if students had not lost faith and respect in the institution which nurtured them. Student strikes reflect a profound intuition widely shared among the younger generation: the intuition that schooling has vulgarized education, that the school has become anti-educational and anti-social, as in other epochs the Church has become anti-Christian or Israel idolatrous. This intuition can, I believe, be explicitly and briefly formulated.
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+The protest of some students today is analogous to the dissidence of those charismatic leaders without whom the Church would never have been reformed: their prophecies led to martyrdom , their theological insights to their persecutions as heretics, their saintly activity often led to the stake. The prophet is always accused of subversion, the theologian of irreverence, and the saint is written off as crazy.
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+The Church has always depended for its vitality upon the sensitivity of its bishops to the appeals of the faithful, who see the rigidity of the ritual as an obstacle to their faith. The churches, incapable of dialogue between their ruling clerics and their dissidents, have become museum pieces, and this could easily happen with the school system of today. It is easier for the university to attribute dissidence to ephemeral causes than to attribute this dissidence to a profound alienation of the students from the school. It is also easier for student leaders to operate with political slogans than to launch basic attacks upon sacred cows. The university that accepts the challenge of its dissident students and helps them to formulate in a rational and coherent manner the anxiety they feel because they are rejecting schooling exposes itself to the danger of being ridiculed for its supposed credulity. The student leader who tries to promote in his companions the consciousness of a profound aversion to their school (not to education itself) finds that he creates a level of anxiety which few of his followers care to face.
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+The university has to learn to distinguish between sterile criticism of scholastic authority and a call for the conversion of the school to the educational purposes for which it was founded, between destructive fury and the demand for radically new forms of education—scarcely conceivable by minds formed in the scholastic tradition; between, on the one hand, cynicism which seeks new benefits for the already privileged and, on the other, Socratic sarcasm, which questions the educational efficacy of accepted forms of instruction in which the institution is investing its major resources. It is necessary, in other words, to distinguish between the alienated mob and profound protest based on rejection of the school as a symbol of the status quo.
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+In no other place in Latin America has investment in education , demand for education, and information about education, increased so rapidly as in Puerto Rico. There is no place, therefore , in which members of your generation could begin the search for a new style of public education so readily as in Puerto Rico. It is up to you to get us back, recognizing that the generations which preceded you were misled in their efforts to achieve social equality by means of universal compulsory schooling.
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+In Puerto Rico three of every ten students drop out of school before finishing the sixth grade. This means that only one of every two children, from families with less than the median income , completes the elementary school. Thus half of all Puerto Rican parents are under a sad illusion if they believe that their children have more than an outside chance of entering the university.
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+Public funds for education go directly to the schools, without students having any control of them. The political justification for this practice is that it gives everyone equal access to the classroom. However, the high cost of this type of education, dictated by educators trained largely outside Puerto Rico, makes a public lie of the concept of equal access. Public schools may benefit all of the teachers but benefit mainly the few students who reach the upper levels of the system. It is precisely our insistence on direct financing of the “free school” that causes this concentration of scarce resources on benefits for the children of the few.
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+I believe that every Puerto Rican has the right to receive an equal part of the educational budget. This is something very different and much more concrete than the mere promise of a place in the school. I believe, for example, that a young thirteen-year -old who has had only four years of schooling has much more right to the remaining educational resources than students of the same age who have had eight years of schooling. The more “disadvantaged” a citizen is, the more he needs a guarantee of his right.
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+If in Puerto Rico it were decided to honor this right, then the free school would immediately have to be abandoned. The annual quota of each person of school age would obviously not support a year of schooling, at present costs. The insufficiency would, of course, be even more dramatic if the total educational budget for all levels were divided among the population from six to twenty-five years of age, the period between kindergarten and graduate studies, to which all Puerto Ricans supposedly have free access.
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+These facts leave us three options: leave the system as it is, at the cost of justice and conscience; use the available funds exclusively to assure free schooling to children whose parents earn less than the median income; or use the available public resources to offer to all the education that an equal share of these resources could assure to each. The better-off could, of course, supplement this amount and might continue to offer their children the doubtful privilege of participating in the process which you are completing today. The poor would certainly use their share to acquire an education more efficiently and at lower cost.
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+The same choices apply, a fortiori, to other parts of Latin America where frequently not more than $20.00 a year in public funds would be available for each child if the 20 per cent of tax receipts now destined for education were distributed equally to all children who should be in school under existing laws. This amount could never pay for a year of conventional schooling. It would however be enough to provide a good many children and adults with one month of intensive education year after year. It would also be enough to finance the distribution of educational games leading to skills with numbers, letters, and logical symbols . And to sponsor successive periods of intensive apprenticeship . In Northeast Brazil, Paulo Freire (who was forced to leave the country) showed us that with a single investment of this amount he was able to educate 25 per cent of an illiterate population to the point where they could do functional reading. But this, as he made clear, was only possible when his literacy program could focus on the key words that are politically controversial within a community.
+
+My suggestions may mortify many. But it is from the great positivists and liberals that we inherited the principle of using public funds for the administration of schools directed by professional educators; just as, previously, tithes had been given to the Church to be administered by priests. It remains for you to fight the free public school in the name of true equality of educational opportunity. I admire the courage of those of you willing to enter this fight.
+
+Youth wants educational institutions that provide them with education. They neither want nor need to be mothered, to be certified, or to be indoctrinated. It is difficult, obviously, to get an education from a school that refuses to educate without requiring that its students submit simultaneously to custodial care, sterile competition, and indoctrination. It is difficult, obviously, to finance a teacher who is at the same time regarded as guardian, umpire, counselor, and curriculum manager. It is uneconomical to combine these functions in one institution. It is precisely the fusion of these four functions, frequently antithetical , which raises the cost of education acquired in school. This is also the source of our chronic shortage of educational resources. It is up to you to create institutions that offer education to all at a cost within the limits of public resources.
+
+Only when Puerto Rico has psychologically outgrown the school will it be able to finance education for all, and only then will truly efficient, non-scholastic forms of education find acceptance . Meanwhile, these new forms of education will have to be designed as provisional means of compensating for the failures of the schools. In order to create new forms of education, we will have to demonstrate alternatives to the school that offer preferable options to students, teachers, and taxpayers.
+
+There is no intrinsic reason why the education that schools are now failing to provide could not be acquired more successfully in the setting of the family, of work and communal activity, in new kinds: of libraries and other centers that would provide the means of learning. But the institutional forms that education will take in tomorrow’s society cannot be clearly visualized, either could any of the great reformers anticipate concretely the institutional styles that would result from their reforms. The fear that new institutions will be imperfect, in their turn, does not jusify our servile acceptance of present ones.
+
+This plea to imagine a Puerto Rico without schools must, for many of you, come as a surprise. It is precisely for surprise that true education prepares us. The purpose of public education should be no less fundamental than the purpose of the Church, although the purpose of the latter is more explicit. The basic purpose of public education should be to create a situation in which society obliges each individual to take stock of himself and his poverty. Education implies a growth of an independent sense of life and a relatedness which go hand in hand with increased access to, and use of, memories stored in the human community. The educational institution provides the focus for this process. This presupposes a place within the society in which each of us is awakened by surprise; a place of encounter in which others surprise me with their liberty and make me aware of my own. The university itself, if it is to be worthy of its traditions , must be an institution whose purposes are identified with the exercise of liberty, whose autonomy is based on public confidence in the use of that liberty.
+
+My friends, it is your task to surprise yourselves, and us, with the education you succeed in inventing for your children. Our hope of salvation lies in our being surprised by the Other. Let us learn always to receive further surprises. I decided long ago to hope for surprises until the final act of my life—that is to say, in death itself.
+
+# Sexual power and political potency
+
+In urban areas of Latin America, at least one of four pregnancies terminates in abortion. In many inner city districts the rate is even higher. At the end of their childbearing age, at least two women in five have braved serious damage to their health, disrepute, and often gruesome guilt to avoid the birth of another child. All this happens in a culture in which common law marriage and illegitimate births approach and even exceed church marriages or legitimate births, and no stigma comparable to that known in the Anglo-Saxon world attaches to either. It also happens in a culture where other people’s abandoned children are easily welcomed for upbringing in one’s own family, without any formality. Evidently a lot of people do not want to have any more children.
+
+Most of these abortions are performed by midwives, herb-doctors and witches, except in Uruguay and Argentina, where many doctors volunteer their illegal services even to the poor. Abortion is by far the most frequent cause of death among young women. These women need an alternative to the present situation.
+
+The conditions for increased carnage are favorable. Enough girls have already been born to insure a doubling of women of childbearing age in the very early eighties. Neither development nor revolution can prevent growing misery for an exploding and hungry population, which drifts into abulia and passivity. It would be misleading to tell a woman seeking an abortion that a rosy future is on the horizon for her child.
+
+But also, where can politicians afford to take a strong, positive stand for either birth control or legal abortion? Only a strong-man could afford simultaneously to dare traditional Catholics who speak about sin, communists who want to out-breed the U.S. imperialists and nationalists who speak about colonizing vast unsettled expanses.
+
+The major change in public policy must be initiated at the grass roots. Present programs, semi-clandestine, try to gain acceptance for birth control among the common people. I suggest that a major campaign demanding clear population policies should rise from the grass roots. In the following article, I explain why this campaign must be coupled with a major effort leading to critically increased political awareness. This was originally a speech given at a meeting of population experts in 1967. Since it has frequently been quoted, I have left it unchanged, fully aware that my attempt to be compact makes it difficult reading.
+
+This speech was given some months before publication of the notorious papal encyclical on birth control. I had hoped that the Pope would speak, but wagered that he would keep silent. I lost my wager, and was disappointed. I had hoped that the Pope would speak about the ambiguity of technology, as well as the need for a more intense consciousness and love on the part of men forced by circumstances to use that technology. I had hoped that the Pope would make all men face the fact that lowered infant mortality must be accompanied by equally lowered birth rates, if we wanted to avoid widespread de-humanization, and that we were obligated as Christians to restrain self reproduction. The results of modern hygiene’s fostering physical life must be countered by the the use of modern hygiene to check its cancerous growth.
+
+Instead the Pope came out with a document written in dead, juridical language, a document into which one can read all this, but one which lacks courage, is in bad taste, and takes the initiative away from Rome in the attempt to lead modern men in Christian humanism. This is sad.
+
+In Latin America the population is exploding. The citizenry of Mexico is doubled every eighteen years, that of Brazil every seventeen, and that of Peru every twenty. A swelling of the lower age groups is occurring in countries where, even now, two-thirds of youth cannot complete an elementary education. The result of this is not only inferior education for the great majority, but also the growing awareness of the adult masses that they are being excluded from all the key institutions of middle class society. The brief education they receive is, in the long run, an education in dissatisfaction.
+
+Birth control programs in Latin America generally fail because they stress the fear of poverty rather than the joy of life. An individual may employ contraception as the only defense against imminent misery—or he can choose it as a constructive means for a more human life. But there is nothing constructive in the present message of family planning. It is addressed to the same audience as the TV commercial and billboard advertising: the minority that is moving into the middle class. Today’s clients for consumer goods and contraceptives in Mexico and Brazil form an odd and a marginal lot; they are the very few who will allow their sexual patterns to be affected by an appeal involving constant consumption and material advancement.
+
+Success in modern schools, in modern jobs, or at modern sex seem related. Such success remains the privilege of a minority in Latin America. Although this minority is drawn from all strata of society, it is selected from those “achievers” who know how to maintain the growth rate of their personal income above the national average. And this class of strivers surges into political power, providing further privilege to those already on their way to affluence. Even if family planning were practiced by this small group, it would have little impact on the over-all population growth. The “others” (which in Latin America means most) remain excluded from an equal opportunity to plan their families. Like the legal provisions for social, educational, and political equality, opportunities for the poor to practice birth control are but a mockery.
+
+Within the present political and social context, it is impossible to induce the majority of the people to adopt birth control. Neither seduction nor current efforts at education work. To seduce effectively, the marketing of birth control would have to become more aggressive: twenty-five dollars offered for the insertion of each coil, one hundred dollars for each sterilization. To educate effectively, governments would be promoting their own subversion through sudden and widespread adult education. For it is clear that the education that enables adults to formulate their own dissent risks the loss of all constraints on freedom and imagination.
+
+The double failure of seduction and education is based on a discrepancy between the new message and the style of life common to Latin America’s peasant majorities. For most, the idea that sexual technique can prevent conception is incredible; but even less credible to them is the idea that such techniques will produce personal affluence. Both claims seem to invoke magic. Further, the style by which this magical remedy is pushed has an odious smell. It evokes a rich establishment solicitous of teaching the poor how not to reproduce their like.
+
+Even the approach to the individual is frequently brash, involving the tragic moment in a woman’s life when, as an alternative to the next abortion, she has become a receptive victim for initiation into the mystery of contraception. Claim, style, and method put the accent on protection against life rather than freedom for it. No wonder they fail.
+
+To be attractive, family planning would have to be embraced as a way to express a deeper sense of life rather than be used as a mere protection against evil.
+
+The appeal to magic, myth, and mystery must be dropped by both the proponents and the opponents of contraception. Obviously this is not easy. The vision of increasing world poverty overwhelms the imagination, and the creation of a myth is one way to escape unbearable anguish. The transformation of hungry persons into a mythical corporate enemy is as old as mankind, but so is the illusion that we can manage the myths we have made.
+
+Once the “poor” have been reduced to a faceless river reaching the high-water mark on a statistical table, birth control campaigns can be credited with magical power and invoked to conjure away further flooding. Such programs give the impression that individuals should recognize themselves as drops in a swelling tide, so that each can do his best to reduce his kind. Not surprisingly, nobody does.
+
+Only professors can delude themselves into the belief that men can be prodded to take for their personal motives in family planning the possibly valid policy reasons of the economist and the sociologist. One’s vital behavior is always beyond the reach of a decision made by others.
+
+Populations are mindless: they can be managed but not motivated. Only persons can make up their minds; and the more they make up their minds, the less they can be controlled. People who freely decide to control their own fertility have new motivations or aspirations to political control. It is clear that responsible parenthood cannot be separated from the quest for power in politics. Programs that aim at such goals are unwelcome under the military governments prevailing in South America, and such programs are not the kind usually financed by the United States.
+
+The development of Latin America as a Western colony requires massive schooling for children, to fit them passively into the acceptance of an ideology that keeps them “democratically” in place. Political order cannot tolerate too much awareness or originality or risk. The kind of education of adults that is analytical and dialectic leads inevitably to a liberation from taboos. Idols cannot be knocked off selectively; the kind of adult education that is aimed at dethroning some idols dethrones them all and is always politically subversive.
+
+Kindred insights usually reinforce each other. The awareness that sex does not have to lead to unwanted motherhood provokes another concept: the insight that economic survival does not have to breed political exploitation. The freedom of the mate and of the citizen lead over the same road. Each taboo left behind means one obstacle less in the change from the social conditions that make all idols necessary.
+
+All those who will give birth before 1984 are now in life. For each I ask: Will this child become a passive object, manipulated and sated by a technological milieu that encroaches on his feelings ? Or will this child grow into a man who shares in the responsibility for a set of social trends? Will demographers trim his sex patterns to fit the planned population curve, just as industrial designers fit his job behavior to investment needs? Or will his move from the subsistence farm to a sprawling city increase his conscious control over his own life history?
+
+In other words, will the city swallow his life? Or will he live with deeper freedom in the city? This is the question for 300 millions. Two-thirds of the 200-odd million inhabitants of America, below the Rio Grande, now are considered “rural.” Yet less than 35 per cent of the 350 millions expected in the next generation will make a living from agriculture. Most of those now alive—or those to be born during the next fifteen years—are existing in a world where mind, mores, and myth are rooted in a rural past. This means they come from a milieu in which personal success depends on the struggle for scarce resources, say, limited land, and where survival of one’s group had to be ensured by massive procreation against high mortality. Peasants value possession , tradition, and multiple fertility. This taste finds expression in their style of language, symbol, ideology, and religion.
+
+Peasants’ culture provides categories that endow even extreme rural privation with dignity. The individual who moves to the city loses this powerful hereditary tool, and awareness and acceptance of this loss becomes a condition for survival. This requires a change in each man: a change both of behavior and of personal bearings.
+
+This necessary change in behavior is the sum total of the change in the many strains of conduct that, like the strands of a rope, make up a human life. Each change in a man’s actions (on the job, in the street, or with his girl friend) is the fruit of his personal insight. Either it has freed him for the invention of a new habit, or it has resulted in his deadening submission to the new rhythm of the city.
+
+Even more revolutionary than change behavior, however, are the new moorings the personality must find in the city. Urbanization for the individual means the search for new bearings in a world that assigns new coordinates to his most intimate feelings and drives. Character forces are given new labels and new slogans, and symbols are attached to them, to fit them into a new ideology.
+
+The city, like any other engineered product, is sold to the newcomer with a set of instructions for its use. These instructions mystify the non-believer, the man who has not subscribed to the prevailing beliefs. This city creed has many dogmas. It prizes a medically protracted span of life, scholastic performance and certification, continued advancement and achievement on the job. Production and consumption become measuring sticks for most values, including fertility.
+
+Change in behavior, change in bearings, and change in belief go hand in hand. Only the few capable of this triple change can elbow their way into the tiny islands of affluence.
+
+Within this context, high consumption combined with high fertility is a luxury that few can afford. These few, quite often, are not the old bourgeois, but couples who by good luck rose quickly and established themselves. For most families the speed of social climb depends upon tight control of family size.
+
+The lifelong discipline demanded by such control is hard on any adolescent raised in a hut, untrained as he is for silent deference to the humdrum of schooling, or the monotony of an office, or docility toward clock and schedule. A rare combination of character, circumstances, and peers is necessary to teach a peasant the set of disciplines by which he alone can ensure his climb to the upper reaches of city, business, or family life. The city is a much better selector than teacher.
+
+The personality structure or character that makes for a child’s success in school ensures the passing of those who will also fit the corporate structure in the modern city. Those labeled by a certificate and outfitted with a car are presumably those most suited to take the needed precautions to lower their fertility and raise their insurance. The proven correlation of high schooling and low fertility is usually interpreted as a result of a schooling that renders pupils capable of using technical know-how, such as contraceptives. Actually the contrary is probable: schools select those already inclined toward such technical know-how. This is much more true in countries where grammar schools are selective and by that selection exclude more individuals than they accept.
+
+Let me explain: the height of a social pyramid in Kansas and Caracas is about the same. What is different, north and south, is its shape. At best, three men out of one hundred in Caracas take the path corresponding to high school graduation, the family car, private health insurance and corresponding hygiene. I suggest that we distinguish between those who were lifted onto this level by birth and privilege and those who climbed there. These latter are much more carefully selected in Caracas than in Kansas. The steeper the pyramid, the more successfully it bars weakly motivated climbers who would barely even amble to the top of a slightly slanted incline. Those who scale the narrow and steep passage to success in Caracas must be sustained by more common drives and aims than those who are pushed up the broad flight of stairs of the United States college.
+
+We are frequently reminded that family planning was adopted rapidly by certain ethnic groups, for example, Puerto Ricans in New York. Fertility of the entire group declined suddenly as the group moved to the city. This is true of those who made up their minds to go to New York and then “made it” there: those who moved out of Harlem, through school and into jobs that pay more than $7,000 annually. They are the ones who survived the police, drugs, discrimination, and welfare. Indeed, they rose faster than any ethnic group before them, and their fertility, too, fell faster.
+
+Similar groups of leapfrog immigrants to affluence can be spotted all over Latin America. Their members tend to join the Lions Club, Knights of Columbus, the Christian Family movement , and other clubs that allow them to organize for further privilege for their kind. “The Association for the Protection of the Middle Classes” recently formed by Esso employees in Caracas is a good example of their tactics. But the fact that members of such groups do control their fertility is no proof that contraception is, even partially, a result of a more comfortable life. It means more probably that at present in Latin America only a few can be bewitched by the mirage of affluence.
+
+It is revealing that fertility among the United States poor, particularly in the black ghetto, remains near Latin American levels. The common element is not some numerical indicator but a mood. In the United States ghetto, economic averages have been reached that are out of sight for our generation in Latin America. Per capita income, years of schooling, expenditure on health, printed pages read per person—all are beyond the healthy aspiration of 80 per cent of all Peruvians or Colombians, for example. But both here and there, political participation is low, power is limited, and the mood bleak. For the United States Negro the signs pointing to integration and affluence have led all too often to a dead-end street.
+
+During the last two years, the United States public has begun, very rapidly, to sympathize with the Negro sentiment against birth control in the ghetto. It is more shocking that the same public considers the poor overseas less sensitive and more gullible than those at home. More free advice in Brazil is supposed to turn the same trick that failed in the United States ghetto. A rebuff at home is to be taken seriously. That same rebuff overseas can be written off as folly and hysteria.
+
+Last year in Brazil the Roman Catholic bishops and the communists combined to arouse public indignation against supposed favors extended by the military government to missionaries who import U.S.-produced “serpents” into Amazonia. The serpentinas (coils) were to be “put into women” to render them sterile and to make Amazonia fit for colonization by Negroes imported from the United States, it was said.
+
+The population expert bred around the North Atlantic easily interprets this as an outburst of sick imagination, rather than a symbolic protest against the United States serpent, soliciting tropical Eve to taste the apple of affluence. The economist, the planner, and the doctor tacitly assume that all men are compulsive consumers and achievers yearning for well-paid jobs and wishing themselves in the shoes of those who have made it with fewer babies and more things. Such reasoning is based on a presumed “law of human nature,” but that presumption is at least as spurious as that preached by the Catholics. Too often missionaries condescendingly see their own idiosyncrasies as other peoples’ natures.
+
+Current American conversation in English about population unwittingly promotes an “imperialist” bias. I suggest that we awaken to this bias and handle it as an acceptable variable in policy making. But equally I suggest that we beware of joining in the controversy over sin, usually conducted in Latin, or in the conspiracy to outbreed the paleface, which sounds Chinese.
+
+Only for a minority in Caracas or São Paulo could having a small family pay off immediately in higher living standards. For some 90 per cent, a meaningful improvement of such standards through birth control is beyond even their own temporal horizon. Most “constructive” reasons peddled to this majority for family control, therefore, are deceptive. They usually imply a subtle indoctrination of “middle class values.” Acceptance of these values should forestall revolution against them. He who has learned to see wealth as the key sign of success, and children the major obstacle to growing rich, might now blame his children for his poverty. Few do, of course, because the argument is outrageous and also untrue.
+
+To obtain the unreasoned assent of the majority all kinds of programs are launched, most of them emphasizing immediate economic gain for the individual: direct rewards for each contraceptive treatment; oblique favors to small families; subtle, persuasive nudges connecting rising levels of expectation with low fertility. None works well enough. Why?
+
+The fear of unattainable affluence does not intimidate the traditionally poor, just as the appeal to Hell has hardly influenced the sexual behavior of devout Catholics. In any case, it is cynical to expect them to forgo present enjoyment for the sake of a paradise that is open to others but is beyond, and will remain beyond, their reach. Nowhere do people breed according to White House policies or the Pope’s commands. Socioeconomic “reasons” and moral codes are equally ineffective in introducing contraceptives. The use of ideology to push or oppose family planning is always a call to idolatry and, therefore, anti-human.
+
+Ideology can arouse in some persons regressive forces and lead them to the use of contraceptives. Ideology can justify the desire for money, resentment, envy, unwillingness to share, the fear of risk, or the desire to keep up with whatever Joneses. Ideology can explain these tendencies as contributions to political stability and productivity. But such reasoned sex control works only with a few, and they are strange and sick; their ideological motivations more frequently lead to irresponsible aggression than to discipline. Birth control is sold to the great majority under false pretenses; for them, it is a blind alley to enrichment and there it does not decrease fertility. The use of ideology to motivate individual behavior then is not only inhuman but it is also a fallacious policy. In such private matters, an appeal to patriotism, public spirit, or religion is usually a good excuse—but rarely a good reason.
+
+For example, let me compare the documented failure of teachers to turn out readers to the failure of welfare agencies to teach contraception. Teachers try to convince Juanito that he should want to read in order to be able to know, and work, and vote. But Juanito wants none of this, and there is no reason why he should. Reading will hardly lead to college unless he gets help from an uncle who is already there. And his vote in Latin America today is certainly less meaningful than ten years ago when the Alliance for Progress began. The one argument that might convince Juanito to stay in school is the need for a certificate that is supposed to open the door to a job—many years later.
+
+People learn complex skills best if this process of learning affords the learner an opportunity to give clear shape to feelings of images that already exist in his heart. Only he who discovers the help of written words in order to face his fears and make them fade, and the power of words to seize his feelings and give them form, will want to dig deeper into other people’s writing. The mere ability to decipher the written message will only lead indoctrinated masses to submit to instruction by schools and for factories, and at best enable them thereafter to use their leisure time to escape into cheap pulp-reading or make out the dubbed versions of foreign films.
+
+Health workers tend to proceed very much like the teachers, except that they suggest that a pessary rather than a book will serve as the flying carpet into the better life. The product of the druggist, the stationer and the witch are used in the same style. Therefore, women who just swallow contraception are not better off than those who submit to print, or trust love potions or, superstitiously, Saint Anthony.
+
+Schools succeed, at high cost, in producing literacy in a few children: only one out of four, in all of Latin America, go beyond the sixth grade. Welfare clinics have equally modest results in teaching adults contraception: only one out of four who seek advice ceases bearing children. Both agencies help to maintain the mold and the fold of the West. An economic comparison of school and clinic speaks for a shift of resources from literacy to birth control. On a short-term basis (let us say over fifteen years) the savings to a nation from one prevented life is much greater than the rise in productivity resulting from one schooled child.
+
+Classroom and clinic both select better than they teach. If their combined budget were cut, it would probably not very significantly affect over-all fertility. But such a cut in favor of other programs cannot be taken into consideration unless it is understood to what degree the present school and health programs are politically necessary.
+
+Latin American society is regarded as barren even by some of its utopian dreamers. Even educational reformers speak and act as if teachers on this continent are unable to bring forth something truly new in education. Whenever effective adult education programs are conceived and grow and threaten tradition, they are declared spurious and either aborted or ridiculed. Certainly large-scale programs are never financed, the excuse being that on such a scale the methods proposed for them have never been proven.
+
+Military governments must fear Socrates: he must be jailed, exiled, ridiculed, or driven underground. Few great, popular, and respected Latin American teachers are employed in their own countries. If such men join the government, the Church, or an international agency, they will be threatened by corruption through compromise.
+
+There is a profound difference in the character of those who participate in Latin American educational structures, and this difference makes it difficult for North Americans to understand the reasons fundamental education is both more important and more dangerous in South America than it is in the ghetto. In Latin America the political establishment consists of the less than 3 per cent of heads of family who have graduated from secondary school. For this minority, any massive involvement of the unschooled in political argument threatens a profound change. Therefore programs that might ultimately promote such involvement are either written off as self-defeating demagoguery, or quelled, quite understandably, as incitement to riot. Certainly they are not financed.
+
+The prevailing uneven distribution of schooling is usually considered a major obstacle to the spread of technological know-how and to effective political participation. Huge increases of school budgets for children are recommended as the one way of spreading political power and technological know-how, including contraception. This policy, in my opinion, rests on three erroneous assumptions: an overestimation of the educational efficiency of schools; an unrealistic expectation that a geometric increase of resources for schooling could ever become feasible; and a lack of confidence in the educational value of politically oriented education.
+
+Paulo Freire, the exiled Brazilian educator, has shown that about 15 per cent of the illiterate adult population of any village can be taught to read and write in six weeks, and at a cost comparable to a fraction of one school year for a child. An additional 15 per cent can learn the same but more slowly. For that purpose he asks his team to prepare in each village a list of words that have the greatest intensity of meaning. Usually these words relate to politics and are, therefore, a focus of controversy. His literacy sessions are organized around the analysis of the chosen words. The persons attracted by this literacy program are mostly those with political potential. We must assume that they are interested in dialogue and that learning to read and write its key words means for them a step to carry their political participation to new levels of intensity and effectiveness.
+
+Obviously such education is selective. So are our present schools. The difference is that political potential makes the written page the place of encounter for the potentially subversive elements in society, rather than making it a sieve through which to pass those children who prove tolerant to compliance and qualified failure. Freire’s alumni consume a diet that is different from the pulp and trash on which dropouts feed.
+
+I will never forget an evening with Freire’s pupils, hungry peasants in Sergipe, in early 1964. One man got up, struggled for words and finally put into one utterance the argument I want to make in this article: “I could not sleep last night … because last evening I wrote my name … and I understood that I am I … this means that we are responsible.”
+
+Responsible citizenship and responsible parenthood go hand in hand. Both are the result of an experienced relatedness of the self to others. The discipline of spontaneous behavior is effective, creative, and sustained only if it is accepted with other people in mind. The decision to act as responsible mate and parent implies participation in political life and acceptance of the discipline this demands. Today in Brazil this means readiness for revolutionary struggle.
+
+In this perspective, my suggestion to orient large-scale formal educational programs for adults intensively toward family planning implies a commitment in favor of a political education. The struggle for political liberation and popular participation in Latin America can be rooted in new depth and awareness if it will spring from the recognition that, even in the most intimate domains of life, modern man must accept technology as a condition . Conducted in this style, education to modem parenthood could become a powerful form of agitation to help an uprooted mass grow into “people.”
+
+# Planned poverty the end result of technical assistance
+
+At the beginning of the second development decade, at the time the “Pearson Report” was presented to Robert McNamara, it seemed important to discuss alternatives to the current notions of development, which, though based on supposedly irrefutable evidence, actually concealed highly questionable presuppositions.
+
+It is now common to demand that the rich nations convert their war machine into a program for the development of the Third World. The poorer four-fifths of humanity multiply unchecked while their per capita consumption actually declines. This population expansion and decrease of consumption threaten the industrialized nations, who may still, as a result, convert their defense budgets to the economic pacification of poor nations. And this in turn could produce irreversible despair, because the plows of the rich can do as much harm as their swords. United States trucks can do more lasting damage than United States tanks. It is easier to create mass demand for the former than for the latter. Only a minority needs heavy weapons, while a majority can become dependent on unrealistic levels of supply for such productive machines as modern trucks. Once the Third World has become a mass market for the goods, products, and processes which are designed by the rich for themselves, the discrepancy between demand for these Western artifacts and the supply will increase indefinitely. The family car cannot drive the poor into the jet age, nor can a school system provide the poor with education, nor can the family refrigerator ensure healthy food for them.
+
+It is evident that only one man in a thousand in Latin America can afford a Cadillac, a heart operation, or a Ph.D. This restriction on the goals of development does not make us despair of the fate of the Third World, and the reason is simple. We have not yet come to conceive of a Cadillac as necessary for good transportation , or of a heart operation as normal healthy care, or of a Ph.D. as the prerequisite of an acceptable education. In fact we recognize at once that the importation of Cadillacs should be heavily taxed in Peru, that an organ transplant clinic is a scandalous plaything to justify the concentration of more doctors in Bogotá, and that a betatron is beyond the teaching facilities of the University of São Paulo.
+
+Unfortunately it is not held to be universally evident that the majority of Latin Americans—not only of our generation, but also of the next and the next again—cannot afford any kind of automobile, or any kind of hospitalization, or for that matter an elementary school education. We suppress our consciousness of this obvious reality because we hate to recognize the corner into which our imagination has been pushed. So persuasive is the power of the institutions we have created that they shape not only our preferences, but actually our sense of possibilities. We have forgotten how to speak about modern transportation that does not rely on automobiles and airplanes. Our conceptions of modern health care emphasize our ability to prolong the lives of the desperately ill. We have become unable to think of better education except in terms of more complex schools and of teachers trained for ever longer periods. Huge institutions producing costly services dominate the horizons of our inventiveness.
+
+We have embodied our world view into our institutions and are now their prisoners. Factories, news media, hospitals, governments , and schools produce goods and services packaged to contain our view of the world. We—the rich—conceive of progress as the expansion of these establishments. We conceive of heightened mobility as luxury and safety packaged by General Motors or Boeing. We conceive of improving the general well-being as increasing the supply of doctors and hospitals, which package health along with protracted suffering. We have come to identify our need for further learning with the demand for ever longer confinement to classrooms. In other words, we have packaged education with custodial care, certification for jobs, and the right to vote, and wrapped them all together with indoctrination in the Christian, liberal, or communist virtues.
+
+In less than a hundred years industrial society has molded patent solutions to basic human needs and converted us to the belief that man’s needs were shaped by the Creator as demands for the products we have invented. This is as true for Russia and Japan as for the North Atlantic community. The consumer is trained for obsolescence, which means continuing loyalty toward the same producers who will give him the same basic packages in different quality or new wrappings.
+
+Industrialized societies can provide such packages for personal consumption for most of their citizens, but this is no proof that these societies are sane, or economical, or that they promote life. The contrary is true. The more the citizen is trained in the consumption of packaged goods and services, the less effective he seems to become in shaping his environment. His energies and finances are consumed in procuring ever new models of his staples, and the environment becomes a by-product of his own consumption habits.
+
+The design of the “package deals” of which I speak is the main cause of the high cost of satisfying basic needs. So long as every man “needs” his car, our cities must endure longer traffic jams and absurdly expensive remedies to relieve them. So long as health means maximum length of survival, our sick will get ever more extraordinary surgical interventions and the drugs required to deaden their consequent pain. So long as we want to use school to get children out of their parents’ hair or to keep them off the street and out of the labor force, our young will be retained in endless schooling and will need ever increasing incentives to endure the ordeal.
+
+Rich nations now benevolently impose a strait jacket of traffic jams, hospital confinements, and classrooms on the poor nations, and by international agreement call this “development.” The rich and schooled and old of the world try to share their dubious blessings by foisting their prepackaged solutions onto the Third World. Traffic jams develop in São Paulo while almost a million northeastern Brazilians flee the drought by walking five hundred miles. Latin American doctors get training at The Hospital for Special Surgery in New York, which they apply to only a few, while amoebic dysentery remains endemic in slums where 90 per cent of the population live. A tiny minority gets advanced education in basic science in North America—not infrequently paid for by their own governments. If they return at all to Bolivia, they become second-rate teachers of pretentious subjects at La Paz or Cochabamba. The rich export outdated versions of their standard models.
+
+The Alliance for Progress is a good example of benevolent production for underdevelopment. Contrary to its slogans, it did succeed—as an alliance for the progress of the consuming classes, and for the domestication of the Latin American masses. The Alliance has been a major step in modernizing the consumption patterns of the middle classes in South America by integrating them with the dominant culture of the North American metropolis . At the same time, the Alliance has modernized the aspirations of the majority of citizens and fixed their demands on unavailable products.
+
+Each car which Brazil puts on the road denies fifty people good transportation by bus. Each merchandised refrigerator reduces the chance of building a community freezer. Every dollar spent in Latin America on doctors and hospitals costs a hundred lives, to adopt a phrase of Jorge de Ahumada, the brilliant Chilean economist. Had each dollar been spent on providing safe drinking water, a hundred lives could have been saved. Each dollar spent on schooling means more privileges for the few at the cost of the many; at best it increases the number of those who, before dropping out, have been taught that those who stay longer have earned the right to more power, wealth, and prestige. What such schooling does is to teach the schooled the superiority of the better schooled.
+
+All Latin American countries are frantically intent on expanding their school systems. No country now spends less than the equivalent of 18 per cent of tax-derived public income on education —which means schooling—and many countries spend almost double that. But even with these huge investments, no country yet succeeds in giving five full years of education to more than one-third of its population; supply and demand for schooling grow geometrically apart. And what is true about schooling is equally true about the products of most institutions in the process of modernization in the Third World.
+
+Continued technological refinements of products which are already established on the market frequently benefit the producer far more than the consumer. The more complex production processes tend to enable only the largest producer to replace outmoded models continually, and to focus the demand of the consumer on the marginal improvement of what he buys, no matter what the concomitant side effects: higher prices, diminished life span, less general usefulness, higher cost of repairs. Think of the multiple uses for a simple can opener, whereas an electric one, if it works at all, opens only some kinds of cans, and costs one hundred times as much.
+
+This is equally true for a piece of agricultural machinery and for an academic degree. The midwestern farmer can become convinced of his need for a four-axle vehicle which can go 70 mph on the highways, has an electric windshield wiper and upholstered seats, and can be turned in for a new one within a year or two. Most of the world’s farmers don’t need such speed, nor have they ever met with such comfort, nor are they interested in obsolescence. They need low-priced transport, in a world where time is not money, where manual wipers suffice, and where a piece of heavy equipment should outlast a generation. Such a mechanical donkey requires entirely different engineering and design than one produced for the United States market. This vehicle is not in production.
+
+Most of South America needs paramedical workers who can function for indefinite periods without the supervision of an M.D. Instead of establishing a process to train midwives and visiting healers who know how to use a very limited arsenal of medicines while working independently, Latin American universities establish every year a new school of specialized nursing or nursing administration to prepare professionals who can function only in a hospital, and pharmacists who know how to sell increasingly more dangerous drugs.
+
+The world is reaching an impasse where two processes converge : ever more men have fewer basic choices. The increase in population is widely publicized and creates panic. The decrease in fundamental choice causes anguish and is consistently overlooked . The population explosion overwhelms the imagination, but the progressive atrophy of social imagination is rationalized as an increase of choice between brands. The two processes converge in a dead end: the population explosion provides more consumers for everything from food to contraceptives, while our shrinking imagination can conceive of no other ways of satisfying their demands except through the packages now on sale in the admired societies.
+
+I will focus successively on these two factors, since, in my opinion, they form the two coordinates which together permit us to define underdevelopment.
+
+In most Third World countries, the population grows, and so does the middle class. Income, consumption, and the well-being of the middle class are all growing while the gap between this class and the mass of people widens. Even where per capita consumption is rising, the majority of men have less food now than in 1945, less actual care in sickness, less meaningful work, less protection. This is partly a consequence of polarized consumption and partly caused by the breakdown of traditional family and culture. More people suffer from hunger, pain, and exposure in 1969 than they did at the end of World War II, not only numerically, but also as a percentage of the world population .
+
+These concrete consequences of underdevelopment are rampant ; but underdevelopment is also a state of mind, and understanding it as a state of mind, or as a form of consciousness, is the critical problem. Underdevelopment as a state of mind occurs when mass needs are converted to the demand for new brands of packaged solutions which are forever beyond the reach of the majority. Underdevelopment in this sense is rising rapidly even in countries where the supply of classrooms, calories, cars, and clinics is also rising. The ruling groups in these countries build up services which have been designed for an affluent culture; once they have monopolized demand in this way, they can never satisfy majority needs.
+
+Underdevelopment as a form of consciousness is an extreme result of what we can call in the language of both Marx and Freud Verdinglichung, or reification. By reification I mean the hardening of the perception of real needs into the demand for mass manufactured products. I mean the translation of thirst into the need for a Coke. This kind of reification occurs in the manipulation of primary human needs by vast bureaucratic organizations which have succeeded in dominating the imagination of potential consumers.
+
+Let me return to my example taken from the field of education . The intense promotion of schooling leads to so close an identification of school attendance and education that in everyday language the two terms are interchangeable. Once the imagination of an entire population has been “schooled,” or indoctrinated to believe that school has a monopoly on formal education, then the illiterate can be taxed to provide free high school and university education for the children of the rich.
+
+Underdevelopment is the result of rising levels of aspiration achieved through the intensive marketing of “patent” products. In this sense, the dynamic underdevelopment that is now taking place is the exact opposite of what I believe education to be: namely, the awakening awareness of new levels of human potential and the use of one’s creative powers to foster human life. Underdevelopment, however, implies the surrender of social consciousness to prepackaged solutions.
+
+The process by which the marketing of “foreign” products increases underdevelopment is frequently understood in the most superficial ways. The same man who feels indignation at the sight of a Coca-Cola plant in a Latin American slum often feels pride at the sight of a new normal school growing up alongside. He resents the evidence of a foreign “license” attached to a soft drink which he would like to see replaced by “Cola-Mex.” But the same man is willing to impose schooling—at all costs—on his fellow citizens, and is unaware of the invisible license by which this institution is deeply enmeshed in the world market.
+
+Some years ago I watched workmen putting up a sixty-foot Coca-Cola sign on a desert plain in the Mexquital. A serious drought and famine had just swept over the Mexican highland. My host, a poor Indian in Ixmiquilpan, had just offered his visitors a tiny tequila glass of the costly black sugar-water. When I recall this scene I still feel anger; but I feel much more incensed when I remember UNESCO meetings at which well-meaning and well-paid bureaucrats seriously discussed Latin American school curricula, and when I think of the speeches of enthusiastic liberals advocating the need for more schools.
+
+The fraud perpetrated by the salesmen of schools is less obvious but much more fundamental than the self-satisfied salesmanship of the Coca-Cola or Ford representative, because the schoolman hooks his people on a much more demanding drug. Elementary school attendance is not a harmless luxury, but more like the coca chewing of the Andean Indian, which harnesses the worker to the boss.
+
+The higher the dose of schooling an individual has received, the more depressing his experience of withdrawal. The seventh grade dropout feels his inferiority much more acutely than the dropout from the third grade. The schools of the Third World administer their opium with much more effect than the churches of other epochs. As the mind of a society is progressively schooled, step by step its individuals lose their sense that it might be possible to live without being inferior to others. As the majority shifts from the land into the city, the hereditary inferiority of the peon is replaced by the inferiority of the school dropout who is held personally responsible for his failure. Schools rationalize the divine origin of social stratification with much more rigor than churches have ever done.
+
+Until this day no Latin American country has declared youthful underconsumers of Coca-Cola or cars as lawbreakers, while all Latin American countries have passed laws which define the early dropout as a citizen who has not fulfilled his legal obligations . The Brazilian government recently almost doubled the number of years during which schooling is legally compulsory and free. From now on any Brazilian dropout under the age of sixteen will be faced during his lifetime with the reproach that he did not take advantage of a legally obligatory privilege. This law was passed in a country where not even the most optimistic could foresee the day when such levels of schooling would be provided for only 25 per cent of the young. The adoption of international standards of schooling forever condemns most Latin Americans to marginality or exclusion from social life—in a word, underdevelopment.
+
+The translation of social goals into levels of consumption is not limited to only a few countries. Across all frontiers of culture , ideology, and geography today, nations are moving toward the establishment of their own car factories, their own medical and normal schools—and most of these are, at best, poor imitations of foreign and largely North American models.
+
+The Third World is in need of a profound revolution of its institutions. The revolutions of the last generation were overwhelmingly political. A new group of men with a new set of ideological justifications assumed power to administer fundamentally the same scholastic, medical, and market institutions in the interest of a new group of clients. Since the institutions have not radically changed, the new group of clients remains approximately the same size as that previously served. This appears clearly in the case of education. Per pupil costs of schooling are today comparable everywhere since the standards used to evaluate the quality of schooling tend to be internationally shared. Access to publicly financed education, considered as access to school, everywhere depends on per capita income. (Places like China and North Vietnam might be meaningful exceptions.)
+
+Everywhere in the Third World modern institutions are grossly unproductive, with respect to the egalitarian purposes for which they are being reproduced. But so long as the social imagination of the majority has not been destroyed by its fixation on these institutions, there is more hope of planning an institutional revolution in the Third World than among the rich. Hence the urgency of the task of developing workable alternatives to “modern” solutions.
+
+Underdevelopment is at the point of becoming chronic in many countries. The revolution of which I speak must begin to take place before this happens. Education again offers a good example: chronic educational underdevelopment occurs when the demand for schooling becomes so widespread that the total concentration of educational resources on the school system becomes a unanimous political demand. At this point the separation of education from schooling becomes impossible.
+
+The only feasible answer to ever increasing underdevelopment is a response to basic needs that is planned as a long-range goal for areas which will always have a different capital structure. It is easier to speak about alternatives to existing institutions, services, and products than to define them with precision. It is not my purpose either to paint a Utopia or to engage in scripting scenarios for an alternate future. We must be satisfied with examples indicating simple directions that research should take.
+
+Some such examples have already been given. Buses are alternatives  to a multitude of private cars. Vehicles designed for slow transportation on rough terrain are alternatives to standard trucks. Safe water is an alternative to high-priced surgery. Medical workers are an alternative to doctors and nurses. Community food storage is an alternative to expensive kitchen equipment. Other alternatives could be discussed by the dozen. Why not, for example, consider walking as a long-range alternative for locomotion by machine, and explore the demands which this would impose on the city planner? And why can’t the building of shelters be standardized, elements be precast, and each citizen be obliged to learn in a year of public service how to construct his own sanitary housing?
+
+It is harder to speak about alternatives in education, partly because schools have recently so completely preempted the available educational resources of good will, imagination, and money. But even here we can indicate the direction in which research must be conducted.
+
+At present, schooling is conceived as graded, curricular, class attendance by children, for about one thousand hours yearly during an uninterrupted succession of years. On the average, Latin American countries can provide each citizen with between eight and thirty months of this service. Why not, instead, make one or two months a year obligatory for all citizens below the age of thirty?
+
+Money is now spent largely on children, but an adult can be taught to read in one-tenth the time and for one-tenth the cost it takes to teach a child. In the case of the adult there is an immediate return on the investment, whether the main importance of his learning is seen in his new insight, political awareness, and willingness to assume responsibility for his family’s size and future, or whether the emphasis is placed on increased productivity . There is a double return in the case of the adult, because not only can he contribute to the education of his children, but to that of other adults as well. In spite of these advantages, basic literacy programs have little or no support in Latin America, where schools have a first call on all public resources. Worse, these programs are actually ruthlessly suppressed in Brazil and elsewhere, where military support of the feudal or industrial oligarchy has thrown off its former benevolent disguise.
+
+Another possibility is harder to define, because there is as yet no example to point to. We must therefore imagine the use of public resources for education distributed in such a way as to give every citizen a minimum chance. Education will become a political concern of the majority of voters only when each individual has a precise sense of the educational resources that are owing to him—and some idea of how to sue for them. Something like a universal GI Bill of Rights could be imagined, dividing the public resources assigned to education by the number of children who are legally of school age, and making sure that a child who did not take advantage of his credit at the age of seven, eight, or nine would have the accumulated benefits at his disposal at age ten.
+
+What would the pitiful education credit which a Latin American republic could offer to its children provide? Almost all of the basic supply of books, pictures, blocks, games, and toys that are totally absent from the homes of the really poor, but enable a middle class child to learn the alphabet, the colors, shapes and other classes of objects and experiences which ensure his educational progress. The choice between these things and schools is obvious. Unfortunately, the poor, for whom alone the choice is real, never get to exercise this choice.
+
+Defining alternatives to the products and institutions which now preempt the field is difficult, not only, as I have been trying to show, because these products and institutions shape our conception of reality itself, but also because the construction of new possibilities requires a concentration of will and intelligence in a higher degree than ordinarily occurs by chance. This concentration of will and intelligence on the solution of particular problems regardless of their nature we have become accustomed over the last century to call research.
+
+I must make clear, however, what kind of research I am talking about. I am not talking about basic research either in physics, engineering, genetics, medicine, or learning. The work of such men as F. H. C. Crick, Jean Piaget, and Murray Gell-Mann must continue to enlarge our horizons in other fields of science. The labs and libraries and specially trained collaborators these men need cause them to congregate in the few research capitals of the world. Their research can provide the basis for new work on practically any product.
+
+I am not speaking here of the billions of dollars annually spent on applied research, for this money is largely spent by existing institutions on the perfection and marketing of their own products . Applied research is money spent on making planes faster and airports safer; on making medicines more specific and powerful and doctors capable of handling their deadly side effects; on packaging more learning into classrooms; on methods to administer large bureaucracies. This is the kind of research for which some kind of counterfoil must somehow be developed if we are to have any chance to come up with basic alternatives to the automobile, the hospital, and the school, and any of the many other so-called “evidently necessary implements for modern life.”
+
+I have in mind a different, and peculiarly difficult, kind of research, which has been largely neglected up to now, for obvious reasons. I am calling for research on alternatives to the products which now dominate the market; to hospitals and the profession dedicated to keeping the sick alive; to schools and the packaging process which refuses education to those who are not of the right age, who have not gone through the right curriculum , who have not sat in a classroom a sufficient number of successive hours, who will not pay for their learning with submission to custodial care, screening, and certification or with indoctrination in the values of the dominant elite.
+
+This counterresearch on fundamental alternatives to current prepackaged solutions is the element most critically needed if the poor nations are to have a livable future. Such counter-research is distinct from most of the work done in the name of the “year 2000,” because most of that work seeks radical changes in social patterns through adjustments in the organization of an already advanced technology. The counterresearch of which I speak must take as one of its assumptions the continued lack of capital in the Third World.
+
+The difficulties of such research are obvious. The researcher must first of all doubt what is obvious to every eye. Second, he must persuade those who have the power of decision to act against their own short-run interests or bring pressure on them to do so. And, finally, he must survive as an individual in a world he is attempting to change fundamentally so that his fellows among the privileged minority see him as a destroyer of the very ground on which all of us stand. He knows that if he should succeed in the interest of the poor, technologically advanced societies still might envy the “poor” who adopt this vision.
+
+There is a normal course for those who make development policies, whether they live in North or South America, in Russia or Israel. It is to define development and to set its goals in ways with which they are familiar, which they are accustomed to use in order to satisfy their own needs, and which permit them to work through the institutions over which they have power or control. This formula has failed, and must fail. There is not enough money in the world for development to succeed along these lines, not even in the combined arms and space budgets of the superpowers.
+
+An analogous course is followed by those who are trying to make political revolutions, especially in the Third World. Usually they promise to make the familiar privileges of the present elites, such as schooling, hospital care, etc., accessible to all citizens ; and they base this vain promise on the belief that a change in political regime will permit them to sufficiently enlarge the institutions which produce these privileges. The promise and appeal of the revolutionary are therefore just as threatened by the counterresearch I propose as is the market of the now dominant producers.
+
+In Vietnam a people on bicycles and armed with sharpened bamboo sticks have brought to a standstill the most advanced machinery for research and production ever devised. We must seek survival in a Third World in which human ingenuity can peacefully outwit machined might. The only way to reverse the disastrous trend to increasing underdevelopment, hard as it is, is to learn to laugh at accepted solutions in order to change the demands which make them necessary. Only free men can change their minds and be surprised; and while no men are completely free, some are freer than others.
+
+# A constitution for cultural revolution
+
+At the invitation of the publishers of the annual Great Ideas volume I wrote the article which follows, and which I feel is an appropriate conclusion to this book. Its purpose was to initiate discussion about the need of constitutional principles which would guarantee an ongoing cultural revolution in a technological society. The article originally appeared in Great Ideas Today 1970, published by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
+
+During the decade just past we have gotten used to seeing the world divided into two parts: the developed and the underdeveloped . People in the development business may prefer to speak of the developed nations and the less developed or developing nations. This terminology suggests that development is both good and inevitable. Others, especially protagonists of revolutionary change, speak of the “Third World” and wait for the day when the wretched of the earth will rise in armed revolt against the imperialist powers and shift control over existing institutions from North to South, from White to Black, from metropolis to colony.
+
+A vulgar example of the first assumption is the Rockefeller Report on the Americas. Its doctrine is aptly summed up by President Nixon: “This I pledge to you tonight: the nation that went to the moon in peace for all mankind is ready to share its technology in peace with its nearest neighbors.” The governor, in turn, proposes that keeping the pledge might require a lot of additional weaponry in South America.
+
+The Pearson Report on partnership in development is a much more sophisticated example of the development mentality. It outlines policies which will permit a few more countries to join the charmed circle of the consumer nations but which will actually increase the poverty of the poor half in these same countries : because the strategies proposed will sell them ever more thoroughly on goods and services ever more expensive and out of their reach. The policy goals of most revolutionary movements and governments I know—and I do not know Mao’s China—reflect another type of cynicism. Their leaders make futile promises that—once in power for a sufficient length of time—more of everything which the masses have learned to know and to envy as privileges of the rich will be produced and distributed . Both the purveyors of development and the preachers of revolution advocate more of the same. They define more education as more schooling, better health as more doctors, higher mobility as more high-speed vehicles. The salesmen for United States industry, the experts for the World Bank, and ideologues of power for the poor seem to forget that heart surgery and college degrees remain beyond the reach of the majority for generations.
+
+The goals of development are always and everywhere stated in terms of consumer value packages standardized around the North Atlantic—and therefore always and everywhere imply more privileges for a few. Political reorganization cannot change this fact; it can only rationalize it. Different ideologies create different minorities of privileged consumers, but heart surgery or a university education is always priced out of range for all but a few: be they the rich, the orthodox, or the most fascinating subjects for experiments by surgeons or pedagogues.
+
+Underdevelopment is the result of a state of mind common to both socialist and capitalist countries. Present development goals are neither desirable nor reasonable. Unfortunately anti-imperialism is no antidote. Although exploitation of poor countries is an undeniable reality, current nationalism is merely the affirmation of the right of colonial elites to repeat history and follow the road traveled by the rich toward the universal consumption of internationally marketed packages, a road which can ultimately lead only to universal pollution and universal frustration.
+
+The central issue of our time remains the fact that the rich are getting richer and the poor, poorer. This hard fact is often obscured by another apparently contradictory fact. In the rich countries the poor expect a quantity and quality of commodities beyond the dreams of Louis XIV, while many of the so-called developing countries enjoy much higher economic growth rates than those of industrialized countries at a similar stage of their own histories. From icebox to toilet and from antibiotic to television , conveniences are found necessary in Harlem which Washington could not have imagined at Mount Vernon, just as Bolívar could not have foreseen the social polarization now inevitable in Caracas. But neither rising levels of minimum consumption in the rich countries nor of urban consumption in the poor countries can close the gap between rich and poor nations or between the rich and poor of any one nation. Modern poverty is a by-product of a world market catering to the ideologies of an industrial middle class. Modern poverty is built into an international community where demand is engineered through publicity to stimulate the production of standard commodities. In such a market, expectations are standardized and must always outrace marketable resources.
+
+In the United States, for all its gargantuan prosperity, real poverty levels rise faster than the median income. In the capital-starved countries, median incomes move rapidly away from rising averages. Most goods now produced for rich and poor alike in the United States are beyond the reach of all but a few in other areas. In both rich and poor nations consumption is polarized while expectation is equalized.
+
+During the decade now beginning we must learn a new language , a language that speaks not of development and under-development but of true and false ideas about man, his needs, and his potential. Development programs all over the world progressively lead to violence, either in the form of repression or of rebellion. This is neither due to the evil intentions of capitalists nor to the ideological rigidity of communists, but to the radical inability of men to tolerate the by-products of industrial and welfare institutions developed in the early industrial age. In the late sixties attention has suddenly been drawn to the inability of man to survive his industry. During the late sixties it has become evident that less than 10 per cent of the human race consumes more than 50 per cent of the world’s resources, and produces 90 per cent of the physical pollution which threatens to extinguish the biosphere. But this is only one aspect of the paradox of present development. During the early seventies it will become equally clear that welfare institutions have an analogous regressive effect. The international institutionalization of social service, medicine, and education which is generally identified with development has equally overwhelming destructive by-products.
+
+We need an alternative program, an alternative both to development and to merely political revolution. Let me call this alternative program either institutional or cultural revolution, because its aim is the transformation of both public and personal reality. The political revolutionary wants to improve existing institutions —their productivity and the quality and distribution of their products. His vision of what is desirable and possible is based on consumption habits developed during the last hundred years. The cultural revolutionary believes that these habits have radically distorted our view of what human beings can have and want. He questions the reality that others take for granted, a reality that, in his view, is the artificial by-product of contemporary institutions, created and reinforced by them in pursuit of their short-term ends. The political revolutionary concentrates on schooling and tooling for the environment that the rich countries , socialist or capitalist, have engineered. The cultural revolutionary risks the future on the educability of man.
+
+The cultural revolutionary must not only be distinguished from the political magician but also from both the neo-Luddite and the promoter of intermediary technology. The former behaves as if the noble savage could either be restored to the throne or the Third World transformed into a reservation for him. He opposes the internal combustion engine rather than opposing its packaging into a product designed for exclusive use by the man who owns it. Thus the Luddite blames the producer; the institutional revolutionary tries to reshape the design and distribution of the product. The Luddite blames the machine; the cultural revolutionary heightens awareness that it produces needless demands. The cultural revolutionary must also be distinguished from the promoter of intermediary technology who is frequently merely a superior tactician paving the road to totally manipulated consumption.
+
+Let me illustrate what I mean by a cultural revolution within one major international institution, by taking as an example the institution which currently produces education. I mean, of course, obligatory schooling: full-time attendance of age-specific groups at a graded curriculum.
+
+Latin America has decided to school itself into development. This decision results in the production of homemade inferiority. With every school that is built, another seed of institutional corruption is planted, and this is in the name of growth.
+
+Schools affect individuals and characterize nations. Individuals merely get a bad deal; nations are irreversibly degraded when they build schools to help their citizens play at international competition. For the individual, school is always a gamble. The chances may be very slim, but everyone shoots for the same jackpot. Of course, as any professional gambler knows, it is the rich who win in the end and the poor who get hooked. And if the poor man manages to stay in the game for a while, he will feel the pain even more sharply when he does lose, as he almost inevitably must. Primary school dropouts in a Latin American city find it increasingly difficult to get industrial jobs.
+
+But no matter how high the odds, everyone plays the game, for, after all, there is only one game in town. A scholarship may be a long shot, but it is a chance to become equal to the world’s best-trained bureaucrats. And the student who fails can console himself with the knowledge that the cards were stacked against him from the outset.
+
+More and more, men begin to believe that, in the schooling game, the loser gets only what he deserves. The belief in the ability of schools to label people correctly is already so strong that people accept their vocational and marital fate with a gambler’s resignation. In cities, this faith in school-slotting is on the way to sprouting a more creditable meritocracy—a state of mind in which each citizen believes that he deserves the place assigned to him by school. A perfect meritocracy, in which there would be no excuses, is not yet upon us, and I believe it can be avoided. It must be avoided, since a perfect meritocracy would not only be hellish, it would be hell.
+
+Educators appeal to the gambling instinct of the entire population when they raise money for schools. They advertise the jackpot without mentioning the odds. And those odds are high indeed for someone who is born brown, poor, or in the pampa. In Latin America, no country is prouder of its legally obligatory admission-free school system than Argentina. Yet only one Argentinian of five thousand born into the lower half of the population gets as far as the university.
+
+What is only a wheel of fortune for an individual is a spinning wheel of irreversible underdevelopment for a nation. The high cost of schooling turns education into a scarce resource, as poor countries accept that a certain number of years in school makes an educated man. More money gets spent on fewer people. In poor countries, the school pyramid of the rich countries takes on the shape of an obelisk, or a rocket. School inevitably gives individuals who attend it and then drop out, as well as those who don’t make it at all, a rationale for their own inferiority. But for poor nations, obligatory schooling is a monument to self-inflicted inferiority. To buy the schooling hoax is to purchase a ticket for the back seat in a bus headed nowhere.
+
+Schooling encrusts the poorest nations at the bottom of the educational bucket. The school systems of Latin America are fossilized deposits of a dream begun a century ago. The school pyramid is a-building from top to bottom throughout Latin America. All countries spend more than 20 per cent of their national budget and nearly 5 per cent of their gross national product on its construction. Teachers constitute the largest profession and their children are frequently the largest group of students in the upper grades. Fundamental education is either redefined as the foundation for schooling, and therefore placed beyond the reach of the unschooled and the early dropout, or is defined as a remedy for the unschooled, which will only frustrate him into accepting inferiority. Even the poorest countries continue to spend disproportionate sums on graduate schools—gardens which ornament the penthouses of skyscrapers built in a slum.
+
+Bolivia is well on the way to suicide by an overdose of schooling. This impoverished, landlocked country creates papier-mâché bridges to prosperity by spending more than a third of its entire budget on public education and half as much again on private schools. A full half of this educational misspending is consumed by 1 per cent of the school-age population. In Bolivia, the university student’s share of public funds is a thousand times greater than that of his fellow citizen of median income . Most Bolivian people live outside the city, yet only 2 per cent of the rural population makes it to the fifth grade. This discrimination was legally sanctioned in 1967 by declaring grade school obligatory for all—a law that made most people criminal by fiat and the rest immoral exploiters by decree. In 1970, the university entrance examinations were abolished with a flourish of egalitarian rhetoric. At first glance, it does seem a libertarian advance to legislate that all high school graduates have a right to enter the university—until you realize that less than 2 per cent of Bolivians finish high school.
+
+Bolivia may be an extreme example of schooling in Latin America. But on an international scale, Bolivia is typical. Few African or Asian countries have attained the progress now taken for granted there.
+
+Cuba is perhaps an example of the other extreme. Fidel Castro has tried to create a major cultural revolution. He has reshaped the academic pyramid, and promised that by 1980 the universities can be closed, since all of Cuba will be one big university with higher learning going on at work and leisure. Yet the Cuban pyramid is still a pyramid. There is no doubt that the redistribution of privilege, the redefinition of social goals, and the popular participation in the achievement of these goals have reached spectacular heights in Cuba since the revolution. For the moment, however, Cuba is showing only that, under exceptional political conditions, the base of the present school system can be expanded exceptionally. But there are built-in limits to the elasticity of present institutions, and Cuba is at the point of reaching them. The Cuban revolution will work—within these limits. Which means only that Dr. Castro will have masterminded a faster road to a bourgeois meritocracy than those previously taken by capitalists or bolsheviks. Sometimes, when he is not promising schools for all, Fidel hints at a policy of deschooling for all, and the Isle of Pines seems to be a laboratory for redistribution of educational functions to other social institutions. But unless Cuban educators admit that work-education which is effective in a rural economy can be even more effective in an urban one, Cuba’s institutional revolution will not begin. No cultural revolution can be built on the denial of reality.
+
+As long as communist Cuba continues to promise obligatory high school completion by the end of this decade, it is, in this regard, institutionally no more promising than fascist Brazil, which has made a similar promise. In both Brazil and Cuba, enough girls have already been born to double the number of potential mothers in the 1980s. Per capita resources available for education can hardly be expected to double in either country, and even if they could, no progress would have been made at all. In development-mad Brazil and in humanist Cuba, waiting for Godot is equally futile. Without a radical change in their institutional goals, both “revolutions” must make fools of themselves. Unfortunately, both seem headed for manifest foolishness, albeit by different routes. The Cubans allow work, party, and community involvement to nibble away at the school year, and call this radical education, while the Brazilians let United States experts peddle teaching devices that only raise the per capita cost of classroom attendance.
+
+The production of inferiority through schooling is more evident in poor countries and perhaps more painful in rich countries. The 10 per cent in the United States with the highest incomes can provide most of the education for their children through private institutions. Yet they also succeed in obtaining ten times more of the public resources devoted to education than the poorest 10 per cent of the population. In Soviet Russia a more puritanical belief in meritocracy makes the concentration of schooling privileges on the children of urban professionals even more painful.
+
+In the shadow of each national school-pyramid, an international caste system is wedded to an international class structure. Countries are ranged like castes, whose educational dignity is determined by the average years of schooling of its citizens. Individual citizens of all countries achieve a symbolic mobility through a class system which makes each man accept the place he believes to have merited.
+
+The political revolutionary strengthens the demand for schooling by futilely promising that under his administration more learning and increased earning will become available to all through more schooling. He contributes to the modernization of a world class structure and a modernization of poverty. It remains the task of the cultural revolutionary to overcome the delusions on which the support of school is based and to outline policies for the radical deschooling of society.
+
+The basic reason for all this is that schooling comes in quanta. Less than so much is no good and the minimum quantum carries a minimum price. It is obvious that with schools of equal quality a poor child can never catch up with a rich one, nor a poor country with a rich country. It is equally obvious that poor children and poor countries never have equal schools but always poorer ones, and thus fall ever further behind, so long as they depend on schools for their education.
+
+Another illusion is that most learning is a result of teaching. Teaching may contribute to certain kinds of learning under certain circumstances. The strongly motivated student faced with the task of learning a new code may benefit greatly from the discipline we now associate mostly with the old-fashioned schoolmaster . But most people acquire most of their insight, knowledge, and skill outside of school—and in school only insofar as school in a few rich countries becomes their place of confinement during an increasing part of their lives. The radical deschooling of society begins, therefore, with the unmasking by cultural revolutionaries of the myth of schooling. It continues with the struggle to liberate other men’s minds from the false ideology of schooling—an ideology which makes domestication by schooling inevitable. In its final and positive stage it is the struggle for the right to educational freedom.
+
+A cultural revolutionary must fight for legal protection from the imposition of any obligatory graded curriculum. The first article of a bill of rights for a modern and humanist society corresponds to the first amendment of the United States Constitution . The state shall make no law with respect to an establishment of education. There shall be no graded curriculum, obligatory for all. To make this disestablishment effective, we need a law forbidding discrimination in hiring, voting, or admission to centers of learning based on previous attendance at some curriculum. This guarantee would not exclude specific tests of competence, but would remove the present absurd discrimination in favor of the person who learns a given skill with the largest expenditure of public funds. A third legal reform would guarantee the right of each citizen to an equal share of public educational resources, the right to verify his share of these resources, and the right to sue for them if they are denied. A generalized GI bill, or an edu-credit card in the hand of every citizen, would effectively implement this third guarantee.
+
+Abolition of obligatory schooling, abolition of job discrimination in favor of persons who have acquired their learning at a higher cost, plus establishment of edu-credit, would permit the development of a free exchange for educational services. According to present political ideology, this exchange could be influenced by various devices: premiums paid to those who acquire certain needed skills, interest-bearing edu-credit to increase the privileges of those who use it later in life, advantages for industries that incorporate additional formal training into the work routine.
+
+A fourth guarantee to protect the consumer against the monopoly of the educational market would be analogous to antitrust laws.
+
+I have shown in the case of education that a cultural or institutional revolution depends upon the clarification of reality. Development as now conceived is just the contrary: management of the environment and the tooling of man to fit into it. Cultural revolution is a review of the reality of man and a redefinition of the world in terms which support this reality. Development is the attempt to create an environment and then educate at great cost to pay for it.
+
+A bill of rights for modern man cannot produce cultural revolution . It is merely a manifesto. I have outlined the principles of an educational bill of rights. These principles can be generalized.
+
+The disestablishment of schooling can be generalized to freedom from monopoly in the satisfaction of any basic need. Discrimination on the basis of prior schooling can be generalized to discrimination in any institution because of underconsumption or underprivilege in another. A guarantee of equal education resources is a guarantee against regressive taxation. An educational antitrust law is obviously merely a special case of antitrust laws in general, which in turn are statutory implementations of constitutional guarantees against monopoly.
+
+The social and psychological destruction inherent in obligatory schooling is merely an illustration of the destruction implicit in all international institutions which now dictate the kinds of goods, services, and welfare available to satisfy basic human needs. Only a cultural and institutional revolution which reestablishes man’s control over his environment can arrest the violence by which development of institutions is now imposed by a few for their own interest. Maybe Marx has said it better, criticizing Ricardo and his school: “They want production to be limited to ‘useful things,’ but they forget that the production of too many useful things results in too many useless people.”
diff --git a/contents/book/awareness/es.bib b/contents/book/awareness/es.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d47b1ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/awareness/es.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-awareness-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Alternativas},
+  year = {1969},
+  date = {1969},
+  origdate = {1969},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/awareness:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/awareness/es.md b/contents/book/awareness/es.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/awareness/es.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1254 @@
+---
+  title: "Alternativas"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1969"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
+
+# Introducción
+
+No hay necesidad de una introducción a los siguientes artículos o al autor de los mismos. Sin embargo, si el doctor Illich me ha honrado al invitarme a escribirla y si yo acepté gustoso, la razón en nuestras dos mentes parece ser que esta introducción ofrece una oportunidad que permite clarificar la naturaleza de una actitud y una fe comunes, a pesar del hecho de que algunos de nuestros puntos de vista difieren considerablemente. Incluso algunos de los puntos de vista del propio autor de los artículos no son hoy los mismos que él mantenía cuando los escribió, en diferentes ocasiones y en el curso de los años. Pero él se ha mantenido coherente en lo esencial de su actitud y es esa esencia la que ambos compartimos.
+
+No es fácil encontrar una palabra justa que describa esa esencia. ¿Cómo se puede concretar en un concepto una actitud fundamental hacia la vida sin con ello distorsionarla y torcerla? Pero, dado que necesitamos comunicarnos con palabras, el término más adecuado —o, mejor dicho, el menos inadecuado— parece ser “radicalismo humanista”.
+
+¿Qué se quiere decir con radicalismo? ¿Qué es lo que implica _radicalismo humanista_?
+
+Por radicalismo no me refiero principalmente a un cierto conjunto de ideas sino más bien a una actitud, a una “manera de ver”, por así decir. Para comenzar, esta manera de ver puede caracterizarse con el lema: _de omnibus_ _dubitandum_; todo debe ser objeto de duda, particularmente los conceptos ideológicos que son virtualmente compartidos por todos y que como consecuencia han asumido el papel de axiomas indudables del sentido común.
+
+En ese sentido, “dudar” no implica un estado psicológico de incapacidad para llegar a decisiones o convicciones, como es el caso de la duda obsesiva, sino la disposición y capacidad para cuestionar críticamente todas las asunciones e instituciones que se han convertido en ídolos, en nombre del sentido común, la lógica y lo que se supone que es “natural”.
+
+Ese cuestionamiento radical sólo es posible si uno no da por sentados los conceptos de su propia sociedad o de todo un periodo histórico —como la cultura occidental desde el Renacimiento— y, más aún, si uno aumenta el alcance de su percepción y se interna en los aspectos de su pensar. Dudar radicalmente es un acto de investigación y descubrimiento; es comenzar a darnos cuenta de que el emperador está desnudo y de que su espléndido atuendo no es más que el producto de nuestra fantasía.
+
+Dudar radicalmente quiere decir cuestionar; no quiere necesariamente decir negar. Es fácil negar simplemente al aseverar lo opuesto de lo que existe; la duda radical es dialéctica en cuanto abarca el proceso del desenvolvimiento de los opuestos y se dirige hacia una nueva síntesis que niega y afirma.
+
+La duda radical es un proceso; un proceso que nos libera del pensamiento idolatrante; un ensanchamiento de la percepción, de la visión creativa e imaginativa de nuestras posibilidades y opciones. La actitud radical no existe en el vacío. No empieza de la nada, sino que comienza en las raíces, y la raíz, como dijo una vez Marx, es el hombre. Pero decir “la raíz es el hombre” no quiere significar un sentido positivista, descriptivo.
+
+Cuando hablamos del hombre no hablamos de él como una cosa sino como un proceso; hablamos de su potencial para desarrollar sus poderes; los poderes de dar mayor intensidad a su ser, mayor armonía, mayor amor, mayor percepción. También hablamos del hombre con un potencial para ser corrupto, con su poder _de_ acción que se transforma en la pasión de poder _sobre_ los demás, con su amor por la vida que degenera en pasión destructora de la vida.
+
+El radicalismo humanista es un cuestionamiento radical guiado por el entendimiento de la dinámica de la naturaleza del hombre y por una preocupación por el crecimiento y pleno desarrollo del hombre. En contraste con el positivismo contemporáneo, el radicalismo humanista no es “objetivo”, si por “objetividad” se entiende teorizar con pasión sin una meta manifiesta que impulse y nutra al proceso del pensamiento. Pero el radicalismo humanista es extremadamente objetivo si por ello se entiende que cada paso en el proceso del pensamiento está basado en evidencias críticamente analizadas y si además se le vincula al examen de las premisas del sentido común. Todo esto significa que el radicalismo humanista cuestiona cualquier idea y cualquier institución con el objeto de saber si ayudan u obstaculizan la capacidad del hombre para vivir en la plenitud y la alegría. Éste no es el lugar para analizar completamente algunos ejemplos del tipo de premisas de sentido común que son cuestionadas por el radicalismo humanista. Ni siquiera es necesario hacerlo, porque los artículos del doctor Illich tratan precisamente acerca de tales ejemplos; como la utilidad de la escuela obligatoria o la función actual del clero. Se podrían agregar muchos ejemplos más, algunos de los cuales están implicados en los artículos del autor. Quiero mencionar sólo unos cuantos: el concepto moderno de “progreso”, que significa el principio del constante aumento de la producción, del consumo, del ahorro de tiempo, de la maximización de la eficiencia y ganancias, del cálculo de todas las actividades económicas sin tomar en cuenta sus efectos sobre la calidad de la vida y el desarrollo del hombre; el dogma de que el aumento del consumo conduce a la felicidad del hombre, de que el manejo de las empresas a gran escala debe ser por necesidad burocrático y alienado; el que el objeto de la vida es tener (y usar), en lugar de ser; el que la razón reside en el intelecto y está divorciada de la vida afectiva; el que lo más nuevo es siempre mejor que lo más viejo; el que el radicalismo es la negación de la tradición; el que lo contrario de “ley y orden” es la falta de estructuras. En pocas palabras, el que las ideas y categorías que han surgido durante el desarrollo de la ciencia moderna y la industrialización son superiores a todas aquellas de culturas anteriores, e indispensables para el progreso de la raza humana.
+
+El radicalismo humanista cuestiona todas estas premisas y no se asusta de llegar a ideas y soluciones que puedan sonar absurdas. Veo el gran valor de los escritos del doctor Illich precisamente en el hecho de que representan el radicalismo humanista en su aspecto más pleno e imaginativo. El autor es un hombre de particular coraje, gran vitalidad, erudición y brillo extraordinarios, y fértil imaginación, y todo su pensamiento está basado en su preocupación por el desarrollo físico, espiritual e intelectual del hombre.
+
+La importancia de su pensamiento, tanto en éste como en sus otros escritos, reside en el hecho de que tienen un efecto liberador sobre la mente; porque muestran posibilidades totalmente nuevas; vitalizan al lector porque abren la puerta que conduce fuera de la cárcel de las ideas hechas rutina, estériles, preconcebidas. A través del impacto creador que comunican —salvo para aquellos que reaccionan con ira hacia tanto sinsentido— estos escritos pueden ayudar a estimular la energía y la esperanza para un nuevo comienzo.
+
+ERICH FROMM
+
+# Prefacio
+
+Cada capítulo de este volumen registra un esfuerzo de mi parte por poner en duda la naturaleza de una certidumbre particular. De ahí que cada uno de ellos encare una decepción —la decepción incorporada a una de nuestras instituciones—. Las instituciones crean certezas y, cuando se las toma en serio, las certezas amortecen el corazón y encadenan la imaginación. Confío en que cada una de mis afirmaciones —airada o apasionada, diestra o inocente— provoque también una sonrisa y, con ella, una nueva libertad, aunque sea una libertad que tuvo su precio.
+
+No fue por accidente que la mayoría de estos artículos obtuvo notoriedad al poco tiempo de su publicación original. Cada ensayo fue escrito en un lenguaje distinto, iba dirigido a un diferente grupo de lectores, tenía por intención dar en el blanco de una crisis particular de confianza.
+
+Cada uno de ellos irritó a algunos burócratas consumados en momentos en que se les hacía difícil racionalizar una posición según la cual sólo había que resolver una crisis interna en una situación estable.
+
+De ahí que los ensayos fueran literalmente escritos para una ocasión particular. El paso del tiempo hace necesario precisar algunos detalles ocasionales: las estadísticas, la situación que se discutía —e incluso mi propia actitud— pudieron haber cambiado desde entonces en cuestión de matices o de grados. Pero me he rehusado expresamente a poner al día dichos artículos para presentarlos en este volumen. Creo que deben sostenerse como lo que son, es decir, como puntos de vista sobre un fenómeno particular en su tiempo. El conjunto adolece inevitablemente de algunas repeticiones de ciertos hechos y expresiones que también quedan sin tocar —de haber pensado al escribirlas que algún día reuniría esos textos ocasionales en forma de libro, las habría entonces omitido—.
+
+“La alianza para el progreso de la pobreza” es el texto de un discurso que pronuncié en la Asamblea de la Canadian Foreign Policy Association para subrayar la trivialidad del “Informe Pearson” al Banco Mundial sobre la “Segunda Década del Desarrollo”, y provee un marco para los demás ensayos. “La metamorfosis del clero” es la ponencia con que contribuí en un círculo de teólogos en 1959 y que publiqué en 1967 para enjuiciar la superficialidad de las propuestas de reforma que estaban de moda entre los “católicos de avanzada”. Las reformas que ellos preconizaban no eran lo suficientemente radicales para que valiesen la pena (se limitaban a cambios litúrgicos, al casamiento de los curas, a un clero revolucionario y algunas otras cosas), ni tampoco se arraigaban en opciones tradicionales que me parecían indignas de sacrificar (tales como la valoración del celibato libremente escogido, la estructura episcopal de la Iglesia y la permanencia de la ordenación sacerdotal). Pretendo que sólo la desclericalización de la Iglesia le permitiría aquella renuncia al poder que es la única que puede concederle hablar en nombre de los pobres.
+
+“El reverso de la caridad” es un panfleto. Lo hice circular para acabar con el entusiasmo internacional que favorecía el envío de “misioneros” para el desarrollo de América Latina.
+
+“La vaca sagrada” fue publicado como artículo en _Siempre!_, en agosto de 1968. Es mi primer esfuerzo por identificar el sistema escolar como instrumento de colonización interna.
+
+“La desescolarización de la Iglesia” es el discurso de apertura que pronuncié en Lima en 1971 para la Asamblea del Consejo Mundial de Educación Cristiana. El Consejo se disolvió al finalizar este encuentro.
+
+“La alternativa a la escolarización” es el último de una serie de ensayos que escribí sobre educación. Con este texto traté de oponerme a la recuperación de mi tesis expuesta en el libro _La sociedad desescolarizada_ (Barral, Barcelona, 1974). Varias organizaciones internacionales se veían obligadas a reconocer los fundamentos de mi crítica al sistema escolar tradicional, y quisieron utilizar mis argumentos en favor de la proliferación de nuevas agencias para la educación recurrente, permanente, interminable.
+
+Desde 1971 me opuse a este exorcismo del diablo por Belcebú.
+
+“Conciencia política y control de la natalidad” es mi contribución a un encuentro de expertos en demografía que tuvo lugar en 1967 en Barranquitas, Puerto Rico. Propongo una “inversión” del problema que normalmente perciben los demagogos de la demografía. Mi tesis se elaboró ulteriormente en _La convivencialidad_ (Barral, Barcelona, 1974).
+
+“La aceleración paralizadora” aplica al caso del transporte mi teoría general sobre la crisis institucional contemporánea. En todo campo de valores existen dos tipos extremos de producción. Cuando prevalece —más allá de un cierto umbral— el tipo de producción industrial, entonces las desutilidades marginales en la producción cancelan el valor respectivo. El texto es la traducción de una ponencia que hice en la Universidad de Munich. Mi tesis se trata en extenso en _Energía y equidad_ (Barral, Barcelona, 1974).
+
+“La expropiación de la salud” demuestra que la institucionalización industrial de un valor de servicio puede paralizar su producción en la misma forma en la que, como se vio en el capítulo precedente, el transporte impide la movilidad cuando su potencia se desarrolla más allá de un umbral crítico.
+
+La ponencia fue presentada en la facultad de medicina de la Universidad de Edimburgo en 1974, para celebrar un centenario.
+
+“La elocuencia del silencio” concluye el volumen, aunque su composición precede a la de los demás ensayos. Es una meditación propuesta a unos religiosos yanquis que aprendían el castellano para “integrar” mejor a los puertorriqueños en sus parroquias de Nueva York.
+
+Les sugerí la necesidad de reconocer límites para sus buenas intenciones.
+
+IVÁN ILLICH
+
+ _Cuernavaca, julio de 1974_
+
+
+# La alianza para el progreso de la pobreza
+
+Está de moda exigir que las naciones ricas transformen su maquinaria bélica en un programa de ayuda al desarrollo del Tercer Mundo. La amenaza que para el mundo industrializado representan la superpoblación y el subconsumo de nueve décimos de la humanidad podría aún conducir a esa improbable manifestación de autodefensa. Pero si ello sucede, llevaría también a una desesperación irreversible, porque los arados de los ricos pueden hacer tanto daño como sus espadas. A largo plazo, los camiones norteamericanos pueden ser tan dañinos como los tanques norteamericanos, puesto que es más fácil crear una demanda en masa para los primeros que para los segundos. Y una vez que el Tercer Mundo se haya convertido en un mercado masivo para los bienes, los productos y las formas de procesamiento diseñados por y para los ricos, el subdesarrollo progresivo se tornará inevitable. El automóvil familiar no puede transportar al pobre a la era de los jets, ni el sistema escolar proporcionarle una educación de por vida, ni el pequeño refrigerador familiar asegurarle una alimentación sana.
+
+Es evidente que en América Latina sólo un hombre de cada mil puede costearse un Cadillac, una operación del corazón o un título de licenciado.
+
+Esta restricción de las metas del desarrollo no nos hace desesperar acerca del destino del Tercer Mundo; la razón es simple. Aún no hemos concebido el Cadillac como un requisito para una buena locomoción, ni la cirugía del corazón como un cuidado indispensable para la salud, ni un título de licenciado como el umbral de una educación aceptable. De hecho, reconocemos que la importación de Cadillacs debe ser severamente gravada en Perú; que, en Colombia, una clínica para el trasplante de órganos es un juguete escandaloso que sirve para justificar la concentración de un número mayor de doctores en Bogotá; y que el Betatrón está más allá de los medios docentes de la Universidad de São Paulo.
+
+Por desgracia, no todos consideran evidente el hecho de que la mayoría de los latinoamericanos —no sólo de nuestra generación sino de la próxima y aun de la siguiente— no puede costearse ninguna clase de automóvil, ni de hospitalización, ni siquiera de escuela primaria. Preferimos no ser conscientes de esa realidad tan obvia; la verdad es que detestamos reconocer que nuestra imaginación ha sido arrinconada. Tan persuasivo es el poder de las instituciones que nosotros mismos hemos creado, que ellas modelan no sólo nuestras preferencias sino también nuestra visión de lo posible. No podemos hablar de medios modernos de transporte sin referirnos a los automóviles y a los aviones. Nos sentimos impedidos de tratar el problema de la salud sin implicar automáticamente la posibilidad de prolongar una vida enferma indefinidamente. Hemos llegado a ser completamente incapaces de pensar en una educación mejor salvo en términos de escuelas aún más complejas y maestros entrenados durante un tiempo aún más largo. El horizonte de nuestra facultad de invención está bloqueado por gigantescas instituciones que producen servicios carísimos.
+
+Hemos limitado nuestra visión del mundo a los marcos de nuestras instituciones y somos ahora sus prisioneros.
+
+Las fábricas, los medios de comunicación, los hospitales, los gobiernos y las escuelas producen bienes y servicios especialmente concebidos, enlatados de manera tal que contengan nuestra visión del mundo. Nosotros —los ricos— concebimos el progreso en términos de la creciente expansión de esas instituciones. Concebimos el perfeccionamiento del transporte en términos de lujo y seguridad enlatados por la General Motors y la Boeing bajo el aspecto de automóviles estándar y de aviones. Creemos que el bienestar cada vez mayor viene dado por la existencia de un mayor número de doctores y hospitales, que enlatan la salud como una prolongación del sufrimiento. Hemos llegado a identificar nuestra necesidad de una creciente educación con la demanda de un mayor confinamiento en los salones de clases. En otras palabras, la educación es hoy un producto enlatado, un conjunto que incluye guarderías, certificados para trabajar y derecho de voto, todo ello empaquetado con la indoctrinación en las virtudes cristianas, liberales o marxistas.
+
+En escasos 100 años, la sociedad industrial ha modelado soluciones patentadas para satisfacer las necesidades básicas del hombre, y nos ha hecho creer que las necesidades humanas fueron configuradas por el Creador como demandas para los productos que nosotros mismos inventamos. Esto es tan cierto para Rusia o Japón como para las sociedades del Atlántico Norte. Mediante una lealtad invariable a los mismos productores —quienes le darán siempre los mismos productos enlatados ligeramente mejorados o mejor presentados—, el consumidor es entrenado para enfrentarse a la desvalorización anual del artículo. Las sociedades industrializadas pueden surtir estos productos enlatados a la mayoría de los ciudadanos para su consumo personal, pero esto no prueba que esas sociedades sean sanas, o que promuevan un humanismo vital. Lo contrario es verdad. Cuanto más se ha entrenado al ciudadano para el consumo de estos paquetes de uso corriente, menos efectivo parece ser para modelar la totalidad de su medio ambiente. Así es como agota sus energías y sus finanzas en procurar continuamente nuevos artículos de primera necesidad, y el medio ambiente se convierte en un subproducto de sus hábitos de consumo.
+
+El diseño de estos productos enlatados de que hablo se halla en la base del alto costo para satisfacer las necesidades primarias. Mientras cada hombre “necesite” de su automóvil, nuestras ciudades continuarán soportando los embotellamientos de tráfico y los remedios absurdamente caseros que pretenden solucionarlos. Mientras la salud se entienda como el tiempo máximo de supervivencia, nuestros enfermos serán objeto creciente de intervenciones quirúrgicas fantásticas y de drogas que sirvan para aliviar el progresivo dolor subsiguiente. Mientras utilicemos las escuelas para que los niños dejen de exasperar a sus padres; para evitar que vaguen en las calles; para mantenerlos fuera del mercado de trabajo o para impedir que a los jóvenes se les tome en serio en la política; mientras eso suceda, la juventud será recluida en periodos de escolarización cada vez mayores y se necesitarán incentivos crecientes para soportar las penosas pruebas. Ahora, benevolentemente, las naciones ricas imponen a las pobres las camisas de fuerza de los embotellamientos de tráfico, el confinamiento en los hospitales y en las escuelas, y resulta que mediante un consenso internacional se llama a esto desarrollo. Los ricos, los escolarizados y los viejos pacientes del mundo desarrollado tratan de compartir sus dudosas bendiciones enfilando hacia el Tercer Mundo sus soluciones preenlatadas.
+
+Mientras en São Paulo crecen los enjambres de tráfico, casi un millón de campesinos del nordeste brasileño deben caminar 800 km para escapar de la sequía. Mientras que en las favelas, villas miseria y ranchitos, donde se concentra 90% de la población, la disentería amibiana sigue siendo un mal endémico, los doctores latinoamericanos reciben, en el New York Hospital for Special Surgery, un entrenamiento que luego aplicarán a unos pocos.
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+Pagada casi siempre por los gobiernos de sus propios países, una insignificante minoría de latinoamericanos recibe, en Norteamérica, una avanzada educación en el campo de las ciencias básicas. Si alguna vez regresan, por ejemplo a Bolivia, pasan a ser maestros de segunda categoría u orgullosos residentes de La Paz o Cochabamba.
+
+El mundo rico nos exporta las versiones anticuadas de sus modelos desechados. La Alianza para el Progreso es un buen ejemplo de la benevolente producción del subdesarrollo. Contrariamente a lo que dicen los eslogans, tuvo éxito —como una alianza para el progreso de las clases consumidoras y la domesticación de las grandes masas—. La Alianza ha sido un paso mayúsculo en la modernización de los patrones de consumo de las clases medias sudamericanas —en otras palabras, ha sido un medio para integrar esa metástasis colonial a la cultura dominante en la metrópolis norteamericana—. Al mismo tiempo, la Alianza ha modernizado los niveles de aspiración de la gran mayoría de los ciudadanos y ha dirigido sus demandas hacia artículos a los que hoy no tiene ni tendrá mañana acceso.
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+Por cada automóvil que Brasil echa a andar, se les niega a 50 brasileños el poder disfrutar de un buen servicio de autobús. Cada refrigerador particular que se negocia en el comercio reduce la posibilidad de construir un congelador comunitario. Cada dólar que se gasta en América Latina en doctores y hospitales cuesta 100 vidas —para adoptar una frase de Jorge Ahumada, el brillante economista chileno, quien solía añadir—: porque si cada dólar así gastado se hubiera invertido en un plan para proveer agua potable, habría salvado 100 vidas. Cada dólar que se gasta en escolarización significa un mayor privilegio para una minoría a costo de la gran mayoría; en el mejor de los casos aumenta el número de aquellos a quienes, antes de abandonar la escuela, se les ha enseñado que quienes permanecen en el colegio durante más tiempo se han ganado el derecho a un poder, una salud y un prestigio mayores. Basta un poco de escolarización para enseñar a los escolarizados la superioridad de los más escolarizados.
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+Todos los países latinoamericanos se hallan frenéticamente volcados en gastar más y más dinero en sus sistemas escolares. Hoy en día, ni un solo país gasta en su educación —es decir, en su escolarización— menos de 18% de los impuestos derivados del ingreso público, y hay varios países que gastan casi el doble de ese porcentaje. Pero pese a esas gigantescas inversiones, ningún país ha tenido hasta ahora éxito en proporcionar cinco años completos de educación a más de un tercio de sus habitantes. La demanda y la oferta de escolarización crecen geométricamente en dirección contraria. Y lo que es verdad acerca de la escolarización lo es también en lo que se refiere a los productos de la mayoría de las instituciones en el proceso de “modernización” del Tercer Mundo.
+
+El continuo refinamiento tecnológico de los productos que ya se han incorporado al mercado no hace frecuentemente sino aumentar las ventajas del productor y no los beneficios para el consumidor. Los procesos de producción cada vez más complejos tienden a permitir que solamente los grandes productores puedan reemplazar continuamente los artículos, y enfocar así la demanda del consumidor hacia las mejoras marginales sin importarle —y, es más, haciéndole olvidar— los resultados concomitantes: precios más altos, duración menor, menor utilidad general, mayor costo de preparación. Piensen en la cantidad de usos posibles para un abrelatas común y corriente; en cambio, un abrelatas eléctrico, si funciona, sólo sirve para abrir un cierto tipo de latas, a pesar de costar 100 veces más.
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+Lo dicho vale tanto para una maquinaria destinada a la agricultura como para un grado académico. La propaganda puede convencer a un granjero del medio oeste de Estados Unidos de que necesita un transporte de doble tracción que desarrolle una velocidad de 70 millas por hora en carretera, que tenga un limpiaparabrisas eléctrico y que en un año o dos pueda cambiarse por uno nuevo. Pero la mayoría de los agricultores del mundo no necesita ni esa velocidad ni esa comodidad, ni se preocupa tampoco en lo más mínimo porque el artículo pase de moda. Lo que ellos necesitan son vehículos que gasten poco, porque en su mundo el tiempo no es dinero, los limpiaparabrisas manuales son suficientes y un equipo pesado dura cuando menos una generación. Aquel tipo de vehículo requeriría una ingeniería y un diseño totalmente distintos de los empleados en ese rubro del mercado norteamericano: hoy, esa clase de vehículo no se produce. La mayoría de los sudamericanos necesita en realidad de un personal paramédico que pueda funcionar eficazmente durante largo tiempo sin necesidad de ser supervisado por un doctor. En lugar de establecer un proceso para entrenar a las parteras y a los asistentes médicos que saben cómo usar un arsenal limitado de medicamentos con bastante independencia, las universidades latinoamericanas crean cada año un nuevo departamento de enfermería especializada para preparar un personal que sólo sabe trabajar en un hospital, o farmacéuticos que sólo saben vender una cantidad cada vez mayor de recetas delicadas.
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+El mundo se mueve hacia un atolladero, definido por dos procesos convergentes: un número mayor de personas tiene cada vez un número menor de alternativas básicas. El crecimiento de la humanidad es ampliamente publicitado y crea pánico. La disminución de alternativas fundamentales es consciente y constantemente despreciada por el productor, pues ellas causan una angustia profunda. La explosión demográfica excede las fronteras de la imaginación, pero la atrofia progresiva de la misma imaginación social es racionalizada como un aumento de la posibilidad de elegir entre dos marcas registradas. Los dos procesos convergen hacia un punto muerto: la explosión demográfica provee cada vez más consumidores para todo, desde alimentos hasta anticonceptivos, mientras que nuestra imaginación se encoge y no puede concebir otra forma de satisfacer su demanda como no sea a través de los productos enlatados que ya están a la venta. En lo siguiente me limitaré a esos dos factores, puesto que, a mi modo de ver, forman las dos coordenadas que juntas nos permiten definir el subdesarrollo.
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+En la mayoría de los países del Tercer Mundo, la población crece, así como también la clase media —ingreso, consumo y bienestar se polarizan —. Aun cuando los índices de consumo per cápita aumentan, la gran mayoría de los hombres dispone de menos alimentos que en 1945, de menos salud pública, de menos trabajo significativo y de peores condiciones habitacionales. La creciente marginalidad es una consecuencia parcial del consumo polarizado y resulta parcialmente causada por la ruptura de la familia y de la cultura tradicionales.
+
+En 1969 más personas padecen hambre, dolor y frío a la intemperie que al final de la segunda guerra —no sólo en cifras absolutas sino también en términos comparativos de porcentaje de población mundial—.
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+Confrontada con la realidad, la definición cualitativa del subdesarrollo medido según los indicadores de consumo se queda corta, pero aún así sirve para definir una de las dos mayores coordenadas del atolladero mundial. El carácter realmente crítico del subdesarrollo radica en que es un estado de ánimo y al mismo tiempo una categoría de la conciencia. En esta dimensión el proceso del subdesarrollo puede acelerarse intensamente a través de un esfuerzo planeado y dirigido hacia el mercado masivo de la modernización estandarizada. Pero al mismo tiempo, es dentro de ese marco donde se puede operar una inversión decisiva. El subdesarrollo como estado de ánimo aparece cuando las necesidades humanas se vacían en el molde de una demanda urgente por nuevas marcas de soluciones enlatadas que estarán continuamente fuera del alcance de la mayoría. En este sentido el subdesarrollo crece rápidamente, incluso en los países donde la oferta de salones de clase, calorías, autos y hospitales, va también en aumento. Estas instituciones ofrecen a una minoría servicios que satisfacen los requerimientos internacionales. Pero una vez que han monopolizado la demanda de todos, ya no pueden cumplir con las necesidades de las mayorías.
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+Insisto: el subdesarrollo como un estado de ánimo —y de desaliento—, ocurre cada vez que las necesidades humanas básicas se presentan como demanda por productos enlatados específicos que han sido diseñados para la sociedad de la abundancia. En este sentido el subdesarrollo es un resultado extremo de lo que podemos llamar, en términos comunes a Marx y a Freud, _Verdinglichung_ o cosificación.
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+Por cosificación entiendo la enajenación de las necesidades reales que ya se perciben como si sólo pudieran satisfacerse mediante una demanda explícita de productos manufacturados en masa. Por cosificación entiendo traducir la “sed” por “necesidad de tomar una Coca-Cola”. Este tipo de cosificación surge cuando las necesidades humanas primarias las manipula un aparato burocrático que ha impuesto un monopolio sobre la imaginación de los consumidores en potencia.
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+Permítaseme volver a mi ejemplo tomado del campo de la educación.
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+La propaganda intensa de la necesidad de escuelas lleva a todos a creer que la asistencia a clases y la educación son sinónimos, a tal grado que en el lenguaje cotidiano los dos términos son intercambiables. Una vez que la imaginación de todo un pueblo ha sido escolarizada o monopolizada a través de esa equivalencia, entonces a los analfabetos se les puede obligar a pagar impuestos para proporcionarles una educación gratuita a los hijos de los ricos y para una mayor expansión de la profesión magisterial.
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+El subdesarrollo es un resultado del aumento de los niveles de aspiración de las masas, sujetas a la intensa circulación en el mercado de los productos patentados en el foro de la imaginación alienada.
+
+En ese sentido, el subdesarrollo dinámico es exactamente lo opuesto de lo que yo entiendo por educación, esto es: despertar la conciencia de que existen otros y nuevos niveles de posibilidades humanas, otras formas inexploradas de utilizar el saber tecnológico y de usar la imaginación creadora para evitar la capitulación de la conciencia social a manos de un monopolio que impone una solución prefabricada. El procedimiento mediante el cual la circulación en el mercado de productos importados desarrolla el subdesarrollo, es algo que frecuentemente se estudia sólo en términos superficiales. El hombre que siente indignación al ver una planta de Coca-Cola en una favela, un ranchito o una callampa, es a menudo el mismo que se siente orgulloso al ver una escuela que crece en el mismo lugar. Resiente la evidencia de que hay una patente extranjera vinculada con el refresco; le gustaría ver en su lugar algo como Coca-Mex o Coca-Perú. Y a la vez ése es el mismo hombre que trata de imponer a toda costa la escolarización de sus compatriotas, sin darse cuenta de la patente invisible que ata profundamente esta otra institución al mercado mundial.
+
+Hace algunos años vi a un grupo de trabajadores levantar un anuncio, de 20 metros, de la Coca-Cola en el valle desértico del Mezquital. La sequía y el hambre acababan de afectar seriamente la meseta mexicana. Un pobre indio de Ixmiquilpan, que fue quien me invitó, ofrecía a sus visitantes vasitos de tequila con un traguito de la oscura y costosa agua azucarada.
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+Cuando recuerdo esa escena reacciono con furia. Pero me exaspero aún más al recordar los encuentros de la UNESCO, en los cuales los bien intencionados y bien pagados burócratas discuten con seriedad los currículos escolares en América Latina, o cuando pienso en las peroratas de entusiastas liberales que abogan por la necesidad de un número mayor de escuelas. El fraude perpetrado por los vendedores de escuelas es por cierto mucho menos obvio, pero mucho más fundamental que el arte del satisfecho representante de la Ford o de la Coca-Cola, puesto que el partidario de la escuela consigue hacer morder a la gente el anzuelo de una droga mucho más eficaz.
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+La asistencia a la escuela primaria no es un lujo inofensivo, sino que con ella ocurre lo mismo que con el indio de los Andes a quien su hábito de mascar coca lo tiene enjaezado a su patrón. Cuanto mayor es la dosis de escolarización que ha recibido un individuo, tanto más deprimente resulta su experiencia en abandonar las clases. El muchacho que deja la secundaria en el primer año padece mucho más su inferioridad que el que deja la primaria después del tercer año. Las escuelas del Tercer Mundo administran su opio mucho más eficazmente que las iglesias de otras épocas. A medida que el espíritu de una sociedad es progresivamente escolarizado, sus miembros pierden paso a paso las excusas que los hacían sentirse inferiores a los demás. Las escuelas racionalizan el origen divino de la estratificación social con mucho más rigor que el que siempre han usado las iglesias.
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+Hasta la fecha ningún país latinoamericano ha promulgado leyes contra los jóvenes que no consumen suficiente Coca-Cola o automóviles, pero todos los países latinoamericanos han aprobado leyes que definen a los desertores como ciudadanos que no han cumplido con sus obligaciones legales. Recientemente, el gobierno brasileño elevó casi al doble el número de años de escolarización gratuita obligatoria. Desde ahora cualquier desertor escolar que tenga menos de 16 años enfrentará por el resto de su vida el reproche de no haber aprovechado ese privilegio legalmente obligatorio para todos los ciudadanos. Lo curioso es que esa ley se promulgó en un país donde ni siquiera la predicción más optimista puede hacernos avizorar el día en que sea posible otorgar esas prerrogativas escolares por lo menos a 25%. La adopción de los estándares internacionales de educación condena para siempre a la mayoría de los latinoamericanos a la marginalidad o a la exclusión de la vida social —en una palabra, al subdesarrollo progresivo—. Esa traducción de “objetivos sociales” en “niveles de consumo de los productos” no es exclusiva de unos pocos países. Por encima de todas las fronteras culturales, ideológicas y geográficas, las naciones se mueven hoy en día hacia el establecimiento de sus propias fábricas de automóviles, de sus propios hospitales y de sus propias escuelas primarias, y en la mayoría de los casos se trata, cuando mucho, de pobres imitaciones de modelos extranjeros y, especialmente, norteamericanos.
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+El Tercer Mundo necesita una profunda revolución de sus instituciones.
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+Las revoluciones de la última generación fueron abrumadoramente políticas. Un nuevo grupo de hombres, con un nuevo conjunto de justificaciones ideológicas, tomó el poder para dedicarse luego a administrar fundamentalmente las mismas instituciones escolares, médicas y económicas, con el fin de satisfacer el interés de un nuevo grupo de clientes. Y puesto que las instituciones no habían cambiado radicalmente, la dimensión de la nueva clientela es aproximadamente igual a la anterior.
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+Esto resulta claro en el caso de la educación. Los costos de escolarización por alumno son hoy prácticamente comparables en todas partes, puesto que se tiende a compartir los estándares empleados para evaluar la calidad de la escolarización. El grado de acceso a la enseñanza públicamente subsidiada, la cual se identifica con la posibilidad de ir a la escuela, depende en todas partes de su variable principal: el ingreso per cápita. Lugares como China y Vietnam del Norte pueden ser las excepciones significativas.
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+En todo el Tercer Mundo —si tenemos en cuenta el propósito igualitario según el cual fueron fundadas— las instituciones modernas son absolutamente improductivas. Mientras la imaginación social de la mayoría no haya sido paralizada de manera irreversible mediante la fijación a estas instituciones, hay cada vez mayor esperanza de que la revolución de las instituciones pueda planearse en el Tercer Mundo y no en los países ricos.
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+De ahí la urgencia de abocarnos a la tarea de desarrollar alternativas viables frente a las soluciones “modernas”.
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+En muchos países el subdesarrollo se acerca a un estado crónico. La revolución a la cual me refiero debe echarse a andar antes de que eso suceda. Una vez más la educación ofrece un buen ejemplo de ello: el subdesarrollo educativo crónico tiene lugar cuando la demanda de escolarización tiende de tal modo a ser universal que la concentración total de los recursos educativos en el sistema escolar se convierte en una exigencia política unánime. En ese momento, desenlatar la educación de la escuela, disociar el binomio escuela-educación, se hace prácticamente imposible.
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+La única respuesta viable frente al creciente subdesarrollo es planear una respuesta que sea una alternativa para las áreas de bajo capital. Es más sencillo hablar de alternativas para las instituciones y servicios que definir esas alternativas en términos precisos. No quiero añadir otro capítulo a las publicaciones acerca del año 2000 inspiradas por el señor Herman Kahn.
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+No es mi propósito pintar una Utopía ni describir el escenario de un futuro de alternativas. Debemos contentarnos con algunos ejemplos que indiquen la posible dirección de las investigaciones.
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+Algunos de esos ejemplos ya han sido expuestos. Los autobuses son una alternativa para los enjambres de automóviles particulares. Unos vehículos diseñados especialmente para un transporte un poco más lento, o sobre rieles, sirven de alternativa a los camiones estándar. El agua no contaminada es una alternativa frente a la costosa cirugía. Los ayudantes de los médicos son una alternativa para los doctores y las enfermeras. El almacenamiento comunal de los alimentos resulta una alternativa frente a los costosos equipos de cocina. Podrían discutirse otras alternativas. ¿Por qué no, por ejemplo, considerar las caminatas como una futura alternativa que puede sustituir a la locomoción motorizada y explorar al mismo tiempo las tareas que ese cambio demandaría de los arquitectos? ¿Y por qué no uniformar la construcción de habitaciones familiares con estructuras prefabricadas, de modo que a cada ciudadano se le obligue a aprender durante un año de servicio social cómo construir su propia casa?
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+Hablar de alternativas en la educación es más difícil. Ello se debe, en parte, a que las escuelas han agotado enteramente los recursos que se destinan a la educación. Pero, incluso en este campo, podemos indicar las líneas generales para la investigación.
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+Hoy en día la escolarización se concibe como la asistencia de los niños a clase, las calificaciones, los programas de estudio. Los niños deben ir a la escuela durante cerca de 1 000 horas por año, y durante un periodo ininterrumpido de varios años. Como regla general, los países latinoamericanos pueden proporcionar a cada ciudadano entre 30 y 40 meses de ese servicio. ¿Por qué no, por ejemplo, hacer obligatorio uno o dos meses de clases para todos los ciudadanos de menos de 30 años?
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+Hoy en día la mayor parte del dinero se gasta en los niños. A un adulto se le puede enseñar a leer en una décima del tiempo y a un costo 10 veces menor que los insumidos por un niño. En el caso de la persona adulta existe una recuperación inmediata de la inversión, no importa que su aprendizaje se vea a través de una nueva perspectiva y conciencia políticas, o que se enfoque desde el punto de vista de una productividad creciente. En el caso del adulto el saldo es doble, puesto que no sólo contribuye a la educación de sus hijos, sino también a la de otros adultos.
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+A pesar de esas ventajas, en América Latina —donde la mayor parte de los recursos públicos se destinan a las escuelas— los programas de alfabetización de adultos no sólo no son subsidiados, sino que son bárbaramente suprimidos, como sucede en Brasil y otros países donde el apoyo militar a las oligarquías feudales o industriales se ha quitado la máscara de su inicial benevolencia.
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+Es difícil definir otra alternativa, puesto que no existe aún ningún ejemplo para demostrarla, pero eso no quiere decir que no exista. Debemos entonces imaginar que los recursos públicos destinados a la educación se distribuyan de tal manera que se ofrezca a cada ciudadano una oportunidad mínima. Se podría imaginar algo así como una ley de derechos universales, similar a aquella que concibieron los militares después de la guerra, de tal modo que se divida la cantidad de los recursos públicos destinados a la educación entre el número de niños que está en edad escolar, asegurándose de que un niño que no ha aprovechado esas ventajas a la edad de siete, ocho o nueve años, cuando llegue a los 10 las tendrá disponibles.
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+Preguntamos entonces, ¿qué hacer con los compasivos recursos que cualquier república latinoamericana le ofrece a cada uno de sus niños?
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+Respondemos: proveer casi todos los libros básicos, dibujos, cubos, juegos y juguetes que están totalmente ausentes de las casas y de los niños pobres y que le permiten a un niño de clase media aprender los números enteros, el alfabeto, los colores, las formas y otras clases de objetos y experiencias que aseguren su progreso educativo. Proveer anualmente a cada ciudadano menor de 30 años de varias semanas de vacaciones en un campamento de intenso trabajo educativo. Entre todas estas cosas sin escuelas o las escuelas sin ninguna de estas cosas, la elección es obvia.
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+Pero el niño pobre, el único para quien desafortunadamente la elección se plantea en términos reales, jamás puede elegir.
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+Definir las alternativas a los productos y a las instituciones que en la hora presente dominan nuestra visibilidad es difícil, no sólo, como he tratado de demostrarlo, por el hecho de que tanto esos productos como esas instituciones modelan nuestra concepción de la realidad, sino también porque la construcción de esas alternativas requiere de una concentración de voluntad e inteligencia poco frecuente.
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+En el último siglo hemos acostumbrado llamar a esa combinación de voluntad e inteligencia al servicio de la solución de problemas particulares independientemente de su naturaleza, investigación. Quiero dejar claro, sin embargo, a qué clase de investigación me refiero. No hablo de investigación básica en el campo de la física, la ingeniería, la genética, la medicina o las letras. El trabajo de hombres como Pauling, Crick, Penfield y Hibb debe sin duda continuar ampliando nuestro horizonte científico en otros campos. Los laboratorios, las bibliotecas y los colaboradores especializados que estos hombres necesitan los llevan a congregarse cada vez más en las pocas capitales de investigación que existen en el mundo. Sus avances radicales proporcionan nuevos parámetros para el diseñador de cualquier producto.
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+Tampoco hablo de los millones de dólares que se gastan anualmente en la investigación aplicada, puesto que ese dinero lo invierten las grandes instituciones que buscan perfeccionar y dar a la publicidad sus productos.
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+La investigación aplicada es dinero gastado para hacer aviones más veloces y aeropuertos más seguros; dinero gastado para hacer medicamentos cada vez más específicos y poderosos y doctores más capaces de manejar los efectos secundarios de esas drogas; dinero gastado para enlatar más enseñanza en salones de clase; dinero gastado en métodos dedicados a administrar burocracias cada vez más grandes. Éste es el tipo de investigación al cual debemos oponer cierta clase de contracorriente, si deseamos llegar a presentar alguna alternativa a los automóviles, los hospitales, las escuelas y muchos de los tantos otros llamados “implementos necesarios para la vida moderna”.
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+Hablo de un tipo de investigación peculiarmente difícil, que por razones obvias ha sido hasta ahora profundamente descuidada. Lo que estoy haciendo es un llamado para investigar las alternativas a todos los productos que hoy en día dominan el mercado: alternativas a los hospitales y las profesiones que se dedican a mantener vivos a los enfermos; alternativas a las escuelas y a los procesos de enlatar productos que se rehúsan a proveer educación a quienes no tienen la edad requerida, a quienes no han seguido los programas exigidos, a quienes no se han sentado en un salón de clase durante el número sucesivo de horas indicado, en fin, a quienes no van a pagar para estar sometidos a las guarderías, los exámenes de admisión y la constancia de materias o títulos, a más del adoctrinamiento en los valores de la élite dominante.
+
+Esta investigación contracorriente que intenta hallar alternativas fundamentales a las soluciones patentadas más comunes es el elemento crítico principal para la búsqueda de un futuro en el cual podremos vivir.
+
+Esta investigación contracorriente es distinta a la mayor parte del trabajo que se hace en nombre del año 2000: porque casi todo ese trabajo busca cambios en los modelos sociales, pero a través del desarrollo lineal de las consecuencias de la tecnología avanzada. La investigación contracorriente, a la cual hago referencia, debe tomar como uno de sus parámetros fundamentales la continua falta de capital en los países del Tercer Mundo.
+
+Las dificultades de ese tipo de investigación son obvias. El investigador debe, en primer lugar, dudar de todo aquello que a primera vista es evidente. Segundo, debe persuadir a quienes tienen el poder de decisión para que actúen contra sus intereses a corto plazo. Y, finalmente, debe sobrevivir como individuo en un mundo que él mismo está tratando de cambiar tan fundamentalmente, ya que sus amigos de la minoría privilegiada lo ven como un destructor de la realidad cotidiana en la que todos nos apoyamos. Él sabe, por supuesto, que si logra tener éxito beneficiando a los pobres, puede que un día los ricos quieran también imitar a los felices.
+
+Hay un camino normal para aquellos que dictan una política del desarrollo, ya sea que vivan en el Norte o en Sudamérica, en Rusia o en Israel. Ese camino es definir el desarrollo y establecer sus objetivos en términos que nos resulten familiares, según la manera habitual como ellos están acostumbrados a satisfacer sus necesidades, y de acuerdo con realidades que les permitan usar las instituciones sobre las cuales ejercen el poder o control. Esa fórmula no sólo ha fracasado, sino que fracasará siempre. No hay en el mundo suficiente dinero como para que el desarrollo pueda tener éxito según esas vías, ni siquiera en el caso en que las superpotencias combinaran para ese fin sus presupuestos bélicos.
+
+Un curso análogo lo siguen aquellos que intentan llevar a cabo las revoluciones políticas, especialmente en el Tercer Mundo. Como regla general, prometen hacer accesibles a todos los ciudadanos los privilegios más comunes de que gozan las élites del presente, es decir, la escolarización, la hospitalización, etc. Respaldan esa promesa con la vana creencia de que un cambio de régimen político les permitirá holgadamente ampliar las instituciones que producen esos privilegios. La promesa y el llamado de los revolucionarios están, por tanto, tan amenazadas por el tipo de investigación contracorriente que yo propongo, como lo está el dominante mercado de los productores.
+
+Vietnam, un pueblo armado con bicicleta y lanzas de bambú, ha llevado a un callejón sin salida a la mayor concentración de centros de investigación y producción que jamás haya conocido la historia. Debemos buscar nuestra supervivencia en el Tercer Mundo, en el que la ingenuidad humana es más lista que el poder mecánico.
+
+Por más difícil que sea, la única manera de revertir el progresivo subdesarrollo es aprender a reírnos de las soluciones aceptadas, para así poder cambiar las demandas que las hacen necesarias. Sólo los hombres libres pueden cambiar sus mentalidades y ser capaces de asombrarse, y mientras acontece que no todos los hombres son completamente libres, resulta también que algunos son más libre que los demás.
+
+# La metamorfosis del clero
+
+La iglesia romana que quiere ser el signo de la presencia de Cristo en el mundo, se ha convertido en la mayor administración no gubernamental del mundo. Emplea 1 800 000 trabajadores de tiempo completo: sacerdotes, religiosos y religiosas, laicos. Estos hombres y estas mujeres trabajan al servicio de un organismo que una empresa americana especializada ha clasificado entre las organizaciones más eficientes. La institución-Iglesia funciona conforme al tipo de la General Motors. Algunos católicos ven en esto un motivo de orgullo. Otros son conscientes de que la complejidad creciente de su administración amenaza su vitalidad y su capacidad de revelar a Dios a los hombres.
+
+El esfuerzo por modernizar y hacer más eficiente a la Iglesia queda neutralizado por un deterioro de la disciplina. Cuanto más se convierte la Iglesia en una empresa organizada y moderna, más abandonada parece por su personal de tiempo completo.
+
+Algunos reaccionan ante esta crisis con dolor, angustia y miedo. Otros trabajan heroicamente y se sacrifican inútilmente para conjurarla. Y otros, lamentándolo o mostrándose satisfechos, interpretan el desorden disciplinario como un signo de la desaparición de la misma Iglesia romana.
+
+Me permito preguntarme si esta modificación profunda de las estructuras de la institución no podría llenarnos de alegría porque anuncia a una Iglesia más consciente de su impotencia y a una Iglesia más presente en un mundo que se socializa.
+
+La estructura de la Iglesia está en crisis. Los mismos que emplean su lealtad y su obediencia en mantener su organización, y que podrían garantizar su eficacia, la abandonan en número creciente. Antes de 1960 las “defecciones” eran relativamente raras. Hoy son frecuentes. ¿Qué pasará mañana? En las dos Américas, como consecuencia de dramas personales vividos en el secreto de las conciencias, personas permanentes de la Iglesia en número cada vez mayor deciden renunciar a la seguridad afectiva, espiritual y frecuentemente económica de cuya provisión se encargaba el sistema graciosamente. Algunos se retiran a la vida cristiana: fatigados, desalentados e incluso desgarrados y amargados. Otros, con toda serenidad, toman un compromiso más profundo. Tanto si se quedan como si no se quedan en el interior de la estructura presente, quieren permanecer en la primera línea del esfuerzo creador para modificar esta estructura.
+
+Mi impresión es que, en los próximos años, la mayoría de los sacerdotes y religiosos tendrá que hacer frente a decisiones que en otro tiempo eran inconcebibles. La crisis de que hablo no proviene de un “mal espíritu del siglo”, ni de la ausencia de generosidad de eventuales “desertores”, sino más bien de un estado clerical que ha absorbido la función magisterial de la Iglesia.
+
+La Iglesia presenta a la sociedad moderna estructuras superadas que, a su vez, están basadas en un manual de procedimiento internacional llamado Código de Derecho Canónico. Una teología fundada en nociones sociológicas inaplicables al mundo de hoy en su especificidad y en su complejidad trata de justificar este Código. Tomemos el “ministerio clerical” como ejemplo de este equívoco. Sólo en la medida en que tengamos la valentía de prever, en un lapso más o menos largo, la desaparición del personaje del “señor cura”, del “eclesiástico”, podremos hacernos una idea de la Iglesia del mañana. En efecto, estas apelaciones son la expresión de una profunda confusión de cuatro realidades en las cuales se funda la estructura presente de la Iglesia: _1)_ el clérigo; _2)_ el ministro, ya sea diácono o sacerdote; _3)_ el “monje”; _4)_ el “teólogo” profesional. Creo que la imagen que nos hacemos del “cura” o del “eclesiástico” es una mezcla de estas cuatro realidades. Me permitiré hablar en seguida de estos diferentes conceptos:
+
+1. Es muy posible que 90% de los empleados que trabajan actualmente en la estructura funcional de la Iglesia, que viven de ella y a quienes debería reservarse en exclusiva el nombre de “clérigos”, son inútiles a la misma Iglesia.
+2. En América Latina por lo menos, según todas las probabilidades, el “ministerio” pronto será ejercido sobre todo por no clérigos.
+3. La secularización radical de la mayor parte de los ministros sagrados es paralela a la secularización de la vida religiosa que empezó con los institutos seculares. Esta secularización debe considerarse como una señal de la gratuidad y creciente vitalidad de la renuncia del “monje moderno”, para el que echamos de menos una apelación adecuada, como la echamos de menos para el sacerdote laico.
+4. Me permitiré, finalmente, sugerir que el seminario es una institución indispensable si se quiere formar “curas” para su profesión, y una institución anacrónica e irreformable si debe servir para preparar laicos para el diaconado o para el sacerdocio en su plenitud.
+
+## Eclipse del clérigo
+
+El personal eclesiástico goza de notables privilegios. Todo adolescente deseoso de entrar a formar parte del “clero” puede dar por descontada una situación prácticamente garantizada, con una serie de ventajas psicológicas y sociales. Su promoción depende en general de la edad y no de la competencia.
+
+Los empleados eclesiásticos ocupan con frecuencia viviendas que pertenecen a la Iglesia, gozan de un trato de favor en los servicios de hospital y tienen toda la educación gratuita que deseen. La situación, la reputación y el rango social se los procura la sotana, y no la competencia o la fidelidad. A los laicos, empleados sin “tonsura” en las estructuras eclesiásticas, les son reconocidos algunos “derechos del hombre”, pero su promoción depende sobre todo de su habilidad para captarse los favores de los otros “permanentes de carrera”.
+
+La Iglesia posconciliar sigue el ejemplo de ciertas Iglesias protestantes, que transfieren numerosos eclesiásticos del trabajo parroquial a las funciones de papeleo en el “apostolado burocrático”. Se nos pide que roguemos a Dios para que envíe más empleados a las oficinas y para que inspire a los fieles el deseo de pagar la cuenta. No todo el mundo es capaz de desear tales “beneficios”.
+
+El desarrollo automático de las oficinas se realiza ciertamente sin asistencia divina: el mismo Vaticano es un ejemplo de esto. Desde el final del Concilio, las 12 venerables congregaciones han sido arropadas con numerosos organismos posconciliares que se entrecruzan e imbrican: comisiones, consejos, órganos consultivos, comités, asambleas, institutos y sínodos. Este laberinto se sustrae a todo gobierno. Y muy bien. Tal vez aprenderemos así que los principios de administración de empresas no son aplicables al Cuerpo de Cristo. El Vicario de Cristo no es ni un presidente director general de una sociedad de negocios, ni un monarca bizantino. La tecnocracia clerical se encuentra todavía más lejos del Evangelio que la aristocracia sacerdotal. Tal vez reconoceremos que el mito de la eficacia corrompe el testimonio cristiano más insidiosamente que el poder; que el papa ganaría en grandeza y en fidelidad evangélica en la medida en que perdiera la iniciativa e incluso el control del testimonio de los cristianos en el mundo.
+
+En el momento mismo en que el Pentágono trata de reducir su personal, estableciendo contratos por trabajos concretos, dirigiéndose al mercado libre de la industria, de la investigación y de la enseñanza, el Vaticano se orienta hacia la diversificación y proliferación de los organismos de la Iglesia. La nueva administración central superorganizada escapa de las manos de los sacerdotes de carrera italianos, en beneficio de los especialistas eclesiásticos reclutados en el mundo entero. La curia pontificia de los tiempos medievales toma el cariz de un cuartel general de planificación y de administración de una firma internacional centralizada, cuyas sucursales gozan de una autonomía bien calculada.
+
+La Iglesia antes hacía esfuerzos por hacerse reconocer por los Estados modernos como otro Estado; actualmente, trata en forma sutil de hacerse reconocer como un organismo de interés público internacional, análogo a la FAO o al Consejo de las Iglesias. Roma se convierte en algo similar a las fundaciones filantrópicas, a los consejos de investigación y a la comisión internacional atómica. Se crean muchos puestos nuevos y la jerarquía, habituada al control absoluto de sus subordinados, trata de cubrirlos con elementos dóciles a su iniciativa: la “gente de Iglesia”. La periferia de la Iglesia, como la misma Roma, está regida por las leyes de Parkinson: “el trabajo aumenta con el personal disponible” y “siempre hay personal dispuesto a servir en los grados superiores”. La superestructura de la Iglesia latinoamericana ofrece un ejemplo impresionante de esto.
+
+Los obispos latinoamericanos de la generación precedente se trasladaban a Roma, aproximadamente cada 10 años, para hacer su informe al papa. Fuera de esto, su contacto con Roma se reducía a las peticiones rutinarias de indulgencias o de dispensas, transmitidas a través de la nunciatura y a las venidas ocasionales de los visitadores apostólicos. Hoy, una comisión romana para América Latina (CAL) reúne a subcomisiones de obispos europeos y americanos a fin de mantener el equilibrio con la asamblea episcopal latinoamericana. La organización de ésta incluye un consejo (CELAM) y comisiones, secretariados, instituciones y delegaciones en gran número. El CELAM corona las asambleas episcopales nacionales, algunas de las cuales poseen una organización burocrática de extraordinaria complejidad. Todo este edificio ha sido construido con el fin de facilitar deliberaciones ocasionales entre obispos para que, una vez vueltos a sus diócesis, puedan obrar con más independencia y originalidad. Los resultados raramente responden a esta intención. La mayoría de los obispos adquiere la mentalidad burocrática necesaria para establecer una ronda de reuniones cada vez más frecuentes. Los organismos nuevos exigen un personal cada vez más numeroso para los servicios del Estado Mayor clerical.
+
+Una dirección central se cierne amenazadora sobre las iniciativas renovadoras y espontáneas de las iglesias locales. La multiplicación de los funcionarios, por otra parte, puede verse desde la base como un elemento que contribuye a su propia desclericalización: los “curas” se eliminan a sí mismos de la parroquia, convirtiéndose en “monseñores de la oficina”. Este proceso se encuentra aliado con otros dos factores que reducen el número de sacerdotes: la creciente oposición de los jóvenes atraídos por el sacerdocio a dejarse embarcar en la carrera clerical convirtiéndose en “curas”, y el número creciente de sacerdotes que obligan a la Iglesia a aceptar su dimisión.
+
+Lo que se ha dado en llamar reforma posconciliar del clero en todos estos planos, desde la curia romana a la parroquia rural, puede verse así como la condición previa, por una parte, para la renovación de una base “sin curas”, y por otra, para la aparición de un “clero” sin pretensiones apostólicas.
+
+¿Por qué no podríamos prever, en efecto, en la Iglesia una “carrera eclesiástica” profesional? Un “clero” muy limitado, profesionalmente bien formado y bien pagado, que podría colocarse en el Estado Mayor para funciones técnicas. No veo ninguna razón para dar las órdenes a estos sociólogos, teólogos y contables, ni para exigir a estos hombres o mujeres una carrera de por vida. Su profesión no sería anunciar la Palabra ni presidir la comunidad, sino más bien un servicio eficaz de la superestructura inevitable.
+
+## El culto de mañana
+
+Un laico adulto, que habrá recibido las órdenes, presidirá la comunidad cristiana “corriente” del futuro. El ministerio se convertirá en una obra realizada en tiempo libre, y no será un trabajo profesional. Imaginamos que la “diaconía” sustituirá a la parroquia, como unidad fundamental institucional de la Iglesia. El contacto periódico entre amigos tomará el lugar de la reunión dominical de extraños. Una persona independiente, un dentista, un obrero, un profesor, y no un empleado de la Iglesia, escriba o funcionario, presidirá la reunión. El ministro, normalmente, saldrá del seno de su propia comunidad y sólo excepcionalmente será un enviado que constituye en torno a él una nueva iglesia. Será un hombre madurado en la sabiduría cristiana por su prolongada participación en una liturgia íntima de su comunidad, y no uno que ha recibido un título en el seminario, instruido profesionalmente en una jerga “teológica”. La plenitud y la madurez del matrimonio en unos, y la gozosa renuncia en otros, serán reconocidos como un signo válido para la carga del ministerio.
+
+Más que la asistencia de una multitud anónima en torno a un altar, preveo el contacto personal de familias en torno a una mesa. Más que los edificios consagrados, destinados a santificar la ceremonia, será la celebración la que santificará el comedor de una casa. Esto no significa que todas las iglesias serán transformadas en teatros o en inmuebles invendibles.
+
+Evidentemente, no propongo que le quiten al obispo su catedral, ni que se le exija que se gane la vida. Creo que tomando el diaconado en serio, y sin ordenar por el momento a hombres casados para el sacerdocio en su plenitud, la Iglesia puede progresar en el momento mismo en que el número de sacerdotes disminuye.
+
+Las estructuras pastorales han quedado ampliamente determinadas por 10 siglos de sacerdocio clerical y celibatario. En 1964 el Concilio dio un paso significativo hacia la renovación al aprobar el diaconado de personas casadas. El decreto es ambiguo, puesto que podría favorecer la proliferación de un clero de segundo orden sin cambiar las estructuras. Pero puede también conducir a la ordenación de hombres adultos, materialmente independientes, y no clérigos. El gran peligro es la clericalización del diaconado, que el diácono viva de los recursos de la Iglesia, retrasando así la necesaria e inevitable secularización del ministerio sacerdotal.
+
+El futuro sacerdote “ordinario”, que se gana la vida, presidirá en su casa una reunión semanal de una docena de diáconos. Leerán juntos la Sagrada Escritura, estudiarán y comentarán la instrucción semanal del obispo. Si se ha celebrado la misa en el curso de la reunión, cada diácono llevará a su casa el Sacramento y lo conservará con su crucifijo y su Biblia. El sacerdote visitará las diversas “diaconías” y eventualmente presidirá en ellas la misa.
+
+Un cierto número de “diaconías” se reunirán de vez en cuando en otra sala alquilada, o en la catedral, para una misa más solemne. El obispo y sus sacerdotes, a media jornada liberados de sus tareas administrativas, encontrarán el tiempo necesario para concelebrar en ciertas ocasiones. El obispo, asistido por algunos permanentes, tendrá la posibilidad de preparar y de hacer circular su selección semanal de fragmentos de los Padres de la Iglesia y un esquema para su discusión. Asistido por su presbiterio, orientará la liturgia doméstica de las diaconías.
+
+Todos estos cambios obligarán a revisar el precepto de la misa dominical, y también a revalorizar las prácticas rituales de la Penitencia.
+
+### El sacerdote secularizado
+
+El derecho canónico actual prevé la ordenación de personas cuya subsistencia corre de por vida a cargo de la Iglesia, y la de personas dotadas de bienes propios suficientes. Vincular la ordenación a esta forma burguesa de independencia económica nos parece, en nuestros días, una cosa anormal, por no decir indigna. Hoy un hombre se gana la vida realizando un trabajo cualquiera en el mundo, y no desempeñando un papel en una jerarquía. La Iglesia ha tenido razones válidas para oponerse al trabajo de los sacerdotes deformados por el seminario y por la vida clerical. Pero estas razones no se aplican al trabajador adulto, ordenado de diácono o de sacerdote, tanto si está casado como si es “monje”. Considerar las capacidades profesionales o la seguridad social adquirida por el trabajo como una señal de independencia suficiente para ordenarse no es ciertamente contrario a la intención del derecho canónico. El ministerio sacramental de “laicos ordenados” nos ayudará a ver con ojos nuevos la “oposición” tradicional entre el eclesiástico y el laico en la Iglesia. A medida que superemos estos dos conceptos, se volverá evidente su carácter transitorio. El Concilio, resumiendo el proceso histórico de la última centuria, ha tratado de definir al sacerdote y al laico en dos documentos distintos. Pero el futuro, a partir de la antítesis aparente, edificará una nueva síntesis que irá más allá de las categorías presentes.
+
+El lenguaje cotidiano no tiene palabras para definir esta nueva realidad, y la imaginación católica se asusta al querer dar un nombre bautismal a este “hijo legítimo”, ¿un laico-sacerdote? ¿Un no clérigo ordenado de diácono o de sacerdote? ¿Un sacerdote de los domingos? ¿Un sacerdote a media jornada? ¿Un ministro sacramental secularizado?
+
+La historia de la institución clerical desde el Concilio de Trento ha hecho que la expresión “sacerdote secular” sea impropia.
+
+Este nuevo tipo de cristiano será sobre todo el presidente de la celebración, y no el sacerdote para toda clase de actividades, que se presta muchas veces sin competencia para una variedad pasmosa de tareas sociales y psicológicas. Su aparición librará finalmente a la Iglesia del sistema restrictivo de los beneficios y de los regalos. Más aún, la Iglesia en este momento habrá renunciado al número infinito de responsabilidades que han hecho del sacerdote un accesorio artificial de funciones sociales establecidas. El laico ordenado hará que sea superflujo, desde el punto de vista pastoral, el “cura eclesiástico”. La transformación de la existencia actual permite a todo hombre una libertad, reservada con anterioridad a los nobles y a los clérigos, que le deja disponible para aceptar funciones espirituales a media jornada. El tiempo libre aumenta paralelamente a la reducción de las horas de trabajo, a la jubilación precoz y a las ventajas más amplias de la seguridad social.
+
+El trabajador que libremente renuncia al tiempo de esparcimiento ya no encuentra límites para su educación. Para una creciente mayoría de hombres maduros e independientes existe tiempo disponible de preparación para el ejercicio del ministerio cristiano en una sociedad pluralista y secular. Las mismas razones que hacen de todo cristiano entregado una persona capaz de prepararse para la presidencia de la comunidad eclesiástica, hacen que sea superflujo el clero parroquial. Los ciudadanos católicos formados no piden al señor cura consejo para una acción profana. El político ateo o el técnico laico poseen tal vez mejores títulos para la función de consejeros en valores humanos. La gente capaz de reflexión teológica no va ya a pedir al padre una dirección moral. Piensa por su cuenta. Su formación teológica es a veces superior a la del sacerdote. Los padres que tienen una buena educación dudan cada vez más en confiar a sus hijos al sistema de enseñanza clerical. Se dan cuenta de que ellos mismos son capaces de evangelizarlos, de que en el mundo moderno esta tarea no puede delegar solamente al consiliario, y de que tienen
+
+### Sacerdotes a título interino
+
+Es verdad que existen dificultades para la ordenación de hombres sobre los cuales la Iglesia tiene poco dominio. El laico ordenado podría querer dejar el ministerio; podría ser reo de pecado público; él o su mujer podrían convertirse en factores de discordia en la comunidad cristiana. ¿Y entonces, qué? El derecho canónico actual contiene en germen la solución: que se le suspenda de sus funciones. La “suspensión” la debe decidir tanto el individuo como la comunidad, y no debe entenderse solamente como un castigo en manos del obispo. El ministro ordenado puede creerse llamado a tomar una posición criticable y discutida: si así ocurriera, dejaría de ser un símbolo de la unidad sacramental, ya que juzgaría necesario convertirse en un signo de contradicción. Que él mismo, la comunidad o el obispo decidan con toda libertad si debe retirarse de la presidencia de la comunidad, de la cual será entonces un simple miembro. La comunidad que reconoció su carisma y lo presentó al obispo para que lo ordenara, debe respetar su libertad de conciencia y permitirle que renuncie al ejercicio de la función para la cual había sido habilitado. El ejercicio ritual del orden recibido no es un derecho inalienable ni un deber perpetuo. El no clérigo no tiene que defender ventajas especiales, ni rentas, ni situaciones que dificultarían la suspensión de sus funciones ministeriales: ejerce estas funciones sin pertenecer a un estado clerical.
+
+### La estrategia de la transición
+
+Hemos visto que el crecimiento de la superestructura clerical podría en el momento presente acelerar la ordenación de laicos, despoblando las filas de los antiguos “curas”. El “sacerdote laico”, por su parte, haría posible poner fin a la “falta de clero” que preocupa extraordinariamente a los obispos.
+
+Pero los obispos, cuya mentalidad ha sido moldeada por las estructuras heredadas del pasado, se oponen a que el título que justifica la existencia del clero como “clase aparte” (me refiero a las órdenes sagradas) pase a manos de los que se niegan a formar parte de esta clase.
+
+En este callejón sin salida, “la crisis del clero en América Latina” podría transformarse en fuente de renovación para la Iglesia universal. La misma gravedad de esta crisis permite allí un diagnóstico que es imposible en otras partes, en donde los paliativos producen la ilusión de que el estado clerical podría sobrevivir. Hay hoy en día sacerdotes que comienzan a ver que están ahogados en la medida en que su sacerdocio se halla vinculado a los privilegios y a las responsabilidades de este estado. Por una parte, estos privilegios los encierran en un _ghetto_, incluso en el interior de la Iglesia, y por otra, las responsabilidades del orden establecido no les permiten comprometerse en ningún tipo de revolución.
+
+Muchos sacerdotes están descontentos de sus ocupaciones, bien porque no se sienten libres de realizar el trabajo para el que se saben dotados, o porque carecen de preparación para la tarea que les es asignada. En el primer caso buscan una definición nueva de la función del “cura” que les permita emprender nuevas tareas. En el segundo, hay que tratar de dar una formación más adecuada. Ambas soluciones se limitan con frecuencia a ser paliativos. Lo que habrá que hacer es más bien plantearse la cuestión siguiente: ¿por qué obligar a un hombre a estar en el clero para siempre?
+
+¿Por qué mantener bajo el control de la Iglesia las funciones que le han sido asignadas?
+
+En la medida en que la Iglesia se apega al sistema existente, que hace del sacerdote un permanente “clerical”, nuestro actual problema queda enteramente en pie: el del “cura” cada vez más especializado, insatisfecho y frustrado, y el del cristiano que rechaza el “ministerio” por aprecio de su “estado laico”.
+
+Con el objeto de responder a esta crisis, los próximos años verán cómo proliferan los programas de puesta al día del clero. Estos programas pueden clasificarse en tres tipos: la mayor preparación del clero, el volver a encontrar los motivos que hacen válido para el sacerdote su estado clerical y, finalmente, la preparación para escoger periódicamente su futuro con toda libertad.
+
+_a)_ Cada vez más, las diócesis y las congregaciones religiosas piden a expertos consejeros de la industria que les enseñen los actuales métodos profesionales. La Iglesia se convierte así en una “empresa de servicios” entre muchas otras. Se parte del principio de que hay que renovar _(recycler)_ el “producto” desusado del noviciado y del seminario, para hacer que funcione después del Concilio: se habla entonces en una nueva jerga y se celebra según un nuevo rito. La repetición de estos cursos de pastoral es inevitable si se quiere hacer funcionar una máquina cada vez más complicada.
+
+_b)_ El retiro espiritual, por otra parte, ya no sirve para robustecer el compromiso personal del sacerdote en la aventura y en los riesgos evangélicos; por el contrario, los superiores lo utilizan con frecuencia para confirmar la fe vacilante de los sujetos en una estructura que se presenta como si estuviera fundada en la voluntad de Dios. Se insiste en que la ordenación para la función sacerdotal implica el deber perentorio de ser fiel al estado clerical.
+
+_c)_ Tenemos que prever una renovación _(recyclage)_ de adultos que periódicamente desean plantearse su vocación. Yo, que me he puesto totalmente al servicio de la Iglesia, ¿debo seguir siendo clérigo? ¿Debo abandonar esta estructura para vivir en adelante el tipo de sacerdote del futuro? Si debo seguir siendo un funcionario eclesiástico, ¿es para colaborar en el progreso del clero hacia la nueva estructura de que la Iglesia tendrá mañana necesidad, o es para provocar la subversión de la estructura presente?
+
+El futuro de la Iglesia no se planifica: se imagina, se vive en la obediencia, y sólo entonces se descubre. Mi presente es siempre el pasado de alguien y el futuro de algún otro.
+
+Tenemos necesidad hoy de algunos sacerdotes, formados en los seminarios de antes, que estén decididos a romper ciertas estructuras heredadas, sin abandonar la disciplina fundamental, incluida la del celibato.
+
+Éstos podrán convertirse en pioneros del “sacerdote-monje” de la Iglesia de mañana, aunque por el momento se expongan a la incomprensión y a la “suspensión”. Tenemos también necesidad de estas vocaciones de sacerdotes animados de esperanza, capaces de dejar el “clero” sin endurecimientos, sin amargura y sin cobardía.
+
+Tenemos igualmente necesidad de sacerdotes, asimismo libres y desprendidos, que continúen en su puesto, aunque lo consideren contrario a su ideal de la Iglesia.
+
+Tal vez habrá otros que se creerán libres para abandonar la disciplina del celibato o para obligar a la Iglesia que los dispense, pero que renunciarán a esta libertad para no frenar su renovación. También éstos tendrán necesidad de una puesta al día _(recyclage)_ para decidirse con toda libertad.
+
+
+### La costumbre creadora de confusión
+
+
+Es difícil separar lo que el hábito o la costumbre ha unido. La unión del estado clerical, del sacramento del orden y del celibato voluntario en la vida del “cura” ha dificultado la comprensión de cada una de estas realidades, y ha impedido que fuera posible intentar su separación. El clero se ha afincado en su estatuto socioeconómico y en su poder, defendiendo su derecho exclusivo al sacerdocio. Es muy raro que se propongan argumentos teológicos contra la idea del laico ordenado, si se exceptúa la referencia a la impropiedad de la misma expresión. Sólo los eclesiásticos católicos que desean casarse y los pastores protestantes que temen perder su posición clerical desean extender los privilegios clericales a los ministros católicos casados.
+
+El vínculo entre el celibato y el orden es fuertemente atacado, a pesar de las declaraciones de la autoridad que lo defiende. Se ponen sobre el tapete argumentos exegéticos, pastorales y sociales que no demuestran nada. Son cada vez más los sacerdotes que realizan actos en que niegan el celibato, y, lo que es más grave, abandonan al mismo tiempo celibato y ministerio. El problema es calificado, de común acuerdo, como complejo; efectivamente, convergen en él dos realidades que son sólo comprensibles a la luz de la fe: el ministerio sacramental del sacerdocio y el misterio personal de una renuncia extraordinaria. Nuestro lenguaje secular se confiesa impotente ante el análisis sutil de sus relaciones mutuas. Enunciar y discutir cada una de las tres cuestiones por separado nos ayudará tal vez a diferenciarlas entre sí y a comprender la naturaleza de las relaciones entre: _a)_ el compromiso del celibato voluntario; _b)_ la constitución de comunidades religiosas; _c)_ la prescripción legal del “celibato eclesiástico”.
+
+### La elección voluntaria de una vida impotente
+
+Siempre ha habido en la Iglesia hombres y mujeres que han renunciado libremente al matrimonio “en vista del Reino”. De conformidad con tal acto, fundan simplemente su decisión en la llamada interior de Dios. La experiencia, que es el motivo de la decisión, debe distinguirse de la exposición discursiva mediante nociones abstractas y razones que la justifican. Para muchos estas nociones han quedado actualmente vacías de sentido, lo cual les induce a renunciar al compromiso del celibato. Los defensores del celibato interpretan este gesto como la manifestación de un debilitamiento de la fe en los católicos modernos. Este gesto podría aportar igualmente la prueba de que es una purificación de la propia fe, y de que es una renuncia a fundar el propio testimonio en argumentos especiosos. En los motivos alegados, los hombre ven hoy día más claramente motivos sociológicos, psicológicos y mitológicos en favor del celibato, y reconocen su carácter inadecuado ante la verdadera renuncia cristiana.
+
+La renuncia al matrimonio ya no es necesaria, desde el punto de vista económico, para el servicio de los pobres; ni tampoco es ya una condición legal para el ministerio ordenado; ni una situación extraordinariamente propicia para los estudios. El celibato no puede ya contar, para su defensa, con la aprobación de la sociedad.
+
+Los motivos psicológicos invocados en otro tiempo para justificar las ventajas de la continencia, apenas son hoy aceptables. Numerosos célibes comprenden ahora que rechazaron el matrimonio por desgana, miedo, egoísmo, falta de preparación o sencillamente de atractivo. Y ahora escogen el matrimonio, o bien en virtud de una mejor comprensión de sí mismos, o bien en virtud del deseo de probar su error inicial. Ya no se presentan como héroes delante de sus padres, por su fidelidad, ni se sienten parias por su “defección”.
+
+El estudio comparado de las religiones descubre en la historia de la humanidad muchas “razones” de la continencia. Estos motivos son de orden ascético, mágico o místico. Son ciertamente “religiosos”, aunque apenas sean “cristianos”. El asceta renuncia tal vez al matrimonio con objeto de ser libre para la oración; el “mago”, para salvar mediante su sacrificio a un chinito; el “místico”, en favor de la intimidad nupcial exclusiva con el “Todo”. Nuestros contemporáneos saben que la continencia no intensifica la oración, ni hace el amor más ardiente, ni aumenta las gracias recibidas.
+
+Hoy el cristiano que renuncia al matrimonio y a los hijos “en vista del Reino” no aduce, en favor de su decisión, ninguna razón abstracta. Quiere vivir ahora el estado de pobreza absoluta que todo cristiano espera encontrar en la hora de la muerte, y que todo hombre encontrará. Su vida no prueba nada, ni siquiera la trascendencia de Dios. Su renuncia no sirve para nada, excepto a su propia verdad. Su resolución de renunciar a una esposa tiene el mismo carácter de intimidad, de incomunicabilidad y de gratuidad que la preferencia única de un hermano suyo por su esposa. El “monje” (como lo llamaría yo para distinguirlo) arriesga su personalidad en una disponibilidad, una apertura y una soledad que podrían conducirlo al orgullo, a la insensibilidad y al aislamiento. Su hermano arriesga su futuro humano de otra manera, escogiendo una mujer, para lo mejor y para lo peor. El “monje” elige vivir su vida en la impotencia voluntaria revelada por el Todopoderoso en el momento culminante y paradójico de su amor. Sigue el ejemplo del crucificado impotente. Esta conducta, y no la intervención de la Iglesia, es la que constituye al “monje”.
+
+Esta conducta se vive en las profundidades del corazón: no importa que el monje la elija gratuitamente haciendo los votos en una orden religiosa, o que la acepte como una condición impuesta por la Iglesia para servir dentro del clero, o que se someta simplemente a una vocación percibida a través de los acontecimientos de su vida sin haberla escogido mediante votos o aceptado como condición de un cargo.
+
+### La vida religiosa
+
+La Iglesia se ha servido de dos signos para dar una expresión visible a la decisión de ciertos cristianos de seguir hasta el final a Cristo en la impotencia de la cruz. Ha dado una organización social y jurídica a las comunidades religiosas y ha instituido la celebración ritual de los votos que son la manifestación del compromiso del individuo en una de estas comunidades: estos dos signos visibles están en vías de desaparición.
+
+Las órdenes religiosas ofrecen una estructura comunitaria en la que cada miembro se supone que profundiza el compromiso de santidad de su bautismo, y que ocupa al mismo tiempo su propio lugar entre el personal administrado por su superior. Las obras de las órdenes religiosas desaparecerán sin duda todavía más rápidamente que las instituciones parroquiales o diocesanas, a medida que sus miembros más evolucionados, en número creciente y con permiso de su superior, empiecen a seguir fuera del convento su vocación personal.
+
+Los cristianos deseosos de practicar radicalmente los consejos evangélicos ya no experimentan tanto la necesidad de entrar en comunidades establecidas, ni siquiera en los institutos seculares. Reconocen con todo la eficacia de una unión, temporal o permanente, con otros cristianos a quienes anima el mismo deseo, con el fin de encontrar en ella un mutuo sostén en una común aventura espiritual. Para la próxima generación es de desear la floración de lugares de oración intensa, de casas de retiro, de centros de formación espiritual, de monasterios y de “desiertos” para sostener a la Iglesia entera en su renovación.
+
+Antes los votos eran signos mediante los cuales el cristiano se vinculaba a su comunidad religiosa. A medida que las razones tradicionales de conservar estas comunidades particulares jurídicas se evaporen, se buscarán otras formas para celebrar públicamente la presencia misteriosa de la renuncia en la Iglesia entera. En estas condiciones el compromiso personal debería caracterizarse públicamente más por la celebración litúrgica de un acontecimiento que pertenece a la línea del misterio que por un acto jurídico al que van anejas unas obligaciones legales hacia una comunidad particular.
+
+Mediante este rito la Iglesia afirmaría públicamente que cree en la autenticidad del carisma individual. El gesto personal sería realizado entonces como un signo de la misma Iglesia. La admisión a realizar este “gesto” quedaría reservada a los adultos que durante muchos años hubieran practicado la renuncia en el siglo. La Iglesia manifestaría así su voluntad de confiar el testimonio del misterio, el testimonio del anonadamiento de la cruz, a la fidelidad personal de estos nuevos “monjes”. Una evolución que se orientara en este sentido mantendría dentro de la Iglesia la tradición monástica y eliminaría múltiples “dispensas” que a los ojos del mundo causan una lamentable impresión. Entonces volveríamos a encontrar la analogía real e íntima del matrimonio cristiano y de la renuncia: en el rito público y litúrgico del matrimonio, y en el rito público y litúrgico de la renuncia, el cristiano tendría ocasión de celebrar un compromiso que él habría escogido, maduro y ya vivido.
+
+La desaparición progresiva de las comunidades religiosas y de los votos jurídicos se mira así desde un punto de vista positivo: podría dar paso a una elección mucho más gratuita y evangélica; podría provocar a determinados jóvenes a una vida “monástica” temporal como preparación, ya sea al matrimonio, ya a la soledad; podría, finalmente, ayudar a la Iglesia a superar el callejón sin salida de las múltiples dispensas jurídicas, y dar al compromiso litúrgico un carácter definitivo de tipo sacramental.
+
+### El celibato clerical
+
+
+De momento, la Iglesia ordena solamente a aquellos hombres que, mediante el rito de la tonsura, han sido admitidos al estado clerical. Y mantiene la ley del celibato eclesiástico. La Iglesia, con buenas razones, se niega a admitir en este estado, tal como se presenta actualmente, a funcionarios casados. El papa, gracias a Dios, insiste en este punto. El celibato eclesiástico contribuye a la desaparición del clero. Abre la puerta a la ordenación de laicos, ya sea laicos casados, ya seculares.
+
+A la baja de las vocaciones y a los abandonos eclesiásticos se les proponen muchos remedios. Un clero casado, religiosas y laicos promovidos a las funciones pastorales, la creciente intensidad de las campañas de vocaciones, una mejor distribución mundial del clero existente: todo esto no son más que tentativas tímidas para reavivar un organismo moribundo.
+
+Durante nuestra generación, por lo menos, la ordenación sacerdotal de hombres casados no es un hecho que se impondrá. Los no casados son más que suficientes en número. En este momento la ordenación de sacerdotes casados retrasaría una verdadera reforma pastoral. Pero hay además una segunda razón, más sutil. En nuestros días hay millares de sacerdotes que rechazan el celibato; ofrecen el deprimente espectáculo de hombres formados para la continencia, que se comprometen tardíamente en matrimonios llenos de riesgos. La Iglesia les concede en secreto una dispensa arbitraria y desganada. Habría que clarificar y hacer más realista este proceso mediante el cual la Iglesia permite el matrimonio a los “curas”.
+
+Pero no hay que cambiar las condiciones que implica. La Iglesia exige que el “ex cura” renuncie a la seguridad de su estado y al ejercicio de su ministerio. Ha sido cobarde y no puede servir de modelo. Servir de modelo es tan difícil al sacerdote que “quiere salirse” sin aceptar las consecuencias inevitables de su acto, como al obispo que quiere “conservar cueste lo que cueste” a su sacerdote. Hay que consolarse: el éxodo masivo del clero cesará con la desaparición del sistema clerical actual. Durante este intervalo la ordenación para el sacerdocio de hombres ya casados sería un error lamentable. La confusión que esto acarrearía no podría dejar de provocar un retraso en las reformas radicales necesarias.
+
+## Es el sacerdocio una profesión
+
+La Iglesia, al limitar el sacerdocio a los “curas”, lo vincula a los miembros del estado clerical, a la condición de célibe y, finalmente, a una preparación profesional en los seminarios. Nos queda por analizar este último aspecto, el más peligroso para el porvenir según mi manera de ver. No hay peligro más temible que el de permitir que la palabra de Dios justifique la existencia de una profesión en el sentido moderno de la palabra. ¿No hay en muchas partes la propuesta de que el servicio de la palabra de Dios se considere como una profesión, por los mismos motivos que lo es la de maestro o la de psicólogo, y que en ella la ascensión se realice según la experiencia y la competencia de cada uno, y que un sindicato represente los intereses de los miembros ante el obispo-patrono?
+
+Este peligro existe, por lo menos en ciertos países, por el hecho de que una minoría distinguida del clero está empleada en los seminarios.
+
+Instintivamente, esta minoría trata de asegurar la supervivencia de estas instituciones. Si el seminario sobrevive a la desaparición del estado clerical postridentino engendrado por él, sólo justificará su existencia inventando una nueva profesión para el pastor en paro forzoso por él producido: la profesión de “pastor católico”.
+
+Proseguir el reclutamiento de muchachos generosos con el objeto de ponerlos en el molde del “cura” tal como lo describe todavía el Concilio Vaticano II, acabará por ser una ofensa a la moral pública. Es inadmisible hoy persistir en la preparación de jóvenes para un sacerdocio vinculado a un estado que está en vías de desaparición; pero sería todavía peor formarlos para una “profesión” moderna que monopolizaría el sacerdocio, y que por esta razón no debería nacer. Esperemos que la minoría selecta de la Iglesia, en vez de aferrarse a los seminarios, quedará disponible para ayudar a los obispos en su tarea más importante: la investigación teológica, por una parte, y la formación profesional de adultos preparados para el ministerio, por otra.
+
+Desgraciadamente, la expresión “formación cristiana” ha llegado a abarcar demasiadas cosas. Como tantos otros términos empleados dentro de la Iglesia, ha perdido casi todo su sentido. Es necesario volverla a precisar para comprender que no es la formación profesional en teología lo que hace al sacerdote.
+
+La madurez de la persona, la precisión teológica, la oración contemplativa y la caridad heroica no son propiedad exclusiva de los católicos. Hay ateos que pueden llegar a la madurez, hay no católicos que pueden alcanzar la precisión teológica, hay budistas que pueden llegar a ser místicos y hay paganos que pueden practicar la generosidad heroica. El resultado específico de la educación cristiana es el “sentido de la Iglesia”. El hombre que lo posee echa sus raíces en la autoridad viva de esta Iglesia, vive en la fecundidad de inversión de la fe y habla en términos inspirados por los dones del Espíritu.
+
+Este “sentido de la Iglesia” dimana de la lectura de las fuentes cristianas, de la participación recogida en la celebración litúrgica, de una particular manera de vivir. Es fruto del encuentro con Cristo, y da la medida de la real profundidad de la oración silenciosa. Es el resultado de la penetración del contenido de la fe por la luz de la inteligencia, por la apertura del corazón y por la sumisión de la voluntad. Este “sentido de la Iglesia” no es el resultado de un análisis abstracto de la doctrina, sino más bien un enraizamiento del espíritu en los datos de la tradición. Cuando se trate de designar a un adulto para el diaconado o para el sacerdocio, buscaremos en él este “sentido” más que los éxitos en teología o el tiempo pasado fuera del siglo. No le exigiremos la competencia profesional para enseñar a “su” público, sino la humildad profética adecuada para la animación de un grupo de cristianos.
+
+## Conclusión
+
+El futuro de la Iglesia lo vivimos ya, pero para percibirlo no es necesario hacerlo en el sentido del espíritu utópico. La utopía no es ni profecía ni plan: es un modo humorístico de ver el presente, que lo hace transparente a la fe. El falso profeta se equivoca porque se sitúa en el lugar de Dios. El mal planificador da por sentado “su” poder. La utopía cesa cuando comienza a tomarse demasiado en serio. La mayor administración mundial cuenta con la asistencia del Espíritu Santo, y éste se manifiesta en toda su historia en lo que llamamos la esperanza, la locura de Cristo y alguna vez la utopía.
+
+
+# El reverso de la caridad
+
+En 1960 el papa juan XXIII encargó a todos los superiores religiosos estadunidenses y canadienses que enviaran 10% de sus fuerzas efectivas, entre sacerdotes y monjas, a América Latina en el curso de los 10 años siguientes. La mayoría de los católicos estadunidenses interpretaron esta solicitud papal como un llamado para ayudar a modernizar a la Iglesia latinoamericana de acuerdo con el modelo norteamericano. Había que salvar del “castrocomunismo” a un continente en el cual vive la mitad de los católicos del mundo.
+
+Me opuse a la ejecución de esa orden: estaba convencido de que dañaría seriamente a las personas enviadas, a sus protegidos y a los patrocinadores de los países de origen. Además, serviría inevitablemente a la propagación del desarrollismo. Había aprendido en Puerto Rico que son pocas las personas que no salen tullidas o completamente destruidas del trabajo de por vida “en beneficio de los pobres” en un país extranjero. Sabía que la transferencia de los estándares de vida y las expectativas norteamericanas no harían más que impedir los cambios revolucionarios necesarios y que estaba mal usar el Evangelio al servicio del capitalismo. Por último, sabía que si bien el hombre común en Estados Unidos necesitaba ser informado sobre la realidad revolucionaria de América Latina, los “misioneros” sólo deformarían la visión de esta realidad: sus informes son notoriamente caprichosos. Era necesario detener la cruzada proyectada.
+
+Junto con unos amigos, fundé un centro de estudios en Cuernavaca.
+
+Elegimos ese lugar debido a su clima, ubicación y logística. En la apertura del centro establecí dos de los propósitos de nuestra empresa. El primero era ayudar a disminuir el daño que la ejecución de la orden papal amenazaba causar. Nuestro programa educativo para los misioneros intentaría enfrentarlos de cara a la realidad y consigo mismos, de modo que, o rechazaban sus nombramientos o, de aceptarlos, estarían entonces un poco menos faltos de preparación. El segundo propósito era recabar suficiente influencia entre los núcleos que tomaban las decisiones en las agencias parroquiales de esa empresa misionera y tratar de disuadirlos de aplicar el plan. Durante la década de los sesenta, tanto nuestra experiencia y nuestra reputación en el entrenamiento intensivo de profesionales extranjeros que habían sido nombrados para desempeñarse en Sudamérica como el hecho de que éramos el único centro especializado en ese tipo de educación, aseguraron un flujo permanente de estudiantes a través del centro —a pesar del carácter básicamente subversivo de los propósitos citados—.
+
+Hacia 1966, en lugar del 10% que se había pedido en 1960, apenas 0.7% del clero norteamericano y canadiense se había desplazado hacia el sur. Los grupos avanzados de la Iglesia estadunidense albergaban ya serias dudas acerca de la necesidad de la empresa en su conjunto. Pero la información plañidera que llegaba desde América Latina y una intensa y costosísima campaña de relaciones públicas conducida desde Washington hicieron que muchos obispos y la gran mayoría de católicos ignorantes continuaran levantando los ánimos en pro de la causa para “ayudar a salvar a América Latina”. Bajo esas circunstancias era necesario respaldar una controversia intensiva y abierta y, por ello, en enero de 1967, escribí el siguiente artículo para la revista jesuita norteamericana _América_. La ocasión era más que propicia: al final de ese mes se habrían de reunir en Boston, con el fin de dar nuevo ímpetu a sus programas, 3 000 miembros de la Iglesia —católicos y protestantes—, de Estados Unidos y de América Latina. Sabía también que la revista _Ramparts_ estaba por publicar su _exposé_^[En francés, en el original. (E.)] acerca del financiamiento prestado por la CIA a los movimientos estudiantiles, principalmente en América Latina.
+
+Hace cinco años los católicos estadunidenses emprendieron una peculiar alianza para el progreso de la Iglesia latinoamericana. Se calculaba que para 1970 el 10% de los 225 000 sacerdotes norteamericanos, incluidos hermanos y hermanas, habrían sido voluntariamente enviados al sur de la frontera. En cinco años el “clero” masculino y femenino norteamericano ha contribuido con 1 622 personas en toda Sudamérica. La mitad del camino es un buen momento para determinar si un programa navega todavía según los cálculos previstos cuando se echó a andar y, lo que es más importante, si su destino vale todavía la pena. Numéricamente el programa fue un verdadero fracaso. ¿Debe ello ser fuente de disgusto o de alivio?
+
+El programa dependía de un impulso respaldado por una imaginación acrítica y por juicios sentimentales. Carteles con un “llamado a 20 000” y un dedo dirigido al observador convencieron a muchos de que “América Latina te necesita”. Nadie se atrevió a explicar claramente por qué, a pesar de que la primera propaganda pública incluía cuatro páginas de texto con varias referencias al “peligro rojo”, el Buró Latinoamericano de la _National_ _Catholic Welfare Conference_ añadió al programa, a los voluntarios y al propio llamado, la palabra “papal”.
+
+Ahora se propone una campaña para recabar más fondos. Ha llegado el momento de reexaminar tanto el llamado para reclutar a 20 000 personas como la necesidad de varios millones de dólares. Ambas peticiones deben someterse a un debate público entre los católicos estadunidenses, desde los obispos hasta las viudas, ya que a ellos se exhorta a proveer el personal y pagar las cuentas. Ante todo debe prevalecer el pensamiento crítico. Los eslóganes de las campañas elegantes y coloridas, y las súplicas emocionantes, no hacen más que enturbiar los verdaderos problemas.
+
+Examinemos fríamente el sarampión de frenética caridad que se propaga por la Iglesia estadunidense y que ha tenido como resultado la creación de los voluntarios “papales”, las “misiones de cruzada” estudiantiles, los plenos de las asambleas del Catholic Inter-American Cooperation Program, las innumerables misiones diocesanas y las nuevas comunidades religiosas.
+
+No me detendré en detalles. De ellos se encargan continuamente los programas mencionados. En lugar de eso me voy a atrever a señalar algunos de los hechos e implicaciones fundamentales del llamado plan papal — parte de un esfuerzo multifacético para mantener a América Latina dentro de las ideologías de Occidente—. Les corresponde a los que dictan la política eclesiástica estadunidense enfrentarse de lleno con sus bien intencionadas aventuras misioneras. Les toca a ellos revisar sus vocaciones de teólogos cristianos y sus acciones de políticos occidentales.
+
+Los hombres y el dinero enviados con motivaciones misioneras transportan una imagen cristiana extranjera, una postura pastoral extranjera, y un mensaje político extranjero. Llevan también consigo la etiqueta del capitalismo norteamericano de los años cincuenta. ¿Por qué no nos detenemos, siquiera una vez, a considerar el reverso de la moneda de la caridad? ¿Por qué no sopesamos las cargas inevitables que la ayuda extranjera impone a la Iglesia sudamericana? ¿Por qué no probamos la amargura del daño causado por nuestros sacrificios? Si, por ejemplo, los católicos estadunidenses sencillamente abandonaran el sueño de “10%” y pensaran honradamente en la implicación de su ayuda, entonces la creciente conciencia de las falacias intrínsecas podría llevar a una generosidad sobria y significativa. Seré más preciso. La alegría incuestionable del dar y los frutos del recibir deben ser tratados como dos capítulos distintos. Propongo delinear solamente los resultados negativos que producen el dinero, los hombres y las ideas extranjeras en la Iglesia sudamericana, de modo tal que se pueda preparar debidamente el futuro programa estadunidense.
+
+Durante los últimos cinco años el costo del funcionamiento de la Iglesia en América Latina se ha multiplicado varias veces. No hay precedentes que indiquen una tasa de crecimiento tal en los gastos de la Iglesia a escala continental. En la actualidad, el funcionamiento de una universidad católica, una misión social o una cadena radiofónica cuesta más que los gastos eclesiásticos del país hace una década. La mayor parte de los fondos para este tipo de crecimiento provino de afuera y fluyó de dos fuentes distintas. La Iglesia fue una de ellas. Recababa ese dinero de tres maneras:
+
+_1)_ Dólar por dólar, apelando a la generosidad de los fieles —como hicieron Adveniat, Miseror y Oostpriesterhulp, en Alemania y los Países Bajos—. Esas contribuciones superan el orden de los 25 millones de dólares al año.
+
+_2)_ Mediante contribuciones masivas, ya sea por parte de miembros individuales de la Iglesia —el ejemplo más sobresaliente es el del cardenal Cushing— o por parte de instituciones —tales como la National Catholic Welfare Conference, que transfirió un millón de dólares de las misiones locales al Buró Latinoamericano.
+
+_3)_ Mediante la asignación de sacerdotes, religiosos y laicos, todos entrenados a un costo considerable y a menudo apoyados financieramente en sus empresas apostólicas.
+
+Este tipo de generosidad extranjera ha tentado a la Iglesia latinoamericana a convertirse en satélite de la política y los fenómenos culturales del Atlántico Norte. El aumento de los recursos apostólicos intensificó la necesidad de ese flujo continuo, creando islas de bienestar apostólico que cada día están más lejos de la capacidad local de mantenerlas. El nuevo florecimiento de la Iglesia latinoamericana tiene lugar mediante un regreso a la marca que le impuso la Conquista: una planta colonial que florece mediante el cultivo extranjero. En lugar de aprender a arreglárselas con menos dinero o de plano a cerrar las puertas, los obispos caen en la trampa de precisar más y heredar al futuro una institución cuyo funcionamiento no será viable. La educación, que es una de las inversiones que podría dar ganancias a largo plazo, es concebida en su mayor parte como el entrenamiento de burócratas que conservan la estructura presente.
+
+Hace muy poco, un grupo considerable de sacerdotes latinoamericanos enviados a Europa para cursar estudios avanzados, me ofreció un buen ejemplo de lo anterior. Con el fin de poner a la Iglesia en contacto con el mundo, nueve de cada 10 de ellos se dedicaron a aprender métodos de enseñanza —catequística, teología pastoral o ley canónica—, sin avanzar por lo tanto directamente ni en sus conocimientos de la Iglesia ni del mundo. Sólo una reducida minoría estudió la historia o las fuentes de la Iglesia, o el mundo tal cual es.
+
+Es fácil recaudar grandes sumas para construir una iglesia nueva en la selva o una escuela secundaria en un barrio bajo y luego rellenar los planteles con misioneros nuevos. Se puede mantener artificialmente y a grandes costos un sistema pastoral a todas luces inaplicable y considerar que la investigación básica, que puede permitir la instauración de un sistema pastoral nuevo y vivo, es un lujo extravagante. Las becas para el estudio de humanidades no eclesiásticas, el dinero inicial destinado a la experimentación pastoral imaginativa, y las donaciones hechas para la documentación y la investigación dirigidas a formular una crítica constructiva específica, corren por igual el riesgo aterrador de constituirse en amenazas de nuestras estructuras temporales, planteles clericales y métodos de los “buenos negocios”.
+
+Hay una segunda fuente de recursos todavía más sorprendente que la generosidad eclesiástica hacia la propia Iglesia. Hace una década la Iglesia se parecía a una _grande dame_^[En francés, en el original. (E.)] empobrecida que trataba de mantener una tradición imperial de dar limosnas de su reducido ingreso. Durante algo más de un siglo, desde que España perdió a América Latina, la Iglesia perdió gradualmente donativos de los gobiernos, regalos de patronos y, por último, las rentas de sus antiguas tierras. De acuerdo con el concepto colonial de la caridad, la Iglesia perdió su poder de ayudar a los pobres. Pasó a ser considerada una reliquia histórica, inevitable aliada de los políticos conservadores.
+
+En 1966, y al menos a primera vista, lo contrario parece ser verdad. La Iglesia se ha convertido en un agente en quien se confía para ejecutar programas dirigidos al cambio social. Se halla suficientemente comprometida como para producir algunos resultados. Pero cuando se siente amenazada por el cambio verdadero, prefiere retirarse antes que permitir que la conciencia social se extienda como fuego griego. La supresión de las escuelas radiofónicas de Brasil por una alta autoridad eclesiástica constituye un buen ejemplo de ello.
+
+Así, la disciplina eclesiástica le asegura al donante que su dinero rinde el doble en manos del sacerdote. Ni se evaporará ni se le tendrá por lo que es: publicidad para la empresa privada e indoctrinación en un modo de vida que los ricos han decidido como el que mejor le viene a los pobres. El receptor inevitablemente entiende el mensaje: el cura está del lado de W. R. Grace Company, Esso, la Alianza para el Progreso, el gobierno democrático, los sindicatos del AFL-CIO y todo lo que sea sagrado en el panteón occidental.
+
+Las opiniones se dividen, por supuesto, cuando se discute si la Iglesia se metió de lleno en los proyectos sociales debido a que así podía obtener fondos “para los pobres” o si fue tras esos fondos porque de ese modo podía contener el castrismo y asegurar su propia respetabilidad institucional. Al convertirse en agencia “oficial” partidaria de un tipo de progreso, la Iglesia deja de hablar para los de abajo, que son ajenos a todas las agencias pero que constituyen una mayoría creciente. Al aceptar el poder de ayudar, la Iglesia debe necesariamente denunciar a un Camilo Torres que simboliza el poder de la renuncia. De esa manera el dinero le construye a la Iglesia una estructura “pastoral” que está más allá de sus medios y la convierte en un poder político.
+
+El compromiso emotivo superficial oscurece el pensamiento racional con que debe considerarse la “asistencia” norteamericana internacional. Un deseo extrañamente motivado de “ayudar” en Vietnam reprime los sanos sentimientos de culpa. Por fin, nuestra generación comienza a ver más allá de la retórica “lealtad” a la patria. A fuerza de golpes reconocemos la perversidad de nuestra política de poder y la dirección destructiva de nuestros torcidos esfuerzos por imponer a los demás “nuestro modo de vida”. No hemos empezado aún a enfrentar el reverso del compromiso de la mano de obra clerical y la complicidad de la Iglesia en el sofocamiento de un despertar universal demasiado revolucionario como para descansar mansamente en el seno de la “Gran Sociedad”.
+
+No sé de ningún sacerdote o monja extranjeros cuyos trabajos hayan sido tan artificiales como para que sus estancias en América Latina no hayan enriquecido alguna vida. Y no hay misionero tan incompetente como para que a través suyo América Latina no haya hecho una mínima contribución a Europa y Norteamérica. Pero ni nuestra admiración por la conspicua generosidad ni nuestro temor de hacer enemigos acérrimos de amigos indiferentes pueden llevarnos a darle la espalda a los hechos. Los misioneros enviados a América Latina pueden: _a)_ hacer de una Iglesia extraña una Iglesia más extranjera; _b)_ cargar de más sacerdotes a una Iglesia ya sobrepoblada, y _c)_ convertir a los obispos en mendigos abyectos. El reciente desacuerdo público ha hecho pedazos la unanimidad del consenso nacional estadunidense sobre Vietnam. Espero que cuando el público caiga en la cuenta de los elementos represivos y corruptores contenidos en los programas de ayuda eclesiástica “oficial” aparezca un verdadero sentimiento de culpa: la culpa de haber desperdiciado la vida de hombres y mujeres jóvenes dedicados a la tarea de evangelización en América Latina.
+
+La importación masiva e indiscriminada de clero ayuda a la burocracia eclesiástica a sobrevivir en su propia colonia que cada día se vuelve tanto más extranjera como agradable. La inmigración ayuda a transformar la hacienda de Dios —que era el estilo antiguo en el que el pueblo estaba formado sólo por advenedizos— en el supermercado del Señor —con abundante surtido de catecismos, liturgia y otros medios de gracia—.
+
+Transforma a los campesinos vegetativos en consumidores resignados, y a los antiguos devotos en clientes exigentes. Reviste los bolsillos sagrados, proporcionando refugio a los hombres temerosos de la responsabilidad secular.
+
+Los feligreses, acostumbrados como estaban a sacerdotes, novenas, libros y cultura de España (y muy posiblemente al retrato de Franco en la rectoría), se encuentran ahora con un nuevo tipo de financiero ejecutivo, administrador y talentoso, que promueve una cierta clase de democracia como ideal cristiano. El pueblo ve muy pronto que la Iglesia está alejada y alienada de él, habiéndose constituido en una operación importada y especializada que es financiada desde el extranjero y que habla con un acento, por lo extranjero, sagrado.
+
+Esta transfusión extranjera —y la esperanza de que aumente— dio a la pusilanimidad eclesiástica un nuevo contrato a su vida, una nueva posibilidad de echar a andar el sistema colonial y arcaico. Mientras Norteamérica y Europa envíen suficientes sacerdotes para llenar vacantes, no habrá necesidad de pensar en laicos que trabajen gratuitamente durante algunas horas diarias cumpliendo la mayoría de las tareas evangélicas, ni de reexaminar la estructura de la parroquia, la función del sacerdote, la obligación de los domingos y el sermón clerical, ni de probar el uso de un diaconato casado, la práctica de nuevas formas de celebración de la Palabra y de la Eucaristía y la implementación de íntimas reuniones familiares que celebren en el seno del hogar la conversión al Evangelio. La promesa de un aumento de clero es una sirena encantadora. Hace invisible el crónico excedente de clérigos que tiene América Latina e imposibilita el diagnosticarlo como una de las enfermedades más graves de la Iglesia. En la actualidad, esta evaluación pesimista resulta ligeramente alterada por un puñado de personas valientes e imaginativas, entre las que se cuentan algunas no latinas, que miran, estudian y luchan por una verdadera reforma.
+
+Una gran proporción del personal de la Iglesia latinoamericana se emplea actualmente en instituciones privadas que sirven a las clases media y alta, y que frecuentemente obtiene ganancias cuantiosas en un continente que necesita desesperadamente maestros, enfermeras y trabajadores sociales en instituciones públicas que presten servicio al pobre. Una gran parte del clero está metida en funciones burocráticas a menudo vinculadas con la venta de chucherías sacramentales y “bendiciones” supersticiosas. La mayoría de ellos vive en la mugre. Incapaz de emplear a su personal en tareas pastorales significativas, la Iglesia no puede siquiera sustentar a los sacerdotes y a los 670 obispos que los gobiernan. Para justificar ese sistema se echa mano de la teología, del derecho canónico para administrarlo y del clero extranjero para crear un consenso mundial acerca de la necesidad de su continuación.
+
+Un sano sentido de lo valores vacía los seminarios y las filas del clero mucho más eficientemente que la falta de disciplina y la generosidad. De hecho, el nuevo sentimiento de bienestar hace a la carrera eclesiástica más atractiva para los que andan en pos de sí mismos. Obispos convertidos en mendigos serviles se sienten tentados a organizar safaris e ir a la caza de sacerdotes extranjeros y recursos económicos para construir anomalías tales como los seminarios menores. Mientras esas expediciones tengan éxito será más difícil, si no imposible, tomar el sendero emocionalmente más pesado y preguntarnos honestamente si necesitamos ese juego.
+
+La exportación de empleados eclesiásticos a América Latina enmascara el temor universal e inconsciente que se le tiene a una nueva Iglesia. Las autoridades norteamericanas y sudamericanas, con motivaciones distintas pero con un mismo temor, se hacen cómplices en el mantenimiento de una Iglesia fuera de propósito. Al sacralizar la propiedad y los empleos, esa Iglesia se ciega cada vez más a la posibilidad de sacralizar a la persona y a la comunidad.
+
+Es difícil ayudar rehusándose a dar limosna. Recuerdo una ocasión cuando hice detener la distribución de alimentos en las sacristías de un área asolada por el hambre. Todavía siento el aguijón de una voz acusadora que me dice: “Duerme bien el resto de tu vida con la muerte de docenas de niños en tu conciencia”. Algunos doctores prefieren incluso la aspirina en lugar de la cirugía radical. No sienten ninguna culpa si el paciente muere de cáncer, pero temen el riesgo de aplicar el cuchillo. Hoy es necesaria una valentía como la expresada por el jesuita norteamericano Daniel Berrigan, quien escribió sobre América Latina: “Sugiero que cesemos de enviar personas o cosas durante tres años, que pongamos los pies en la tierra, que enfrentemos nuestros errores y que busquemos la manera de no canonizarlos”.
+
+Después de seis años de experiencia en el entrenamiento de cientos de misioneros asignados a América Latina, sé que cada vez es mayor el número de voluntarios auténticos que quieren enfrentarse a la verdad para poner a prueba su fe. Los superiores deciden administrativamente rotar el personal y no tienen que vivir con las decepciones consecuentes, se hallan emocionalmente en desventaja para hacer frente a esa realidad.
+
+La Iglesia estadunidense debe encarar el reverso doloroso de la generosidad: la carga que una vida gratuitamente ofrecida le impone al recipiente. Los hombres que van a América Latina deben aceptar humildemente la posibilidad de que, por más que den cuanto tengan, pueden ser allí inútiles o dañinos. Deben aceptar el hecho de que un programa de ayuda eclesiástica tullido los usa como paliativos para amortiguar el dolor de una estructura cancerosa, con la única esperanza de que el remedio le dará al organismo tiempo y calma suficientes para iniciar una curación espontánea. Es mucho más probable que la píldora del farmacéutico aleje al paciente de los consejos de un cirujano y lo convierta en un adicto.
+
+Los misioneros norteamericanos se dan cada vez más cuenta de que atendieron a un llamado para remendar agujeros en un barco que se hunde porque los oficiales no se atrevieron a lanzar los botes salvavidas. A menos que esto sea visto claramente, los hombres que ofrecieron obedientemente los mejores años de sus vidas se encontrarán engañados en una lucha estéril por mantener a flote un barco sentenciado que navega sin rumbo. Debemos reconocer que los misioneros pueden convertirse en peones de una lucha ideológica mundial y que es blasfemo emplear el Evangelio para apuntalar a este o aquel sistema político o social. El dinero y los hombres enviados a una sociedad como parte de un programa llevan consigo ideas que les sobreviven. Se ha señalado, en el caso de los Cuerpos de Paz, que la mutación cultural catalizada por un grupo extranjero puede ser mucho más efectiva que todos los servicios inmediatos que ese grupo preste. Lo mismo puede ser cierto de los misioneros norteamericanos que —no lejos de casa, con grandes medios a su disposición y cumpliendo a menudo un cometido muy corto— penetran en un área intensamente colonizada, cultural y económicamente, por Estados Unidos. Ese misionero es parte de esta esfera de influencia y a menudo de intriga. A través del misionero estadunidense su país sombrea y colorea a gusto la imagen pública de la Iglesia. El influjo de los misioneros estadunidenses coincide con los proyectos de la Alianza para el Progreso, el plan Camelot y la CIA y se parece a un bautizo de los tres. La Alianza aparece dirigida por la justicia cristiana y no se ve en lo que es, independientemente de sus varias motivaciones: una decepción designada para mantener el _statu quo_. Durante los primeros cinco años de dicho programa se triplicaron los capitales netos que escapan de América Latina. El programa es demasiado pequeño como para permitir siquiera el logro de un umbral de crecimiento sostenido. Es un hueso que se le echa al perro para que no alborote el corral de Estados Unidos.
+
+En esas circunstancias el misionero estadunidense tiende a cumplir el papel tradicional que tenía el capellán lacayo de un poder colonial. Cuando la ayuda la administra un “gringo” para tranquilizar a los “subdesarrollados”, los peligros implícitos en el uso de dinero extranjero con fines eclesiásticos adquieren proporciones caricaturescas. Por supuesto sería mucho pedir a la mayoría de los norteamericanos que hicieran una crítica abierta, clara y contundente a la agresión sociopolítica de Estados Unidos en América Latina; y más difícil todavía pedir que lo hicieran sin la amargura del expatriado o el oportunismo del que cambia de partido.
+
+Los grupos de misioneros norteamericanos no pueden evitar proyectar la imagen de “puestos de avanzada de Estados Unidos”. Esta distorsión sólo la podrían impedir individuos norteamericanos mezclados con personas locales. El misionero es por necesidad un agente “solapado” que sirve — por más inconsciente que esté de ello— al consenso social y político norteamericano. Pero es consciente y deliberado en su deseo de trasplantar los valores de su Iglesia a Sudamérica; la adaptación y la selección natural rara vez alcanzan el nivel para cuestionar los propios valores.
+
+La situación no era tan ambigua hace 10 años, cuando las sociedades misioneras eran canales de buena fe para el flujo de la quincallería tradicional de la Iglesia estadunidense hacia América Latina. No había mercancía que no fuera vendible en el mercado latinoamericano que apenas se abría —desde los collarines romanos hasta las escuelas parroquiales, desde los catecismos norteamericanos hasta las universidades católicas—.
+
+Tampoco se necesitaba mucha mercadotecnia para convencer a los obispos latinoamericanos que probaran la etiqueta con el sello _Made in USA_.
+
+Entretanto la situación ha cambiado considerablemente. La Iglesia estadunidense se sacude todavía a raíz de los resultados de su primera autocrítica científica y masiva. No sólo los métodos y las instituciones, sino también las ideologías que ellos implican, son objeto de exámenes y ataques. De ahí que también se tambalee la confianza del vendedor eclesiástico estadunidense en sí mismo. Así es que vemos la extraña paradoja de un hombre que trata de implantar en una cultura realmente diferente estructuras y programas que hoy son rechazados en su propio país de origen. (Hace poco me enteré de que el personal norteamericano planea establecer una escuela primaria católica en una parroquia de una ciudad centroamericana que ya tiene una docena de escuelas públicas.) Está también el peligro opuesto. Latinoamérica ya no puede seguir tolerando ser un puerto para los liberales norteamericanos que no pueden acertar en su país, una salida para apóstoles demasiado “apostólicos” como para que encuentren en su propia comunidad sus vocaciones de profesionales competentes. El vendedor de quincallería amenaza con inundar el resto del continente con imitaciones de segunda clase de parroquias, escuelas y catecismos, que han pasado ya de moda en el mismo Estados Unidos. El escapista vagabundo va más allá y amenaza con confundir a un mundo extranjero con protestas superficiales que ni siquiera son viables en su casa.
+
+La Iglesia estadunidense de la generación de la guerra de Vietnam encuentra difícil comprometerse en ayuda al extranjero sin exportar sus soluciones y sus problemas. Para las naciones en desarrollo ambos lujos son prohibitivos. Los mexicanos, para evitar ofender a los remitentes, pagan fuertes sumas en derechos para sacar de las aduanas regalos inútiles o jamás solicitados que les envían amigos estadunidenses bien intencionados. Los que hacen regalos no deben pensar en el presente y en la necesidad actual, sino en los efectos futuros sobre toda una generación. Los planificadores de la caridad se deben preguntar si el valor global del regalo, en hombres, dinero e ideas, amerita el precio que el destinatario tendrá que pagar en última instancia. Como sugiere el padre Berrigan: los ricos y los poderosos pueden decidirse a no dar; el pobre difícilmente puede rehusarse a aceptar.
+
+Y como la limosna condiciona al espíritu del mendigo, los obispos latinoamericanos no están enteramente extraviados cuando piden una ayuda extranjera errada y dañina. Gran parte de la culpa la tiene la eclesiología subdesarrollada de los clérigos estadunidenses que dirigen la “venta” de las buenas intenciones estadunidenses.
+
+El católico estadunidense quiere comprometerse en un programa eclesiológicamente válido y no en programas subsidiariamente políticos y sociales designados para influir en el crecimiento de las naciones en vías de desarrollo de acuerdo con la doctrina social de cualquiera, aunque se la describa como la del papa. El meollo de la discusión no está por ello en _cómo_ enviar más dinero y más hombres sino en _por qué_ hacerlo. Mientras tanto, la Iglesia no está en peligro crítico. Estamos tentados a salvar las estructuras en lugar de cuestionar su propósito y verdad. Deseosos de glorificarnos con el trabajo de nuestras manos, nos sentimos culpables, frustrados y airados cuando una parte del edificio comienza a crujir. En lugar de creer en la Iglesia intentemos frenéticamente construirla de acuerdo con nuestra nublada imagen cultural. Queremos construir la comunidad dependiendo de las técnicas, y somos ciegos al deseo latente de unidad que lucha por expresarse entre los hombres. Aterrados, planeamos _nuestra_ Iglesia con estadísticas, en lugar de buscar esperanzadamente a la Iglesia viva que está aquí entre nosotros.
+
+# La vaca sagrada
+
+## El mito liberal y la integración social
+
+Durante las dos últimas décadas, el concepto “crecimiento demográfico” estuvo presente en toda conversación relacionada con el desarrollo de América Latina. En 1950, alrededor de 200 millones de personas vivían entre México y Chile, cifra equivalente a la población total de Estados Unidos y Canadá, en donde sólo 15 millones lograron producir suficiente comida para todos sus conciudadanos y, además, para una buena parte del mundo. Dado el nivel tecnológico de América Latina, tenemos que 120 millones de campesinos subyugados por una agricultura primitiva no lograron abastecer siquiera las necesidades de su población total.
+
+Si damos por sentada la eficacia de los programas de control de la natalidad y de desarrollo de la tecnología rural, seguramente para 1985 no existirán más de 40 millones de agricultores que producirán alimentos para una población total de 340 millones. Los 300 millones restantes quedarán marginados de la economía si no se les incorpora a la vida urbana o a la producción industrial.
+
+Por otra parte, durante estos últimos 20 años los gobiernos latinoamericanos y la ayuda técnica extranjera aumentaron su confianza en la eficacia de la escuela —elemental, industrial y superior— como un instrumento de incorporación de los habitantes de barrios, rancherías y poblados, al mundo de la fábrica, del comercio, de la vida pública. Se mantiene la ilusión de que pese a que se posea una economía precaria, la escuela podrá producir una amplia clase media, con virtudes análogas a las que predominan en las naciones altamente industrializadas. Hoy ya se hace evidente que la escuela no está alcanzando estas metas, y su ineficacia ha motivado un aumento en las investigaciones tendientes a mejorar el proceso de enseñanza que se sigue en las escuelas y a adaptar los planes de estudio y la administración escolar a las circunstancias concretas de una sociedad en desarrollo. Pero dicha investigación no es suficiente; se hace necesaria una revisión radical. En vez de estancarnos en un esfuerzo por mejorar las escuelas, lancémonos a analizar críticamente la ideología que nos presenta al sistema escolar como un dogma indiscutible de cualquier sociedad industrial. Y al efectuar la revisión no deberemos escandalizarnos si descubrimos que posiblemente no sea la escuela el medio de educación universal en las naciones en vías de desarrollo. Por el contrario, tal vez esto sirva para dejar libre nuestra imaginación y crear un escenario de futuro en el que la escuela resulte un anacronismo.
+
+Tal ha sido, durante 1967-1968, el tema de la mayor parte de los coloquios que tuvieron lugar en el Cidoc (Centro Intercultural de Documentación) de Cuernavaca.
+
+El problema es difícil e inquietante. La angustiosa carencia de alternativas que presenta el sistema tradicional escolar, hizo que las discusiones tuviesen un matiz demasiado abstracto y a ratos frustrante. Sin embargo, ellas nos hicieron más conscientes de la ineficacia de la escuela tal como funciona hoy. Llegamos a la conclusión de que en América Latina la escuela acentúa la polarización social, concentra sus servicios —de tipo educativo y no educativo— en una élite, y está facilitando el camino a una estructura política de tipo fascista. Por el solo hecho de existir, tiende a fomentar un clima de violencia.
+
+Tomando en cuenta que la escolarización es un subsistema dentro del sistema social, durante los próximos años nos concentraremos en el Cidoc en analizarlo no desde otro subsistema, sino desde fuera del sistema social.
+
+No existe reforma social sin signo político. Cualquier cambio real en el método de admisión, en el plan de estudios y en la expedición de certificados y títulos, es políticamente discutible. Pero aquí proponemos mucho más: el rechazo de la ideología que exige la reclusión de los niños en la escuela. Esta afirmación no sería esencialmente discutible si no fuera considerada políticamente subversiva.
+
+## La alianza para el progreso de las clases medias
+
+Hace siete años los gobiernos americanos constituyeron una “Alianza para el Progreso”; o tal vez para frenar el progreso, aunque más bien parece una “alianza” al servicio del “progreso” de las clases medias. En la mayoría de los países, la Alianza ha impulsado la sustitución de una élite cerrada, feudal y hereditaria por otra que se dice “meritocrática”.
+
+Esta “nueva” élite se encuentra abierta solamente a los infelices privilegiados que han obtenido un certificado escolar. Simultáneamente el proletariado marginado urbano (compuesto en parte por vendedores ambulantes, vigilantes de autos, boleros o lustradores de zapatos, y otros que prestan servicios menores) tuvo una tasa de crecimiento inmensamente mayor que la de las masas rurales tradicionales o la de los trabajadores sindicalizados, lo que es señal de que cada día se ensancha más el abismo que separa a la mayoría marginada de la minoría escolarizada.
+
+La antigua y estable sociedad feudal latinoamericana está engendrando dos nuevas sociedades separadas, desiguales y sólo presuntamente entrelazadas. La naturaleza de este distanciamiento representa un fenómeno nuevo, cualitativamente distinto a las formas tradicionales de discriminación social de la América hispana. Es un proceso discriminatorio en pañales que crece con el desarrollo mismo de la escolarización. La escuela es la niñera encargada de que no se interrumpa el ensanchamiento de ese abismo. Resulta ilusorio, por ello, invocar la escolarización universal como medio de eliminar la discriminación. Yo sostengo que la razón fundamental de la alienación creciente de las mayorías marginadas es la aceptación progresiva del “mito liberal”: la convicción de que las escuelas son una panacea para la integración social.
+
+Arraigado en una tradición, ya sólida en el tiempo de los enciclopedistas, el hombre occidental concibe al ciudadano como un ser que “pasó por la escuela”. La asistencia a clase sustituyó a la tradicional reverencia al cura. La conversión a la nación por medio del adoctrinamiento escolar sustituyó la incorporación a la colonia por medio de la catequesis.
+
+Con la ayuda del misionero, la colonización preparó a las Repúblicas latinoamericanas para la adopción de constituciones basadas en el modelo norteamericano, generalizando la convicción de que todos los ciudadanos tienen el derecho —y por lo tanto, la posibilidad— de entrar en la sociedad a través de la puerta de la escuela. El maestro, como misionero de la escuela, encontró en Latinoamérica más éxito en las capas populares que en otras zonas de similar atraso industrial. El misionero de la colonia había preparado la aceptación de su sucesor.
+
+Tal vez esto explique por qué fue fácil para las izquierdas liberales conseguir aumentar las inversiones nacionales e internacionales en escolarización. De hecho, tanto los presupuestos como las inversiones privadas destinadas a la educación han ido aumentando rápidamente y, a falta de una revisión radical, se prepara el terreno para un aumento ulterior totalmente desproporcionado en relación con el de otros sectores de interés nacional. Es el momento de analizar a fondo la cuestión.
+
+El sistema escolar ha venido a hacer de puente estrecho por el que atraviesa ese sistema social que se ensancha día a día. Como único pasaje “legítimo” para pasar de la masa a la élite, el sistema coarta cualquier otro medio de promoción del individuo y, mediante la falacia de su gratuidad, crea en el marginado la convicción de ser él el único culpable de su situación.
+
+## La escuela institución anticuada
+
+No es paradójico afirmar que Latinoamérica no necesita más establecimientos escolares para universalizar la educación. Esto suena ridículo porque estamos acostumbrados a pensar en la educación como en un producto exclusivo de la escuela, y porque estamos inclinados a presumir que lo que funcionó en los siglos XIX y XX necesariamente dará los mismos resultados en el XXI. De hecho, ninguna de las dos suposiciones es cierta.
+
+América Latina necesitó tanto sistemas escolares como ferroviarios. Ambos abarcaron continentes, ambos impulsaron a las naciones ricas (ahora ya establecidas) hacia la primera época industrial, y ambos son ahora reliquias inofensivas de un pasado victoriano. Ninguno de esos dos sistemas conviene a una sociedad que pasa directamente de la agricultura primitiva a la era del jet. Latinoamérica no puede darse el lujo de mantener instituciones sociales obsoletas en medio del proceso tecnológico contemporáneo. Debe dejar que se desmorone el bloque del sistema educativo imperante, en vez de gastar energías en apuntalarlo. Los países industrializados según los moldes del pasado pagan un precio desorbitante por mantener unido lo nuevo y lo viejo. Este precio significa, en último término, un freno a la economía, a la libertad, al desarrollo social e individual. Si América Latina se empeña en imitar esta conducta, la educación, no menos que el transporte, será privilegio de “la crema y nata” de la sociedad. La educación se identificará con un título, y la movilidad con un automóvil. Eso es precisamente lo que por desgracia está ocurriendo. Ni económica ni políticamente pueden nuestros pueblos soportar “la era del dominio de la escuela”.
+
+## El monopolio de la escuela sobre la educación
+
+Al hablar de “escuela” no me refiero a toda forma de educación organizada.
+
+Por “escuela” y “escolarización” entiendo aquí esa forma sistemática de recluir a los jóvenes desde los siete a los 25 años, y también el carácter de _rite de passage_^[En francés, en el original. (E.)] que tiene la educación como la conocemos, de la cual la escuela es el templo donde se realizan las progresivas iniciaciones. Hoy nos parece normal que la escuela llene esa función, pero olvidamos que ella, como organización con su correspondiente ideología, no constituye un dogma eterno, sino un simple fenómeno histórico que aparece con el surgimiento de la nación industrial.
+
+El sistema escolar se impone a todos los ciudadanos durante un periodo que abarca de 10 a 18 años de su juventud con un promedio de 10 meses al año con varias horas por día. El local escolar es el recinto encargado de la custodia de quienes sobran en la calle, el hogar o el mercado laboral.
+
+Cuando una sociedad se escolariza, acepta mentalmente el dogma escolar.
+
+Se confiere entonces al maestro el poder de establecer los criterios según los cuales los nuevos grupos populares deberán someterse a la escuela para que no se los considere subeducados. Tal sujeción, ejercida sobre seres humanos saludables, productivos y potencialmente independientes, es ejecutada por la institución escolar con una eficiencia sólo comparable a la de los conventos, _Kibbutzim_ o campos de concentración.
+
+Luego de distinguir a sus graduados con un título, la escuela los coloca en el mercado para que pregonen su valor. Una vez que la educación universal ha sido aceptada como la marca de buena calidad del “pueblo escogido del maestro”, el grado de competencia y adaptabilidad de sus miembros pasará a medirse por la cantidad de tiempo y dinero gastados en educarlos, y no mediante la habilidad o instrucción adquiridas fuera del curriculum “acreditado”.
+
+La idea de la alfabetización universal sirvió para declarar a la educación competencia exclusiva de la escuela. Ésta se transformó así en una vaca sagrada más intocable que la Iglesia del periodo colonial. Se declaró tan esencial para el buen ciudadano del siglo XIX saber leer y escribir, como ser bautizado lo había sido en el siglo XVII. Parece ser que a la par de la electricidad se descubrió la “ley natural” de que los niños deben asistir a la escuela. Las leyes correlativas se descubren más fácilmente en los países ricos. En marzo de 1968, el Consejo Superior de Enseñanza de la ciudad de Nueva York concluyó que en 1975 el cien por ciento de los habitantes de 22 años tendrán un mínimo de 14 años de escolarización. Incluso los que han rechazado el sistema social en que viven deberán aceptar el sistema escolar.
+
+Ni la prisión salvará al neoyorquino menor de 23 años de la imposición escolar.
+
+Se proyecta ya una sociedad en la que el título universitario reemplazará a la alfabetización. De hecho, en Estados Unidos se considera a las personas con menos de 14 años de escolarización como miembros subdesarrollados de la sociedad, confinados a los arrabales. Quien se rebele contra la evolución del dogma escolar será tachado de loco o subversivo. Esto último lo es, efectivamente.
+
+Es necesario entender la escuela monopolizadora de la educación en analogía con otros sistemas educativos inventados por sociedades anteriores. Pensemos en el proceso instructivo del aprendiz en el taller del gremio medieval, en la hora de la doctrina como instrumento evangelizador del periodo colonial, o bien pensemos en _Les Grandes Écoles_ con las que la Francia burguesa supo legitimar técnicamente el privilegio de sus élites posrevolucionarias. Sólo observando este monopolio en una perspectiva histórica es posible hacerse la pregunta de si la escuela conviene hoy a América Latina.
+
+Cada uno de los sistemas mencionados surgió para dar estabilidad y proteger la estructura de la sociedad que los produjo. Estados Unidos no ha sido la primera nación dispuesta a pagar un alto precio —subvencionando incluso sus propios misioneros— con tal de exportar su sistema educativo a todos los rincones de la Tierra, buscando en su caso imponer _The American_ _Dream_. La colonización hispana de América, con todo su aparato de catequización, es un predecesor digno de tenerse en cuenta.
+
+## La escuela como manía obsesiva
+
+Es difícil desafiar la ideología escolar en un ambiente en el que todos sus miembros tienen una mentalidad escolarizada. Es propio de las categorías que se manejan en una sociedad capitalista industrializada el medir todo resultado como producto de instituciones e instrumentos especializados.
+
+Los ejércitos producen defensa, las Iglesias producen salvación eterna, Ford produce transporte… ¿Por qué no concebir entonces la educación como un producto de la escuela? Una vez aceptada esta divisa proveniente de una mentalidad cuantitativo-productiva, tendremos que toda educación que pueda recibirse fuera de la escuela o “fábrica de educación” dará la impresión de algo espurio, ilegítimo y, ciertamente, no acreditado.
+
+La sociedad moderna tiende a creer en las soluciones masivas de sus problemas. Se trata de ganar guerras con una inmensa cantidad de bombas, de mover millones de personas con un sinnúmero de cochecitos y de educar con cantidades industriales de escuelas. Estados Unidos es “suficientemente” rico para mantener listas un número de bombas mucho mayor del que se necesita para exterminar tres veces todas las cosas vivientes; para congestionar de autos el creciente pulpo de las carreteras, y para obligar a cada niño a 16 000 horas de escolarización primaria y secundaria al precio de 1.27 dólares por hora en Estados Unidos.
+
+Probablemente las naciones de América Latina no sean lo suficientemente ricas para adoptar estos sistemas, aunque algunos de sus gobiernos actúan como si lo fuesen. El ejemplo de las naciones desarrolladas hace que los peruanos gasten un notable porcentaje de su presupuesto en comprar bombarderos Mirage (supongo que para exhibirlos en algún desfile militar), y que los brasileños promulguen el ideal del _family_ _car_ (naturalmente sólo para unos pocos). El mismo ejemplo consigue que absolutamente todos los gobiernos latinoamericanos (Cuba inclusive) gasten de una a dos quintas partes de su presupuesto en escolarizar, sin encontrar por eso oposición.
+
+Insistamos por un momento en la analogía entre el sistema escolar moderno y el auto particular. Una economía basada en la idea de tener un auto es ya un ideal latinoamericano, por lo menos entre los que en el presente formulan la política nacional. En los últimos 20 años, los gastos en carreteras, estacionamientos y toda esa otra clase de beneficios para los que poseen automóvil propio, han aumentado cuantiosamente. Estas inversiones sólo sirven a una minoría ínfima y, lo que es peor aún, obstaculizan la instalación de cualquier sistema alternativo, pues desde ahora predeterminan la orientación de presupuestos futuros. Mientras tanto, la proliferación de carros particulares, además de dificultar en las calles el tránsito de autobuses —único medio de transporte popular sin contar el subterráneo—, discrimina la circulación de éstos en las autopistas urbanas.
+
+Criticar estas inversiones en comunicaciones es permisible. Sin embargo, quien proponga limitar radicalmente las inversiones escolares y encontrar medios más eficaces de educación, comete un suicidio político.
+
+Los partidos de oposición pueden permitirse gestionar la necesidad de construir supercarreteras, pueden oponerse a la adquisición de armamentos que se oxidarán entre desfile y desfile, pero, ¿quién en su sano juicio se atreve a contradecir la irrebatible “necesidad” de dar a todo niño la oportunidad de hacer su bachillerato?
+
+## La escuela tabú intocable
+
+La escuela se ha vuelto intocable por ser vital para el mantenimiento del _statu quo_. Sirve para mitigar el potencial subversivo que debería poseer la educación en una sociedad alienada, ya que al quedar confinada a sus aulas sólo confiere sus más altos certificados a quienes se han sometido a su iniciación y adiestramiento.
+
+En sociedades infracapitalizadas, donde la mayoría no puede darse el lujo de una escolarización limitada —por más que para los pocos que la reciben sea gratuita—, el presente sistema implica la total subordinación de esa mayoría al escolarizado prestigio de la minoría. En esta minoría de los beneficiarios del monopolio escolar se encuentran los líderes políticos y los técnicos de planificación, independientemente de que sean conservadores, marxistas o liberales. También forman parte de ella las niñas mimadas de las universidades privadas y los cabecillas estudiantiles de las huelgas universitarias. Todos estos grupos están igualmente interesados en el mantenimiento del monopolio escolar. La única divergencia gira en torno a quién debe gozar del privilegio y quién no.
+
+## La escuela en el mundo de la electrónica
+
+Para el año 2000 el proceso de educación formal habrá cambiado, tanto en las naciones ricas como en las pobres. Las escuelas cesarán de dividir la vida humana en dos partes: la edad escolar para los discriminados por su inmadurez y la edad madura para los titulados por la escuela. La edad escolar durará toda la vida. A medida que un individuo se haga más maduro y capaz, se intensificará su educación formal, convirtiéndose ésta en una actividad de adultos, más que de jóvenes. Lo que se entiende hoy día por asistir a clase será entonces obsoleto.
+
+Todos los sistemas sociales, especialmente las incorporaciones industriales y administrativas, asumirán la tarea de entrenar y especializar a sus miembros; prestarán una especie de servicio de aculturación, concentrado en un aprendizaje relevante para el individuo, en vez de forzarlo a perder tantos años de su vida aprendiendo cosas que no utilizará jamás. La educación no será ya identificada con la escolarización, y será posible el adiestramiento fuera del monopolio escolar.
+
+Ya es posible entrever las tendencias hacia esas metas. En Berkeley o en la Zona Rosa de México, la nueva generación pide trabajo no alienante y poder de decisión a nivel de grupos pequeños donde tenga cabida la experiencia personal. En rebeldía contra el sistema que los mimó, estos jóvenes prefieren poder “celebrar” la experiencia de vivir, al _achievement_^[En inglés, en el original. (E.)] o logro, que es el dios de las generaciones pasadas. Es decir, se encuentran proclamando los mismos ideales que pretenden ser normativos tanto en China como en Cuba.
+
+El sistema escolar, al encargarse de producir seres infantiles, consigue que éstos se organicen para reaccionar contra el paternalismo de esa sociedad que insiste en mantenerlos niños declarándolos “escolares”.
+
+Constituyen dinámicamente una nueva clase universal —carente de toda base de poder legítimo— aún no reconocida como tal. Los ideales de esta clase son de penetrante contenido humanista. Ideal que por utópico no deja de ser vehementemente sugestivo.
+
+Toda sociedad que hace de la experiencia humana su centro de desarrollo —y es ésta la sociedad que esperamos y soñamos— necesita distinguir tajantemente entre el proceso de instrucción y la apertura de la conciencia de cada individuo, entre adiestramiento y desarrollo de la imaginación creadora. La instrucción es cada vez más susceptible de planificación y programación, lo que no ocurre con la comprensión.
+
+Concibamos la instrucción como la cantidad de socialización programada que un individuo necesita adquirir antes de ser admitido en un nuevo ambiente. Preveo un escenario de futuro en el que resurgirá el aprendizaje medieval. Cada ambiente o cada organización proporcionará la instrucción necesaria a sus actividades. Esto lo hacen ya los sindicatos, las Iglesias, los bancos, la industria, el ejército, y no la escuela. La persona se encuentra incitada a aprender porque se trata de cuestiones que le atañen personalmente. Es lo que Paulo Freire en Brasil llamó _conscientisação_. Es la única palabra aplicable.
+
+Sin embargo, podría y debería no ser así. La comprensión puede adquirirse de manera cómoda y no estructurada, haciendo que el individuo se vaya conociendo más a sí mismo a través del diálogo con las personas de su ambiente.
+
+El papel de la escuela en la evolución hacia la utopía de finales de este siglo es diametralmente opuesto tanto en las naciones ricas como en las naciones pobres. Las primeras invirtieron enormes cantidades de dinero en poblar sus tierras de escuelas, al mismo tiempo que construyeron redes ferroviarias. Gastaron mucho más aun cuando descubrieron que necesitaban universidades además de escuelas, las cuales construyeron al mismo tiempo que las autopistas. Piensan ser bastante ricas para terminar, en la próxima década, el proceso de poblar sus tierras de universidades construidas alrededor de un estacionamiento, ya que cada uno de sus jóvenes está por tener automóvil propio. Son tan ricas, que el aumento cuantitativo de escuelas no impide a primera vista el cambio social. Pero en mi opinión lo frena, principalmente por la despersonalización del individuo que tal escolarización implica.
+
+De intentar algo semejante, las naciones pobres sufrirán una desastrosa quiebra económica mucho antes de aproximarse a este género de saturación escolar. En América Latina es imposible lograr un promedio de 12 años de escolarización para todos los ciudadanos. Según el último censo, no hay país latinoamericano en el que 27% de los alumnos de un curso escolar correspondiente a una edad determinada vaya más allá del sexto grado ni en el que más de 1% se gradúe en la universidad. Y esto ocurre a pesar de que de 18 a más de 30% de los presupuestos oficiales se invierten en las escuelas. Esta sola consideración debería convencernos de la peligrosa ambigüedad del mito de la escolarización universal. La imitación del sistema escolar de la metrópoli capitalista constituye un peligro mortal para sus colonias no menos que para sus ex colonias. _1)_ Ni un control radical del crecimiento de la población, _2)_ ni el máximo aumento posible del porcentaje presupuestal dedicado a la educación, _3)_ ni ayudas extranjeras sin precedente, podrían asegurar a la próxima generación latinoamericana un promedio de 10 años de escolarización, mucho menos uno de 14. Esto por lo siguiente:
+
+_1)_ En una población joven como la de América Latina — particularmente en sus zonas tropicales—, ni los programas más radicales de control de la natalidad podrían reducir el presente nivel de población de las generaciones jóvenes.
+
+_2)_ No es posible aumentar arbitrariamente el porcentaje del presupuesto público que se invierte en escuelas. Las carreteras, el seguro social y el fomento industrial, son fuertes competidores. Además, para los próximos 15 años ya podemos prever las tasas máximas de crecimiento de los presupuestos.
+
+_3)_ Se habla mucho ahora de que el dinero gastado en Vietnam podría invertirse mejor en escuelas en Latinoamérica. Y lo proponen no sólo los idealistas que creen en el mito liberal, sino también los cínicos que saben muy bien que el monopolio escolar combate la insurgencia con mucha mayor eficacia que el napalm. Es importante observar, sin embargo, que un país latinoamericano que utiliza ahora 25% de su presupuesto en “escolarizarse”, necesitaría una ayuda extranjera de 150% de su presupuesto total. Es dudoso que esto pudiera ser políticamente recomendable.
+
+Más aún: el problema no es sólo que América Latina carece de los recursos necesarios para aumentar suficientemente las escolarización. Al mismo tiempo su costo per cápita aumenta: _1)_ con la expansión cuantitativa del sistema (la tarea de la escuela se hace más difícil y costosa a medida que penetra zonas más distantes: las escuelas no son “más baratas por docena”, para lo cual basta pensar que al aumentar el número sube también el costo administrativo y burocrático, sin aludir a las ganancias que extrae de ahí el sistema económico dominante), _2_) con tasas de perseverancia escolar creciente (por supuesto que cuesta más un año en la escuela superior que dos o tres en la elemental), _3)_ con un aumento en la calidad de la enseñanza (no cuesta lo mismo enseñar física utilizando un laboratorio en lugar de un pizarrón), _4)_ con las exigencias justificadas del personal docente (las asociaciones de maestros son ya, en muchos países, los gremios profesionales más poderosos, un poco análogos al clero de la colonia; pero su agitación es justificada: en 1963, el promedio de su salario en 14 países de nuestra América equivalía a 60 dólares mensuales).
+
+Por tanto, serán muy pocos los que podrían gozar del estatus simbólico y del uso del poder despótico que la escuela confiere. Es necesario considerar estos dos elementos.
+
+## La escuela como símbolo de estatus
+
+Ese portentoso papelito llamado título o diploma se ha convertido en la posesión más codiciada. Recompensa principalmente a quien fue capaz de soportar hasta el final un ritual penoso; a la vez, representa una iniciación al mundo del “ejecutivo”. El ideal de que cada persona tenga su auto y su título ha producido una sociedad de masas tipo clase media. A medida que se van haciendo realidad, estos ideales se transforman en mecanismos que aseguran el sistema que ellos produjeron. Tanto el auto como el título son símbolos de los esfuerzos correspondientes al periodo de industrialización liberal. Representan un logro y posesión individual.
+
+Toda sociedad necesita pagar un precio para conservar sus ritos. Brasil tiene su carnaval, México su Guadalupe, algunos países su “revolución”. Y Estados Unidos tiene su graduación. A pesar de su popularidad, los ritos son normalmente obsoletos. La sociedad tiene que hacer sacrificios para que esos ritos, dioses e iglesias hereditarias satisfagan parte del hambre del ser contemporáneo. Los ricos pueden practicar ritos más costosos y tienden a imponerlos a todos aquellos que quieran compartir el juego político, industrial e intelectual.
+
+Es absurdo que el simple hecho de que Estados Unidos no pueda liberarse del costosísimo ritual para el título y el coche, sea argumento para universalizar esta religión en América Latina.
+
+Como todos los países que llegan tarde a la industrialización, Latinoamérica puede aprovechar las invenciones de las naciones industrializadas, pero no debe dejar que éstas le impongan el sistema social de su tecnología avanzada porque será imposible financiarlo. Incluyo ahí a la endiosada escuela. No vale la pena que nuestra naciones provean de automóviles y de títulos a sus burguesías asimiladas a la burguesía internacional. Nuevos procesos eliminarán ambos símbolos en Estados Unidos mucho antes de que 10% de los latinoamericanos logre obtenerlos.
+
+## La escuela creadora de déspotas
+
+La escuela, que ayudó en el siglo pasado a superar el feudalismo, se está convirtiendo en ídolo opresor que sólo protege a los escolarizados. Ella gradúa y, consecuentemente, degrada. Por fuerza del mismo proceso, el degradado deberá volver a sometérsele. La prioridad social se otorgará entonces de acuerdo con el nivel escolar alcanzado. En toda América Latina, más di-nero para escuelas significa más privilegios para unos pocos a costa de muchos. Este altivo paternalismo de la élite se formula incluso entre los objetivos políticos como igualdad (gratuidad, universalidad) en la oportunidad escolar. Cada nueva escuela establecida bajo esta ley deshonra al no escolarizado y lo hace más consciente de su “inferioridad”. El ritmo con el cual crece la expectativa de escolarización es mucho mayor al ritmo con el cual aumentan las escuelas.
+
+El hecho es que cada año disminuye el número de clientes satisfechos que se gradúan en un nivel que se considere “satisfactorio” y aumenta el de los marcados con el estigma de la deserción escolar. A estos últimos su título de desertores los gradúa para ejercer en el mercado de los marginados. La aguda pirámide educacional asigna a cada individuo su nivel de poder, prestigio y recursos, según lo considera apropiado para él.
+
+Lo convence de que esto es ni más ni menos lo que merece. La aceptación del mito escolar por los distintos niveles de la sociedad justifica ante todos los privilegios de muy pocos.
+
+No hay mucha diferencia entre los que justifican su poder con base en la herencia y los que lo hacen con base en un título. En gran parte son los mismos. Las escuelas frustran, sí, a la mayoría, pero lo hacen no sólo con todas las apariencias de legitimidad democrática sino también de clemencia.
+
+A alguien que no esté satisfecho con su falta de educación se le aconseja “que se supere”. El remedio de la escuela nocturna o la educación de adultos están siempre disponibles: medidas ambas ineficaces para generalizar la educación, pero sumamente eficaces para demostrar al individuo que es culpable de la discriminación que sufre.
+
+La perpetuación del mito escolar y su expansión hacia nuevas capas de la sociedad son tareas de la misma escuela. De este modo ella asegura su propio porvenir. En el caso de la escolarización no es verdad que “algo es mejor que nada”. Pocos años de escuela inculcan una convicción en el niño: el que tiene más escolarización que él, tiene una indiscutida autoridad sobre él.
+
+Las escuelas aumentan el ingreso nacional por dos razones opuestas pero igualmente explotadoras del individuo: _1)_ capacitan a la minoría graduada para una producción económica mayor, pero sometida siempre a la mentalidad escolar, _2)_ esta minoría se vuelve tan productiva que se hace preciso enseñar a la mayoría a consumir disciplinadamente (lo que se logra dándole alguna escolarización). Así la escuela limita la vitalidad de la mayoría y de la minoría, capando la imaginación y destruyendo la espontaneidad. La escuela divide a la sociedad en dos grupos: la mayoría disciplinadamente marginada por su escolarización deficiente, y la minoría de aquellos tan productivos que el aumento previsto en su ingreso anual es muchísimo mayor que el promedio anual del ingreso de esa inmensa mayoría marginada. El ingreso de ésta también aumenta, pero, por supuesto, mucho más despacio. La dinámica de la sociedad ensancha el abismo que separa a los dos grupos.
+
+Cualquier cambio o innovación en la estructura escolar o en la educación formal, según la conocemos, presupone: _1)_ cambios radicales en la esfera política; _2)_ cambios radicales en el sistema y la organización de la producción, y _3)_ una transformación radical de la visión que el hombre tiene de sí como un animal que necesita escolarización. Aun cuando se proponen devastadoras reformas del sistema escolar se ignoran estos supuestos. De aquí que fallen, puesto que se toma como base el marco social que las sostiene, en vez de gestionarlo radicalmente.
+
+Las escuelas vocacionales —consideradas como remedio al problemas de la educación en masa— proveen un buen ejemplo de la limitada visión ante el problema de reformas escolares: _1)_ el que egresa de una escuela vocacional o técnica se encuentra ante el problema de encontrar empleo en una sociedad cada vez más automatizada en sus medios de producción; _2)_ el costo de operación de este tipo de escuela es varias veces más alto que el de la escuela común; _3)_ su matrícula se nutre de estudiantes que ya han aprobado el sexto grado, estudiantes que, como ya hemos visto, son la excepción. Pretenden educar haciendo una imitación barata de una fábrica dentro de un edificio escolar.
+
+En vez de cifrar las esperanzas en las escuelas vocacionales o técnicas, hay que comenzar por visualizar la transformación subvencionada de la fábrica o planta industrial. En relación con esto debe existir la posibilidad de: _1)_ hacer obligatorio el uso de las fábricas en sus horas no productivas como centro de adiestramiento; _2)_ que la gerencia emplee parte de su tiempo en la planificación y supervisión de dicho adiestramiento; _3)_ la reestructuración total del proceso industrial para lograr un proceso educativo. Si parte de las asignaciones presupuestarias empleadas ahora en el sistema escolar se reorientasen para promover el aprovechamiento del potencial educativo presente en el sistema industrial, los resultados podrían ser enormes en relación con los obtenidos en el presente, tanto en lo educativo como en lo económico. Además, si tal instrucción estuviese disponible para todo aquel que la desease, sin tomar en consideración la edad o si la persona ha de ser empleada por esa fábrica, la industria habría comenzado a asumir un papel muy importante que es ahora exclusivo de la escuela. Con esto ya estaríamos bien encaminados a terminar con la idea equivocada de que la persona debe estar acreditada para el empleo antes de ser empleada y, por lo tanto, que la escolarización debe preceder al trabajo productivo. No hay razón alguna para continuar con la tradición medieval de que los hombres se preparan para la vida secular cotidiana a través de la encarcelación en un recinto sagrado, llámese monasterio, sinagoga o escuela.
+
+Otro remedio que frecuentemente se propone para compensar las fallas del sistema escolar es la educación fundamental de adultos. Paolo Freire ha demostrado en Brasil un nuevo método para lograr la instrucción de adultos; el grupo de éstos que logre interesarse en los problemas políticos de su comunidad puede aprender a leer y escribir en seis semanas de clases nocturnas. La eficacia de este programa se construye en torno a determinadas palabras clave que están cargadas de sentido político. Se entiende por qué dicho plan ha tropezado con dificultades. También se ha planteado que 10 meses separados de educación adulta cuestan tanto como un año de educación formal en la escuela; y, sin embargo, es mucho más efectiva que la mejor de las educaciones escolares.
+
+Desafortunadamente, la educación de adultos se visualiza como un medio para proveerle al indigente un paliativo para la escolarización que le falta. Habría que cambiar completamente la situación si queremos visualizar la educación como un ejercicio en madurez. Deberíamos considerar un cambio radical en la duración del año escolar, reduciendo la sesión de clases a dos meses por año, pero extendiendo el proceso educativo a los primeros 20 o 30 años de la vida de un hombre. Mientras que otras formas de aprendizaje práctico en fábricas y cursos programados e idiomas y matemáticas deben ocupar la mayor porción de lo que habíamos denominado como instrucción, dos meses al año de educación formal deben considerarse suficientes para permitir lo que los griegos denominaban _echole_, es decir, tiempo de ocio para la creación. No sorprende que se nos haga casi imposible concebir cambios sociales de tan gran alcance, como es el de distribuir en nuevos patrones la función educativa de las escuelas. Encontramos la misma dificultad al sugerir formas concretas por las cuales las funciones no educativas de un sistema escolar que va desapareciendo puedan redistribuirse. No sabemos qué hacer con aquellos a quienes denominamos “niños” o “estudiantes”, y que hacemos ingresar a las escuelas.
+
+Es difícil prever las consecuencias políticas que estos cambios tan fundamentales puedan traer, sin mencionar las consecuencias en el plano internacional. ¿Cómo podrán coexistir una sociedad con una tradición de escuelas corrientes, con otras que se han salido del patrón educativo tradicional y cuya industria, comercio, publicidad y participación en la política es, de hecho, diferente? Áreas que se desarrollan fuera del sistema universal convencional no tendrían el lenguaje común ni criterios de coexistencia respetuosa con los escolarizados. Dos mundos, tales como China y Estados Unidos, casi tendrían que aislarse el uno del otro. Un mundo que tiene fe en la iniciación ritual de todos sus miembros a través de una “liturgia escolar” tiene que combatir cualquier sistema educativo que escape a sus cánones sagrados. Intelectualmente, resulta difícil acreditar el partido de Mao como una institución educativa, que puede resultar más efectiva que las escuelas convencionales de más prestigio, por lo menos en lo que se refiere a enseñar lo que es ciudadanía. Las guerrillas en Latinoamérica son otro medio educativo que se malinterpreta y se usa indebidamente la mayor parte de las veces. El Che Guevara, por ejemplo, las veía como una última manera de enseñarle al pueblo lo ilegítimo que resulta el sistema político que padece. En países escolarizados donde la radio ha llegado a todo el pueblo, no debemos menospreciar las funciones educativas de grandes figuras disidentes y carismáticas como Dom Helder Camara en Brasil y Camilo Torres en Colombia. Fidel Castro describió sus primeras arengas como sesiones educativas.
+
+La mentalidad escolarizada percibe estos procesos solamente como adoctrinamiento político. No puede comprender el propósito educativo. La legitimación de la educación por las escuelas tiende a que se visualice cualquier tipo de educación fuera de ella como accidental, cuando no como delito grave. Aun así, sorprende la dificultad con que la mentalidad escolarizada puede percibir el rigor con el que las escuelas inculcan lo imprescindibles que son y, con esto, la inevitabilidad del sistema que patrocinan. Las escuelas adoctrinan al niño de manera que éste acepte el sistema político representado por sus maestros, incluso ante la insistencia de que la enseñanza es apolítica.
+
+En última instancia, el culto a la escolarización llevará a la violencia. El establecimiento de cualquier religión lleva a eso. Al permitir que se extienda la prédica por la escolarización universal, tiene que aumentar la habilidad militar para reprimir la “insurgencia” en Latinoamérica. Sólo la fuerza podrá controlar en última instancia las expectativas frustradas que la propagación del mito de escolarización ha desencadenado. La permanencia del actual sistema escolar puede muy bien fomentar el fascismo latinoamericano. Sólo un fanatismo inspirado en la idolatría por un sistema puede, en último término, racionalizar la discriminación masiva que es la resultante de insistir en clasificar con grados académicos a una sociedad necesitada.
+
+Ha llegado el momento de reconocer la gran carga que las escuelas suponen para las naciones jóvenes. Al hacerlo podremos liberarnos y contemplar el cambio de la estructura social que hace a las escuelas necesarias. Yo no apoyo una utopía como la comuna china para Latinoamérica. Pero sí sugiero que esforcemos nuestra imaginación para construir escenarios que permitan una denodada reestructuración de las funciones educativas en la industria y la política, cortos retiros educativos e intensa preparación de los padres sobre educación temprana. El costo de las escuelas no debe medirse solamente en términos políticos. Las escuelas, en una economía de escasez invadida por la automatización, acentúan y racionalizan la coexistencia de dos sociedades: una colonia de la otra.
+
+Una vez que se entienda que el costo de la escolarización es aún superior al costo del caos, nos colocaremos al margen de un compromiso desproporcionadamente costoso. Hoy en América Latina es tan peligroso dudar del mito de la salvación social por medio de la escolarización, como lo fue hace cientos de años dudar de los derechos divinos de los reyes católicos.
+
+
+# La desescolarización de la iglesia
+
+Todos los hombres necesitan techo y comida, pero hay, por supuesto, necesidades no tan católicas. Un ejemplo: hace tres siglos un certificado de bautismo era necesario para vivir en una colonia española. Hoy ya no lo es.
+
+Algunas necesidades se van de la misma manera que vinieron. La educación es una de ellas. Si el mundo sobrevive, muy pronto ni la sentiremos.
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+Hoy en día, un tercio de los seres vivos predica la necesidad de la educación. Admiten, eso sí, que algunas personas pueden sobrevivir sin ella, de la misma manera que otros sobreviven sin techo, pero resienten el despojo de ambos. Su presencia aquí me hace pensar que la mayoría de ustedes se encuentra entre estos nuevos evangelistas.
+
+Todo el poder terrestre va rumbo a las manos de esta minoría educada.
+
+La educación sirve de justificación para este privilegio que la minoría dominante detenta y reclama. Cuando se le desafía, el educado responde como el mayordomo que no podía cavar, se avergonzaba de pedir, y por ello hacía depender su futuro del valor de los certificados que obtenía.
+
+Al final de la Edad Media la gente le dio la espalda a la realidad y depositó su confianza en los certificados que les conferían indulgencias.
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+Hoy, en una época de ilustración evanescente, el hombre se confía a la adquisición de algo llamado “educación”.
+
+Educación ha llegado a significar lo opuesto del proceso vital de aprendizaje que parte de un medio ambiente humano; un medio en el que, casi continuamente, la mayoría tiene acceso a todos los hechos e instrumentos que modelan sus vidas. Ha pasado a significar algo adquirible a espaldas de la cotidianidad, mediante el consumo de una mercancía y la acumulación del conocimiento abstracto sobre la vida.
+
+Subrepticiamente, nuestra sociedad ha convertido la educación en un proceso que fabrica capitalistas del conocimiento. Su valor se define en términos de las horas de instrucción que alguien ha comprado con los fondos públicos, mientras la pobreza se mide y explica por el fracaso del hombre en consumir. En esa sociedad, los pobres son quienes se quedan a la zaga en educación. El hombre rico, el capitalista del poder, apenas puede salvar la brecha que lo separa de Lázaro. Es más fácil para un camello pasar por el ojo de una aguja que para el hombre devoto de esa educación retomar la perspectiva realista de los pobres.
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+Históricamente, esta fe en la educación creció a la sombra de la alquimia. La educación es hoy la versión contemporánea de la piedra filosofal: con tocarla se refinan los elementos básicos del mundo. Es el procedimiento mediante el cual los metales ordinarios se amasan a través de sucesivas etapas hasta que brillan como el oro puro.
+
+El obispo Amós Comenio es justicieramente conocido como uno de los fundadores de la educación moderna. Versado en alquimia, aplicó el concepto y el lenguaje de ese Arte Secreto al refinamiento y la ilustración de los hombres. Fue él quien proveyó de un significado pedagógico al vocabulario químico del progreso, el proceso y la ilustración.
+
+Hoy, la fe en la educación se ha convertido en una nueva religión mundial. La naturaleza religiosa de la educación pasa casi inadvertida; tal es el ecumenismo de la fe en la educación. La creencia alquimista de que la educación puede transformar a los hombres para que encajen en un mundo creado por el hombre mediante la magia del tecnócrata se ha hecho universal e incuestionable, y encima se le tiene por tradicional. Esa creencia la comparten marxistas y capitalistas, líderes de países pobres y de grandes potencias, rabinos, ateos y sacerdotes. Su dogma fundamental: un proceso llamado “educación” puede aumentar el valor de un ser humano; resulta en la creación de capital humano; llevará a todos los hombres una vida mejor.
+
+La gente más generosa de nuestra era entrega su vida para educar a los pobres. Inevitablemente, los educadores pueden contar con el respaldo de los poderosos, al igual que los misioneros españoles contaban con el de la Corona. Después de todo, el educador enseña a los pobres a sentirse incompetentes.
+
+Para seducir u obligar a los otros a aceptar su fe, el educador emplea el mismo rito en todas partes: la escolarización. La totalidad de los países que pertenecen a las Naciones Unidas demandan de sus ciudadanos un mínimo de 20 horas de asistencia semanal durante un periodo de por lo menos cinco años. La Escuela es la primera Iglesia en establecer tal exigencia.
+
+La liturgia escolar tiene las mismas características universalmente. A los niños se les reúne por edades. Se les hace asistir a los servicios en un recinto sagrado reservado con ese fin: “la clase”. Se les hace llevar a cabo tareas que producen educación porque están determinadas por un ministro ordenado: el maestro titulado. Se les hace progresar en la gracia que les concede la sociedad al moverlos de grado en grado.
+
+No tengo nada contra los maestros. Se cuentan entre los hombres más dedicados, generosos y amables. Cabalmente, sus cualidades humanas se comparan con ventaja a las de cualquier grupo anterior de siervos profesionales de la religión. Sus servicios son mucho más versátiles que los de cualquier sacerdote anterior. No hay enseñanza particular para la que falte un maestro. Pero lo que hoy llamamos “educación” no es lo que tiene lugar entre un pupilo y un maestro. Lo que denominamos educación es el servicio profesional que una institución proporciona a sus clientes a través del maestro profesional.
+
+El rito de la escolaridad constituye un poderoso currículum oculto. Un currículum que no depende de la intención del maestro. Un currículum que no varía con la materia enseñada; llámese comunismo, lectura, sexo, historia o retórica.
+
+Lo primero que el niño aprende del currículum oculto de la escolaridad es un viejo adagio, la corrupción inquisitorial de la fe: _extra scholam nulla_ _est salus_ —fuera del rito no hay salvación—. Por su mera presencia en la escuela, el niño suscribe el valor de aprender de un maestro y el valor de aprender acerca del mundo. O sea: desaprende a considerar a cada persona como un modelo en potencia: desaprende a aprenderlo todo de la cotidianidad. En la escuela, el niño aprende a distinguir dos mundos: el real, al que algún día ha de entrar, y el sagrado, en el que se le encierra para que aprenda. De la promoción o del progreso escolar, el niño aprende el valor del consumo interminable; la apetencia de grados que caducan anualmente.
+
+En la escuela, aprende que su propio crecimiento social vale la pena sólo porque es el resultado de su consumo de una mercancía llamada educación.
+
+Durante generaciones hemos tratado de mejorar el mundo mediante una escolarización creciente. Hasta ahora ese empeño ha fracasado. En cambio, hemos aprendido que forzar a los niños a trepar una escalera sin fin no puede realzar la igualdad sino favorecer a quienes empiezan más temprano, mejor alimentados, mejor preparados. Hemos aprendido que la instrucción obligada amortigua, en la mayoría, su deseo de un aprendizaje independiente. Aprendimos que al concebir el conocimiento como una mercancía, al empaquetarlo para su entrega al consumidor y al aceptarlo como propiedad privada de quien lo adquiere, estamos escaseándolo cada día más. Súbitamente la escuela va perdiendo su legitimidad política, económica, pedagógica. Súbitamente, va siendo reconocida como un rito necesario para hacer tolerables las contradicciones de nuestra sociedad. Proceso de socialización con miras a la conformidad con las demandas de una sociedad de consumo, la escuela sostiene el mito igualitario de nuestras sociedades al mismo tiempo que establece su estructura rigurosa de acuerdo con 16 niveles de desertores.
+
+La bancarrota escolar es una señal prometedora. Pero eso no significa aún que quienes critican a la escuela hayan abandonado el sueño del alquimista. De la historia de la Iglesia sabemos que la mera reforma litúrgica no garantiza una renovación teológica. El resquebrajamiento de las escuelas puede conducirnos a la búsqueda de nuevos dispositivos educativos. Sin duda, al igual que anteriormente sucedió con otras Iglesias, la escuela será pronto desestablecida. Pero ello puede acarrear una apoteosis de la Educación para el Progreso, y su estado final será peor que el inicial.
+
+Podría llevar a un gigantesco esfuerzo por alcanzar _fuera_ de la estructura escolar lo que obviamente ha fracasado _dentro_ de la estructura escolar, a saber: una manera más efectiva y universal de enlatar el “aprender para vivir” y ponerlo en el mercado mediante otros sistemas distintos al de la escuela. El resultado neto sería el mismo: el concepto según el cual las personas deben ser “educadas” para vivir y que ello debe hacerse adquiriendo información sobre la realidad antes de enfrentarla.
+
+A menos que el desestablecimiento de la escuela lleve a una sociedad donde la educación se reemplace también por una situación que otorgue a los hombres acceso ilimitado al auténtico aprendizaje para la vida, a menos que eso suceda paralelamente, la transferencia de la educación de los salones escolares a otras instituciones de una sociedad de consumo aparejará inevitablemente una enseñanza creciente acerca de un mundo aún más alienado.
+
+Debemos mirar más allá de la actual bancarrota escolar. En el presente, la escuela restringe al salón de clase la competencia del maestro. Se le impide que reclame posesión sobre la vida entera de un hombre. La defunción de las escuelas levantará esa restricción y dará un semblante de legitimidad a la eterna invasión pedagógica del mundo privado de cada uno.
+
+Abrirá las puertas a una contienda por el “conocimiento” en el mercado libre, que nos conducirá hacia la paradoja de una meritocracia vulgar, aunque aparentemente igualitaria. Salvo si transformamos nuestro concepto del conocimiento, el desestablecimiento de la escuela llevará al altar un creciente sistema de meritocracia que separará la enseñanza de la certificación, para casarla con una sociedad comprometida en proporcionar una terapia pedagógica hasta que cada uno esté maduro y listo para que se le coloque en su nicho. Sólo por nombre podremos distinguir una sociedad convertida en un inmenso salón de clases de un manicomio general o de una prisión universal. Hace 80 años, Soloviev ya predecía que el Anticristo sería un maestro.
+
+A menudo olvidamos que el término “educación” es de reciente cuño.
+
+Era desonocido antes de la Reforma. La educación de los niños se mencionó por vez primera en francés, en un documento que data de 1498.
+
+Por ese año, Erasmo se establecía en Oxford, a Savonarola lo quemaban vivo en Florencia, y Durero grababa su _Apocalipsis_, donde nos habla con vigor del sentido de ruina inminente que se ceñía hacia el final de la Edad Media. En lengua inglesa, la palabra educación apareció por primera vez en 1530. Es el año del divorcio de Enrique VIII y de la separación de la Iglesia luterana de la romana, en la dieta de Augsburgo. En España y sus territorios pasó un siglo más antes que la palabra y la idea de la educación fueran comunes. Todavía en 1632 Lope de Vega se refería a la educación como una novedad. Como ustedes recordarán, en ese año, aquí, en Lima, la Universidad de San Marcos celebraba su decimosexto aniversario. Los centros para el aprendizaje existían antes que el término educación se incorporara al lenguaje corriente. Se leían los clásicos o el derecho —no se educaba sobre la vida diaria—.
+
+Como cristianos, tenemos la tarea especial de cargar sobre nuestros hombros la responsabilidad que le cabe a nuestras Iglesias por la promoción de todos los tipos de capitalismo, pero, especialmente, por la promoción del capitalismo del saber. La religión de la educación universal y obligatoria se ha convertido en una corrupción de la Reforma. Es nuestro deber entenderlo y señalarlo.
+
+Gutenberg descubrió una tecnología que puso los libros al alcance de todos. Nosotros hemos descubierto la manera de interponer una monstruosa iglesia de maestros entre las personas y el libro. Ello ha traído como consecuencia una creciente inhabilidad para leer. Lutero nos puso la Biblia al alcance de la mano, pero también inventó un método de enseñanza masiva: el catecismo, un curso programado de preguntas y respuestas. La Iglesia católica lanzó la Contrarreforma al congelar su doctrina en un catecismo propio. Los jesuitas secularizaron la idea y crearon el _Ratio_ _Studiorum_ para sus universidades. Paradójicamente, este _Ratio_ pasó a ser el currículum en el que se formaron las élites de la Ilustración. Y, finalmente, en la actualidad, las naciones-Estado producen sus propias élites, a las que les está reservada la buena vida en la tierra; se les hace consumir educación.
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+Al pobre, basta administrarle unas dosis menores del mismo consumo para ilustrarlo sobre su inferioridad predestinada.
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+Permítaseme resumir mi argumento. Los reformistas trataron de extender el misterio de la revelación divina sobre el reino por venir. Hoy, los educadores hacen depender de sus ministerios institucionalizados el descenso a la Tierra del Reino del Consumo Universal. El mito de la educación universal, el rito de la escuela obligatoria y de una estructura profesional equilibrada para el progreso del tecnócrata, se refuerzan unos a otros.
+
+Una vez que esto se entienda, ya no será posible tolerar ninguna complicidad de las Iglesias cristianas con el culto de la Ideología del Progreso.
+
+Cada comunidad cristiana organizada está hoy forzada a elegir una de tres políticas posibles: aferrarse a las escuelas, o destruirlas y aferrarse a la seudorreligión de la educación, o sentirse llamada a ser radical o profeta.
+
+_1)_ Si la Iglesia insiste con sus escuelas, sus políticos se preocuparán de cómo aumentar el número de las mismas, de cómo mejorar su calidad, y de cómo proveerse de más limosnas para beneficio de los no escolarizados — tales como educación correctiva, escuelas radicales, entrenamiento técnico y demás—.
+
+Los hombres previsores que se encuentran dentro de una Iglesia que se embarca en esta política, debieran sentirse inquietos por el vaivén y la creciente frustración de sus trabajadores educativos.
+
+_2)_ Una Iglesia puede también escoger el reconocimiento de la bancarrota de las escuelas, pero de todas formas mantenerse comprometida con el mito de la educación general entendida como artículo de consumo.
+
+De ser así, esa Iglesia preconizará el desestablecimiento de las escuelas, una distribución más equitativa de los recursos educativos y la protección de los no escolarizados frente a la discriminación de la que son objeto en el mercado de trabajo o en la sociedad en general. Todas estas garantías son necesarias y la Iglesia que las endose será ciertamente acogida por otros movimientos más progresistas. Pero una Iglesia que haga esta elección, una Iglesia que reconozca la inevitable bancarrota escolar pero no el carácter seudorreligioso de la “educación”, una Iglesia tal se hará inexorablemente cómplice de un futuro “mundo feliz” del consumo, porque los instrumentos educativos desescolarizados son sólo nuevos métodos de empacar y distribuir más eficazmente la instrucción, nuevas formas de acumulación de vida enlatada para satisfacer las formas diseñadas por profesionales. Si la Iglesia que adopta esa política no va más allá de la demanda por desestablecer las escuelas, se hará cómplice del faraón que ahora enreda a los esclavos en un mundo en el que el progreso tecnocrático se vuelve impersonal, opaco, contaminado.
+
+_3)_ Tienen una última elección: leer las Escrituras, regresar a la más pura tradición de la Iglesia y anunciar la llegada del Reino que no es de este Mundo; del Reino cuyo misterio tenemos el privilegio de conocer. Ésta es una elección que cada uno de nosotros debe hacer si quiere seguir a Jesús, y debe hacerla incluso si la Iglesia en la que tiene sus raíces ha incorporado el “progreso de los pueblos” como neologismo en el venerable latín.
+
+Debemos, en el nombre de Dios, denunciar la idolatría del progreso y la contaminante escalada de la producción. Debemos poner al descubierto la seudoteología de la educación concebida como preparación para una vida de consumo frustrante. Debemos recordar al hombre que Dios ha hecho bien el mundo y nos ha dado el poder de conocerlo y apreciarlo sin la constante necesidad de un intermediario. Tenemos sí, después de todo, la experiencia de que el hombre crece y aprende en la medida en que se compromete en una interacción personal, íntima, siempre sorprendente, con los demás y en un medio ambiente significativo, en tanto que se encoge y arruga cuando es servido por funcionarios. Consecuentemente, debemos rehusarnos a cooperar en cualquier intento que busque crear un ambiente hecho por el hombre, pero en el que la vida de todos y de cada uno dependa del grado en que haya sido cliente de una organización de servicios.
+
+Se necesita valentía para ponerle precio a un mundo claro y transparente, para determinar a qué costo la tecnología puede ponerse al servicio directo de las mayorías mundiales, permitiéndole a cada uno curarse, educarse, albergarse y transportarse, en lugar de poner la tecnología al servicio del tecnócrata que se siente orgulloso de proveer eternamente una medicina, una educación, una habitación y una transportación cada vez menores y cada vez más caras. Un mundo que renuncie al espectáculo de la tecnología progresiva es un mundo que pone coto radical al consumo, de acuerdo con el consenso de una inmensa mayoría y para el provecho de todos. No tiene sentido proponer un ingreso mínimo hasta que no se tenga la valentía de aceptar que ello implica fijar un ingreso máximo. Nadie puede tener lo suficiente si no sabe cuánto es suficiente. No tiene sentido advocar un mínimo de servicios médicos, de instrumentos y de transportación, si no se afirma la necesidad de nivelar los máximos de servicios disponibles a cualquiera y por la razón que sea.
+
+Una forma de tal consenso antitecnocrático se traduce fácilmente en la necesidad de la pobreza voluntaria de los pobres, tal como lo predicara el Señor. La pobreza voluntaria, el desprendimiento del poder y la no violencia están en el corazón del mensaje cristiano. Puesto que son sus elementos más preciosos, son también los más fácilmente corruptibles, ridiculizables o descuidables. Se necesita valentía para hacer de la renuncia la condición fundamental para la supervivencia de la humanidad. Si predicamos el Evangelio inalterado y anunciamos la bienaventuranza de los pobres, entonces los ricos se reirán en nuestra cara y los ricos en ciernes se mofarán despreciativamente. Pero como nunca antes ha sucedido, el mensaje cristiano más radical es también la política más cuerda en un mundo que ve crecer vertiginosamente el abismo entre pobres y ricos.
+
+El Tercer Mundo tiene una responsabilidad crucial en la liberación del mundo de sus ídolos del progreso, la eficiencia, el PNB. Sus masas no son todavía presas del hábito del consumo, especialmente del consumo de servicios. La mayoría de las personas aún se curan y se albergan y se enseñan unas a otras y podrían hacerlo de mejor manera si tuvieran herramientas ligeramente mejores. El Tercer Mundo podría abrir el camino en la búsqueda de un estilo de aprender para vivir, un estilo que será la preparación de los hombres para el cumplimiento de las necesidades auténticas en un contexto genuinamente humano. Sin lugar a dudas, estas naciones podrían alumbrar el camino para el mundo tan desarrollado como decadente.
+
+Dos mundos se hallan frente a frente: la Babel de Rusia y el Egipto de Estados Unidos, ambos prisioneros de ídolos comunes. Un Tercer Mundo cubre el resto del orbe. Es el del desierto. Dentro de los propios imperios crecen las tierras baldías en las favelas. Egipto y Babel son impotentes para salvarse a sí mismos. De la tiranía de sus ídolos sólo pueden salvarlos quienes adoran en el desierto al Dios Vivo y Sin Nombre, quienes han renunciado a las ollas de Egipto.
+
+Pero de ninguna manera todos los que habitan en el desierto son miembros del Pueblo de Dios. Algunos bailan en torno al becerro de oro: fundan avanzadas del Imperio en las tierras yermas. Otros se rebelan contra Moisés y escogen a sus propios profetas para que los devuelvan a la esclavitud que sus padres abandonaron cuando expoliaron a los egipcios.
+
+Buscan una alianza para el progreso con Egipto. Y hay otros que no son capaces de permanecer fieles a la vocación divina. Desertan del Pueblo de Dios, se mueven hacia el Este y, como los judíos, ungen a su propio Rey para ser sus siervos al igual que otros moradores de la Tierra.
+
+Ha llegado la hora de hacer saber el mensaje que nos ha sido revelado.
+
+Ha llegado la hora de anunciar que la liberación de los ricos y de los ricos en ciernes depende del Pueblos de Dios. Depende de aquellos a quienes Dom Helder Camara ha llamado Minorías Abrahámicas, entre las cuales los cristianos, digámoslo con rubor, parecen una excepción.
+
+La liberación sólo puede provenir de quienes han elegido el desierto porque han sido puestos en libertad.
+
+
+# La alternativa a la escolarización
+
+Durante generaciones hemos tratado de hacer del mundo un mejor lugar para vivir aumentando cada vez más el número de escuelas; pero hasta ahora hemos fracasado. Lo que hemos aprendido es que al obligar a todos los niños a subir por una escalera de educación abierta no realzamos la igualdad sino que favorecemos al individuo que empieza antes, al más sano o al mejor preparado; que la instrucción obligatoria apaga en la mayoría el deseo de obtener conocimientos independientes; y que el conocimiento tratado como mercancía, distribuido en paquetes, y aceptado como propiedad privada una vez adquirido, siempre será escaso.
+
+De repente la gente se ha dado cuenta de que la empresa de la educación pública mediante escuelas obligatorias ha perdido su legitimidad social, pedagógica y económica. En respuesta, los críticos del sistema educativo proponen ahora soluciones enérgicas y heterodoxas que van desde el plan de recibos (_voucher_), que permitiría a cada persona comprar la educación que desee en un mercado abierto, hasta el desplazamiento de la responsabilidad de la educación de la escuela a los medios y al aprendizaje en el trabajo. Algunos individuos consideran que la escuela tendrá que desestablecerse igual que sucedió con la Iglesia en todo el mundo durante los últimos dos siglos. Otros reformadores proponen reemplazar la escuela universal con distintos sistemas nuevos que, según ellos, prepararían mejor a todos para vivir en la sociedad moderna. Estas propuestas de nuevas instituciones educativas caen dentro de tres amplias categorías: la reforma del aula dentro del sistema escolar; la dispersión de aulas libres en toda la sociedad, y la transformación de toda la sociedad en una gran aula. Pero estos tres enfoques —el aula reformada, el aula libre y el aula mundial— representan tres etapas en un escalamiento de la educación en que cada peldaño amenaza con implantar un control más sutil y penetrante del que reemplaza.
+
+Considero que el desestablecimiento de la escuela se ha vuelto inevitable y que el fin de esta ilusión debe llenarnos de optimismo. Pero también creo que el fin de la “era de la escolaridad” podría introducir una era de la escuela mundial que sólo se distinguiría en nombre de un manicomio o prisión mundial en donde la educación, la corrección y la adaptación se convertirían en sinónimos. Por lo tanto, considero que el rompimiento de la escuela nos obliga a mirar más allá de su inminente deceso y encarar disyuntivas fundamentales en la educación. O trabajamos para encontrar instrumentos educativos temibles y nuevos que hablen de un mundo cada vez más opaco e impenetrable para el hombre, o fijamos las condiciones para una nueva era en que la tecnología se utilizaría para hacer la sociedad más sencilla y transparente, de manera que todos los hombres puedan volver a tener los conocimientos y utilizar las herramientas que moldean sus vidas. En resumen, podemos desestablecer escuelas o podemos desescolarizar la cultura.
+
+## El currículum oculto de las escuelas
+
+Para poder ver claramente las disyuntivas a que nos enfrentamos, debemos primero distinguir entre el aprendizaje y la escolaridad, lo que significa separar el objeto humanístico del maestro del impacto de la estructura invariante de la escuela. Esta estructura oculta constituye una forma de instrucción que el maestro o el consejo de la escuela nunca llegan a controlar. Transmite indeleblemente el mensaje de que sólo a través de la escuela el individuo podrá prepararse para la vida adulta en la sociedad, que lo que no se enseña en la escuela carece de valor, y que lo que se aprende fuera de la escuela no vale la pena aprenderlo. Yo llamo a eso el currículum oculto de la escolaridad porque constituye el marco inalterable del sistema, dentro del cual se hacen todos los cambios en el currículum.
+
+El currículum oculto siempre es el mismo, cualquiera que sea la escuela o el lugar. Obliga a todos los niños de cierta edad a congregarse en grupos de alrededor de 30, bajo la autoridad de un maestro autorizado, durante 500, 1 000 o más horas al año. No importa si el currículum está diseñado para enseñar los principios del fascismo, del liberalismo, del catolicismo, del socialismo o la liberación, mientras la institución reclame la autoridad de definir cuáles actividades son las que considera “educación” legítima. No importa si el propósito de la escuela es producir ciudadanos soviéticos o norteamericanos, mecánicos o doctores, mientras no se pueda ser un ciudadano o doctor _si no_ se ha graduado. No importa si todas las reuniones ocurren en el mismo lugar, mientras se consideren una asistencia: cortar caña es trabajo para los cañeros, corrección para los prisioneros, y parte del currículum para los estudiantes.
+
+Lo que importa en el currículum oculto es que los estudiantes aprendan que la educación es valiosa cuando se adquiere en la escuela a través de un proceso graduado del consumo; que el grado de éxito de que disfrutará el individuo en sociedad depende de la cantidad de conocimientos que consume, y que los conocimientos _sobre_ el mundo son más valiosos que los conocimientos adquiridos _del_ mundo. La imposición de este currículum oculto dentro de un programa educativo distingue la escolarización de otras formas de educación planeada. Todos los sistemas escolares del mundo tienen características comunes en relación con su producto institucional, y éstos son el resultado del currículum oculto en común de todas las escuelas.
+
+Debe entenderse claramente que el currículum oculto de las escuelas traduce la enseñanza de una actividad en una mercancía cuyo mercado lo monopoliza la escuela. El nombre que ahora damos a esta mercancía es “educación”, producto cuantificable y acumulativo de una institución profesionalmente diseñada denominada escuela, cuyo valor puede medirse por la duración y lo costoso de la aplicación de un proceso (el currículum oculto) al estudiante. El graduado de una universidad local y el que recibe un título de una universidad famosa podrán haber adquirido 135 créditos en cuatro años, pero están totalmente conscientes del valor diferencial de su acervo de conocimientos.
+
+En todos los países “escolarizados” el conocimiento se considera como artículo de primera necesidad para la supervivencia, pero también como una forma de moneda más líquida que los rublos o los dólares. Nos hemos acostumbrado, a través de los escritos de Karl Marx, a hablar de la enajenación del obrero por su trabajo en una sociedad clasista. Debemos ahora reconocer el alejamiento del hombre de su aprendizaje cuando éste se convierte en producto de una profesión que aporta servicios y él se convierte en el consumidor.
+
+Mientras más educación consume un individuo, mayor es el “acervo de conocimientos” que adquiere, y más se eleva en la jerarquía de los capitalistas del conocimiento. Así, la educación define una nueva estructura de clase para la sociedad dentro de la cual los grandes consumidores de conocimientos —aquellos que han adquirido un gran acervo de conocimientos— pueden alegar que tienen mayor valor para la sociedad.
+
+Ellos representan los valores de primera en la cartera de capital humano de una sociedad, y a ellos queda reservado el acceso a los instrumentos más poderosos o escasos de la producción.
+
+De esta forma, el currículum oculto define y mide lo que es la educación y el nivel de productividad a que tiene derecho el consumidor.
+
+Sirve como razón de la creciente correlación entre los trabajos y el privilegio correspondiente: que puede traducirse en ingreso personal en algunas sociedades, y en un derecho directo a servicios que ahorren tiempo, mayor educación y prestigio en otras. (Este punto es especialmente importante a la luz de la escasez de correspondencia entre la escolarización y la competencia ocupacional establecida en estudios como _Education and_ _Jobs: The Great Training Robbery_, de Ivar Berg.) El empeño en que todos los hombres atraviesen etapas sucesivas de ilustración está firmemente arraigado en la alquimia, el Gran Arte de una Edad Media decadente. A Juan Amós Comenius, un obispo moravo, pansofista de _motu proprio_ y pedagogo, se le considera con justicia como uno de los fundadores de la escuela moderna. Fue uno de los primeros que propusieron de siete a 12 grados de instrucción obligatoria. En su _Magna_ _Didactica_ describió a la escuela como un instrumento para “enseñar a todos todo” y delineó un plan para la producción en masa de conocimientos, que de acuerdo con su método haría que la educación fuera más barata y mejor, y permitiría que todos llegaran a su máxima realización humana. Pero Come-nius no sólo fue uno de los primeros expertos de la eficiencia, fue también un alquimista que adoptó el lenguaje técnico de su oficio para describir el arte de educar niños. El alquimista buscaba refinar los elementos base dirigiendo sus espíritus destilados a través de 12 etapas de procesos sucesivos, de manera que pudieran convertirse en oro para su propio beneficio y el del mundo. Los alquimistas nunca lo lograron pese a todos sus intentos, pero en cada ocasión su “ciencia” rendía nuevas razones para su fracaso, y volvían a ensayar.
+
+La pedagogía abrió un nuevo capítulo en la historia de la _Ars Magna_. La educación se convirtió en la búsqueda de un proceso de alquimia que construiría un nuevo tipo de hombre que encajara en un ambiente creado por magia científica. Pero por mucho que cada generación gastara en sus escuelas, siempre resultaba que la mayoría de la gente no estaba capacitada para que se le instruyera mediante este proceso y se la tenía que descartar como impreparada para la vida en un mundo de hechura humana. Los reformadores de la educación que aceptan la idea de que las escuelas han fracasado caen dentro de tres grupos. Los más respetables son sin duda los grandes maestros de la alquimia que prometen mejores escuelas. Los más seductores son magos populares que prometen hacer de cada cocina un laboratorio de alquimia. Los más siniestros son los nuevos Masones del Universo que desean transformar el mundo en un enorme templo del aprendizaje.
+
+Entre los maestros más notorios de la alquimia de hoy están ciertos directores de investigación, empleados o patrocinados por las grandes fundaciones, que consideran que si la escuela pudiera de alguna manera mejorarse, también podría volverse económicamente más viable que las que ahora tienen problemas, y al mismo tiempo podría vender un paquete de servicios más grande. Aquellos a quienes preocupa principalmente el currículum pretenden que está pasado de moda o es irrelevante. De esta forma el currículum se llena de nuevos cursos empaquetados sobre cultura africana, imperialismo norteamericano, liberación de la mujer, contaminación o sociedad de consumo. El aprendizaje pasivo es equivocado —realmente lo es— de manera que amablemente permitimos que los estudiantes decidan lo que quieren que se les enseñe y cómo. Las escuelas son prisiones. Por lo tanto, los directores están autorizados a permitir clases fuera del edificio de la escuela, por ejemplo, moviendo los pupitres a una calle cercada de Harlem. El entrenamiento sensibilizado cobra actualidad.
+
+De manera que importamos la terapia de grupos al salón de clases. La escuela, que se suponía iba a enseñar todo a todos, se convierte ahora en todo para todos los niños.
+
+Otros críticos subrayan que las escuelas hacen un uso ineficiente de la ciencia moderna. Algunos administrarían drogas que facilitarían al instructor el cambio de la conducta del niño. Otros transformarían la escuela en un estadio para el juego educativo. Otros más electrificarían el salón de clase. Si son los discípulos simplistas de McLuhan, reemplazarían los pizarrones y los libros de texto por _happenings_ ayudados por todos los medios de difusión; si siguen a Skinner considerarían que pueden modificar la conducta más eficientemente que los practicantes pasados de moda del aula.
+
+No cabe duda de que la mayoría de estos cambios han tenido algunos efectos saludables. Los alumnos de las escuelas experimentales son menos holgazanes. Los padres tienen una mayor sensación de participación en un distrito descentralizado. A menudo, los estudiantes a los que el maestro asigna un aprendizaje, resultan ser más competentes que los que se quedan en el salón de clase. Algunos niños mejoran sus conocimientos de un idioma extranjero en el laboratorio de idiomas porque prefieren jugar con las manijas de la grabadora que hablar con sus mayores. Sin embargo, todas estas mejoras funcionan dentro de límites predeciblemente estrechos, ya que mantienen intacto el currículum oculto de la escuela. Algunos reformadores quisieran deshacerse del currículum oculto de la escuela pública, pero es raro que lo logren. Las escuelas libres que llevan a más escuelas libres producen un espejismo de libertad, aun cuando la cadena de asistencia se ve a menudo interrumpida por largos periodos de vagancia. La asistencia mediante la seducción inculca la necesidad de tratamiento educativo de una manera más persuasiva que la asistencia renuente enforzada por un vigilante escolar. Los maestros permisivos en un aula acojinada pueden impedir fácilmente que los alumnos sobrevivan una vez que la dejan.
+
+A menudo el aprendizaje en estas escuelas no es más que la adquisición de habilidades de valor social definidas, en este caso, por el consenso de una comuna en lugar de por el decreto de un consejo escolar. Nuevo presbítero no es más que viejo cura escrito con palabras más largas.
+
+Las escuelas libres, para que realmente lo sean, deben cumplir con dos condiciones: primero, deben dirigirse de manera que se evite la reintroducción del currículum oculto de asistencia graduada y estudiantes autorizados que estudien a los pies de maestros autorizados. Y, más importante, deben proporcionar un sistema en que todos los participantes, personal y alumnos, puedan liberarse de las bases ocultas de una sociedad escolarizada. La primera condición queda frecuentemente estipulada dentro de los objetivos de una escuela libre. La segunda, sólo se reconoce en raras ocasiones y es difícil definirla como objetivo de una escuela libre.
+
+## Los supuestos ocultos de la educación
+
+Resulta inútil distinguir entre el currículum oculto que acabo de describir, y las bases ocultas de la escolarización. El currículum oculto es un ritual que puede considerarse como la iniciación oficial a la sociedad moderna, institucionalmente establecida a través de la escuela. El propósito de este ritual es el de esconder a sus participantes las contradicciones entre el mito de una sociedad igualitaria y la realidad consciente de clases que certifica.
+
+Una vez que se reconocen como tales, los rituales pierden su poder, y esto es lo que ahora empieza a suceder con la escolarización. Pero existen varios supuestos fundamentales sobre el desarrollo —las bases ocultas— que ahora encuentran su expresión en el ceremonial de la escolarización, y que fácilmente podrían reforzarse por lo que hacen las escuelas libres.
+
+A primera vista, cualquier generalización sobre las escuelas libres parece aventurada. Especialmente en Estados Unidos, Canadá y Alemania en 1971, son las mil flores de una nueva primavera. Pero sobre estas empresas experimentales que pretenden ser _instituciones educativas_, pueden hacerse algunas generalizaciones. Sin embargo, debemos primero tener una idea más clara de la relación entre la escolarización y la educación.
+
+A menudo olvidamos que la palabra _educación_ es de reciente cuño. No se conocía antes de la Reforma. La educación de los niños, como ya lo he referido,^[Véase cap. V, “La desescolarización de la Iglesia”, p. 116. (E.)] se menciona por primera vez en francés en un documento fechado en 1498. Fue el año en que Erasmo se estableció en Oxford, cuando a Savonarola lo mataron en la hoguera en Florencia, y cuando Durero esbozó su _Apocalipsis_, que nos transmite el sentido de destrucción que existía al final de la Edad Media. En lengua inglesa la palabra _education_ hizo su primera aparición en 1530. El año en que Enrique VIII se divorció de Catalina de Aragón y en que la Iglesia luterana se separó de Roma en la Dieta de Augsburgo. En tierras de España, el uso de la palabra y la idea de _educación_ tardó otro siglo más. En 1632, Lope de Vega sigue refiriéndose a la educación como una cosa novedosa. Ese año, como ustedes recordarán, la Universidad de San Marcos en Lima celebró su sexagésimo aniversario.
+
+Los centros de aprendizaje existían antes de que el término _educación_ entrara en el lenguaje común. Se “leía” a los Clásicos o la Ley; no se educaba para poder vivir.
+
+Durante el siglo XVI, la necesidad universal de “justificación” fue el meollo de las polémicas teológicas. Racionalizaba la política y servía como pretexto para los magnicidios. La Iglesia se dividió y pudieron sostenerse opiniones ampliamente divergentes sobre el grado en que todos los hombres nacieron en pecado, corrompidos y predestinados. Pero para principios del siglo XVII comenzó a haber un nuevo consenso: la idea de que el hombre nacía incompetente para la sociedad si no se le proporcionaba “educación”. La educación llegó a significar lo inverso de la competencia vital. Llegó a significar un proceso, más que el solo conocimiento de los hechos y la capacidad para utilizar las herramientas que moldean la vida de un hombre concreto. La educación llegó a significar una mercancía intangible que debía producirse para beneficio de todos, e impartirse a todos igual que antes la Iglesia visible impartía la gracia invisible. La justificación frente a la sociedad se convirtió en la primera necesidad de un hombre nacido en la estupidez original, análoga al pecado original.
+
+La escolarización y la “educación” están relacionadas como la Iglesia y la religión o, en términos más generales, como el ritual y el mito. El ritual crea y sostiene al mito; es un mito-poyético, y el mito genera el currículum a través del cual se perpetúa. “Educación” como la designación de una categoría global de justificación social es una idea que no tiene (fuera de la teología cristiana) un analogía específica en otras culturas. Y la producción de “educación” a través del proceso de escolarización separa a las escuelas de otras instituciones de aprendizaje que existieron en otras épocas. Este punto debe entenderse si queremos aclarar las limitaciones de la _mayoría_ de las “escuelas” libres, no estructuradas o independientes.
+
+Para ir más allá de la simple reforma del aula, una escuela libre debe evitar que se incorpore el currículum oculto de la escolarización que he descrito arriba. La escuela libre ideal trata de proporcionar educación y al mismo tiempo intenta evitar que esa educación se utilice para establecer o justificar una estructura de clase, de que se convierta en razón para medir al alumno según alguna escala abstracta, y de reprimirlo, controlarlo y empequeñecerlo. Pero mientras la escuela libre trate de proporcionar una “educación general”, no podrá avanzar más allá de los supuestos ocultos de la escuela.
+
+Entre estos supuestos está lo que Peter Schrag denomina el “síndrome de la inmigración”, que nos mueve a tratar a todas las personas como si fueran extranjeras que deben atravesar por un proceso de naturalización.
+
+Sólo los consumidores certificados de conocimientos podrán recibir su ciudadanía. Los hombres no nacen iguales sino que se hacen iguales a través de su gestación en el _Alma Mater_.
+
+Otro supuesto es que el hombre nace maduro y debe “madurar” antes de que pueda encajar en la sociedad civilizada. Este supuesto es, desde luego, contrario a la creencia de que el hombre es el mamífero cuyos ancestros fueron dotados de inmadurez para toda la vida por la evolución, lo que constituye su “gracia” peculiar. De acuerdo con esta fijación ideológica sobre la madurez, se debe alejar al hombre de su ambiente natural y pasarlo a través de un útero social en el que se endurece lo suficiente para poder encajar en la vida diaria. A menudo las escuelas libres pueden desempeñar esta función mejor que las escuelas de un tipo menos atractivo.
+
+Los establecimientos educativos libres tienen otra característica en común con los establecimientos menos libres: despersonalizan la responsabilidad de la “educación”. Colocan una institución _in loco parentis_.
+
+Perpetúan la idea de que si la “instrucción” se efectúa fuera del seno familiar, debe hacerse mediante una institución donde el maestro es sólo un agente o funcionario. En una sociedad escolarizada hasta la familia queda reducida a “organismo de aculturación”. Las instituciones educativas que utilizan maestros para cumplir los mandatos de su junta directiva son instrumentos para la despersonalización de las relaciones íntimas.
+
+Es cierto que muchas escuelas libres funcionan sin maestros acreditados. Al hacerlo representan una grave amenaza para los sindicatos establecidos de maestros. Pero no constituyen una amenaza a la estructura profesional de la sociedad. Una escuela en la que el consejo nombra personas de su propia elección para desempeñar su tarea educativa aun cuando no tengan un certificado o licencia profesional o tarjeta sindical, no está amenazando por ello la legitimidad de la profesión docente, como tampoco se pone en peligro la _legitimidad_ social de la profesión más antigua cuando una prostituta, que opera en un país en que su trabajo _legal_ requiere una licencia de la policía, establece un burdel privado.
+
+La mayoría de los maestros que enseñan en las escuelas libres no tienen oportunidad de enseñar en nombre propio. Realizan la tarea de enseñar en nombre de una junta la función menos transparente de enseñar en nombre de sus alumnos o la función más mística de enseñar en nombre de la “sociedad” en general. La mejor prueba de esto es que la mayoría de los maestros en las escuelas libres pasan más tiempo que sus colegas profesionistas planeando, con un comité, la forma en que la escuela debe educar. Al verse frente a las pruebas de sus ilusiones, lo prolongado de las reuniones de comité lleva a muchos maestros generosos de la escuela pública a la escuela libre y después de un año más allá de ella.
+
+La retórica de todos los establecimientos educativos declara que forman hombres para algo, para el futuro, pero no los liberan de esta tarea antes de que hayan desarrollado un alto nivel de tolerancia a las formas de sus mayores: la educación _para_ la vida en lugar de _en_ la vida diaria. Pocas escuelas libres pueden abstraerse de hacer precisamente esto. Sin embargo, están entre los centros más importantes de los que irradia un nuevo estilo de vida, no por el efecto que tendrán sus graduados, sino, más bien, porque los mayores que eligen educar a sus hijos sin el beneficio de maestros adecuadamente ordenados con frecuencia pertenecen a una minoría radical porque su preocupación en relación con la educación de sus hijos los sostiene en su nuevo estilo.
+
+## La mano oculta en un mercado educativo
+
+El tipo más peligroso de reformador de la educación es el que argumenta que el conocimiento puede producirse y venderse con mucha mayor eficacia en el mercado abierto que en un mercado controlado por la escuela.
+
+Estas personas consideran que es fácil adquirir una habilidad de modelos-dehabilidad si el estudiante realmente está interesado en su adquisición, que los derechos individuales pueden proporcionar un poder de compra más equitativo para la educación. Piden una separación cuidadosa del proceso con que se mide y certifica. Me parece que estas afirmaciones son obvias.
+
+Pero sería una falacia creer que el establecimiento de un mercado libre de conocimientos constituiría una alternativa radical en la educación.
+
+El establecimiento de un mercado libre realmente aboliría lo que anteriormente denominé currículum oculto de la escolarización actual —su asistencia específica en una edad determinada a un currículum graduado—.
+
+De igual manera, en un principio el mercado libre daría la apariencia de contrarrestar lo que he denominado bases ocultas de una sociedad escolarizada: el “síndrome de la inmigración”, el monopolio institucional de la enseñanza y el ritual de la iniciación lineal. Pero, al mismo tiempo, un mercado libre en educación proporcionaría al alquimista innumerables manos ocultas para encajar a cada hombre en los múltiples, estrechos y pequeños nichos que puede proporcionar una tecnocracia más compleja.
+
+Muchas décadas de dependencia en la escolarización han hecho que el conocimiento se convierta en mercancía, un bien especial susceptible de mercadeo. El conocimiento se considera ahora simultáneamente como bien de primera necesidad y como la moneda más preciosa de una sociedad. (La transformación del conocimiento en una mercancía se refleja en una transformación correspondiente del lenguaje. Palabras que antes funcionaban como verbos se están convirtiendo en sustantivos que designan propiedades. Hasta hace poco las palabras habitación, conocimiento y curación designaban actividades. Ahora, por lo general, se conciben como mercancías o servicios a entregarse. Hablamos de la fabricación de la vivienda o de la entrega de asistencia médica. Los hombres ya no se consideran aptos para curarse a sí mismos ni para construirse sus viviendas.
+
+En este tipo de sociedad, el hombre llega a creer que los servicios profesionales son más valiosos que la atención personal. En lugar de aprender cómo cuidar a la abuelita, el adolescente aprende a hacer una manifestación frente al hospital que no la admite.) Esta actitud fácilmente podría sobrevivir a la desinstitucionalización de la escuela, igual que la afiliación a una Iglesia siguió siendo una condición para ocupar un puesto público mucho después de la adopción de la Primera Reforma a la Constitución Norteamericana. Es aún más palpable que los exámenes que miden paquetes complejos de conocimientos podrían fácilmente sobrevivir a la desinstitucionalización de la escuela —y con esto acabaría la compulsión de obligar a todos a adquirir un paquete mínimo de las existencias de conocimientos—. Al fin coincidirían la medida científica del valer de cada hombre y el sueño alquimista de “poder educar a todos los hombres para realizarse plenamente en su humanidad”. Bajo la apariencia de un mercado “libre”, la aldea global se convertiría en un útero ambiental en el que los terapeutas pedagógicos controlarían el complejo ombligo por donde se alimenta el hombre.
+
+En la actualidad las escuelas limitan la competencia del maestro al aula.
+
+Evitan que haga de la vida entera del hombre su dominio. La muerte de la escuela acabará con esta restricción y dará una apariencia de legitimidad a la invasión pedagógica en la intimidad del individuo durante toda su vida.
+
+Abrirá el camino de una lucha por el “conocimiento” en un mercado libre, lo que nos llevaría a la paradoja de una vulgar, aun cuando aparentemente igualitaria, meritocracia.
+
+Las escuelas no son de ninguna manera las únicas o más eficientes instituciones que pretenden traducir la información, el entendimiento y la sabiduría en rasgos de conducta cuya medición es la clave del prestigio y el poder. Las escuelas tampoco son las primeras instituciones que se utilizan para convertir la educación en un derecho. Por ejemplo, el sistema mandarín de China fue durante siglos un incentivo estable y eficaz para la educación al servicio de una clase relativamente abierta cuyo privilegio dependía de la adquisición de conocimientos cuantificables.
+
+Se dice que alrededor de 2200 a. C. el emperador de China examinaba a sus funcionarios cada tercer año. Después de tres exámenes, los ascendía o los despedía para siempre del servicio. Mil años más tarde, en 1115 a. C., el primer emperador Chan estableció exámenes generales formales para entrar al servicio público: música, ballestería, equitación, escritura y aritmética.
+
+Los examinados se presentaban cada tercer año para competir con sus pares, en lugar de someterse a calificación de normas abstractas desarrolladas por científicos. Uno de cada 100 era ascendido a través de tres grados: de “genio en potencia” y “estudioso ascendido”, hasta el nivel de aquellos que estaban “listos para el servicio público”. El coeficiente selectivo de los exámenes para los tres niveles sucesivos era tan pequeño que losmismos exámenes no habrían tenido que ser muy exactos para ser útiles. Sin embargo, se tenía sumo cuidado para asegurar la objetividad. En el segundo nivel, donde la composición era importante, el examen del competidor lo copiaba un secretario y esta copia se sometía a un jurado para evitar que la caligrafía del autor se reconociera y llevara a los jueces a actuar con algún prejuicio.
+
+El ascenso a una posición de estudioso en China no daba derecho a ninguno de los trabajos más codiciados, pero sí proporcionaba un billete para una lotería pública en la que los puestos se distribuían entre los mandarines certificados. En China no se desarrollaron escuelas, ni mucho menos universidades, hasta que empezó a guerrear con los poderes europeos. La comprobación de conocimientos cuantificables adquiridos independientemente permitió que durante 3 000 años el imperio chino, que fue la única nación-Estado que careció de un verdadero sistema eclesiástico o escolástico, seleccionara su élite gobernante sin crear una gran aristocracia hereditaria; la familia del emperador y aquellos que aprobaban los exámenes tenían acceso a ella.
+
+Voltaire y sus contemporáneos alabaron el sistema de ascenso chino a través de conocimientos comprobados. En Francia se introdujo el Examen para el Servicio Público en 1791, examen que Napoleón abolió. Sería fascinante especular qué hubiera sucedido si el sistema mandarín se hubiese elegido para propagar los ideales de la Revolución francesa, en lugar del sistema escolástico que inevitablemente respalda el nacionalismo y la disciplina militar. Sucedió que Napoleón fortaleció la escuela politécnica residencial. El modelo jesuita del ritual, el ascenso secuencial en un pedigrí enclaustrado, predominó sobre el sistema mandarín como el método preferido para dar legitimidad a las élites en las sociedades occidentales.
+
+Los principales se convirtieron en los abates de una cadena mundial de monasterios en la que todos se empeñan en acumular el conocimiento necesario para entrar en el constantemente obsoleto cielo sobre la tierra.
+
+Igual que los calvinistas desinstitucionalizaron los monasterios sólo para convertir a toda Ginebra en uno, debemos temer que la desinstitucionalización de la escuela nos lleve a una fábrica mundial de conocimiento. Si el concepto de enseñanza o conocimiento no se transforma, la desinstitucionalización de la escuela nos llevará a un casamiento entre el sistema mandarín que separa el aprendizaje de la certificación y una sociedad comprometida en proporcionar terapia para cada hombre hasta que llegue a la madurez de la edad dorada.
+
+Ni la Alquimia ni la Magia ni la Masonería pueden resolver el problema de la actual crisis “en la educación”. La desescolarización de nuestra visión mundial exige que reconozcamos la naturaleza ilegítima y religiosa de la empresa educativa misma. Su _hybris_ descansa en el intento de hacer del hombre un ente social por haberse sometido a un tratamiento en un proceso manejado. Para aquellos que están de acuerdo con la moral tecnocrática, lo que es posible técnicamente debe ponerse a disposición al menos de unos cuantos, quiéranlo o no. Ni la privación ni la frustración de la mayoría cuenta. Si es posible el tratamiento de cobalto, entonces la ciudad de Tegucigalpa necesita un aparato en cada uno de sus dos hospitales principales, al costo que liberaría a una parte importante de la población de Honduras de parásitos. Si las velocidades supersónicas son posibles, entonces se deben acelerar los viajes de algunos. Si puede concebirse el viaje a Marte, entonces debe encontrarse una razón para que parezca una necesidad. En la moral tecnocrática, la pobreza se moderniza: no sólo se cierran las viejas alternativas con nuevos monopolios, sino que la falta de necesidades también aumenta por una diseminación creciente entre aquellos servicios que son tecnológicamente viables y aquellos que realmente están a disposición de la mayoría.
+
+Un maestro se convierte en “educador” cuando adopta esta moral tecnocrática. Entonces actúa como si la educación fuera una empresa tecnológica cuyo objeto fuera adaptar al hombre al ambiente que crea el “progreso” de la ciencia. Se ciega ante las pruebas de que el precio de la constante obsolescencia de todas las mercancías es alto: el costo creciente de entrenar personas para que las conozcan. Parece olvidar que el costo creciente de las herramientas se compra a un alto precio en términos de educación: disminuye la intensidad de mano de obra de la economía, hace que el aprendizaje en el trabajo sea imposible o, cuando mucho, un privilegio para unos cuantos. En todo el mundo el costo de educar al hombre para la sociedad aumenta con mayor rapidez que la productividad de toda la economía, y menos personas tienen la sensación de participar inteligentemente en el bienestar común.
+
+## La contradicción de las escuelas como herramientas del progreso tecnocrático
+
+Para una sociedad de consumo, educación equivale a entrenamiento del consumidor. La reforma del aula, la dispersión del aula y la difusión del aulason formas diferentes de moldear a los consumidores de mercancías obsoletas. La supervivencia de una sociedad en la que las tecnocracias pueden redefinir constantemente la felicidad humana en función del consumo de su último producto depende de las instituciones educativas (desde las escuelas hasta los anuncios) que convierten a la educación en control social.
+
+En países ricos como Estados Unidos, Canadá o la URSS, enormes inversiones en escolarización ponen de manifiesto las contradicciones institucionales del progreso tecnocrático. En estos países, la defensa ideológica del progreso ilimitado descansa en la pretensión de que los efectos igualadores de una escolarización abierta pueden contrarrestar la fuerza desigualadora de la constante obsolescencia. La legitimidad de la sociedad industrial misma llega a depender de la credibilidad de la escuela, y no importa si el partido en el poder es el comunista o el republicano. Bajo estas circunstancias, el público está ávido de libros como el informe de Charles Silberman o la Comisión Carnegie, publicado bajo el título de _Crisis in the Classroom_. Este tipo de investigación inspira confianza por su bien documentada condena de la escuela actual, a la luz de la cual los intentos insignificantes por salvar al sistema manicurando sus faltas más obvias puede crear una nueva oleada de expectativas inútiles. Mayores inversiones en escuelas de todas partes hacen monumental la ineficacia de la escolarización. Paradójicamente, los pobres son las primeras víctimas de la mayor escolarización. La Comisión Wright en Ontario tuvo que informar a sus patrocinadores del gobierno que la educación post-secundaria está inevitable e irremediablemente gravando a los pobres en forma desproporcionada para una educación que siempre disfrutarán principalmente los ricos.
+
+La experiencia confirma estas advertencias. Durante varias décadas un sistema de cuotas en la URSS daba preferencia al ingreso a la universidad a los hijos de padres trabajadores sobre los hijos de graduados universitarios.
+
+Sin embargo, la desproporción de estos últimos es todavía mayor en las clases que se gradúan en Rusia que en Estados Unidos.
+
+El 8 de marzo de 1971, el magistrado de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, Warren E. Burger, presentó la opinión unánime de la corte en el caso de Griggs _et al_. frente a la Duke Power Company. Interpretando la intención del Congreso en la sección referente a la igualdad de oportunidades de la Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1964, la corte de Burger determinó que cualquier grado académico o cualquier examen a que se sometan futuros empleados debe “calificar al hombre para el trabajo” y no al “hombre en abstracto”. Lacarga de demostrar que los requisitos educativos son una “medida razonable de la actuación en el trabajo” descansa en el patrón. En esta decisión, la corte sólo habló sobre los exámenes y diplomas como medio de discriminación racial, pero la lógica del argumento del magistrado se aplica a cualquier uso del pedigrí educativo como prerrequisito de un empleo. _The Great Training Robbery (El gran robo del entrenamiento)_, tan eficazmente expuesto por Ivar Berg, debe ahora enfrentarse al desafío de una conjura de compinches, de alumnos, patrones y causantes.
+
+En los países pobres, las escuelas racionalizan el rezago económico de toda una nación. La mayoría de los ciudadanos quedan excluidos de los escasos medios modernos de producción y consumo, pero arden en deseos de entrar en la economía por la puerta de la escuela. La legitimación de la distribución jerárquica del privilegio y el poder se ha desplazado de la alcurnia, la herencia, el favor del rey o del papa y la crueldad en el mercado o en el campo de batalla, a una forma más sutil de capitalismo: la institución jerárquica pero liberal de la escolarización obligatoria que permite al bien escolarizado imputar culpabilidad al consumidor rezagado de conocimientos por tener un certificado de menor denominación. Sin embargo, esta racionalización de la desigualdad nunca puede ir de acuerdo con los hechos, y los regímenes populistas cada vez se encuentran con mayores problemas para ocultar el conflicto entre la retórica y la realidad.
+
+Durante 10 años la Cuba de Fidel Castro se ha empeñado en el rápido crecimiento de la educación popular, dependiendo del material humano disponible, sin el respeto normal a las credenciales profesionales. Los éxitos espectaculares al principio de esta campaña, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la disminución del analfabetismo, se han citado como pruebas de que la lenta tasa de crecimiento de otros sistemas escolásticos latinoamericanos se debe a la corrupción, al militarismo y a una economía capitalista de mercado. No obstante, ahora, la lógica de la escolarización jerárquica está alcanzando a Fidel y a su intento de producir al Nuevo Hombre por medio de la escuela. Aun cuando los estudiantes pasan la mitad del año en los campos de caña y se adhieren totalmente a los ideales igualitarios del compañero Fidel, cada año la escuela entrena a una cosecha de consumidores de conocimientos autoconscientes dispuestos a moverse hacia nuevos niveles de consumo. Además, el _Dr_. Castro se enfrenta a las pruebas de que el sistema escolástico nunca producirá suficientes técnicos certificados. Aquellos graduados que obtienen las nuevas colocaciones destruyen con su conservadurismo los resultados obtenidos por los núcleos no certificados que han llegado a sus puestos a través de entrenamientos en el trabajo. No se puede culpar de ninguna manera a los maestros de los fracasos de un gobierno revolucionario que insiste en la capitalización institucional del potencial humano a través de un currículum oculto que garantiza la producción de una burguesía universal.
+
+## Recuperación de la responsabilidad de enseñar y aprender
+
+Una revolución en contra de aquellas formas de privilegio y de poder que se basan en el derecho de obtener conocimientos profesionales debe iniciarse con una transformación de la conciencia sobre la naturaleza del aprendizaje.
+
+Esto significa, sobre todo, un desplazamiento de la responsabilidad de enseñar y aprender. El conocimiento sólo puede definirse como una mercancía mientras se le considere el resultado de una empresa institucional o el cumplimiento de los objetivos institucionales. Sólo cuando el hombre recupere el sentido de la responsabilidad personal de lo que aprende y enseña podrá romperse el sortilegio y superarse el alejamiento entre el aprender y el vivir.
+
+La recuperación del poder de aprender o enseñar significa que el maestro que se arriesga a interferir en la vida privada de otro individuo también se hace responsable de los resultados. De manera similar, el estudiante que se expone a la influencia de un maestro debe hacerse responsable de su propia educación. Para ello lo ideal sería que las instituciones educativas —si se necesitan— adoptaran la forma de centros de servicios donde se pudiera adquirir un techo adecuado sobre su cabeza, tener acceso a un piano o a un horno y a discos, libros o diapositivas. Las escuelas, las estaciones de televisión, los teatros y similares están diseñados principalmente para el uso de profesionales. La desescolarización de la sociedad significa, sobre todo, la negación del estatus profesional para la segunda profesión más antigua del mundo, a saber: enseñar. La certificación de maestros constituye ahora una restricción indebida del derecho a la libertad de expresión; la estructura corporativa y las pretensiones profesionales del periodismo coartan indebidamente la libertad de prensa.
+
+Las reglas de asistencia obligatoria interfieren con la libertad de reunión. La desescolarización de la sociedad no es más que una mutación cultural mediante la cual un pueblo recupera el uso efectivo de sus libertades constitucionales: el aprender y enseñar por hombres que saben que han nacido libres y no con una libertad que les ha sido otorgada. La mayoría de las personas aprenden casi siempre cuando hacen algo que les divierte; la mayoría tiene curiosidad y desea dar un significado a todo aquello con que entra en contacto; y la mayoría puede tener relaciones personales íntimas con otros si no están idiotizados por un trabajo inhumano o se cierran a causa de la escolarización.
+
+El hecho de que las personas en los países ricos no aprendan mucho de _motu proprio_ no es prueba de lo contrario. Más bien es consecuencia de vivir en un medio ambiente del cual, paradójicamente, no pueden aprender mucho precisamente porque está altamente programado. Constantemente se ven frustrados por la estructura de la sociedad contemporánea, donde los hechos en que se basan las decisiones se han vuelto más huidizos. Viven en un ambiente en el que los instrumentos que pueden utilizarse para propósitos creativos se han convertido en un lujo, un ambiente en que los canales de comunicación sirven a unos cuantos para hablar a muchos.
+
+## Una nueva tecnología más que una nueva educación
+
+Un mito moderno desea hacernos creer que el sentido de impotencia con el que vive la mayoría de los hombres de hoy es consecuencia de la tecnología que sólo puede crear sistemas enormes. Pero no es la tecnología la que hace enormes sistemas, instrumentos inmensamente poderosos, canales de comunicación unidireccionales. Todo lo contrario: si la tecnología estuviera adecuadamente controlada, podría capacitar a cada hombre para entender mejor su medio ambiente, moldearlo con sus propias manos, y permitirle la intercomunicación total a un grado nunca antes alcanzado. Este uso alternativo de la tecnología constituye la disyuntiva central en la educación.
+
+Para que una persona pueda desarrollarse necesita, antes que nada, tener acceso a cosas, lugares y procesos, a acontecimientos y datos. Necesita ver, tocar, asir, ocuparse con lo que existe en un escenario significativo. En la actualidad este acceso le está en buena medida negado. Cuando el conocimiento se convirtió en una mercancía adquirió la protección de la propiedad privada; así, un principio diseñado para resguardar la intimidad personal se transformó en una razón para declarar que los conocimientos no son para las personas que carecen de las credenciales apropiadas. En las escuelas los maestros se guardan los conocimientos si no encajan dentrodel programa del día. Los medios informan, pero excluyen lo que consideran inadecuado para imprimirse. La información se encierra en idiomas especiales, y los maestros especializados viven de su retraducción. Las empresas protegen las patentes, las burocracias guardan los secretos, y el poder de alejar a los demás de cotos privados —ya sean cabinas, despachos de abogados, basureros o clínicas— se guarda celosamente por las profesiones, las instituciones y los países. Ni la estructura política ni la profesional de nuestras sociedades, oriental y occidental, podrían soportar la eliminación del poder de impedir el acceso a conocimientos que podrían servir a muchas clases de personas. El acceso a los conocimientos por que abogo va más allá que la verdad etiquetada. El acceso debe construirse dentro de la realidad, mientras que todo lo que pedimos de la publicidad es la garantía de que no nos engañe. El acceso a la realidad constituye una alternativa fundamental en la educación para un sistema que sólo pretende enseñar _sobre_ él.
+
+La abolición del derecho a un secreto corporativo —aun cuando la opinión profesional sostiene que este secreto sirve al bien común— es, como pronto se verá, un objetivo político mucho más radical que la demanda tradicional de la propiedad pública o el control de los bienes de producción. La socialización de estos bienes sin una socialización efectiva del _know-how_ (saber cómo) de su uso, tiende a colocar al capitalista del conocimiento en la posición que antes tenía el financiero. La única pretensión de poder del tecnócrata es el acervo que tiene de algún tipo de conocimiento escaso y secreto, y la mejor manera de proteger su valor es creando una organización importante con intensidad de capital que hace que el acceso al _know-how_ sea formidable y prohibitivo.
+
+No pasa mucho tiempo antes de que el aprendiz interesado adquiera casi cualquier habilidad que desee usar. Eso tiende a olvidarse en una sociedad en la que los maestros profesionales monopolizan la entrada a todos los campos y etiquetan como charlatanería la enseñanza impartida por individuos que carecen de un certificado. Existen pocas habilidades mecánicas en la industria o la investigación que sean tan exigentes, complejas y peligrosas como manejar un automóvil; habilidad que la mayoría de la gente adquiere fácilmente de un instructor. No todas las personas están capacitadas para la lógica avanzada, y sin embargo aquellos que lo están progresan rápidamente si se les interesa en juegos matemáticos a una temprana edad. Uno de cada 20 niños en Cuernavaca me gana en un juego de _Wff’n Proof_ después de unas cuantas semanas de entrenamiento.
+
+En cuatro meses un gran porcentaje de los adultos motivados en el Cidoc aprenden el español con la suficiente corrección para llevar a cabo asuntos académicos en la nueva lengua.
+
+Un primer paso para abrir el acceso a las diferentes especialidades sería proporcionar distintos incentivos a los individuos calificados para que compartan sus conocimientos. Inevitablemente, esto iría en contra de los intereses de las guildas, las profesiones y los sindicatos. Empero, el aprendizaje múltiple es atractivo; proporciona a todos la oportunidad de aprender algo sobre casi cualquier cosa. No hay razón para que una persona no pueda combinar la capacidad de manejar un auto, componer teléfonos y excusados, ser partera y dibujante de arquitecto. Las grandes empresas y sus consumidores disciplinados pretenderían, desde luego, que el público necesita la protección de una garantía profesional. Pero este argumento lo ponen continuamente en tela de juicio las asociaciones de protección del consumidor. Tenemos que tomar más seriamente la objeción que los economistas hacen a la socialización radical de las habilidades: que no habrá “progreso” si los conocimientos —patentes, habilidades y todo el resto— se democratizan. Sólo podremos encarar sus argumentos si les demostramos la tasa de crecimiento de deseconomías inútiles generadas por cualquiera de los sistemas educativos que existen.
+
+El acceso a la gente que desea compartir sus habilidades no es garantía de aprendizaje. Este acceso se restringe no sólo por el monopolio de los programas educativos sobre el aprendizaje y de los sindicatos sobre su licitud, sino también por una tecnología de la escasez: las habilidades que hoy cuentan con el _know-how_ en el uso de herramientas que se diseñaron para ser escasas. Estas herramientas producen bienes o prestan servicios que todos quieren, pero que sólo unos cuantos pueden disfrutar, y que sólo un número limitado de personas sabe cómo utilizar. Sólo unos cuantos individuos privilegiados del total de personas que padecen una enfermedad dada se benefician de los resultados de la tecnología médica sofisticada, y todavía menos médicos desarrollan la habilidad para utilizarla.
+
+Sin embargo, los mismos resultados de la investigación médica también se han utilizado para crear un instrumental básico que permite a los médicos de la armada y la marina, con sólo unos cuantos meses de entrenamiento, obtener resultados en el campo de batalla que habrían sido un sueño imposible de los doctores titulados durante la segunda Guerra Mundial. En un nivel aún más sencillo, cualquier campesina podría aprender a diagnosticar y tratar la mayoría de las infecciones si los científicos de lamedicina prepararan específicamente dosis e instrucciones para un área geográfica dada.
+
+Todos estos ejemplos ilustran el hecho de que las consideraciones de tipo educativo por sí solas son suficientes para requerir una reducción radical de la estructura profesional que ahora impide la relación entre el científico y la mayoría de los que desean tener acceso a la ciencia. Si se escuchara esta demanda, todos los hombres podrían aprender a usar los instrumentos de ayer, que la ciencia moderna ha vuelto más efectivos y duraderos, para crear el mundo del mañana.
+
+Por desgracia, en la actualidad existe precisamente la tendencia contraria. Conozco una región costera en Sudamérica donde la mayoría de la gente vive de la pesca con pequeños botes. El motor fuera de borda es sin duda el instrumento que ha cambiado más dramáticamente las vidas de estos pescadores costeños. Pero en la región que yo he estudiado, la mitad de todos los motores fuera de borda se compraron entre 1945 y 1950 y se mantienen en uso por arreglos constantes, mientras que la mitad de los motores adquiridos en 1965 ya no sirven porque no se construyeron para repararse. El progreso tecnológico proporciona a la mayoría de las personas artefactos que no pueden comprar y las priva de las herramientas más sencillas que necesitan.
+
+Los metales, los plásticos y el cemento armado que se utilizan en la construcción han mejorado muchísimo desde la década de los años cuarenta y deben dar a más personas la oportunidad de construir sus propias casas.
+
+Pero mientras que en 1948 más de 30% de todas las casas unifamiliares de Estados Unidos las construyeron sus propietarios, para fines de los años sesenta este porcentaje había disminuido a menos de 20 por ciento.
+
+La reducción del nivel de habilidades a través del llamado desarrollo económico es todavía más palpable en América Latina. Aquí, la mayoría de la gente sigue construyendo su casa desde el piso hasta el techo. A menudo usan barro en forma de adobe y techados de paja de utilidad insuperable en su clima húmedo, caliente y ventoso. En otros lugares hacen sus viviendas de cartón, barriles de petróleo y otros desperdicios industriales. En lugar de proporcionar a la gente instrumentos sencillos y componentes altamente estandarizados, duraderos y fáciles de componer, todos los gobiernos se han pronunciado en favor de la producción masiva de viviendas de bajo costo.
+
+Es obvio que ningún país puede darse el lujo de proporcionar unidades habitacionales modernas satisfactorias para la mayoría de la gente. No obstante, en todas partes esta política hace que cada vez sea más difícil que la mayoría adquiera el conocimiento y la capacidad que necesita para construirse mejores casas.
+
+## La pobreza
+
+Consideraciones de tipo educativo nos permiten formular una segunda característica fundamental que debe poseer cualquier sociedad posindustrial: una caja de herramientas que por su misma naturaleza compense el control tecnocrático. Por razones educativas debemos trabajar para lograr una sociedad en la que el conocimiento científico se incorpore a las herramientas y componentes que puedan utilizarse con buenos resultados en unidades suficientemente pequeñas para que estén al alcance de todos. Sólo este tipo de herramientas podrá socializar el acceso a las habilidades. Sólo estas herramientas favorecen asociaciones temporales entre aquellos que desean utilizarlas en ocasiones específicas. Sólo estas herramientas permiten el surgimiento de objetivos específicos en el proceso de su utilización, como bien sabe cualquier remendón. Sólo con la combinación de un acceso garantizado a los conocimientos y un poder limitado en la mayoría de las herramientas se podrá contemplar una economía de subsistencia capaz de incorporar los frutos de la ciencia moderna.
+
+El desarrollo de una economía científica de subsistencia como ésta es indudablemente ventajoso para la gran mayoría de las personas en los países pobres. También es la única alternativa a la contaminación progresiva, a la explotación y a la opacidad en los países ricos. Pero, como hemos visto, el derrocamiento del PNB no puede lograrse sin trastornar simultáneamente la ENB (Educación Nacional Bruta, generalmente concebida como capitalización del potencial humano). Una economía igualitaria no puede existir en una sociedad en la que el derecho de producir lo otorgan las escuelas.
+
+La viabilidad de la economía moderna de subsistencia no depende de nuevos intentos científicos. Depende principalmente de la capacidad de una sociedad para estar de acuerdo sobre restricciones fundamentales antiburocráticas y antitecnocráticas autoelegidas.
+
+Estas restricciones pueden adoptar muchas formas, pero no funcionarán si no tocan las dimensiones básicas de la vida. (La decisión del Congreso norteamericano en contra del desarrollo de un avión supersónico es uno de los pasos más alentadores en la dirección correcta.) La sustancia de estas restricciones sociales voluntarias sería algo muy sencillo que cualquier hombre prudente puede entender y juzgar plenamente. Los intereses en juego en la controversia del avión supersónico proporcionan un buen ejemplo. Todas estas restricciones se elegirían para fomentar el usufructo estable y equitativo de _know-how_ científico. Los franceses dicen que se tarda 1 000 años para educar a un campesino en el cuidado de una vaca. No se tardarían dos generaciones en ayudar a toda la gente de Latinoamérica o África a utilizar y reparar motores fuera de borda, coches sencillos, bombas de agua, botiquines y máquinas de cemento armado si su diseño no cambiara a cada rato. Y ya que una vida feliz es aquella en la que hay una sensata interrelación con los demás en un ambiente interesante, habría un gozo igual si se traduce en igual educación. En la actualidad es difícil imaginar un consenso sobre austeridad. La razón que generalmente se da para la impotencia de la mayoría se estipula en términos de clases económicas o políticas. Lo que generalmente no se entiende es que la nueva estructura de clase de una sociedad escolarizada está todavía más controlada por los intereses creados. No cabe duda que la organización imperialista y capitalista de la sociedad proporciona una estructura social en la que sólo una minoría puede influir desproporcionadamente sobre la opinión efectiva de la mayoría. Pero en una sociedad tecnocrática el poder de una minoría de capitalistas del conocimiento puede evitar la formación de una opinión pública real a través del control del _know-how_ científico y de los medios de comunicación. Las garantías constitucionales de la libertad de expresión, la libertad de prensa y la libertad de reunión, tenían el propósito de asegurar un gobierno del pueblo. En principio, la electrónica moderna, las prensas de foto-offset, las computadoras y los teléfonos han proporcionado las herramientas que podrían dar un significado enteramente nuevo a estas libertades. Por desgracia estas cosas se utilizan en los medios modernos de comunicación para incrementar el poder de los banqueros del conocimiento para canalizar sus paquetes de programas a través de cadenas internacionales a más gente, en lugar de utilizarlos para aumentar las verdaderas redes que proporcionan iguales oportunidades para una reunión de los miembros de la mayoría.
+
+La desescolarización de la cultura y la estructura social requieren el uso de tecnología para que la política de participación sea posible. Sólo con base en una coalición de la mayoría podrán determinarse los límites a los secretos y al poder creciente sin dictadura. Necesitamos un nuevo ambiente en el que el desarrollo sea sin clases, o tendremos un “Mundo feliz” en el que el _Big Brother_ nos eduque a todos.
+
+# Conciencia política y control de la natalidad
+
+Los programas para controlar la natalidad que se pretenden imponer en América Latina fracasan porque subrayan más el temor a la pobreza que la alegría de vivir. Los que practican la planificación familiar son los mismos que orientan sus consumos conforme a las “necesidades” que crean los avisos de television y la propaganda en general. Tanto en México como en Brasil ellos forman esa minoría rara y marginal que ha dado en llamarse clase media. Su misma situación de privilegio económico los expone a que su intimidad sexual sea regulada desde afuera mediante un juego de demandas.
+
+Lograr éxito en la escuela, en el trabajo y en el sexo es una combinación de la que sólo goza en Latinoamérica una minoría que va de 1 a 5%. En ella se encuentran los “triunfadores” que se las saben arreglar para mantener el índice de sus entradas por encima del promedio nacional; allí también están los únicos que tienen acceso al poder político, que usarán como instrumento poderoso para favorecer a su estirpe. Incluso suponiendo que el pequeño número de los que han sabido aprovecharse de la Alianza para el Progreso de las clases medias practicase la planificación familiar, eso no afectaría en forma significativa los índices de crecimiento demográfico. Pero la posibilidad de planificar sus familias es algo que está fuera del alcance de los “otros” (que en América Latina quiere decir “los más”). ¿A quién le sorprende que una “igualdad” más se le reconozca al pobre en el papel y se le niegue de hecho?
+
+En un contexto político seudodemocrático es imposible inducir a la mayoría a practicar el control de la natalidad. Ni la seducción ni la educación producen efecto. Lo primero, porque es propio de tales regímenes aparentar que respetan a la persona y, por tanto, no pueden ser demasiado agresivos en la propaganda, como sería anunciar que se pagan 25 dólares a cada mujer que se haga aplicar una espiral y 100 a la que se deje esterilizar. Eso sería más económico —conforme a sus objetivos—, pero no les permitiría guardar las apariencias. Lo segundo, porque a estos gobiernos no les conviene dar a los adultos analfabetos un tipo de educación en estamateria, que los llevaría a la crítica y a la disensión en el plano político. Saben que hacer eso sería labrarse su propia subversión.
+
+## El fracaso de lo mágico
+
+Ese doble fracaso se explica también al ver la inadecuación que existe entre lo que se predica y el estilo de vida común a las mayorías campesinas de América Latina. Éstas no creen que controlar su impulso sexual las llevará a la abundancia material. Creen menos en eso que en la eficacia misma de los métodos anticonceptivos. Sin embargo, se las quiere convencer de que ambas cosas habrán de producirse por arte de magia. Si al pobre le repele el olor del remedio mágico, es porque huele allí el doblez de un rico magnate que le enseña “afablemente” cómo hacer para no seguir trayendo al mundo seres pobres y detestables como él. También se utiliza la agresividad para imponer los nuevos métodos, pero cobardemente, es decir, cuando se tiene enfrente a una criatura indefensa. Baste pensar en la mujer que, víctima de la “curación” hecha en su barrio, llega a la clínica donde será iniciada en el misterio de la contracepción como única alternativa para no tener que volver el año próximo. La demanda, el estilo y el método usados, insisten en cómo protegerse frente al mal, más que en cómo poder expresar más profundamente la vida y ser libres para actuar en ella. Al no tener la planificación familiar así planteada nada de atractivo, no es de maravillar que fracase.
+
+Mientras no se desmitologicen los programas para controlar la expansión demográfica, éstos no conseguirán reducir la fertilidad. El recurso a la magia, al mito y al misterio lo deben abandonar tanto los abanderados de la contracepción como sus opositores éticos. Pero es que la creciente pobreza del mundo embota la imaginación de quienes deben buscar las soluciones. Entonces se recurre al mito para escapar a esa angustia insoportable: se convierte a las personas hambrientas en un informe enemigo mitológico con la ilusión de poder controlarlo; se confiere a los programas para controlar la natalidad un poder mágico y se les invoca para mantener a raya los desbordamientos en las tablas estadísticas. Pero dado que el hombre no acepta ser tratado como una célula que se reproduce dentro de ese monstruo y lo hace crecer, las invocaciones al mito no hacen disminuir su fertilidad. Sólo los hombres de gabinete creen que se puede convencer a los individuos para que tomen como _motivos personales_ las _razones válidas_ de los economistas de la nación.
+
+“Población” es algo acéfalo, dirigible pero no motivable. Sólo las personas toman decisiones, y en la medida en que lo hacen son más o menos controlables. Por eso quien se decide libremente a controlar su fertilidad en forma responsable se sentirá también motivado para aspirar al poder político, porque en esa forma se asegura de no ser manejado según el gusto de otros. De ahí que los gobiernos militares de América del Sur no quieran aceptar los programas que buscan promover la paternidad responsable y la participación en el control político.
+
+En América Latina, como colonia occidental, la escolarización masiva ha sido la forma de someter pasivamente a los niños a una ideología que se encarga de mantenerlos “democráticamente” en su lugar. Su “orden” político no ha tolerado una educación que despierte la conciencia de las masas adultas no escolarizadas, que promueva su originalidad y los impulse al riesgo. Dar eso a los adultos es exhortarlos a liberarse de los tabúes y a destronar los ídolos que los defensores del _statu quo_ tan celosamente custodian.
+
+Todo tabú que se deja atrás significa un obstáculo menos para la liberación total del hombre. Caer en la cuenta de que el sexo no tiene por qué llevar a una fecundidad que no se desea, hace que la persona vea que la sobrevivencia económica no tiene por qué engendrar la explotación política.
+
+Ser más libre como consorte, significa serlo también como ciudadano y, por consiguiente, volverse una fuerza activa en el proceso de cambio social.
+
+## El contexto de la urbanización
+
+Todos los que procrearán antes de 1984 ya viven hoy día. Me pregunto si a los que aún son niños se les usurparán sus sentimientos por medio de la técnica, se les desposeerá de sus responsabilidades sociales, se les manipulará en su comportamiento sexual para adaptarlos a los intereses de otros, o si el traslado del campo a la ciudad los hará más libres y conscientes para controlar la historia de sus vidas. En otras palabras: ¿llegará la ciudad a tragarse sus vidas o lograrán vivir en ella con mayor libertad? La mayoría de los actuales habitantes de América Latina vive en un mundo donde el modo de pensar, las costumbres y los mitos están enraizados en un pasado rural. Ahora bien, menos de 30% de los 350 millones que se espera tendrá el continente en la próxima generación podrá considerarse “rural”. La diferencia se habrá trasladado a los centros poblados trayendo el bagaje que heredara de sus abuelos: aprecio por la tradición y por la prole numerosa (con la que el grupo hacía frente a la elevada mortalidad). Su lenguaje, símbolos, ideología y religión expresarán tales valores.
+
+Pero una vez que el campesino se instala en la ciudad, pierde la poderosa herramienta que su cultura le diera para llevar con dignidad su situación de carencia. Más aún, debe renunciar conscientemente a ella para poder sobrevivir. O acepta cambiar libremente la orientación de su vida y adaptar su conducta conforme eso se lo vaya exigiendo o la ciudad lo esclavizará cuando no lo aplastará. La urbanización le ofrece nuevas coordenadas, símbolos y eslogans con los que orientar sus más íntimos sentimientos y tendencias y labrar su carácter.
+
+La ciudad se vende al recién llegado con una serie de instrucciones para su uso. Allí se mistifica al que no acepta las creencias tradicionales, sino las del credo de la ciudad con sus nuevos dogmas: prolongación de los años de vida obtenida mediante adelantos médicos; exaltación del sistema escolar; habilidad para mejorar de puesto en el trabajo y conseguir mayor remuneración. Producción y consumo se convierten en el patrón medida de los valores, sin excluir el de la fertilidad. Cambio de orientación, conducta y creencia van juntos y solamente la minoría capaz de someterse a los tres podrá abrirse camino hacia las diminutas islas en que florece la abundancia.
+
+## Resistencia a la riqueza
+
+Es fácil percibir que un grado elevado de consumo, combinado con una fertilidad abundante, es un lujo que pocos pueden afrontar. Lo común es que quien rápidamente asciende en la pirámide social sea el que controla rigurosamente su número de hijos. Pero eso demanda una disciplina de por vida que no es fácil pedírsela a quien se ha criado en una choza y carece del entrenamiento que se requiere para ajustarse al ritmo que marca la escuela o al horario inflexible de una oficina. Salvo que se dé una rara combinación de carácter y circunstancias, la ciudad —mejor selectora que maestra— no enseñará al campesino las disciplinas que se precisan para triunfar en ella, en los negocios y en la vida de familia. Tampoco es la escuela quien mejor se las puede enseñar, pues ella también es más selectiva que pedagógica. Si bien se ha pensado que la alta escolaridad trae consigo la baja fertilidad, yo prefiero creer que lo que pasa es que las escuelas al hacer su selección sólo se quedan con aquellos mansos corderos capaces de seguir ahora sus órdenes y, más tarde, las del planificador.
+
+¿Quiénes son los que todavía dicen que si la gente no progresa es porque no quiere; y que las oportunidades son las mismas para todos?
+
+Miremos los hechos. En Caracas, y en el mejor de los casos, sólo tres de cada 100 están en camino de conseguir lo siguiente: título secundario, auto privado, seguro de enfermedad y un grado de higiene aceptable.
+
+Se dice que la planificación familiar ha sido adoptada rápidamente por ciertos grupos étnicos. Pero tomemos a los puertorriqueños que viven en Nueva York. Es verdad que la fertilidad del grupo decrece, pero sólo si tomamos en cuenta a los que, habiendo decidido ir a esa ciudad, lograron escapar de Harlem, pasar por la escuela y conseguir un empleo por más de 7 000 dólares al año. Ellos son los privilegiados que pudieron eludir a la policía, las drogas, la discriminación y las agencias de bienestar social.
+
+Entre los muchos que buscan El Dorado son ellos el grupito selecto que no muere antes de haberlo encontrado.
+
+En América Latina puede detectarse un fenómeno similar. Me refiero a esos pequeños grupos que a saltos de rana marchan hacia la riqueza. Lo propio de ellos es asociarse al Club de Leones, al Movimiento Familiar Cristiano, a los Caballeros de Colón o a grupos por el estilo, que les permiten organizarse para poder alcanzar nuevos privilegios. La Asociación para la Protección de la Clase Media, recientemente fundada en Caracas por los empleados de Esso, sirve para ilustrar lo que mencionábamos. El que los miembros de estos grupos controlen su fertilidad no prueba que la contracepción sea un resultado de confort. Más bien quiere decir que en Latinoamérica son muy pocos los que tienen acceso a la riqueza.
+
+El fracaso de la planificación familiar en las naciones en vías de desarrollo es comparable al fracaso que ha tenido en los guetos negros de Estados Unidos. La proliferación entre los norteamericanos pobres alcanza niveles próximos a los latinoamericanos. Con todo, el elemento común es más una disposición de ánimo que un factor numérico. Porque si bien por un lado en el gueto negro se han alcanzado promedios económicos y disponibilidad de servicios que están fuera del alcance de nuestra generación en América Latina, por otro nos encontramos que en ambos lados la participación política es baja, el poder de que se dispone es sumamente limitado y el humor se torna helado. Sorprende entonces que el mínimo público norteamericano que logró sensibilizarse con sus compatriotas de color que rechazaban la trampa que se les tendía para que dejasen de reproducirse, mire como necedad e histeria que el pobre de ultramar busque escapar de la misma trampa. Tal como se viene planteando, dar más información gratis a la gente es un truco que tiene que fracasar en Brasil de la misma forma que fracasó en el gueto: no importa cuál sea el escenario, ese truco anticonceptivo saldrá mal y no hará decrecer la fertilidad.
+
+El año pasado en Brasil, obispos y comunistas levantaron la indignación pública contra los supuestos favores extendidos por el gobierno militar a los misioneros que importasen a la Amazonia _serpentes_ producidas en Estados Unidos. Las _serpentes_ (espirales), decían los acusadores, habría que “aplicarlas al interior de las mujeres” para preparar la Amazonia a ser colonizada por “sobrantes” negros que se importarían de Estados Unidos.
+
+El demógrafo criado en torno al Atlántico Norte fácilmente interpreta eso como el arranque de una imaginación enfermiza, más que como una protesta simbólica contra la serpiente norteamericana que solicita a la Eva tropical para que guste la manzana de la abundancia. ¿Es que se busca acaso seducir a nuestros hombres para que acepten como “ley de la naturaleza humana” lo que no es más que idiosincrasia de un pueblo?
+
+## Alienación ideológica
+
+Procuraremos tratar el tema libres de cualquier tendencia “imperialista”, moralista o masivista que inconscientemente pueda determinar su intepretación.
+
+Un individuo puede recurrir a la contracepción como defensa contra la miseria angustiante —caso de tantos abortos— o como medio de mejorar económicamente lo que sólo puede verificarse en la ínfima minoría que ha aceptado los postulados capitalistas y sube rápidamente los escalones del “progreso”. Porque para 90% de la población de ciudades tipo Caracas o Sao Paulo tener pocos hijos no representa un mejoramiento significativo de nivel de vida. De ahí que los incentivos socioeconómicos (ganancia a corto plazo, ventajas paralelas para la pequeña familia…), a través de los cuales los programas tradicionales de educación contraceptiva buscan motivar a las masas de escasa capacidad de consumo, sean percibidos por ellas como un engaño. Se las podrá adoctrinar sutilmente en los “valores de la clase media” o luchar por conseguir su asentimiento irreflexivo, pero eso no conseguirá disminuir su fertilidad, sino tan sólo aumentar su alienación.
+
+El pobre no teme que se le cierren las puertas de una riqueza futura que nunca llegará a poseer, como tampoco el recurso al infierno ha tenido gran influencia en la conducta sexual de católicos fervientes. Pero es cinismo pedirle que se abstenga del placer para que otros puedan seguir alcanzando lo que a él se le niega. Ni la política de la Casa Blanca, con todas sus “razones”, ni los códigos morales que pueda proponer el papa, logran determinar la conducta sexual de la gente. Ambos son igualmente ineficaces porque usar la ideología para _imponer_ la planificación familiar u oponerse a ella es un llamado a la idolatría y, por lo tanto, es un llamado inhumano.
+
+La ideología puede encontrarle justificación al egoísmo, al temor al riesgo, a la envidia…; con tal de mover a las personas a usar contraceptivos, se las ingenia incluso para demostrar que todo eso contribuye a la estabilidad política y al aumento de la producción. Pero son sólo unos pocos y raros individuos los que se deciden a controlar su vida sexual engatusados por tales razonamientos. Ya hemos visto lo que pasa con la mayoría a quien se busca convencer con falsas razones: sigue tan prolífera como antes. En sentido contrario, la ideología es capaz de hacer que algunos —¿por un miedo mítico al infierno?— se lancen a procrear con “consciente irresponsabilidad”. Pero también aquí alegra pensar que no sean muchos los que padecen tal neurosis. De tal manera que usar la ideología para motivar el comportamiento individual es a la vez un modo falaz de hacer política dirigida. Porque el recurso a los “absolutos” para determinar a la gente, es más una buena excusa que una buena razón.
+
+Así como el maestro cree que los libros son la panacea para poder mejorar la situación de la vida, los agentes de Salud Pública prefieren ver en un pesario la alfombra mágica que habrá de llevar al paraíso soñado. El producto del farmacéutico, el del librero y el de la curandera se usan con el mismo estilo. Por lo tanto, las mujeres que tragan a ojos cerrados la píl-dora mágica no se diferencian psicológicamente de quienes depositan toda su confianza en los libros, en los filtros de amor o en San Antonio.
+
+Pero ni las escuelas ni las agencias de bienestar social han logrado mover a sus clientes con sus motivos. Las escuelas, a un alto precio, consiguen dar algo de alfabetización a unos pocos niños: en América Latina sólo uno de cada cuatro pasa del sexto grado. Las clínicas de bienestar social, por otro lado, logran resultados igualmente modestos: sólo uno de cada cuatro de los que allí se aconsejan, deja de tener hijos. La causa está en que ambas seleccionan mejor de lo que enseñan.
+
+Si los guardianes del _statu quo_ fueran consecuentes con sus intereses económicos, reconocerían públicamente que una nación ahorra más y a corto plazo por cada vida que se evita que el aumento en la productividadque trae consigo un nuevo niño escolarizado. Pero como decidirse por eso sería dejar al descubierto lo humanamente detestable que es el “orden” que se defiende, prefieren mantener las escuelas y las clínicas tal como funcionan, porque son políticamente necesarias y porque ayudan a mantener la envoltura del mundo occidental. Entonces se entiende por qué cuando se reduce el presupuesto para las escuelas se reinvierte en las clínicas o viceversa; pero las reinversiones nunca se hacen en favor de nuevos programas.
+
+Los gobiernos militares no pueden sino temerle a Sócrates: hay que encarcelarlo, exiliarlo, ridiculizarlo o forzarlo a la clandestinidad. Son pocos los promotores de la educación fundamental en América Latina que habiendo dado muestras de su capacidad, popularidad y dignidad siguen empleados en sus países. De unirse al gobierno, a la Iglesia o a una agencia internacional, los amenazaría el tener que transar. En nuestro continente los que dirigen la política y los que han terminado la escuela secundaria (sólo 3%) son los mismos. Por eso todo lo que signifique involucrar masivamente a los adultos no escolarizados en el razonamiento político implica un cambio que va más allá del gusto y de la imaginación de esa minoría. Si un nuevo programa educativo se propone alcanzar ese fin, pronto será declarado abortivo, ignorado como demagogia destinada al fracaso, reprimido como incitación al motín y, por supuesto, no financiado.
+
+Paulo Freire, educador brasileño exiliado, demostró que se puede enseñar a leer y escribir en seis semanas a aproximadamente 15% de los adultos analfabetos de un pueblo, con menos de lo que cuesta tener a un niño en la escuela durante un año. Freire hace que su equipo prepare para la comunidad con la que va a trabajar una lista de palabras profundamente significativas y que, fácilmente, se convierten en foco de controversia política. Las sesiones se centran en torno al análisis de esas palabras. Los atraídos por el programa suelen ser gente que dispone de potencial político.
+
+Asumiendo que les interesa el diálogo, aprender a leer y escribir las palabras claves les significa dar un paso hacia adelante en la intensidad y efectividad de su participación política.
+
+Es obvio que tal tipo de educación sea selectivo. También lo son las escuelas. Sólo que el potencial político y la sala de clase reúnen a gente distinta: de un lado los elementos potencialmente subversivos de la sociedad, y de otro los niños dóciles dispuestos a condescender con la dictadura del sistema.
+
+Los alumnos de Freire consumen una dieta diferente a los desechos con que se alimentan los fracasados de la escuela que consiguieron, sin embargo, aprender a leer. Nunca olvidaré una noche pasada con uno de esos grupos de campesinos hambrientos. Fue en Sergipe a comienzos de 1964.
+
+Un hombre se levantó, luchó por encontrar las palabras y luego expuso brevemente el argumento que trato de elaborar en este artículo: “Anoche no pude dormir… porque anoche escribí mi nombre… y comprendí que yo soy yo… que quiere decir que _nosotros_ somos responsables”.
+
+Ciudadanía responsable y paternidad responsable marchan juntas.
+
+Ambas resultan de haber experimentado la relación que existe entre uno mismo y los demás. Someter a disciplina el comportamiento espontáneo es algo efectivo, creador y sostenible, sólo si se acepta teniendo en vista a los demás. La decisión de actuar como consorte y padre responsable implica participar en la vida política y aceptar la disciplina que eso exige. Hoy día en Brasil, eso significa prontitud para la lucha revolucionaria.
+
+En esta perspectiva, mi sugerencia para que esos programas vastos para la educación de adultos se orienten hacia la planificación familiar, supone estar en favor de que se dé educación política. La lucha por la liberación política y la participación popular en América Latina podrá adquirir mayor profundidad y conciencia si brota del reconocimiento de que incluso en los dominios más íntimos de la vida el hombre moderno debe aceptar la técnica como una condición. Si la educación para la paternidad se condujera con ese estilo, podría volverse una forma poderosa de agitación que ayudaría a las masas desarraigadas a convertirse en “pueblo”.
+
+## La iglesia católica como agente publicitario
+
+Si la Iglesia católica se propusiera oponerse sistemáticamente a los programas que promueven la planificación familiar realista y responsable —posibilidad que no consideré al escribir originalmente este artículo— tendría por resultado el mantener sobre el tapete la controversia, a la vez que despertar el humor y la cordura de la gente.
+
+Polarizar la atención de los individuos en una determinada dirección provoca el deseo de su contrario, y en ese sentido lleva algo de positivo: el analfabetismo, al fijar al adulto en la ignorancia, mantiene vivo en él el deseo de saber —que no ha sido corrompido por las deformaciones del sistema escolar—. El oscurantismo, de modo semejante, hace consciente a la persona de que se le está ocultando el acceso a algo, logrando de ese modo despertar su curiosidad. Cuando éste descubre que lo que se le oculta nodaña —como se le había dicho con amenazas ideológicas— se desencanta y rechaza la polarización en la que se pretendía recluirlo. Eso es lo que la batalla en torno a los programas oficiales de control de la natalidad está logrando en nuestro continente. Mi impresión es que el clero y la jerarquía católica —pese a sus buenas intenciones—, al tomar partido en esa lucha, se vuelven una fuerza polarizadora que hace brotar lo que buscaba suprimir. Si ayudasen a instruir concientizando para que luego el hombre pudiese tomar sus decisiones, podrían constatar tal vez mejores resultados a su favor y dejarían de jugar el papel que les toca en este momento, es decir, el de agentes publicitarios del producto de sus contrincantes.
+
+Es curioso notar cómo están compuestos los bandos que se enfrentan en esa lucha. De un lado encontramos un grupo de extraños consortes que se unen y juntos apelan al “machismo” popular. Entre ellos se cuentan quienes se oponen a la planificación familiar por suponerla contra la ley natural, y quienes la rechazan por considerarla enemiga de sus intereses políticos. Los que proponen la explosión demográfica como única forma de defenderse contra el “imperialismo yanqui” llegan hasta citar al papa en su favor. La eficiencia de este grupo se resuelve en dar publicidad a los inventos baratos que están al alcance de quienes viven en una choza y no han ido a la escuela.
+
+En el bando ideológico contrario se da cita otra rara combinación de aliados: el doctor, el planificador y la solterona rica. Cada uno tiene sus razones para que se fuerce al pobre a que deje de reproducirse.
+
+A éstos también les sirve la controversia que despiertan las autoridades eclesiásticas, porque aprovechándose de ella dan a conocer sus argumentos.
+
+Durante medio siglo no hubo otro medio de poder discutir la contracepción que el confesionario o la clase de catecismo. Después de las recriminaciones ardientes oídas allí, han sido más las mujeres que han venido a la clínica pidiendo se les informe cómo hacer para cometer lo que el sacerdote les dijo que era pecado.
+
+La prédica y la conversación piadosa sobre las técnicas que no deben usarse en el lecho nupcial se vuelven, irónicamente, una gran contribución para que la gente se decida a usar aquellas que se le antojen. ¿Es eso lo mejor que puede hacer la Iglesia católica para cumplir su misión humanizadora?
+
+Tal vez glosando (o profanando) a Cervantes puede entenderse mejor lo que queremos decir: que no es fácil tener a todo el mundo en poco; ser el espantajo y el coco…; y acreditar nuestra ventura con morir cuerdos y vivir locos.
+
+# La aceleración paralizadora
+
+La llamada crisis de energía no es más que un eufemismo bajo el cual se pretende disimular la sujeción imprescindible de nuestra sociedad al uso de los combustibles fósiles. No es la falta de combustibles utilizables sino la propensión maniática al abuso de energía la verdadera razón de la presente crisis. Si pensamos en el futuro, habría que elegir desde ahora entre una burocracia monopólica de la administración de los combustibles fósiles y atómicos, y la limitación voluntaria del consumo mediante una técnica adecuada a fines sociales realizables. Si en los medios técnicos de producción la concentración de energía en favor del consumidor individual sobrepasa un punto crítico, las fuerzas materiales de producción imponen una estructura explotadora de las relaciones sociales. La lucha de clase no tiene solución que no descanse sobre el reconocimiento de estos umbrales técnicos.
+
+Un ejemplo: se ha calculado que el norteamericano pasa, en promedio, un cuarto de su vida, directa o indirectamente, movilizándose. Anualmente invierte 1 700 horas en ganar el dinero para comprar su coche, mantenerlo, pagar el seguro y las multas por infracciones, y recorrer —con él— la cantidad de 12 000 kilómetros. Si se suma el tiempo que está frente al volante al tiempo que pasa en su trabajo para ganar el dinero que le permita el honor de sentarse en su coche, resulta que una hora de su vida le alcanza para avanzar no mucho más de seis kilómetros. En países no motorizados, los individuos con una hora de vida consagrada al tránsito cubren esta misma distancia, pero en lugar de pasar —en promedio— 25% de su vida trasladándose, los campesinos invierten 3% de su tiempo, y los nómadas menos de 7%. Depender de los motores, fenómeno de exorbitante gravedad para las sociedades industriales, lleva al hecho de que 42% de la energía total de Estados Unidos se usa para construir y mantener coches y carreteras. Sólo por concepto de transporte de personas, 250 millones de norteamericanos usan más energía mecánica que 1 500 millones de asiáticos para todas sus necesidades; a pesar de todo, los yanquis no caminan menos horas, aunque no van a pie directamente a sus destinos: usan sus pies únicamente para llegar hasta sus coches. En países que utilizan menos cantidad de energía per cápita, la parte que se invierte por concepto de transporte es, muchas veces, proporcionalmente más alta que la de los países industrializados. Lo que distingue el transporte de los países “esclavos de la energía” del transporte de los países preindustriales no es una ganancia en la relación de horas de vida por kilómetro recorrido, sino un mayor gasto de tiempo. Eso significa que la mayoría de sus habitantes debe invertir forzosamente más tiempo de vida a causa del consumo de cantidades cada vez más altas de energía que requiere la industria del transporte y que se distribuyen, además, en forma desigual desde el punto de vista social. Elevar la velocidad vehicular de una sociedad más allá de un umbral crítico implica una acumulación material tan intensa que la misma intensidad de energía reduce la movilidad típica de sus miembros.
+
+Sería perfectamente posible una sociedad que limitara la técnica moderna del transporte de personas a una velocidad adecuada a un máximo de movilidad, pero la mayoría de las personas no pueden imaginarlo. Al contrario, por el hecho de haberse acostumbrado a una aceleración progresiva se les ha removido el suelo bajo los pies, del mismo modo que el proceso de industrialización les ha distorsionado la imaginación política.
+
+No quieren ver que si una sociedad se pudiera poner de acuerdo en la velocidad máxima decisiva de sus medios de transporte, el tiempo total que gastaría esa sociedad en el transporte podría reducirse, con generosidad e igualdad de oportunidades, sin necesidad de disminuir el total de las distancias que cubren sus miembros. Este umbral de energía crítica fue haciéndose invisible porque, de un lado, se sitúa en una velocidad demasiado baja para que la “gente transportada” la tome en serio y, del otro lado, es demasiado alta para las cuatro quintas partes de la humanidad que nunca la han experimentado. En dos estados mexicanos típicos, Chiapas y Guerrero, una encuesta dio como resultado que, en 1971, menos de una entre 100 personas había cubierto, en el lapso de ese año, la distancia de 15 kilómetros en una hora, a pesar de que en ambos estados hay varias autopistas.
+
+Hay un umbral crítico de energía que, si se sobrepasa, necesariamente aumentará, en cada sociedad, la dependencia, la impotencia, el despotismo, la explotación y los privilegios. Lo que aquí demuestro para el caso de la aceleración de la movilidad espacial tiene su paralelo en las demás instancias de aplicación de altos niveles de energía. Habría que meter esta verdad de Perogrullo en los ojos de los expertos. Frente a lo modesto de los niveles del umbral, su prestigio queda evidentemente en ridículo.
+
+Naturalmente, los países pueden optar por el “consumo conspicuo” de combustibles. Pero esta decisión impulsa una aceleración que roba el tiempo de las mayorías, fomenta distancias enajenantes y otorga a una pequeña élite el don de la ubicuidad heroica. Los medios de transporte que se exceden críticamente en el uso de la energía imponen, a la estructuración social del espacio y del tiempo, la jerarquización de los privilegios. Sólo si se toma conciencia del peligro que significa sobrepasar el punto crítico del nivel de energía per cápita, la técnica podría mantenerse dentro de límites “humanos” y el progreso —que consecuentemente implica— permanecer bajo el control político. Una sociedad puede perfectamente intoxicarse a causa de la electricidad excesiva que consumen sus máquinas, del mismo modo que el exceso de calorías lleva a la gente a la obesidad; sólo que la parálisis social es mucho más difícil de admitir que el resultado de la arterioesclerosis provocada por una dieta chatarra. Antes de que sea imposible sustentar el costo del aprovisionamiento de energía, y antes aún de que el exceso de energía contamine y destruya las condiciones ambientales, la energía, en grandes cantidades, corromperá la participación democrática que hubiera permitido un uso igualitario. Sobrepasando la frontera, tal vez sea posible una igualdad en la distribución, pero jamás una igualdad en cuanto a decisiones. La alternativa de la participación democrática se lograría solamente en el caso de llevarse a cabo una política restrictiva de la energía utilizada en los productos industriales.
+
+Mientras no elijamos, después de haber discutido públicamente el problema, entre el mayor gasto posible de energía y el gasto mínimo necesario al servicio de una comunidad moderna e igualitaria, seremos impotentes frente a la creciente paralización de nuestra sociedad. En el momento actual, la discusión se ha detenido en una controversia que oscurece estas alternativas fundamentales: los que pretenden controlar las inversiones, supervisar la producción, planificar la distribución y fijar los precios, se oponen a aquellos que dan más importancia a un mercado libre que se sustente sobre la posibilidad de encontrar nuevas fuentes de combustibles fósiles. Ambos partidos tratan de resolver la crisis mediante la inversión de grandes cantidades de energía para el uso de un vasto sector mayoritario, en lugar de salir de ella convenciendo a la opinión pública de las ventajas que se desprenden de un consumo mínimo necesario y de un control más amplio y democrático.
+
+El problema del transporte es sólo un ejemplo con el que puede demostrarse que existen determinadas cantidades de energía que desbaratan las relaciones sociales. El transporte de personas es el resultado de dos procesos diferentes. Uno se basa en el impulso muscular de la fuerza humana, e implica, por lo tanto, un trabajo intensivo; tiene valor de uso pero, en la mayoría de los casos, ningún valor de cambio, y es, por naturaleza, autosuficiente. Con sandalias casi todas las personas tienen a su alrededor un horizonte de movilidad de 15 kilómetros; en bicicleta se triplica el radio, y es 10 veces mayor la superficie de esta nueva circunferencia. El segundo proceso se basa en la propulsión motorizada; requiere un uso intensivo de capital, presupone una industria, tiene carácter de mercancía y, si no se controla, crea necesidades más rápido de lo que puede satisfacerlas.
+
+No tiene mayor importancia si son el dinero, los diplomas y honores personales o el cumplimiento fiel de la ortodoxia política los que aseguren a un norteamericano, a un ruso o a un chino, respectivamente, su butaca en la “maravillosa máquina de reducir el tiempo”. Más allá de una velocidad crítica, nadie puede economizar su tiempo en un vehículo motorizado sin forzar a otras personas a sacrificar el suyo. La persona “altamente acelerada” se roba tiempo de vida de los “menos acelerados”, y lo hace con el pretexto de una productividad mayor. Esta “transferencia de tiempo de vida” causa problemas éticos mucho mayores que aquellos que produce la elección de pacientes para un trasplante de corazón o para el uso de un riñón artificial. Tal vez este robo de tiempo, justamente por ser tan obvio, se agazapa en el punto ciego de las ideologías. Un solo salto hasta Mallorca enceguece al obrero alemán frente al hecho de que el tiempo que invierte para llegar a su trabajo crece mucho más rápidamente de lo que crece su sueldo o de lo que se acortan sus horas de trabajo.
+
+Es una ilusión suponer que pueden ser equivalentes progreso técnico y consumo creciente de energía. Hace exactamente 100 años que se fabricó el primer rodamiento, y con esto el roce disminuyó a una fracción de lo que había sido antes. Sin rodamientos no hay ni coche ni bicicleta, y estos dos vehículos pueden servir como símbolos de dos alternativas de la técnica moderna. El coche, y la ciudad planificada en torno a él, obligan al individuo a ser esclavo de una industria que se desborda de energía. En un espacio creado para la bicicleta, y al mismo tiempo adecuado a su velocidad, los productos industriales se repartirían a todos por igual. Los vehículos rápidos no sólo causan la impotencia y el gasto de la vida, también aumentan, y al mismo tiempo ocultan, la injusta distribución de las ventajas. Las distancias se alargan para todos, pero la solución pertenece a unos pocos. Gran parte del tiempo que se desperdicia en transporte se le quita a aquellos que, día a día, son condenados a viajar lentamente en ciudades cada vez más extensas. Pero 1% de los hombres, que son los que realizan la mitad del total de los viajes a larga distancia, reservan sólo para ellos el uso de la “alfombra mágica”. En consecuencia, la sociedad hace uso de la mayor parte de su tiempo, energía y espacio con el fin arbitrario de empequeñecer las distancias para muy pocos e imponer a la mayoría no solamente un costo cada vez más alto sino además un daño irreparable.
+
+Y sin embargo no es todo, porque el cliente habitual de medios de transporte costea impuestos y pasajes de su propio bolsillo mientras los directores, burócratas, científicos y líderes de partidos utilizan los fondos públicos en viajes gratuitos, generalmente de primera clase. El hombre común y corriente, que necesita trasladarse todos los días, atraviesa suburbios a paso de tortuga, mientras que los “señores del tiempo”, subvencionados con viáticos, llegan rápidamente a su destino, ya sea éste un organismo, algún lugar de veraneo o una simple oficina.
+
+La bicicleta permitió una nueva utilización de la fuerza humana. En terreno plano, un hombre puede movilizarse cuatro veces más rápido, gastando por kilómetro la quinta parte de las calorías, siempre que lo haga en bicicleta en lugar de a pie. El costo y el mantenimiento de este tipo de máquina requiere poca inversión de tiempo, y su volumen y desplazamiento no necesitan de gran espacio. Los chinos pueden comprarse una bicicleta que les dure toda la vida, y sólo con su escueto salario y una pequeña fracción de las horas de trabajo que necesitaría un europeo para adquirir un coche que, por lo común, pasa de moda apenas comprado. Cuarenta mil personas que cruzan un puente en una hora, necesitarán dos vías si utilizan trenes, cuatro pistas si viajan en autobús, 12, si lo hacen en automóvil, y menos de dos si lo hacen en bicicleta.
+
+Adecuados a la estructura y velocidad de una bicicleta, los motores sirven de complemento al poder muscular. Si se limita la energía a un _quantum_ razonable per cápita, el progreso técnico puede expandir los horizontes sin alejar a los vecinos; puede crear un tiempo libre para viajes sin apuro, en lugar de compensar la escasez por medio de viajes demasiado rápidos; puede permitirle a los hombres ganar su autonomía, sin que la sociedad recurra a diferencias de clase estructuradas por la velocidad.
+
+En nuestra sociedad —con velocidades cada vez mayores y, por lo tanto, con un uso creciente de la energía per cápita— el vehículo motorizado ha relegado a segundo plano al vehículo impulsado por la propia energía del ser humano. Sería un error creer que este efecto degradante lo tenga sólo el coche. Cualquier medio de transporte, más allá del umbral típico para él, ejerce el mismo tipo de selección social y de explotación de las mayorías. El resultado de las altas velocidades vehiculares es que la mayoría de las personas han perdido gran parte de la libertad, la igualdad y la eficacia de movimientos, para “ganar”, en cambio, en rigidez de horarios, restricción de tiempo y en menor rendimiento por hora recorrida. Esto quiere decir que a un gran sector mayoritario, y porque el medio ya fue distorsionado en favor de los vehículos veloces, se le roba la posibilidad de trasladarse por sus propios medios. El cada vez más absoluto “monopolio radical” de los procesos industriales no permite ninguna solución que no se ajuste bien a sus modos de producción y comercialización. De esta manera, sin importar si es la Ford o alguna empresa estatal la que suministra los servicios, el ser humano se denigra hasta el punto de no ser otra cosa que un consumidor de transporte. Se engendra, así, un nuevo tipo de individuo: el pasajero que no llega a tiempo por sus propios medios y que, a causa de ello, se va haciendo poco a poco un ausente perpetuo, siempre necesitado de estar en otro lugar. Este robo de poder es, generalmente, independiente del tipo de tecnología, planificación urbana o arquitectura utilizados. Siempre que la velocidad y la distribución sean iguales, el tiempo que invierte el condenado a transportarse es prácticamente el mismo si se usan automóviles o ferrocarriles subterráneos.
+
+Naturalmente, esta aceleración que se vuelve contra sí misma es un ejemplo más que nos demuestra que tanto en el Este como en el Oeste la humanidad ha sido forzada, por la estructura de los medios de producción, al uso enajenante de la energía. Lo que se ha dicho del transporte humano es igualmente válido para el transporte de las mercancías y para la construcción de edificios. Nuestra conclusión es que el uso creciente y destructivo de la energía se transforma cada vez más en otro síntoma del “monopolio radical” de los procesos industriales, que se manifiesta además en la torturante prolongación de la vida por medio de la medicina, y en el soporífico método de la actual pedagogía. Entendiendo las cosas de este modo, la crisis de energía nos permite llegar hasta el descubrimiento de los límites del proceso industrial de producción que, tanto en los países infratecnificados como en los superindustrializados, tienen la misma magnitud.
+
+# La expropiación de la salud
+
+En la última década el _establishment_ médico se ha convertido en la mayor amenaza para la salud. La depresión, infección, incapacidad y el mal funcionamiento que acompañaron su auge causan ahora más sufrimiento que el causado por todos los accidentes de la circulación vehicular y de la industria. Solamente el perjuicio orgánico provocado por la producción industrial de alimentos puede rivalizar con el deterioro de la salud que causan los doctores. Por añadidura, la práctica médica patrocina la enfermedad y fomenta a una sociedad morbosa que no sólo protege sus anormalidades sino que engendra un tipo de cliente ligado al terapeuta de modo cibernético. Finalmente, las llamadas “profesiones para fomentar la salud” tienen un repugnante poder indirecto, una eficacia estructuralmente negativa para la salud. Ellas transforman el dolor, la enfermedad y la muerte, de un desafío personal, en un problema técnico y, de ese modo, enajenan la eficacia de la gente para habérselas con plena autonomía con su condición humana.
+
+## El contragolpe del progreso
+
+Este contragolpe final del progreso higiénico supera toda la iatrogénesis técnica; sobrepasa la suma de los tratamientos erróneos o ilegales protegidos, las negligencias administrativas y la insensibilidad profesional contra las cuales el desagravio judicial llega a ser extremadamente difícil; está arraigado más profundamente que la inadecuada distribución de los recursos para la que todavía se buscan remedios políticos; es más global que todos los daños causados por los experimentos y errores de índole médica. El enajenamiento profesional del cuidado de la salud es el resultado de un esfuerzo desenfrenado de su manejo; de ello resulta que la vida se conserva con altos niveles de insalubridad, insalubridad que se experimenta como una nueva clase de horror que llamo Némesis médica.
+
+Durante los últimos 20 años, el índice de precios en Estados Unidos se ha elevado cerca de 74%, pero el costo de la atención médica ha aumentado hasta 330%. Mientras el _gasto público para el cuidado de la salud_ se ha decuplicado, los pagos con pérdida por servicios de salud se incrementaron al triple y el costo de los seguros privados aumentó 18 veces. El costo de los hospitales públicos desde 1950 ha aumentado 500%. Las cuentas por la atención de pacientes en los hospitales grandes se elevó todavía más, triplicándose en ocho años. Los gastos de administración se multiplicaron por un factor de siete y los costos de laboratorio por un factor de cinco.
+
+Instalar una cama en un hospital cuesta ahora 65 000 dólares, de los que dos terceras partes son para la adquisición de equipos mecánicos cuya depreciación se fija para 10 años o menos. No obstante, durante este mismo periodo de inflación sin precedente de los gastos médicos, la expectativa de vida para el hombre americano adulto _ha declinado_.
+
+El Decreto para la Salud en Inglaterra fija una contribución comparable al costo de la inflación, pero también evita algunas de las sorprendentemente malas asignaciones que dan pábulo a la crítica pública en Estados Unidos. La expectativa de vida todavía no ha declinado en Inglaterra, pero las enfermedades crónicas en los hombres de mediana edad han registrado un incremento, tal y como sucedió en la década anterior en Estados Unidos. En la Unión Soviética, el número de médicos y días-hospital per cápita se ha triplicado en el mismo periodo. En China, después de una breve luna de miel con la moderna desprofesionalización, el _establishment_ médico-tecnológico ha crecido más rapidamente. La proporción en que la gente se vuelve dependiente de los médicos parece no guardar relación con la forma de su gobierno. Estas tendencias no reflejan utilidades marginales decrecientes. Ellas son un ejemplo de la economía política de la dependencia en la que impedimentos marginales acompañan inevitablemente el incremento de la inversión. Pero, por sí misma, la dependencia no es todavía Némesis.
+
+En Estados Unidos, los remedios para el sistema nervioso central forman el sector de más rápido crecimiento en el mercado de los medicamentos, que comprende 31% de las ventas totales. En los últimos 12 años, el aumento en el consumo de licores per cápita fue de 23%, para los derivados ilegales del opio cerca de 50% y para las drogas tranquilizadoras recetadas por médicos, 290%. Algunas personas han tratado de explicar este ejemplo por la manera peculiar en que a los médicos en Estados Unidos se les entrena durante toda su vida en el servicio: en 1970, las compañías farmacéuticas en Estados Unidos gastaron 4 500 dólares en propaganda por cada doctor, entiéndase, por cada uno de los 350 000 médicos que ejercen en ese país. Sorprendentemente, en todo el mundo el uso de tranquilizantes per cápita es correlativo al ingreso personal, aunque en muchos países el costo de la “educación científica” del médico no está incluido en el precio del medicamento. Tan seria como podría ser la creciente dependencia hacia los doctores y los medicamentos, sólo es un síntoma de Némesis.
+
+La medicina no puede hacer mucho por las enfermedades asociadas con la edad avanzada. No puede curar enfermedades cardiovasculares ni la mayoría de los casos de cáncer, artritis, esclerosis múltiple, cirrosis avanzada o el resfriado común. Algo del dolor que los ancianos sufren puede disminuirse algunas veces. La mayoría de los tratamientos aplicados a personas ancianas que demandan la intervención profesional no sólo aviva su dolor —si se tiene éxito—, sino también lo prolonga. Por lo tanto, se sorprende uno al descubrir a qué grado se gastan recursos en el tratamiento de personas de edad avanzada. Mientras que 10% de la población de Estados Unidos tiene una edad superior a los 65 años, 28% del gasto está dedicado al cuidado de la salud de esa minoría. El número de las personas de edad avanzada está aumentando en forma tal que sobrepasa el incremento del resto de la población en proporción de 3%, mientras que el costo per cápita de la atención de estos ancianos está elevándose en una proporción de 6%. La gerontología se posesiona del producto nacional bruto. Esta mala asignación del poder del hombre, de los recursos y del cuidado social, generará un dolor inenarrable conforme las demandas aumenten y los recursos se agoten. No obstante, eso también es sólo un síntoma y Némesis sobrepasa hasta el desperdicio ritual.
+
+Desde que Nixon y Brejnev se pusieron de acuerdo sobre la recíproca colaboración científica en lo tocante a la conquista del espacio, el cáncer y las enfermedades cardiacas, las unidades para el cuidado intensivo de las coronarias se han convertido en símbolos del progreso pacífico y en un argumento para elevar los impuestos. Estas unidades requieren tres veces el equipo y cinco veces el personal que normalmente se necesita para la atención de los enfermos; 12% de las enfermeras graduadas encuentran empleo en tales unidades. Éstas demuestran también el desfalco conducido profesionalmente. Estudios efectuados a gran escala en los que se han comparado los resultados obtenidos en el tratamiento de pacientes en cuidados intensivos con el tratamiento doméstico proporcionado a enfermos con características similares, no han demostrado todavía ninguna ventaja. El valor terapéutico de las instalaciones para el control de padecimientos cardiacos es sin duda de la misma clase que el valor de los vuelos espaciales en la televisión, ambos equivalen a danzas de lluvia para millones que aprenden así a confiar en la ciencia y que dejan de preocuparse por ellos mismos. Me encontraba en Rio de Janeiro y en Lima cuando el doctor Christian Barnard visitaba esos lugares como turista. Tanto en Brasil como en Perú, el doctor sudafricano pudo llenar los mayores estadios de futbol dos veces el mismo día con multitudes que aclamaban histéricamente su macabra habilidad para intercambiar corazones humanos.
+
+Poco tiempo después vi testimonios bien documentados que probaban que la policía brasileña ha sido la primera en utilizar equipos para prolongar la vida en las cámaras de tortura. Inevitablemente, cuando el cuidado o la recuperación de la salud se transfiere a organizaciones o máquinas, la terapéutica se vuelve un ritual en cuyo centro está la muerte: pero Némesis supera hasta el sacrificio humano.
+
+## Remedios para las explosiones prematuras
+
+La prevención de las enfermedades por medio de la intervención de terceras personas profesionales se ha vuelto una manía. La demanda por ella está creciendo. Las mujeres embarazadas, los niños sanos, los trabajadores y las personas ancianas son sometidos a “chequeos” periódicos y a procedimientos para diagnósticos cada vez más complejos. Mientras tanto; los ciudadanos se dejan convencer de que ellos son máquinas cuya duración depende de un proyecto social. Una revisión de dos docenas de estudios muestra que esos procedimientos de diagnóstico no tienen impacto alguno sobre las tasas de enfermedad o de mortalidad. De hecho, transforman a la gente sana en pacientes ansiosos, y los riesgos para la salud asociados con este riesgoso diagnóstico automatizado pesan más que cualquier beneficio teórico. Irónicamente, los serios desórdenes asintomáticos que sólo esta clase de ocultamiento puede descubrir son frecuentemente enfermedades incurables en las que el tratamiento prematuro agrava la condición física del paciente: pero Némesis supera hasta la tortura final.
+
+Hasta cierto punto la medicina moderna estaba interesada en la ingeniería terapéutica —el desarrollo de estrategias para la intervención quirúrgica, química o de modificación del comportamiento en la vida de la gente enferma o propensa a enfermarse—. Como estas intervenciones no resultan más efectivas por el hecho de ser más costosas, un nuevo nivel de ingeniería terapéutica se está impulsando. Los sistemas para la salud ahora se ponen del lado de la medicina curativa y preventiva y se les dará preferencia en el control sanitario del medio ambiente. La obsesión por la inmunidad da lugar a una higiene de pesadilla. Ya que el sistema de salud falla en satisfacer lo que de él se requiere, las condiciones que ahora se clasifican como enfermedad bien podrían pronto clasificarse como desviaciones criminales. Así, la imposición de una intervención médica podría reemplazarse por una reeducación obligatoria o por una autoacusación a la manera soviética. La convergencia de la ingeniería higiénica individual y del control del medio ambiente amenaza ahora a la estirpe humana con una nueva epidemia en la que la explosión prematura de medidas preventivas agudiza la plaga. Esta repugnante sinergia de las funciones técnicas y no técnicas de la medicina es lo que yo llamo la atormentadora Némesis médica o higiénica.
+
+## Némesis industrial
+
+El sufrimiento desmedido siempre ha sido obra del hombre: en la historia está la constancia de la esclavitud y la explotación. En ella se habla también de la guerra y del pillaje, del hambre y de la peste. La guerra entre Estados y clases ha sido hasta ahora el principal agente de la miseria causada por el hombre. Así, el hombre es el único animal cuya evolución ha sido condicionada para su adaptación en dos frentes. Si no sucumbió a los elementos, tuvo que hacer frente al uso y abuso de otros seres de su misma especie: el carácter y la cultura reemplazaron al instinto en esta lucha en dos frentes. Un tercer frente ha sido reconocido desde Homero, pero a los mortales comunes se les consideró inmunes a su amenaza. Némesis, el nombre griego para el pavor que se vislumbra en esta tercera dirección fue el destino de unos cuantos héroes que cayeron devorados por la envidia de los dioses. El hombre común creció y pereció en su lucha contra la naturaleza y sus vecinos. Sólo la élite desafiaría los umbrales establecidos por la naturaleza para el hombre. Prometeo no era todos los hombres, sino uno que se desvió. Conducido por Pleonexia, la codicia radical, traspasó los linderos de la condición humana. Con arrogancia desenfrenada o desmedida presunción (_hybris_) trajo el fuego del cielo, con lo que atrajo a Némesis sobre sí mismo. Fue encadenado en una roca del Cáucaso. Un buitre devoró sus entrañas y dioses curativos sin piedad lo mantuvieron vivo injertando su hígado todas las noches. El encuentro con Némesis hizo del héroe clásico un recordatorio inmortal de ineludible represalia cósmica. Se volvió un tema de la tragedia épica, pero no ciertamente un modelo para el anhelo de todos los días. Ahora Némesis se ha vuelto endémica; es el retroceso del progreso. Paradójicamente se ha extendido tan lejos y con tanta amplitud como las franquicias, la enseñanza, la aceleración mecánica y la atención médica. Cada hombre ha caído devorado por la envidia de los dioses. Si la especie debe sobrevivir sólo podrá lograrlo aprendiendo a superarse en este tercer frente.
+
+La mayor parte de la miseria provocada por el hombre es ahora un subproducto de las instituciones que originalmente se diseñaron para dar protección al hombre común en su lucha contra las inclemencias del medio ambiente y contra la desenfrenada injusticia infligida por la élite. La fuente principal de dolor, incapacidad y muerte es ahora —aunque no intencional — el hostigamiento dirigido. Las dolencias, el desamparo y la injusticia que prevalecen son las consecuencias de las estrategias del progreso. Némesis es ahora tan predominante que muy pronto una parte de la condición humana la confundió. La idea de que la esfera de actividad de la acción humana estaba estrechamente circunscrita era común a toda la antigua ética.
+
+Techné fue un tributo de la medida a la necesidad y no el camino que escogió la humanidad para la acción. La desesperante incapacidad del hombre contemporáneo para percibir una alternativa a la agresión industrial sobre la condición humana, es una parte integral de la maldición por la cual sufre.
+
+El intento para sojuzgar a Némesis por el proceso político o biológico frustra cualquier diagnóstico de la actual crisis institucional. Cualquier estudio sobre la controversia de los llamados “límites al crecimiento” se vuelve fútil si reduce Némesis a una amenaza que puede enfrentarse en los dos frentes tradicionales. Némesis no pierde su pavor específico simplemente porque se le ha industrializado. La crisis contemporánea de la sociedad industrial no puede comprenderse sin distinguir entre la agresión intencionalmente explotadora de una clase contra otra y la inevitable predestinación a la ruina en cualquier intento desproporcionado para transformar la condición humana. Nuestro predicamento no puede comprenderse sin establecer distinciones entre la violencia creada por el hombre y la envidia destructora del cosmos; entre la servidumbre impuesta al hombre por el hombre y el avasallamiento del hombre por sus dioses que, por supuesto, son sus instrumentos. Némesis no puede reducirse a un problema que sea de la competencia de ingenieros o de dirigentes políticos.
+
+La enseñanza, el transporte, el sistema legal, la agricultura moderna y la medicina sirven igualmente bien para ilustrar cómo trabaja la frustración engendrada. Más allá de cierto umbral, la degradación del aprender es el resultado de la enseñanza intencional que inevitablemente engendra una nueva clase de impotencia en la mayoría pobre y un nuevo tipo de estructura de clase que la discrimina. Todas las formas planeadas de enseñanza obligatoria tienen esos efectos secundarios, no importa cuánto dinero se invierta o cuánta buena voluntad se gaste en retórica política, o pedagógica para llevarlas a la práctica; no importa tampoco que el mundo esté abarrotado de aulas o si se transforma en un salón de clases.
+
+Más allá de cierto nivel de energía usada para la aceleración de cualquier persona en la circulación, la industria del transporte inmoviliza y esclaviza a la mayoría de los pasajeros sin nombre, y brinda sólo discutibles ventajas marginales a una élite olímpica. Ningún nuevo combustible, tecnología o control público puede impedir que la creciente movilización social produzca siempre más apresuramiento, programación, parálisis e injusticia.
+
+Más allá de cierto nivel de inversión de capital en la agricultura y en la preparación de alimentos, la desnutrición llegará a ser endémica; la ilusión verde despedaza el hígado de los consumidores más efectivamente que los buitres de Zeus el hígado de Prometeo. Ningún control biológico puede evitar ese resultado.
+
+Más allá de cierto punto crítico, la producción y distribución de la atención médica producen más dolencias de las que pueden curar. El seguro social garantiza una miserable supervivencia más efectiva y democráticamente que los más despiadados dioses.
+
+El progreso ha llegado con una violencia tal que ya no puede llamarse costo. El primer pago se leía en la etiqueta y podía manifestarse en términos medibles. Pero los pagos a plazos aumentaron en forma de sufrimiento que rebasa todo sentido del “precio”. Han transformado sociedades enteras en prisiones de deudores en las que el nivel de tortura para la mayoría abruma y cancela cualquier posibilidad de recompensas que pudieran todavía beneficiar a unos cuantos.
+
+El labriego que deja de tejer su ropa, construir su casa y hacer herramientas y se vuelve comprador de trajes hechos, viguetas de cemento y tractores, ya no podrá estar satisfecho sin contribuir a la Némesis mundial. En tanto su vecino, que sigue tejiendo su ropa, construyendo su casa y atendiendo su milpa, no podrá vivir mucho tiempo en un mundo dominado por la Némesis industrial. Esta situación ambigua es el acontecimiento que yo quiero explorar. La exasperante codicia y el cegador atrevimiento dejaron de ser heroicos; se han vuelto parte de la obligación social de cada uno de los hombres industrializados. Al entrar en el mercado de la economía contemporánea, generalmente tomando el camino que pasa por la enseñanza, el ciudadano se incorpora al coro que convoca a Némesis.
+
+Pero él se incorpora también a una horda de furias desencadenadas sobre aquellos que permanecen fuera del sistema. Los llamados participantes marginales que no entran por completo en el mercado económico se ven privados de los medios tradicionales con los que podrían enfrentarse a la naturaleza y a sus vecinos.
+
+En algún punto de la expansión de nuestras instituciones mayores, sus clientes comienzan a pagar un precio cada vez mayor por un consumo constante, a pesar de la evidencia de que, además de pagar más, inevitablemente sufrirán más. En este punto del desarrollo, el comportamiento predominante de la sociedad corresponde al que define tradicionalmente a los adictos. La dependencia palidece en comparación con el incremento marginal de los impedimentos. El _homo economicus_ se convierte en _homo religiosus_. Los objetos de su anhelo se vuelven sublimes, aun si cada vez son menos útiles. La venganza de los dioses es doble: _1)_ su precio al consumidor es cada vez más alto; _2)_ sus consecuencias (simbólicos y culturales) pesan más que el daño conjunto hecho a la naturaleza y al prójimo. La Némesis clásica fue el castigo por el temerario abuso de un privilegio. La Némesis industrial es la retribución por la concienzuda participación en la sociedad.
+
+La guerra y el hambre, la peste y la muerte repentina, la tortura y la locura han acompañado siempre al hombre, pero ahora están moldeados dentro de una _Gestalt_ nueva bajo la égida de Némesis. Entre más grandioso el progreso económico de una sociedad, tanto mayor la parte que juega la Némesis industrial en el dolor, la discriminación y la muerte sufridas por sus miembros. Por lo tanto, el estudio disciplinado de los matices modernos de Némesis debería ser el tema clave de la investigación sobre el cuidado de la salud, de la curación y del consuelo.
+
+La Némesis industrial es el resultado de la política de desarrollo que produce inevitablemente desgracias contrarias a la intuición que las motivó.
+
+Es el resultado de un estilo de administración que es poco más que un crucigrama para los que lo proyectan. Mientras estas desgracias se describan con el lenguaje de la ciencia y de la economía política, seguirán apareciendo extrañas sorpresas. El lenguaje para el estudio de la Némesis industrial todavía debe fraguarse. Este lenguaje deberá ser capaz de describir las contradicciones inherentes al modo de pensar de una sociedad que privilegia la verificación del funcionamiento por encima de la evidencia intuitiva.
+
+## Tántalo
+
+La Némesis médica es sólo un aspecto de las más generales “desgracias contraintuitivas” características de una sociedad industrial. Es el monstruoso resultado de un muy específico sueño de sensatez especialmente “atormentadora” y de una arrogancia desenfrenada (_hybris_).
+
+Tántalo fue un famoso rey a quien los dioses invitaron al Olimpo para compartir una de sus comidas. Tántalo se robó a Ambrosía, el divino brebaje que daba a los dioses la inmortalidad. Como castigo fue hecho inmortal en los infiernos (Hades) y condenado a sufrir un hambre y una sed sin fin. Cuando Tántalo se inclinaba hacia el río en donde se encontraba de pie, el agua retrocedia, y cuando trataba de alcanzar la fruta que estaba sobre su cabeza, las ramas se movían fuera de su alcance. Los etólogos podrían decir que ahora la Némesis higiénica lo ha programado para tener un comportamiento obligatoriamente contraintuitivo.
+
+El anhelo por Ambrosía se ha extendido ahora al común de los mortales.
+
+El optimismo científico y político ha propagado la adicción. Para sostenerlo, Tántalo se ha organizado en un clero que ofrece una mejoría ilimitada de la salud humana bajo control médico. Los miembros de este gremio se hacen pasar por discípulos del curandero Asklepios, mientras que de hecho pregonan a Ambrosía. La gente exige de ellos que la vida se mejore, se prolongue, se vuelva compatible con las máquinas y capaz de sobrevivir a todos los grados de aceleración, distorsión y esfuerzo. Como resultado, la salud se ha vuelto escasa a tal grado que el hombre común hace que su salud dependa del consumo de Ambrosía.
+
+## Cultura y salud
+
+La humanidad evolucionó solamente porque cada uno de sus individuos vino a existir protegido por varios capullos visibles e invisibles. Cada uno conoció la matriz de donde había venido y él mismo se orientó por medio de las estrellas bajo las cuales fue traído al mundo. Para ser humano y volverse humano, el individuo de nuestra especie tiene que encontrar su destino en su singular lucha con la naturaleza y su prójimo. Tiene que bastarse a sí mismo en la lucha, pero las armas y las reglas y el estilo le son dados por la cultura en que ha crecido. Cada una de las culturas evolucionó de acuerdo con su propia viabilidad, y con la cultura creció la gente, aprendiendo cada uno a conservarse vivo en un capullo común. Cada cultura es la esencia de las reglas mediante las cuales el individuo pudo aceptar el dolor, la enfermedad y la muerte; pudo interpretarlas y practicar la compasión mezclado con otros que tendrían que enfrentarse a las mismas amenazas. Cada cultura puso el mito, los rituales, los tabúes y los estándares éticos necesarios para tratar con la fragilidad de la vida.
+
+La civilización médica cosmopolita niega la necesidad de que el hombre acepte estos males. La civilización médica está planteada para matar el dolor, para eliminar la enfermedad y para luchar contra la muerte. Éstas son nuevas metas que nunca antes fueron la pauta para la vida social y que son antitéticas para cada una de las culturas con las que la civilización médica se enfrenta cuando se lanza de súbito sobre lo que se llama pobre.
+
+El efecto negativo para la salud de la civilización médica es de ese modo igualmente poderoso en los países ricos y pobres, aun cuando estos últimos escapan todavía a algunos de sus lados más siniestros.
+
+## La destrucción del dolor
+
+Para que una experiencia sea dolor en el más completo sentido, debe adaptarse a una cultura. Precisamente porque cada cultura proporciona una manera de sufrir, la cultura es una forma particular de salud. El acto de sufrir está formado por la cultura de tal modo que se vuelve una cuestión que puede expresarse y compartirse.
+
+La civilización médica sustituye la competencia en el sufrimiento determinada culturalmente, por la creciente demanda de cada individuo por una administración institucional de su dolor. Un gran número de diferentes sentimientos, que expresan alguna clase de fortaleza, se homogeneiza y se vuelve centro de la presión política de los consumidores de anestesia. El dolor se convierte en un artículo en la lista de las quejas. Como resultado, un nuevo tipo de horror emerge. Conceptualmente todavía es dolor; pero el impacto en nuestras emociones de esta lastimadura impersonal, opaca y sin valor, es algo bastante nuevo.
+
+De esta manera, para el hombre industrial el dolor ha venido a plantear una pregunta estrictamente técnica: ¿qué necesito hacer para lograr que mi dolor sea administrado o amortiguado? Si el dolor continúa, la culpa no es del universo, de Dios, de mis pecados o del diablo, sino del sistema médico.
+
+El sufrimiento es expresión del reclamo del consumidor para el incremento de la producción médica. Al volverse innecesario, el dolor se ha vuelto intolerable. Con esta actitud, ahora parece racional escapar del dolor y no enfrentarlo, aun a costa de la adicción. También parece razonable eliminar el dolor aun a costa de la salud. Parece culto negar legitimidad a todas las ediciones no técnicas del dolor, aun a costa de desarmar a los pacientes frente al dolor residual. Por un tiempo puede discutirse que el total del dolor anestesiado en una sociedad es más grande que la totalidad del dolor generado. Pero en algún punto, grandes inconvenientes marginales surgen.
+
+El nuevo sufrimiento no sólo es imposible de administrar sino que ha perdido su carácter de referente. Se ha vuelto una tortura que no pregunta y que no tiene significado. Sólo recobrando la voluntad o el deseo y la habilidad para sufrir puede rehacerse la salud en el dolor.
+
+## La eliminación de la enfermedad
+
+Las intervenciones médicas no han afectado la proporción total de la mortalidad: en su mejor momento han transferido la supervivencia de uno a otro segmento de la población. Cambios dramáticos en la naturaleza de las enfermedades que han azotado a las sociedades occidentales durante los últimos 100 años están bien documentados. Primero, la industrialización exacerbó las infecciones, las que a la sazón se han apaciguado. La tuberculosis alcanzó su índice más alto comparándola con un periodo de 50-75 años y declinó antes de que el bacilo de la tuberculosis se hubiese descubierto o los programas antituberculosis hubiesen iniciado. En Gran Bretaña y en Estados Unidos síndromes de extrema desnutrición, raquitismo y pelagra tomaron el lugar de la tuberculosis que también alcanzaron su nivel máximo y después declinaron dando lugar a enfermedades de la primera infancia, las que a su vez dieron paso a las úlceras duodenales en los jóvenes. Cuando esto declinó, las epidemias modernas cobraron su cuota —enfermedades de las coronarias, hipertensión, cáncer, artritis, diabetes y enfermedades mentales—. Por lo menos en Estados Unidos la tasa de mortalidad por enfermedades cardiacas originadas por la hipertensión parece declinar ahora. A pesar de una investigación intensiva ninguno de los cambios en la distribución estadística de las enfermedades citadas puede atribuirse a la práctica profesional de la medicina.
+
+La abrumadora mayoría de los diagnósticos modernos e intervenciones terapéuticas que han demostrado hacer más bien que mal tienen dos características: los recursos materiales para ellas son extremadamente baratos y pueden empacarse y diseñarse para que uno mismo los use o para que los miembros de la familia los apliquen. El precio de la tecnología significativamente curativa que podría fomentar la salud en la medicina canadiense es tan bajo que los recursos que ahora la India dedica a la medicina moderna serían suficientes para poner esa tecnología a disposición de todo el continente. Por otro lado, las habilidades necesarias para la aplicación de los auxilios terapéuticos y de diagnóstico que más se usan son tan sencillas que la cuidadosa observancia de las instrucciones por personas que se preocupen personalmente por ello, garantizaría un uso más efectivo y responsable que el que la práctica médica profesional puede proporcionar.
+
+Ni el descenso en cualquiera de las mayores epidemias de enfermedades mortales ni los notables cambios en la estructura de las edades de la población, ni la disminución o el aumento del ausentismo en los centros de trabajo, influyen significativamente en el cuidado de los enfermos y ni siquiera en la adquisición de inmunidad. Los servicios médicos no merecen crédito por la longevidad ni a ellos debe achacarse la amenazante presión de la sobrepoblación. La longevidad le debe mucho más al ferrocarril y a la síntesis de los fertilizantes e insecticidas que a los nuevos medicamentos y a las jeringas.
+
+La práctica profesional es poco efectiva, pero cada vez más solicitada. Esta inflación no respaldada por resultados técnicos sólo puede explicarse en analogía con un ritual mágico cuyas metas están más allá del alcance técnico y político. Sólo puede combatirse a través de una acción legal, política y decidida a favor de la desprofesionalización del cuidado de la salud.
+
+La desprofesionalización de la medicina no implica ni debería entenderse como la negación de toda atención especializada, de la competencia, del criticismo mutuo o del control público. Implica ante todo una predisposición contra la mistificación, contra el dominio trasnacional de un modo de ver ortodoxo y contra la exclusión del debate de los curanderos escogidos por sus pacientes, pero no certificados por el gremio.
+
+La desprofesionalización de la medicina no significa tampoco el rechazo de fondos públicos para propósitos curativos. Significa una predisposición contra el desembolso de tales fondos bajo el control de los miembros del gremio, más bien que bajo el control del consumidor. Desprofesionalizar la medicina no significa eliminar las terapias modernas ni oponerse a la invención de otras nuevas, ni tampoco volver a programas, prescripciones, rituales y medios antiguos. Significa que ningún profesional debe tener el poder de malgastar en cualquiera de sus pacientes un paquete de recursos curativos más grande que el que cualquier otro podría reclamar. Finalmente, desprofesionalizar la medicina no significa descuidar las necesidades especiales que la gente manifiesta en momentos especiales de su vida, como al nacer, romperse una pierna, casarse y dar a luz, enfermarse o enfrentar la muerte. Sólo significa que la gente tiene derecho a vivir en un medio ambiente hospitalario que tome en cuenta el alto grado a que ha llegado la experiencia.
+
+## La lucha contra la muerte
+
+El efecto fundamental de la Némesis médica es la expropiación de la muerte. En cada sociedad la imagen de la muerte es la anticipación culturalmente condicionada de una fecha insegura. Esta anticipación determina una serie de normas de comportamiento durante la vida y la estructura de ciertas instituciones.
+
+Por dondequiera que la civilización médica moderna ha penetrado una cultura médica tradicional, ha fomentado un nuevo ideal cultural de la muerte. Este nuevo ideal se extiende por medio de la tecnología y del carácter profesional que a ella corresponde.
+
+En las sociedades primitivas, la muerte siempre se imagina como la intervención de un agente: un enemigo, una bruja, un antepasado o un dios.
+
+La Edad Media cristiana y la islámica vieron en cada muerte la mano de Dios. El ideal occidental de la muerte que viene a todos por igual por causas naturales tiene un origen bastante reciente. La muerte en Occidente sólo tuvo rostro hasta por el año 1420. Fue durante el otoño de la Edad Media cuando la muerte apareció como un esqueleto dotado de poder, y a partir del siglo XVI, los pueblos europeos desarrollaron “el arte y la habilidad para conocer tu deseo de morir” (_arte and crafte to knowe ye will to dye_).
+
+Durante los tres siglos siguientes, los labriegos y los nobles, los sacerdotes y las prostitutas se preparaban a lo largo de su vida a presidir su propia muerte. La muerte injusta, la muerte amarga se convirtió en el fin más bien que en la meta de la vida. La idea de que la muerte natural vendría sólo en la vejez hizo su aparición en el siglo XVIII como un fenómeno específico de la clase burguesa. La demanda para que los doctores lucharan contra la muerte y conservaran saludables a personas delicadas y enfermizas (valetudinarios) no tiene nada que ver con su habilidad para prolongar la vida. Philippe Ariès ha demostrado que los primeros costosos intentos de prolongar la vida fueron pagados por banqueros cuyo poder se había incrementado por los años que habían pasado ante un escritorio.
+
+No se puede comprender a fondo la organización social contemporánea si no se ve en ella un exorcismo polifacético de todas las formas de muerte maligna. Nuestras mayores instituciones constituyen un gigantesco programa de defensa de la “humanidad” contra todos aquellos agentes que pueden asociarse con lo que comúnmente se concibe como la injusticia social del trato con la muerte. No sólo las agencias médicas sino también los programas para el bienestar, la ayuda internacional y el desarrollo se han alistado en esta lucha. Las burocracias ideológicas de todos los colores se han unido a la cruzada. Hasta la guerra se usa para justificar la derrota de aquellos a quienes se considera culpables de la tolerancia desenfrenada de la enfermedad y de la muerte. Garantizar la “muerte natural” para todos los hombres está a punto de volverse una justificación fundamental para el control social. Bajo la influencia de rituales médicos, la muerte contemporánea vuelve a ser la justificación razonada de una cacería de brujas.
+
+## Sumario
+
+Un creciente daño irreparable acompaña la presente expansión industrial en todos los sectores. En medicina estos daños aparecen como iatrogénesis. La iatrogénesis puede ser directa, cuando el dolor, la enfermedad y la muerte son el resultado de la atención médica; o también puede ser indirecta, cuando los sistemas de salud refuerzan a una organización industrial dañina para la salud; puede ser estructural cuando el comportamiento promovido médicamente y el _bluff_ profesional mutilan la autonomía vital del pueblo, socavando su autonomía creativa, su autoestima y su arte de envejecer. La iatrogénesis nulifica el reto personal planteado por el dolor, la incapacidad y la angustia.
+
+La mayoría de los remedios propuestos para reducir la iatrogénesis son intervenciones dirigidas. Están terapéuticamente diseñadas para adaptar al individuo al grupo, a la institución o al medio ambiente. Al fomentar un nuevo prejuicio contra la autonomía del ciudadano, estos remedios generan padecimientos iatrogénicos de segundo orden.
+
+Sin embargo, los efectos iatrogénicos de la estructura técnico-médica son el resultado de sus funciones sociales no técnicas. Las repugnantes consecuencias técnicas y no técnicas de la institucionalización de la medicina se unen para generar una nueva clase de sufrimiento: la supervivencia anestesiada y solitaria en una sala de hospital ancha como el mundo.
+
+La Némesis médica no puede verificarse funcionalmente. Mucho menos puede medirse. La intensidad con la que se experimenta depende de la independencia, vitalidad y sociabilidad de cada individuo. En tanto concepto teórico es parte de una amplia teoría de las anomalías que plagan hoy los sistemas para el cuidado de la salud. Es un aspecto peculiar de un fenómeno aún más general que he llamado Némesis industrial: el contragolpe de la arrogancia industrial desenfrenada (_hybris_) e institucionalizada. Esta _hybris_ consiste en el descuido de los linderos dentro de los cuales el fenómeno humano permanece viable. La actual investigación científica está abrumadoramente orientada hacia la apertura de pasos inasequibles. Lo que yo he llamado la investigación para la gente es el análisis disciplinado a niveles en los que tales reverberaciones deben inevitablemente dañar al hombre.
+
+La percepción de una Némesis envolvente nos lleva a una opción social.
+
+O se reconocen los umbrales naturales de la acción humana y se traducen dentro de límites determinados políticamente, o la alternativa a la extinción será la supervivencia obligatoria, un Infierno planeado y dirigido.
+
+En varios países, el público está listo para efectuar una revisión de sus sistemas de salud. Las frustraciones de los usuarios de los sistemas controlados por empresas privadas se asemejan cada vez más a las que provocan los sistemas socializados. Las diferencias entre las quejas de los rusos, franceses, americanos e ingleses se han vuelto insignificantes. Hay, sin embargo, un serio peligro de que las evaluaciones de estos sistemas se efectúen dentro de las coordenadas fijadas por las ilusiones poscartesianas.
+
+Tanto en los países ricos como en los pobres las demandas para reformar los sistemas nacionales de salud están dominadas por las ilusiones de un acceso equitativo a las mercaderías del gremio, por el espejismo de la expansión profesional y de la de los curanderos. Es así como se cree lograr mayor verdad en las proclamas del progreso y el control del acceso al templo de Tántalo. Hasta la fecha la discusión pública de la crisis de la salud se ha usado para canalizar aún más poder, prestigio y dinero hacia los ingenieros y diseñadores biomédicos.
+
+Todavía es tiempo de evitar un debate que reforzaría al frustrante sistema. La discusión debe orientarse haciendo de la Némesis higiénica el acontecimiento central. La explicación de Némesis requiere la elucidación simultánea del lado técnico y del lado no técnico de la medicina; debe enfocarse tanto a la industria como a la religión. La denuncia de la medicina como una forma de _hybris_ institucional pone en tela de juicio esas ilusiones personales que paralizan al crítico dependiente del cuidado de la salud.
+
+La percepción y comprensión de Némesis tiene por lo tanto el poder de orientarnos hacia formas de acción que rompan el círculo vicioso de quejas que refuerzan la dependencia del demandante hacia las agencias de planeación sanitaria. El reconocimiento de Némesis puede ser la purga necesaria para una revolución no violenta de nuestras actitudes hacia lo perverso y el dolor. La alternativa a una cruzada contra estos males es la búsqueda de la paz de los fuertes.
+
+La salud denota un proceso de adaptación. No es fruto del instinto sino una reacción autónoma y viva a una realidad experimentada. Connota la habilidad para adaptarse a cambios del medio ambiente, al crecimiento y al envejecimiento, a sanar cuando se está enfermo, al sufrimiento y a la espera tranquila de la muerte. La salud abarca asimismo el porcentaje y por lo tanto incluye la angustia y la capacidad interior de vivir con ella.
+
+La fragilidad, la soledad y la sociabilidad vividas conscientemente por el hombre hacen de las experiencias del dolor, de la enfermedad y de la muerte una parte integral de su vida. La habilidad autónoma para hacer frente a este trío es fundamental para su salud. En el momento en que llegara a depender de la administración de su intimidad y renunciara a su autonomía, su salud declinaría inmediatamente. El verdadero milagro de la medicina moderna es diabólico. Consiste en hacer no sólo que individuos sino poblaciones enteras sobrevivan en niveles inhumanos de salud personal. Que la salud declina con el aumento en la distribución de los servicios de salud sorprende únicamente al gerente sanitario para el que las estrategias son el resultado de su ceguera que busca la inalienabilidad de la salud.
+
+El nivel de la salud pública corresponde al grado en que los medios y la responsabilidad para hacer frente a la enfermedad se distribuyen entre el total de la población. La habilidad para hacer frente a las enfermedades puede acrecentarse. pero nunca reemplazarse por la intervención médica en la vida de la gente o en las características higiénicas del medio ambiente.
+
+Aquella sociedad que pueda reducir la intervención profesional al mínimo, proveerá las mejores condiciones para la salud. Mientras más grande sea la capacidad autónoma de la adaptación a uno mismo, a otros y al medio ambiente, menos administración para la adaptación se necesitará o tolerará.
+
+Recobrar una sana actitud hacia la enfermedad no es ni luddita ni romántica ni utópica: es un ideal que servirá de guía y que si bien nunca podrá alcanzarse totalmente, sí podrá lograrse de manera parcial valiéndose de modernos inventos como nunca antes ha habido en la historia. El mismo ideal deberá orientar la política hacia la definición de límites que eviten que se inmiscuya Némesis.
+
+# La elocuencia del silencio
+
+La lingüistica nos ha provisto de nuevos horizontes para la comprensión de las comunicaciones humanas. Un estudio objetivo de la manera como se transmiten los significados ha demostrado que es mucho más lo que un hombre retransmite a otro a través del silencio que a través de las palabras.
+
+Las palabras y las cláusulas están compuestas de silencios mucho más significativos que los sonidos de las mismas. Se puede decir que las pausas entre los sonidos y las articulaciones están preñadas y pasan a ser dominios luminosos en medio de un vacío increíble, como los electrones en un átomo o los planetas del sistema solar. El lenguaje es una cuerda de silencio en el que los sonidos son los nudos —de la misma manera que en un _quipu_ peruano los espacios vacíos hablan—. En Confucio podemos ver el lenguaje como si fuera una rueda. Los rayos convergen hacia un centro, pero son los espacios vacíos los que hacen la rueda.
+
+Es así que lo que debemos aprender de otra persona para entenderla no son sus palabras sino sus silencios. No son tanto nuestros sonidos los que proveen el significado, sino que nos hacemos entender mediante las pausas.
+
+El aprendizaje de una lengua radica mucho más en el aprendizaje de sus silencios que de sus sonidos. Solamente el cristiano cree en la Palabra como el Silencio coeterno. Entre los hombres de todas las épocas el ritmo es una ley mediante la cual nuestra conversación se convierte en un _yangyin_ de silencio y sonido. De ahí que aprender una lengua de manera humana y madura consiste en aceptar la responsabilidad de sus silencios y de sus sonidos. El don que una persona nos otorga al enseñarnos su lengua es mucho más la comunicación del don del ritmo, el modo y las sutilezas de su sistema del silencio, que el de sus sonidos. Es un regalo íntimo por el que nos hacemos responsables ante quienes nos han confiado su lenguaje. Un lenguaje del que conozca solamente las palabras, pero no las pausas, es una ofensa permanente; la caricatura de un negativo fotográfico.
+
+Se requiere más esfuerzo, tiempo y delicadeza para aprender el silencio de un pueblo que para aprender sus sonidos. Algunas personas están mejor dotadas que otras para esto. De ahí, quizás, que algunos misioneros, a pesar de sus esfuerzos, nunca llegan a hablar otra lengua con propiedad, esto es, a comunicarse delicadamente mediante silencios. Aunque “hablen con el acento de los nativos” siempre están a miles de kilómetros de los mismos.
+
+El aprendizaje de la gramática del silencio es un arte mucho más difícil que el aprendizaje de la gramática de los sonidos.
+
+Así como las palabras se aprenden al escuchar con atención y al intentar penosamente imitar al nativo, los silencios se adquieren a través de una delicada franqueza hacia ellas. El silencio tiene sus pausas y sus vacilaciones; sus ritmos, expresiones e inflexiones; sus duraciones y sus tonos; sus razones de ser y sus fuera de lugar. Así como con nuestras palabras, hay también una analogía entre nuestro silencio con los hombres y con Dios. Para comprender el significado completo de uno, debemos practicar y profundizar el otro.
+
+Si clasificáramos los silencios, el primer lugar lo ocuparía el silencio del mero oyente, de una pasividad femenina; un silencio mediante el cual el mensaje de los otros se hace “él en nosotros”. El silencio del profundo interés está amenazado por otro silencio, el silencio de la indiferencia, que asume que no hay nada que yo quiera o pueda recibir de la comunicación del otro. Éste es el silencio ominoso de la esposa que, como si fuera una figura de palo, escucha a su marido relatarle fervorosamente una serie de pequeñeces. Es el mismo silencio del cristiano que lee el Evangelio con la actitud de conocerlo de cabo a rabo. Es el silencio de la piedra —que está muerto porque no se relaciona con la vida—. Es el silencio del misionero que nunca comprendió el milagro de un extranjero oyente y que es un mayor testimonio de amor que el del que habla. El hombre que nos muestra que conoce el ritmo de nuestro silencio está mucho más cerca de nosotros que aquel que cree que sabe hablar.
+
+Mientras mayor sea la distancia entre los dos mundos, mayor muestra de amor será este silencio del interés. Es fácil para la mayoría de los norteamericanos escuchar chismes sobre el futbol; pero es un signo de amor el que un hombre del Medio Oeste escuche los datos del jai alai. El silencio del cura urbano que escucha los datos de la enfermedad de un chivo en el autobús es un regalo, el fruto verdadero de una forma misionera de largo entrenamiento y paciencia.
+
+No hay distancia más grande que la que existe entre un hombre que reza y Dios. Sólo cuando esta distancia asoma en la conciencia puede desarrollarse el silencio agradecido de la disposición paciente. Ése debe haber sido el silencio de la Virgen ante el _Ave_, que le permitió convertirse en el modelo eterno de la claridad ante la Palabra. Gracias a ese profundo silencio la Palabra pudo recibir la Carne. Únicamente en la oración de quien escucha silenciosamente puede el cristiano adquirir el hábito de este primer silencio a partir del cual la Palabra nace en una cultura extranjera. Esta Palabra, concebida en el silencio, crece también en el silencio.
+
+El segundo lugar en una gramática del silencio está ocupado por el silencio de la Virgen después que concibió la Palabra —un silencio del que nació no tanto el _Fiat_ como el _Magnificat_—. No tanto un silencio que acerque al hombre a la concepción como un silencio que alimenta a la Palabra concebida. Un silencio que encierra al hombre en sí mismo permitiéndole así preparar la Palabra para los demás. Es el silencio de la sintonía; un silencio en el que aguardamos el instante propicio para que la Palabra nazca en el mundo.
+
+Ese silencio también se halla amenazado, no solamente por la prisa y la profanación de la multiplicidad de la acción, sino también por la costumbre del hábito verbal y de la producción masiva que no tiene tiempo para él.
+
+Está amenazado por un silencio abaratado según el cual una palabra es tan buena como cualquier otra y ninguna necesita crearse.
+
+El misionero, o el extranjero, que usa las palabras tal como figuran en el diccionario, no conoce este silencio. Es el hombre de habla inglesa que, al tratar de decir algo en español, busca dentro de sí mismo la palabra en inglés en lugar de procurar la sintonía o en lugar de encontrar la palabra o el gesto o el silencio que sea entendido aunque carezca de equivalente en su propio lenguaje o en su propia cultura. Es el hombre que no da tiempo a que la semilla del nuevo lenguaje crezca en el surco extranjero de su alma. Éste es el silencio _anterior_ a las palabras o _entre_ ellas; el silencio en el que las palabras viven y mueren. Es el silencio del rezo lento de duda; el de la oración en la que las palabras tienen la valentía de nadar en un mar de silencio. Es diametralmente opuesto a otras formas de silencio anteriores a la palabra —el silencio de la flor artificial que recuerda a las palabras que no crecen, la pausa entre las repeticiones—. Es el silencio del misionero que espera la dispensa de la siguiente perogrullada que tiene que memorizar porque no ha hecho el esfuerzo de penetrar en el lenguaje vivo de los demás. El silencio antes de las palabras se opone también al silencio de la agresión urdida —si es que a eso puede llamársele silencio—, el cual también es un intervalo empleado para preparar las palabras, pero palabras que en lugar de unir dividen. Éste es el silencio que tienta al misionero cuando se aferra a la idea de que en español no hay manera de significar lo que quiere decir. Un silencio en el que una agresión verbal —por más velada que sea— prepara la siguiente.
+
+En esta gramática del silencio el lugar próximo está ocupado por el silencio que está _más allá_ de las palabras. A medida que avanzamos en la clasificación de los silencios crece también la distancia que separa a un buen silencio de un mal silencio. Hemos llegado ahora al tipo de silencio que no anticipa ninguna conversación futura. Es el silencio que lo ha dicho todo porque ya no hay nada más que decir. Éste es el silencio que está más allá de un _sí_ o un _no_ terminantes. Es el silencio del amor más allá de las palabras, así como el silencio del no para siempre; el silencio de un paraíso o del infierno. Es la actitud decisiva de un hombre que se enfrenta a la Palabra que es Silencio, o el silencio de un hombre que se ha obstinado en darle la espalda.
+
+Este silencio es el infierno, un silencio fulminante. En este silencio, la muerte no es la frialdad de la piedra, indiferente a la vida, ni la insensibilidad de una flor seca, rememoración de la vida. Es la muerte después de la vida —el rechazo final de la vida—. Este silencio puede estar lleno de ruidos y de agitaciones y de palabras, pero tiene un solo significado que es común a todos los ruidos y a todos los lapsos que los separan: _No_.
+
+Hay una manera en la que este silencio infernal amenaza la existencia del misionero. De hecho, las posibilidades inusitadas de testimoniar a través del silencio abren al hombre cargado con la Palabra, en un mundo que no es el suyo, la habilidad inusitada de destruir con el silencio. El silencio misionero arriesga mucho más: convertirse en el infierno en la propia tierra.
+
+En definitiva, el silencio misionero es un don, un don de oración — aprendido en la oración por alguien infinitamente distante y extranjero, experimentado en el amor a los hombres, siempre mucho más distante y extranjero que un hombre en su propia casa—. Puede que el misionero olvide que su silencio es un don, en el más profundo sentido de lo otorgado gratuitamente, un don que nos transmiten concretamente quienes desean enseñarnos su lenguaje. Si el misionero olvida esto y trata de conquistar a través de su propio poder aquello que sólo los otros pueden ofrendar, entonces su existencia comienza a estar amenazada. El hombre que intenta comprar el lenguaje como si se tratara de una camisa, el hombre que trata de conquistar el lenguaje a través de la gramática para poder hablar “mejor que los nativos de por aquí”, el hombre que olvida la analogía entre el silencio de Dios y el silencio de los otros y no trata de hacerla crecer a través de la oración, es un hombre que básicamente trata de violar la cultura a la que ha sido enviado, y debe por lo tanto esperar las reacciones correspondientes. Si tiene una pizca de humano se dará cuenta de que está en una prisión espiritual, pero no admitirá que él mismo la ha creado; acusará a los otros de ser sus carceleros. La muralla que lo separa de aquellos a los que ha sido enviado se hará cada vez más impenetrable.
+
+Mientras se vea a sí mismo como “misionero” sabrá que está frustrado, que fue enviado pero no llegó a ninguna parte, que salió de su hogar pero nunca llegó a ninguna tierra firme, que dejó su casa y nunca entró en otra.
+
+Mientras continúa predicando aumenta en él la conciencia de que no lo entienden, porque dice lo que cree y habla su propio lenguaje en una farsa extranjera. Continúa “haciendo cosas para los demás” y los considera desagradecidos porque entienden que todo lo que hace tiene por objeto defender su ego. Sus palabras se convierten en una burla del lenguaje, en una expresión de un silencio de muerte.
+
+A esta altura se necesita una gran valentía para regresar al paciente silencio del interés o a la delicadeza del silencio en el que germinan las palabras. La sordera ha dado lugar al mutismo. A menudo, el miedo a enfrentar la dificultad de aprender un lenguaje nuevo, avanzada ya la vida, conduce a un estado de desesperación. Una versión típicamente misionera del silencio infernal nació en su corazón.
+
+En el polo opuesto de la desesperación está el silencio del amor, las manos entrelazadas de los amantes. La oración en la que la vaguedad anterior a las palabras cedió al vacío absoluto que las sigue. La forma de comunicación que abre la sencilla profundidad del alma. Viene por momentos y se puede convertir en una vida entera —tanto en la oración como entre las personas—. Quizás ése sea el único aspecto universal del lenguaje, el único medio de comunicación que no alcanzó la maldición de Babel. Quizá sea la única manera de estar con los otros y con la Palabra sin tener un acento extranjero.
+
+Hay todavía otro silencio que está más allá de las palabras: el de la Pietà. No es un silencio de muerte sino el silencio del misterio de la muerte.
+
+No es el silencio de la aceptación activa de la voluntad de Dios, que da lugar al nacimiento del _Fiat_; ni tampoco el silencio de la aceptación viril del Getsemaní en el que está enraizada la obediencia. El silencio que ustedes como misioneros buscan adquirir a través de este curso de español es el silencio que está más allá del azoro y de las preguntas; un silencio que está más allá de la posibilidad de una respuesta o siquiera de una referencia a la palabra precedente. Es el silencio misterioso a través del cual el Señor pudo descender al silencio del infierno, la aceptación sin frustraciones de una vida, inútil y desperdiciada en Judas, un silencio de impotencia deseada libremente a través de la cual se salvó el mundo. Nacido para redimir el mundo, el Hijo de María murió a manos de Su pueblo, abandonado por Sus amigos y traicionado por Judas, a quien amó pero no pudo salvar — contemplación silenciosa de la paradoja culminante de la Encarnación que no sirvió siquiera para redimir a un amigo personal—. La apertura del alma a este silencio fundamental de la Pietà es la culminación de la lenta maduración de las tres formas previas del silencio misionero.
diff --git a/contents/book/awareness/index b/contents/book/awareness/index
index e96a41c..cfaef41 100644
--- a/contents/book/awareness/index
+++ b/contents/book/awareness/index
@@ -3,5 +3,3 @@
 * **#@LANG_publicationdate@#:** 1969
 * **#@LANG_comments@#:**
 * **#@LANG_langorig@#:** #@LANG_lang_en@#
-
-{{tag>available compilation}}
diff --git a/contents/book/awareness/notes.bib b/contents/book/awareness/notes.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be706e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/awareness/notes.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-awareness-notes,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {},
+  year = {1969},
+  date = {1969},
+  origdate = {1969},
+  language = {notes},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/notes/book/awareness:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-08}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/awareness/tags b/contents/book/awareness/tags
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0f07e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/awareness/tags
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+compilation
diff --git a/contents/book/church/en.bib b/contents/book/church/en.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78489cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/church/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-church-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {The Church, Change and Development},
+  year = {1970},
+  date = {1970},
+  origdate = {1970},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/church:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/church/en.md b/contents/book/church/en.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc3eef2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/church/en.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+  title: "The Church, Change and Development"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1970"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
diff --git a/contents/book/church/es.md b/contents/book/church/es.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c862820
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/church/es.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+  title: ""
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1970"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
diff --git a/contents/book/church/index b/contents/book/church/index
index 06c337b..88ba5c8 100644
--- a/contents/book/church/index
+++ b/contents/book/church/index
@@ -3,5 +3,3 @@
 * **#@LANG_publicationdate@#:** 1970
 * **#@LANG_comments@#:** ...
 * **#@LANG_langorig@#:** #@LANG_lang_en@#
-
-{{tag>pending compilation}}
diff --git a/contents/book/church/notes.bib b/contents/book/church/notes.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..721187b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/church/notes.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-church-notes,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {},
+  year = {1970},
+  date = {1970},
+  origdate = {1970},
+  language = {notes},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/notes/book/church:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-08}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/church/tags b/contents/book/church/tags
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0f07e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/church/tags
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+compilation
diff --git a/contents/book/church/text.bib b/contents/book/church/text.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d35e8e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/church/text.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-church-text,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {},
+  year = {1970},
+  date = {1970},
+  origdate = {1970},
+  language = {text},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/text/book/church:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-08}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/compile.sh b/contents/book/compile.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index 8b82c86..0000000
--- a/contents/book/compile.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Book compilers
-
-echo "#### STARTING TO COMPILE BOOKS. Press a key to proceed..."
-read
-
-for i in `ls -d */`; do
-  echo "*** $i"
-
-  cd $i
-  for j in `ls *.txt`; do
-    LANG=`echo $j | cut -d '.' -f1`
-    echo "**** $LANG"
-
-    # Creates the article directory
-    if [[ ! -d ../../../data/pages/$LANG/book/$i ]]
-    then
-        echo "Create the book directory for $i in $LANG"
-        mkdir ../../../data/pages/$LANG/book/$i
-    fi
-
-    # Creates the index file
-    echo "Regenerate the index file for $i in $LANG"
-    INDEX="../../../data/pages/$LANG/book/$i/index.txt"
-    head -n1 $LANG.txt > $INDEX
-    echo "" >> $INDEX
-    cat index >> $INDEX
-    cat $LANG.notes | sed s/\*/\ \ \*/ >> $LANG.notes.tmp
-    line=`grep -n -m 1 LANG_comments $INDEX |sed  's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/'`
-    sed -i "${line}r $LANG.notes.tmp" $INDEX
-    rm $LANG.notes.tmp
-    echo "" >> $INDEX
-    echo "~~NOTOC~~" >> $INDEX
-
-    # Creates the link to the text in the specific language
-    cd ../../../data/pages/$LANG/book/$i
-    if [[ ! -f text.txt ]]
-    then
-      ln -s ../../../../../contents/books/$i$LANG.txt text.txt
-    fi
-    echo ""
-    cd -
-  done
-
-
-
-
-  cd ..
-  echo ""
-done
diff --git a/contents/book/conviviality/en.bib b/contents/book/conviviality/en.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cedc1a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/conviviality/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-conviviality-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Tools for Conviviality},
+  year = {1973},
+  date = {1973},
+  origdate = {1973},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/conviviality:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/conviviality/en.md b/contents/book/conviviality/en.md
index f6e59bc..75c8657 100644
--- a/contents/book/conviviality/en.md
+++ b/contents/book/conviviality/en.md
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 ---
-title: "Tools for Conviviality"
-author: "Ivan Illich"
-date: "1973"
-lang: "en"
-documentclass: book
-classoption:
-- oneside
-geometry: margin=1.75in
-fontsize: 12pt
-fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
-newtxmathoptions:
-- cmintegrals
-- cmbraces
-toc: true
-colorlinks: true
-linkcolor: RoyalBlue
-urlcolor: RoyalBlue
-titlepage: true
+  title: "Tools for Conviviality"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1973"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
 ---
 
 # Acknowledgments
diff --git a/contents/book/conviviality/es.bib b/contents/book/conviviality/es.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..642358f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/conviviality/es.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-conviviality-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {La convivencialidad},
+  year = {1973},
+  date = {1973},
+  origdate = {1973},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/conviviality:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/conviviality/es.md b/contents/book/conviviality/es.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a143f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/conviviality/es.md
@@ -0,0 +1,770 @@
+---
+  title: "La convivencialidad"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1973"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
+
+> Esta versión traducida de la obra esta basada en las siguientes ediciones pre-existentes: Barral Editores, España (1974); Editorial Posada, México (1978); Joaquín Mortiz / Planeta, México (1985). Se incorporan cambios y correcciones tomando como referencia el texto original.
+
+
+
+# Prefacio
+
+En enero de 1972 un grupo de latinoamericanos, principalmente chilenos, peruanos y mexicanos, se encontraron en el Centro Intercultural de Documentación (CIDOC), en Cuernavaca, para discutir la hipótesis siguiente: existen características técnicas en los medios de producción que hacen imposible su control en un proceso político. Sólo una sociedad que acepte la necesidad de escoger un techo común a ciertas dimensiones técnicas en sus medios de producción tiene alternativas políticas. La tesis discutida había sido formulada en un documento elaborado en 1971 con Valentina Borremans, cofundadora y directora del CIDOC.
+
+Formulé las líneas fundamentales de este ensayo sucesivamente en español, inglés y francés; sometí mis ideas a grupos de médicos, arquitectos, educadores y otros ideólogos; las publiqué en revistas serias y en hojitas atrevidas. Agradezco profundamente a quienes quisieron criticarme y así me ayudaron a precisar mis conceptos. Sobre todo doy las gracias a los participantes en mi seminario en CIDOC en los años 1971-1973, quienes reconocerán en estas páginas no solamente sus ideas sino, con mucha frecuencia, sus palabras.
+
+Este libro tomó su forma definitiva a raíz de una presentación que hice para un grupo de magistrados y legisladores canadienses. Ahí utilicé por primera vez el paradigma del derecho común anglosajón, que desde entonces quedó incorporado en la estructura del ensayo. Me hubiese gustado poder ilustrar los mismos puntos refiriéndome a los fueros de España, pero mi tardío descubrimiento posterga intentarlo.
+
+Ivan Illich, Ocotepec, Morelos, enero de 1978.
+
+# Introducción
+
+Durante estos próximos años intento trabajar en un epílogo a la era industrial. Quiero delinear el contorno de las mutaciones que afectan al lenguaje, al derecho, a los mitos y a los ritos, en esta época en que se condicionan los hombres y los productos. Quiero trazar un cuadro del ocaso del modo de producción industrial y de la metamorfosis de las profesiones que él engendra y alimenta.
+
+Sobre todo quiero mostrar lo siguiente: las dos terceras partes de la humanidad pueden aún evitar el atravesar por la era industrial si eligen, desde ahora, un modo de producción basado en un equilibrio posindustrial, ese mismo contra el cual las naciones superindustrializadas se verán acorraladas por la amenaza del caos. Con miras a ese trabajo y en preparación al mismo presento este manifiesto a la atención y la crítica del público.
+
+En este sentido hace ya varios años que sigo una investigación crítica sobre el monopolio del modo industrial de producción y sobre la posibilidad de definir conceptualmente otros modos de producción posindustrial. Al principio centré mi análisis en la instrumentación educativa; en los resultados publicados en _La sociedad desescolarizada_ (Illich, 1971), quedaron establecidos los puntos siguientes:
+
+_1._ La educación universal por medio de la escuela obligatoria es imposible.
+
+_2._ Condicionar a las masas por medio de la educación permanente en nada soluciona los problemas técnicos, pero esto resulta moralmente menos tolerable que la escuela antigua. Nuevos sistemas educativos están en vías de suplantar los sistemas escolares tradicionales tanto en los países ricos como en los pobres. Estos sistemas son instrumentos de condicionamiento, poderosos y eficaces, que producirán en serie una mano de obra especializada consumidores dóciles, usuarios resignados. Tales sistemas hacen rentable y generalizan los procesos de educación a escala de toda una sociedad. Tienen aspectos seductores, pero su seducción oculta la destrucción. Tienen también aspectos que destruyen, de manera sutil e implacable, los valores fundamentales.
+
+_3._ Una sociedad que aspire a repartir equitativamente el acceso al saber entre sus miembros y a ofrecerles la posibilidad de encontrarse realmente, debería reconocer límites a la manipulación pedagógica y terapéutica que puede exigirse por el crecimiento industrial y que nos obliga a mantener este crecimiento más acá de ciertos umbrales críticos.
+
+El sistema escolar me ha parecido el ejemplo-tipo de un escenario que se repite en otros campos del complejo industrial: se trata de producir un servicio, llamado de utilidad pública, para satisfacer una necesidad llamada elemental. Luego, nuestra atención se trasladó al sistema de la asistencia médica obligatoria y al sistema de los transportes que, al rebasar cierto umbral de velocidad, también se convierten, a su manera, en obligatorios. La superproducción industrial de un servicio tiene efectos secundarios tan catastróficos y destructores como la superproducción de un bien. Así pues, nos encontramos enfrentando un abanico de límites al crecimiento de los servicios de una sociedad; como en el caso de los bienes, estos límites son inherentes al proceso del crecimiento y, por lo tanto, inexorables.
+
+De manera que podemos concluir que los _límites_ asignables al crecimiento deben concernir a _los bienes y los servicios_ producidos industrialmente. Son estos límites lo que debemos descubrir y poner de manifiesto.
+
+Anticipo aquí el concepto de _equilibrio multidimensional_ de la vida humana. Dentro del espacio que traza este concepto, podremos analizar la relación del hombre con su herramienta. Aplicando _'el análisis dimensional'_ esta relación adquirirá una significación absoluta _'natural'_. En cada una de sus dimensiones, este equilibrio de la vida humana corresponde a una escala natural determinada. Cuando una labor con herramientas sobrepasa un umbral definido por la escala _ad hoc_, se vuelve contra su fin, amenazando luego destruir el cuerpo social en su totalidad. Es menester determinar con precisión estas escalas y los umbrales que permitan circunscribir el campo de la supervivencia humana.
+
+En la etapa avanzada de la producción en masa, una sociedad produce su propia destrucción. Se desnaturaliza la naturaleza: el hombre, desarraigado, castrado en su creatividad, queda encarcelado en su cápsula individual. La colectividad pasa a regirse por el juego combinado de una exacerbada polarización y de una extrema especialización. La continua preocupación por renovar modelos y mercancías produce una aceleración del cambio que destruye el recurso al _precedente_ como guía de la acción. El monopolio del modo de producción industrial convierte a los hombres en materia prima elaboradora de la herramienta. Y esto ya es insoportable. Poco importa que se trate de un monopolio privado o público, la degradación de la naturaleza, la destrucción de los lazos sociales y la desintegración del hombre nunca podrán servir al pueblo.
+
+Las ideologías imperantes sacan a la luz las contradicciones de la sociedad capitalista. No presentan un cuadro que permita analizar la crisis del modo de producción industrial. Yo espero que algún día, con suficiente vigor y rigor, se formule una teoría general de la industrialización, para que enfrente el asalto de la crítica.
+
+Para que funcionara adecuadamente, esta teoría tendría que plasmar sus conceptos en un lenguaje común a todas las partes interesadas. Los criterios, conceptualmente definidos, serían otras tantas herramientas a escala humana: instrumentos de medición, medios de control, guías para la acción. Se evaluarían las técnicas disponibles y las diferentes programaciones sociales que implican. Se determinarían umbrales de nocividad de las herramientas, según se volvieran contra su fin o amenazaran al hombre; se limitaría el poder de la herramienta. Se inventarían formas y ritmos de un modo de producción posindustrial y de un nuevo mundo social.
+
+No es fácil imaginar una sociedad donde la organización industrial esté equilibrada y compensada con modos distintos de producción complementarios y de alto rendimiento. Estamos en tal grado deformados por los hábitos industriales, que ya no osamos considerar el campo de las posibilidades; para nosotros, renunciar a la producción en masa significa retornar a las cadenas del pasado, o adoptar la utopía del buen salvaje. Pero si hemos de ensanchar nuestro ángulo de visión hacia las dimensiones de la realidad, habremos de reconocer que no existe una única forma de utilizar los descubrimientos científicos, sino por lo menos dos, antinómicas entre sí. Una consiste en la aplicación del descubrimiento que conduce a la especialización de las labores, a la institucionalización de los valores, a la centralización del poder. En ella el hombre se convierte en accesorio de la megamáquina, en engranaje de la burocracia. Pero existe una segunda forma de hacer fructificar la invención, que aumenta el poder y el saber de cada uno, permitiéndole ejercitar su creatividad, con la sola condición de no coartar esa misma posibilidad a los demás.
+
+Si queremos, pues, hablar sobre el mundo futuro, diseñar los contornos teóricos de una sociedad por venir que no sea hiperindustrial, debemos reconocer la existencia de escalas y de límites _naturales_. El equilibrio de la vida se expande en varias dimensiones, y, frágil y complejo, no transgrede ciertos cercos. Hay umbrales que no deben rebasarse. Debemos reconocer que la esclavitud humana no fue abolida por la máquina, sino que solamente obtuvo un rostro nuevo, pues al trasponer un umbral, la herramienta se convierte de servidor en déspota. Pasado un umbral la sociedad se convierte en una escuela, un hospital o una prisión. Es entonces cuando comienza el gran encierro. Importa ubicar precisamente en dónde se encuentra este umbral crítico para cada componente del equilibrio global. Entonces será posible articular de forma nueva la milenaria tríada del hombre, de la herramienta y de la sociedad. Llamo sociedad convivencial a aquella en que la herramienta moderna está al servicio de la persona integrada a la colectividad y no al servicio de un cuerpo de especialistas. Convivencial es la sociedad en la que el hombre controla la herramienta.
+
+Me doy cuenta de que introduzco una palabra nueva en el uso habitual del lenguaje. Me fundo para ello en el recurso al precedente. El padre de este vocablo es Brillat Savarin en su _Physiologie du gout: Med tat ons sur la gastronomie trascendentale_. Debo precisar, sin embargo, que en la aceptación un poco novedosa que confiero al calificativo, convivencial es la herramienta, no el hombre.
+
+Al hombre que encuentra su alegría y su equilibrio en el empleo de la herramienta convivencial, le llamo austero. Conoce lo que en castellano podría llamarse _la convivencialidad_; vive dentro de lo que el idioma alemán describe como _Mitmenschlichkeit_. Porque la austeridad no tiene virtud de aislamiento o de reclusión en sí misma. Para Aristóteles como para Tomás de Aquino la austeridad es lo que funda la amistad. Al tratar del juego ordenado y creador, Tomás definió la austeridad[^n01] como una virtud que no excluye todos los placeres, sino únicamente aquellos que degradan la relación personal. La austeridad forma parte de una virtud que es más frágil, que la supera y que la engloba: _la alegría, la eutrapelia, la amistad_.
+
+# Dos umbrales de mutación
+
+El año 1913 marca un giro en la historia de la medicina moderna, ya que traspone un umbral. A partir aproximadamente de esta fecha, el paciente tiene más de cincuenta por ciento de probabilidades de que un médico diplomado le proporcione tratamiento eficaz, a condición, por supuesto, de que su mal se encuentre en el repertorio de la ciencia médica de la época. Familiarizados con el ambiente natural, los chamanes y los curanderos no habían esperado hasta esa fecha para atribuirse resultados similares, en un mundo que vivía en un estado de salud concebido en forma diferente.
+
+A partir de entonces, la medicina ha refinado la definición de los males y la eficacia de los tratamientos. En Occidente, la población ha aprendido a sentirse enferma y a ser atendida de acuerdo con las categorías de moda en los círculos médicos. La obsesión de la cuantificación ha llegado a dominar la clínica, lo cual ha permitido a los médicos medir la magnitud de su éxito por criterios que ellos mismos han establecido. Es así como la salud se ha vuelto una mercancía dentro de una economía en desarrollo. Esta transformación de la salud en producto de consumo social se refleja en la importancia que se da a las estadísticas médicas.
+
+Sin embargo, los resultados estadísticos sobre los que se basa cada vez más el prestigio de la profesión médica no son, en lo esencial, fruto de sus actividades. La reducción, muchas veces espectacular, de la morbilidad y de la mortalidad se debe sobre todo a las transformaciones del hábitat y del régimen alimenticio y a la adopción de ciertas reglas de higiene muy simples.
+
+Los alcantarillados, la clorización del agua, el matamoscas, la asepsia y los certificados de no contaminación que requieren los viajeros o las prostitutas, han tenido una influencia benéfica mucho más fuerte que el conjunto de los 'métodos' de tratamientos especializados muy complejos. El avance de la medicina se ha traducido más en controlar las tasas de incidencia que en aumentar la vitalidad de los individuos.
+
+En cierto sentido, la industrialización, más que el hombre, es la que se ha beneficiado con los progresos de la medicina; la gente se capacitó mejor para trabajar con mayor regularidad bajo condiciones más deshumanizantes. Para ocultar el carácter profundamente destructor de la nueva instrumentación, del trabajo en cadena y del imperio del automóvil, se dio amplia publicidad a los tratamientos espectaculares aplicados a las victimas de la agresión industrial en todas sus formas: velocidad, tensión nerviosa, envenenamiento del ambiente. Y el médico se transformó en un mago; sólo él dispone del poder de hacer milagros que exorcicen el temor; un temor que es engendrado, precisamente, por la necesidad de sobrevivir en un mundo amenazador.
+
+Al mismo tiempo, si los medios para diagnosticar la necesidad de ciertos tratamientos y el instrumento terapéutico correspondiente se simplificaban, cada uno podría haber determinado mejor por sí mismo los casos de gravidez o septicemia, como podría haber practicado un aborto o tratado un buen número de infecciones. La paradoja está en que mientras más sencilla se vuelve la herramienta, más insiste la profesión médica en conservar el monopolio. Mientras más se prolonga la duración para la iniciación del terapeuta, más depende de él la población en la aplicación de los cuidados más elementales. La higiene, una virtud desde la antigüedad, se convierte en el ritual que un cuerpo de especialistas celebra ante el altar de la ciencia.
+
+Recién terminada la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se puso de manifiesto que la medicina moderna tenía peligrosos efectos secundarios. Pero habría de transcurrir cierto tiempo antes de que los médicos identificaran la nueva amenaza que representaban los microbios que se habían hecho resistentes a la quimioterapia, y reconocieran un nuevo género de epidemias dentro de los desórdenes genéticos debidos al empleo de rayos X y otros tratamientos durante la gravidez. Treinta años antes, Bernard Shaw se lamentaba ya: los médicos dejan de curar, decía, para tomar a su cargo la vida de sus pacientes. Ha sido necesario esperar hasta los años cincuenta para que esta observación se convirtiera en evidencia: al producir nuevos tipos de enfermedades, la medicina franqueaba un segundo umbral de mutación.
+
+En el primer plano de los desórdenes que induce la profesión, es necesario colocar su pretensión de fabricar una salud 'mejor'. Las primeras víctimas de este mal iatrogenético (es decir, engendrado por la medicina) fueron los planificadores y los médicos. Pronto la aberración se extendió por todo el cuerpo social. En el transcurso de los quince años siguientes, la medicina especializada se convirtió en una verdadera amenaza para la salud. Se emplearon sumas colosales para borrar los estragos inconmensurables producidos por los tratamientos médicos. No es tan cara la curación como lo es la prolongación de la enfermedad. Los moribundos pueden vegetar por mucho tiempo, aprisionados en un pulmón de acero, dependientes de un tubo de perfusión, o sometidos al funcionamiento de un riñón artificial. Sobrevivir en ciudades insalubres, y a pesar de las condiciones de trabajo extenuantes, cuesta cada vez más caro. Mientras tanto, el monopolio médico extiende su acción a un número cada vez mayor de situaciones de la vida cotidiana. No sólo el tratamiento médico, sino también la investigación biológica, han contribuido a esta proliferación de las enfermedades. La invención de cada nueva modalidad de vida y de muerte ha llevado consigo la definición paralela de una nueva norma y, en cada caso, la definición correspondiente de una nueva desviación, de una nueva malignidad.
+
+Finalmente, se ha hecho imposible para la abuela, para la tía o para la vecina, hacerse cargo de una mujer encinta, de un herido, de un enfermo, de un lisiado o de un moribundo, con lo cual se ha creado una demanda imposible de satisfacer. A medida que sube el precio del servicio, la asistencia personal se hace más difícil, y frecuentemente imposible. Al mismo tiempo, cada vez se hace más justificable el tratamiento para situaciones comunes, a partir de la multiplicación de las especializaciones y para profesiones cuyo único fin es mantener la instrumentación terapéutica bajo el control de la corporación.
+
+Al llegar al segundo umbral, es la _vida_ misma la que parece enferma dentro de un ambiente deletéreo. La protección de una población sumisa y dependiente se convierte en la preocupación principal, y en el gran negocio, de la profesión médica. Se vuelve un privilegio la costosa asistencia de prevención o de cura, al cual tienen derecho únicamente los consumidores importantes de servicios médicos. Las personas que pueden recurrir a un especialista, ser admitidas en un gran hospital o beneficiarse de la instrumentación para el tratamiento de la vida, son los enfermos cuyo caso se presenta interesante o los habitantes de las grandes ciudades, en donde el costo para la prevención médica, la purificación del agua y el control de la contaminación es excepcionalmente elevado. Paradójicamente, la asistencia por habitante resulta tanto más cara cuanto más elevado el costo de la prevención. Y se necesita haber consumido prevención y tratamiento para tener derecho a cuidados excepcionales. Tanto el hospital como la escuela descansan en el principio de que sólo hay que dar a los que tienen. Es así cómo para la educación, los consumidores importantes de la enseñanza tendrán becas de investigación, en tanto que los desplazados tendrán como único derecho el de aprender su fracaso. En relación a la medicina, mayor asistencia conducirá a mayores dolencias: el rico se hará atender cada vez más los males engendrados por la medicina, mientras que el pobre se conformará con sufrirlos.
+
+Pasado el segundo umbral, los subproductos de la industria médica afectan a poblaciones enteras. La población envejece en los países ricos. Desde que se entra en el mercado del trabajo, se comienza a ahorrar para contratar seguros que garantizarán, por un periodo cada vez más largo, los medios de consumir los servicios de una geriatría costosa. En Estados Unidos el 27% de los gastos médicos van a los ancianos, que representan el nueve por ciento de la población. Es significativo el hecho de que el primer campo de colaboración científica elegido por Nixon y Brejnev concierna a las investigaciones sobre las enfermedades de los ricos que van envejeciendo. De todo el mundo, los capitalistas acuden a los hospitales de Boston, de Houston o de Denver para recibir los cuidados más costosos y singulares, en tanto que en los mismos Estados Unidos, entre las clases pobres, la mortalidad infantil se mantiene comparable a la existente en ciertos países tropicales de África o de Asia. En Norteamérica es preciso ser muy rico para pagarse el lujo que a todo el mundo se le ofrece en los países pobres: ser asistido a la hora de la muerte (estar acompañado por familiares o amigos). En dos días de hospital un norteamericano gasta lo que el Banco Mundial de Desarrollo calcula que es el ingreso medio anual de la población mundial. La medicina moderna hace que más niños alcancen la adolescencia y que más mujeres sobrevivan a sus numerosos embarazos. Entretanto, la población aumenta, sobrepasa la capacidad de acogerse al medio natural, y rompe los diques y las estructuras de la cultura tradicional. Los médicos occidentales hacen ingerir medicamentos a la gente que, en su vida pasada, había aprendido a vivir con sus enfermedades. El mal que se produce es mucho peor que el mal que se cura, pues se engendran nuevas especies de enfermedad que ni la técnica moderna, ni la inmunidad natural, ni la cultura tradicional saben cómo enfrentar. A escala mundial, y muy particularmente en Estados Unidos, la medicina fabrica una raza de individuos vitalmente dependientes de un medio cada vez más costoso, cada vez más artificial, cada vez más higiénicamente programado. En 1970, durante el Congreso de la _American Medical Association_, el presidente, sin atraer ninguna oposición, exhortó a sus colegas pediatras a considerar a todo recién nacido como _paciente_ mientras no haya sido certificada su buena salud. Los niños nacidos en el hospital, alimentados bajo prescripciones, atiborrados de antibióticos, se convierten en adultos que, respirando un aire viciado y comiendo alimentos envenenados, vivirán una existencia de sombras en la gran ciudad moderna. Aún les costará más caro criar a sus hijos, quienes, a su vez, serán aún más dependientes del monopolio médico. El mundo entero se va convirtiendo poco a poco en un hospital poblado de gente que, a lo largo de su vida, debe plegarse a las reglas de higiene dictadas y a las prescripciones médicas.
+
+Esta medicina burocratizada se expande por el planeta entero. En 1968, el Colegio de Medicina de Shanghai tuvo que inclinarse ante la evidencia:
+
+> "Producimos médicos llamados de primera clase [...] que ignoran la existencia de quinientos millones de campesinos y sirven únicamente a las minorías urbanas [...] adjudican grandes gastos de laboratorio para exámenes de rutina [...] prescriben, sin necesidad, enormes cantidades de antibióticos [...] y, cuando no hay hospital, ni laboratorios, se ven reducidos a explicar los mecanismos de la enfermedad a gentes por quienes no pueden hacer nada, y a quienes esta explicación a nada conduce.""
+
+En China, esta toma de conciencia condujo a una inversión de la institución médica. En 1971, informa el mismo colegio, un millón de trabajadores de la salud han alcanzado un nivel aceptable de competencia. Estos trabajadores son campesinos. Durante la temporada de poca actividad, siguen cursos acelerados: aprenden la disección en cerdos, practican los análisis de laboratorio más corrientes, adquieren conocimientos elementales en bacteriología, patología, medicina clínica, higiene y acupuntura. Luego hacen su aprendizaje con médicos o con trabajadores de la salud ya ejercitados. Después de esta primera formación, estos _médicos descalzos_ vuelven a su trabajo original, pero, cuando es necesario, se ausentan para ocuparse de sus camaradas. Son responsables de lo siguiente: la higiene del ambiente de vida y de trabajo, la educación sanitaria, las vacunaciones, los primeros auxilios, la supervivencia de los convalecientes, los partos, el control de la natalidad y los métodos abortivos.
+
+Diez años después de que la medicina occidental franquease el segundo umbral, China emprende la formación, cada centenar de ciudadanos, de un trabajador competente de la salud. Su ejemplo prueba que es posible invertir de golpe el funcionamiento de una institución dominante. Queda por ver hasta qué punto esta desprofesionalización puede mantenerse, frente al triunfo de la ideología del desarrollo ilimitado y a la presión de los médicos clásicos, recelosos de incorporar a sus homónimos descalzos a la jerarquía médica y formar con ellos una infantería de no graduados que trabajan a tiempo parcial.
+
+Pero por todas partes se exhiben los síntomas de la enfermedad de la medicina, sin tomar en consideración el desorden profundo del sistema que la engendra. En Estados Unidos, los abogados de los pobres acusan a la _American Medical Association_ de ser un bastión de prejuicios capitalistas, y a sus miembros de llenarse los bolsillos. Los portavoces de las minorías critican la falta de control social en la administración de la salud y en la organización de los sistemas de asistencia. ¿Quieren creer que participando en los consejos de administración de los hospitales podrían controlar las actuaciones del cuerpo médico? Los portavoces de la comunidad negra encuentran escandaloso que los fondos para investigación se concentren en las enfermedades que afligen a los blancos provectos y sobrealimentados. Exigen que las investigaciones se dediquen a una forma particular de la anemia, que afecta solamente a los negros. El elector norteamericano espera que con el término de la guerra del Vietnam se destinen más fondos al desarrollo de la producción médica. Todas estas acusaciones y críticas descansan sobre los síntomas de una medicina que prolifera como un tumor maligno y que produce el alza de los costos y de la demanda, junto con un malestar general.
+
+La crisis de la medicina tiene raíces mucho más profundas de lo que se puede sospechar a simple vista del examen de sus síntomas. Forma parte integrante de la crisis de todas las instituciones industriales. La medicina se ha desarrollado en una organización compleja de especialistas. Financiada y promovida por la colectividad, se empeña en producir una salud mejor. Los clientes no han faltado, voluntarios para todas las experiencias. Como resultado, el hombre ha perdido el derecho a declararse enfermo: necesita presentar un certificado médico. Aún más, es a un médico a quien hoy corresponde, como representante de la sociedad, elegir la hora de la muerte del paciente. Igual que el condenado a muerte, el enfermo es vigilado escrupulosamente para evitar que encuentre la muerte cuando ella le venga a buscar.
+
+Las fechas de 1913 y de 1955 que hemos elegido como indicativas de dos umbrales de mutación de la medicina no son restrictivas. Lo importante es comprender lo siguiente: a principios de siglo, la práctica médica se dedicó a la verificación científica de sus resultados empíricos. La aplicación del resultado ha marcado, para la medicina moderna, la trasposición de su primer umbral. El segundo umbral se traspuso al comenzar a decrecer la utilidad marginal de la mayor especialización, cuantificable en términos del bienestar del mayor número; se puede decir que este último umbral se traspuso cuando la _desutilidad_ marginal comenzó a aumentar, a medida que el desarrollo de la institución médica llegó a significar mayor sufrimiento para más gente. En ese momento la institución médica fue más vehemente en cantar victoria. Los virtuosos de las nuevas especialidades exhibían como _vedettes_ a algunos individuos atacados de raras enfermedades. La práctica médica se concentró en operaciones espectaculares realizadas por equipos hospitalarios. La fe en la operación-milagro cegaba el buen sentido y destruía la sabiduría antigua en materia de salud y curación. Los médicos extendieron el uso inmoderado de drogas químicas entre el público general. En la actualidad el costo social de la medicina ha dejado de ser mensurable en términos clásicos. ¿Cómo medir las falsas esperanzas, el agobio del control social, la prolongación del sufrimiento, la soledad, la degradación del patrimonio genético y el sentimiento de frustración engendrados por la institución médica?
+
+Otras instituciones industriales han traspuesto también estos dos umbrales. En particular es el caso de las grandes industrias terciarias y de las actividades productivas, _organizadas_ científicamente desde mediados del siglo XIX. La educación, el correo, la asistencia social, los transportes y hasta las obras públicas, han seguido esta evolución. En un principio se aplica un nuevo conocimiento a la solución de un problema claramente definido y los criterios científicos permiten medir los beneficios en eficiencia obtenidos. Pero, en seguida, el progreso obtenido se convierte en medio para explotar al conjunto social, para ponerlo al servicio de los valores que una élite especializada, garante de su propio valor, determina y revisa constantemente.
+
+En el caso de los transportes, se ha necesitado el transcurso de un siglo para pasar de la liberación lograda a través de los vehículos motorizados, a la esclavitud impuesta por el automóvil. Los transportes a vapor comenzaron a ser utilizados durante la Guerra de Secesión. Este nuevo sistema dio a mucha gente la posibilidad de viajar en ferrocarril a la velocidad de una carroza real y con un confort jamás soñado por rey alguno. Poco a poco se empezó a confundir la buena circulación con la alta velocidad. Desde que la industria de los transportes traspuso su segundo umbral de mutación, los vehículos crean más distancia de la que suprimen. El conjunto de la sociedad consagra a la circulación cada vez más tiempo del que supone que ésta le ha de hacer ganar. Por su parte, el norteamericano tipo dedica más de 1.500 horas por año a su automóvil: sentado en él, en movimiento o estacionado, trabajando para pagarlo, para pagar la gasolina, los neumáticos, los peajes, el seguro, las contravenciones y los impuestos. De manera que emplea cuatro horas diarias en su automóvil, sea usándolo, cuidando de él o trabajando para sus gastos. Y conste que aquí no se han tomado en cuenta otras actividades determinadas por el transporte: el tiempo pasado en el hospital, en los tribunales o en garaje, el tiempo pasado en ver por televisión la publicidad automovilística, el tiempo consumido en ganar dinero necesario para viajar en vacaciones, etc. Y este norteamericano necesita esas 1.500 horas para hacer apenas 10.000 kilómetros de ruta; seis kilómetros le toman una hora.
+
+La visión que se tiene de la crisis social actual se ilumina con la comprensión de los dos umbrales de mutación descritos. En sólo una década, varias instituciones dominantes han traspuesto juntas, gallardamente, el segundo umbral. La escuela ya no es un buen instrumento de educación, ni el automóvil un buen instrumento de transporte, ni la línea de montaje un modo aceptable de producción. La escuela produce males y la velocidad devora el tiempo.
+
+Durante los años sesenta, la reacción característica contra el crecimiento de la insatisfacción ha sido la _escalada_ de la técnica y de la burocracia. La escalada del poder de autodestruirse se convierte en el rito ceremonial de las sociedades altamente industrializadas. La guerra de Vietnam ha sido en este sentido una revelación y un encubrimiento. Ha revelado ante el planeta entero el ritual _en ejercicio_, sobre un campo de batalla. Pero, al hacerlo, ha desviado nuestra atención de los sectores llamados pacíficos, en donde el mismo rito se repite más discretamente. La historia de la guerra de Vietnam demuestra que un ejército convivencial de ciclistas y de peatones puede revertir en su favor las oleadas del poder anónimo del enemigo. Por lo tanto, ahora que la guerra ha 'terminado', son muchos los norteamericanos que piensan que con el dinero gastado anualmente para dejarse vencer por los vietnamitas, sería posible vencer la pobreza doméstica. Otros quieren destinar los veinte billones de dólares del presupuesto de guerra a reforzar la cooperación internacional, lo que multiplicaría por diez los recursos actuales. Ni los unos ni los otros comprenden que la misma estructura institucional sostiene la guerra pacífica contra la pobreza y la guerra sangrienta contra la disidencia. Todos elevan en un grado más la escalada que tratan de eliminar.
+
+# La reconstrucción convivencial
+
+## La herramienta y la crisis
+
+Ya son manifiestos los síntomas de una crisis planetaria progresivamente acelerada. Por todos lados se ha buscado el porqué. Anticipo, por mi parte, la siguiente explicación: la crisis se arraiga en el fracaso de la empresa moderna, a saber, la sustitución del hombre por la máquina. El gran proyecto se ha metamorfoseado en un implacable proceso de servidumbre para el productor, y de intoxicación para el consumidor.
+
+El señorío del hombre sobre la herramienta fue reemplazado por el señorío de la herramienta sobre el hombre. Es aquí donde es preciso saber reconocer el fracaso. Hace ya un centenar de años que tratamos de hacer trabajar a la máquina _para el hombre_ y de educar al hombre para _servir a la máquina_. Ahora se descubre que la máquina no 'marcha', y que el hombre no podría conformarse a sus exigencias, convirtiéndose de por vida en su servidor. Durante un siglo, la humanidad se entregó a una experiencia fundada en la siguiente hipótesis: la herramienta puede sustituir al esclavo. Ahora bien, se ha puesto de manifiesto que, aplicada a estos propósitos, es la herramienta la que hace al hombre su esclavo.
+
+La sociedad en que la planificación central sostiene que el productor manda, como la sociedad en que las estadísticas pretenden que el consumidor es rey, son dos variantes políticas de la misma dominación por los instrumentos industriales en constante expansión. El fracaso de esta gran aventura conduce a la conclusión de que la hipótesis era falsa.
+
+La solución de la crisis exige una conversión radical: solamente echando abajo la sólida estructura que regula la relación del hombre con la herramienta, podremos darnos unas herramientas justas. La herramienta justa responde a tres exigencias: es generadora de eficiencia sin degradar la autonomía personal; no suscita ni esclavos ni amos; expande el radio de acción personal. El hombre necesita de una herramienta _con la cual trabajar_, y no de instrumentos que _trabajen en su lugar_. Necesita de una tecnología que saque el mejor partido de la energía y de la imaginación personales, no de una tecnología que le avasalle y le programe.
+
+Yo creo que se deben _invertir_ radicalmente las instituciones industriales y _reconstruir_ la sociedad completamente. Para poder ser eficiente y poder cubrir las necesidades humanas que determina, un nuevo sistema de producción debe también reencontrar nuevamente la dimensión personal y comunitaria. La persona, la célula de base, conjugando en forma óptima la eficacia y la autonomía, es la única escala que debe determinar la necesidad humana dentro de la cual la producción social es realizable.
+
+El hombre quieto o en movimiento necesita de herramientas. Necesita de ellas tanto para comunicarse con el otro como para atenderse a sí mismo. El hombre que camina y se cura con sencillez no es el hombre que hace cien kilómetros por hora sobre la autopista y toma antibióticos. Pero ninguno de ellos puede valerse totalmente por sí mismo y depende de lo que le suministra su ambiente natural y cultural. La herramienta es, pues, el proveedor de los objetos y servicios que varían de una civilización a otra.
+
+Pero el hombre no se alimenta únicamente de bienes y servicios, necesita también de la libertad para moldear los objetos que le rodean, para darles forma a su gusto, para utilizarlos con y para los demás. En los países ricos, los presos frecuentemente disponen de más bienes y servicios que su propia familia, pero no tienen voz ni voto sobre la forma en que se hacen las cosas, ni tienen derechos sobre lo que se hace con ellas. Degradados esencialmente al rango de meros consumidores-usuarios, se ven privados de la _convivencialidad_.
+
+Por _convivencialidad_ entiendo lo inverso de la productividad industrial. Cada uno de nosotros se define por la relación con los otros y con el ambiente, así como por la sólida estructura de las herramientas que utiliza. Éstas pueden ordenarse en una serie continua cuyos extremos son la herramienta como instrumento dominante y la herramienta convivencial. El paso de la productividad a la convivencialidad es el paso de la repetición de la falta a la espontaneidad del don. La relación industrial es reflejo condicionado, una respuesta estereotipada del individuo a los mensajes emitidos por otro usuario a quien jamás conocerá a no ser por un medio artificial que jamás comprenderá. La relación convivencial, en cambio siempre nueva, es acción de personas que participan en la creación de la vida social. Trasladarse de la productividad a la convivencialidad es sustituir un valor técnico por un valor ético, un valor material por un valor realizado. _La convivencialidad es la libertad individual, realizada dentro del proceso de producción, en el seno de una sociedad equipada con herramientas eficaces_. Cuando una sociedad, no importa cuál, rechaza la convivencialidad antes de alcanzar un cierto nivel, se convierte en presa de la falta, ya que ninguna hipertrofia de la productividad logrará jamás satisfacer las necesidades creadas y multiplicadas por la envidia.
+
+## La alternativa
+
+La institución industrial tiene sus fines que justifican los medios. El dogma del crecimiento acelerado justifica la sacralización de la productividad industrial, a costa de la convivencialidad. La desarraigada sociedad actual se nos presenta de pronto como un teatro de la peste, un espectáculo de sombras productoras de demandas y generadoras de escasez. Únicamente _invirtiendo la lógica de la institución_ se hace posible revertir el movimiento. Por esta inversión radical la ciencia y la tecnología moderna no serán aniquiladas, sino que dotarán a la actividad humana de una eficacia sin precedentes. Por esta inversión ni la industria ni la burocracia serán destruidas, sino eliminadas como impedimentos a otros modos de producción. Y la convivencialidad será restaurada en el centro mismo de los sistemas políticos que protegen, garantizan y refuerzan el ejercicio óptimo del recurso que mejor repartido está en el mundo: _la energía personal que controla la persona_. Oigo decir que desde ahora es necesario que aseguremos colectivamente la defensa de nuestra vida y de nuestro trabajo contra los instrumentos y las instituciones, que amenazan o desconocen el derecho de las personas a utilizar su energía en forma creativa. Oigo proponer que con este objeto debemos explicitar la estructura formal común a los procesos de decisión ética, legal y política: es ella _la que garantiza que la limitación y el control de las herramientas sociales_ serán resultado de un proceso de participación y no de los oráculos de los expertos.
+
+El ideal propuesto por la tradición socialista no se traducirá en realidad mientras no se inviertan las instituciones imperantes y no sea sustituida la instrumentación industrial por herramientas convivenciales. Y por su parte la reinstrumentación de la sociedad tiene todas las probabilidades de perdurar como piadoso propósito, si los ideales socialistas de justicia no lo adoptan. Por ello se debe saludar a la crisis declarada de las instituciones dominantes como al amanecer de una liberación revolucionaria que nos emancipará de aquellas instancias que mutilan la libertad elemental del ser humano, con el solo fin de atosigar cada vez a más usuarios. Esta crisis planetaria de las instituciones nos puede hacer llegar a un _nuevo estado de conciencia_, que afecte a la naturaleza de la herramienta y a la acción a seguir, para que la mayoría tome el control. Si, desde ahora, las herramientas no se someten a un control político, la cooperación de los burócratas del bienestar y de los burócratas de la ideología nos hará reventar de 'felicidad'. La libertad y la dignidad del ser humano seguirán degradándose, estableciendo una servidumbre sin precedentes del hombre a su herramienta.
+
+A la amenaza de un apocalipsis tecnocrático, yo opongo la visión de una sociedad convivencial. La sociedad convivencial descansará sobre contratos sociales que garanticen a cada uno el mayor y más libre acceso a las herramientas de la comunidad, con la condición de no lesionar una igual libertad de acceso al otro.
+
+## Los valores de base
+
+En nuestros días existe la tendencia a confiar a un cuerpo de especialistas la tarea de sondear y anunciar el futuro. Se entrega el poder a hombres políticos que prometen construir la megamáquina para producir el porvenir. Se acepta una creciente disparidad de niveles de energía y de poder, puesto que el desarrollo de la productividad requiere la desigualdad. Mientras más igualitaria es la distribución, más centralizado es el control de la producción. Las propias instituciones políticas funcionan como mecanismos de presión y de represión, que doman al ciudadano y vuelven a domar al desviado para conformarlos a los objetivos de producción. El Derecho se subordina al bien de la institución. El consenso de la fe utilitaria degrada la justicia al simple rango de una distribución equitativa de los productos de la institución.
+
+Una sociedad que define el bien como la satisfacción máxima, por el mayor consumo de bienes y servicios industriales, del mayor número de gente, mutila en forma intolerable la autonomía de la persona. Una solución política de repuesto a este utilitarismo definiría el bien por la capacidad de cada uno para moldear la imagen de su propio porvenir. Esta redefinición del bien puede ser operacional sólo si se aplican criterios negativos. Ante todo se trata de proscribir los instrumentos y las leyes que obstaculizan el ejercicio de la libertad personal. Esta empresa colectiva limitaría las dimensiones de las herramientas, a fin de defender valores esenciales que yo llamaría: _sobrevivencia, equidad, autonomía creadora_, pero que asimismo podrían designarse por los tres criterios matemáticos de viabilidad, curva de distribución de _inputs_ y curva de control de _outputs_. Estos valores son fundamento para toda estructura convivencial, aun cuando las leyes y la moral varíen de una cultura a otra.
+
+Cada uno de estos valores limita, a su manera, la herramienta. La supervivencia es condición necesaria, pero no suficiente, para la equidad: se puede sobrevivir en prisión. La _equidad_ en la distribución de los productos industriales es condición necesaria, pero no suficiente, para un trabajo convivencial: uno puede convertirse en prisionero de la instrumentación. La autonomía, como poder de control sobre la energía, engloba los dos primeros valores citados, y define el _trabajo convivencial_. Éste tiene, como condición, el establecimiento de estructuras que posibiliten esta distribución equitativa de la energía. Debemos construir --y gracias a los progresos científicos lo podemos hacer-- una sociedad posindustrial en que el ejercicio de la creatividad de una persona no imponga jamás a otra un trabajo, un conocimiento o un consumo obligatorio. En la era de la tecnología científica, _solamente una estructura convivencial de la herramienta puede conjugar la supervivencia y la equidad_. La equidad exige que, a un tiempo, se compartan el poder y el haber. Si bien la carrera por la energía conduce al holocausto, la centralización del control de la energía en manos de un leviatán burocrático sacrificaría el control igualitario de la misma a la ficción de una distribución equitativa de los productos obtenidos. La estructuración convivencial de las herramientas es una necesidad y una urgencia desde el momento en que la ciencia libera nuevas formas de energía. Una estructura convivencial de la herramienta hace realizable la equidad y practicable la justicia; ella constituye la única garantía de supervivencia.
+
+## El precio de esta inversión
+
+Sin embargo, la transición del presente estado de cosas a un modo de producción convivencial amenazará a mucha gente, incluso en sus posibilidades de sobrevivir. En opinión del hombre industrializado, los primeros en sufrir y morir, a consecuencia de los límites impuestos a la industria, serían los pobres. Pero la dominación del hombre por la herramienta ha tomado ya un giro suicida. La supervivencia de Bangladesh depende del trigo canadiense, y la salud de los neoyorquinos exige el saqueo de los recursos planetarios. La transición pues a una sociedad convivencial irá acompañada de extremos sufrimientos: hambre para algunos, pánico para otros. Tienen el derecho a desear esta transición sólo aquellos que saben que la organización industrial dominante está en vías de producir sufrimientos aún peores, so pretexto de aliviarlos. Para ser posible dentro de la equidad, la supervivencia exige sacrificios y postula una elección. Exige una renuncia general a la sobrepoblación, a la sobreabundancia y al superpoder, ya se trate de individuos o de grupos. Esto redunda en renunciar a la ilusión que sustituye la preocupación por lo prójimo, es decir _del más próximo_, por la insoportable pretensión de organizar la vida en las antípodas. Esto implica renunciar al poder, en servicio tanto de los demás como de sí mismo. La supervivencia dentro de la equidad no será producto de un _ukase_ de los burócratas, ni efecto de un cálculo de los tecnócratas. Será resultado del idealismo de los humildes. La convivencialidad no tiene precio, pero se debe saber muy bien lo que costará desprenderse del modelo actual. El hombre reencontrará la alegría de la sobriedad y de la austeridad, reaprendiendo a depender del otro, en vez de convertirse en esclavo de la energía y de la burocracia todopoderosa.
+
+## Los límites de mi demostración
+
+En lo que sigue, no pretendo otra cosa que ofrecer una metodología que permita detectar los medios que han sido transformados en fines. Me ciño a la rudeza de la herramienta, no a la sutileza de la intención. El rigor de mi propósito me impedirá tratar cuestiones laterales, complementarias o subordinadas.
+
+_1._ De nada me serviría ofrecer una ficción detallada de la sociedad futura. Quiero dar una guía para actuar y dejar libre curso a la imaginación. La _vida_ dentro de una sociedad convivencial y moderna nos reserva sorpresas que sobrepasan nuestra imaginación y nuestra esperanza. No propongo una _utopía normativa_, sino las condiciones formales de un procedimiento que permita a cada colectividad elegir continuamente su utopía realizable. La convivencialidad es multiforme.
+
+_2._ No he de proponer aquí _un tratado de organización_ de las instituciones, ni un _manual técnico_ para la fabricación de la herramienta justa, ni un _modo de empleo_ de la institución convivencial, desde el momento en que no pretendo vender una tecnología 'mejor', ni soy propagandista de una ideología. Sólo espero definir los indicadores que hacen guiños cada vez que la herramienta manipula al hombre, con el fin de poder proscribir la instrumentación y las instituciones que destruyen el modo de vida convivencial. Este manifiesto es pues guía, detector para utilizarlo como tal. La paradoja es que, actualmente, hemos alcanzado un nivel anteriormente impensable en nuestra habilidad de instrumentar la acción humana y que, por lo mismo, es justamente en nuestra época cuando resulta difícil imaginar una sociedad de herramientas simples, en donde el hombre pudiera lograr sus fines utilizando una energía puesta bajo su control personal. Nuestros sueños están estandarizados, nuestra imaginación industrializada, nuestra fantasía programada. No somos capaces de concebir más que sistemas de hiperinstrumentalización para los hábitos sociales, adaptados a la lógica de la producción en masa. Casi hemos perdido la capacidad de soñar un mundo en donde la palabra se tome y se comparta, en donde nadie límite la creatividad del prójimo, en donde cada uno pueda cambiar la vida.
+
+El mundo actual está dividido en dos: están aquellos que no tienen lo suficiente y aquellos que tienen demasiado; aquellos a quienes los automóviles sacan de la carretera y aquellos que conducen esos vehículos. Los pobres se sienten frustrados y los ricos siempre insatisfechos. Una sociedad equipada con el sistema de rodamientos a bolas (menor fricción en el rodaje) y que rodara al ritmo del hombre sería incomparablemente más autónoma que todas las sociedades programadas del presente. Nos encontramos en la época de los hombres-máquina, incapaces de considerar, en su riqueza y en su concreción, el radio de acción que ofrecen las herramientas modernas mantenidas dentro de ciertos límites. En su mente no hay un lugar reservado al salto cualitativo que implicaría una economía en equilibrio estable con el mundo.
+
+En su cerebro no hay un hueco para una sociedad liberada de los horarios y de los tratamientos que les impone el incremento de la instrumentalización. El hombre-máquina no conoce la alegría que tiene al alcance de la mano dentro de una pobreza querida; no conoce la sobria embriaguez de la vida. Una sociedad en donde cada cual apreciara lo que es suficiente sería quizás una sociedad pobre, pero sería seguramente rica en sorpresas y sería libre.
+
+_3._ Me atengo a la estructura de la herramienta, _no a la estructura del carácter del individuo y de la comunidad_. Ciertamente, la reconstrucción social, esencialmente en los países ricos implica que la mirada adquiera transparencia, que la sonrisa se haga atenta y que los gestos se suavicen: exige una reconstrucción del hombre y de la índole de la sociedad. Pero aquí no hablo como psicólogo, aunque estoy seguro de que dominar la herramienta permitirá disminuir la distorsión del carácter social.
+
+Cada ciudad tiene su historia y su cultura y, por lo mismo, cada paisaje urbano de hoy sufre la misma degradación. Todas las supercarreteras, todos los hospitales, todas las aulas, todas las oficinas, todos los grandes complejos urbanos y todos los supermercados se asemejan. Las mismas herramientas producen los mismos efectos. Todos los policías motorizados y todos los especialistas en informática se parecen; en toda la superficie del planeta tienen la misma apariencia y hacen los mismos gestos, en tanto que, de una región a otra, los pobres difieren. A menos de reinstrumentalizar la sociedad, no escaparemos a la homogeneización progresiva de todo, al desarraigamiento cultural y a la estandarización de las relaciones personales. Una investigación complementaria sería la que se ocuparía de los caracteres del hombre industrial que obstaculizan o amenazan la reinstrumentación. Yo no quiero dar recetas para cambiar al hombre y crear una nueva sociedad, y no pretendo saber cómo van a cambiar las personalidades y las culturas. Pero sí tengo una certeza: una pluralidad de herramientas limitadas y de organizaciones convivenciales estimularía una diversidad de modos de vida, que tendría más en cuenta la memoria, es decir la herencia del pasado, o la invención, es decir la creación.
+
+_4._ Cae fuera de mi propósito central el ocuparme _de la estrategia o de la táctica política_; a excepción tal vez de China bajo el presidente Mao Tse Tung, ningún gobierno actual podría reestructurar su proyecto para la sociedad siguiendo una linea convivencial. Los dirigentes de los partidos y de las industrias son como los oficiales de un barco, apostados al timón de mando de las instituciones dominantes: empresas multinacionales, estados, partidos políticos y movimientos organizados, monopolios profesionales, etc., pueden cambiar de ruta, de cargamento y de dotación, pero no de oficio. Hasta pueden producir una demanda que satisfaga la oferta de herramientas, o limitarla para maximizar las ganancias. El presidente de una empresa europea o el de una comuna china pueden facilitar la participación cómplice de los trabajadores en las directrices de producción, pero no tienen el poder de invertir la estructura de la institución que dirigen.
+
+Las instituciones dominantes optimizan la producción de los megainstrumentos y la orientan hacia una población de fantasmas. Los directivos de hoy forman una clase nueva de hombres; seleccionados por su personalidad, su saber y su gusto por el poder, son hombres entrenados para garantizar, al mismo tiempo, el incremento del producto bruto y el acondicionamiento del cliente. Detentan el poder y poseen la energía, dejando al público la ilusión de mantener la propiedad legal de los instrumentos. Es a ellos a quienes hay que liquidar. Pero de nada servirá eliminarlos, sobre todo si es para limitarse a reemplazarlos. El nuevo equipo en el poder, pretendería ser más legítimo, con mayor base para manipular ese poder heredado y bien estructurado. Así sólo hay una forma de liquidar para siempre a los dirigentes: demoliendo la maquinaria que los hace necesarios y, con ello, la demanda masiva que asegura su imperio. La profesión de gerente general no tiene porvenir en una sociedad convivencial, como no tiene cabida el profesor en una sociedad sin escuela. Una especie se extingue cuando ya no tiene razón de ser.
+
+Lo inverso es un medio propicio a la producción, obra de un pueblo anárquico. Pero el político que ha conquistado el poder es el último en comprender el poder de la renuncia. En una sociedad donde la decisión política encauzara la eficacia de la herramienta, no sólo se extenderían los destinos personales, sino que saldrían a la luz nuevas formas de participación política. El hombre hace la herramienta y se hace por la herramienta. La herramienta convivencial suprime ciertos escalones de poder, de limitación y de programación, aquellos precisamente que tienden a uniformar a todos los gobiernos actuales. La adopción de un modo de producción convivencial no prejuzga en favor de ninguna forma determinada de gobierno, como tampoco excluye una federación mundial, pactos entre naciones, entre comunas o conservación de ciertos tipos de gobiernos tradicionales. En el centro de una sociedad convivencial está la vida política, pero aquí me concreto a describir los criterios estructurales negativos de la producción y la estructura formal base para un nuevo pluralismo político.
+
+_5._ Una metodología que nos permita detectar la destrucción de la sociedad por la mega-instrumentación postula el reconocimiento de la supervivencia dentro de la equidad como valor fundamental e implica, por lo tanto la elaboración de una teoría de la justicia. Pero este primer manifiesto no puede ser _ni un tratado ni un compendio de ética_. En apoyo de mi argumento, es preciso que me contente con enunciar simplemente los valores fundamentales de esta teoría.
+
+
+_6._ En una sociedad posindustrial y convivencial, los problemas económicos no desaparecerán de un día para otro, como tampoco se resolverán por sí solos. Reconocer que el PNB no evalúa el bienestar, no elimina la necesidad de una noción que cuantifique las transferencias injustas de poder; asignar límites no monetarios y políticamente definidos al incremento industrial, entraña someter a revisión muchas nociones económicas consagradas, pero no hace desaparecer la desigualdad entre los hombres. Limitar la explotación del hombre por la herramienta trae consigo el peligro de que ella sea sustituida por nuevas formas de explotación del hombre por el hombre. Pero de hecho, el individuo tendrá mayores posibilidades de integrarse a la sociedad, de provocar el cambio, que en la era industrial o preindustrial.
+
+Aún limitada, la herramienta convivencial será incomparablemente más eficiente que la herramienta primitiva, y, a diferencia de la instrumentación industrial, estará al alcance de todos. Pero habrá quienes le saquen más ventajas que otros. Se dirá que la limitación de los instrumentos no pasará de ser letra muerta mientras _una nueva teoría económica_ no haya alcanzado la etapa de operación que asegure la redistribución dentro de una sociedad descentralizada. Esto, que es absolutamente exacto, cae, sin embargo, _fuera del propósito_ que nos ocupa, que es el de una teoría sobre la eficacia y la distribución de los medios de producción, y no el de una teoría que se refiera directamente a la reorganización financiera. Propongo, pues, la identificación de seis cercos imponibles a la expansión de la producción. Cada uno de ellos representa una dimensión natural dentro de la cual las unidades de medida de la economía se reducen a una clase de factores sin dimensión.
+
+## La industrialización de la falta
+
+Una metodología que permita señalar la perversión de la herramienta al convertirse en su propio fin, encontrará necesariamente una fuerte resistencia entre quienes están habituados a medir el bien en términos de francos o de dólares. Platón decía que el mal hombre de estado cree poder medirlo todo y mezcla la consideración de lo inferior y de lo superior en busca de lo que conviene más al fin pretendido. Nuestra actitud hacia la producción ha sido moldeada, a lo largo de los siglos, por una larga sucesión de este tipo de hombres de estado. Poco a poco las instituciones no sólo han conformado nuestra demanda, sino que también han dado forma a nuestra lógica, es decir, a nuestro sentido de la medida. Primero se pide lo que produce la institución, pronto se cree no poder vivir sin ello. Y mientras menos se puede gozar de lo que ha llegado a convertirse en necesidad, más fuertemente se siente la necesidad de cuantificarlo. La necesidad personal se convierte así en falta medible.
+
+La invención de la 'educación' es un ejemplo de lo que expongo. Se tiene la tendencia a olvidar que la necesidad de educación, en su acepción moderna, es una invención reciente. Era desconocida antes de la Reforma, excepto en la crianza de la primera edad, que los animales y los hombres prodigan a sus crías. Se la distinguía con mucha exactitud de la instrucción necesaria al niño, y del estudio al cual más tarde se dedicaban algunos, bajo la dirección de un maestro. Para Voltaire, la palabra 'educación' era todavía un neologismo presuntuoso, empleado por fatuos maestros de escuela.
+
+La empresa que consiste en hacer pasar a todos los hombres por grados sucesivos de iluminación encuentra raíces profundas en la alquimia, el Gran Arte de finales de la Edad Media. Con muy justo título se considera Juan Amos Comenius, obispo moravo del siglo XVII --pansofista y pedagogo, como él mismo se nombraba--, uno de los fundadores de la escuela moderna. Fue uno de los primeros en proponer siete o doce grados de aprendizaje obligatorio. En su _Magna Didáctica_ describe la escuela como un instrumento para «enseñar a todos totalmente todo» ( _omnes_ , _omnta_ , _omino_ ) y esboza el proyecto de una producción en cadena del saber, que disminuye el costo y aumenta el valor de la educación, con el fin de permitir a cada cual alcanzar la plenitud de la humanidad. Pero Comenius no sólo fue uno de los primeros teóricos de la producción en masa, fue también un alquimista, que adaptó el vocabulario técnico de la transmutación de los elementos al arte de criar a los niños. El alquimista quiere refinar los elementos base, purificando sus espíritus a través de doce etapas sucesivas de iluminación. Al término de este proceso, para su mayor bien y el del universo, los elementos son transformables en metal precioso: el residuo de la materia, habiendo sufrido siete clases de tratamiento, da plata, y lo que subsiste, después de doce pruebas, da oro. Naturalmente los alquimistas fracasaban siempre, cualquiera que fuera la perseverancia en sus esfuerzos, pero siempre su ciencia les ofrecía nuevas buenas razones para volver a la carga con tenacidad. El fracaso de la alquimia culmina con el fracaso de la industria.
+
+El modo industrial de producción fue plenamente racionalizado, por primera vez, con motivo de la fabricación de un nuevo bien de servicio: la educación, la pedagogía agregó un nuevo capítulo a la historia del Gran Arte. Dentro del proceso alquimista, la educación se convierte en la búsqueda de aquello de donde nacerá un nuevo tipo de hombre, requerido por el medio, moldeado por la magia científica. Pero sea cual haya sido el precio pagado por las sucesivas generaciones, se reveló cada vez de nuevo que la mayoría de los alumnos no eran dignos de alcanzar los más altos grados de la iluminación, y era preciso excluirlos del juego, por ineptos para llevar la 'verdadera' vida, ofrecida en ese mundo creado por el hombre.
+
+La redefinición del proceso de adquisición del saber, en términos de escolarización, no sólo ha justificado a la escuela, al darle apariencia de necesidad, sino que también, simultáneamente, ha creado una nueva especie de pobres, los no escolarizados, y una nueva clase de segregación social, la discriminación de los que carecen de educación por parte de los orgullosos de haberla recibido. El individuo escolarizado sabe exactamente el nivel que ha alcanzado en la pirámide jerárquica del saber, y conoce con precisión lo que le falta para alcanzar la cúspide. Una vez que acepta ser definido por una administración, según su grado de conocimientos, acepta después, sin dudar, que los burócratas determinen sus necesidades de salud, que los tecnócratas definan su falta de movilidad. Una vez moldeado en la mentalidad de consumidor-usuario, ya no puede ver la perversión de los medios en fines, inherente a la estructura misma de la producción industrial tanto de lo necesario como de lo suntuario. Condicionado para creer que la escuela puede ofrecerle una existencia de conocimientos, llega a creer igualmente que los transportes pueden ahorrarle tiempo, o que en sus aplicaciones militares, la física atómica le puede proteger. Se apega a la idea de que el aumento de salarios corresponde al del nivel de vida y que el crecimiento del sector terciario refleja un alza en la calidad de la vida.
+
+En realidad, la industrialización de las necesidades reduce toda satisfacción a un acto de verificación operacional, sustituye la alegría de vivir por el placer de aplicar una medida.
+
+El servicio _educación_ y la institución escuela se justifican mutuamente. La colectividad sólo tiene una manera de salir de ese círculo vicioso, y es tomando conciencia de que la institución ha llegado a fijar ella misma los fines: la institución presenta valores abstractos, luego los materializa encadenando al hombre a mecanismos implacables. ¿Cómo romper el círculo? Es necesario hacerse la pregunta: ¿quién me encadena, quién me habitúa a sus drogas? Hacerse la pregunta es ya responderla. Es liberarse de la opresión del sin sentido y de la falta, reconociendo cada uno su propia capacidad de aprender, de moverse, de descuidarse, de hacerse entender y de comprender. Esta liberación es obligadamente instantánea, puesto que no hay término medio entre la inconsciencia y el despertar. La falta, que la sociedad industrial mantiene con esmero, no sobrevive al descubrimiento que muestra cómo las personas y las comunidades pueden, ellas mismas, satisfacer sus verdaderas necesidades.
+
+La definición industrial de los valores entorpece extremadamente la posibilidad del usuario de percibir la estructura profunda de los medios sociales. Le es difícil captar que existe una vía distinta, que no es la alienación del trabajo, la industrialización de la falta y la supereficiencia de la herramienta. Le es difícil imaginar que se puede ganar en rendimiento social lo que se pierde en rentabilidad industrial. El temor de que rechazando el presente se retorne a la esclavitud del pasado, le encierra en la prisión multinacional de hoy, llámese ésta fábrica Phillips o escuela.
+
+En tiempos pasados la existencia dorada de unos cuantos descansaba sobre la servidumbre de los demás. La eficiencia de cada uno era débil: la vida fácil de una minoría exigía el embargo del trabajo de la mayoría. Ahora bien, una serie de descubrimientos recientes, muy simples, pero inconcebibles en el siglo XVIII, han aumentado la eficiencia del hombre. El balero[^n02], la sierra, la reja de acero del arado, la bomba de agua o la bicicleta, han multiplicado el rendimiento horario del hombre y facilitado su trabajo.
+
+En Occidente, entre la alta Edad Media y el Siglo de las Luces, más de un auténtico humanista se extravió en el sueño del alquimista. La ilusión consistía en creer que la máquina era un hombre artificial que reemplazaría al esclavo.
+
+## La otra posibilidad: una estructura convivencial
+
+Una sociedad convivencial es la que ofrece al hombre la posibilidad de ejercer la acción más autónoma y más creativa, con ayuda de las herramientas menos controlables por los otros. La productividad se conjuga en términos de tener, la convivencialidad en términos de ser. En tanto que el incremento de la instrumentación, pasados los umbrales críticos, produce siempre más uniformación reglamentada, mayor dependencia, explotación e impotencia, el respeto a los límites garantizará un libre florecimiento de la autonomía y de la creatividad humanas. Claramente, yo empleo el término _herramienta_ en el sentido más amplio posible, como instrumento o como medio, independientemente de ser producto de la actividad fabricadora, organizadora o racionalizante del hombre o, como es el caso del sílex prehistórico, simplemente apropiado por la mano del hombre para realizar una tarea específica, es decir, para ser puesto al servicio de una intencionalidad.
+
+Una escoba, un bolígrafo, un destornillador, una jeringa, un ladrillo, un motor, son herramientas, a igual título que un automóvil o un televisor. Una fábrica de empanadas o una central eléctrica, como instituciones productoras de bienes, entran también en la categoría de la herramienta. Dentro del herramental, hay que ordenar también las instituciones productoras de servicios, como son la escuela, la institución médica, la investigación, los medios de comunicación o los centros de planificación. Las leyes sobre el matrimonio o los programas escolares conforman la vida social del mismo modo que las redes de carreteras. La categoría de la herramienta engloba todos los instrumentos razonados de la acción humana, la máquina y su modo de empleo, el código y su operador, el pan y el circo. Como se ve, el campo abierto al concepto de herramienta varía de una cultura a otra. Depende de la impronta que una sociedad determinada ejerza sobre su estructura y su medio ambiente. Todo objeto tomado como medio para un fin se convierte en herramienta.
+
+La herramienta es inherente a la relación social. En tanto actúo como hombre, me sirvo de herramientas. Según que yo la domine o ella me domine, la herramienta o me liga, o me desliga del cuerpo social. En tanto que yo domine la herramienta, yo doy al mundo mi sentido; cuando la herramienta me domina, su estructura conforma e informa la representación que tengo de mí mismo. La herramienta convivencial es la que me deja la mayor latitud y el mayor poder para modificar el mundo en la medida de mi intención. La herramienta industrial me niega ese poder; más aún, por su medio, es otro quien determina mi demanda, reduce mi margen de control y rige mi propio sentido. La mayoría de las herramientas que hoy me rodean no podrían ser utilizadas de manera convivencial.
+
+La herramienta es a la vez medio de control y elemento transformador de energía. Como se sabe, el hombre dispone de dos tipos de energía, la que genera de sí mismo (o energía metabólica) y la que extrae del exterior. El hombre maneja la primera y manipula la segunda. Es por eso que haré una distinción entre la herramienta manejable y la herramienta manipulable.
+
+_La herramienta manejable_ adapta la energía metabólica a una tarea específica. Es multivalente, como el sílex original, el martillo o el cortaplumas. Es univalente y altamente elaborada, como el torno del alfarero, el telar, la máquina de coser a pedal o la fresa del dentista. La herramienta manejable puede alcanzar la complejidad de una organización de transportes que saca de la energía humana el máximo de movilidad, como ocurre en un sistema de bicicletas y de triciclos, al que correspondería una red de pistas tal vez cubiertas y con estaciones de mantenimiento. La herramienta manejable es conductora de energía metabólica: la mano, el pie, la dominan; la energía que ella pide puede producirla cualquiera que coma y respire.
+
+_La herramienta manipulable_ es movida, por lo menos en parte, por energía exterior. Puede servir para multiplicar la energía humana: los bueyes tiran del arado, pero para guiarlos se necesita del labrador. Asimismo un montacargas o una sierra eléctrica conjugan la energía metabólica con la energía exógena. Sin embargo, la herramienta manipulable puede exceder la escala humana. La energía que proporciona el piloto de un avión supersónico ya no es parte significativa de la energía consumida en el vuelo. El piloto es un simple operador, cuya acción es regida por los datos que un ordenador dirige por él. Y aun hay alguien más en la cabina de mando, porque el ordenador es imperfecto, o porque el sindicato de pilotos es poderoso y organizado.
+
+_La herramienta es convivencial_ en la medida en que cada uno puede utilizarla sin dificultad, tan frecuente o raramente como él lo desee, y para los fines que él mismo determine. El uso que cada cual haga de ella no invade la libertad del otro para hacer lo mismo. Nadie necesita de un diploma para tener el derecho de usarla a voluntad; se lo puede tomar o no. Entre el hombre y el mundo ella es un conductor de sentido, un traductor de intencionalidad.
+
+Ciertas instituciones son, estructuralmente, herramientas convivenciales y ello independientemente de su nivel tecnológico. El teléfono puede servir de ejemplo. Bajo la única condición de disponer de las monedas necesarias para su funcionamiento, cualquiera puede llamar a la persona que quiera para decirle lo que quiera; informaciones bursátiles, injurias o palabras de amor. Ningún burócrata podrá fijar de antemano el contenido de una comunicación telefónica --si acaso, podrá violar el secreto, pero asimismo puede protegerlo--. Cuando los computadores infatigables mantienen ocupadas más de la mitad de las líneas californianas y, con ello, restringen la libertad de las comunicaciones personales, es la compañía telefónica la responsable, al desviar la explotación de una licencia concedida originariamente a las personas para el habla. Cuando una población entera se deja intoxicar por el uso abusivo del teléfono y pierde así la costumbre de intercambiar cartas o visitas, este error conduce al recurso inmoderado a una herramienta que es convivencial por esencia, pero cuya función se desnaturaliza por haber recibido su campo de acción una extensión errónea.
+
+La herramienta manejable llama al uso convivencial. Si no se presta a ello es porque la institución reserva su uso para el monopolio de una profesión, como lo hace, por ejemplo, al poner las bibliotecas en el recinto de las escuelas o al decretar la extracción de los dientes y otras intervenciones simples como actos médicos, practicables sólo por especialistas. Pero la herramienta puede también ser objeto de una especie de segregación, como es el caso de los motores, concebidos de tal manera que uno mismo no puede practicar pequeñas reparaciones con ayuda de una tenaza y un destornillador. El monopolio de la institución sobre este tipo de herramientas manejables constituye un abuso, pervierte el uso del mismo, pero sin que por ello éste se desnaturalice, como el cuchillo del asesino no deja de ser cuchillo.
+
+El carácter convivencial de la herramienta no depende, en principio, de su nivel de complejidad. Lo que se ha dicho del teléfono podría repetirse, punto por punto, respecto al sistema de correos, o al de transportes fluviales en Tailandia. Cada uno de esos sistemas es una estructura institucional que maximiza la libertad de la persona, aun cuando pueda ser desviada de su finalidad y pervertida en su uso. El teléfono es el producto de una técnica avanzada; el sistema de correos puede funcionar a diversos niveles técnicos, pero exige siempre mucha organización; la red de canales y de piraguas integra una programación mínima, dentro del cuadro de una técnica consuetudinaria.
+
+## El equilibrio institucional
+
+Al aproximarse a su segundo umbral la institución pervierte el uso de la herramienta manejable. Es entonces cuando se abre el reino de las manipulaciones. Cada vez más, se va adoptando el medio como fin. Reunidas en esa forma, las condiciones para la enseñanza cuestan más caras que la enseñanza misma, y el costo de la formación ya no se compensa con el fruto que produce. Los medios para el fin perseguido por la institución son cada vez menos accesibles a una persona autónoma o, dicho con más exactitud, se integran a una cadena de eslabones solidarios que hay que aceptar en su totalidad. En Estados Unidos no hay viaje en avión sin automóvil, y sin viaje en avión no hay congreso de especialistas. Las herramientas que alcanzarían los mismos fines, exigiendo menos del usuario, respetando su libertad de maniobra, son eliminadas del mercado. Mientras que las aceras van desapareciendo, la complejidad de la red de carreteras no hace sino crecer.
+
+Es posible que ciertos medios de producción, no convivenciales, parezcan deseables en una sociedad posindustrial. Es probable que, aun en un mundo convivencial, ciertas colectividades elijan tener más abundancia, a costa de menos creatividad. Es casi seguro que, durante el periodo de transición, la electricidad no sea en todas partes el resultado de una producción doméstica. Ciertamente, el conductor de un tren no puede salirse de la vía férrea ni elegir sus estaciones y su horario. Los postillones no estaban menos sujetos a una ruta precisa que los petroleros modernos lo están hoy, muy al contrario. La transmisión de mensajes telefónicos se hace sobre una banda de frecuencia determinada y debe ser dirigida por una administración central, aun cuando cubra una zona delimitada. En realidad, no hay ninguna razón para proscribir de una sociedad convivencial toda herramienta poderosa y toda producción centralizada. Dentro de la perspectiva convivencial, el equilibrio entre la justicia en la participación y la igualdad dentro de la distribución puede variar de una sociedad a otra, en función de la historia, de los ideales y del medio ambiente de esa sociedad.
+
+No es esencial que las instituciones manipuladoras o los bienes y los servicios susceptibles de intoxicar sean totalmente excluidos de una sociedad convivencial. Lo que importa es que semejante sociedad logre un equilibrio entre, por una parte, la instrumentación concebida para satisfacer la demanda que produce y, por otra, los instrumentos que estimulan la realización personal. Lo primero materializa programas abstractos concernientes a los hombres en general; lo segundo favorece la aptitud de cada uno para perseguir sus fines a su manera personal, inimitable.
+
+No es cuestión de proscribir una herramienta por el sólo hecho de que, de acuerdo con nuestros criterios de clasificación, se pueda calificar de anticonvivencial. Estos criterios son guías para la acción. Una sociedad puede utilizarlos para reestructurar la totalidad de su instrumentación, en función del estilo y del grado de convivencialidad que desee alcanzar. Una sociedad convivencial no prohíbe la escuela. Proscribe el sistema escolar pervertido en herramienta obligatoria, basada en la segregación y el rechazo de los fracasados. Una sociedad convivencial no suprime los transportes interurbanos a gran velocidad, a menos que su existencia impida garantizar al conjunto de la población la posibilidad de circular a la velocidad y al ritmo que quiera. Una sociedad convivencial ni siquiera pretende rechazar la televisión, aun cuando ésta deja a discreción de algunos productores y charlatanes seleccionar y fabricar lo que habrá de 'tragar' la masa de televidentes; sin embargo, una sociedad de ese tipo debe proteger a la persona contra la _obligación_ de convertirse en cautiva de la pantalla. Como se ve, los criterios de la convivencialidad no son reglas a aplicarse mecánicamente, sino indicadores de la acción política concerniente a todo lo que se debe evitar. Son criterios de detección de una amenaza, que permiten a cada uno hacer valer su propia libertad.
+
+## La ceguera actual y el ejemplo del pasado
+
+En el presente, los criterios institucionales sobre la acción humana son opuestos a los nuestros, incluso en las sociedades marxistas en donde la clase obrera se cree en el poder. El planificador socialista rivaliza con el vocero de la libre empresa, en su intento por demostrar que sus principios aseguran a una sociedad el máximo de productividad. En los países socialistas, la política económica con frecuencia se define por su preocupación de aumentar la productividad industrial. El monopolio de la interpretación industrial del marxismo sirve de barrera y de medio de chantaje contra toda forma de marxismo heterodoxo. Falta ver si China, después de la muerte del presidente Mao Tse-Tung, abandonará, ella también, la convivencialidad productiva, para volverse hacia la productividad estandarizada. La interpretación exclusivamente industrial del socialismo, permite a los comunistas y a los capitalistas hablar el mismo idioma, medir en forma similar el grado de desarrollo alcanzado por una sociedad. Una sociedad en donde la mayoría de la gente depende, respecto a los bienes y servicios que recibe, de las cualidades, de la imaginación, del amor y de la habilidad de cada cual, pertenece a la clase considerada como subdesarrollada. En cambio, una sociedad en donde la vida cotidiana no es más que una serie de pedidos sobre catálogo al gran supermercado universal, se considera avanzada. Y el revolucionario no es más que un entrenador deportivo: campeón del Tercer Mundo o portavoz de las minorías subconsumidoras, encauza la frustración de las masas a las que revela su _retraso_; canaliza la violencia popular y la transforma en _energía para dar alcance_.
+
+Cada uno de los aspectos de la sociedad industrial es componente de un sistema de conjunto que implica la escalada de la producción y el incremento de la demanda indispensables para justificar el costo social total. Es por ello que, cuando se concentra la crítica social sobre la mala administración, la corrupción, la insuficiencia de la investigación o el retraso tecnológico, no se hace más que distraer la atención del público del único problema que cuenta: la estructura inherente a la herramienta que se toma como medio, y que determina una creciente falta general. Otro error consiste en creer que la frustración actual se debe principalmente a la propiedad privada de los medios de producción, y que la apropiación pública de esos medios, a través de un organismo central de planificación, protegerá los intereses de la mayoría y conducirá a un reparto equitativo de la abundancia. Este remedio propuesto no cambiará la estructura antihumana de la herramienta. Mientras se ataque al consorcio Ford por la única razón de que enriquece al señor Ford, se mantendrá la ilusión de que las fábricas Ford podrían enriquecer a la colectividad. Mientras la población suponga que el automóvil le reporta ventajas, no tendrá queja contra Ford por construir automóviles. Mientras comparta la ilusión de que es posible aumentar la velocidad de desplazamiento de cada uno, la sociedad continuará criticando su propio sistema político, en vez de imaginar otro sistema de transportes. Sin embargo, la solución está al alcance de la mano: no reside en una forma determinada de apropiación de la herramienta, sino en el descubrimiento del carácter de ciertas herramientas, en saber que nadie podrá jamás _poseerlas_. El concepto de apropiación no se podrá aplicar a una instrumentación incontrolable. La cuestión urgente sería determinar qué herramientas pueden ser controladas en interés general, y comprender que una herramienta incontrolable representa una amenaza insoportable. Es secundaria la cuestión de saber cómo organizar un medio privado de control que responda al interés general.
+
+Ciertas herramientas son siempre destructoras, cualesquiera que sean las manos que las detenten: la mafia, los capitalistas, una firma multinacional, el Estado o incluso una colectiva obrera. Es así, por ejemplo, en el caso de las redes de autopistas de vías múltiples, de los sistemas de comunicación a larga distancia que utilizan bandas anchas de frecuencias y también de las minas o de las escuelas. El instrumento destructor incrementa la uniformación, la dependencia, la explotación y la impotencia; despoja al pobre de su parte de convivencialidad, para frustrar más al rico de la suya.
+
+Al hombre moderno le es difícil concebir el desarrollo y la modernización en términos de reducción y no de incremento del consumo de energía. Para él, una técnica avanzada rima con una profunda intervención en el proceso físico, mental y social. Si queremos aprehender la instrumentación con exactitud, debemos abandonar la ilusión de que un alto grado de cultura implica el más alto consumo de energía posible. En las civilizaciones antiguas, los recursos energéticos estaban repartidos equitativamente. Cada ser humano, por su constitución biológica, disponía de por vida de toda la energía potencial necesaria para transformar conscientemente el contorno físico según su voluntad, puesto que la fuente era su propio cuerpo bajo la sola condición de que se le mantuviera en buena salud. En estas condiciones, controlar grandes cantidades de energía física no era más que resultado de manipulaciones psíquicas o de una dominación política.
+
+Para edificar las pirámides de Teotihuacán en México, para formar las terrazas de arrozales de Ibagué, en Filipinas, los hombres no necesitaron para nada de herramientas manipulables. La cúpula de San Pedro en Roma y los canales de Angkor Vat fueron construidos sin bulldozeres, sólo a fuerza de brazos. Los generales de César recibían las noticias a través de _jinetes_, los Fugger y los jefes incas utilizaban corredores. Hasta el siglo XVIII, las galeras de la República Veneciana y todos los mensajeros viajaban a menos de 120 kilómetros por día. El ejército de Napoleón se desplazaba siempre con la misma lentitud que el de César. La mano o el pie impulsaban la bobina o el torno, la rueda de alfarero y la sierra de madera. La energía metabólica del hombre alimentaba la agricultura, la artesanía y la guerra. La ingeniosidad del individuo canalizaba la energía animal hacia ciertas tareas sociales. Los poderosos de la tierra no controlaban otra energía más que la suministrada, de grado o por fuerza por sus propios súbditos.
+
+Ciertamente, el metabolismo humano no bastaba para procurar toda la energía deseable, pero en la mayoría de las culturas se mantenía incluso como su fuente principal: el hombre sabía poner a su servicio ciertas fuerzas naturales. Utilizaba el fuego para cocer sus alimentos y más tarde para forjar las armas; sabía extraer el agua de la tierra, descender por los ríos, navegar a vela, utilizar la fuerza de la gravedad, domesticar al animal. Pero en su totalidad estos recursos fueron secundarios y de poco rendimiento. La sociedad ateniense del siglo VI o la del Cuatrocientos florentino, sabían utilizar en forma armoniosa las fuerzas naturales, pero la construcción de templos y palacios se hizo, en lo esencial, sólo por obra de la energía humana. Es cierto que el hombre podía reducir una ciudad a cenizas o hacer del Sahara un desierto, pero esta explosión de energía, una vez desatada, escapaba a su poder de control.
+
+Es posible dar un valor aproximado a la cantidad de energía física de que disponían las sociedades tradicionales. El ser humano quemaba un promedio de 2.500 calorías diarias, de las cuales cuatro quintos servían únicamente para mantenerle vivo, hacer latir su corazón y accionar su cerebro. El remanente se podía aplicar a diversas tareas, pero no todo era transformable en trabajo. No sólo se aplicaba a los juegos de la infancia, sino también, y sobre todo, a las actividades de sobrevivencia cotidiana: levantarse, preparar los alimentos, protegerse contra el frío o contra la amenaza de los otros. Privado del impulso de sus actividades, el hombre se ha vuelto inepto para el trabajo: la sociedad puede moldearlas, pero no puede suprimirlas, para destinar a otras tareas la energía que requieren. La costumbre, el lenguaje y el Derecho determinan la forma de alfarería que fabrica el esclavo, pero el amo no puede privar a su esclavo de techo, salvo privándose a sí mismo del esclavo. Sumando múltiples descargas pequeñas de energía individual, puestas a disposición de la colectividad, se construyeron templos, se trasladaron montañas, se tejieron vestimentas, se hicieron guerras, se transportó al monarca y se le honró.
+
+La energía estaba limitada, era función del nivel de la población, se abastecía del vigor del cuerpo. Su eficacia dependía del grado de desarrollo --y de distribución en la población-- de las herramientas manejables. La herramienta incorporaba la energía metabólica a la tarea. Jugaba con las fuerzas, ya fuera la de gravedad o la del viento, pero no ampliaba la fuerza de trabajo. Para disponer de más poder físico que el vecino había que avasallarle. Si el amo empleaba formas de energía humana, podía controlarlas únicamente si gobernaba sobre otros hombres. Cada yunta de bueyes requería un boyero para cuidarla y conducirla. Hasta el fuego de la forja requería de un guardián para cuidarlo. El poder político era el dominio de la voluntad de los demás, y el dominio de la fuerza física era la detentación de la autoridad.
+
+En las sociedades preindustriales, el poder político no podía controlar más que la energía _excedente_, proporcionada por la población. Cada ventaja en la eficiencia, obtenida gracias a una nueva herramienta o a un nuevo modo de organización, significaba para la población el riesgo de verse privada del control de ese excedente de energía. Todo aumento en la eficiencia permitía a la clase dominante apropiarse de una parte mayor de la energía total disponible. De modo que a la evolución de las técnicas correspondía una evolución paralela de las clases sociales. Se cobraban impuestos al individuo, quitándole una parte de su producto personal, o bien se le imponían trabajos obligatorios suplementarios. La ideología, la estructura de la economía, el armamento y el modo de vida favorecían esta concentración, en manos de unos cuantos, del dominio de la energía biológica aumentada.
+
+Sin embargo, este tipo de concentración no tiene los mismos efectos en una cultura u otra, sobre el reparto de los frutos del esfuerzo social. En el mejor de los casos, amplía el radio de acción para las energías personales. La sociedad campesina en Europa central, a finales de la Edad Media, es un buen ejemplo de ello. Tres invenciones recientes --el estribo, las herraduras para caballos y el arnés-- triplicaron el rendimiento del caballo. Equipado así, el arado tirado por un caballo hizo posible la rotación trienal de los cultivos, la explotación de nuevas tierras y, enganchado a una carreta, elevó al cuadrado el radio de acción del campesino, lo cual provocó el movimiento de concentración del _hábitat_ en poblaciones agrupadas en torno a una iglesia, más tarde a una escuela. En el peor de los casos, la concentración del poder, al disponer de la energía, condujo al establecimiento de grandes imperios, propagados por los ejércitos mercenarios y alimentados por los campesinos reducidos al vasallaje.
+
+Hacia finales de la Edad de Hierro, o sea desde el reino de Agripa hasta el siglo de Watt, la cantidad total de energía disponible aumentó rápidamente. De hecho, la mayoría de las grandes mutaciones técnicas anteriores al descubrimiento de la electricidad, se produjeron durante la alta Edad Media. La invención de los tres mástiles, sacando mejor partido de la fuerza del viento, hizo posible la navegación alrededor del mundo. La excavación de los canales europeos y la invención de la esclusa hicieron posibles los transportes regulares de cargamentos pesados. Los cerveceros, los tintoreros, los alfareros, los ladrilleros, los azucareros y los salineros se beneficiaron del perfeccionamiento y difusión de los molinos de viento y de agua. La forja a orillas del torrente sustituye a la fragua en el bosque; el martillo es reemplazado por los molinetes de pilón para triturar el mineral, y al canasto a espaldas del hombre, lo reemplaza la polea que permite levantar cargas. La fuerza hidráulica acciona sopletes para ventilar galerías y gracias a las norias se bombea el agua para drenar el fondo de la mina y el hombre se sumerge más adentro de la tierra. Aun se dice del campesino, detrás de su arado, que 'labora'; del minero se dice que 'trabaja'. Después, el carro, equipado de un tren delantero pivotante y de ejes móviles, permite duplicar la velocidad del desplazamiento, con lo cual, a partir del siglo XVIII, se benefician el correo y el transporte de pasajeros. Por primera vez en la historia del hombre es posible desplazarse a cien kilómetros por hora. Poblados y campos, unos más lentamente que los otros, fueron transformados, remodelados, poco a poco.
+
+En su libro _The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power_ , Lewis Mumford subraya las características específicas que convirtieron la actividad minera en prototipo de las formas ulteriores de mecanización:
+
+> "... indiferencia hacia los factores humanos, a la contaminación y a la destrucción del contorno, puesto el acento en el proceso fisicoquímico con miras a obtener el metal o el carburante deseado y, sobre todo, el aislamiento geográfico y mental del universo del granjero y del artesano, del mundo de la Iglesia, de la Universidad y de la Ciudad. Por su efecto destructor sobre el medio ambiente y su desprecio por los riesgos impuestos al hombre, la actividad minera se acerca mucho a la actividad guerrera --como la guerra, la mina produce con frecuencia un tipo de hombre duro y digno, habituado a afrontar el peligro y la muerte [...], el soldado en su mejor aspecto--. Pero el _animus_ destructor de la mina, su siniestra labor, su aura de miseria humana y la degradación del paisaje, todo eso lo transmite la actividad minera a las industrias que utilizan su producción. El costo social excede grandemente al beneficio mecánico".
+
+De manera que a la herramienta accionada al ritmo del hombre, sucedió un hombre actuando al ritmo de la herramienta, con lo cual, todas las modalidades humanas de actuar se vieron transformadas.
+
+## Un nuevo concepto del trabajo
+
+A finales de la Edad Media, el antiguo sueño del alquimista de fabricar un homúnculo en el laboratorio, poco a poco tomó la forma de la creación de robots para que trabajaran por el hombre, y de la educación del hombre para trabajar a su lado. Esta nueva actitud hacia la actividad productora se reflejaba en la introducción de una nueva palabra. _Tripaliare_ significaba torturar sobre el _trepalium_ , mencionado en el siglo VI como un armazón formado de tres troncos, suplicio que reemplazó en el mundo cristiano al de la cruz. En el siglo XII, la palabra trabajo significaba una prueba dolorosa. Hubo que esperar al siglo XVI para poder emplear la palabra 'trabajo' en lugar de obra o de labor. A la _obra_ ( _poiesis_ ) del hombre artista y libre, a la _labor_ ( _poneros_ ) del hombre apremiado por el otro o por la naturaleza, se agrega entonces el _trabajo_, al ritmo de la máquina. En seguida la palabra 'trabajador' desliza su sentido hacia 'labrador' y 'obrero': a fines del siglo XIX los tres términos apenas se distinguen.
+
+La ideología de la organización industrial, de la instrumentación y de la organización capitalista de la economía, aparece antes de lo que se ha dado en llamar Revolución Industrial. Desde la época de Bacon, los europeos comenzaron a realizar operaciones indicadoras de un nuevo estado mental: ganar tiempo, reducir el espacio, aumentar la energía, multiplicar los bienes, echar por la borda las normas naturales, prolongar la duración de la vida, sustituir los organismos vivos por mecanismos que los simulan o amplían una función particular. De estos imperativos se desarrollaron en nuestras sociedades los dogmas de la ciencia y de la técnica que tienen valor de axiomas porque no se les somete a análisis. El mismo cambio de mente se refleja en la transición del ritmo ritual a la regularidad mecánica, se pone el acento en la puntualidad, en la medida del espacio y en la contabilización de los votos, de manera que los objetos concretos y los sucesos complejos se transforman en _quanta_ abstracta. Esta pasión capitalista por un orden repetitivo mina el equilibrio cualitativo entre el obrero y su débil instrumentación.
+
+El surgimiento de nuevas formas de energía y de poder alteró la relación que el hombre mantenía con el tiempo. El préstamo a interés era condenado por la Iglesia como una práctica contra natura; el dinero era, por naturaleza, un medio de cambio para comprar lo necesario, no un capital que pudiera _trabajar_ o dar frutos. En el siglo XVII, la Iglesia misma abandona esta concepción, aunque a su pesar, para aceptar el hecho de que los cristianos se habían convertido en capitalistas comerciantes. El uso del reloj se generaliza y, con él, la idea de la 'falta' de tiempo. El tiempo se transforma en dinero: «he ganado tiempo»; «me sobra tiempo, ¿cómo voy a gastarlo?»; «me falta tiempo»; «¡no puedo permitirme el lujo de derrocharlo, ganar una hora, ya es ganancia!»
+
+Pronto se comenzó a considerar abiertamente al hombre como una fuente de energía. Se trató de medir la prestación diaria máxima que se podía obtener de un hombre, luego a comparar el costo de manutención y la potencia del hombre con la del caballo. El hombre fue redefinido como fuente de energía mecánica. Se observó que los galeotes no eran muy eficientes porque permanecían sujetos al movimiento simple del remo. En cambio, los prisioneros condenados al suplicio de la ardilla, utilizado aún en el siglo XIX en las prisiones inglesas, proporcionaban una potencia rotativa capaz de alimentar cualquier máquina nueva.
+
+La nueva relación del hombre con su instrumentalización echa raíces durante la Revolución Industrial; como, a su vez, el capitalismo, en el siglo XVI, reclamó nuevas fuentes de energía. La máquina a vapor es más un efecto de esta sed de energía que una causa de la Revolución Industrial. Con el ferrocarril, esta preciosa máquina se vuelve móvil y el hombre se hace usuario. En 1782, la diligencia franqueó los cien kilómetros por día entre París y Marsella; en 1855, Napoleón III se ufanaba de recorrer cien kilómetros por hora. Poco a poco, la máquina puso al hombre en movimiento: en 1900, un trabajador francés, no empleado en la agricultura, alcanzaba en promedio treinta veces más kilómetros que su homónimo en 1850. Llega entonces el fin de la Edad de Hierro y a la vez el de la Revolución Industrial. La capacidad de moverse se sustituye por el recurso a los transportes. El hacer en serie reemplaza al _savoir-faire_[^n03], la industrialización se convierte en norma.
+
+En el siglo XX, el hombre pone en explotación gigantescas reservas naturales de energía. El nivel energético así logrado establece sus propias normas, determina los caracteres técnicos de la herramienta, más aún, el nuevo emplazamiento del hombre. A la obra, a la labor, al trabajo, viene a agregarse el servicio de la máquina: obligado a adaptarse a su ritmo, el trabajador se transforma en operador de motores o en empleado de oficina. Y el ritmo de la producción exige la docilidad del consumidor que acepta un producto estandarizado y condicionado.
+
+A partir de entonces, disminuye la necesidad de jornaleros en el campo y el siervo deja de ser rentable. También el trabajador deja de ser rentable, desde que la automatización logra por medio de la industrialización, la franca transformación que la producción en masa ha perseguido. El encanto discreto del condicionamiento abstracto de la mega-máquina reemplaza el efecto del chasquido del látigo en el oído del labrador esclavo, y el avance implacable de la cadena sin fin desencadena el gesto estereotipado del esclavo.
+
+Así, pues, hemos revisado cuatro niveles energéticos que pueden marcar la organización de una sociedad, la estructura de sus herramientas y el estilo dominante de sus actividades productoras. Esas cuatro organizaciones circunscriben, respectivamente, el campo de la obra independiente y creadora, de la labor bajo la ley de la necesidad, del trabajo al ritmo de la cadena sin fin y del funcionamiento 'condicionado operacionalmente' dentro de la mega- máquina. La manera en que estos diferentes tipos de actividad participan en los cambios de la economía y afrontan las leyes del mercado es reveladora de sus mutuas diferencias. El creador de una obra no puede ofrecerse él mismo en el mercado, solamente puede ofrecer el fruto de su actividad. El labrador y el trabajador pueden ofrecer a otro su fuerza y su competencia. En fin, el puesto del funcionario y del operador se ha convertido también en una mercancía. El derecho a manejar una máquina y a beneficiarse con los privilegios correspondientes se obtiene como resultado del consumo de una serie de tratamientos previos: currículum escolar, condicionamiento profesional, educación permanente.
+
+Todos somos hijos de nuestro tiempo y, como tales, nos resulta bien difícil imaginar un tipo de producción posindustrial, y por lo mismo, humana. Para nosotros, limitar la instrumentación industrial significa el retorno al infierno de la mina y al cronómetro de la fábrica, o al trabajo del granjero que compite con la agricultura mecanizada. El obrero que sumerge un neumático en una solución hirviente de ácido sulfúrico debe repetir ese gesto absurdo y agotador a cada gemido de la máquina, y está así realmente atado a la máquina. Por otra parte, el trabajo del campo ya no es lo que fue para el siervo o para el campesino tradicional. Para éstos era laborar un campo en función del crecimiento de las plantas, del apetito de los animales y del tiempo que haría al día siguiente. El obrero agrícola moderno que no dispone de herramientas manipulables, se encuentra en cambio en una situación absurda. Cogido entre dos fuegos, o debe agotarse para rivalizar con los rendimientos de los que poseen tractores y máquinas de usos múltiples, o bien debe hacer funcionar esta maquinaria moderna, consciente de estar fastidiado, explotado y chasqueado, con la sensación de ser una simple pieza de recambio para la mega- máquina. Es incapaz de imaginar la posibilidad de usar herramientas manejables que son, a la vez, menos fatigadoras que el antiguo arado, menos alienantes que la trilladora y más productivas que uno y otra.
+
+Ninguno de los tipos de instrumentos fabricados en el pasado posibilitaba un tipo de sociedad y un modo de actividad marcados a la vez con el sello de la eficiencia y de la convivencialidad. Pero hoy en día podemos concebir herramientas que permitan eliminar la esclavitud del hombre frente al hombre, sin someterlo a la máquina. La condición para esta posibilidad es la reversión del cuadro de las instituciones que rigen la aplicación de los resultados de las ciencias y de las técnicas. En nuestros días, el avance científico se identifica con la sustitución de la iniciativa humana por la instrumentación programada, pero lo que, de esa manera, se toma por efecto de la lógica del saber, no es en realidad más que la consecuencia de un prejuicio ideológico.
+
+La convicción común es que la ciencia y la técnica apoyan el modo industrial de producción, y que, por este hecho, imponen el reemplazo de todos los instrumentos específicamente relacionados con un trabajo autónomo y creador. Pero semejante proceso no está implícito en los descubrimientos científicos, y no es una consecuencia ineluctable de su aplicación. Lejos de ello, es el resultado de la decisión absoluta en favor del desarrollo del modo industrial de producción: la investigación se esfuerza por reducir en todas partes los obstáculos secundarios que entraban en el crecimiento de un determinado proceso; bajo una programación a largo plazo, se adorna como si se tratara de un logro costoso, realizado con gran esfuerzo en interés del público. En realidad, la investigación está casi totalmente al servicio del desarrollo industrial. Pero una técnica avanzada podría reducir el peso de la labor y, de mil maneras, servir también a la expansión de la obra de producción personal. Las ciencias de la naturaleza y las ciencias del hombre podrían aplicarse a crear herramientas, a trazar su marco de utilización y forjar sus reglas de empleo para alcanzar una incesante recreación de la persona, del grupo y del ambiente --un despliegue total de la iniciativa y de la imaginación de cada uno--.
+
+Hoy podemos comprender la naturaleza de una manera nueva. Todo consiste en saber para qué fines. Ha llegado la hora de elegir entre la constitución de una sociedad hiperindustrial, electrónica y cibernética, y el despliegue en un amplio abanico de las herramientas modernas y convivenciales. La misma cantidad de acero puede servir para producir tanto una sierra y una máquina de coser como un elemento industrial: en el primer caso se multiplicará por tres o por diez la eficacia de mil personas; en el segundo, gran parte del _savoir-faire_ perderá su razón de ser. Se debe elegir entre distribuir a millones de personas, al mismo tiempo, la imagen a colores de un tipo agitándose sobre la pantalla, a conceder a cada grupo la posibilidad de producir y distribuir sus propios programas en centros de vídeo. En el primer caso, la técnica está puesta al servicio de la promoción del especialista, regida por burócratas. Cada vez, más planificadores harán estudios de mercado, elaborarán equilibrios planificados y moldearán la demanda de más y más gente en un número mayor de sectores. Habrá siempre más cosas útiles entregadas a los inútiles. Pero se vislumbra una posibilidad. La ciencia se puede emplear también para simplificar la instrumentación, para que cada uno sea capaz de moldear su medio ambiente inmediato, es decir, sea capaz de cargarse de sentido, cargando el mundo de signos.
+
+## La desprofesionalización
+
+### La medicina
+
+A semejanza de lo que hizo la Reforma al arrancar el monopolio de la escritura a los clérigos, podemos nosotros arrancar el enfermo a los médicos. No es necesario ser muy sabio para aplicar los descubrimientos fundamentales de la medicina moderna, reconocer y atender la mayoría de los males curables, para aliviar el sufrimiento del otro y acompañarle cuando se aproxima la muerte. Nos es difícil creerlo, porque, complicado a sabiendas, el ritual médico nos encubre la simplicidad de los actos. Conozco una niña norteamericana de diecisiete años que fue procesada por haber atendido la sífilis primaria de 130 camaradas de escuela. Un detalle de orden técnico, señalado por un experto, le valió el indulto: los resultados obtenidos fueron, estadísticamente, mejores que los del Servicio de Salud. Seis semanas después del tratamiento ella logró exámenes de control satisfactorios de todos sus pacientes, sin excepción. Se trata de saber si el progreso debe significar independencia progresiva o progresiva dependencia.
+
+La posibilidad de confiar la atención médica a no especializados va en contra de nuestra concepción del mayor bienestar, debido a la organización establecida por la medicina. Concebida como una _empresa industrial_, está en manos de _productores_ (médicos, hospitales, laboratorios, farmacéuticos) que estimulan la difusión de procedimientos avanzados, costosos y complicados, reduciendo así al enfermo y a sus cercanos al estatus de clientes dóciles. Organizada como sistema de distribución social de beneficencia, la medicina incita a la población a luchar por unos siempre crecientes cuidados dispensados por profesionales en materia de higiene, de anestesia o de asistencia a los moribundos. Antaño el deseo de justicia distributiva se basaba en la confianza en la autonomía. Actualmente, congelada en el monopolio de una _jerarquía monolítica_, la medicina protege sus fronteras impulsando la formación de una valla de para-profesionales a cuyos subtratamientos se somete al enfermo, que antes los recibía de sus allegados. Con esto la organización médica protege su monopolio ortodoxo contra la competencia desleal de toda curación obtenida por medios heterodoxos. En realidad, cualquiera puede cuidar de su prójimo y en este campo no todo es necesariamente materia de enseñanza. En una sociedad en que cualquiera podría y debería cuidar de su prójimo, simplemente unos serían más expertos que otros. En una sociedad en que se naciera y muriera en casa, o en que el lisiado y el idiota no fueran desterrados de la plaza pública, en que se supiera distinguir la vocación médica de la profesión de plomero, se encontrarían personas para ayudar a los demás a vivir, a sufrir y a morir.
+
+La complicidad evidente entre el profesional y su cliente no basta para explicar la resistencia del público a la idea de desprofesionalizar la atención. En la raíz de la impotencia del hombre industrializado se encuentra la otra función de la medicina actual, que sirve de ritual para conjurar la muerte. El paciente se confía al médico, no sólo a causa de su padecimiento, sino por miedo a la muerte, para protegerse de ella. La identificación de toda enfermedad con una amenaza de muerte es de origen bastante reciente. Al perder la diferenciación entre el alivio de una enfermedad curable y la preparación para aceptar un mal incurable, el médico moderno ha perdido el derecho de sus predecesores a distinguirse claramente del brujo y del charlatán; y su cliente ha perdido la capacidad de distinguir entre el alivio del sufrimiento y el recurso al conjuro. Con la celebración del ritual médico, el médico encubre la divergencia entre el hecho que profesa y la realidad que crea, entre la lucha contra el sufrimiento y la muerte por una parte, y el retardo de la muerte a costa de sufrimientos prolongados, por otra. La entereza de asistirse a sí mismo la tiene únicamente el hombre que tiene la entereza de enfrentarse a la muerte.
+
+### El sistema de transportes
+
+A comienzos de la década del treinta, bajo la presidencia de Lázaro Cárdenas, México fue dotado de un sistema moderno de transportes. En pocos años, las cuatro quintas partes de la población percibieron las ventajas del transporte motorizado. Las poblaciones principales fueron unidas por caminos o trochas. Camiones sólidos, sencillos y duraderos, hacían el trayecto a una velocidad inferior a treinta kilómetros por hora. Los pasajeros se apretaban en los bancos clavados al piso, mientras los equipajes y las mercancías iban atrás o sobre el techo. En distancias cortas, el camión no aventajaba a la gente habituada a caminar llevando pesadas cargas, pero daba a todos la posibilidad de recorrer distancias largas. El hombre ya no arrastraba su cerdo al mercado, lo llevaba consigo en el camión. Cualquiera, en México, podía ir a cualquier punto del país en unos cuantos días.
+
+A partir de 1945, cada año es mayor el gasto para el sistema vial. Se construyeron autopistas entre algunos centros importantes. Frágiles automóviles ruedan sobre carreteras bien asfaltadas. Los vehículos pesados van de una fábrica a la obra. Los viejos camiones para todo terreno y para todo uso han sido desplazados a las montañas. En la mayoría de los Estados, el campesino debe tomar un autobús para ir al mercado a comprar productos industrializados, pero le es imposible cargar en el vehículo a su cerdo, y se ve obligado a venderlo al comprador ambulante. Sin embargo, contribuye a financiar la construcción de carreteras que aprovechan los detentadores de diversos monopolios especializados. Está obligado a hacerlo, bajo el supuesto de que, en última instancia, también él será beneficiario del progreso.
+
+A cambio de un trayecto ocasional sobre el asiento tapizado de un autobús con aire acondicionado, el hombre medio ha perdido mucho de la movilidad que le garantizaba el sistema antiguo, sin que por ello haya ganado en libertad. Un estudio hecho en dos de los grandes estados típicos de México --uno desértico, el otro montañoso y tropical-- confirma lo que decimos. Menos del uno por ciento de la población de esos dos estados ha recorrido en 1970 más de veinte kilómetros en menos de una hora. Un sistema de bicicletas o de carretas, motorizadas quizás, hubiera representado para el 99% de la población una solución técnicamente mucho más eficaz que la tan cacareada red de carreteras. Esta clase de vehículos pueden construirse y mantenerse a costos relativamente bajos, y podrían moverse por redes viales análogas a las del Imperio Inca. El argumento en favor de la producción masiva de automóviles y de carreteras es que ellas son condición del desarrollo, que sin ellas una región queda desconectada del mercado mundial. Queda por ver si la integración al mercado monetario, que en nuestros días es un símbolo luminoso, es realmente la meta del desarrollo.
+
+Desde hace algunos años se empieza a admitir que los automóviles, en la forma en que se utilizan, no son eficaces. Se atribuye esta falta de eficiencia al hecho de que los vehículos se han concebido para la propiedad privada y no para el bien público. En realidad, el sistema moderno de transportes no es eficiente porque todo incremento en velocidad se asimila a un progreso en la circulación. Al igual que el imperativo de mayor bienestar a toda costa, la carrera por la velocidad es una forma de desorden mental. En el país capitalista el viaje largo es una cuestión de dinero. En el país socialista, es una cuestión de poder. La velocidad es un nuevo factor de estratificación social en las sociedades supereficientes.
+
+La intoxicación por la velocidad es un buen campo para el control social de las condiciones del desarrollo. En Estados Unidos, la industria de los transportes, en todas sus formas, devora el 23% del presupuesto total de la nación, consume el 35% de la energía y, al mismo tiempo, es la fuente principal de contaminación y la razón más poderosa del endeudamiento de las familias. Esta misma industria con frecuencia consume una fracción aún mayor del presupuesto anual de las municipalidades latinoamericanas. Y lo que en las estadísticas aparece bajo la rúbrica 'desarrollo', es en realidad el vehículo motorizado del médico o del político. Cuesta más caro al conjunto de la población que a los egipcios la construcción de la pirámide de Keops.
+
+Tailandia, por ejemplo, es célebre en la historia por su sistema de canales, los _klongs_. Estos canales cubrían con su red todo el país. Garantizaban la circulación de los hombres, del arroz y de los impuestos. Ciertos poblados quedaban aislados durante la temporada seca, pero el ritmo estacional de la vida hacía de este aislamiento periódico ocasión para la meditación y las celebraciones. Un pueblo que se concede largas vacaciones y las llena de actividades, ciertamente no es un pueblo pobre. Durante los últimos cinco años, los canales más importantes han sido rellenados y transformados en carreteras. A los conductores de autobús se les paga por kilómetro, y los vehículos aún son poco numerosos. Asimismo, en un corto plazo, los tailandeses probablemente batirán los records mundiales de velocidad en autobús. Pero habrán de pagar cara la destrucción de las milenarias vías acuáticas. Los economistas dicen que el autobús y los automóviles inyectan dinero a la economía. Esto es cierto, ¿pero a qué precio? ¿Cuántas familias van a perder su ancestral embarcación y, con ella, la libertad? Jamás los automovilistas hubieran podido competir con ellas si el Banco Mundial no les hubiera pagado las carreteras y si el gobierno tailandés no hubiera promulgado nuevas leyes que autorizaran la profanación de los canales.
+
+### La industria de la construcción
+
+El Derecho y las Finanzas están detrás de la industria de la construcción, dándole poder para sustraer al hombre la facultad de construir su propia casa. Últimamente, en más de un país de América Latina se han lanzado programas destinados a dar a cada trabajador 'un alojamiento decente'. Al principio se establecieron nuevas normas para la construcción de unidades habitacionales. Éstas estaban destinadas a proteger al adquisidor de los abusos de la industria de la construcción. Pero, paradójicamente, estas mismas normas han privado a un número mayor de gente de la posibilidad tradicional de construirse su casa. Este nuevo código habitacional dicta condiciones mínimas que un trabajador, al construirse su casa en el tiempo libre, no puede satisfacer. Aún más, el solo alquiler de una vivienda cualquiera construida industrialmente sobrepasa el ingreso del ochenta por ciento de la población. Este 'alojamiento decente', como se dice, no puede ser ocupado más que por gente acomodada o por aquellos a quienes la ley concede una subvención para vivienda.
+
+Los alojamientos que no satisfacen las normas industriales se declaran peligrosos e insalubres. Se rehúsa ayuda pública a la aplastante mayoría de la población que no tiene medios para comprar una casa, pero que bien podría construirla. Los fondos públicos destinados al mejoramiento de las condiciones habitacionales en las barriadas pobres se destinan a la construcción de poblaciones nuevas cercanas a las capitales provinciales y regionales, en donde podrán vivir los funcionarios, los obreros sindicados y los que tienen conexiones. Toda esa gente es empleada del sector moderno de la economía, _tiene trabajo_. Se les puede clasificar entre los que hablan de su trabajo en sustantivo. Los que no trabajan o que trabajan de cuando en cuando, y los que apenas alcanzan el nivel de subsistencia, utilizan la forma verbal cuando, por casualidad, les es posible _trabajar_.
+
+Sólo las personas que tienen trabajo reciben subvenciones para construir su casa; además, todos los servicios públicos están organizados para hacerles la vida grata. En las grandes ciudades de América Latina, el diez por ciento de la población consume alrededor del cincuenta por ciento del agua potable. La mayoría de esas ciudades están en los altiplanos, donde el agua es muy escasa. El código de urbanismo impone normas mucho más bajas que las de los países ricos, pero, al prescribir cómo se deben construir las casas, crea un ambiente de escasez de alojamientos. La pretensión de una sociedad de ofrecer cada vez mejores viviendas sufre de la misma aberración que la de los médicos al pretender cada vez mayor bienestar, o la de los ingenieros al producir cada vez más velocidad. En lo abstracto se fijan fines imposibles de alcanzar, y en seguida se sustituyen los medios por los fines.
+
+Lo que ha sucedido en toda la América Latina en los años sesenta, incluyendo a Cuba, también ha sucedido en Massachusetts. En 1945, la tercera parte de las familias habitaba una casa que era enteramente obra de sus ocupantes, o había sido construida según sus planos y bajo su dirección. En 1970, la proporción de esas casas no representaba más que el once por ciento del total. Entretanto, el alojamiento se había convertido en el problema número uno. Aunque gracias a las nuevas herramientas y a los materiales disponibles, construir una casa se ha hecho más fácil en la actualidad, son las instituciones sociales --reglamentos, sindicatos, cláusulas hipotecarias-- las que se oponen a ello.
+
+La mayoría de la gente no se siente realmente en su casa, sino cuando una parte significativa del valor de ella es fruto de su propia labor. Una política convivencial se ocuparía primero de definir lo que es imposible que alguien obtenga por sí mismo, cuando se construye su casa. En consecuencia, aseguraría a cada uno el acceso a un mínimo de espacio, de agua, de elementos prefabricados de herramientas convivenciales, desde el barreno hasta el montacargas y, probablemente, también el acceso a un mínimo crédito.
+
+Semejante inversión de la política actual daría a una sociedad posindustrial moradas modernas tan atractivas para sus miembros como lo fueron, para los antiguos mayas, las casas que aún son la regla en Yucatán.
+
+Hoy día, la asistencia, los transportes, la vivienda, son concebidos como el resultado necesario de una acción que exige la intervención profesional. Esta intervención se concreta por la suma de _quanta_ sucesivas, siendo el _quantum_ la unidad mínima de medida. Tres años de escuela tienen peores efectos que la falta de escolarización: hacen del niño que la abandona un fracasado. Lo que es válido para la escuela lo es también para la medicina, los transportes, la vivienda, la agricultura o la justicia. Los transportes motorizados no son rentables sino a partir de cierta velocidad. La acción de la justicia no es rentable más que cuando la importancia del daño sufrido justifica el costo de la acción judicial. Sembrar nuevas especies no es rentable más que cuando el granjero dispone de suficiente tierra y capital. Es fatal que los instrumentos asombrosos, concebidos para obtener fines sociales definidos en abstracto, provean productos inaccesibles, por _quanta_ , a la mayoría de la gente. Por lo demás, esos instrumentos están _integrados_. Es la misma minoría la que utiliza la escuela, el avión, el teletipo y el aire acondicionado. La productividad exige recurrir a _quanta_ ya diseñados de valores definidos por las instituciones, y una gestión productiva exige que un mismo individuo tenga a la vez acceso a todos esos lotes bien condicionados. La demanda de cada producto específico es regulada por la ley de un medio instrumentado, que concurre a mantener las circunstancias producidas por las otras profesiones. La gente que vive entre su automóvil y su apartamento en un rascacielos, debe poder terminar su existencia en el hospital. Por definición, todos esos bienes son escasos y cada vez se vuelven más escasos, a medida que las profesiones se especializan y elevan el nivel de normas que las rigen. De allí que todo nuevo _quantum_ lanzado al mercado frustra a más gente de la que satisface.
+
+Las estadísticas que demuestran el crecimiento del producto y el elevado consumo per cápita de _quanta_ especializados encubren la amplitud de los costos invisibles. La gente es mejor educada, mejor atendida, mejor transportada, mejor divertida y con frecuencia mejor alimentada, bajo la sola condición de que, por unidad de medida de eso _mejor_, acepte dócilmente los objetivos fijados por los expertos. La posibilidad de establecer una sociedad convivencial depende de que se reconozca el carácter destructor del imperialismo político, económico y técnico. Es más importante para una sociedad posindustrial fijar criterios para la concepción de la instrumentación --y límites a su desarrollo-- que establecer objetivos de producción, como es el caso actualmente. Instituyendo el desarrollo obligatorio y sistemático de la producción, nuestra generación amenaza la supervivencia de la humanidad. Para traducir a la práctica la posibilidad teórica de un modo de vida posindustrial y convivencial, necesitamos señalar los umbrales a partir de los cuales la institución produce frustración, y los límites a partir de los cuales las herramientas ejercen un efecto destructor sobre la sociedad en su totalidad.
+
+# El equilibrio múltiple
+
+Abierto, el equilibrio humano es susceptible de modificarse en función de parámetros flexibles pero finitos: si los hombres pueden cambiar, lo hacen en el interior de ciertos límites. A la inversa, la dinámica del sistema industrial produce su propia inestabilidad: está organizada con miras a un crecimiento indefinido y para la creación ilimitada de necesidades nuevas que pronto se hacen coercitivas dentro del cuadro industrial. El modo industrial de producción, una vez establecido como dominante, aportará este o aquel bien de consumo, pero no pondrá límite a la industrialización de los valores. Semejante proceso de crecimiento pone al hombre una exigencia fuera de lugar: encontrar satisfacción en la sumisión a la lógica de la herramienta. Ahora bien, la estructura de la fuerza productiva moldea las relaciones sociales.
+
+La exigencia que la herramienta pone al hombre es cada vez más costosa --es el costo del ajuste del hombre al servicio de su herramienta, reflejado por el crecimiento del sector terciario en el producto global--. Cada vez hay mayor necesidad de manipular al hombre para vencer la resistencia de su equilibrio vital a la dinámica industrial; y esto toma la forma de múltiples terapias pedagógicas, médicas y administrativas. La educación produce consumidores competitivos, la medicina los mantiene con vida en el ambiente instrumentado que se les ha hecho indispensable, y la burocracia refleja la necesidad de que el cuerpo social ejerza su control sobre los individuos dedicados a un trabajo insensato. Que los seguros, la policía y el ejército hagan subir el costo de la defensa de los nuevos privilegios, refleja la situación inherente a una sociedad de consumo: es inevitable que comporte dos tipos de esclavos, aquellos que están intoxicados, y aquellos que ambicionan estarlo, los iniciados y los neófitos.
+
+Es hora de centrar el debate político sobre las formas en que la estructura de la fuerza productiva amenaza al hombre. Semejante debate será soslayado por los que se empeñan en prescribir paliativos, encubriendo así la causa profunda del bloqueo de los sistemas de salud, transportes, educación y vivienda, bloqueo que alcanza a las mismas instancias jurídica y política. La crisis ecológica se trata superficialmente, cuando no se subraya lo siguiente: la instalación de dispositivos anticontaminantes no tendrá efecto sino yendo acompañada de la disminución de la producción global. De otra manera, con esas medidas no se hará otra cosa que pasarles los desechos a nuestros vecinos, reservarlos a nuestros hijos o vaciarlos sobre el Tercer Mundo. Estrangular la contaminación creada localmente por una gran industria exige inversiones en material y en energía que recrean, en otra parte, el mismo daño a escala mayor. Si se imponen dispositivos anticontaminantes no se logra más que aumentar el costo unitario de producción. Ciertamente, se conserva un poco de aire respirable para la colectividad, puesto que menos gente puede darse el lujo de conducir un automóvil, dormir en una casa climatizada o tomar el avión para ir de pesca el fin de semana; en lugar de degradar el medio físico, se acentúan las brechas sociales. La estructura de las fuerzas de producción amenaza a las relaciones sociales más directamente que al funcionamiento biológico. Pasar del carbón al átomo es pasar del _smog_ de hoy a altos niveles de radiación mañana. Los norteamericanos, al transportar sus refinerías a ultramar, en donde el control de la contaminación es menos severo, se protegen contra los olores desagradables (aunque no así a los subdesarrollados), y se reservan la fetidez para Venezuela, sin disminuir el envenenamiento del planeta.
+
+El crecimiento desmesurado de la herramienta amenaza a las personas en forma radicalmente nueva y, al mismo tiempo, análoga a las formas clásicas de perjuicio y daño. La amenaza es nueva, en el sentido de que el verdugo y las víctimas se confunden en la dualidad operadores/clientes de instrumentos inexorablemente destructores. En este juego algunos salen ganando, pero todo el mundo, finalmente pierde.
+
+Señalaré cinco amenazas que entraña para la población mundial el desarrollo industrial avanzado:
+
+1. El supercrecimiento amenaza el derecho del hombre a arraigarse en el medio con el cual ha evolucionado.
+2. La industrialización amenaza el derecho del hombre a la autonomía en la acción.
+3. La sobreprogramación del hombre relacionada con su nuevo medio amenaza su _creatividad_.
+4. Por la complejidad que genera, el proceso de producción amenaza el derecho del hombre a la palabra, es decir, a la política.
+5. El fortalecimiento de los mecanismos de obsolescencia amenaza el derecho del hombre a su tradición, su recurso al precedente por medio del lenguaje, el mito y el ritual.
+
+Voy a describir estas cinco amenazas, a la vez distintas e interrelacionadas, regidas por una mortal inversión de los medios en fines. La frustración profunda engendrada por vía de la satisfacción obligatoria e instrumentada, constituye una _sexta amenaza_, que no es la menos sutil, pero que no podría situarse en ninguna violación determinada de un derecho ya definido.
+
+La clasificación que utilizo tiene por objeto hacer reconocible el daño (la _nueva_ amenaza) en terminología tradicional. Una herramienta anónima aplicada a salvar la parte dañada, infecta la herida: he aquí un hecho nuevo; por lo mismo, el mal que amenaza a todos no es nuevo. Esta primera clasificación de los perjuicios sufridos puede servir de base para acciones legales cuando las personas lesionadas por el funcionamiento de las herramientas quieran hacer valer su derecho. La explicación de estas teorías de daños puede servir para reconquistar principios de procedimiento político-jurídico con los cuales la gente puede descubrir, acusar y corregir el desequilibrio actual del complejo institucional de la industria.
+
+Yo postulo que los principios subyacentes a todo procedimiento son tres, y se aplican en el orden moral, político y jurídico:
+
+* a. Un conflicto planteado por una persona es legítimo.
+* b. Las decisiones que han sido incorporadas formalmente en la tradición de una sociedad y representan desde entonces una realidad histórica, pasan por delante de los procesos actuales de decisión.
+* c. El recurso al pueblo, a un consejo de pares, sella las decisiones comunitarias.
+
+Invertir de raíz el funcionamiento de nuestras instituciones más importantes, he ahí una revolución de una profundidad bien distinta que el asalto al haber o al poder, que la entrega al público de títulos de propiedad, como se nos propone. No se puede contemplar ni emprender semejante revolución más que llegando a reconquistar --y a ponerse de acuerdo sobre-- una estructura formal de procedimiento.
+
+Antes de entrar a precisar el único procedimiento político capaz de salvaguardar el equilibrio humano, conviene centrar el análisis sobre cada una de las dimensiones en donde se presenta la amenaza.
+
+## La degradación del medio ambiente
+
+La importancia del equilibrio entre el hombre y la biosfera es algo reconocido, y repentinamente ha comenzado a preocupar a mucha gente. La degradación del medio ambiente es dramática y espectacular. Durante años, en México, la circulación de automóviles ha aumentado con regularidad, bajo un cielo azul. Y luego, de golpe, el _smog_ se ha extendido, se ha vuelto peor que en Los Angeles. Venenos de un poder desconocido son inyectados en nuestro bio-sistema. No hay medio de eliminarlos, ni de saber cuánto necesitarán aumentar para reducir el planeta, repentinamente, a una cosa muerta, como ha sucedido ya con el lago de Erie o el lago Baikal. La antropogénesis es evolución dentro de un nicho cósmico. La Tierra es nuestra morada y he aquí que el hombre la amenaza.
+
+Generalmente se considera que el crecimiento demográfico, la sobreabundancia y la perversión de la herramienta, son las tres fuerzas que se conjugan para poner en peligro el equilibrio ecológico. Paul Ehrlich subraya el hecho de que si, honestamente, se quiere controlar la explosión demográfica y estabilizar el consumo, está uno expuesto a ser tratado de « _antipoblación_ y _antipobre_ ». Insiste: «medidas impopulares, que límiten a la vez los nacimientos y el consumo, son la única esperanza que tiene la humanidad de evitar una miseria sin precedente». Ehrlich, seguido por otros defensores del crecimiento cero de la población, quiere conjugar el control de los nacimientos y la eficiencia industrial. Por su parte, Barry Commoner pone el acento sobre el hecho de que la perversión de la herramienta, tercera incógnita de la ecuación, es la principal responsable de la reciente degradación del medio ambiente. Él se expone a la crítica de ser un demagogo rompe-máquinas. Commoner, al igual que muchos otros ecólogos, quiere reinstrumentar la industria, más bien que invertir, de raíz, la estructura de base de la herramienta.
+
+La fascinación provocada por la crisis ecológica ha limitado la discusión sobre la supervivencia a la consideración de un solo equilibrio, el amenazado por el instrumento contaminante. Pero este debate sigue siendo unidimensional y, por lo tanto, sin objeto, aun si se hace intervenir en él a tres variables, cada una de ellas tendiente a alterar el equilibrio entre el hombre y su medio ambiente. El crecimiento demográfico hace depender a mayor número de gente de recursos limitados, la sobreabundancia obliga a cada uno a depender más de la energía, y la herramienta destructora degrada esta energía sin beneficio.
+
+Si se consideran estas tres fuerzas como únicas amenazas y la biosfera como el objeto amenazado, dos cuestiones merecen solamente ser discutidas:
+
+* a. ¿Qué factor (o qué fuerza) ha degradado más los recursos genéticos, y cuál representa la amenaza mayor para el futuro próximo? * b. ¿Qué factor, en la medida en que sea reducible o invertible, requiere mayor atención de parte nuestra?
+
+Unos dicen que es más fácil ocuparse de la población, otros que es más cómodo reducir la producción que genera la entropía.
+
+La honestidad nos obliga a todos a reconocer la necesidad de una limitación de la procreación, del consumo y del despilfarro, pero importa más abandonar la ilusión de que las máquinas pueden trabajar por nosotros, o de que los terapeutas pueden capacitarnos para servirnos de ellas. La única solución a la crisis ecológica consiste en que la gente comprenda que sería más feliz si pudiera _trabajar_ junta y _prestarse asistencia_ mutuamente. Una inversión tal de la manera de ver las cosas reclama osadía intelectual. En efecto, se expone a una crítica que, por poco ilustrada, no por eso es menos dolorosa: no sólo será tratado de 'antipueblo' y 'antipobres', sino también de oscurantista opuesto a la escuela, al saber y al progreso. El desequilibrio ecológico es un recargo que se conjuga con otros para operar, cada uno dentro de una dimensión particular, la distorsión del equilibrio vital. Más adelante indicaré cómo, dentro de esta perspectiva, la superpoblación es el resultado de un desequilibrio de la educación, que la sobreabundancia proviene de la monopolización industrial de los valores personales, que la perversión de la herramienta es efecto ineluctable de la inversión de los medios en fines.
+
+El debate unidimensional que sostienen los poseedores de diversos remedios milagrosos, que conjugan el desarrollo industrial con la supervivencia en equidad, no puede más que alimentar la ilusoria esperanza de que, en alguna forma, la acción humana, convenientemente instrumentada, responderá a las exigencias del mundo concebido como Totalidad-Herramienta. Una supervivencia garantizada burocráticamente en estas condiciones significaría la expansión de la industrialización del sector terciario hasta el punto de que la orientación de la evolución mundial sería identificada con un sistema de producción y de reproducción centralmente planificado.
+
+Según los partidarios de esta solución --espíritus apegados a la instrumentación--, la conservación del medio físico podrá convertirse en la preocupación primordial del leviatán burocrático puesto al mando regulador de los niveles de reproducción, de demanda, de producción y de consumo. Semejante respuesta tecnocrática al crecimiento demográfico, a la contaminación y a la sobreabundancia, no puede basarse más que en un desarrollo creciente de la industrialización de los valores.
+
+La creencia en la posibilidad de semejante desarrollo se basa ella misma en un postulado erróneo, a saber:
+
+> "Los logros históricos de la ciencia y la tecnología han hecho posible el desplazamiento de los valores, su materialización en tareas técnicas. A partir de entonces, el problema candente es el de la redefinición de los valores en términos técnicos, como elementos de un proceso tecnológico. Técnicos, los nuevos fines serían operantes no solamente en el uso, sino fuera del proyecto y de la construcción de la instrumentación"[^n04].
+
+El restablecimiento de un equilibrio ecológico depende de la capacidad del cuerpo social para reaccionar contra la progresiva materialización de los valores, en su transformación en áreas técnicas. Al desatender esto, el hombre se encontrará cercado por los productos de su instrumentación, encerrado bajo siete llaves. Rodeado por un medio físico, social y psíquico que él se habrá forjado, se encontrará prisionero de su cápsula-instrumento, incapaz de volver a encontrar el antiguo medio ambiente con el cual se había formado. El equilibrio ecológico no se restablecerá si no reconocemos que únicamente la persona tiene fines, y que sólo puede trabajar para realizarlos.
+
+## El monopolio radical
+
+Las herramientas supereficientes pueden destruir el equilibrio entre el hombre y la naturaleza y destruir el medio ambiente. Pero las herramientas pueden ser supereficientes de una manera totalmente distinta: pueden alterar la relación entre lo que la gente necesita hacer por sí misma y lo que obtiene de la industria. Dentro de esta segunda dimensión, una producción supereficiente produce un monopolio radical.
+
+Por monopolio radical entiendo yo un tipo de dominación por un producto, más allá de lo que así se denomina habitualmente. En general, por monopolio se entiende el control exclusivo, por una firma, de los medios de producción o de venta de un bien o de un servicio. Se dirá que Coca-Cola tiene el monopolio de las bebidas suaves en Nicaragua, por ser el único fabricante de este tipo de bebidas que dispone de los medios modernos de publicidad. Nestlé impone su marca de chocolate al controlar el mercado de la materia prima; un fabricante de automóviles, al controlar las importaciones extranjeras; una cadena de televisión, obteniendo una licencia de exclusividad. Hace un siglo que los monopolios de este estilo han sido reconocidos como subproductos peligrosos del crecimiento industrial, habiéndose establecido dispositivos legales de control de muy poco resultado. Normalmente la legislación opuesta al establecimiento de monopolios ha intentado evitar que con ellos se imponga un límite al desarrollo; en ello nada tenía que ver la preocupación de proteger al individuo.
+
+Este primer tipo de monopolio reduce la elección que se le ofrece al consumidor, incluso le obliga a comprar un producto en el mercado, pero raras veces limita su libertad. Un hombre sediento puede desear una bebida no alcohólica, fresca y gaseosa, y verse limitado en la elección por haber una sola marca, pero queda libre de apagar su sed bebiendo cerveza o agua. Sólo cuando su sed se traduce, sin otra posibilidad, en la necesidad apremiante de comprar obligadamente una botella de determinada bebida, se establece el monopolio radical. Yo entiendo por este término, más que la dominación de una marca, la de un tipo de producto. En ese caso un proceso de producción industrial ejerce un control exclusivo sobre la satisfacción de una necesidad apremiante excluyendo en ese sentido todo recurso a las actividades no industriales.
+
+Es así como los transportes pueden ejercer el monopolio de la circulación. Los automóviles pueden moldear una ciudad a su imagen, eliminando prácticamente el desplazamiento a pie o en bicicleta, como sucede en Los Angeles. La construcción de carreteras para autobuses puede liquidar la circulación fluvial, como en Tailandia. Cuando el automóvil hace puramente nominal el derecho a caminar --no se trata ya de que haya en circulación más Chevrolets que Peugeots--, se da el monopolio radical. Que la gente se vea obligada a hacerse transportar y se vuelva impotente para circular sin motor, eso es monopolio radical. Lo que los transportes motorizados producen en la gente en virtud de ese monopolio radical es totalmente distinto e independiente de lo que hacen al quemar gasolina que podría ser transformada en alimentos para un mundo superpoblado. También es distinto del homicidio automovilístico. Ciertamente, los automóviles queman gasolina en holocausto. Ciertamente son costosos. Ciertamente, los norteamericanos celebraron la cienmilésima víctima del automóvil desde 1908\. Pero el monopolio radical establecido por el vehículo de motor tiene su propia forma de destruir. Los autos crean las distancias, y la velocidad, bajo todas sus formas, estrangula el espacio. Se abren autopistas a través de regiones superpobladas, luego se extorsiona a la gente un peaje para 'autorizarles' a franquear las distancias que el sistema de transporte exige. Este monopolio de los transportes, como una bestia monstruosa, devora el espacio. Aunque los aviones y los autobuses funcionaran como servicio público, sin contaminar el aire y el silencio, y sin agotar los recursos de energía, su velocidad inhumana no degradaría menos la movilidad natural del hombre, obligándole siempre a dedicar más tiempo a la circulación mecánica.
+
+La escuela también puede ejercer un monopolio radical sobre el saber al redefinirlo como educación. Mientras que la gente acepte la definición de la realidad que le da el maestro, los autodidactos llevarán la etiqueta oficial de 'no educados'. La medicina moderna, por su parte, priva a los que sufren de los cuidados que no están bajo prescripción médica. Hay monopolio radical cuando la herramienta programada despoja al individuo de su posibilidad de hacer. Esta dominación de la herramienta instaura el consumo obligatorio y con ello limita la autonomía de la persona. Es un tipo particular de control social reforzado por el consumo obligatorio de una producción en masa que sólo las grandes industrias pueden garantizar.
+
+El hecho de que las empresas organizadas de pompas fúnebres lleguen a controlar los entierros demuestra cómo funciona un monopolio radical y en qué difiere de otras formas de comportamiento cultural. En México, apenas hace una generación, cavar la fosa y bendecir el cadáver eran las dos únicas funciones practicadas por especialistas: el sepulturero y el sacerdote. Una muerte en familia creaba obligaciones sociales, de las que se hacían cargo los parientes cercanos. El velorio, las exequias y la comida tenían por función armonizar disputas, dar rienda suelta al dolor, celebrar la vida y la fatalidad de la muerte. La mayoría de los usos, en esa oportunidad, eran de naturaleza ritual, objeto de reglas precisas que diferían de una región a otra. Luego se instalaron las empresas de pompas fúnebres en todas las grandes ciudades. Al principio les fue difícil encontrar clientes, porque la gente aún sabía enterrar a sus muertos. En los años sesenta, estas empresas adquirieron el control de nuevos cementerios y comenzaron a ofrecer servicio completo, incluyendo el ataúd, la ceremonia y el embalsamamiento del difunto. Ahora se ha promulgado una ley que establece, como obligatorio, recurrir a los buenos oficios de los sepultureros. Mientras tenga el control del cadáver, el patrón de pompas fúnebres tendrá el monopolio radical del entierro, así como la medicina está a punto de tomar el de la muerte.
+
+La reciente controversia sobre los servicios médicos en Estados Unidos echa una luz brutal sobre la fortaleza que representa un monopolio radical. En la discusión, cada partido político hace del servicio a la enfermedad un problema candente y, por ese hecho, relega el servicio de la salud a un campo donde la política tiene poco que decir. Cada partido promete más dinero a los médicos, a los hospitales y a los farmacéuticos. Con estas promesas no se beneficia la gran masa, pero contribuyen a acrecentar el poder, detentado por una minoría de especialistas, de determinar las herramientas de que ha de servirse el hombre para conservar la salud, cuidar la enfermedad y combatir la muerte. Más dinero revalidará el embargo que ejerce la industria de la salud sobre los fondos públicos, aumentando su prestigio y su poder arbitrario. Puesto en manos de una minoría, semejante poder aumentará el sufrimiento humano y disminuirá la iniciativa de la persona. Se destinará más dinero a las herramientas que no hacen más que retardar una muerte segura, y a servicios que mutilan aún más los derechos elementales de aquellos que quieren cuidarse unos a otros. Más dinero gastado bajo el control de especialistas de la salud significa más gente condicionada en forma operacional para jugar el papel del enfermo, papel que ni siquiera tienen el derecho a jugar cuando les da la gana. Una vez que se acepta este papel, sus necesidades más simples no se pueden satisfacer sin pasar por servicios que, por definición, son profesionales, y, por tanto, sometidos a la escasez.
+
+Los hombres disponen de la capacidad innata de cuidarse, reconfortarse, desplazarse, adquirir conocimientos, construir sus moradas y enterrar a sus muertos. Cada uno de estos poderes responde a una necesidad. Los medios para satisfacer estas necesidades no faltan: mientras los hombres sigan dependiendo de lo que puedan hacer por y para sí mismos, el recurso a los profesionales será marginal. Estas actividades tienen un valor de uso y no han sido afectadas por el valor de cambio. Su _ejercicio_ no se considera un _trabajo_.
+
+Estas satisfacciones elementales se ratifican cuando el medio ambiente social ha sido transformado de tal suerte que las necesidades primordiales ya no pueden ser satisfechas fuera del comercio. Y un monopolio radical se establece cuando la gente abandona su capacidad innata de hacer lo que puede por sí misma y por los demás, a cambio de algo 'mejor' que sólo puede producir para ellos una herramienta dominante. El monopolio radical refleja la industrialización de los valores. La respuesta personal la sustituye por el objeto estandarizado; crea nuevas formas de escasez y un nuevo instrumento de medida y, por lo tanto, de clasificación del nivel de consumo. Esta reclasificación provoca el alza en el costo unitario de la prestación del servicio, modula la distribución de privilegios, limita el acceso a los recursos, e instala a la gente dentro de la dependencia. Es necesario establecer una defensa contra el monopolio radical. Es necesario defender a la gente contra la muerte y la sepultura estandarizadas, contra el consumo que les es impuesto por el interés de la libre empresa de los médicos y los sepultureros, o por el gobierno en nombre de la higiene. Esta defensa la necesitan, aun cuando la mayoría de ellos son ya tributarios de los servicios especializados. Si no se reconoce la necesidad de una defensa contra el monopolio radical, éste reforzará y afinará su instrumentación, hasta conducir a que el umbral humano de resistencia a la inacción y a la pasividad sea traspuesto.
+
+No siempre es fácil determinar lo que constituye el consumo obligatorio. El monopolio escolar no se basa primordialmente sobre una ley que sancione a los padres o a sus hijos por la deserción escolar. No es que no existan leyes semejantes, pero la escuela se apoya en otra táctica: la segregación de los no escolarizados, la centralización de la instrumentación del saber bajo el control de los maestros, el tratamiento social privilegiado de los estudiantes. Si bien es importante defenderse contra las leyes que hacen obligatorias la educación, o la vacunación o la prolongación de la vida humana, esto no basta. Los procedimientos que actualmente permiten protegerse contra la privación de un bien o de un derecho deben extenderse al caso de que las partes amenazadas quieran defenderse de la obligación de consumir, y esto independientemente del tipo del consumo de que se trate. No se puede fijar por adelantado el umbral de intolerabilidad de un monopolio radical, pero se puede anticipar su amenaza. La legislación que define la naturaleza precisa del monopolio considerada como intolerable debe ser fruto de un proceso político.
+
+Es tan difícil defenderse contra la generalización del monopolio, como contra la extensión de la contaminación. La gente se enfrenta con mayor facilidad a un peligro que amenaza sus intereses privados que a uno que amenaza al cuerpo social en general. Tiene muchos más enemigos confesos el automóvil que el manejarlo. Los mismos que se oponen a los automóviles, porque contaminan el aire, el silencio y monopolizan la circulación, conducen el suyo y juzgan que su capacidad de contaminación es desestimable, y de ninguna manera tienen la sensación de alienar su libertad cuando van al volante. La defensa contra el monopolio es aún más difícil si se toman en cuenta los siguientes factores: por una parte la sociedad está ya plagada de autopistas, escuelas y hospitales; por otra la capacidad innata de que dispone el hombre para ejercer actos independientes está paralizada desde hace tiempo hasta parecer atrofiada; finalmente, las soluciones que ofrecen otra posibilidad, por ser simples, en apariencia quedan fuera del alcance de la imaginación. Es difícil desembarazarse del monopolio cuando éste ha congelado la forma del mundo físico, anquilosado el comportamiento y mutilado la imaginación. Cuando se descubre el monopolio radical, casi siempre ya es demasiado tarde.
+
+Un monopolio comercial se rompe a costa de la minoría que de él se beneficia, es decir, a costa de aquellos que habitualmente se las arreglan para escapar a los controles. Puesto que la colectividad soporta el costo del monopolio radical, éste no podrá romperse si esta misma colectividad no toma conciencia de que le iría mejor financiando la destrucción del monopolio, en vez de su perpetuación. Y no aceptará el pago de este precio si no pone en la balanza, de un lado las promesas de una sociedad convivencial y del otro los espejismos de una sociedad de progresos. La gente elegirá la bicicleta cuando haya calculado bien el precio que paga por los vehículos rápidos. Nadie aceptará pagar si confunde la convivencialidad con la indigencia.
+
+Ciertos síntomas del monopolio radical comienzan a apuntar en la conciencia social, y sobre todo éste: aun en los países superdesarrollados, cualquiera que sea su régimen político, la tasa de crecimiento de la frustración excede grandemente a la de la producción. Ciertamente, las políticas de acomodo de la frustración fácilmente distraen la atención de la índole profunda del monopolio. Pero cada éxito superficial, que corrige distorsiones y diluye la crítica en reformas vagas, arraiga más sólidamente el monopolio a que nos referimos.
+
+El primer paliativo es la defensa del consumidor. El consumidor no puede pasarse sin un automóvil. Compra ésta o aquella marca. Descubre que la mayoría de los automóviles son peligrosos, no importa a qué velocidad. Entonces se organiza con otros consumidores para obtener automóviles más seguros, de mejor calidad y más duraderos. La victoria del consumidor es una victoria pírrica: se gana otra vez la confianza en los vehículos superpotentes (públicos o privados), lo que significa más dependencia colectiva hacia ellos y siempre más frustración para los que andan a pie porque tienen que hacerlo, o porque así lo quieren.
+
+Que los consumidores 'enganchados' a un producto se organicen para defenderse tiene como efecto inmediato aumentar la calidad de la droga suministrada y la potencia del proveedor y, en última instancia, puede llevar al desarrollo a encontrar sus propios límites: es posible que los automóviles lleguen a ser algún día demasiado costosos para la compra y los medicamentos demasiado violentos para los ensayos. Es exacerbando las contradicciones inherentes a tal proceso de industrialización de los valores como las mayorías pueden, por sí mismas, llegar a tomar plena conciencia de estas contradicciones. Es posible que el consumidor sagaz, que elige sus compras, llegue a descubrir que está mejor servido arreglándoselas por sí solo.
+
+El segundo paliativo, que tiende a igualar la tasa de crecimiento de la producción, es el de la frustración y la planificación. La ilusión imperante es que los planificadores, animados de ideales socialistas, pueden de alguna manera crear una sociedad socialista en donde los trabajadores industriales representarán la mayoría. Quienes sostienen esta idea desatienden el siguiente hecho: el margen de adaptación de instrumentos anticonvivenciales (que manipulan a la persona) a una sociedad socialista es extremadamente estrecho. El recurso a los transportes, a la educación o la medicina, una vez que se establece su gratuidad, corre el riesgo de ser reforzado por los guardianes del orden moral: se acusará al subconsumidor de sabotear el esfuerzo nacional. En una economía de mercado, quien quiere cuidarse la gripe quedándose en la cama es acusado por dejar de ganar. En una sociedad que apela 'al pueblo' para alcanzar objetivos de producción determinados desde arriba, el resistirse a consumir la medicina se asimila a una profesión de inmoralidad pública. La defensa contra el monopolio radical es posible bajo una condición: que se obtenga, en el plano político, un acuerdo unánime sobre la necesidad de poner término al crecimiento. Este consenso se sitúa en oposición directa a la actitud subyacente en todas las oposiciones políticas, y que consiste en reclamar más cosas útiles para más gente inútil.
+
+El equilibrio entre el hombre y su medio, por una parte, y por otra, entre la posibilidad de ejercer una actividad creativa y la suma de necesidades elementales a satisfacer en esa forma, da un doble equilibrio que se aproxima actualmente al punto de ruptura. Sin embargo, la gran mayoría no se siente preocupada. Debo explicar aquí por qué esta gran mayoría es ciega o impotente ante el peligro. Creo que la ceguera se debe a un tercer equilibrio: el del saber; en cuanto a la importancia, es el hecho de la perturbación de un cuarto equilibrio, que yo llamo equilibrio del poder.
+
+## La sobreprogramación
+
+El equilibrio del saber es determinado por la relación de dos variables: por un lado, el saber que proviene de las relaciones creativas entre el hombre y su medio; por otro, el saber cosificado del hombre movido por su medio instrumentado.
+
+El primer saber es efecto de los nudos de relaciones que se establecen espontáneamente entre las personas, dentro del empleo de herramientas convivenciales. El segundo saber es el resultado de un amansamiento intencional y programado. El aprendizaje del lenguaje materno exime del primer saber, la ingestión de matemáticas en la escuela exime del segundo. Nadie sensato irá a decir que hablar, caminar u ocuparse de un niño sea resultado de una educación formal. Es distinto, de ordinario, tratándose de las matemáticas, la danza clásica o la pintura.
+
+El equilibrio del saber cambia, según el lugar y el tiempo. El rito es determinante: un musulmán sabe un poco de árabe gracias a su oración. Esta adquisición del saber se opera por interacción dentro del medio circunscrito por una tradición. De manera análoga los campesinos transmiten el folklore de su tierra. Las clases y las castas multiplican las oportunidades de aprender: el rico _sabe_ comportarse en la mesa y sabe conversar (subrayando además que 'eso no se aprende'), el pobre sabrá sobrevivir dignamente allí donde ninguna escuela ha enseñado a los ricos cómo hacerlo.
+
+Primero es la estructura de la herramienta para la adquisición del primer saber: mientras menos convivenciales son nuestras herramientas, más alimentan la instrucción. En ciertas tribus de reducido tamaño y de gran cohesión, el saber es compartido muy equitativamente entre la mayoría de sus miembros: cada uno sabe la mayor parte de lo que todo el mundo sabe. Ulteriormente, en el proceso de civilización, se introducen nuevas herramientas: más gente sabe más cosas, pero no todos saben hacer todas las cosas igualmente bien. La maestría, en todo caso, no implica todavía el monopolio de la comprensión: se puede tener la comprensión de lo que hace el herrero sin ser herrero, no es necesario ser cocinero para saber cómo se cocina. Este juego combinado de una información ampliamente extendida y de la aptitud general de sacarle partido, caracteriza a una sociedad donde prevalece la herramienta convivencial. Si la técnica del artesano puede ser comprendida al observar el trabajo, los recursos complejos que maneja no pueden adquirirse más que tras una larga operación disciplinada: el aprendizaje. El saber global de una sociedad florece cuando al mismo tiempo se desarrolla el saber adquirido espontáneamente y el saber recibido de un maestro; entonces el rigor y la libertad se conjugan armoniosamente. La extensión del campo del equilibrio del saber no puede llegar hasta el infinito; lleva en sí su propio límite. Este campo es optimizable, no es indefinido. Primero, porque el tiempo de la vida de un hombre es limitado. Segundo --y esto es inexorable-- porque la especialización de la herramienta y la división del trabajo están en interacción, y requieren, más allá de un punto determinado, una superprogramación del operador y del cliente. La mayor parte del saber de cada uno es pues efecto de la voluntad y del poder de otro. La cultura puede florecer en innumerables variedades, pero hay barreras materiales que no puede bordear.
+
+¿Dentro de qué ambiente nace el niño de las ciudades? Dentro de un conjunto complejo de sistemas que significan una cosa para quienes los conciben y otra para quienes los emplean. Colocado en contacto con miles de sistemas, colocado en sus terminales, el hombre de las ciudades sabe servirse del teléfono y de la televisión, pero no sabe cómo funcionan. La adquisición espontánea del saber está confinada a los mecanismos de ajuste a un confort masificado. El hombre de las ciudades cada vez tiene menos posibilidad de hacer las cosas a su antojo. Hacer la corte, la comida y el amor se convierten en materia docente. Desviado por y hacia la educación, el equilibrio del saber se degrada. La gente aprende lo que se le ha enseñado, pero ya no sabe por sí misma. Siente la necesidad de ser educada. El saber es pues un bien, y como todo bien puesto en el mercado, está sujeto a la escasez. Ocultar la naturaleza de esta escasez, es la función bastante costosa de una educación multiforme. La educación es la preparación programada para la 'vida activa', a través de la ingurgitación (engullir, tragar) de instrucciones masivas y estandarizadas, producidas por la escuela. Pero la educación es también la ramificación continua sobre el flujo de las informaciones mediatizadas sobre lo que pasa: es el 'mensaje' de cada bien manufacturado. A veces el mensaje está escrito sobre el envoltorio, se lee por fuerza. Si el producto es más elaborado, su forma, su color, las asociaciones provocadas, dictan al usuario la forma de empleo. Particularmente, la educación es permanente, como medicina de temporada, para el administrador, el policía y el obrero calificado, periódicamente sobrepasados por las innovaciones de su ramo. Cuando la gente se agota y debe volver sin cesar a los bancos de la escuela para recibir un baño de saber y seguridad, cuando el analista debe ser reprogramado para cada nueva generación de computadores, es que la educación realmente es un bien sujeto a la escasez. Es entonces cuando la educación se convierte en la cuestión, más candente para la sociedad y, al mismo tiempo, la más mistificante.
+
+En todas partes, la tasa de crecimiento del costo de la formación es superior a la del producto global. Hay dos interpretaciones posibles. Para una, la educación es un medio de alcanzar esos fines económicos. Desde este punto de vista la inversión del saber del hombre se requiere por la necesidad de elevar la productividad. La disparidad en las tasas de crecimiento del sector terciario terapéutico significa que la producción global se acerca al asíntoma. Para detener el peligro, es necesario encontrar el medio de aumentar la relación costo/beneficio dentro de la ortopedia pedagógica. Las escuelas serán las primeras afectadas en el proceso de racionalización de los mecanismos de capitalización del saber. En mi opinión esto es una lástima. Por destructora e ineficaz que sea la escuela, dado su carácter tradicional, asegura un mínimo de defensa al niño. Los institutores transformados en 'educadores' y liberados de los obstáculos inherentes al sistema escolar, podrían revelarse como 'condicionadores' horriblemente eficaces.
+
+El punto de partida de la segunda interpretación es opuesto: el sector terciario, sin que se le pueda asimilar sólo a la educación, es el producto social más precioso del crecimiento industrial. En ese sentido, la declinación de la utilidad marginal de la educación no podrá justificar una limitación en su producción. Al contrario, la sustitución de la demanda de bienes por la demanda de servicios, marca a la vez la transición de una sociedad hacia una economía estable y un alza en la 'calidad de la vida'. Nueve sobre diez de las proposiciones adelantadas sobre lo que será el año 2000 describen, en su último capitulo, la felicidad como una avalancha de consumo terciario.
+
+Estas dos interpretaciones desvían, ambas, el equilibrio del saber: concurren en el desarrollo de las técnicas de manipulación educativa y hacen abortar toda curiosidad personal. Considerar la educación como medio de producción o como producto de lujo viene a ser lo mismo, desde el momento en que es demandada. En los dos casos, el equilibrio del saber es desviado en favor de más enseñanza. Las dos posiciones descansan sobre el mismo postulado con un carácter de fatalidad: el mundo moderno es de tal manera artificial, alienado, hermético, que sobrepasa el alcance de cualquier mortal y no puede ser conocido más que por los grandes iniciados y sus discípulos.
+
+Sustituir el despertar del saber por el de la educación es ahogar el poeta en el hombre, es congelar su poder de dar sentido al mundo. Por poco que se le arranque de la naturaleza, que se le prive del trabajo creativo, que se le mutile su curiosidad, el hombre es desarraigado, maniatado, secado. Sobredeterminar el medio físico es hacerlo fisiológicamente hostil. Ahogar al hombre en el bienestar es encadenarlo al monopolio radical. Desbaratar el equilibrio del saber es hacer del hombre una marioneta de sus herramientas. Empantanado en su felicidad climatizada, el hombre es un gato castrado: no le queda sino la rabia que le hace matar o matarse.
+
+Siempre ha habido poetas y bufones para alzarse contra el aplastamiento del pensamiento creativo por el dogma. Metaforizando, denuncian el literal vacío cerebral. El humor apoya su demostración: lo serio es insensato. Ellos abren los ojos a lo maravilloso, disuelven lo cierto, destierran el temor y desatan los cuerpos. El profeta denuncia las creencias, desnuda las supersticiones, despierta a la gente, saca afuera la fuerza y la llama. Las intimidaciones que lanzan la poesía, la intuición y la teoría, al avance blindado del dogma sobre el espíritu, ¿serán capaces de lograr una revolución del despertar? Esto no es imposible. Pero para que el equilibrio del saber pueda ser restablecido, se precisa que el Estado y la Iglesia sean separados, que la burocracia del bienestar y la burocracia de la verdad sean divididas, que la acción política y el saber obligatorio sean diferenciados. Las palabras poéticas no harán estallar la sociedad sino metiéndose en el molde del proceso político.
+
+El Derecho ya ha servido para desvincular de las leyes la ideología. El Derecho que ha defendido ya al cuerpo social contra las pretensiones exageradas de sus clérigos, puede hacerlo ahora contra las de sus educadores. No es mucho lo que dista la obligación de ir a la escuela de la de ir a la iglesia. Un día, el Derecho podrá realizar la separación de la educación y de la política, y convertirla en principio constitutivo de la sociedad. Pero ya desde ahora, el Derecho puede servir para combatir la proliferación del sector terciario y su empleo en la reproducción de una sociedad de clases.
+
+Comprender verdaderamente el alza del costo de la educación supone conocer las dos fases del problema: primero la herramienta no convivencial tiene efectos educativos que alcanzan un umbral de intolerabilidad; segundo, una educación no instrumentalizada convivencialmente no es económicamente viable.
+
+El primer punto nos abre a la necesidad de una transición hacia una sociedad donde el trabajo, la recreación y la política, favorecieran el aprendizaje, una sociedad que funcionara con menos educación formal. El segundo nos abre la posibilidad de poner en vigor soluciones educativas que facilitaran una adquisición espontánea del saber y confinaran la enseñanza programada a casos limitados y claramente específicos. Para vencer _la crisis de comunicación_ hay que subrayar la distorsión paralela que existe en la instrumentación de la energía y de la información.
+
+En toda la superficie del planeta, el instrumento altamente capitalizado requiere de un hombre atiborrado de conocimientos almacenados. Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la racionalización de la producción ha penetrado en las regiones llamadas retrasadas y las metástasis industriales ejercen sobre la escuela una intensa demanda de personal programado. La proliferación del bienestar exige el condicionamiento apropiado para vivir en él. Lo que la gente aprende en las escuelas que se multiplican en Malasia o en Brasil es, ante todo, a medir el tiempo con el reloj del programador, estimar el adelanto con los anteojos del burócrata, apreciar el consumo creciente con el corazón del comerciante, y considerar la razón del trabajo con los ojos del responsable sindical. Esto no es el maestro quien se lo enseña, sino el recorrido programado, producido y, al mismo tiempo, obliterado por la estructura escolar. Lo que enseña el maestro no tiene ninguna importancia, desde el momento en que los niños deben pasarse centenares de horas reunidos en clases por edades, entrar en la rutina del programa (o _curriculum_ ), y recibir un diploma en función de su capacidad de someterse a él. ¿Qué se aprende en la escuela? Se aprende que mientras más horas se pasen en ella, más vale uno en el mercado. Se aprende a valorar el consumo escalonado de programas. Se aprende que todo lo que produce una institución dominante vale y cuesta caro, aun lo que no se ve, como la educación y la salud. Se aprende a valorar la promoción jerárquica, la sumisión y la pasividad, y hasta la desviación tipo, que el maestro interpretará como síntoma de creatividad. Se aprende a solicitar sin indisciplina los favores del burócrata que preside las sesiones cotidianas: profesor en la escuela, patrón en la fábrica. Se aprende a definirse como detentador de un lote de conocimientos en la especialización en que ha invertido su tiempo. Se aprende, finalmente, a aceptar sin rebelarse su lugar dentro de la sociedad, es decir la clase y la carrera precisas que corresponden respectivamente al nivel y al campo de especialización escolares.
+
+Las reglas de contratación en las industrias incipientes en los países pobres son tales que solamente los escolarizados ocupan las escasas plazas, por ser los únicos que en la escuela han aprendido a callarse. Estos puestos en la cadena son definidos como los más productivos, los mejor pagados, de manera que el acceso a los productos industriales es reservado a los escolarizados y prohibido a los no-escolarizados. Fabricados por la máquina, los zapatos, las bolsas, la ropa, los alimentos congelados y las bebidas gaseosas desplazan en el mercado a los bienes equivalentes, que eran producidos convivencialmente. La escuela sirve a la industrialización justificando en el Tercer Mundo la existencia de dos sectores, el del mercado y el de la subsistencia: el de la pobreza modernizada y el de una nueva miseria de los pobres. A medida y conforme la producción se concentra y se capitaliza, la escuela pública, para continuar en su papel de pantalla, cuesta más cara a los que asisten a ella, pero, sobre todo, hace pagar la cuenta a los que no asisten.
+
+La educación no se convierte en necesidad sólo para diplomar a la gente, para seleccionar a aquellos a quienes se les da trabajo, sino también para controlar a los otros que acceden al consumo. Es el mismo crecimiento industrial el que conduce a la educación a ejercer el control social indispensable para un uso eficiente de los productos. La industria de la vivienda en los países de América Latina es un buen ejemplo de las disfunciones educativas producidas por los arquitectos. En estos países las grandes ciudades están rodeadas de vastas zonas, _favelas_ , _barriadas_ o _poblaciones_, donde la gente levanta ella misma sus moradas. No costaría caro prefabricar elementos para viviendas y construcciones de servicios comunes fáciles de ubicar. La gente podría construirse moradas más duraderas, más confortables y salubres, al mismo tiempo que aprendería el empleo de nuevos materiales y de nuevos sistemas. En vez de ello, en vez de estimular la aptitud innata de las personas para moldear su propio ambiente, los gobiernos encajan en esas barriadas servicios comunes concebidos para una población instalada en casas de tipo moderno. Por su sola presencia, la escuela nueva, la carretera asfaltada y los puestos de policía en acero y vidrio, definen el edificio construido por los especialistas como modelo, y, de esa manera, imprimen a la vivienda que se construya uno mismo el sello de la barriada, reduciéndola a ser nada más que una choza. Semejante definición es implantada por la ley; niega el permiso de construir a la gente que no puede presentar un plano firmado por un arquitecto. Y es así como se priva a la gente de su aptitud natural de invertir su tiempo personal en la creación de valores de uso, y se les obliga a un trabajo asalariado: podrán entonces cambiar sus salarios contra el espacio industrialmente condicionado. Aquí también se les priva de la posibilidad de aprender construyendo.
+
+La sociedad industrial exige que unos sean programados para conducir camiones, otros para construir casas. Y a otros más hay que enseñarles a vivir en los grandes complejos habitacionales. Maestros de escuela, trabajadores sociales y policías trabajan mano a mano para mantener a individuos subpagados o semidesocupados, en casas que no pueden construir por sí mismos ni modificar. Así la suma economizada en la construcción de conjuntos habitacionales populares aumenta el costo de mantenimiento del inmueble y exige invertir un múltiplo del ahorro conseguido en gastos terciarios para instruir, animar, promover; es decir, para controlar, conformar y condicionar al locatario dócil. Para hacinar más gente sobre menos terreno, Brasil y Venezuela han hecho el experimento de construir grandes inmuebles. Primero fue necesario que la policía evacuara a la gente de sus tugurios y los reinstalara en los apartamentos. En seguida los trabajadores sociales se enfrentaron a la ruda tarea de socializar a inquilinos insuficientemente escolarizados para comprender por sí mismos que no se crían marranos negros en los balcones de un onceavo piso, y que no se siembran frijoles en la tina del baño.
+
+En Nueva York, la gente que no tiene doce años de escolaridad es considerada impedida: se convierte en inempleable y es controlada por trabajadores sociales que deciden cómo va a vivir. El monopolio radical de la herramienta supereficiente extorsiona del cuerpo social un creciente y costoso condicionamiento de sus clientes. Los automóviles producidos por Ford requieren, para ser reparados, mecánicos reinstruidos por la misma compañía. Los autores del 'milagro verde' sacan semillas de alto rendimiento que puede usar sólo una minoría que dispone del doble abono, del químico y del educador. Más salud, más velocidad o más cosechas significa individuos más receptivos, más pasivos, más disciplinados. Las escuelas productoras de control social, al tomar por su cuenta la mayor parte del costo de esas conquistas dudosas, lo encubren con ese mismo hecho.
+
+Al ceder a las presiones ejercidas sobre ella, en nombre del control social, la escuela alcanza y sobrepasa su segundo umbral critico. Los planificadores fabrican programas más variados y más complejos, cuya utilidad marginal declina por ese mismo hecho.
+
+Mientras la escuela ensancha el campo de sus pretensiones, otros servicios descubren su misión educadora. La prensa, la radio y la televisión ya no son únicamente medios de comunicación, desde el momento en que se les pone conscientemente al servicio de la integración social. Los semanarios que conocen la expansión, al llenarse de informaciones estereotipadas, se convierten en productos terminados, entregando completamente empaquetada una información filtrada, aséptica, predigerida. Esta 'mejor' información suplanta la antigua discusión del _foro_; so pretexto de informar, suscita un apetito dócil de alimentos ya preparados y mata la capacidad natural de seleccionar, dominar, organizar la información. Se ofrecen al público algunas estrellas o algunos especialistas vulgarizados por el embalador del saber, se confina la voz de los lectores a la correspondencia o a las encuestas que ellos envían dócilmente.
+
+La producción industrial y la comercialización masiva del saber cierran a la gente el acceso a herramientas para compartir el saber. Es el caso del libro. El libro es resultado de dos grandes invenciones: el alfabeto y la imprenta. La técnica del alfabeto y la de la imprenta son casi idealmente convivenciales. Todo el mundo, o casi todo el mundo, puede aprender su manejo y utilizarlos para sus propios fines. Son técnicas poco costosas. Se las toma o se las deja, como se quiera. Son difíciles de controlar por terceros. Así, el gobierno soviético parece impotente para impedir el _Samtzdat_ , esa edición y circulación clandestina de manuscritos.
+
+Al parecer, el alfabeto y la imprenta arrancan la custodia de la palabra a la empresa exclusiva del escriba. Gracias al alfabeto, el comerciante rompe el monopolio ejercido por los sacerdotes sobre el jeroglífico. Con el papel y el lápiz, y más tarde con la máquina de escribir y los medios modernos de reproducción, aparece un abanico de técnicas nuevas que, en sí mismas, inician una era de comunicación no especializada, verdaderamente convivencial para la conservación, reproducción y difusión de la palabra. Con la película y la cinta magnética aparecen nuevos sistemas de comunicación convivencial. Sin embargo, el privilegio acordado a las instituciones con estructuras manipuladoras ha puesto estas herramientas al servicio de una enseñanza aún más unívoca y monologada. La escuela amaestra al alumno para que se sirva de textos continuamente revisados. Difunde la ilusión de que sólo el escolarizado sabe leer, y refuerza la tendencia a no publicar más que sus obras. Produce consumidores de información y lectores de noticias técnicas. Las estadísticas dicen que los estudiantes leen menos libros no especializados desde que empieza a irles bien en sus exámenes. Cada vez hay más libros escritos para los especialistas educados, pero los diplomados cada vez leen menos por su cuenta. Cada vez la gente pasa más tiempo aprisionada en el programa definido por los nuevos directores de estudios: el editor, el productor y el programador. Es la misma gente que cada semana espera con avidez la salida de revistas como _Selecciones_.
+
+Las propias bibliotecas han sido puestas al servicio de un mundo escolarizado. A medida y conforme las van 'mejorando', el libro es colocado siempre más lejos del alcance del lector. Primero era el bibliotecario quien se interponía entre el libro y el lector, ahora el computador reemplaza al bibliotecario. Al colocar esos libros, almacenados en inmensos silos, a la disposición de un computador, el funcionamiento de la biblioteca pública de la ciudad de Nueva York se ha hecho tan costoso que ya no abre sus puertas más que de las diez a las dieciocho horas en días hábiles y el sábado sólo las entreabre. Esto significa que los libros se han convertido en instrumentos especializados de investigadores a quienes una beca libere de la escuela y del trabajo.
+
+En realidad, una biblioteca es un modelo de herramienta convivencial, un sitio que ofrece libre acceso y no hace obedecer a programas rígidos, un sitio donde se toma o se deja lo que se quiere, fuera de toda censura. Sobre este modelo, se pueden extender y se pueden organizar discotecas, filmotecas, fonotecas y videotecas públicas, donde la gente tendría ciertamente acceso a herramientas de producción. Dentro de estructuras análogas a la biblioteca, no sería difícil poner a disposición del público las herramientas, bien simples, que han hecho posible la mayoría de los adelantos científicos del siglo pasado.
+
+Los instrumentos de manipulación de los que se sirve la enseñanza hacen subir el precio del saber. Se plantea la pregunta de qué es lo que la gente debe aprender, y, en seguida, se invierte en un instrumento para enseñárselo. Valdría la pena aprender a preguntar primero cuáles son los tipos de herramientas que la gente desea, si quiere ir al encuentro del otro, de lo desconocido, del extranjero, del pasado. Los maestros de oficio se ríen de la idea de que las personas puedan sacar mayor ventaja del libre acceso a las herramientas del saber que de su enseñanza. Con frecuencia apoyan su escepticismo poniendo como ejemplo la decadencia de las bibliotecas públicas. No pueden ver que si éstas son poco frecuentadas es precisamente porque, en su gran mayoría, han sido organizadas como formidables instalaciones de enseñanza, y que se mantienen desiertas precisamente porque la gente ha sido amaestrada para reclamar instrucción.
+
+Ahora bien, los hombres no tienen necesidad de más enseñanza. Sólo necesitan aprender ciertas cosas. Hay que enseñarles a renunciar, cosa que no se aprende en la escuela, aprender a vivir dentro de ciertos límites, como exige, por ejemplo, la necesidad de responder a la situación de la natalidad. La supervivencia humana depende de la capacidad de los hombres para aprender muy pronto y por sí _mismos_ lo que _no pueden_ hacer. Los hombres deben aprender a controlar su reproducción, su consumo y el uso de las cosas. Es imposible _educar_ a la gente para la pobreza voluntaria, lo mismo que el dominio de sí mismo no puede ser el resultado de una manipulación. Es imposible _enseñar_ la renuncia gozosa y equilibrada en un mundo totalmente estructurado para producir siempre más, y mantener la ilusión de que esto cuesta cada vez menos.
+
+Es necesario que cada uno aprenda el porqué y el cómo de la contracepción. La razón es clara: el hombre ha evolucionado sobre una parcela del cosmos; confinado por los recursos de la ecosfera, su universo no puede admitir más que un número limitado de ocupantes. Por la técnica, ha modificado las características de su nicho ecológico. La ecosfera puede actualmente acoger más gente, cada vez menos adaptada vitalmente a su ambiente, cada vez pudiendo disponer de menos espacio, de menos capacidad, de menos tradición. La tentativa de fabricar un medio ambiente _mejor_ se ha revelado tan presuntuosa como la de mejorar la salud, la educación o la comunicación. El resultado es que ahora hay más gente que se siente cada vez menos a gusto. Los nuevos instrumentos, que han favorecido el crecimiento de la población, no pueden asegurar su supervivencia. La colocación de instrumentos aún más potentes, aumenta con más rapidez el número de frustrados que la cifra total de la población. En un mercado atestado, la falta se acentúa, y exige siempre mayor programación de la clientela.
+
+Toda planificación es garantizada por un factor clave, a saber, el control del número de gentes para las cuales se planifica. Pero, hasta el presente, toda planificación de la población ha fracasado: la gente no limita su reproducción sino por propia decisión. La paradoja es que el hombre opone máxima resistencia a la enseñanza que más necesita. Todo programa de control de la natalidad fundado sobre el modelo industrial fracasará ahí donde han fracasado la escuela y el hospital. Al principio, tendrá atractivo; más tarde vendrá la escalada del aborto y de la esterilización; finalmente, será el mazazo cerebral para perpetrar genocidios, paupericidios y otros megacidios.
+
+Sin la práctica de una contracepción voluntaria y eficaz, la humanidad será aplastada por su número, antes de ser aplastada por la potencia de su propia instrumentación. Pero la generalización de la contracepción no puede en ningún caso ser resultado de un instrumento milagroso. Una nueva práctica, opuesta a la presente, no puede resultar más que de una relación nueva del hombre con su herramienta. El control de la herramienta, al cual me refiero, exige la generalización de la contracepción. Pero la contracepción demanda, para ser eficaz, la generalización del estado mental convivencial que acompaña al control de la herramienta en cuestión.
+
+Los sistemas requeridos para controlar los nacimientos son el ejemplo-tipo de la herramienta convivencial moderna. Integran los datos de la ciencia más avanzada con las herramientas utilizables con un mínimo de buen sentido y de aprendizaje. Estos sistemas ofrecen nuevos medios de ejercer las prácticas milenarias de contracepción, de esterilización y de aborto. Por su bajo costo pueden llegar a ser accesibles a todos. En su variedad convienen a las creencias, ocupaciones y situaciones más diversas. Con toda evidencia, estas herramientas estructuran la relación que cada uno sostiene con su cuerpo y con los demás.
+
+El control de los nacimientos es una empresa que debe realizarse dentro de un horizonte temporal muy limitado. No puede darse sino de una manera convivencial. Es un contrasentido querer obligar al uso de la herramienta convivencial a la gente que, en lo demás, continúa estando condicionada al solo consumo. Es absurdo pedir a un campesino que se sirva del preservativo cuando se le _enseña a depender_ del médico para las inyecciones y las recetas, del juez para dirimir los litigios y del maestro para la alfabetización. Es un contrasentido legislar en la actualidad sobre el aborto como 'acto médico', cuando hoy es más simple que nunca reconocer el comienzo de una gravidez o interrumpirla. También es utópico imaginar que los médicos van a confiar las esterilizaciones a asistentes analfabetos formados para ello. El día en que los interesados se den cuenta de que esta operación delicada puede ser realizada igualmente, si no mejor, por un profano, siempre que disponga del cuidado y habilidad que requiere una práctica ancestral como la de tejer, por ejemplo, se habrá acabado el monopolio médico sobre operaciones poco costosas que pueden estar al alcance del mayor número. A medida que las herramientas posindustrial es racionales se extiendan, los tabúes del especialista seguirán a la instrumentación industrial en su caída como la siguieron en su gloria. La herramienta simple, pobre, transparente, es un servidor humilde; la herramienta elaborada, compleja, secreta, es un amo arrogante.
+
+## La polarización
+
+La industrialización multiplica la gente y las cosas. Los subprivilegiados crecen en número, en tanto que los privilegiados consumen siempre más. En consecuencia, el hambre crece entre los pobres y el temor entre los ricos. Llevado por el hambre y el sentimiento de impotencia, el pobre reclama una industrialización acelerada; impelido por el miedo y el deseo de proteger su mayor bienestar, el rico se embarca en una protección cada vez más explosiva y blindada. Mientras que el poder se polariza, la insatisfacción se generaliza. La posibilidad que se nos presenta de crear más felicidad para todo el mundo, con menos abundancia, queda relegada al punto amarillo de visión social.
+
+Esta ceguera es el hecho del desequilibrio en la balanza del saber. Los intoxicados por la educación resultan buenos consumidores y buenos usuarios. Consideran su crecimiento personal bajo la forma de una acumulación de bienes y de servicios producidos por la industria. Antes que hacer las cosas por sí mismos, prefieren recibirlas embaladas por la institución. Rechazan su capacidad innata de captar lo real. El desequilibrio del balance del saber explica cómo el despliegue del monopolio radical de bienes y servicios es casi imperceptible para el usuario. Pero no nos dice por qué éste se siente hasta tal punto impotente para modificar las disfunciones en la medida en que las percibe.
+
+Es allí donde interviene el efecto de un cuarto tipo de trastorno: la polarización creciente del poder. Bajo el empuje de la mega-máquina en expansión, el poder de decisión sobre el destino de todos se concentra en las manos de algunos. Y, dentro de este frenesí de crecimiento, las innovaciones que mejoran la suerte de la minoría privilegiada crecen aún más rápidamente que el producto global.
+
+Un alza del tres por ciento del nivel de vida norteamericano cuesta veinticinco veces más caro que un alza igual en la India. La India, sin embargo, es más poblada y prolífica que América del Norte. La condición del pobre puede mejorarse, siempre que el rico consuma menos, mientras que la condición del rico no puede mejorar sino a costa de la expoliación mortal del pobre. El rico pretende que al explotar al pobre le enriquece, puesto que, en última instancia crea la abundancia para todos. Las élites de los países pobres difunden esta fábula.
+
+El rico se enriquecerá y despojará más al pobre en el decenio que viene. El hecho de que el mercado internacional les suministre trigo impondrá a los países pobres la construcción de redes de transporte y de distribución a un precio social que, de hecho, hubiera bastado para transformar la agricultura local. Pero la angustia que nos oprime no debe, bajo ningún precio, impedirnos comprender bien la estructura del reparto del poder, pues ésta es la cuarta dimensión por donde el sobrecrecimiento ejerce sus efectos destructores. La industrialización sin freno fabrica la pobreza moderna. Es cierto que los pobres con ello disponen de un poco más de dinero, pero pueden hacer menos con sus pocos pesos. La modernización de la pobreza camina de la mano con la concentración del poder: es necesario comprender bien, o no se percibirá la naturaleza profunda de la polarización.
+
+La pobreza se moderniza: su umbral monetario se eleva porque nuevos productos industriales se presentan como bienes de primera necesidad, manteniéndose totalmente fuera del alcance económico de la gran mayoría. En el Tercer Mundo, el granjero pobre es expulsado de sus tierras por la revolución verde. Gana más como asalariado agrícola, pero sus hijos no comen como antes. El ciudadano norteamericano que gana diez veces más que el asalariado agrícola es, también, desesperadamente pobre. Los dos pagan cada vez más cara la creciente falta de bienestar.
+
+De manera complementaria, el distanciamiento entre ricos y pobres se acentúa, porque el control de la producción se centraliza con miras a producir siempre más para mayor número. Mientras que el alza de los umbrales de la pobreza es efecto de la estructura del producto industrial, el crecimiento del distanciamiento entre inermes y poderosos es consecuencia de la estructura de la herramienta. Quienes quieran resolver el primer aspecto del problema sin poner atención en el segundo, no hacen más que reemplazar la falta de cosas por la falta de voces. La redistribución del producto no es el remedio para la polarización del control.
+
+El impuesto es un paliativo a los efectos superficiales de la concentración industrial del poder. El impuesto sobre la renta encuentra su complemento en los sistemas de seguridad social, de asignaciones y de distribución equitativa del bienestar. Incluso es posible que, más allá de un cierto umbral, se estatice el capital, o bien se decida reducir el abanico de los salarios. Pero este tipo de control de la renta privada no puede ser eficaz sino con un control paralelo del consumo, de los privilegios del individuo en razón de su función de productor. El control de la renta privada no tiene ningún efecto igualitario sobre los privilegios que realmente cuentan en una sociedad donde el trabajo es promovido a primer plano y la vida doméstica relegada al segundo. Mientras que los trabajadores sean clasificados en función del grado de capitalización de la fuerza de trabajo de cada uno, la minoría que detenta existencias de saber de alto precio se arroga regularmente todos los privilegios que _permiten ganar tiempos_. La concentración de privilegios entre las manos de unos cuantos es inherente a la productividad industrial.
+
+Hace apenas un siglo, nadie hubiera podido imaginar la concentración de poder y de energía que hoy nos parece normal. En una sociedad moderna, la energía industrializada excede considerablemente a la energía metabólica global, es decir, la energía de la cual dispone el cuerpo humano para realizar tareas. La relación entre energía mecánica y energía humana disponible es de quince a uno en China y de trescientos a uno en Estados Unidos. Y los recursos eléctricos concentran más eficazmente el control de la energía y el ejercicio del poder que el látigo en las viejas civilizaciones. La distribución social del control del consumo de energía ha sido modificada en forma radical. El funcionamiento y, aun más, los lineamientos de la infraestructura energética de una sociedad moderna imponen la ideología del grupo dominante, con una fuerza y una penetración inconcebibles para el sacerdote del antiguo Egipto, o para el banquero del siglo XVII. En tanto que instrumento de dominación, la moneda pierde su valor en beneficio del carburante. Si el capital es lo que suministra la energía del cambio, la inflación energética ha reducido a la mayoría a la indigencia. A medida y conforme el instrumento se infla, el número de operadores potenciales disminuye. A medida que el instrumento se hace más eficiente, el operador emplea más bienes y servicios costosos. En los países que se industrializan, en la obra el ingeniero es el único que tiene aire acondicionado en su barraca. Su tiempo es tan precioso que toma el avión para dirigirse a la capital, y sus decisiones son tan importantes que las comunica por un transmisor de radio de onda corta. El ingeniero ha ganado sus privilegios acaparando los fondos públicos para obtener sus diplomas. El albañil indígena no puede evaluar la situación relativamente privilegiada de su contramaestre, pero los ayudantes técnicos y los dibujantes, que han sido escolarizados, pero no diplomados, sienten inmediatamente en forma más aguda el calor del campamento y la lejanía de su familia. Se ven relativamente empobrecidos por toda la eficiencia suplementaria ganada por su patrón.
+
+Nunca antes la herramienta había sido tan poderosa. Y jamás había llegado a ser acaparada hasta ese punto por una élite. El derecho divino robaba menos en favor de los reyes de antaño de lo que el crecimiento de los servicios, al socaire del interés superior de la producción, roba hoy a los cuadros populares. Los soviéticos justifican los transportes supersónicos diciendo que ahorran tiempo a sus sabios. Los transportes a gran velocidad, las redes de telecomunicación, los cuidados médicos especializados, la asistencia ilimitada de la burocracia se presentan como necesidades para sacar el máximo de los individuos que han sido objeto de un _máximum_ de capitalización.
+
+La sociedad de la mega-herramienta depende para sobrevivir de múltiples sistemas que impiden a un gran número de gente hacer valer su palabra. Este último privilegio se reserva a los individuos reconocidos como los más productivos. Normalmente se mide la productividad de un individuo por la inversión educativa de que ha sido objeto, por la importancia del ritual de iniciación al que ha sido sometido. Mientras más grande es el montón de saber que ha sido inyectado a un individuo determinado, más grande es el valor social atribuido a sus decisiones, y más legítima también es su demanda de productos industriales avanzados.
+
+Mientras se derrumba el poder fundado en el saber certificado en la escuela, formas más antiguas de segregación vuelven al primer plano en la escena: la fuerza de trabajo de un individuo vale menos cuando es negro, de sexo femenino, extranjero; no piensa como se debe o no pasa ciertas ordalías. En la selección de una meritocracia, el más mínimo rol de escuela abre la puerta a procedimientos de selección primitivos. Así queda montado el tablado para la multiplicación de minorías y para el desarrollo espectacular de sus reivindicaciones. Cada uno que reclama su parte, expone inevitablemente a la minoría de la cual forma parte a ser víctima de sus propios fines.
+
+Conforme van cubriendo instituciones más escasas y más vastas, las jerarquías se elevan y se aglutinan. Un puesto en la administración de una industria moderna es el más ambicionado y disputado producto del crecimiento. Los otros, los que corren detrás en vano, y que son los más, se reparten en una variedad de clases 'inferiores': los subeducados, las mujeres, los homosexuales, los jóvenes, los viejos, etc. Cada día se inventa un nuevo tipo de inferioridad. Los movimientos minoritarios, los de las mujeres, de los negros o de los mal pensantes, logran, cuando mucho, obtener diplomas y carreras para algunos de los miembros salidos de sus filas. Cantan victoria cuando logran que sea reconocido el principio: _a igual trabajo, igual salario_. Allí se asienta una paradoja: por una parte esos movimientos fortalecen la creencia de que las necesidades de una sociedad igualitaria no pueden ser satisfechas sin pasar por un trabajo especializado y por una jerarquía burocratizada; por otra acumulan _quanta_ fabulosos de frustración, que la menor chispa hará explotar.
+
+Poco importa saber para qué fines específicos se organizan las minorías, siempre que aspiren a un reparto equitativo del consumo, de las buenas plazas o del poder formal para gobernar las herramientas ingobernables. Cada vez que una minoría actúe con miras a obtener su parte en una sociedad de crecimiento, no obtendrá para la mayoría de sus miembros más que un sentimiento siempre más agudo de insatisfacción.
+
+En cuanto a las oposiciones que quieren alcanzar el control de las instituciones existentes, con ello les dan una legitimidad de un nuevo tipo, exacerbando al mismo tiempo las contradicciones. Cambiar el equipo dirigente no es una revolución. ¿Qué significa el poder de los trabajadores, el poder negro, el poder de las mujeres o el de los jóvenes si no es el poder de tomarse el poder establecido? Un poder tal es a lo más el de dirigir mejor un crecimiento ya encaminado a proseguir su curso glorioso por estas providenciales tomas del poder. La escuela, ya se enseñe en ella marxismo o fascismo, reproduce una pirámide de clases de fracasados. El avión, aunque se le conceda pasaje a un trabajador en ocasión de sus vacaciones, reproduce la jerarquía social con una clase superior de gente cuyo tiempo se supone más precioso que el de los demás.
+
+Entre los inevitables subproductos del crecimiento industrial se cuentan las nuevas clases de subconsumidores y de subempleados. Las mujeres, los negros, los hijos de los pobres se están organizando. La organización les hace tomar conciencia de su condición común. Por el momento, las minorías organizadas reclaman el derecho a poseer, manteniendo así el _statu quo_. Exigir _a trabajo igual, igual salario_ es apoyar la idea de un trabajo desigual. El día que estas organizaciones reclamen un derecho igual en el poder, podrán llegar a ser el pivote de la reconstrucción social. La sociedad industrial no resistiría el asalto de un movimiento vigoroso de mujeres que reclamaran, por ejemplo, un trabajo igual para todos, sin distinción alguna. Todas las clases, todas las razas cuentan con mujeres. Ellas ejercen la mayoría de sus actividades cotidianas en una forma no industrial. Las sociedades industrializadas son viables precisamente porque cuentan con las mujeres para tareas caseras que se escapan a la industrialización. Pero una sociedad regida por criterios de eficiencia industrial degrada y devalúa el trabajo doméstico. En realidad, éste se haría aún más inhumano al colocarlo en el molde industrial. Es más fácil imaginar al norteamericano dejando de explotar la subindustrialización de América Latina que cesando de destinar sus mujeres a los trabajos no industrializables. La expansión de la industria se detendría si las mujeres nos obligaran a reconocer que la sociedad deja de ser viable en cuanto un solo modo de producción ejerce su dominio sobre el conjunto. Es urgente tomar conciencia de la pluralidad de los modos de producción, cada uno válido y respetable, que una sociedad para ser viable debe permitir que coexistan. Esta toma de conciencia nos haría los amos del crecimiento industrial. Éste se detendría si las mujeres y las otras minorías alejadas del poder exigiesen un trabajo igualmente creativo para todos, en vez de reclamar la igualdad de derechos sobre la mega-instrumentación manipulada hasta ahora sólo por el hombre. Sólo una estructura de producción que protege el reparto igual del poder permite un goce igual del haber.
+
+## Lo obsoleto
+
+La reconstrucción convivencial supone el desmantelamiento del actual monopolio de la industria, no la supresión de toda producción industrial. Exige que sea reducida la polarización social de la herramienta, a fin de que coexista una pluralidad dinámica de estructuras complementarias en la fuerza productiva y que haya lugar para una pluralidad de ambientes y de élites. Reclama la adopción de herramientas que pongan en acción la energía del cuerpo humano, no la regresión hacia una explotación del hombre. Exige la reducción considerable de la serie de tratamientos obligatorios, pero no impide a nadie ser enseñado o asistido si así lo desea. Una sociedad convivencial tampoco es una sociedad congelada. Su dinámica es función de la amplitud en el reparto del control de la energía, es decir, del poder de operar un cambio real. En el sistema actual de obsolescencia programada en gran escala, algunos centros de decisión son los que imponen la innovación al conjunto de la sociedad y privan a las comunidades de base para elegir su porvenir. De hecho, es el instrumento el que impone la dirección y el ritmo de la innovación. Un proceso ininterrumpido de reconstrucción convivencial es posible a condición de que el cuerpo social proteja el poder de las personas y de las colectividades para modificar y renovar sus estilos de vida, sus herramientas, su ambiente; dicho de otra forma, su poder para dar a la realidad un rostro nuevo. Dentro de esta amenaza industrial al pasado y al futuro, a la tradición y a la utopía, reside la quinta dimensión para salvaguardar el equilibrio.
+
+La polarización social, como se ha visto, resulta de dos factores combinados: el alza del costo de los bienes y servicios producidos y empaquetados por la industria, y la escasez creciente de los empleos considerados como altamente productivos. Lo obsoleto, por su parte, produce la desvalorización. Esta _desvalorización_ no es el efecto de una tasa global de cambio, sino del cambio que afecta a los productos que ejercen un monopolio radical. La _polarización_ social es determinada por el hecho siguiente: el costo de los bienes y servicios estandarizados ha llegado a ser tal, que la mayoría de la gente no puede obtenerlos. Mientras más aumenta su producción, más se iguala su distribución y más se excluye al consumidor del control sobre lo que recibe. Lo obsoleto, por su parte, puede llegar a ser intolerable, aun para quien no está eliminado del mercado. Obliga al consumidor a desprenderse continuamente de aquello que ha sido forzado a desear, a pagar y a instalar en su existencia. La necesidad artificial y la obsolescencia planificada, son dos dimensiones distintas de la supereficiencia que apoya una sociedad donde la jerarquía sedimenta el privilegio.
+
+Apenas importa que la usura forzada destruya viejos modelos o viejos sistemas. Ford puede desembarazarse de un modelo viejo dejando de suministrar repuestos, y la policía puede eliminar de la vía pública los automóviles antiguos por no responder a las nuevas normas de seguridad. Por falta de gasolina o por aspirar a la eficiencia, se podría reemplazar el automóvil por el monorrail. La renovación está dentro de un modo de producción industrial y va acompañada de una ideología de progreso. El producto no puede ser mejorado si la mega-máquina no es reinstrumentada. Y para que esto 'pague' se deben crear inmensos mercados en vistas al nuevo modelo. La mejor forma de abrir un mercado es asimilando el producto nuevo a un importante privilegio. Si esto funciona, el modelo antiguo se desvaloriza, y el consumidor se entrega a la ideología del desarrollo ilimitado que afecta la 'calidad' mejorada del bien de consumo. Los individuos, pero también los países, se clasifican socialmente según la antigüedad de sus existencias en instrumentos y bienes. Algunos, los menos, pueden pagarse el lujo de tener siempre el último modelo; otros siguen utilizando automóviles, máquinas lavadoras y radios que tienen cinco o quince años, y probablemente pasan sus vacaciones en hoteles también pasados de moda, es decir, sin categoría. El nivel de obsolescencia de su consumo indica el sitio exacto que ocupan en la escala social.
+
+La clasificación social de los individuos en función de la edad de los objetos que utilizan no es manifestación sólo del capitalismo. Como sea que la economía se basa en la producción y el empaquetamiento masivo de bienes y servicios sujetos a la obsolescencia, únicamente algunos privilegiados tienen acceso a los productos de última creación. Son únicamente algunas enfermeras las que asisten a los cursos de anestesia más moderna y sólo algunos burócratas pueden correr o volar en el último modelo de vehículos. Cada uno, dentro de la élite que se forma en el seno de la minoría, reconoce y clasifica al otro según la edad de sus instrumentos, ya sea de su material doméstico, ya del equipo de su oficina.
+
+La innovación cuesta cara; para justificar el gasto, los administradores deben probar que es un factor de progreso. Para justificar este progreso, en una economía planificada, el departamento de investigación y desarrollo recurre a la seudociencia; en una economía de mercado, el departamento de ventas recurre al estudio del mercado. En cualquier caso, la innovación periódica alimenta la misma creencia que la ha engendrado, la ilusión de que lo nuevo es lo mejor. Esta creencia se ha convertido en parte integrante de la mentalidad moderna. Se olvida únicamente que cada vez que una sociedad industrial se alimenta de esta ilusión, cada nueva unidad lanzada al mercado crea más necesidades de las que satisface. Si lo que es nuevo es mejor, lo que es viejo no es tan bueno; la suerte de la humanidad, en su aplastante mayoría, es entonces bastante mala. El modelo nuevo produce una nueva pobreza. El consumidor, el usuario, se resiente duramente de la distancia que hay entre lo que tiene y lo que sería mejor tener. Mide el valor de un producto por su novedad, y se presta a una educación permanente en vista del consumo y del uso de la innovación. Nada escapa a lo obsoleto, ni siquiera los conceptos. La lógica de 'siempre mejor' reemplaza la del bien como elemento estructurante de la acción.
+
+Una sociedad empeñada en la carrera hacia el mayor bienestar, siente como una amenaza la mera idea de cualquier limitación del progreso. Entonces el individuo que no cambia los objetos conoce el rencor del fracaso y quien los cambia descubre el vértigo de la falta. Lo que tiene le repugna, lo que desea tener le enferma. El cambio acelerado produce en él los mismos efectos que la habituación de una droga: ensaya, comienza de nuevo, está atado, está enfermo, algo le falta. La dialéctica de la historia se rompe. La relación entre el presente y la tradición se desvanece; el lenguaje pierde sus raíces; la memoria social se endurece; en el Derecho, el precedente pierde su influencia. El acuerdo sobre la acción legal, social y política se orienta hacia la alquimia del porvenir.
+
+Pero se nos objeta que al establecer cercos al crecimiento, al producir una cantidad terminada y durable de bienes industrializados, se acaba con la libertad de experimentar e innovar. Esta objeción se justificaría si aquí se tratara de formular una nueva forma de economía del crecimiento. Actualmente, el último grito de la moda es justamente una producción limpia y limitada de bienes, y un desarrollo ilimitado de servicios. Pero no es eso lo que nos interesa, pues no hablamos del porvenir de la sociedad industrial, sino de la transición a una sociedad que diversifique los modos de producción. La limitación del producto industrial tiene para nosotros la finalidad de liberar el porvenir, de abrir las acciones personales a la sorpresa.
+
+Ahora bien, la innovación industrial es programada, grosera, reaccionaria. La renovación de las herramientas convivenciales tendrá la espontaneidad de los seres que las manejen. En la hora actual, el progreso del _savoir-faire_ está trabado por la asimilación de la investigación científica al desarrollo industrial. La mayoría de los instrumentos de la investigación se reservan a los investigadores programados para interpretar el mundo en términos de ganancias y poder, y la mayoría de los fines de la investigación se determinan por móviles de poder y de eficiencia. La mayor parte del costo de la investigación se debe a su carácter secreto, competitivo, impersonal. En cambio, nada impide que la investigación convivencial sea también una investigación fundamental. La investigación que se realiza por placer nos reserva, estoy seguro, más sorpresas que la del grano de arena que bloquea la gran máquina. La innovación del saber, como la del poder, puede florecer únicamente donde esté protegida contra la obsolescencia industrial.
+
+Una sociedad congelada sería tan insoportable al hombre como la sociedad de la aceleración: entre las dos se sitúa la sociedad de la innovación convivencial. El cambio acelerado conduce al absurdo, a la administración de una sociedad regida por el Derecho. La razón es que el Derecho se basa sobre el precedente. Más allá de un cierto umbral de aceleración, ya no hay sitio para esta referencia al precedente, y, por tanto, para el juicio. Al perder este recurso al Derecho, la sociedad queda condenada a la educación. El ejercicio del control social, puesto al servicio del _plan_, se convierte en la tarea de los especialistas. El ideólogo reemplaza al jurista. El educador moldea al individuo para ser domesticado y re-domesticado, orientado a lo largo de toda su existencia. Ya en el oficio, cien veces se reanuda este trabajo, para producir un individuo fascinado con las ganancias y siempre mejor adaptado a las exigencias de la industria. La producción de instrumentos para adaptar al hombre a su medio se convierte en la industria dominante cuando el ritmo del cambio del ambiente sobrepasa cierto umbral. La reconstrucción convivencial exige que sea limitada la tasa de usura y de innovación obligatoria. El hombre es un ser frágil. Nace en el lenguaje, vive en el derecho y muere en el mito. Sometido a un cambio desmesurado, pierde su calidad de hombre.
+
+## La insatisfacción
+
+Hemos revisado cinco circuitos diferentes. En cada uno de ellos la herramienta supereficiente amenaza un equilibrio. Amenaza el equilibrio de la _vida_, amenaza el equilibrio de la _energía_, amenaza el equilibrio del _saber_, amenaza el equilibrio del _poder_, en fin, amenaza el derecho a la historia.
+
+La perversión de la herramienta amenaza saquear el medio físico. El monopolio radical amenaza congelar la creatividad. La superprogramación amenaza transformar el planeta en una vasta zona de servicios. La polarización amenaza instituir un despotismo estructural e irreversible. Finalmente, lo obsoleto amenaza desarraigar la especie humana. En cada uno de estos circuitos, y cada vez según una dimensión diferente, la herramienta supereficiente afecta a la relación del hombre con su ambiente: amenaza provocar un cortocircuito fatal.
+
+Nuestro análisis sería incompleto si tratara de un circuito con exclusión de los otros. Cada uno de esos equilibrios debe ser protegido. Los _outputs_ de la energía limpia pueden ser equitativamente distribuidos por un monopolio radical intolerable. La secuela obligatoria o los medios de comunicación omnipresentes puede afectar el equilibrio del saber y abrir el camino a una polarización de la sociedad, es decir, a un despotismo del saber. Cualquier industria puede engendrar una aceleración insoportable de los ritmos de usura. Las culturas han florecido en el seno de una multiplicidad de geografías, amenazadas hoy. Pero, actualmente, son también el medio social y el medio psíquico los que corren el riesgo de ser destruidos. La especie humana puede ser envenenada por la contaminación. Puede también desvanecerse y desaparecer por falta de lenguaje, de derecho o de mito. Si el monopolio radical degrada al hombre y la polarización le amenaza, el choque del futuro puede desintegrarlo.
+
+En cada uno de los circuitos, como se ha visto, se pueden determinar criterios y divisar umbrales que permitan verificar la degradación de los diversos equilibrios. Es posible describir estos umbrales en un lenguaje comprensible para todos. En el curso de un proceso político, la población puede servirse de estos criterios para mantener el desarrollo de la herramienta más acá de los umbrales críticos. Los cercos así trazados circunscribirán el tipo de estructuras de las fuerzas productivas que pueden seguir siendo controladas por la población: el poder indicar estos cercos forma el apéndice tecnopolítico necesario a toda constitución contemporánea. Más allá, la herramienta escapa a todo control político. El poder que tiene el hombre de hacer valer su derecho desaparece cuando se vincula a los procesos en los cuales ya no hay derecho a voz en la junta. En tanto pueda gozar de ello, su cuerpo, su reposo, su libertad y sus amores, en una palabra, el sentido de su vida, le serán concedidos como un factor de optimización de la lógica de la herramienta. En este punto, el hombre se ha convertido en materia prima para la mega-máquina, la más maleable de las materias primas. Los umbrales críticos circunscriben un espacio que es el de la sobrevivencia humana. Si este espacio no fuera cercado por un Derecho, la dignidad y la libertad de la persona serán arrolladas.
+
+En la hora actual, la investigación científica se orienta masivamente hacia esta reducción del hombre, a través de la persecución de dos objetivos: por una parte, garantizar el avance tecnológico que permita producir mejor, mejores productos; por otra parte, aplicar el análisis de sistemas a la manipulación de la supervivencia de la especie humana, a fin de preservar su mejor consumo. Para permitir al hombre realizarse, la investigación futura debe ir en un sentido radicalmente opuesto, debe llegar a la raíz del mal. Le daremos el nombre de investigación radical. La investigación radical persigue también dos objetivos: por una parte presentar criterios que permitan determinar cuándo una herramienta alcanza un umbral de nocividad; por otra, inventar herramientas que optimicen el equilibrio de la vida y así maximicen la libertad de cada uno. El primer objetivo enfoca la formulación de las cinco clases de umbrales identificadas anteriormente. El segundo, enfoca las limitaciones de las técnicas del bienestar.
+
+La investigación radical no es ni una nueva disciplina científica ni una empresa interdisciplinaria. Es el análisis dimensional de la relación del hombre y su herramienta.
+
+Es evidente que la existencia social del hombre se desarrolla en varias escalas, en diversos medios concéntricos: la célula de base, la unidad de producción, la ciudad, el estado, la Tierra, en fin. Cada uno de estos medios tiene su espacio y su tiempo, sus hombres y sus recursos de energía. Hay disfunción de la herramienta en uno de estos medios cuando el espacio, el tiempo y la energía requeridos por el conjunto de herramientas exceden la _escala natural_ que corresponde. Estas escalas naturales son susceptibles de ser identificadas, sin avanzar una determinada interpretación respecto a la naturaleza del hombre o de la sociedad. Estas escalas definen, en términos negativos y de proscripción, el espacio dentro del cual el fenómeno humano se puede observar. Pero no avanzan ni una palabra sobre la naturaleza propia de ese fenómeno, como no formulan prescripciones. En este sentido, se puede hablar de la _homeóstasis_ del hombre dentro de su ambiente, amenazada por toda disfunción de la herramienta, y se puede definir la política como el proceso por el cual los hombres asumen la responsabilidad de esa _homeóstasis_. Ya va siendo hora de no seguir definiendo las necesidades humanas en abstracto, sometiéndolas, como a los problemas, al tratamiento de la tecnocracia que practica el método de la escalada. Es tiempo de comenzar a buscar dentro de qué cercos las colectividades humanas concretas pueden usar la técnica para satisfacer sus necesidades sin provocar prejuicios a los demás. Precisar el anatema que es necesario lanzar marca el primer paso de la investigación radical.
+
+Los umbrales más allá de los cuales se perfila la destrucción, no determinan el registro en el cual una sociedad limita voluntariamente el uso de sus herramientas. Los umbrales determinan el campo de la supervivencia posible; los límites de ese registro representan los cercos de una cultura. Los umbrales naturales son efecto de la necesidad; los límites culturales son el hecho de la libertad. Los umbrales configuran el derecho constitutivo de toda sociedad, los límites prefiguran la justicia convivencial de una sociedad particular. La necesidad de determinar umbrales y de observar los cercos así definidos es la misma para todas las sociedades. La fijación de límites depende del modo de vida y del grado de libertad de cada colectividad.
+
+Existe una forma de disfunción dentro de la cual el crecimiento aún no destruye la vida, pero ya pervierte el uso de la herramienta. La herramienta no es óptima, no es tampoco intolerable; todavía es tolerable, pero es ya supereficiente; degrada un equilibrio de la naturaleza más subjetivo y más sutil que los descritos anteriormente: _el equilibrio de la acción_. Es el equilibrio entre el precio pagado personalmente y el resultado obtenido. Es la conciencia de que _los medios y los fines se equilibran_. Mientras la herramienta avasalla el fin al que debiera servir, el usuario se convierte en presa de una profunda insatisfacción. Si no deja a la herramienta, o la herramienta no le deja a él, se vuelve loco. En el Hades el castigo más espantoso estaba reservado a los blasfemos: el juez de los infiernos los condenaba a la acción frenética. La roca de Sísifo es la herramienta pervertida. El colmo es que, en una sociedad en donde la acción frenética es la regla, se formen hombres que rivalizan entre sí en la conquista del derecho de frustrarse a sí mismos. Movidos por la rivalidad, cegados por el deseo, la única cuestión es quién de entre ellos será intoxicado primero por la herramienta.
+
+Como he desarrollado en otra parte[^n05], el predominio del transporte sobre la circulación de la gente puede servir para ilustrar la diferencia entre lo que es la frontera del equilibrio y lo que es un límite elegido para hacer florecer la igualdad en el goce de la libertad. Proteger el ambiente puede significar la prohibición de los transportes supersónicos. Evitar que la polarización social se convierta en intolerable puede significar la prohibición de los transportes aéreos. Defenderse contra el monopolio radical puede significar la prohibición de los automóviles. En ausencia de estas medidas, el transporte amenaza a la sociedad. El equilibrio entre fines y medios que he subrayado aquí, nos presenta un nuevo criterio de selección de la herramienta. La consideración de este nuevo equilibrio, tal vez nos conduzca hasta proscribir todos los transportes públicos de velocidad superior a la de la bicicleta.
+
+Cualquier vehículo cuya velocidad máxima excede un cierto umbral, acrecienta la pérdida de tiempo y de dinero del usuario medio. Todas las veces que en un punto del sistema de circulación la velocidad máxima excede cierto umbral, significa que más gente empleará más tiempo en la parada del autobús, en la atascada autopista de circunvalación, o en una cama de hospital. Significa también que empleará más tiempo en pagar el sistema de transporte que se está obligado a utilizar.
+
+El umbral crítico de velocidad depende de una multitud de factores: condiciones geográficas, culturales, económicas, técnicas, financieras. Con tantas variables para una incógnita, se podría esperar que el margen de estimación para dicho umbral fuera muy grande. Pero no es así. Es de tal manera bajo y estrecho que parece improbable a la mayoría de los especialistas en circulación.
+
+Hay disfunción en la circulación desde que ésta admite, en un punto dado del sistema, una velocidad superior a la de la bicicleta. Es por esto que la velocidad de la bicicleta puede servir de criterio en la determinación del umbral crítico. Todo exceso en un punto dado del sistema acrecienta la suma de tiempo destinado por el conjunto de los usuarios al servicio de la industria de los transportes.
+
+La sobreabundancia de bienes conduce a la escasez de tiempo. El tiempo se rarifica porque es necesario para consumir y para dejarse asistir, y porque el acostumbramiento a la producción hace aún más costoso el desacostumbramiento. Mientras más se enriquece el consumidor, más consciente es de los grados que ha ascendido, tanto en la casa en que vive como en la oficina. Mientras más alto ha trepado en la pirámide de la producción, menos tiempo tiene para abandonarse a las actividades que no pueden ser contabilizadas.
+
+Es difícil ganar tiempo cuando se tiene muy empeñado el porvenir. Staffan Linder subraya el hecho de que tenemos la tendencia a sobreemplear el futuro. En tanto que el futuro se hace presente, continuamente tenemos la sensación de falta de tiempo, por la sencilla razón de haber previsto jornadas de treinta horas. Como si no fuera suficiente el costo más o menos alto del tiempo --y que en general en una sociedad de la abundancia, cada vez se hace más caro--, el sobreempleo del futuro engendra una tensión devastadora.
+
+La industria de los transportes produce escasez de tiempo. En una sociedad en donde mucha gente emplea vehículos rápidos, todo el mundo debe consagrarles más tiempo y dinero. Una vez roto el equilibrio, sobrepasado el umbral de la velocidad, la rivalidad entre la industria del transporte y las otras industrias se hace feroz, tratando de controlar los espacios y la energía disponibles. Mientras la velocidad crece en forma lineal, la confusión crece en forma exponencial. El tiempo consagrado a la circulación usurpa el tiempo de trabajo, como devora el tiempo de recreo.
+
+Los vehículos más grandes no deben estar vacíos nunca; los más rápidos, deben moverse continuamente. Las cápsulas individuales se vuelven ruinosas. Los transportes públicos no prestan servicios más que en las grandes arterias. Es necesario que esto se mueva cada vez más rápido.
+
+Mientras la velocidad aumenta, el vehículo se convierte en tirano de la existencia cotidiana. Se prevé un tiempo determinado, se necesita el doble. Se proyectan planes con meses y hasta con años de anticipación. Algunos de esos planes, realizados con gran costo, no pueden cumplirse. El sentimiento de fracaso es continuo. Se vive bajo tensión. El hombre no se deja programar a voluntad. Cuando se ha sobrepasado el umbral crítico para el equilibrio de la acción, viene el enfrentamiento de la industria de la velocidad con las otras industrias, para ver quién va a despojar al hombre de la parte de humanidad que le queda.
+
+La velocidad es el vector clave para detectar cómo la industria del transporte afecta el equilibrio vital. Al considerar las cinco primeras dimensiones se necesita mucho menos de lo que pudiera pensarse para que el transporte se vuelva contra el hombre rompiendo las escalas naturales. Pero se da otro hecho aún más sorprendente. La velocidad, que al aplicar el conjunto de los cinco primeros criterios definidos, se manifiesta tolerable, es del mismo orden de grandeza que la velocidad que optimiza la circulación deseable. Es la que, al menor costo de tiempo social, asegura la equidad del radio de acción y de las posibilidades de acceso maximizadas por la técnica. La gran diversidad de registros de orden técnico que configuran el cerco respectivo de cada civilización, caben naturalmente dentro del espacio de la tecnología tolerable. El cerco de lo tolerable coincide, en orden de grandeza, con el límite superior del registro de lo deseable.
+
+La constatación del contrasentido que representa la sobreproducción no se establece solamente sobre los transportes. El mismo tipo de resultados negativos se encuentra a propósito de las inversiones hechas en medicina. En Estados Unidos se ha calculado que más del 95% de los gastos médicos consagrados a los enfermos cuya muerte se sabe próxima, no han tenido ningún efecto benéfico sobre su bienestar; únicamente intensifican su sufrimiento y los hacen totalmente dependientes de cuidados impersonales, sin prolongar la duración de su existencia. La rentabilidad máxima de un servicio se sitúa dentro de ciertos límites. Pasado cierto umbral, la salud de un paciente se mide por su cuenta de hospital, como la riqueza de una nación se mide por la cuenta de gastos globales que es un PNB. A la escala del individuo como a la de la colectividad, es preciso pagar siempre. Es preciso pagar para remunerar al capital, es preciso también pagar los platos rotos del crecimiento. Al practicar la escalada de la técnica, la medicina primero deja de sanar, y después deja de prolongar la vida humana. Se transforma en ritual de negación de la muerte: el individuo superadaptado a la máquina, hace su última vuelta a la pista, espectacular. Habrá hecho el mejor tiempo.
+
+En una primera etapa, la investigación radical se ciñe a estudiar el alza en las desutilidades marginales y las amenazas engendradas por el crecimiento. En una segunda etapa, se aplica a descubrir los sistemas y las instituciones que optimizan los modos de producción convivenciales. Esta investigación provoca resistencias, de las cuales las de orden psíquico no son las menores. El hombre superinstrumentado es como el _junkie_ : el habituamiento deforma el conjunto de su sistema de valores y mutila su capacidad de juicio. Los drogadictos de toda clase están dispuestos a pagar cada vez más por gozar cada vez menos. Toleran la escalada de la desutilidad marginal. Nada puede afectarles mientras les anime una sola preocupación: subir la postura. Tales espíritus consideran los transportes más como un medio de producir el placer de la velocidad que como medio de ampliar la libertad y el goce de moverse. No aceptarán sin dificultad la evidencia de que el hombre es un ser naturalmente móvil, y que la técnica, por medio de la bicicleta, eleva la movilidad de una sociedad a un nuevo orden de grandeza más allá del cual ninguna aceleración del vehículo puede hacerla aumentar.
+
+La investigación radical se ciñe a hacer sensible la relación entre el hombre y la herramienta, después a hacerla nítida, a identificar los recursos de que disponemos y los efectos que se pueden alcanzar con sus diferentes usos.
+
+Hacer sensible la degradación de los equilibrios que establecen la supervivencia, es la tarea inmediata de la investigación radical. La investigación radical detecta las categorías de población más amenazadas, y les ayuda a discernir la amenaza. Hace tomar conciencia a los individuos o grupos, hasta entonces divididos, de que sobre sus libertades fundamentales pesan las mismas amenazas. Muestra que la exigencia de libertad real, formulada por quien sea, sirve siempre al interés de la mayoría.
+
+El deshabituamiento al crecimiento será doloroso. Será doloroso para la generación de transición, y sobre todo para los más intoxicados de sus miembros. Ojalá el recuerdo de tales sufrimientos preserve a las generaciones futuras de nuestros yerros.
+
+# Los obstáculos y las condiciones de la inversión política
+
+Hemos visto que el equilibrio de la vida se despliega en cinco dimensiones. En cada una de ellas sólo el mantenimiento de un equilibrio determinado que la caracteriza garantiza la homeostasis constitutiva de la vida humana. La intervención en la ecosfera será racional sólo a condición de no franquear los límites genéticos. La institución no suscita la cultura sino al permitir y hacer efectivo un sutil equilibrio entre la acción personal autónoma y las restricciones directrices que ella misma impone. El borrar las barreras geográficas y culturales no puede promover la originalidad social si esa acción no va acompañada de la reducción de la brecha energética entre los privilegiados y la gran mayoría. Un incremento en la tasa de innovación sólo tiene valor si acentúa el arraigamiento más profundo en la tradición y en la plenitud del sentido.
+
+De instrumento, la herramienta puede convertirse en amo, y después en verdugo del hombre. La relación se invierte con más rapidez de lo que se espera: el arado hace del hombre, señor de un jardín, y muy pronto un errabundo en un campo polvoriento. La vacuna, que selecciona sus víctimas, engendra una raza capaz de sobrevivir únicamente en un medio acondicionado. Nuestros hijos nacen disminuidos en un mundo inhumano. El _homo faber_ , de aprendiz de brujo, se transforma en basural voraz. La herramienta puede crecer en dos formas, sea para aumentar el poder del hombre o para reemplazarlo. En el primer caso, la persona conduce su propia existencia, tomando el control y la responsabilidad.
+
+En el segundo, es finalmente la máquina la que lo conduce: reduce a la vez la elección del operador y la del usuario-consumidor; luego les impone a los dos su lógica y sus exigencias. Amenazada por la omnipotencia de la herramienta, la supervivencia de la especie depende del establecimiento de procedimientos que permitan a todo el mundo distinguir claramente entre estas dos maneras de racionalizar y de emplear la herramienta, y, con ello, inciten a elegir la supervivencia dentro de la libertad. En el cumplimiento de esta tarea, hay tres obstáculos que nos cierran el camino: la idolatría de la ciencia, la corrupción del lenguaje cotidiano y la devaluación de los procedimientos formales que estructuran la toma de decisiones sociales.
+
+## La desmitificación
+
+Por encima de todo, el debate político está congelado por un engaño respecto a la _ciencia_. La palabra ha venido a significar una empresa institucional en vez de una actividad personal; la solución de un rompecabezas en vez del despliegue imprevisible de la creatividad humana. La ciencia es actualmente una agencia de servicios fantasmas y omnipresente, que produce _mejor saber_, igual que la medicina produce mejor salud. El daño causado por este contrasentido en la naturaleza del saber es aún más radical que el mal hecho por la mercantilización de la educación, de la salud y de la movilidad. La falsedad de la mejor salud corrompe el cuerpo social, pues cada uno se preocupa cada vez menos de la calidad del ambiente, de la higiene, de su modo de vida o de su propia capacidad de cuidar a los demás. La institucionalización del saber conduce a una degradación global más profunda, pues determina la estructura común de los otros productos. En una sociedad que se define por el consumo del saber, la creatividad es mutilada y la imaginación se atrofia.
+
+Esta perversión de la ciencia se funda en la creencia en dos especies de saber; el inferior del individuo, y el saber superior de la ciencia. El primer saber sería del dominio de la opinión, la expresión de una subjetividad, y el progreso nada tendría que ver en ello. El segundo sería objetivo, definido por la ciencia y extendido por voceros expertos. Este saber objetivo es considerado como un bien que se puede almacenar y mejorar constantemente. Es un recurso estratégico, un capital, la más preciosa de las materias primas, el elemento base de lo que se ha dado en llamar la toma de decisiones, siendo éstas, a su vez, concebidas como un proceso impersonal y técnico. Bajo el nuevo reino del computador y de la dinámica de grupo, el ciudadano abdica de todo su poder en favor del experto, el único competente.
+
+El mundo no es portador de ningún mensaje, de ninguna información. Es lo que es. Todo mensaje que le concierne es producto de un organismo vivo que actúa por él. Cuando se habla de la información almacenada fuera del organismo humano, se cae en una trampa semántica. Los libros y las computadoras forman parte del mundo. Ofrecen datos siempre que haya ojos para leerlos. Al confundir el medio con el mensaje, el receptáculo con la información misma, los datos con la decisión, relegamos el problema del saber y del conocimiento al punto muerto de nuestra mente.
+
+Intoxicados por la creencia de un porvenir mejor, los individuos cesan de fiarse de su propio criterio y piden que se les diga la verdad sobre lo que 'saben'. Intoxicados por la creencia en una toma mejor de decisiones, les es difícil decidir por sí solos, y pronto pierden la confianza en su propio poder de hacerlo. La impotencia creciente del individuo para tomar por sí mismo decisiones afecta a la estructura base de su espera. Antes, los hombres se disputaban una escasez concreta, en el presente reclaman un mecanismo distribuidor para colmar una falta ilusoria. El ritual burocrático organiza el consumo frenético del menú social: programa de educación, tratamiento médico o acción judicial. El conflicto personal se ve privado de toda legitimidad, desde que la ciencia promete la abundancia para todos y pretende dar a cada uno según sus demandas personales y sociales, objetivamente identificadas. Los individuos, que han desaprendido a reconocer sus propias necesidades así como a reclamar sus propios derechos, se convierten en presa de la mega-máquina que define en su lugar lo que les hace falta. La persona ya no puede por sí misma contribuir a la renovación continua de la vida social. El hombre llega a desconfiar de la palabra, se apega a un ser supuesto. El voto reemplaza al corrillo; la caseta electoral, a la terraza del café. El ciudadano se sienta frente a la pantalla, y calla.
+
+Las reglas del sentido común que permitían a los hombres conjugar y compartir sus experiencias se destruyen. El consumidor-usuario tiene necesidad de su dosis de saber garantizado, cuidadosamente acondicionado. Encuentra su seguridad en la certidumbre de leer el mismo periódico que su vecino, de mirar la misma emisión televisiva que su patrón. Se contenta con tener acceso al mismo grifo del saber que su superior, antes que tratar de instaurar la igualdad de condiciones que darían a su palabra el mismo peso que tiene la del patrón. La dependencia, en todas partes aceptada como un hecho, en relación al saber altamente calificado, producido por la ciencia, la técnica y la política, erosiona la confianza tradicional en la veracidad del testigo y despoja de su sentido las principales formas en que los hombres pueden intercambiar sus propias certidumbres. Hasta en los tribunales, el experto rivaliza en importancia con los testigos. El experto es casi admitido como testigo patentado, se olvida que su declaración no representa sino lo que se oye decir: es la _opinión_ de una profesión. Sociólogos y siquíatras acuerdan o rechazan el derecho a la palabra, a una palabra audible. Al poner su fe en el experto, el hombre se despoja de su competencia jurídica, primero, y política, después. Su confianza en la omnipotencia de la ciencia incita a los gobiernos y a sus administrados a descansar sobre la ilusión de que se eliminarán los conflictos suscitados por un evidente enrarecimiento del agua, del aire o de la energía; a creer ciegamente en los oráculos de los expertos, que prometen milagros multiplicadores.
+
+Nutrida en el mito de la ciencia, la sociedad abandona a los expertos hasta la preocupación de fijar límites al crecimiento. Ahora bien, semejante delegación de poder destruye el funcionamiento político; a la palabra, como medida de todas las cosas, se la sustituye por la obediencia a un mito y, finalmente, legitimiza en cierta forma los experimentos practicados en los hombres. El experto no representa al ciudadano, forma parte de una élite cuya autoridad se basa sobre la posesión exclusiva de un saber no comunicable; pero, en realidad, este saber no le confiere ninguna aptitud particular para definir las delimitaciones del equilibrio de la vida. El experto no podrá jamás decir dónde se encuentra el umbral de tolerancia humana. Es la persona quien lo determina; en comunidad, nada le puede hacer desistir de ese derecho. Ciertamente, es posible hacer experiencias sobre seres humanos. Los médicos nazis han explorado los límites de resistencia del organismo. Descubrieron por cuánto tiempo el individuo medio puede soportar la tortura, pero esto nada les reveló respecto a lo que alguien puede considerar tolerable. Hecho significativo, esos médicos fueron condenados, de acuerdo con un pacto firmado en Nuremberg, dos días después de la destrucción de Hiroshima, en vísperas de destruir Nagasaki.
+
+Lo que un pueblo puede tolerar queda fuera del alcance de todo experimento. Se puede decir lo que será de un grupo de hombres particulares dentro de una situación extrema: prisioneros, náufragos o conejos de indias. Pero esto no puede servir para determinar el grado de sufrimiento y frustración que una sociedad dada aceptaría sufrir a causa de la instrumentación forjada por ella misma.
+
+Ciertamente, las operaciones científicas de medida pueden indicar que un determinado tipo de comportamiento amenaza un equilibrio vital mayor. Pero sólo una mayoría de hombres juiciosos, que conozcan la complejidad de las realidades cotidianas y que las tomen en cuenta en sus actuaciones, pueden encontrar la forma de limitar los fines que persiguen la sociedad y los individuos. La ciencia puede iluminar las dimensiones del reino del hombre en el cosmos, pero precisa una comunidad política de hombres conscientes de la fuerza de su razón, del peso de su palabra y de la seriedad de sus actos, para elegir libremente la austeridad que garantizará su vitalidad.
+
+## El descubrimiento del lenguaje
+
+Entre 1830 y 1850 una docena de sabios descubrieron y formularon la ley de conservación de la energía. La mayoría de ellos eran ingenieros que, cada uno por su cuenta, habían redefinido la energía cósmica en términos de pesos levantables por una máquina. Gracias a operaciones de medida efectuadas en laboratorio, se creyó al fin posible reducir a un denominador común la energía primordial, la _vis viva_ de la tradición. Es entonces cuando las ciencias exactas se pusieron a dominar la investigación.
+
+En esta misma época, y en forma análoga, la industria comenzó a competir con los otros modos de producción. Los éxitos industriales se volvieron la medida y la regla de la economía entera. Pronto se tuvo como subsidiarias a todas las actividades productoras a las cuales no se podían aplicar las reglas de medición y los criterios de eficiencia aplicables en la producción en serie: esto valió para los trabajos domésticos, la artesanía y la agricultura de subsistencia. El modo industrial de producción comenzó por degradar la red de relaciones productivas que hasta entonces habían coexistido en la sociedad, para luego paralizarla.
+
+Este monopolio, que ejerce un solo modo de producción sobre todas las relaciones productivas, es más insidioso y más peligroso que la competencia entre firmas, pero menos visible. Es fácil conocer al ganador en la competencia abierta: es la fábrica que utiliza el capital en forma intensiva; es el negocio mejor organizado; la rama industrial más esclavista y mejor protegida; la empresa que malgasta con la mayor discreción o que fabrica más armamentos. A gran escala, este curso toma la forma de una competencia entre firmas trasnacionales y naciones en vías de industrialización. Pero este juego mortal entre titanes distrae la atención de su propia función ritual. A medida que se extiende el campo de la competencia, una misma estructura industrial se desarrolla a través del mundo, y polariza la sociedad. El modo de producción industrial establece su dominación no sólo sobre los recursos y la instrumentación sino también sobre la imaginación y los deseos de un número creciente de individuos. Es el monopolio radical generalizado, ya no el de una rama de la industria sino el del modo industrial de producción. El hombre mismo, en cierta forma, está industrializado. Los sistemas políticos hacen prodigios de ingenio y de agilidad semántica para bautizar con nombres opuestos a esta misma estructura industrial en expansión en todas partes, sin comprender que ella escapa a su control. El antagonismo entre los países pobres y los países ricos, entre las naciones sumisas a una planificación central y las naciones gobernadas por la ley del mercado, es el antifaz necesario para que este monopolio parezca benéfico.
+
+Extendida por el mundo entero, esta industrialización del hombre lleva consigo la degradación de todos los lenguajes, y se hace muy difícil encontrar las palabras que hablarían de un mundo opuesto al que las ha engendrado. El lenguaje refleja el monopolio que el modo industrial de producción ejerce sobre la percepción y la motivación. En las naciones industriales, cuando el hombre habla de sus obras, las palabras que emplea designan los productos de la industria. El lenguaje refleja la materialización de la conciencia. Cuando el hombre aprende algo por la lectura dice que ha _adquirido educación_. El deslizamiento funcional del verbo hacia el sustantivo subraya el empobrecimiento de la imaginación social. La práctica nominalista del lenguaje sirve para marcar las relaciones de propiedad: la gente habla del trabajo que _tiene_. En toda América Latina, sólo los que _tienen_ un empleo dicen que tienen trabajo. Los campesinos (que son la gran mayoría) dicen que lo _hacen_: «se va a trabajar, pero no se tiene trabajo». Los trabajadores modernos y sindicados no sólo esperan que la industria produzca más bienes y servicios, sino también más trabajo para más gente. No solamente el hacer es sustantivo, sino también el querer. La habitación es más un bien que una actividad; el abrigo se convierte en bien que uno se procura, o que reivindica al verse privado del poder de abrigarse por sí mismo. Se adquiere el saber, la movilidad, y aun la sensibilidad o la salud. Se tiene trabajo o salud, como se tiene placer.
+
+El deslizamiento del verbo hacia el sustantivo refleja también el empobrecimiento del consejo de propiedad. _Posesión, embargo, abuso_, no pueden indicar la relación del individuo o del grupo con una institución como la escuela. Porque en su función esencial una herramienta semejante escapa, como hemos visto, a todo control. Las afirmaciones de propiedad concernientes a la herramienta vienen a designar la capacidad de detentar sus productos, sea el interés objetivo del capital o los objetos manufacturados, o incluso toda especie de prestigio ligado a lo uno o a lo otro. El consumidor-usuario integral, el hombre plenamente industrializado, no se apodera de nada más que de lo que consume. Dice: _mi educación, mis desplazamientos, mis recreos, mi salud_. A medida que el campo de su quehacer se estrecha, reclama productos de los que se dice _propietario_. Sometido al monopolio de un solo modo de producción, el usuario ha perdido todo sentido de la rica pluralidad de estilos de tener. En las lenguas polinesias, hay formas verbales distintas para expresar la relación que yo mantengo con mis actos (que me siguen), mi nariz (que me pueden quitar), mis prójimos (que no he escogido), mi piragua (sin la cual no sería un hombre verdadero), una bebida (que ofrezco) y la misma bebida (que me dispongo a tomar).
+
+Es una sociedad donde el lenguaje se ha sustantivado, los predicados son formulados en términos de lucha contra la escasez dentro del cuadro de la concurrencia. «Yo quiero aprender» se convierte en «yo quiero adquirir una educación». La decisión de actuar es reemplazada por la demanda de un billete de la lotería escolar. «Yo tengo deseos de ir a alguna parte» se transforma en «yo quiero un medio de transporte». La insistencia sobre el derecho de actuar se sustituye por la insistencia sobre el derecho de tener. En el primer caso, el sujeto es actor; en el segundo, usuario. El cambio de la lengua apoya la expansión del modo de producción industrial: la competencia gobernada por valores industrializados se refleja en la nominalización del lenguaje. La lucha competitiva inevitablemente toma la forma de un juego a suma cero ( _zero sum-game_ ) en el cual lo que un jugador pierde se transforma en ganancia para los otros jugadores. En el barullo, la gente juega con los nombres tal como los percibe: valorando únicamente el aprendizaje promueve la escuela, define la _educación_ como objeto de competición. El _Alma mater_ tiene demasiados hijos pegados a sus pechos: el que traga su ración de educación priva a un hermano de leche.
+
+El conflicto personal no es forzosamente una lucha por obtener un bien escaso. Puede también expresar un desacuerdo sobre los medios para asegurar mejor la autonomía de la persona. En ese caso, el conflicto se vuelve creador de libertad. Pero el lenguaje nominalista ha oscurecido esta profunda verdad: que el conflicto puede ser creador de derecho para ambos adversarios; creador del derecho de hacer las cosas que, por definición, no son ni bienes ni objetos escasos. El conflicto conducirá al derecho de caminar, de hablar, de leer, de escribir o de recordar en igualdad, de participar en el cambio social, de respirar aire puro y de emplear herramientas convivenciales. Haciéndolo, privará a las dos partes de un bien determinado, por amor de una ganancia inapreciable como es una nueva libertad compartida. Al limitar el consumo obligado, se libera el campo de la acción.
+
+El código operatorio de la instrumentación industrial se incardina en el habla cotidiana. La palabra del hombre que vive como poeta es apenas tolerada como protesta marginal y siempre que no perturbe a la muchedumbre que hace cola frente al aparato distribuidor de productos. Si no accedemos a un nuevo grado de conciencia que nos permita reencontrar la función convivencial del lenguaje, no llegaremos jamás a invertir ese proceso de industrialización del hombre. Pero si cada uno se sirve del lenguaje para reivindicar su derecho a la acción social antes que al consumo, el lenguaje se convertirá en el medio para restituir a la relación del hombre con la herramienta su transparencia.
+
+## La recuperación del derecho
+
+La ley y el Derecho, en sus formas actuales, están, de manera abrumadora, al servicio de una sociedad en expansión indefinida. El proceso por el cual los hombres deciden sobre lo que se debe hacer está actualmente sometido a la ideología de la productividad: hay que producir más, más saber y decisiones, más bienes y servicios. Después de la perversión del saber y del lenguaje, la perversión del Derecho es el tercer obstáculo a una actualización política de los límites. Los partidos, los modos de legislación y el aparato judicial han sido requisados al servicio del crecimiento de las escuelas, de los sindicatos, de los hospitales y de las autopistas, para no hablar de las fábricas. Poco a poco, no sólo la policía, sino también los órganos legislativos y los tribunales han llegado a ser considerados como una instrumentación al servicio del estado industrial. Si a veces defienden al individuo ante las pretensiones de la industria, ésta es la coartada de su docilidad para servir al monopolio radical y de su servilismo para legitimar una concentración siempre más fuerte de poderes. A su manera, los magistrados se convierten en cuerpo de ingenieros del crecimiento. En la democracia popular o capitalista, son los aliados 'objetivos' del instrumento contra el hombre. Con la idolatría de la ciencia y la corrupción del lenguaje, esta degradación del Derecho es un obstáculo mayor para la reinstrumentación de la sociedad.
+
+Se comprende que una sociedad distinta es posible cuando se logra expresarla claramente. Se provoca su aparición al descubrir el procedimiento por el cual la sociedad presente toma sus decisiones. Se organiza su estructura cuando se utilizan la lengua materna y los procedimientos tradicionales del Derecho para servir a fines opuestos a los que fija su presente uso. Pues en cada sociedad hay una estructura profunda que organiza la toma de decisión. Esta estructura existe dondequiera que los hombres se reúnen. El mismo proceso puede dar lugar a decisiones contradictorias, porque la estructura no sirve únicamente para la definición de los valores personales, sino también para la supervivencia de un comportamiento institucionalizado. La existencia de contradicciones no contradice la existencia de una estructura coherente que las engendre, sino al contrario. Yo puedo decidir adquirir una educación aun si por otra parte he decidido que valdría más aprender participando en la vida cotidiana. Me puedo dejar transportar al hospital aun cuando haya decidido que sufriría menos y moriría más fácilmente quedándome en casa. Lo mismo que la captación de disonancias cognoscitivas funda la poesía, así la coexistencia de normas contradictorias manifiesta la existencia de procedimientos normativos.
+
+Los hombres han perdido la confianza en los procedimientos disponibles, no porque éstos hayan sido pervertidos en sí, sino por el uso abusivo que constantemente se hace de ellos. Son utilizados para atiborrar a la gente con argumentos éticos, políticos o legales. Se han convertido en engranajes de la producción ilimitada. Las iglesias predican la humildad, la caridad y la pobreza, y financian programas de desarrollo industrial. Los socialistas se han convertido en defensores sin escrúpulos del monopolio industrial. La burocracia del Derecho se ha aliado a las burocracias de la ideología del bienestar general, para defender el crecimiento de la herramienta. Pronto será el computador el que decida ideas, leyes y técnicas indispensables al crecimiento.
+
+Si no nos ponemos de acuerdo sobre un procedimiento eficaz, duradero y convivencial, con el fin de controlar la instrumentación social, la inversión de la estructura institucional existente no se podrá iniciar y menos mantener. Siempre habrá administradores que quieran aumentar la productividad de la institución, y tribunos que prometan la luna a las multitudes ávidas.
+
+Cada vez que se propone utilizar el Derecho como herramienta de inversión de la sociedad, surgen tres objeciones: la primera es superficial: no todos pueden ser juristas, por tanto no todos pueden manejar el Derecho por su cuenta. Naturalmente, esto es verdad sólo en cierta medida. Sistemas parajurídicos podrían establecerse dentro de ciertas comunidades, y luego ser incorporados a la estructura del conjunto. Es más, a la participación del profano se le podría adjudicar un campo de acción más vasto y revelarse como preciosa en los procedimientos de mediación, de conciliación o de arbitraje. Pero, aun si la objeción es fundada, no viene al caso. El Derecho se aplicaría a la regulación de las herramientas, gobernando la vida cotidiana; pues no hay razón para que la mayoría de los procesos no sean descentralizados, demistificados y desburocratizados. Queda el que ciertos problemas sociales se presentan en gran escala, son complejos y posiblemente permanecerán así por mucho tiempo, y exigen una instrumentación jurídica a su medida. Si está destinado a servir a vastos grupos de hombres, cada uno portador de una tradición secular, para negociar proscripciones a escala mundial, el Derecho, como proceso de regulación de esos problemas sociales, es, de hecho, una herramienta que requiere expertos como operadores. Pero eso no significa que dichos expertos deban ser doctores en Derecho o formar un mandarinato.
+
+La segunda objeción toca directamente nuestro tema, y va mucho más lejos: los actuales operadores de la instrumentación jurídico-social están profundamente intoxicados por la mitología del crecimiento. Su visión de lo posible y de lo factible se mantiene conforme al adoctrinamiento industrial. Sería locura esperar que los gerentes de una sociedad productivista se transformaran en vestales de la sociedad convivencial. El alcance de esta observación se completa y subraya por una tercera objeción: el sistema jurídico no sólo es un conjunto de reglas escritas, es un proceso continuo a través del cual las leyes se elaboran y se aplican a situaciones reales. A través de la serie de actos jurídicos, la colectividad se da un cierto marco mental. De ello resulta un contenido del Derecho que refleja la ideología de los legisladores y de los jueces. La manera en que estos últimos perciben la ideología subyacente a toda cultura se convierte en la mitología oficial que se concreta en las leyes que formulan y aplican. El cuerpo de las leyes que regula una sociedad industrial refleja inevitablemente la ideología, las características sociales y la estructura de clase, al mismo tiempo que la refuerzan y aseguran su reproducción. Cualquiera que sea su sello ideológico, toda sociedad moderna sitúa siempre el bien común en el orden del más: más poder a las empresas y a los expertos, más consumo al usuario.
+
+Si bien estas objeciones subrayan una dificultad fundamental en el uso del Derecho con el fin de invertir la sociedad, dejan de lado el asunto. Cuidadosamente hago la distinción entre el cuerpo de las leyes y la estructura formal que lo elabora, al igual que distingo entre el uso de _slogans_ al que recurren las instituciones y la práctica del lenguaje cotidiano. Así también distinguiré entre un conjunto de políticas y el proceso formal que les da origen. Es bien evidente que, tratándose del Derecho, así como del saber o del lenguaje, nos ceñimos a la estructura que rige en profundidad la donación de sentido. De la recuperación plena y del libre uso de esa estructura depende el despertar de las fuerzas capaces de transfigurar 'la alianza para el progreso'.
+
+En una época en que la _operación_ se ha convertido en un fin en sí, nunca se insistirá bastante sobre la distinción entre los fines y los medios, entre el procedimiento y la sustancia. Vivimos en un mundo en donde el lenguaje nos habla, el saber nos piensa y el Derecho nos actúa. El lenguaje se reduce a la emisión y a la recepción de mensajes; el pensamiento, a la acumulación de informaciones; el Derecho, a la reglamentación del proyecto. Para reencontrar esta distinción crucial entre el procedimiento y la sustancia, el análisis del procedimiento jurídico nos puede servir de paradigma, puesto que esta distinción se encuentra en la raíz del Derecho, aunque cada ejemplo del Derecho se caracteriza por el estilo particular de su proceso formal. Aquí apoyaré mi argumentación haciendo referencia al derecho angloamericano.
+
+## El ejemplo del derecho consuetudinario
+
+La estructura formal del _common law_ presenta dos rasgos dominantes y complementarios que le hacen particularmente adaptable a las necesidades de un tiempo de crisis. El sistema se basa sobre la continuidad y la oposición antagónica o contradictoria de las partes (_adversary nature of the common law_).
+
+La continuidad inherente al proceso de elaboración del Derecho conserva, en un sentido, la sustancia del cuerpo de las leyes. Esto no es tan evidente en la etapa legislativa. El legislador tiene el campo abierto para innovar, desde el momento en que permanece dentro del marco constitucional. Pero toda nueva ley debe inscribirse dentro del contexto de la legislación existente y, por este hecho, no puede apartarse mucho del derecho vigente.
+
+Es claro que la función de la jurisprudencia consiste en asegurar la continuidad de la sustancia del Derecho, actualizándola. Los tribunales aplican el Derecho a situaciones reales. La jurisprudencia zanja del mismo modo dos casos idénticos o decide, por el contrario, que el mismo hecho ya no significa hoy la misma cosa que ayer. El Derecho representa la autoridad soberana que el pasado ejerce sobre el conflicto presente, la continuidad de un proceso dialéctico. El tribunal da al conflicto un estatuto social, luego incorpora el juicio emitido al cuerpo del Derecho. Dentro del proceso jurídico se reactualiza la experiencia social del pasado en vista de las necesidades presentes; en el futuro, a su vez, el juicio presente servirá de precedente para arreglar otras diferencias.
+
+La continuidad de la estructura formal que rige el proceso jurídico no se reduce a la simple incorporación de un conjunto de prejuicios en un conjunto de leyes. Sólo desde el punto de vista formal, este modo de continuidad no se endereza a preservar el contenido de tal o cual ley. Muy al contrario, podría servir para preservar el desarrollo continuo del Derecho de una sociedad regida por principios inversos. En la mayoría de las constituciones, nada prohibe proponer leyes sobre una limitación de la productividad, de los privilegios burocráticos, de la especialización o del monopolio radical. En principio, a condición de estar inversamente orientado, los procesos legislativo y jurisprudencial podrían servir para formular ese derecho nuevo y hacer que se respete.
+
+De igual importancia es el carácter contradictorio del procedimiento de la _common law_. Desde un punto de vista formal, la _common law_ nada tiene que ver con la definición de lo que está bien en materia ética o técnica. Es una herramienta para comprender las relaciones, cuando éstas estallan en forma de conflictos reales. Corresponde a las partes afectadas reclamar su derecho o reivindicar aquello que consideren bueno. Así funciona la estructura tanto a nivel legislativo como a nivel jurisprudencial. Al equilibrar intereses opuestos, la decisión debería retener lo que es, en teoría, preferible para todos.
+
+En las últimas generaciones, este equilibrio, siempre deformado por uno u otro prejuicio, ha sido globalmente dirigido en favor de la sociedad de crecimiento. Pero la frecuente perversión de la estructura jurídica no predica contra su inversión. Muy al contrario, nada impide a las partes globalmente opuestas a la sociedad productivista --liberadas de la ilusión de que el crecimiento puede suprimir la injusticia social y conscientes de la necesidad de límites-- recurrir a esta herramienta. Ciertamente, no basta con que aparezca un nuevo tipo de alegante; es preciso también que el legislador se desintoxique del crecimiento, que las partes interesadas insistan en la protección de sus intereses y que, con ese fin, se dediquen a una revaluación sistemática de las evidencias y de las certidumbres demasiado bien establecidas.
+
+La ley, como la jurisprudencia, supone que las partes someten los conflictos de interés social al juicio de un tribunal imparcial. Este tribunal, o sala de apelación, opera en forma continua. El juez ideal es una persona común, prudente, en el fondo indiferente al asunto en debate, experto en el ejercicio del procedimiento. Pero, dentro de la realidad de la vida, el juez es un hombre de su tiempo y de su medio. De hecho, el tribunal ha llegado a servir a la concentración del poder y al crecimiento de la producción industrial. No sólo el juez y el legislador son impulsados a creer que un asunto está bien juzgado y el conflicto debidamente resuelto cuando la balanza de la justicia se inclina en favor del interés global de las industrias, sino que además la sociedad ha condicionado al demandante a exigir que éstas crezcan. Más bien se reivindica una tajada grande del pastel institucional y no la protección contra una institución que mutila la libertad. Sin embargo, el uso abusivo de la herramienta jurídica no corrompe su naturaleza misma.
+
+Cuando se presentan los procedimientos que oponen formalmente adversarios como la herramienta clave que permite limitar el crecimiento industrial, se levanta a menudo una objeción, a saber: las sociedades ya son fuertemente dependientes de estos procedimientos, muchas veces ineficaces. Los reformadores de América del Norte reivindican el Derecho a la oposición legal para los negros, los indios, las mujeres, los trabajadores, los lisiados, los consumidores organizados. El procedimiento se hace largo, incómodo y costoso, y la mayoría de los demandantes no pueden llegar hasta el fin. Los asuntos se rezagan y las decisiones llegan demasiado tarde. El procedimiento se convierte en un juego que crea nuevos antagonismos, nuevas competencias. Ha sido desviado de su fin, la decisión se vuelve un bien escaso. La sociedad del crecimiento recupera así al usuario del procedimiento formal.
+
+La objeción que se opone a esta multiplicación de procedimientos no queda desplazada si enfoca su proliferación como medio de resolver conflictos personales. Pero aquí los conflictos entre personas o las luchas de grupos entre sí no son mi tema. Lo que me interesa no es la oposición entre una clase de hombres explotados y otra clase propietaria de las herramientas, sino la oposición que se sitúa primero entre el hombre y la estructura técnica de la herramienta, y luego, como consecuencia, entre el hombre y las profesiones cuyo interés consiste en mantener esta estructura técnica. En la sociedad, el conflicto fundamental afecta a los actos, los hechos o los objetos respecto a los cuales las personas entran en oposición formal con las empresas y las instituciones manipuladoras. Formalmente, el procedimiento contradictorio es el modelo de la herramienta de que disponen los ciudadanos para oponerse a las amenazas que la industria presenta.
+
+Con raras excepciones, las leyes y los cuerpos legislativos, los tribunales y los juicios, los demandantes y sus demandas están profundamente pervertidos por el acuerdo unánime y aplastante que acepta sin murmurar el modo de producción industrial y sus _slogans_: _mientras más, mejor_. Además, las empresas y las instituciones saben mejor que las personas cuál es el interés público y cómo servirlo. Pero esta unanimidad desconcertante en nada desvirtúa mi tesis: una revolución que no recurre a los procedimientos jurídicos y políticos se condena al fracaso. Únicamente una activa mayoría de individuos y de grupos que busquen en un procedimiento convivencial común recobrar sus propios derechos, puede arrancar al Leviatán el poder de determinar los cercos que se deben imponer al crecimiento para sobrevivir y el de poder elegir los límites que optimicen una civilización.
+
+Para entablar la lucha contra los prejuicios reinantes que conduzca a la inversión, algunos individuos que pertenecen a las grandes profesiones pueden jugar un papel orientador. Al tomar conciencia de la crisis de la escuela, los educadores generalmente se ponen en búsqueda de una solución-milagro para enseñar más cosas a más gente. Sus esfuerzos y sus pretensiones amplifican la importancia de la minoría de pedagogos que insisten en los _límites pedagógicos_ del crecimiento industrial. De la misma manera, los médicos tienen la tendencia a creer que por lo menos una parte de su saber se puede expresar únicamente en términos esotéricos. A sus ojos, un colega que seculariza los actos médicos no es más que un profanador. Es vano esperar que el Colegio de Médicos, el Sindicato de la Educación Nacional o la Asociación de Ingenieros de la Circulación, expliquen en términos sencillos, sacados del lenguaje común, el gangsterismo profesional de sus colegas. Asimismo, es vano pensar que los diputados, los juristas y los magistrados vayan de pronto a reconocer la independencia del Derecho de su noción preconcebida del bien, que se confunde con el suministro de la mayor cantidad de productos al mayor número de gente. Porque todos están domesticados para arbitrar conflictos en favor de su propia rama de actividad, ya hablen en nombre de los patronos, de los asalariados, de los usuarios o de sus propios colegas. Pero, aquí o allá, por excepción se encontrará a un médico que ayude a los demás a vivir en forma responsable, a aceptar el sufrimiento, a afrontar la muerte y, de modo similar, por excepción se encontrarán juristas que ayuden a las personas a utilizar la estructura formal del Derecho para defender sus intereses dentro del marco de una sociedad convivencial. Aun si la sentencia dictada no llega finalmente a satisfacer a los demandantes, la acción servirá siempre para poner en evidencia el litigio.
+
+No cabe duda de que el recurso al procedimiento con el fin de inmovilizar y de invertir nuestras instituciones dominantes, se presenta a los más poderosos de sus administradores y a los más intoxicados de los usuarios como un desvío del Derecho y una subversión del único orden que reconocen. En sí, el recurso a un procedimiento convivencial, en forma debida, es una monstruosidad y un crimen a los ojos del burócrata, aunque éste pretenda ser juez.
+
+# La inversión política
+
+Si en un futuro muy próximo la humanidad no limita el impacto de su instrumentación sobre el ambiente y no pone en obra un control eficaz de nacimientos, nuestros descendientes conocerán el espantoso apocalipsis predicho por muchos ecólogos. La sociedad puede aislar su supervivencia dentro de los límites fijados y reforzados por una dictadura burocrática, o bien reaccionar _políticamente_ a la amenza, recurriendo a los procedimientos jurídico y político. La falsificación ideológica del pasado nos vela la existencia y la necesidad de esta elección.
+
+La gestión burocrática de la supervivencia humana es una elección aceptable, desde un punto de vista ético o político. Pero habrá de fracasar. Es posible que la gente vuelva a poner de su propio grado sus destinos en manos de un Gran Hermano y de sus agentes anónimos, aterrorizados por la creciente evidencia de la superpoblación, de la mengua de los recursos y de la organización insensata de la vida cotidiana. Es posible que a los tecnócratas se les encargue conducir al rebaño al borde del abismo, es decir, fijar los límites multidimensionales al crecimiento, justamente más acá del umbral de la autodestrucción. Semejante fantasía suicida mantendría al sistema industrial en el más alto grado de productividad capaz de ser tolerado.
+
+El hombre viviría protegido en una cápsula de plástico que le obligaría a sobrevivir como el condenado a muerte antes de la ejecución. El umbral de tolerancia del hombre en materia de programación y de manipulación pronto se volvería el obstáculo más serio para el crecimiento. Y la empresa alquímica renacería de sus cenizas: se trataría de producir y de hacer obedecer al mutante monstruoso parido por la pesadilla de la razón. Para garantizar su supervivencia en un mundo racional y artificial, la ciencia y la técnica se empeñarían en instrumentar el siquismo del hombre. Desde el nacimiento a la muerte, la humanidad estaría confinada en la escuela permanente, extendida a escala mundial, tratada de por vida en el gran hospital planetario y atada día y noche a implacables cadenas de comunicación. Es así como funcionaría el mundo de la Gran Organización. Sin embargo, los fracasos anteriores de las terapias de masa hacen esperar la quiebra también de este último proyecto de control planetario.
+
+La instalación del fascismo tecnoburocrático no está escrita en las estrellas. Existe otra posibilidad: un proceso político que permita a la población determinar el máximo que cada uno puede exigir, en un mundo de recursos manifiestamente limitados; un proceso consensual destinado a fijar y mantener límites al crecimiento de la instrumentación; un proceso de estímulo a la investigación radical, de manera que un número creciente de gente pueda _hacer cada vez más con cada vez menos_. Un programa así puede aún parecer utópico a la hora actual: si sigue agravándose la crisis, pronto revelará su realismo extremo.
+
+## Mitos y mayorías
+
+El impedimento ulterior para la reestructuración de la sociedad no es ni la falta de información sobre los límites necesarios, ni la falta de hombres resueltos a aceptarlos si llegan a hacerse inevitables. Es el poder de la mitología política.
+
+En una sociedad rica, cada uno es, más o menos, consumidor-usuario en alguna forma. Cada uno juega su papel en la destrucción del ambiente. El mito transforma esta multiplicidad de depredadores en una mayoría política. Por este hecho, esta multiplicidad de individuos automatizados se convierte en un bloque mítico de electores que se ponen de acuerdo sobre un problema inexistente: la mayoría silenciosa, guardiana invisible e invencible de los intereses empleados en el crecimiento, que paraliza toda acción política real. Analizándolo más profundamente, esta mayoría es un conjunto ficticio de personas teóricamente dotadas de razón. En realidad, hay una multiplicidad de individuos: el experto en ecología que se dirige en Boeing a una conferencia contra la contaminación; el economista que sabe que el alza de la productividad hace escasear el trabajo y trata de crear nuevos empleos, etc. Ni el uno ni el otro representan los intereses del trabajador especializado que compra a crédito un aparato de televisión a color, o del campesino que, por seguir la revolución verde, utiliza insecticidas prohibidos desde hace cinco años en el país que los produce. Pero, a pesar de su diversidad, un común apego al crecimiento les une, puesto que de ello depende su satisfacción. Sólo el mito les dará la homogeneidad de una mayoría política opuesta a los límites. Todos tienen su razón para desear el crecimiento industrial y para sentir su amenaza. Por el momento, en una palabra, un voto contra el crecimiento estaría tan desprovisto de sentido como un voto en favor del Producto Nacional Bruto.
+
+Una ideología común no crea una mayoría, no tiene eficacia sino a condición de arraigarse en la interpretación del interés racional de cada uno y de dar a este interés una forma política. La acción política de la persona frente a un conflicto social esencial no depende de la ideología aceptada previamente, sino de dos factores:
+
+* [a] el estilo que marcará la transformación del conflicto latente entre el hombre y la herramienta en una crisis abierta, que exija una reacción global y sin precedente;
+* [b] el surgimiento de una multiplicidad de nuevas élites que puedan proveer una nueva forma interpretativa y hasta cierto punto inesperada sobre las líneas de interés.
+
+## De la catástrofe a la crisis
+
+Yo no hago más que conjeturar sobre la agravación de la crisis. Pero puedo exponer con precisión la conducta a mantener delante y dentro de la crisis. Creo que el crecimiento se detendrá por sí mismo. La parálisis sinergética de los sistemas alimenticios provocará el derrumbamiento general del modo de producción industrial. Las administraciones creen estabilizar y armonizar el crecimiento afinando los mecanismos y los sistemas de control, pero no hacen sino precipitar la mega-máquina institucional hacia su segundo umbral de mutación. Dentro de muy corto tiempo, la población perderá la confianza, no sólo de las instituciones dominantes, sino también en los gestores de la crisis. El poder que tienen sus instituciones para definir los valores (la educación, la velocidad, la salud, el bienestar, la información, etc.) se desvanecerá repentinamente cuando se reconozca su carácter ilusorio.
+
+Un suceso imprevisible y probablemente menor, servirá de detonador a la crisis, como el pánico en Wall Street precipitó la Gran Depresión. Una coincidencia fortuita pondrá de manifiesto la contradicción estructural entre los fines oficiales de nuestras instituciones y sus verdaderos resultados. Lo que es ya evidente para algunos, de golpe saltará a la vista de la mayoría: la organización de toda la economía dirigida a un _mejor estar_ es el obstáculo mayor al _bienestar_. Como otras intuiciones ampliamente compartidas, ésta tendrá la virtud de distorsionar completamente la imaginación popular. De la noche a la mañana, importantes instituciones perderán toda respetabilidad, toda legitimidad y reputación de servir al interés público. Es lo que le ha sucedido a la Iglesia de Roma bajo la Reforma y a la monarquía francesa en 1793. En una noche, lo impensable se convirtió en evidencia.
+
+Una mutación repentina no es producto ni del orden, ni de la retroacción, ni de la revolución. Basta ver los torbellinos al pie de una cascada. Las estaciones se suceden, el agua abunda o disminuye hasta ser un débil hilo; pero los remolinos parecen siempre iguales. Sin embargo, basta con que una piedra caiga en la poza, para que la superficie cambie totalmente, sin volver a ser igual. El despertar de la conciencia también se produce de golpe. La mayoría silenciosa hoy apoya totalmente la tesis del crecimiento, pero no se puede prever su comportamiento político cuando estalle la crisis. Cuando un pueblo pierde confianza en la productividad industrial, y no solamente en el papel moneda, todo puede suceder. La inversión es realmente posible.
+
+En la hora actual todavía se trata de parchear las fallas de cada sistema. Ningún remedio surte efecto, pero aún se dispone de medios para aplicarlos todos, uno tras otro. Los gobiernos atacan la crisis de los servicios públicos, la educación, los transportes, los sistemas jurídicos, la juventud. Cada aspecto de la crisis global se separa de los demás, se explica en forma autónoma y se trata en particular. Se proponen soluciones de recambio que dan credibilidad a la reforma sectorial: las escuelas de vanguardia contra las escuelas tradicionales doblan la demanda de educación; las ciudades satélite, contra el monorrail, refuerzan la convicción de que el desarrollo de las ciudades es una fatalidad; una mejor formación de los médicos, contra la proliferación de profesiones para-médicas, alimenta la industria de la salud; y, como los dos términos de la alternativa tienen sus partidarios, en general no se elige entre ellos, sino que se prueban los dos a la vez. El resultado es que se trata de hacer un pastel cada vez más grande, lo que redunda en pura pérdida.
+
+Se imita la actitud de Coolidge frente a los primeros síntomas de la Gran Depresión, descuidando en forma análoga el aviso de una crisis mucho más radical. Se cree que el análisis general de los sistemas vincula entre ellas las crisis institucionales, pero en verdad no hace sino conducir a mayor planificación, centralización y burocratización a fin de perfeccionar el control de la población, de la abundancia de la industria destructora e ineficaz. Se supone que el crecimiento de la producción de decisiones, de controles y de terapias, compensa la extensión del desempleo en los sectores fabriles. Fascinada por la producción industrial, la población permanece ciega a la posibilidad de una sociedad posindustrial donde coexistirán varios modos de producción complementarios. Tratar de promover una era a la vez hiperindustrial y ecológicamente realizable es acelerar la degradación de los otros componentes del equilibrio multidimensional de la vida. El costo de la defensa del _statu quo_ sube como una flecha.
+
+Sería necesario ser geomántico para predecir qué serie de sucesos causaría el derrumbamiento de Wall Street y desencadenaría la crisis inminente. Pero no es necesario ser genial para prever que se tratará de la primera crisis mundial que cuestionará el sistema industrial en sí, en vez de localizarlo en el seno de ese sistema. Pronto se producirá un acontecimiento que tendrá como efecto congelar el crecimiento de los instrumentos. Llegado el momento, el estruendo del derrumbamiento obnubilará las mentes e impedirá escuchar la razón.
+
+Aún nos queda una oportunidad de comprender las causas de la crisis global del sistema que nos amenaza y de prepararnos justamente para no asimilarla a una crisis parcial, interior del sistema. Si queremos anticipar los efectos, debemos imaginar cómo una brusca transformación llevará al poder a grupos sociales sofocados hasta ahora. No es la catástrofe que, en tanto tal, sacará a estos grupos de la nada para alzarlos sobre el resto, sino que la catástrofe debilitará a las potencias reinantes que aplastaban a esos grupos y les impedían participar en el proceso social. El efecto de la sorpresa debilita el control, desorienta a los controladores e instala en primer rango a los que conservan su sangre fría.
+
+Una vez debilitado el control, los controladores buscan nuevos aliados. En el estado industrial debilitado por la Gran Crisis, los gobernantes no pudieron pasarse sin trabajadores organizados, por lo que éstos recibieron parte del poder estructural. En el mercado de trabajo constreñido por la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la industria no ha podido pasarse sin los trabajadores negros, por lo que éstos han comenzado a situarse como poder. Actualmente, al haberse hecho su lugar, la élite negra tiende a convertirse en pilar de un sistema establecido, a imagen de la suerte que anteriormente corrieron los sindicatos. En efecto, el desenlace de la crisis inminente depende de la aparición de élites imposibles de recuperar.
+
+## En el interior de la crisis
+
+Las fuerzas que tienden a limitar la producción ya están operando en el interior del cuerpo social. Una investigación pública y radical puede ayudar de manera significativa a muchos hombres a ganar cohesión y lucidez en la condena de un crecimiento que se juzga destructivo. Seguramente sus voces se harán oír mejor cuando la crisis de la sociedad superproductora se agrave. Sin formar partido, son los portavoces de una mayoría de la cual cada uno es miembro en potencia. Mientras más inesperada sea la crisis más repentinamente las llamadas a la austeridad alegre y equilibrada se convertirán en un programa de limitaciones racionales. Para ser capaces de controlar la situación en el momento dado, estas minorías deben captar la profundidad de la crisis y deben saber describirla con un lenguaje apropiado para declarar qué quieren, qué pueden hacer y qué no necesitan. El uso crítico del lenguaje ordinario es el primer pivote en la inversión política. Se necesita un segundo.
+
+Más crecimiento conduce obligatoriamente al desastre, pero éste presenta un rostro doble. El suceso catastrófico puede ser el fin de la civilización política, o incluso de la especie 'hombre'. Puede ser también la Gran Crisis, es decir, la oportunidad de una elección sin precedente. Previsible e inesperada, la catástrofe no será una _crisis_ en el sentido propio de la palabra, a no ser que en el momento en que llegue, los prisioneros del progreso pidan escaparse del paraíso industrial, y que una puerta se abra en el recinto de la prisión dorada. Será necesario entonces demostrar que el desvanecimiento del espejismo industrial presenta la oportunidad de elegir un modo de producción convivencial y eficaz. Por ahora, la preparación a esta tarea es la clave de una nueva práctica política.
+
+Se necesitará de grupos capaces de analizar con coherencia la catástrofe y de expresarla en lenguaje común. Deberán saber abogar por la causa de una sociedad que establece cercos y hacerlo en términos concretos, comprensibles para todos, deseables en general y aplicables inmediatamente. El sacrificio es el rescate de la elección, precio inevitable a pagar para obtener lo que se quiere, o por lo menos, para liberarse de lo intolerable. Pero no basta con servirse de las palabras de todos los días, como herramientas para sacar a la luz el rostro verdadero de la realidad; también será preciso ser capaz de manejar una herramienta social que convenga al ordenamiento del bien público.
+
+Como quedó explicado anteriormente, esta herramienta es la estructura formal de la política y del Derecho. A la hora del desastre, la catástrofe se transforma en crisis, si un grupo de gente lúcida, de sangre fría, inspira confianza a sus conciudadanos. Su credibilidad dependerá de su habilidad para demostrar que no sólo es necesario, sino posible instaurar una sociedad convivencial, a condición de utilizar conscientemente un procedimiento regulador que reconozca al conflicto de intereses su legitimidad, que dé valor al precedente, y atribuya un carácter ejecutorio a la decisión de hombres corrientes, reconocidos por la comunidad como sus representantes. A la hora del desastre, sólo el arraigo en la historia puede dar la confianza necesaria para trastocar el presente. El uso convivencial del procedimiento garantiza que una revolución institucional se mantenga como herramienta cuya práctica engendra los fines. Un recurso lúcido al procedimiento, hecho dentro de un espíritu de oposición continua a la burocracia, es la única manera posible de evitar que la revolución se transforme, ella misma, en institución. Que la aplicación de este procedimiento para la inversión radical de las principales instituciones sea bautizada revolución cultural, recuperación de la estructura formal del Derecho, socialismo de participación o retorno al espíritu de los _Fueros de España_, no es más que cuestión de denominación.
+
+## La mutación repentina
+
+Cuando hablo acerca de la emergencia de grupos de interés y su preparación no hablo de grupos de acción, o de una iglesia, o de una nueva clase de expertos. Y sobre todo, no estoy hablando de un nuevo partido político que pudiera asumir el poder en un momento de crisis. La administración de la crisis la convertiría en una catástrofe irreversible. Un partido bien entrenado puede establecer su poder en el momento de una crisis en la cual la opción es la única dentro todo un sistema. Tales fueron los instrumentos de producción durante la Gran Depresión. Es así como en los países de Europa del Este, pasada la Segunda Guerra Mundial, tuvieron que 'elegir' el estalinismo. Pero la crisis, de cuyo próximo advenimiento estoy hablando, no está ya dentro de la sociedad industrial sino que concierne al modo de producción industrial en sí. Esta crisis obliga al hombre a elegir entre la herramienta convivencial y el aplastamiento por la megamáquina, entre el crecimiento indefinido y la aceptación de límites multidimensionales. La única respuesta posible consiste en reconocer su profundidad y aceptar el único principio de solución que se ofrece: establecer, por acuerdo político, una autolimitación. Mientras más numerosos y diversos sean los heraldos, más profunda será la comprensión de que el sacrificio es necesario, de que protege intereses variados y de que es la base de un nuevo pluralismo cultural.
+
+Tampoco hablo de una mayoría opuesta al crecimiento, en nombre de principios abstractos. Ésta sería una nueva mayoría fantasma. En realidad, es concebible la formación de una élite organizada que alabe la ortodoxia del anticrecimiento. Esta élite quizás se esté formando. Pero un coro semejante, con el anticrecimiento como todo programa, es el antídoto industrial a la imaginación revolucionaria. Al incitar a la población a aceptar una limitación de la producción industrial, sin poner en cuestión la estructura de base de la sociedad industrial, obligadamente se daría más poder a los burócratas que optimizan el crecimiento, y uno mismo se convertiría en rehén. La producción estabilizada de bienes y servicios muy racionalizados y estandarizados alejaría aún más, de ser posible, la producción convivencial de lo que ya lo hace la sociedad industrial de crecimiento.
+
+Los miembros de una sociedad que se pone cerco no necesitan reunir una mayoría. En democracia, una mayoría electoral no se basa en la adhesión explicita a una ideología o a un valor determinado de todos sus miembros. Una mayoría electoral favorable a la limitación de las instituciones sería heterogénea: comprendería a las víctimas de un aspecto particular de la superproducción, a los ausentes al festín industrial y a la gente que rechaza en bloque el estilo de la sociedad totalmente racionalizada. El ejemplo de la escuela puede ilustrar el funcionamiento de una mayoría electoral en la política tradicional. La gente sin niños rezonga ante las cargas presupuestarias de la educación nacional. Unos encuentran que pagan, sin razón, más que sus vecinos. Otros sostienen las escuelas confesionales. Hay quienes rechazan la obligación escolar porque daña a los niños, otros la combaten porque refuerza la segregación social. Toda esta gente podría formar una mayoría electoral, pero sin constituir ni una secta ni un partido. Actualmente podrían eficazmente reducir las pretensiones de la escuela, pero al hacerlo, reforzarían la legitimidad del producto escolar, que es la 'educación'. Cuando las cosas siguen su curso, limitar una institución dominante con el voto mayoritario toma siempre un giro reaccionario.
+
+Pero una mayoría puede tener un efecto revolucionario cuando una crisis afecta a la sociedad de manera radical. La llegada simultánea de varias instituciones a su segundo umbral de mutación hace sonar la alarma. La crisis no puede tardar. En realidad ya comenzó. El desastre que seguirá, pondrá claramente en evidencia que la sociedad industrial, como tal, y no sólo sus diversos órganos, ha traspuesto los límites.
+
+El Estado-Nación se ha convertido en guardián de los instrumentos ya tan poderosos, que no pueden desempeñar su papel de cuadro político. De la misma manera que Giap supo utilizar la máquina de guerra norteamericana para ganar su guerra, así las empresas multinacionales y las profesiones pueden usar la ley, el sistema bipartidista, para establecer un imperio. Si bien la democracia norteamericana pudo sobrevivir a la victoria de Giap, no podrá sobrevivir a la de la ITT y similares. Cuando la crisis total se avecina, se pone de manifiesto que el estado-nación moderno se ha convertido en un conglomerado de sociedades anónimas, donde cada instrumentación trata de promover su propio producto y servir sus intereses propios. El conjunto produce _bienestar_ , bajo la forma de educación, salud, etc., y el éxito se mide por el crecimiento del capital de todas estas sociedades. En su oportunidad, los partidos políticos reúnen a todos los accionistas para elegir un consejo de administración. Los partidos apoyan el derecho del elector a reclamar un nivel más alto de consumo _individual_ , lo que significa un grado más alto de consumo _industrial_. La gente puede siempre reclamar más transportes rápidos, pero el criterio que se aplica al sistema de transporte basado en el automóvil o el tren y que está absorbiendo una gran parte de la renta nacional, se deja a discrección de los expertos. Los partidos sostienen un Estado cuya meta reconocida es el crecimiento del PNB; nada se puede esperar de ellos para cuando llegue lo peor.
+
+
+El procedimiento contradictorio para el arreglo de un conflicto entre la empresa y el individuo cuando todo va bien refuerza la legitimidad de la dependencia de este último. Pero en el momento de la crisis estructural, cuando aun la reducción voluntaria de la supereficiencia aceptada por las instituciones dominantes no podrá salvarlas de hundirse, el procedimiento contradictorio cambia de signo. Una crisis generalizada abre la vía para la reconstrucción de la sociedad. La pérdida de legitimidad del Estado, como sociedad por acciones, no invalida, sino que reafirma la necesidad de un procedimiento constitucional.
+
+La pérdida de credibilidad, convertidos en facciones rivales de accionistas, no hace mas que subrayar la importancia al recurso de los procedimientos contradictorios en política. La pérdida de credibilidad en las reivindicaciones antagónicas para obtener más consumo individual hace resaltar la importancia del recurso a esos mismos procedimientos contradictorios, cuando se trata de armonizar series opuestas de limitaciones, referentes al conjunto de la sociedad. La misma crisis general puede establecer, de forma duradera, un contrato social que abandone el poder de prescribir el bienestar al despotismo tecnoburocrático y a la ortodoxia ideológica, o bien puede ser la oportunidad para construir una sociedad convivencial, en transformación continua dentro de un cuadro material, que estaría definido por aboliciones racionales y políticas.
+
+Los procedimientos político y jurídico van encajados estructuralmente el uno en el otro. Ambos conforman y expresan la estructura de la libertad dentro de la historia. Reconociendo esto, el procedimiento formal puede ser la mejor herramienta teatral, simbólica y convivencial de la acción política. El concepto de Derecho conserva toda su fuerza, aun cuando la sociedad reserve a los privilegiados el acceso a la maquinaria jurídica, aun cuando, sistemáticamente, encarnezca a la justicia y vista al despotismo con el manto de simulacros de tribunales. Cuando un hombre defiende el recurso al lenguaje ordinario y al procedimiento formal, inscrito en la historia de un pueblo, sigue siendo la herramienta más poderosa para decir la verdad, para denunciar la hipertrofia cancerosa y la dominación del modo de producción industrial como la última forma de idolatría. La angustia me aprisiona cuando veo que nuestra única posibilidad para detener la marejada mortal está en la palabra, más exactamente en el verbo, que ha llegado a nosotros y se encuentra en nuestra historia. Sólo dentro de su fragilidad, el verbo puede reunir a la multitud de los hombres para que el alud de la violencia se transforme en recontrucción convivencial.
+
+Si saben definir criterios para limitar la instrumentación, los países pobres emprenderán más fácilmente su reconstrucción social y, sobre todo, accederán directamente a un modo de producción posindustrial y convivencial. Los límites que deberán adoptar son del mismo orden que aquellos que las naciones industrializadas deberán aceptar para sobrevivir: la convivencialidad, accesible desde ahora a los 'subdesarrollados', costará un precio inaudito a los 'desarrollados'.
+
+Una última objeción se presenta a menudo cuando se propone la orientación convivencial a una sociedad: para elegir una vida austera con herramientas convivenciales es preciso defenderse contra el imperialismo de las megaherramientas en expansión. Tal defensa no sería posible sin un ejército moderno, que a su vez exige una industria en pleno crecimiento. En realidad, la reconstrucción de la sociedad no puede ser protegida por un ejército poderoso: primero, porque habría contradicción entre los términos; luego, porque ningún ejército moderno de un país pobre puede defenderlo contra tal poder. La convivencialidad será obra exclusiva de personas que utilicen una instrumentación efectivamente controlada. Los mercenarios del imperialismo pueden envenenar o destruir una sociedad convivencial, pero no la pueden conquistar.
+
+
+
+[^n01]:"_Awteritas secundum quod est virtus non excludit omnes delectationes, sed superfluas et inordinatas: unde videtur pertinere ad affabilitatem, quam philosophus, lib. 4 Ethic Cap. Vl 'amicitiam' nominat, vel ad eutrapelldiln sive jocunditatem._" (Santo Tomás: _Summa Thelogica_ , IIa IIae, q. 168, art. 4, ad 3m).
+
+[^n02]:Rodamiento de bolas.
+
+[^n03]:¿En francés en el original?
+
+[^n04]:**Marcuse, Herbert** (1964) _El hombre unidimensional_ Ed. española: Joaquín Mortiz, México, 1968
+
+[^n05]:Illich, Ivan (1974) _Energy and Equity_ Marion Boyars Publishers, London. Ed. española: _Energía y equidad_ ; Barral Editores, Barcelona, 1974
+
diff --git a/contents/book/conviviality/fr.bib b/contents/book/conviviality/fr.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43dcffc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/conviviality/fr.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-conviviality-fr,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {La Convivialité},
+  year = {1973},
+  date = {1973},
+  origdate = {1973},
+  language = {fr},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/fr/book/conviviality:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/conviviality/index b/contents/book/conviviality/index
index 520be77..3f6f85b 100644
--- a/contents/book/conviviality/index
+++ b/contents/book/conviviality/index
@@ -3,5 +3,3 @@
 * **#@LANG_publicationdate@#:** 1973
 * **#@LANG_comments@#:**
 * **#@LANG_langorig@#:** #@LANG_lang_en@#
-
-{{tag>available}}
diff --git a/contents/book/deschooling/en.bib b/contents/book/deschooling/en.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25a4104
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/deschooling/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-deschooling-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Deschooling Society},
+  year = {1970},
+  date = {1970},
+  origdate = {1970},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/deschooling:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/deschooling/en.md b/contents/book/deschooling/en.md
index 4d73dd8..4056ebd 100644
--- a/contents/book/deschooling/en.md
+++ b/contents/book/deschooling/en.md
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 ---
-title: "Deschooling Society"
-author: "Ivan Illich"
-date: "1970"
-lang: "en"
-documentclass: book
-classoption:
-- oneside
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+  title: "Deschooling Society"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1970"
+  lang: ""
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+  - cmintegrals
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+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
 ---
 
 # Introduction
diff --git a/contents/book/deschooling/es.bib b/contents/book/deschooling/es.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8437a4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/deschooling/es.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-deschooling-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {La sociedad desescolarizada},
+  year = {1970},
+  date = {1970},
+  origdate = {1970},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/deschooling:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/deschooling/es.md b/contents/book/deschooling/es.md
index 4d019d3..61b286c 100644
--- a/contents/book/deschooling/es.md
+++ b/contents/book/deschooling/es.md
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 ---
-title: "La sociedad desescolarizada"
-author: "Ivan Illich"
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+  title: "La sociedad desescolarizada"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1970"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
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 ---
 
 
diff --git a/contents/book/deschooling/index b/contents/book/deschooling/index
index 9c39603..63b6367 100644
--- a/contents/book/deschooling/index
+++ b/contents/book/deschooling/index
@@ -3,5 +3,3 @@
 * **#@LANG_publicationdate@#:** 1970
 * **#@LANG_comments@#:** ...
 * **#@LANG_langorig@#:** #@LANG_lang_en@#
-
-{{tag>available}}
diff --git a/contents/book/energy/en.bib b/contents/book/energy/en.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79b65c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/energy/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-energy-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Energy and Equity},
+  year = {1974},
+  date = {1974},
+  origdate = {1974},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/energy:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/energy/en.md b/contents/book/energy/en.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..820736d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/energy/en.md
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+---
+  title: "Energy and Equity"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1974"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
+
+# Foreword
+
+This essay is my summary of the discussions which took place in the course of two sessions--one in English, the other in Spanish--of a seminar that met at the Center for Intercultural Documentation (CIDOC) in Cuernavaca, Mexico. I am grateful to my colleagues who contributed ideas, facts and criticism. Copies of the working papers of our ongoing seminar on the history of thermodynamics as applied to transportation can be obtained from Isaac Rogel, CIDOC Librarian, Apdo. 479, Cuernavaca, Mor., Mexico. I owe special thanks to Dennis Sullivan for his editorial assistance on this essay.
+
+The seminar on traffic was one of the preparatory meetings for a consultation which Valentina Borremans is now organizing at CIDOC for 1975-76\. The consultation will focus on the interlocking structure by which medical, legal, educational and energy-intensive agencies (such as those which produce transportation and housing) impose their paralysing monopoly on contemporary society. Although the context of our discussion is Latin America, its theme is pertinent to other regions.
+
+During the next thirty months, the consultation ought to generate several more short working papers which are of general interest even though they are only vulnerable ideas in progress and in search of critique. Such essays cannot await the permanence of the book. They do not belong in the learned journal. They resist packaging in periodicals. The monopoly of publishers over the printed word too often pushes the tract into the mimeograph’s limbo or seduces the author to reshape his text to fit the available vehicles. To break this monopoly Marion Boyars has shaped the format of this series, and Dennis Sullivan has offered to edit and submit to her what our consultation might produce.
+
+> El socialismo puede llegar solo en bicicleta
+
+José Antonio Viera-Gallo, Assistant Secretary of Justice in the Government of Salvador Allende
+
+# The energy crisis
+
+It has recently become fashionable to insist on an impending energy crisis. This euphemistic term conceals a contradiction and consecrates an illusion. It masks the contradiction implicit in the joint pursuit of equity and industrial growth. It safeguards the illusion that machine power can indefinitely take the place of manpower. To face this contradiction and betray this illusion, it is urgent to clarify the reality that the language of crisis obscures: high quanta of energy degrade social relations just as inevitably as they destroy the physical milieu.
+
+The proponents of an energy crisis confirm and continue to propagate a peculiar vision of man. According to this notion, man is born into prolonged dependence on slaves which he must painfully learn to master. If he does not employ prisoners, then he needs motors to do most of his work. According to this doctrine, the well-being of a society can be measured by the number of years its members have gone to school and by the number of energy slaves they have thereby learned to command. This belief is common to the conflicting economic ideologies now in vogue. It is threatened by the obvious inequity, harriedness and impotence that appear everywhere once the voracious hordes of energy slaves outnumber people by a certain proportion. The energy crisis focuses concern on the scarcity of fodder for these slaves. I prefer to ask whether free men need them.
+
+The energy policies adopted during the current decade will determine the range of social relationships a society will be able to enjoy by the year 2000. A low energy policy allows for a wide choice of life styles and cultures. If, on the other hand, a society opts for high energy consumption, its social relations must be dictated by technocracy and will be equally distasteful whether labelled capitalist or socialist.
+
+At this moment, most societies--especially the poor ones--are still free to set their energy policies by any of three guidelines. Well-being can be identified with high amounts of per capita energy use, with high efficiency of energy transformation, or with the least possible use of mechanical energy by the most powerful member of society. The first approach would stress tight management of scarce and destructive fuels on behalf of industry, whereas the second would emphasize the retooling of industry in the interest of thermodynamic thrift. Both attitudes necessarily imply huge public expenditures and increased social control; both rationalize the emergence of a computerized Leviathan, and both are at present widely discussed.
+
+The possibility of a third option is barely noticed. While people have begun to accept ecological limits on maximum per capita energy use as a condition for physical survival, they do not yet think about the use of minimum feasible power as the foundation of any of various social orders that would be both modern and desirable. Yet only a ceiling on energy use can lead to social relations that are characterized by high levels of equity. The one option that is presently neglected is the only choice within the reach of all nations. It is also the only strategy by which a political process can be used to set limits on the power of even the most motorized bureaucrat. Participatory democracy postulates low energy technology. Only participatory democracy creates the conditions for rational technology.
+
+What is generally overlooked is that equity and energy can grow concurrently only to a point. Below a threshold of per capita wattage, motors improve the conditions for social progress. Above this threshold, energy grows at the expense of equity. Further energy affluence then means decreased distribution of control over that energy.
+
+The widespread belief that clean and abundant energy is the panacea for social ills is due to a political fallacy, according to which equity and energy consumption can be indefinitely correlated, at least under some ideal political conditions. Labouring under this illusion, we tend to discount any social limit on the growth of energy consumption. But if ecologists are right to assert that non-metabolic power pollutes, it is in fact just as inevitable that, beyond a certain threshold, mechanical power corrupts. The threshold of social disintegration by high energy quanta is independent from the threshold at which energy conversion produces physical destruction. Expressed in horsepower, it is undoubtedly lower. This is the fact which must be theoretically recognized before a political issue can be made of the per capita wattage to which a society will limit its members.
+
+Even if non-polluting power were feasible and abundant, the use of energy on a massive scale acts on society like a drug that is physically harmless but psychically enslaving. A community can choose between Methadone and ‘cold turkey’--between maintaining its addiction to alien energy and kicking it in painful cramps--but no society can have a population that is at once autonomously active and hooked on progressively larger numbers of energy slaves.
+
+In previous discussions, I have shown that, beyond a certain level of GNP, the cost of social control must rise faster than total output and become the major institutional activity within an economy. Therapy administered by educators, psychiatrists and social workers must converge with the designs of planners, managers and salesmen, and complement the services of security agencies, the military and the police. I now want to indicate one reason why increased affluence requires increased control over personnel. I argue that beyond a certain  median per capita energy level, the political system and cultural context of any society must decay. Once the critical quantum of per capita energy is surpassed, education for the abstract goals of a bureaucracy must supplant the legal guarantees of personal and concrete initiative. This quantum is the limit of social order.
+
+I will argue here that technocracy must prevail as soon as the ratio of mechanical power and metabolic energy oversteps a definite, identifiable threshold. The order of magnitude within which this threshold lies is largely independent from the level of technology applied, yet its very existence has slipped into the blindspot of social imagination in both rich and medium rich countries. Both the United States and Mexico have passed the critical divide. In both countries, further energy inputs increase inequality, inefficiency and personal impotence. Although one country has a per capita income of $500 and the other of nearly $5,000, huge vested interest in an industrial infrastructure prods both of them to further escalate the use of energy. As a result, both North American and Mexican ideologues put the label of ‘energy crisis’ on their frustration, and both countries are blinded to the fact that the threat of social breakdown is due neither to a shortage of fuel, nor to the wasteful, polluting and irrational use of available wattage, but to the attempt of industries to gorge society with energy quanta that inevitably degrade, deprive and frustrate most people.
+
+A people can be just as dangerously overpowered by the wattage of its tools as by the caloric content of its foods, but it is much harder to confess to a national overindulgence in wattage than to a sickening diet. The per capita wattage that is critical for social well-being lies within an order of magnitude which is far above the horsepower known to four-fifths of humanity and far below the power commanded by any Volkswagen driver. It eludes the underconsumer and the overconsumer alike. Neither is willing to face the facts. For the primitive, the elimination of slavery and drudgery depends on the introduction of appropriate modern technology, and for the rich, the avoidance of an even more horrible degradation depends on the effective recognition of a threshold in energy consumption beyond which technical processes begin to dictate social relations. Calories are both biologically and socially healthy only as long as they stay within the narrow range that separates enough from too much.
+
+The so-called energy crisis is, then, a politically ambiguous issue. Public interest in the quantity of power and in the distribution of controls over the use of energy can lead in two opposite directions. On the one hand, questions can be posed that would open the way to political reconstruction by unblocking the search for a post-industrial, labour-intensive, low energy and high equity economy. On the other hand, hysterical concern with machine fodder can reinforce the present escalation of capital-intensive institutional growth, and carry us past the last turnoff from a hyper-industrial Armageddon. Political reconstruction presupposes the recognition of the fact that there exist _critical_ _per_ _capita_ _quanta_ beyond which energy can no longer be controlled by political process. Social breakdown will be the inevitable outcome of ecological restraints on _total_ _energy_ _use_ imposed by industrially-minded planners bent on keeping industrial production at some hypothetical maximum.
+
+Rich countries like the United States, Japan or France might never reach the point of choking in their own waste, but only because their societies will have already collapsed into a socio-cultural energy coma. Countries like India, Burma and, for another short while at least, China, are in the inverse position of being still muscle-powered enough to stop short of an energy stroke. They could choose, right now, to stay within those limits to which the rich will be forced back at an enormous loss in their vested interest.
+
+The choice of a minimum energy economy compels the poor to abandon distant expectations and the rich to recognize their vested interest as a ghastly liability. Both must reject the fatal image of man the slaveholder currently promoted by an ideologically stimulated hunger for more energy. In countries that were made affluent by industrial development, the energy crisis serves as a whip to raise the taxes which will be needed to substitute new, more sober and socially more deadly industrial processes for those that have been rendered obsolete by inefficient overexpansion. For the leaders of people who have been disowned by the same process of industrialization, the energy crisis serves as an alibi to centralize production, pollution and its control in a last-ditch effort to catch up with the more highly powered. By exporting their crisis and by preaching the new gospel of Puritan energy worship, the rich do even more damage to the poor than they did by selling them the products of now outdated factories. As soon as a poor country accepts the doctrine that more energy more carefully managed will always yield more goods for more people, that country is hooked into the race for enslavement to maximum industrial outputs. Inevitably the poor abandon the option for rational technology when they choose to modernize their poverty by increasing their dependence on energy. Inevitably the poor reject the possibility of liberating technology and participatory politics when, together with maximum feasible energy use, they accept maximum feasible social control.
+
+The energy crisis cannot be overwhelmed by more energy inputs. It can only be dissolved, along with the illusion that well-being depends on the number of energy slaves a man has at his command. For this purpose, it is necessary to identify the thresholds beyond which power corrupts, and to do so by a political process that associates the community in the search for limits. Because this kind of research runs counter to that now done by experts and for institutions, I shall call it counterfoil research. It has three steps. First, the need for limits on the per capita use of energy must be theoretically recognized as a social imperative. Then, the range must be located wherein the critical magnitude might be found. Finally, each community has to identify the levels of inequity, harrying and operant conditioning that its members are willing to accept in exchange for the satisfaction that comes of idolizing powerful devices and joining in rituals directed by the professionals who control their operation.
+
+The need for political research on socially optimal energy quanta can be clearly and concisely illustrated by an examination of modern traffic. The United States puts 45 per cent of its total energy into vehicles: to make them, run them and clear a right of way for them when they roll, when they fly and when they park. Most of this energy is to move people who have been strapped into place. For the sole purpose of transporting people, 250 million Americans allocate more fuel than is used by 1,300 million Chinese and Indians for all purposes. Almost all of this fuel is burnt in a rain dance of time-consuming acceleration. Poor countries spend less energy per person, but the percentage of total energy devoted to traffic in Mexico or in Peru is greater than in the USA, and it benefits a smaller percentage of the population. The size of this enterprise makes it both easy and significant to demonstrate the existence of socially critical energy quanta by the example of personal carriage.
+
+In traffic, energy used over a specific period of time (power) translates into speed. In this case, the critical quantum will appear as a speed limit. Wherever this limit has been passed, the basic pattern of social degradation by high energy quanta has emerged. Once some public utility went faster than ± 15 mph, equity declined and the scarcity of both time and space increased. Motorized transportation monopolized traffic and blocked self-powered transit. In every Western country, passenger mileage on all types of conveyance increased by a factor of a hundred within fifty years of building the first railroad. When the ratio of their respective power outputs passed beyond a certain value, mechanical transformers of mineral fuels excluded people from the use of their metabolic energy and forced them to become captive consumers of conveyance. This effect of speed on the autonomy of people is only marginally affected by the technological characteristics of the motorized vehicles employed or by the persons or entities who hold the legal titles to airlines, buses, railroads or cars. High speed is the critical factor which makes transportation socially destructive. A true choice among political systems and of desirable social relations is possible only where speed is restrained. Participatory democracy demands low energy technology, and free people must travel the road to productive social relations at the speed of a bicycle.*
+
+* I speak about traffic for the purpose of illustrating the more general point of socially optimal energy use, and I restrict myself to the locomotion of persons, including their personal baggage and the fuel, materials and equipment used for the vehicle and the road. I purposely abstain from the discussion of two other types of traffic: merchandise and messages. A parallel argument can be made for both, but this would require a different line of reasoning, and I leave it for another occasion.
+
+# The industrialization of traffic
+
+The discussion of how energy is used to move people requires a formal distinction between transport and transit as the two components of traffic. By _traffic_ I mean any movement of people from one place to another when they are outside of their homes. By _transit_ I mean those movements that put human metabolic energy to use, and by _transport_ that mode of movement which relies on other sources of energy. These energy sources will henceforth be mostly motors, since animals compete fiercely with men for their food in an over-populated world, unless they are thistle eaters like donkeys and camels.
+
+As soon as people become tributaries of transport, not only when they travel for several days, but also on their daily trips, the contradictions between social justice and motorized power, between effective movement and higher speed, between personal freedom and engineered routing, become poignantly-clear. Enforced dependence on auto-mobile machines then denies a community of self-propelled people just those values supposedly procured by improved transportation.
+
+People move well on their feet. This primitive means of getting around will, on closer analysis, appear quite effective when compared with the lot of people in modern cities or on industrialized farms. It will appear particularly attractive once it has been understood that modern Americans walk, on the average, as many miles as their ancestors--most of them through tunnels, corridors, parking lots and stores.
+
+People on their feet are more or less equal. People solely dependent on their feet move on the spur of the moment, at three to four miles per hour, in any direction and to any place from which they are not legally or physically barred. An improvement on this native degree of mobility by new transport technology should be expected to safeguard these values and to add some new ones, such as greater range, time economies, comfort, or more opportunities for the disabled. So far this is not what has happened. Instead, the growth of the transportation industry has everywhere had the reverse effects. From the moment its machines could put more than a certain horsepower behind any one passenger, this industry has reduced equality among men, restricted their mobility to a system of industrially defined routes and created time scarcity of unprecedented severity. As the speed of their vehicles crosses a threshold, citizens become transportation consumers on the daily loop that brings them back to their home, a circuit which the United States Department of Commerce calls a ‘trip’ as opposed to the ‘travel’ for which Americans leave home equipped with a toothbrush.
+
+More energy fed into the transportation system means that more people move faster over a greater range in the course of every day. Everybody’s daily radius expands at the expense of being able to drop in on an acquaintance or walk through the park on the way to work. Extremes of privilege are created at the cost of universal enslavement. An elite packs unlimited distance into a lifetime of pampered travel, while the majority spend a bigger slice of their existence on unwanted trips. The few mount their magic carpets to travel between distant points that their ephemeral presence renders both scarce and seductive, while the many are compelled to trip further and faster and to spend more time preparing for and recovering from their trips.
+
+In the United States, four-fifths of all man-hours on the road are those of commuters and shoppers who hardly ever get into a plane, while four-fifths of the mileage flown to conventions and resorts is covered year after year by the same one and a half per cent of the population, usually those who are either well-to-do or professionally trained to do good. The speedier the vehicle, the larger the subsidy it gets from regressive taxation. Barely 0·2 per cent of the entire US population can engage in self-chosen air travel more than once a year, and few other countries can support a jet set which is that large.
+
+The captive tripper and the reckless traveller become equally dependent on transport. Neither can do without it. Occasional spurts to Acapulco or to a Party Congress dupe the ordinary passenger into believing that he has made it into the shrunk world of the powerfully rushed. The occasional chance to spend a few hours strapped into a high-powered seat makes him an accomplice in the distortion of human space, and prompts him to consent to the design of his country’s geography around vehicles rather than around people. Man has evolved physically and culturally together with his cosmic niche. What for animals is their environment he has learned to make into his home. His self-image requires as its complement a life-space and a life-time integrated by the pace at which he moves. If that relationship is determined by the velocity of vehicles rather than by the movement of people, man the architect is reduced to the status of a mere commuter.
+
+The typical American male devotes more than 1,600 hours a year to his car. He sits in it while it goes and while it stands idling. He parks it and searches for it. He earns the money to put down on it and to meet the monthly instalments. He works to pay for petrol, tolls, insurance, taxes and tickets. He spends four of his sixteen waking hours on the road or gathering his resources for it. And this figure does not take into account the time consumed by other activities dictated by transport: time spent in hospitals, traffic courts and garages; time spent watching automobile commercials or attending consumer education meetings to improve the quality of the next buy. The model American puts in 1,600 hours to get 7,500 miles: less than five miles per hour. In countries deprived of a transportation industry, people manage to do the same, walking wherever they want to go, and they allocate only three to eight per cent of their society’s time budget to traffic instead of 28 per cent. What distinguishes the traffic in rich countries from the traffic in poor countries is not more mileage per hour of life-time for the majority, but more hours of compulsory consumption of high doses of energy, packaged and unequally distributed by the transportation industry.
+
+# Speed stunned imagination
+
+PAST a certain threshold of energy consumption, the transportation industry dictates the configuration of social space. Motorways expand, driving wedges between neighbours and removing fields beyond the distance a farmer can walk. Ambulances take clinics beyond the few miles a sick child can be carried. The doctor will no longer come to the house, because vehicles have made the hospital into the right place to be sick. Once heavy lorries reach a village high in the Andes, part of the local market disappears. Later, when the high school arrives at the plaza along with the paved highway, more and more of the young people move to the city, until not one family is left which does not long for a reunion with someone hundreds of miles away, down on the coast.
+
+Equal speeds have equally distorting effects on the perception of space, time and personal potency in rich and in poor countries, however different the surface appearances might be. Everywhere, the transportation industry shapes a new kind of man to fit the new geography and the new schedules of its making. The major difference between Guatemala and Kansas is that in Central America some people are still exempt from all contact with vehicles and are, therefore, still not degraded by their dependence on them.
+
+The product of the transportation industry is the habitual passenger. He has been boosted out of the world in which people still move on their own, and he has lost the sense that he stands at the centre of his world. The habitual passenger is conscious of the exasperating time scarcity that results from daily recourse to the cars, trains, buses, undergrounds and lifts that force him to cover an average of twenty miles each day, frequently crossing his path within a radius of less than five miles. He has been lifted off his feet. No matter if he goes by underground or jetplane he feels slower and poorer than someone else and resents the shortcuts taken by the priviledged few who can escape the frustrations of traffic. If he is cramped by the timetable of his commuter train, he dreams of a car. If he is exhausted by the rush hour, he envies the speed capitalist who drives against the traffic. If he must pay for his car out of his own pocket, he knows full well that the commanders of corporate fleets send the fuel bill to the company and write off the rented car as a business expense. The habitual passenger is caught at the wrong end of growing inequality, time scarcity and personal impotence, but he can see no way out of this bind except to demand more of the same: more traffic by transport. He stands in wait of technical changes in the design of vehicles, roads and schedules; or else he expects a revolution to produce mass rapid transport under public control. In neither case does he calculate the price of being hauled into a better future. He forgets that he is the one who will pay the bill, either in fares or in taxes. He overlooks the hidden costs of replacing private cars with equally rapid public transport.
+
+The habitual passenger cannot grasp the folly of traffic based overwhelmingly on transport. His inherited perceptions of space and time and of personal pace have been industrially deformed. He has lost the power to conceive of himself outside of the passenger role. Addicted to being carried along, he has lost control over the physical, social and psychic powers that reside in man’s feet. The passenger has come to identify territory with the untouchable landscape through which he is rushed. He has become impotent to establish his domain, mark it with his imprint and assert his sovereignty over it. He has lost confidence in his power to admit others into his presence and to share space consciously with them. He can no longer face the remote by himself. Left on his own, he feels immobile.
+
+The habitual passenger must adopt a new set of beliefs and expectations if he is to feel secure in the strange world where both liaisons and loneliness are products of conveyance. To ‘gather’ for him means to be brought together by vehicles. He comes to believe that political power grows out of the capacity of a transportation system, and in its absence is the result of access to the television screen. He takes freedom of movement to be the same as one’s claim on propulsion. He believes that the level of democratic process correlates to the power of transportation and communications systems. He has lost faith in the political power of the feet and of the tongue. As a result, what he wants is not more liberty as a citizen but better service as a client. He does not insist on his freedom to move and to speak to people but on his claim to be shipped and to be informed by media. He wants a better product rather than freedom from servitude to it. It is vital that he come to see that the acceleration he demands is self-defeating, and that it must result in a further decline of equity, leisure and autonomy.
+
+# Net transfer of lifetime
+
+UNCHECKED speed is expensive and progressively fewer can afford it. Each increment in the velocity of a vehicle results in an increase in the cost of propulsion, track-construction and--most dramatically--in the space the vehicle devours while it is on the move. Past a certain threshold of energy consumption for the fastest passenger, a worldwide class structure of speed capitalists is created. The exchange value of time becomes dominant, and this is reflected in language: time is spent, saved, invested, wasted and employed. As societies put price tags on time, equity and vehicular speed correlate inversely.
+
+High speed capitalizes a few people’s time at an enormous rate but, paradoxically, it does this at a high cost in time for all. In Bombay, only a very few people own cars. They can reach a provincial capital in one morning and make the trip once a week. Two generations ago, this would have been a week-long trek once a year. They now spend more time on more trips. But these same few also disrupt, with their cars, the traffic flow of thousands of bicycles and pedicabs that move through downtown Bombay at a rate of effective locomotion superior to that of downtown Paris, London or New York. The compounded, transport-related time expenditure within a society grows much faster than the time economies made by a few people on their speedy excursions. Traffic grows indefinitely with the availability of transports. Beyond a critical threshold, the output of the industrial complex established to move people costs a society more time than it saves. The marginal utility of an increment in the speed of a small number of people has for its price the growing marginal disutility of this acceleration for the great majority.
+
+Beyond a critical speed, no one can save time without forcing another to lose it. The man who claims a seat in a faster vehicle insists that his time is worth more than that of the passenger in a slower one. Beyond a certain velocity, passengers become consumers of other people’s time, and accelerating vehicles become the means for effecting a net transfer of life-time. The degree of transfer is measured in quanta of speed. This time-grab despoils those who are left behind, and since they are the majority, it raises ethical issues of a more general nature than kidney dialysis or organ transplants.
+
+Beyond a certain speed, motorized vehicles create remoteness which they alone can shrink. They create distances for all and shrink them for only a few. A new dirt road through the wilderness brings the city within view, but not within reach, of most Brazilian subsistence farmers. The new expressway expands Chicago, but it sucks those who are well-wheeled away from a downtown that decays into a ghetto.
+
+Man’s speed remained unchanged from the Age of Cyrus to the Age of Steam. News could not travel more than a hundred miles per day, no matter how the message was carried. Neither the Inca’s runners nor the Venetian galley, the Persian horseman or the mail coach under Louis XIV, could break the barrier. Soldiers, explorers, merchants and pilgrims moved at twenty miles per day. In Valéry’s words, Napoleon still had to move at Caesar’s slowness: _Napoléon va à la même lenteur que César._ The Emperor knew that ‘public prosperity is measured by the income of the coaches’: _On_ _mésure_ _la_ _prospérité_ _publique_ _aux_ _comptes_ _des_ _diligences_ , __ but he could barely speed them up. Paris-Toulouse had required about 200 hours in Roman times, and the scheduled stagecoach still took 158 hours in 1782. Only the nineteenth century accelerated man. By 1830, the trip had been reduced to 110 hours, but at a new cost. In the same year, 4,150 stagecoaches overturned in France, causing more than a thousand deaths. Then the railroad brought a sudden change. By 1855, Napoleon III claimed to have travelled an average of 96 kilometres per hour on the train between Paris and Marseilles. Within one generation, the average distance travelled each year per Frenchman increased one hundred and thirty times, and Britain’s railroad network reached its greatest expansion. Passenger trains attained their optimum cost calculated in terms of time spent for their maintenance and use.
+
+With further acceleration, transportation began to dominate traffic, and speed began to erect a hierarchy of destinations. By now, each set of destinations corresponds to a specific level of speed and defines a certain passenger class. Each circuit of terminal points degrades those pegged at a lower number of miles per hour. Those who must get around on their own power have been redefined as underdeveloped outsiders. Tell me how fast you go and I’ll tell you who you are. If you can corner the taxes which fuel the Concorde, you are certainly at the top.
+
+Over the last two generations, the vehicle has become the sign of career achievement, just as the school has become the sign of starting advantage. At each new level, the concentration of power must produce its own kind of rationale. So, for example, the reason that is usually given for spending public money to make a man travel more miles in less time each year is the still greater investment that was made to keep him more years in school. His putative value as a capital-intensive production tool sets the rate at which he is being shipped. Other ideological labels besides ‘a good education’ are just as useful for opening the cabin door to luxuries paid for by others. If the Thought of Chairman Mao must now be rushed around China by jet, this can only mean that two classes are needed to fuel what his revolution has become, one of them living in the geography of the masses and the other in the geography of the cadres. The suppression of intermediary levels of speed in Popular China has certainly made the concentration of power more efficient and rational, but it also underscores the new difference in value between the time of the bullock driver and the time of the jet-driven. Accelerating speed inevitably concentrates horsepower under the seats of a few and compounds the increasing time-lack of most commuters with the further sense that they are lagging behind.
+
+The need for unequal privilege in an industrial society is generally advocated by means of an argument with two sides. The hypocrisy of this argument is clearly betrayed by acceleration. Privilege is accepted as the necessary pre-condition to improve the lot of a growing total population, or it is advertised as the instrument for raising the standards of a deprived minority. In the long run, accelerating transportation does neither. It only creates a universal demand for motorized conveyance, and puts previously unimaginable distances between the various layers of privilege. Beyond a certain point, more energy means less equity.
+
+# The ineffectiveness of acceleration
+
+It should not be overlooked that top speeds for a few exact a different price than high speeds for all. Social classification by levels of speed enforces a net transfer of power: the poor work and pay to get left behind. But if the middle classes of a speed society may be tempted to ignore discrimination, they should not neglect the rising marginal disutilities of transportation and their own loss of leisure. High speeds for all mean that everybody has less time for himself as the whole society spends a growing slice of its time budget on moving people. Vehicles running over the critical speed not only tend to impose inequality, they also inevitably establish a self-serving industry that hides an inefficient system of locomotion under apparent technological sophistication. I will argue that a speed limit is necessary not only to safeguard equity; it is equally a condition for increasing the total distance travelled within a society, while decreasing the total time that travel takes.
+
+There is little research available on the impact of vehicles on the twenty-four-hour time budget of individuals and societies. From transportation studies, we get statistics on the cost of time per mile, on the value of time measured in dollars or in length of trips. But these statistics tell us nothing about the hidden costs of transportation: about how traffic nibbles away at life-time, about how vehicles devour space, about the multiplication of trips made necessary by the existence of vehicles, or about the time spent directly and indirectly preparing for locomotion. Further, there is no available measure of the even more deeply buried costs of transport, such as higher rent to live in areas convenient to the flow of traffic, or the cost of protecting these areas from the noise, pollution and danger to life and limb that vehicles create. The lack of an account of expenditures from the social time budget should not lead us to believe, however, that such an accounting is impossible, nor should it prevent our drawing conclusions from the little that we do know.
+
+From our limited information it appears that everywhere in the world, after some vehicle broke the speed barrier of 15 mph, time scarcity related to traffic began to grow. After industry had reached this threshold of per capita output, transport made of man a new kind of waif: a being constantly absent from a destination he cannot reach on his own but must reach within the day. By now, people work a substantial part of every day to earn the money without which they could not even get to work. The time a society spends on transportation grows in proportion to the speed of its fastest public conveyance. Japan now leads the United States in both areas. Life-time gets cluttered up with activities generated by traffic as soon as vehicles crash through the barrier that guards people from dislocation and space from distortion.
+
+Whether the vehicle that speeds along the public freeway is owned by the state or by an individual has little to do with the time scarcity and over-programming that rise with every increment in speed. Buses use one-third of the fuel which cars burn to carry one man over a given distance. Commuter trains are up to ten times more efficient than cars. Both could become even more efficient and less polluting. If publicly owned and rationally managed, they could be so scheduled and routed that the privileges they presently provide under private ownership and incompetent organization would be considerably cut. But as long as any system of vehicles imposes itself on the public by its unlimited top speed, the public is left to choose between spending more time to pay for more people to be carried from station to station, and paying less taxes so that even fewer people can travel in much less time much further than others. The order of magnitude of the top speed which is permitted within a transportation system determines the slice of its time budget that an entire society spends on traffic.
+
+# The radical monopoly of industry
+
+A desirable ceiling on the velocity of movement cannot be usefully discussed without returning to the distinction between self-powered _transit_ and motorized _transport_ , __ and comparing the contribution each component makes relative to the total locomotion of people, which I have called _traffic._
+
+Transport stands for the capital-intensive mode of traffic and transit indicates the labour-intensive mode. Transport is the product of an industry whose clients are passengers. It is an industrial commodity and therefore scarce by definition. Improvement of transport always takes place under conditions of scarcity that become more severe as the speed--and with it the cost--of the service increases. Conflict about insufficient transport tends to take the form of a zero-sum game where one wins only if another loses. At best, such a conflict allows for the solution of the Prisoner’s Dilemma: by cooperating with their jailer, both prisoners get off with less time in the cell.
+
+Transit is not the product of an industry, but the independent enterprise of transients. It has use value by definition but need not have any exchange value. The ability to engage in transit is native to man and more or less equally distributed among healthy people of the same age. The exercise of this ability can be restricted by depriving some class of people of the right to take a straight route, or because a population lacks shoes or pavements. Conflict about unsatisfactory transit conditions tends to take, therefore, the form of a non-zero-sum game in which everyone comes out ahead--not only the people who get the right to walk through a formerly walled property, but also the owner who now gets a road.
+
+Total traffic is the result of two profoundly distinct modes of production. These can reinforce each other harmoniously only as long as the autonomous outputs are protected against the encroachment of the industrial product.
+
+The harm done by contemporary traffic is due to the monopoly of transport. The allure of speed has deceived the passenger into accepting the promises made by an industry that produces capital-intensive traffic. He is convinced that high-speed vehicles have allowed him to progress beyond the limited autonomy he enjoyed when moving under his own power. He has allowed planned transport to predominate over the alternative of labour-intensive transit. Destruction of the physical environment is the least noxious effect of this concession. The far more bitter results are the multiplication of psychic frustration, the growing disutilities of continued production, and subjection to an inequitable transfer of power--all of which are manifestations of a distorted relationship between life-time and life-space. The passenger who agrees to live in a world monopolized by transport becomes a harassed, overburdened consumer of distances whose shape and length he can no longer control.
+
+Every society that imposes compulsory speed submerges transit to the profit of transport. Where-ever not only privilege but also elementary necessities are denied to those who do not use high-speed conveyances, an involuntary acceleration of personal rhythms is imposed. Industry dominates traffic as soon as daily life comes to depend on motorized trips.
+
+This profound control of the transportation industry over natural mobility constitutes a monopoly much more pervasive than either the commercial monopoly Ford might win over the automobile market, or the political monopoly car manufacturers might wield against the development of trains and buses. Because of its hidden, entrenched and structuring nature, I call this a _radical_ _monopoly._ Any industry exercises this kind of deep-seated monopoly when it becomes the dominant means of satisfying needs that formerly occasioned a personal response. The compulsory consumption of a high-powered commodity (motorized transport) restricts the conditions for enjoying an abundant use value (the innate capacity for transit). Traffic serves here as the paradigm of a general economic law: _Any industrial product that comes in per capita quanta beyond a given intensity exercises a radical monopoly over the satisfaction of a need_. Beyond some point, compulsory schooling destroys the environment for learning, medical delivery systems dry up the non-therapeutic sources of health, and transportation smothers traffic.
+
+Radical monopoly is first established by a rearrangement of society for the benefit of those who have access to the larger quanta, then it is enforced by compelling all to consume the minimum quantum in which the output is currently produced. Compulsory consumption will take on a different appearance in industrial branches where information dominates, such as education or medicine, than it will in those branches where quanta can be measured in British thermal units, such as housing, clothing or transport. The industrial packaging of values will reach critical intensity at different points with different products but, for each major class of outputs, the threshold occurs within an order of magnitude that is theoretically identifiable. The fact that it is possible theoretically to determine the range of speed within which transportation develops a radical monopoly over traffic does not mean that it is possible theoretically to determine just how much of such a monopoly any given society will tolerate. The fact that it is possible to identify a level of compulsory instruction at which learning by seeing and doing declines does not enable the theorist to identify the specific pedagogical limits to the division of labour that a culture will tolerate. Only recourse to juridical and, above all, to political process can lead to the specific, though provisional, measures by which speed or compulsory education will actually be limited in a given society. The magnitude of voluntary limits is a matter of politics; the encroachment of radical monopoly can be pinpointed by social analysis.
+
+A branch of industry does not impose a radical monopoly on a whole society by the simple fact that it produces scarce products, or because it drives competing industries off the market, but rather by virtue of its acquired ability to create and shape the need which it alone can satisfy.
+
+Shoes are scarce all over Latin America and many people never wear them. They walk on the bare soles of their feet, or wear the world’s widest variety of excellent sandals, supplied by a range of artisans. Their transit is in no way restricted by their lack of shoes. But in some countries of South America people are compelled to be shod ever since access to schools, jobs and public services was denied to the barefoot. Teachers or party officials define the lack of shoes as a sign of indifference toward ‘progress’. Without any intentional conspiracy between the promoters of national development and the shoe industry, the barefoot in these countries are now barred from any office.
+
+Schools, like shoes, were scarce at all times. But it was never the small number of privileged pupils that turned the school into an obstacle for learning. Only when laws were enacted to make schools both compulsory and free did the educator assume the power to deny learning opportunities on the job to the underconsumer of educational therapies. Only when school attendance had become obligatory did it become feasible to impose on all a progressively more complex artificial environment into which the unschooled and unprogrammed do not fit.
+
+The potential of a radical monopoly is unmistakeable in the case of traffic. Imagine what would happen if the transportation industry could somehow distribute its output more adequately: a traffic Utopia of free _rapid_ transportation for all would inevitably lead to a further expansion of traffic’s domain over human life. What could such a Utopia look like? Traffic would be organized exclusively around public transportation systems. It would be financed by a progressive tax calculated on income and on the proximity of one’s residence to the next terminal and to the job. It would be designed so that everybody could occupy any seat on a first-come, first-served basis: the doctor, the vacationer and the President would not be assigned any priority of person. In this fool’s paradise, all passengers would be equal, but they would be just as equally captive consumers of transport. Each citizen of a motorized Utopia would be deprived of the use of his feet and drafted into the servitude of proliferating networks of transportation.
+
+Certain would-be miracle makers disguised as architects offer a specious escape from the paradox of speed. By their standards, acceleration imposes inequities, time loss and controlled schedules only because people do not yet live in those patterns and orbits into which vehicles can best place them. These futuristic architects would house and occupy people in self-sufficient units of towers interconnected by tracks for high-speed capsules. Soleri, Doxiadis or Fuller would solve the problem created by high-speed transport by identifying the entire human habitat with the problem. Rather than asking how the earth’s surface can be preserved for people, they ask how reservations for necessary people can be established on an earth that has been reshaped for the sake of industrial outputs.
+
+# The elusive threshold
+
+Any traffic-optimal speed for transport seems capricious or fanatical to the confirmed passenger, whereas it looks like the flight of the bird to the donkey driver. Four or six times the speed of a man on foot constitutes a threshold too low to be deemed worthy of consideration by the habitual passenger and too high to convey the sense of a _limit_ to the three-quarters of humanity who still get around on their own power.
+
+All those who plan other people’s housing, transportation or education belong to the passenger class. Their claim to power is derived from the value their employers place on acceleration. Social scientists can build a computer model of traffic in Calcutta or Santiago, and engineers can design monorail webs according to abstract notions of traffic flow. Since these planners are true believers in problem solving by industry, the real solution for traffic congestion is beyond their grasp. Their belief in the effectiveness of power blinds them to the disproportionately greater effectiveness of abstaining from its use. Traffic engineers have yet to combine in one simulation model the mobility of people with that of vehicles. The engineer cannot conceive the possibility of renouncing speed and slowing down for the sake of permitting optimal traffic flow. He would never entertain the thought of programming his computer on the stipulation that no motorized vehicle within any city should ever overtake the speed of a velocipede. The development expert who looks down compassionately from his Land-Rover on the Indian peasant driving his pigs to market refuses to acknowledge the relative advantage of feet. The expert tends to forget that this man has dispensed ten others in his village from spending time on the road, whereas the engineer and every member of his family separately devote a major part of every day to being in traffic. For a man who believes that human mobility must be conceived in terms of indefinite progress, there can be no optimal level of traffic but only passing consensus on a given level of technical development.
+
+Most Mexicans, not to speak of Indians and Chinese, are in a position inverse to that of the confirmed passenger. The critical threshold is entirely beyond what all but a few of them know or expect. They still belong to the class of the self-powered. Some of them have a lingering memory of a motorized adventure, but most of them have no personal experience of travelling at or above the critical speed. In the two typical Mexican states of Guerrero and Chiapas, less than one per cent of the population moved even once over ten miles in less than one hour during 1970. The vehicles into which people in these areas are sometimes crowded render traffic indeed more convenient, but barely faster than the speed of a bicycle. The third class bus does not separate the farmer from his pig, and it takes them both to market without inflicting any loss of weight, but this acquaintance with motorized ‘comfort’ does not amount to dependence on destructive speed.
+
+The order of magnitude in which the critical threshold of speed can be found is too low to be taken seriously by the passenger, and too high to concern the peasant. It is so obvious it cannot be easily seen. The proposal of a limit to speed within this order of magnitude engenders stubborn opposition. It exposes the addiction of industrialized men to consuming ever higher doses of energy, while it asks those who are still sober to abstain from something they have yet to taste.
+
+To propose counterfoil research is not only a scandal, it is also a threat. Simplicity threatens the expert, who supposedly understands just why the commuter train runs at 8:15 and 8:41 and why it must be better to use fuel with certain additives. That a political process could identify a natural magnitude, both inescapable and limited, is an idea that lies outside the passenger’s world of verities. He has let respect for specialists he doesn’t even know turn into unthinking submission. If a political resolution could be found for problems created by experts in the field of traffic, then perhaps the same remedy could be applied to problems of education, medicine or urbanization. If the order of magnitude of traffic optimal vehicular velocities could be determined by laymen actively participating in an ongoing political process, then the foundation on which the framework of every industrial society is built would be shattered. To propose such research is politically subversive. It puts in question the overarching consensus on the need for more transportation which now allows the proponents of public ownership to define themselves as political adversaries of the proponents of private enterprise.
+
+# Degrees of self powered mobility
+
+A century ago the ball bearing was invented it reduced the coefficient of friction by a factor of a thousand by applying a well calibrated ball-bearing between two neolithic millstones, a man could now grind in a day what took his ancestors a week. The ball-bearing also made possible the bicycle, allowing the wheel--probably the last of the great neolithic inventions--finally to become useful for self-powered mobility.
+
+Man, unaided by any tool, gets around quite efficiently. He carries one gram of his weight over a kilometre in ten minutes by expending 0·75 calories. Man on his feet is thermodynamically more efficient than any motorized vehicle and most animals. For his weight, he performs more work in locomotion than rats or oxen, less than horses or sturgeon. At this rate of efficiency man settled the world and made its history. At this rate peasant societies spend less than five per cent and nomads less than eight per cent of their respective social time budgets outside the home or the encampment.
+
+Man on a bicycle can go three or four times faster than the pedestrian, but uses five times less energy in the process. He carries one gram of his weight over a kilometre of flat road at an expense of only 0·15 calories. The bicycle is the perfect transducer to match man’s metabolic energy to the impedance of locomotion. Equipped with this tool, man outstrips the efficiency of not only all machines, but all other animals as well.
+
+The invention of the ball-bearing, the tangent-spoked wheel and the pneumatic tyre taken together can be compared to only three other events in the history of transportation. The invention of the wheel at the dawn of civilization took the load off man’s back and put it onto the barrow. The invention and simultaneous application, during the European Middle Ages, of stirrup, shoulder harness and horseshoe increased the thermodynamic efficiency of the horse by a factor of up to five, and changed the economy of medieval Europe: it made frequent ploughing possible and thus introduced rotation agriculture; it brought more distant fields into the reach of the peasant, and thus permitted landowners to move from six-family hamlets into 100-family villages, where they could live around the church, the square, the jail and--later--the school; it allowed the cultivation of northern soils and shifted the centre of power into cold climates. The building of the first ocean-going vessels by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, under the aegis of developing European capitalism, laid the solid foundations for a globe-spanning culture and market.
+
+The invention of the ball-bearing signalled a fourth revolution. It created an option between more freedom in equity and more speed. The bearing is an equally fundamental ingredient of two new types of locomotion, respectively symbolized by the bicycle and the car. The bicycle lifted man’s automobility into a new order, beyond which progress is theoretically not possible. In contrast, the accelerating individual capsule enabled societies to engage in a ritual of progressively paralysing speed.
+
+The monopoly of a ritual application over a potentially useful device is nothing new. Thousands of years ago, the wheel took the load off the carrier-slave, but it did so only on the Eurasian landmass. In Mexico, the wheel was well-known, but never applied to transport. It served exclusively for the construction of carriages for toy gods. The taboo on wheelbarrows in America before Cortés is no more puzzling than the taboo on bicycles in modern traffic.
+
+It is by no means necessary that the invention of the ball-bearing continue to serve the increase of energy use, and thereby produce time scarcity, space consumption and class privilege. If the new order of self-powered mobility offered by the bicycle were protected against devaluation, paralysis and risk to the limbs of the rider, it would be possible to guarantee optimal shared mobility to all people and put an end to the imposition of maximum privilege and exploitation. It would be possible to control the patterns of urbanization if the organization of space were constrained by the power man has to move through it.
+
+Bicycles are not only thermodynamically efficient, they are also cheap. With his much lower salary, the Chinese acquires his durable bicycle in a fraction of the working hours an American devotes to the purchase of his obsolescent car. The cost of public utilities needed to facilitate bicycle traffic versus the price of an infrastructure tailored to high speeds is proportionately even less than the price differential of the vehicles used in the two systems. In the bicycle system, engineered roads are necessary only at certain points of dense traffic, and people who live far from the surfaced path are not thereby automatically isolated as they would be if they depended on cars or trains. The bicycle has extended man’s radius without shunting him onto roads he cannot walk. Where he cannot ride his bike he can usually push it.
+
+The bicycle also uses little space. Eighteen bikes can be parked in the place of one car, thirty of them can move along in the space devoured by a single automobile. It takes two lanes of a given size to move 40,000 people across a bridge in one hour by using modern trains, four to move them on buses, 12 to move them in their cars, and only one lane for them to pedal across on bicycles. Of all these vehicles, only the bicycle really allows people to go from door to door without walking. The cyclist can reach new destinations of his choice without his tool creating new locations from which he is barred.
+
+Bicycles let people move with greater speed without taking up significant amounts of scarce space, energy or time. They can spend fewer hours on each mile and still travel more miles in a year. They can get the benefit of technological breakthroughs without putting undue claims on the schedules, energy or space of others. They become masters of their own movements without blocking those of their fellows. Their new tool creates only those demands which it can also satisfy. Every increase in motorized speed creates new demands on space and time. The use of the bicycle is self-limiting. It allows people to create a new relationship between their life-space and their life-time, between their territory and the pulse of their being, without destroying their inherited balance. The advantages of modern self-powered traffic are obvious, and ignored. That better traffic runs faster is asserted, but never proved. Before they ask people to pay for it, those who propose acceleration should try to display the evidence for their claim.
+
+A grizzly contest between bicycles and motors has just come to an end. In Vietnam, a hyperindustrialized army tried to conquer, but could not overcome, a people organized around bicycle speed. The lesson should be clear. High energy armies can annihilate people--both those they defend and those against whom they are launched, but they are of very limited use to a people which defends itself. It remains to be seen if the Vietnamese will apply what they learned in war to an economy of peace, if they will be willing to protect the values that made their victory possible. The dismal likelihood is that the victors, for the sake of industrial progress and increased energy consumption, will tend to defeat themselves by destroying that structure of equity, rationality and autonomy into which American bombers had forced them by depriving them of fuels, motors and roads.
+
+# Dominant v subsidiary motors
+
+Men are born almost equally mobile their natural ability speaks for the personal liberty of each one to go wherever he or she wants to go Citizens of a society founded on the notion of equity will demand the protection of this right against any abridgement. It should be irrelevant to them by what means the exercise of personal mobility is denied, whether by imprisonment, bondage to an estate, revocation of a passport, or enclosure within an environment that encroaches on a person’s native ability to move in order to make him a consumer of transport. This inalienable right of free movement does not lapse just because most of our contemporaries have strapped themselves into ideological seat belts. Man’s natural capacity for transit emerges as the only yardstick by which to measure the contribution transport can make to traffic: there is only so much transport that traffic can bear. It remains to be outlined how we can distinguish those forms of transport that cripple the power to move from those that enhance it.
+
+Transportation can abridge traffic in three ways: by breaking its flow, by creating isolated sets of destinations, and by increasing the loss of time due to traffic. I have already argued that the key to the relation between transport and traffic is the speed of vehicles. I have described how, past a certain threshold of speed, transport has gone on to obstruct traffic in these three ways. It blocks mobility by cluttering up the environment with vehicles and roads. It transforms geography into a pyramid of circuits sealed off from one another according to levels of acceleration. It expropriates life-time at the behest of speed.
+
+If beyond a certain threshold transport obstructs traffic, the inverse is also true: below some level of speed, motorized vehicles can complement or improve traffic by permitting people to do things they could not do on foot or on bicycle. Motors can be used to transport the sick, the lame, the old and the just plain lazy. Motorpulleys can lift people over hills, but they can do so peacefully only if they do not push the climber off the path. Trains can extend the range of travel, but only if they give people equal opportunity to come closer to each other. A well-developed transportation system running at top speeds of 25 mph would have allowed Fix to chase Phileas Fogg around the world in less than half of 80 days. The time engaged in travel must be, as much as possible, the traveller’s own: only insofar as motorized transport remains limited to speeds which leave it subsidiary to autonomous transit can a traffic-optimal transportation system be developed.
+
+A limit on the power and therefore on the speed of motors does not by itself insure those who are weaker against exploitation by the rich and powerful, who can still devise means to live and work at better located addresses, travel with retinue in plush carriages, and reserve a special lane for doctors and members of the central committee. But at a sufficiently limited maximum speed, this is an unfairness which can be reduced or even corrected by a combination of taxes and technological devices. At unlimited top speed neither public ownership of the means of transportation nor technical improvements in their control can ever eliminate growing and unequal exploitation. A transportation industry is the key to optimal production of traffic, but only if it does not exercise its radical monopoly over personal productivity.
+
+# Underequipment overdevelopment and mature technology
+
+The combination of transportation and transit that constitutes traffic has provided us with an example of socially optimal per capita wattage and of the need for politically chosen limits on it. Traffic is also a model for the convergence of worldwide development goals, and a criterion by which to distinguish those countries which are lamely underequipped from those that are destructively overindustrialized.
+
+A country can be classified as underequipped if it cannot outfit each citizen with a bicycle or provide a five-speed transmission for anyone who wants to pedal others around. It is underequipped if it cannot provide good roads for the cycle, or free public motorized transportation for those who want to travel for more than a few hours in succession. No technical, economic or ecological reason exists why such backwardness should be tolerated anywhere in 1975. It would be a scandal if the natural mobility of a people were forced to stagnate on a pre-bicycle level against its will.
+
+A country can be classified as overindustrialized when its social life is dominated by the transportation industry, which has come to determine its class privileges, to accentuate its time scarcity, and to tie its people more tightly to the tracks it has laid out for them.
+
+Beyond underequipment and overindustrialization, there is a place for the world of post-industrial effectiveness, where the industrial mode of production complements other autonomous forms of production. There is a place, in other words, for a world of technological maturity. In terms of traffic, it is the world of those who have tripled the extent of their daily horizon by lifting themselves onto their bicycles. It is just as much the world marked by a variety of subsidiary motors available for the occasions when a bicycle is not enough and when an extra push will limit neither equity nor freedom. And it is, too, the world of the long voyage: a world where every place is open to every person, at his own pleasure and speed, without haste or fear, by means of vehicles that cross distances without breaking with the earth which man walked for hundreds of thousands of years on his own two feet.
+
+Underequipment keeps people enslaved to primordial nature and limits their freedom. Overindustrialization does not admit of differences in production and political style. It imposes its technical characteristics on social relations. The world of technological maturity permits a variety of political choices and cultures. The variety diminishes, of course, as a community allows industry to grow at the cost of autonomous production. Reasoning alone can offer no precise measure for the level of post-industrial effectiveness and technological maturity appropriate to a concrete society. It can only indicate in dimensional terms the range into which these technological characteristics must fit. It must be left to a historical community engaged in its own political process to decide when programming, space distortion, time scarcity and inequality cease to be worth its while. Reasoning can identify speed as the critical factor in traffic. It cannot set politically feasible limits.
+
+Only when top speeds on personal carriage reflect the enlightened self-interest of a political community can they become operative. This interest cannot be expressed in a society where one class monopolizes not only transportation, but communication, medicine, education and weapons as well. It does not matter if this power is held by legal owners or by entrenched managers of an industry that is legally owned by the workers. This power must be reappropriated and submitted to the sound judgment of the common man. The reconquest of power starts with the recognition that expert knowledge blinds the secretive bureaucrat to the obvious way of dissolving the energy crisis, just as it has blinded him to recognize the obvious solution to the war in Vietnam.
+
+There are two roads from where we are to technological maturity: one is the road of liberation from affluence; the other is the road of liberation from dependence. Both roads have the same destination: the social restructuring of space that offers to each person the constantly renewed experience that the centre of the world is where he stands, walks and lives.
+
+Liberation from affluence begins on the traffic islands where the rich run into one another. The well-sped are tossed from one island to the next and are offered but the company of fellow passengers en route to somewhere else. This solitude of plenty breaks down as the traffic islands gradually expand and people begin to recover their native power to move around the place where they live. Thus, the impoverished environment of the traffic island can embody the beginnings of social reconstruction, and the people who now call themselves rich will break with bondage to overefficient transport on the day they come to treasure the horizon of their traffic islands, now fully grown, and to dread frequent shipments from their homes.
+
+Liberation from dependence starts at the other end. It breaks the constriction of village and valley and leaves behind the boredom of narrow horizons and the stifling oppression of a world closed in on itself. To expand life beyond the radius of tradition without scattering it to the winds of acceleration is a goal that any poor country could achieve within a few years, but it is a goal that will be reached only by those who reject the offer of unchecked industrial development made in the name of an ideology of indefinite energy consumption.
+
+Liberation from the radical monopoly of industry is possible only where people engage in a political process founded on the protection of optimal traffic. This protection, in turn, demands a recognition of those energy quanta upon whose neglect industrial society has been built. These energy quanta can carry those who consume that much, but no more, into a post-industrial age that is technologically mature.
+
+Liberation which comes cheap to the poor will cost the rich dear, but they will pay its price once the acceleration of their transportation systems grinds traffic to a halt. A concrete analysis of traffic betrays the truth underlying the energy crisis: the impact of industrially packaged quanta of energy on the social environment tends to be degrading, exhausting and enslaving, and these effects come into play even before those which threaten the pollution of the physical environment and the extinction of the race. The crucial point at which these effects can be reversed is not, however, a matter of deduction, but of decision.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+_Seminars on ‘Alternatives to Acceleration in the Improvement of Traffic’ and on ‘The History of Thermodynamics Applied to Personal Transportation’ are meeting at CIDOC in Cuernavaca during 1974 and 1975. The following list has been culled from the seminar library. Only those titles have been quoted which, besides having proved useful in past sessions of the seminar, could easily be overlooked by those who might wish to pursue the line of inquiry followed in this essay_.
+
+ALBION, R. G., _Naval_ _and_ _Maritime_ _History_ , _An_ _Annotated_ _Bibliography_. Mystic, The Marine Hist. Assn. Conn. 1972.
+
+ANDERSON, Romola and Roger, _The_ _Sailing_ _Ship:_ _Six_ _Thousand_ _Years_ _of_ _History_. London, Harrap, 1926.
+
+BANKS, Arthur S., _Cross-Polity_ _Times_ _Series_ _Data_. Cambridge, Mass.; MIT, 1971.
+
+BARKIN, David, ‘El consumo y la vía chilena al socialismo; reflexiones en torno a la decisión automotriz’. Versión Preliminar. _Centro_ _de_ _Estudios_ _Socio-Económicos_ , Santiago de Chile, 1972. (Available from CIDOC Library.)
+
+BERNSTEIN, M. T., _Steamboats_ _on_ _the_ _Ganges_. Bombay, Orient Longmans, 1960.
+
+BIVAR, A. D. H., ‘The Stirrup and Its Origins’. _Oriental_ _Art_ , vol. I, 1955, pp. 61-65\.
+
+BLAISDEL, R. et al., _Sources_ _of_ _Information_ _in_ _Transportation_. Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press (The Transportation Center), 1964.
+
+BOWDEN, Frank Philip, Art. on ‘Friction’ in the _Encyclopaedia_ _Britannica_ , vol. 9, pp. 840A-841\.
+
+BRANCH, Melville C., _Comprehensive_ _Urban_ _Planning:_ _A_ _Selected_ _Anno_ _tated_ _Bibliography_ _with_ _Related_ _Materials_. Sage Publications, 1973. For material on transportation, cf. pp. 251-272\.
+
+BRAUDEL, Fernand, ‘La Lenteur des Transports’ in _Civilisation_ _Materielle_ _et_ _Capitalisme_ , _XV-XVIII_ _Siècle_ , pp. 314-329\. Paris, Armand Colin, 1967.
+
+----. ‘Vicissitudes des Routes’ in _La_ _Méditerranée_ _et_ _le_ _Monde_ _Medi_ _terranéen_ , pp. 242-259\. Paris, Armand Colin, 1949.
+
+BRUNOT, Ferdinand, _Histoire_ _de_ _la_ _Langue_ _Française_ _des_ _Origines_ _a_ _nos_ _Jours_. For references to ‘transport’, cf. esp. tome VI, pp. 357-360 and tome VII, pp. 201-231\.
+
+BUCHANAN, C. D., _Mixed_ _Blessing:_ _The_ _Motor_ _Car_ _in_ _Britain_. London, 1958.
+
+BUFFET, B., _L’Eau_ _Potable_ _à_ _travers_ _les_ _Ages_. Liege, 1950.
+
+CAUNTER, C. F., _The_ _History_ _and_ _Development_ _of_ _the_ _Cycles_ , _As_ _Illustrated_ _by_ _the_ _Collection_ _of_ _Cycles_ _in_ _the_ _Science_ _Museum_. London, 1955.
+
+CAVAILLES, Henri, _La_ _Route_ _Française_ , _son_ _Histoire_. Paris, 1946.
+
+CHERMAYEFF, Serge, and TZONIS, Alexander, _Shape_ _of_ _Community_. Penguin, 1971.
+
+CLAXTON, E. C., ‘The Future of the Bicycle in a Modern Society’. _Journal_ _of_ _the_ _Royal_ _Society_ _of_ _Arts_ , January, 1968, pp. 114-135\.
+
+COOK, Walter L., _Bike_ _Trails_ _and_ _Facilities_ _:_ _A_ _Guide_ _to_ _Their_ _Design_ , _Construction_ _and_ _Operation_. Wheeling, W.Va., American Institute of Park Executives, 1965.
+
+COPELAND, John, _Roads_ _and_ _Their_ _Traffic_ , _1750 -1858_. Newton Abbot, 1968.
+
+DAVENAS, Paul, _Les_ _Messageries_ _Royales_. Paris, 1937.
+
+DEFFONTAINES, P., ‘Sur la Reparticion Géographique des Voitures à Deux Roues et à Quatre Roues’. _Traveaux_ _du_ _Premier_ _Congrès_ _Internacional_ _de_ _Folklore_ , _Paris_ _1937_ , p. 117 ff. Arbault, Tours, 1938.
+
+DEISCHEL, Erwin, _Umweltbeanspruchung_ _und_ _Umweltschaeden_ _durch_ _den_ _Verkehr_ _in_ _der_ _BDR_ , Munich, 1971.
+
+DOLLFUS, C., _Historie_ _de_ _la_ _Locomotion_ _Terrestre_. Paris, 1935-36\.
+
+EKHOLM, Gordon F., ‘Wheeled Toys in Mexico’. _American_ _Antiquity_ , vol. 2, 1946, pp. 222-228\.
+
+FARVAR, M. Taghi and MILTON, John, _The_ _Careless_ _Technology:_ _Ecology_ _and_ _International_ _Development_. Garden City, N.Y., The Natural History Press, 1972.
+
+FORBES, R. J., ‘Land Transport and Road Building, 1000-1900’. _Janus_ , vol. 46, 1957, p. 100.
+
+----. _Notes_ _on_ _the_ _History_ _of_ _Ancient_ _Roads_ _and_ _Their_ _Construction_. Second Edition. Amsterdam, 1964.
+
+FOSTER, George M., _Culture_ _and_ _Conquest:_ _America’s_ _Spanish_ _Heritage_. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1960.
+
+FROMM, Gary, ed., _Transport_ _Investment_ _and_ _Economic_ _Development_. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution Transport Research Program, 1969.
+
+FULLER, R. Buckminster, _World_ _Resource_ _Inventory_. Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1965. Cf. esp. vol. 4, part 4.
+
+FULLER, Dudley D., _Theory_ _and_ _Practice_ _of_ _Lubrication_ _for_ _Engineers_ , N.Y., Wiley, 1956.
+
+GIEDION, Siegfried, _Mechanization_ _Takes_ _Command_. New York, Norton, 1969.
+
+GINSBURG, Norton, _Atlas_ _of_ _Economic_ _Development_. University of Chicago Press, 1961. Cf. esp. pp. 100-101 and pp. 60-77\.
+
+GOETZ, Wilhelm, _Verkehrswege_ _im_ _Dienste_ _des_ _Welthandels:_ _Eine_ _Historisch-Geographische_ _Untersuchung_. Stuttgart, 1888.
+
+HALDANE, J. B. S., ‘On Being the Right Size’ in James R. Newman, ed., _The_ _World_ _of_ _Mathematics_ , vol. II. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1956.
+
+HALL, Edward T., _Hidden_ _Dimension_. New York, Doubleday, 1969.
+
+HANNEN, Bruce, ‘Options for Energy Conservation’. Unpublished manuscript, Feb., 1973. CIDOC Library.
+
+HASEBRÖK, Johannes, _Griechische_ _Wirtschaftgeschichte_ _und_ _Gesell_ _schaftgeschichte_ _bis_ _zur_ _Perserzeit_. Tübingen, 1931.
+
+HAUDRICOURT, André G., ‘Contribution a la Géographie et a l’Ethnologie de la Voiture’. _Revue_ _de_ _Géographie_ _Humaine_ _et_ _Ethnologie_ , 1948. pp. 54-64\.
+
+HEICHELHEIM, Fritz M., _An_ _Ancient_ _Economic_ _History_ , _From_ _the_ _Paleo_ _lithic_ _Age_ _to_ _the_ _Migrations_ _of_ _the_ _Germanic_ , _Slavic_ _and_ _Arabic_ _Nations_. 3 Volumes, Leiden, 1938.
+
+HERENDEEN, R., Use of Input/Output Analysis to Determine the Energy Cost of Goods and Services. Mimeograph, 22 pp. Urbana, University of Illinois (Center for Advanced Computer Studies), Feb. 20, 1973.
+
+HIRST, E., _Energy_ _Efficiency_ _for_ _Passenger_ _Transportation_ _and_ _for_ _Freight_ _Transportation_. Oak Ridge National Laboratories, 1971.
+
+HORNELL, J., _Water_ _Transport:_ _Origins_ _and_ _Early_ _Evolution_. Cambridge University Press, 1946.
+
+HOSKINS, Halford, _British_ _Routes_ _to_ _India_. New York, 1928.
+
+HUNTER, Holland, _Soviet_ _Transport_ _Experience_ , _Its_ _Lessons_ _for_ _Other_ _Countries_. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution Transport Research Program, 1968.
+
+JOPE, E. M., ‘Vehicles and Harness’ in Singer, _A_ _History_ _of_ _Technology_ , vol. 2, p. 537. Oxford University Press, 1956.
+
+KALMUS, Ludwig, _Weltgeschichte_ _der_ _Post_ _mit_ _besonderer_ _Berücksichtigung_ _des_ _deutschen_ _Sprachgebietes_. Vienna, 1937.
+
+KIRKLAND, Edward, _Men_ , _Cities_ _and_ _Transportation_ _:_ _A_ _Study_ _of_ _New_ _England_ _History_ , _1820 -1900_. Two volumes. Cambridge, Mass., 1948.
+
+KOHL, Johann Georg, _Der_ _Verkehr_ _und_ _die_ _Ansiedlungen_ _der_ _Menschen_ _in_ _ihrer_ _Abhaengigkeit_ _von_ _der_ _Gestaltung_ _der_ _Erdoberflaeche_. Leipzig, 1841.
+
+LANSING, John B.; MARANS, Robert W., et. al., _Car_ _Ownership_ , _Annual_ _Mileage_ , _and_ _the_ _Journey_ _to_ _Work_. Ann Arbor, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1970. Cf. esp. pp. 137-151\.
+
+LAPIN, Howard, _Structuring_ _the_ _Journey_ _to_ _Work_. Philadelphia University Press, 1964.
+
+LARTILLEUX, H., _Geografía_ _de_ _los_ _Ferrocarriles_ _Españoles_. M. Rivadaneyra, 1954.
+
+LEFEBVRE des NOETTES, R., _L’Attelage_ _et_ _le_ _Cheval_ _de_ _Selle_ _à_ _travers_ _les_ _Ages;_ _Contribution_ _à_ _l’Histoire_ _de_ _l_ ’ _Esclavage_. Paris, Picard, 1931.
+
+----. _De_ _la_ _Marine_ _Antique_ _à_ _la_ _Marine_ _Moderne:_ _La_ _Revolution_ _du_ _Gouvernail_. Paris, 1935.
+
+LEWIS, Richard S. and SPINRAD, Bernard I., _The_ _Energy_ _Crisis_. Chicago, Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, 1972.
+
+LIEPMANN, Kate K., _The_ _Journey_ _to_ _Work_ , _Its_ _Significance_ _for_ _Industrial_ _and_ _Community_ _Life_. London, 1944.
+
+LINDER, Staffan Burestam, _The_ _Harried_ _Leisure_ _Class_. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.
+
+LISCO, Thomas E., ‘The Future of Urban Transportation; Mass Transportation: Cinderella in Our Cities’. _The_ _Public_ _Interest_. 1970.
+
+LOPEZ, R. S. and RAYMOND, J. W., eds., _Medieval_ _Trade_ _in_ _the_ _Mediter_ _ranean_ _World_ : _Illustrative_ _Documents_. New York, Columbia University Press, 1955.
+
+MANHEIM, Marvin L., ‘Principles of Transport Systems Analysis’. _Proceedings_ _of_ _the_ _Seventh_ _Annual_ _Meeting_ _of_ _the_ _Transportation_ _Research_ _Forum_ , 1966, pp. 9-21\.
+
+MARSH, George Perkins, _The_ _Earth_ _As_ _Modified_ _by_ _Human_ _Action_. Third Edition. New York, 1888.
+
+MEYER, Balthasar H., ed., _History_ _of_ _Transportation_ _in_ _the_ _United_ _States_ _before_ _1860_. Washington, D.C., 1917.
+
+MEYER, John R., Art. on ‘Transportation: Economic Aspects’ in the _Encyclopedia_ _of_ _Social_ _Sciences_ , vol. 16, pp. 134-140\.
+
+MOTT, George Fox, ‘Transportation in Contemporary Civilization’ in _Transportation_ _Renaissance_ , vol. 345 of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, pp. 1-5, Philadelphia, 1963.
+
+MACKAYE, Benton, ‘Townless Highways for the Motorist’. _Harper’s_ _Magazine_ , Aug., 1931.
+
+MCMURRAY, David F. E., _Aspects_ _of_ _Time_ _and_ _the_ _Study_ _of_ _Activity_ _Routines_. Thesis for the M.S. in city planning. Cambridge, Mass., MIT, 1968.
+
+NEEDHAM, Joseph, ‘Vehicles for Land Transport’ in _Science_ _and_ _Civilization_ _in_ _China_ , vol. 4 (Physics and Physical Technology), part II (Mechanical Engineering), pp. 243-281\. Cambridge University Press, 1965.
+
+----. ‘Power Sources and Their Employment, (1) Animal Traction’ in _ibid_., pp. 303-328\.
+
+OLSSON, Gunnar, _Distance_ _and_ _Human_ _Interaction_ _:_ _A_ _Review_ _Bibliography_. Philadelphia (Regional Science Research Institute, bibl. sec. 2), 1965.
+
+OSTWALD, W., _Energetische_ _Grundlagen_ _der_ _Kulturwissenschaft_. (Philosophisch-Soziologische Bücherei Bd. 16) Leipzig, 1909.
+
+OTTLEY, George, _A_ _Bibliography_ _of_ _British_ _Railway_ _History_. London, Allen and Unwin, 1965.
+
+OWEN, Wolford, _Strategy_ _for_ _Mobility_. Washington, D.G., Brookings Institution, 1964.
+
+PERRATON, Jean K., ‘Planning for the Cyclist in Urban Areas’. _The_ _Town_ _Planning_ _Review_ , vol. 39, no. 2, July, 1968, pp. 149-162\.
+
+PLATT, John, ‘Hierarchical Restructuring’. _Bulletin_ _of_ _Atomic_ _Scientists_ , Nov., 1970.
+
+POLANYI, Karl, ed., _Trade_ _and_ _Market_ _in_ _Early_ _Empires_. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1957.
+
+ROBBINS, Michael, _The_ _Railway_ _Age_. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Penguin, 1964.
+
+RUSSEAU, Pierre, _Histoire_ _des_ _Transports_. Paris, Artheme Fayard, 1961.
+
+SAUER, Carl O., _Agricultural_ _Origins_ _and_ _Dispersal_. Bowman Memorial Lectures, Series Two. New York, 1952.
+
+SAUVY, Alfred, _Les_ _Quatre_ _Roues_ _de_ _la_ _Fortune_ _:_ _Essai_ _sur_ _l_ ’ _Automobile_ , Paris, 1968.
+
+SCHNORE, Leo F., Art. on ‘Transportation, Commutation’ in the _Encyclopedia_ _of_ _Social_ _Sciences_ , vol. 16, pp. 140-144\.
+
+SHERRINGTON, Charles E. R., _A_ _Hundred_ _Years_ _of_ _Inland_ _Transportation_ , _1830 -1933_. London, 1934. Kelly reprint, 1969.
+
+SMERK, George M., _Readings_ _in_ _Urban_ _Transportation_. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1968.
+
+SMITH, Joel. Art. on ‘Transportation: Social Aspects’ in the _Encyclo_ _pedia_ _of_ _Social_ _Sciences_ , vol. 16, pp. 129-134\.
+
+SMITH, William, _The_ _History_ _of_ _the_ _Post_ _Office_ _in_ _British_ _North_ _America_ , _1639 -1870_. Cambridge University Press, 1920.
+
+SPENGLER, Joseph, ‘On the Progress of Quantification in Economics’ in Harry Woolf, ed., _A_ _History_ _of_ _the_ _Meaning_ _of_ _Measurement_ _in_ _the_ _Natural_ _and_ _Social_ _Sciences_ , pp. 128-146\. New York, Bobbs Merrill, 1961.
+
+STONE, Tabor R., _Beyond_ _the_ _Automobile:_ _Reshaping_ _the_ _Transportation_ _Environment_. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1971.
+
+STRUBE ERDMANN, Leon, _Vialidad_ _Imperial_ _de_ _los_ _Incas_. Universidad de Córdoba, Argentina, 1963.
+
+SUNDQUIST, James L., ‘A Policy for Urban Growth: Where Shall They Live?’ _The_ _Public_ _Interest_. No. 18, Winter 1970.
+
+STUTZ, Frederick P., _Research_ _on_ _Intra-Urban_ _Social_ _Travel:_ _Introduction_ _and_ _Bibliography_ _;_ _Exchange_ _Bibliography_ _No_. _173_. Monticello, Mich., Council of Planning Librarians, Feb., 1971.
+
+TAYLOR, George, _The_ _Transportation_ _Revolution_. New York, Harper & Row, 1951.
+
+TERRAZAS DE LA PEÑA, Eduardo, ‘Necesidad de un Incremento en la Intensidad del Uso del Espacio’. Paper presented at a regional meeting on urban development policies, Mexico City, July, 1972. CIDOC Library.
+
+_Transportation_ _Renaissance_ , Vol. 345 of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Philadelphia, 1963.
+
+TURNER, John F. C., ‘Housing for People or Housing by People’? Mimeograph, 10 pp. Cambridge, Mass., MIT, 1970.
+
+WESTERGAARD, John, ‘Journey to Work in London Region’. _TPR_ , April, 1957.
+
+WHEELER, James O., _Research_ _on_ _the_ _Journey_ _to_ _Work:_ _Introduction_ _and_ _Bibliography;_ _Exchange_ _Bibliography_ _No_. _65_. Monticello, Mich., Council of Planning Librarians, January, 1969.
+
+WHITE, Lynn, ‘Tibet, India and Malaya as Sources of Western Medieval Technology’. _American_ _Historical_ _Review_ , vol. 65, 1960, pp. 515-526\.
+
+----. ‘The Agricultural Revolution of the Early Middle Ages’ in _Medieval_ _Technology_ _and_ _Social_ _Change_. Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 39-78\.
+
+WHITE, Leslie, _The_ _Science_ _of_ _Culture_ _:_ _Energy_ _and_ _the_ _Evolution_ _of_ _Culture_. New York, Grove Press, 1949. cf. esp. pp. 363-393\.
+
+WILSON, S. S., ‘Bicycle Technology’. _Scientific_ _American_ , March, 1973, pp. 81-91\.
+
+WILSON, George W., et. al., _The_ _Impact_ _of_ _Highway_ _Investment_ _on_ _Development_. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution Transport Research Program, 1966.
+
+YURICK, Sol, ‘The Political Economy of Junk’. _Monthly_ _Review_ , vol. 22, no. 7, Dec, 1970, pp. 22-37\.
diff --git a/contents/book/energy/es.bib b/contents/book/energy/es.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9536603
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/energy/es.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-energy-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Energía y Equidad},
+  year = {1974},
+  date = {1974},
+  origdate = {1974},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/energy:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/energy/es.md b/contents/book/energy/es.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fd09d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/energy/es.md
@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+---
+  title: "Energía y Equidad"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1974"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
+
+# La importación de una crisis
+
+Mientras mas rico el país, más de buen gusto es mostrarse preocupado por la llamada “crisis de energía”. El tema saltó a primer plano entre aquellos que _Le Monde_ y el _New York Times_ trataron inmediatamente después de que Kissinger anunció la suspensión de bombardeos en Vietnam. El nuevo problema --chispa para los grandes programas de televisión-- está en la agenda del _jet-set_ científico internacional, meollo en la reorganización de las relaciones comerciales entre rusos y norteamericanos. Ya en 1970, este mismo tema llegó a tener preeminencia en las revistas de las élites científicas; en parte porque cómodamente amalgama varias ramas “distinguidas” de la investigación reciente, ampliamente popularizadas durante la década de los sesenta: el estudio psicosociológico de los conflictos, de la ecología y de la contaminación ambiental, el de las mutaciones previsibles en la tecnología futurista. Ahora, en 1973, vemos los primeros signos de que la importación de la “crisis energética” empieza a tener éxito en América Latina. Se multiplica la reproducción de traducciones sobre el tema. En la prensa periódica, destinada a las clases escolarizadas, las vitrinas de las librerías exhiben títulos al respecto; los programas de televisión, promovidos por las fundaciones extranjeras, conectan el tema a la necesidad de limitar la población, de aumentar los niveles tecnológicos para usar la energía escasa en forma más económica y de llegar a acuerdos internacionales de naturaleza no política. Me parece de suma importancia fijar nuestra atención en la realidad que subyace en esta “crisis” y encontrar una manera que habilite a las masas populares para participar en el análisis, sin que por ello baje el nivel lógico y técnico de la discusión. El presente documento es una contribución para orientar esta discusión en uno de los sentidos posibles.
+
+Hay que desenmascarar la así llamada “crisis de energía”. Se trata de un eufemismo que encubre una contradicción, indica una frustración, consagra una ilusión. Encubre la contradicción inherente al hecho de querer alcanzar, al mismo tiempo, un estado social basado en la noción de EQUIDAD y un nivel cada vez más elevado de crecimiento industrial. Indica cuál es el grado de frustración actual, provocado por el desarrollo industrial. Finalmente, consagra la ilusión de que se puede sustituir indefinidamente la potencia de la máquina por la energía metabólica del hombre, ilusión que lleva, en este momento, a los países ricos a la parálisis y fatalmente desorienta la planificación del desarrollo en los países pobres. Al difundir el pánico de una inminente e inevitable “crisis de energía”, los ricos perjudican aún más a los pobres que al venderles los productos de su industria. Construir las propias centrales nucleares en los Andes incorpora a un país al Club de los Exploradores, mientras que la importación de coches o aviones solamente acentúa su dependencia. Al difundir en el mundo de los pobres el temor por la insuficiencia de energía para el “progreso” hacia tales metas, los pobres aceptan la explicación que presentan los ricos sobre la crisis en el progreso y se ponen al mismo tiempo un _handicap_ en la carrera del crecimiento a la cual se obligan. Optan por una pobreza modernizada, en vez de elegir, con el uso racional de las técnicas modernas, el acceso a un modo de producción que refleje madurez política y científica. En mi opinión es de la mayor importancia enfrentarse a la realidad que oculta ese llamado concepto de “crisis”. Hay que reconocer que la incorporación de algo más que un cierto quántum de energía por unidad de un producto industrial inevitablemente tiene efectos destructores, tanto en el ambiente sociopolítico como en el ambiente biofísico.
+
+# El abuso político de la contaminación
+
+A la presente “crisis” energética la precedió una análoga “crisis” ecológica: se abusa de ambas con fines de explotación política. Hay que entender que la segunda no encuentra su solución aun cuando se encontraran formas de producir energía abundante y limpia, es decir, sin efecto destructor sobre el medio ambiente.
+
+Los métodos que hoy se utilizan para producir energía, en su creciente mayoría agotan los recursos y contaminan el ambiente. Al ritmo actual de su utilización, el carbón, el petróleo, el gas natural y el uranio se consumirán dentro del horizonte temporal de tres generaciones, y en el entretiempo habrán cambiado tanto al ser humano como su atmósfera de forma definitiva. Para transportar a un solo hombre en un Volkswagen, sobre una distancia de 500 km, se queman los mismos 175 kg de oxígeno que un individuo respira en todo un año. Las plantas y las algas reproducen suficiente oxígeno para los 3 000 millones de hombres que existen. Pero no puede reproducirlo para un mundo automovilizado, cuyos vehículos queman cada uno por lo menos 14 veces más oxígeno del que quema un individuo. Los métodos usados para producir energía no sólo son caros --y por tanto son recursos escasos--, sino igualmente destructores, al punto de engendrar su propia escasez. Los esfuerzos de los últimos decenios se han orientado a producir más petróleo, a refinarlo mejor y a controlar su distribución. El énfasis ahora se va trasladando hacia la investigación para encontrar fuentes de energía abundante y _limpia_ y motores comparables en potencia a los presentes, que sean más rentables y menos venenosos. Se olvida que automóviles que no envenenen el ambiente, ni en su manufactura ni en su marcha, costarían un múltiplo de los que ahora tenemos. La promoción de la técnica limpia casi siempre constituye la promoción de un médico de lujo para producir bienes de primera necesidad.
+
+En su forma más trágica y amenazante, la quimera energética se manifiesta en la llamada “Revolución verde”. Los granos milagrosos introducidos en la India hace pocos años, hacen sobrevivir y multiplicarse a los hambrientos que se multiplicaron por el crecimiento industrial. Estas nuevas simientes se cargan de energía en forma de agua de bombeo, abonos químicos e insecticidas. Su precio se paga no tanto en dólares sino más bien en trastornos sociales y en destrucción ecológica. De esta forma, los cuatro quintos menos industrializados de la especie humana, quienes llegan a depender más de la agricultura “milagrosa”, empiezan a rivalizar con la minoría privilegiada en materia de destrucción ambiental. Hace sólo 10 años se podía decir que la capacidad de un recién nacido norteamericano de envenenar el mundo con sus excrementos tecnológicos era 100 veces mayor que la de su coetáneo en Bengala. Gracias a que el bengalí depende de la agricultura “científica”, su capacidad de destruir el ambiente en forma irreversible se ha multiplicado por un factor de cinco a 10, mientras que la capacidad del norteamericano para reducir la contaminación que causa ha disminuido un poco. Los ricos, como grupo, ya van en vías de perder el primer puesto en la contaminación del planeta. Los ricos tienden a acusar a los pobres por usar poca energía en forma ineficiente y dañina y los pobres acusan a los ricos de producir más excrementos porque devoran sin digerir mucho más que ellos. Los utópicos prometen soluciones milagrosas a los dos, tales como la posibilidad de realizar pronto un decrecimiento demográfico o la desalinización de las aguas del mar por energía de fusión. Los pobres se ven obligados a fundar sus esperanzas de sobrevivir en su derecho a un ambiente reglamentado que les “ofrece” la generosidad de los ricos. La doble crisis de abastecimiento y de contaminación ya manifiesta los límites implícitos en el crecimiento industrial. Pero la contradicción decisiva de esta expansión más allá de ciertos límites reside en un nivel más hondo, en lo político.
+
+# La ilusión fundamental
+
+Creer en la posibilidad de altos niveles de energía _limpia_ como solución a todos los males, representa un error de juicio político. Es imaginar que la equidad en la participación del poder y el consumo de energía pueden crecer juntos. Víctimas de esta ilusión, los hombres industrializados no ponen el menor límite al crecimiento en el consumo de energía, y este crecimiento continúa con el único fin de proveer cada vez a más gente de más productos de una industria controlada cada vez por menos gente. Prevalece la ilusión de que una revolución política, al suprimir los errores técnicos de las industrias presentes, crearía la posibilidad de distribuir equitativamente el disfrute del bien producido, a la par que el poder de control sobre lo que se produce. Es mi tarea analizar esta ilusión. Mi tesis sostiene que no es posible alcanzar un estado social basado en la noción de equidad y simultáneamente aumentar la energía mecánica disponible, a no ser bajo la condición de que el consumo de energía por cabeza se mantenga dentro de límites. En otras palabras: sin electrificación no puede haber socialismo, pero inevitablemente esta electrificación se transforma en justificación para la demagogia cuando los vatios per cápita exceden cierta cifra. El socialismo exige para la realización de sus ideales un cierto nivel en el uso de la energía: no puede venir a pie, ni puede venir en coche, sino solamente a velocidad de bicicleta.
+
+# Mi tesis
+
+En mi análisis del sistema escolar he señalado que en una sociedad industrial el costo del control social aumenta más rápidamente que el nivel del consumo de energía. Este control lo ejercen en primera línea los educadores y médicos, los cuerpos asistenciales y políticos, sin contar la policía, el ejército y los psiquiatras. El subsistema social destinado al control social crece a un ritmo canceroso convirtiéndose en la razón de la existencia para la sociedad misma. He demostrado que solamente imponiendo límites a la despersonalización e industrialización de los valores se puede mantener un proceso de participación política.
+
+En el presente ensayo mi argumento procederá analógicamente. Señalaré que en el desarrollo de una sociedad moderna existe un momento en el que el uso de energía ambiental excede por un determinado múltiplo el total de la energía metabólica humana disponible. Una vez rebasada esta cuota de alerta, inevitablemente los individuos y los grupos de base tienen que abdicar progresivamente del control sobre su futuro y someterse siempre más a una tecnocracia regida por la lógica de sus instrumentos.
+
+Los ecólogos tienen razón al afirmar que toda energía no metabólica es contaminante: es necesario ahora que los políticos reconozcan que la energía física, pasado cierto límite, se hace inevitablemente corrupta del ambiente social. Aun si se lograra producir una energía no contaminante y producirla en cantidad, el uso masivo de energía siempre tendrá sobre el cuerpo social el mismo efecto que la intoxicación por una droga físicamente inofensiva, pero psíquicamente esclavizante. Un pueblo puede elegir entre una droga sustitutiva tal como el metadone y una desintoxicación realizada a voluntad en el aislamiento; pero no puede aspirar simultáneamente a la evolución de su libertad y convivencialidad por un lado, y a una tecnología de alta energía por el otro.
+
+# El marco latinoamericano
+
+La llamada crisis de la energía es un concepto políticamente ambiguo. En la manera como se usa en el presente, sirve a los intereses imperialistas tanto en Rusia como en Estados Unidos. Sirve de explicación para limitar privilegios a quienes más directamente cooperan en el desarrollo de éstos. En América Latina la difusión del pánico serviría para integrar el continente más perfectamente como periferia de un mundo cuyo centro está donde más energía per cápita se utiliza. No hay movimiento de verdadera liberación que no reconozca la necesidad de adoptar una tecnología de bajo consumo energético.
+
+Discutir la crisis de energía equivale a colocarse en el cruce de dos caminos. A mano izquierda se abre la posibilidad de transición a una economía posindustrial, que pone el énfasis en el desarrollo de formas más eficientes de trabajo manual y en la realización concreta de la equidad. Nos conduciría a un mundo de satisfacción austera de todas las aspiraciones realistas. A mano derecha se ofrece la opción de acometer la escalada de un crecimiento que pondría el énfasis en la capitalización y el control social necesarios para evitar niveles intolerables de contaminación. Nos conduciría a transformar los países latinoamericanos en participantes de tercer orden en el apocalipsis industrial, hacia el cual marchan los países ricos. Estados Unidos, Japón o Alemania ya están a punto de perpetrar el autoaniquilamiento social en una parálisis causada por el superconsumo de energía. Insistiendo en el sueño de hacer trabajar las máquinas en lugar del hombre, se desintegran políticamente, aun antes de verse sofocados en sus propios desechos. Hay ciertos países, como la India, Birmania, y espero que aún por cierto tiempo también China, que son todavía bastante operantes en el uso de sus músculos, previniendo así el aumento del desarrollo energético. Pueden aún limitar el uso de energía al nivel actual, tratando de usar sus vatios para fines cualitativamente cada vez más altos y cada vez en forma de mejor distribución.
+
+Posiblemente den el ejemplo de una economía al mismo tiempo posindustrial y socialista, para lo cual deberán mantener una tecnología con un bajo consumo de energía y decidir, desde ahora, vivir más acá del nivel de consumo por cabeza de energía mecánica que deberán recuperar los países ricos para poder sobrevivir.
+
+América Latina se encuentra dentro de una tercera situación. Sus industrias están subcapitalizadas y sus subproductos, física y socialmente destructores, son menos visibles que en los países ricos, haciendo excepción particular del Distrito Federal en México y de São Paulo en Brasil. El menor número de gente es consciente de sufrir precisamente a causa del aumento de la potencia de la máquina industrial y, por tanto, menos es la gente dispuesta a tomar en serio la necesidad de limitar el desarrollo ulterior de tal potencia. Por otro lado, todos los países de América Latina ya tienen una infraestructura física que _a priori_ impide al no escolarizado, al no motorizado, al no electrificado, al no industrializado participar humanamente en el proceso de producción. Aquí, la idea de una alternativa al desarrollo de la industria pesada ya implica la renuncia a lo que se está haciendo o se cree poder hacer mañana: una renuncia al coche, a la nevera, al ascensor y, en muchos casos, hasta al cemento armado que ya están en el pueblo o en la casa del vecino. En Latinoamérica hay menos conciencia que en los países ricos de la necesidad de un modelo alternativo de tecnología y tampoco se vislumbra una renuncia al modelo de los ricos, cosas que pudieran permitirse los chinos, si así lo quisieran.
+
+# El poderío de alto voltaje
+
+Tanto los pobres como los ricos deberán superar la ilusión de que MÁS energía es MEJOR. Con este fin es necesario, ante todo, determinar el límite de energía más allá del cual se ejerce el efecto corruptor del poder mecánico. Este efecto corruptor puede ser controlado en dos niveles característicos. Una sociedad puede sacrificar su propia supervivencia, como comunidad política, al ídolo del poder material. Puede optar conscientemente, o por falta de iniciativa contraria, por identificar el bienestar con el más alto consumo de energía, estableciendo el sistema de planificación que lo hace posible. La maximización del sistema industrial bajo un techo energético más allá del cual cesa la viabilidad del sistema, requiere la transformación de nuevos poderes a un Leviatán tecnofascista.
+
+Una sociedad que dé preferencia al pleno desarrollo de sus industrias sobre la plena participación de sus miembros en el proceso, no puede evitar un nuevo nivel de tecnocracia. Es de poca importancia real el modo concreto como llegue esta tecnocracia al poder: por imposición extranjera, por revolución dentro o fuera de la legalidad o a través de un nuevo contrato social. Tecnocracia es la orientación que siguen los países ricos y la misma que quieren imponer a los países pobres.
+
+Hay un segundo nivel característico, y más bajo, al cual se puede limitar la energía utilizada dentro de un sistema social: es el nivel en el que un pueblo cree tener mejor participación en el dominio de la máquina al combinar mejor y simultáneamente el desarrollo de sus valores tradicionales con la realización de sus ideales sociales. Para ello hay que limitar el uso de la energía, recuperando el nivel tope, pasado el cual éste reduce la autonomía de los individuos y de los grupos de base.
+
+La hipótesis es evidentemente verdadera: más allá de cierto nivel de uso per cápita de energía física, el ambiente de una sociedad cesa de funcionar como nicho de su población. En esta afirmación no hay nada novedoso pero yo pretendo decir más que esto en mi hipótesis.
+
+# Mi hipótesis
+
+El hombre es el ser consciente de su espacio vital y de su limitación temporal. Integra a los dos por medio de su acción, de la aplicación de su energía a sus circunstancias concretas en las cuales se encuentra. Para tal fin utiliza instrumentos de varios tipos, algunos de ellos dan mayor efecto a las energías metabólicas de las que dispone, y otros le permiten hallar fuentes energéticas que son exteriores a su propio cuerpo.
+
+La energía, transformada en trabajo físico le permite integrar su espacio y su tiempo. Privado de energía suficiente se ve condenado a ser un simple espectador inmóvil en un espacio que lo oprime. Al usar sus manos y pies transforma el espacio, simple territorio para el animal, en casa y patria. Al aumentar la eficiencia en la aplicación de su propia energía, lo embellece. Al aprender a usar nuevas fuentes de energía, lo expande y lo pone en peligro. Más allá de cierto punto, el uso de energía motorizada inevitablemente empieza a oprimirlo.
+
+Mi hipótesis es que no puede existir una sociedad que merezca el calificativo de “socialista” si la energía mecánica que utiliza aplasta al hombre; inevitablemente, pasado cierto punto, la energía mecánica tiene tal efecto. Existe una constante K. Ésta indica la cantidad por la que hay que multiplicar la energía mecánica utilizada para todos los fines en la sociedad. No puede existir una sociedad “socialista”, en tanto K no quede entre los límites. La sociedad debe considerarse subequipada para una forma de producción participativa y eficaz, mientras K no alcanza el valor del límite inferior. Cuando K se vuelve mayor que el valor del límite superior, termina la posibilidad de mantener una distribución equitativa del control sobre el poder mecánico en la sociedad. Espero elaborar un modelo teórico que ilustre esta hipótesis. Si ésta es correcta, existe en cada sociedad concreta un “nivel de energía de rendimiento mecánico” dentro del cual puede funcionar de manera óptima un sistema político participativo. El orden de magnitud en que se da este nivel de energía es independiente del instrumental tecnológico o de la eficiencia en la transformación de la energía misma.
+
+Simultáneamente propongo se verifique esta misma hipótesis en algunos campos concretos que consumen un porcentaje importante de la energía mecánica en nuestras sociedades. Tales campos serían: la habitación, los aspectos mecanizados de la agricultura y del transporte. Yo me he decidido a formular mi argumento partiendo de un análisis de este último.
+
+# El paradigma de la circulación
+
+Para tales fines presento a consideración el campo de la circulación de personas. Me limitaré al análisis de la circulación de la gente y de su equipaje personal, porque la circulación de bienes en cantidades superiores exigiría otro planteamiento. En la circulación distinguiré dos medios de locomoción: _el tránsito_ de las personas que usan su propia fuerza para trasladarse de un punto a otro y _el transporte_ motorizado. Incluyo en la circulación total dos grandes clases estadísticas de locomoción bien distintas: _el viaje_ , que al empezar conlleva la intención de dormir en otro lugar, por lo menos durante una noche, y _el desplazamiento_ , o trayecto de ida y vuelta, que termina durante el mismo día en su lugar de origen. El viaje y el desplazamiento pueden tener como fin el trabajo, el paseo, el mercado o la participación en actividades sociales.
+
+En el ejemplo de la circulación creo poder aclarar por qué la “crisis de energía” es un eufemismo detrás del cual se esconde la ilusión de que el uso de la energía y la equidad puedan crecer al mismo paso indefinidamente. La circulación ofrece una oportunidad para exponer la urgencia del análisis que propongo, al mismo tiempo que permite llamar la atención sobre la ceguera ante la evidencia de esta urgencia. Finalmente, me permito presentar mi argumento en forma tal que pueda entenderse y verificarse en discusiones públicas con gente de cualquier grado de instrucción formal.
+
+# La industria del transporte
+
+En el momento en que una sociedad se hace tributaria del transporte, no sólo para los viajes ocasionales sino por sus desplazamientos cotidianos, se pone de manifiesto la contradicción entre justicia social y energía motorizada, libertad de la persona y mecanización de la ruta. La dependencia, en relación con el motor, niega a una colectividad precisamente aquellos valores que se considerarían implícitos en el mejoramiento de la circulación.
+
+Lo siguiente es evidente para campesinos sensatos y se hace dudoso para una persona que sube por la escalera de la escolaridad: la máquina es una contribución positiva cuando su empleo conduce a expander el radio de circulación para todos, multiplicando los destinos terminales sin que por esto aumente la parte del tiempo social que se dedica a la circulación. Hoy en día, ningún sistema motorizado de locomoción llega a aumentar el radio de circulación y simultáneamente a salvaguardar la equidad en la distribución de costos y en la accesibilidad a los puntos de destino escogidos. Frente a esta evidencia el campesino y el peón fácilmente llegan a entender la trampa de la aceleración que roba su tiempo a la mayoría, mientras que los universitarios justifican los privilegios con que esta velocidad les provee, mediante argumentos extraños al debate; insisten en que los países latinoamericanos tienen derecho a competir con la tecnología rica; muestran que el transporte genera un aumento importante en el PNB y que sin una política de movilización mecánica de las masas no es posible desarrollar aquella forma de control social que para ellos se esconde detrás del ideal nacionalista.
+
+En mi análisis del transporte no me interesa identificar los beneficios económicos que éste genera, sino la contribución que presta a la circulación. Lo quiero analizar como medio de circulación y no como medio de inflación. Es fácil constatar que dondequiera que las máquinas destinan una tasa elevada de energía mecánica a la propulsión de un pasajero, el desarrollo de los transportes como industria reduce la igualdad entre los hombres, limita la movilidad personal dentro de un sistema de rutas trazadas al servicio de las industrias, las burocracias y los militares y, además, aumenta la escasez de tiempo dentro de la sociedad. En otras palabras, cuando la velocidad de sus vehículos rebasa cierto margen, la gente se convierte en prisionera del vehículo que la lleva cada día de la casa al trabajo. La extensión del radio de desplazamiento diario de los trabajadores tiene como contrapartida la disminución en la elección de puntos de destino. Quien va a pie al trabajo llega a crearse un ambiente a lo largo de su ruta; quien recorre el camino en vehículo está privado de una multiplicidad de opciones: paradas, accesos, contactos. Pero, el mismo transporte que para la mayoría crea nuevas distancias físicas y sociales, crea islotes de privilegios al precio de una esclavitud general. Mientras que unos pocos viajan en alfombra mágica entre puntos distantes, y por medio de su presencia prestigiosa los hacen no sólo raros sino seductores, los otros, que son la mayoría, se tienen que desplazar con más y más rapidez por los mismos trayectos monótonos y deben consagrar cada vez más tiempo a estos desplazamientos.
+
+En Estados Unidos de América cuatro quintos del tiempo consumido en la circulación concierne a las personas que se mueven entre su casa, el sitio de su trabajo y el supermercado. Y cuatro quintos de kilometraje destinado a congresos, a viajes de vacaciones y de negocios son para el 1.5% de la población. La gente que se encuentra en los aeropuertos siempre es la misma. También ellos se dividen en dos clases: los que se ven obligados a viajar y quienes lo hacen por propia decisión, que forman la minoría. Un tercio de la población adulta debe hacer 40 kilómetros por día entre la casa, la escuela, el trabajo y el supermercado para que 0.5% pueda elegir viajar en avión más de una vez al año. Todos aumentan su kilometraje personal obligatorio para que algunos puedan franquear incalculables distancias en el transcurso de algunos años.
+
+Los medios de transporte acentúan la división de clases en las sociedades ricas, y siendo su lugar de destino las capitales del mundo pobre, extienden la estratificación en un plano global.
+
+El esclavo del desplazamiento cotidiano y el viajero impenitente se ven igualmente sometidos al transporte. Ocasionales puntos altos de velocidad dan al usuario corriente la ilusión de pertenecer al mundo protegido de los altos consumidores de energía. La oportunidad ocasional que tiene el trabajador negro en Miami de pasar dos semanas de vacaciones en Copacabana, le hace olvidar que para el viaje por avión de seis horas de ida y seis de vuelta tuvo que trabajar tres veces más días de lo que hubiera tomado el viaje por barco. El pobre del mundo moderno, capaz de acelerar de vez en cuando, refuerza él mismo la ilusión de la que es víctima premeditada y se hace cómplice de la destrucción del cuadro social del espacio. No sólo quien usa el avión, sino también quien defiende su uso coopera a destruir la relación multimilenaria que existe entre el hombre y su geografía.
+
+El hombre americano típico consagra más de 1 600 horas por año a su automóvil: sentado dentro de él, en marcha o parado, trabajando para pagarlo, para pagar la gasolina, las llantas, los peajes, el seguro, las infracciones y los impuestos para las carreteras federales y los estacionamientos comunales. Le consagra cuatro horas al día en las que se sirve de él, se ocupa de él o trabaja para él. Aquí no se han tomado en cuenta todas sus actividades orientadas por el transporte: el tiempo que consume en el hospital, en el tribunal y en el taller mecánico; el tiempo pasado ante la televisión viendo publicidad automovilística, el tiempo invertido en ganar dinero para viajar en avión o en tren. Sin duda, con estas actividades hace marchar la economía, procura trabajo a sus compañeros, ingresos a los jeques de Arabia y justificación a Nixon por su guerra en Asia. Pero si nos preguntamos de qué manera estas 1600 horas, que son una estimación mínima, contribuyen a su circulación, la situación se ve diferente. Estas 1 600 horas le sirven para hacer unos 10 000 kilómetros de camino, o sea seis kilómetros en una hora. Es exactamente lo mismo que alcanzan los hombres en los países que no tienen industria del transporte. Pero, mientras el norteamericano consagra a la circulación una cuarta parte del tiempo social disponible, en las sociedades no motorizadas se destina a este fin entre 3 y 8% del tiempo social. Lo que diferencia la circulación en un país rico y en un país pobre no es una mayor eficacia, sino la obligación de consumir en dosis altas las energías condicionadas por la industria del transporte.
+
+# El estupor inducido por la velocidad
+
+Al rebasar determinado límite en el consumo de energía, la industria del transporte dicta la configuración del espacio social. Las autopistas hacen retroceder los campos fuera del alcance del campesino que quisiera caminar, los viaductos y aeropuertos cortan el acceso de un lado del barrio a otro, las ambulancias empujan las clínicas más allá de la corta distancia que se puede cubrir llevando a un niño enfermo. El coche o la moto permiten al médico y a la partera vivir lejos del ambiente en el que ejercen, y mientras más costosos los transportes, más se vuelve privilegio de ricos o de jerarcas la visita a domicilio. Cuando los camiones pesados llegan a un poblado de los Andes, lo primero que desaparece es parte del mercado local. Luego, cuando llega la ruta asfaltada y un grupo de maestros de secundaria se establece en el poblado, cada vez más gente joven se va hacia la ciudad, hasta que no queda una sola familia que no espere reunirse con alguien allá, a cientos de kilómetros.
+
+Frecuentemente nos olvidamos de que la aceleración de los viajes es un hecho muy nuevo. Valéry tenía razón cuando afirmaba que Napoleón aún se movía a la lentitud de César. Desde los tiempos de Ciro el Grande, rey de los persas, los imperios contaban con la posibilidad de enviar las cartas a una velocidad hasta de 160 kilómetros por día, los mensajes de toda la historia circulaban a un promedio de 100 kilómetros diarios, ya fuesen transportados en galeras de Constantinopla a Venecia o llevados por los corredores de los Fugger, por jinetes del califa o por las rutas del inca. El primer camino para diligencia entre París y Marsella o Tolouse, que regularmente hacía más de 100 kilómetros por día precedió por sólo 70 años al primer tren que hacía 100 kilómetros por hora en 1853. Pero una vez creada la vía férrea el hombre se vio clavado a ella. En Francia, entre 1850 y 1900, el kilometraje por pasajero se multiplicó por un factor de 53.
+
+Por su impacto geográfico, en definitiva, la industria del transporte moldea una nueva especie de hombres: los usuarios. El usuario vive en un mundo ajeno al de las personas dotadas de la autonomía de sus miembros. El usuario es consciente de la exasperante penuria del tiempo que provoca recurrir cotidianamente al tren, al automóvil, al metro, al ascensor, que lo trasladan diariamente a través de los mismos canales y túneles sobre un radio de 10 a 25 kilómetros. Conoce los atajos que encuentran los privilegiados para escapar a la exasperación engendrada por la circulación y los conducen adonde ellos quieren llegar, mientras él, el usuario, tiene que conducir su propio vehículo de un lugar, donde preferiría no vivir, a un empleo que preferiría evitar. El usuario se sabe limitado por los horarios de tren y autobús, en las horas que su esposa lo priva del coche, pero ve a los ejecutivos desplazarse y viajar por el mundo cuando y como a ellos les place. Paga su automóvil de su propio bolsillo, en un mundo donde los privilegios van para el personal dirigente de las grandes firmas, universidades, sindicatos y partidos. Los pobres se atan a su coche, y los ricos usan el coche de servicio, o alquilan el coche de Hertz. El usuario se exaspera por la desigualdad creciente, la penuria de tiempo y su propia impotencia, pero insensatamente pone su única esperanza en _más_ de la misma cosa: más circulación por medio de más transporte. Espera el alivio por cambios de orden técnico que han de afectar la concepción de los vehículos, de las rutas o de la reglamentación de la circulación. O bien espera una revolución que transfiera la propiedad de los vehículos a la colectividad y que, por descuento a los salarios, mantenga una red de transportes gratuitos, cuyas secciones más veloces y costosas serán otra vez accesibles sólo a quienes la sociedad considere más importantes. Casi todos los proyectos de reforma de los transportes que se suponen radicales padecen de este prejuicio: se olvidan del costo en tiempo humano resultante de sustituir el sistema presente por otro, más “público”, si este último ha de ser tan rápido como el otro.
+
+Por las noches el usuario sueña con lo que los ingenieros le sugieren durante el día a través de la televisión y de las columnas seudocientíficas de los diarios. Sueña con redes estratificadas de vehículos de diferente velocidad que convergen en intersecciones donde la gente puede encontrarse en los espacios que le conceden las máquinas. Sueña con los servicios especiales de la “Red de Transporte” que se harán cargo de él definitivamente.
+
+El usuario no puede captar la demencia inherente al sistema de circulación que se basa principalmente en el transporte. Su percepción de la relación del espacio con el tiempo ha sido objeto de una distorsión industrial. Ha perdido el poder de concebirse como otra cosa que no sea un usuario. Intoxicado por el transporte, ha perdido conciencia de los poderes físicos, sociales y psíquicos de que dispone el hombre, gracias a sus pies. Olvida que el territorio lo crea el hombre con su cuerpo, y toma por territorio lo que no es más que un paisaje visto a través de una ventanilla por un hombre amarrado a su butaca. Ya no sabe marcar el ámbito de sus dominios con la huella de sus pasos, ni encontrarse con los vecinos, caminando en la plaza. Ya no encuentra al otro sin chocar, ni llega sin que un motor lo arrastre. Su órbita puntual y diaria lo enajena de todo territorio libre.
+
+Atravesándolo a pie el hombre transforma el espacio geográfico en morada dominada por él. Dentro de ciertos límites que aplica al movimiento determina su movilidad y su poder de dominio. La relación con el espacio del usuario de transportes se determina por una potencia física ajena a su ser biológico. El motor mediatiza su relación con el medio ambiente y pronto lo enajena de tal manera que depende del motor para definir su poder político. El usuario está condicionado a creer que el motor aumenta la capacidad de los miembros de una sociedad de participar en el proceso político. Perdió la fe en el poder político de caminar.
+
+En sus demandas políticas el usuario no busca más caminos abiertos sino más vehículos que lo transporten; quiere más de lo mismo que ahora lo frustra, en vez de pedir garantía de que, en todo sentido, la precedencia la tenga siempre el peatón. La liberación del usuario consiste en su comprensión de la realidad: mientras exija más energía para propulsar con más aceleración a algunos individuos de la sociedad, precipita la corrupción irreversible de la equidad, del tiempo libre y de la autonomía personal. El progreso con el que sueña no es más que la destrucción mejor lograda.
+
+# Los chupatiempo
+
+En toda sociedad que hace pagar, el tiempo, la equidad y la velocidad en la locomoción tienden a variar en proporción inversa una de la otra. Los ricos son aquellos que pueden moverse más, ir donde les plazca, detenerse donde deseen y obtener estos servicios a cambio de una fracción muy pequeña de su tiempo vital. Los pobres son los que usan mucho tiempo para que el sistema del transporte funcione para los ricos del país.
+
+La razón de ello es que la velocidad resulta demasiado cara para ser realmente compartida: todo aumento en la velocidad de un vehículo ocasiona un aumento correspondiente en el consumo de energía necesaria para propulsarlo.
+
+No sólo el funcionamiento mismo consume energía: mientras mayor la velocidad, más energía se invierte en la construcción del vehículo mismo, en el mantenimiento de su pista y en los servicios adicionales sin los cuales no puede funcionar.
+
+No sólo energía consume un vehículo veloz; más importante aún es que consume espacio. Cada aumento en la velocidad hace al vehículo más voraz de metros cuadrados o cúbicos.
+
+Alemania Federal consumió su tierra a razón de 0.2% por año durante la década de los cincuenta. En los sesenta ya había logrado cubrir permanentemente con asfalto 0.4% de su territorio. Los norteamericanos requieren, para sus propios movimientos y para los de sus mercancías, una suma de energía superior a la totalidad de lo disponible, en todos los efectos, para la mitad de la humanidad entera, reunida entre China, India y el sudeste asiático. Ineluctablemente la aceleración chupa tiempo, espacio y energía.
+
+Ahora bien, cuando la energía requerida por el usuario rebasa cierta barrera, el tiempo de unos cuantos adquiere un valor muy alto, en tanto se desprecia el de la mayoría de los demás. En Bombay bastan algunos pocos automóviles para perturbar la circulación de miles de bicicletas y carretillas de tracción humana. Desplazándolos reducen gravemente su flujo y crean tapones. Pero uno de estos escasos automovilistas puede trasladarse en una mañana a la capital de provincia, trayecto que, dos generaciones antes, hubiera llevado una semana entera. En Tailandia los transportes tradicionales eran tan excelentes y flexibles que los reyes nunca pudieron imponer contribuciones sobre los movimientos del arroz: tan múltiples eran las vías por las cuales se podía escapar de la vigilancia del recaudador en unos botecitos elegantes y rápidos, usando una vasta red de canales. Para poder introducir el automóvil todo este sistema perfectamente democrático fue paralizado, cubriendo algunos de los _klongs_ (canales) con asfalto. Algunos poquísimos individuos pueden moverse con rapidez y la mayoría se hizo dependiente y debe adquirir “transporte”.
+
+Lo que es válido en la India, donde el ingreso anual por cabeza alcanza 70 dólares, lo es también en Boston, donde la circulación se ha hecho más lenta que en la época de los carruajes de caballos. El tiempo usado en actividades relacionadas con el transporte lógicamente crece con los gastos hechos para acelerarlo. Una minoría de bostonianos puede permitirse el lujo de vivir en rascacielos, cerca de su trabajo, usar el puente aéreo para dar una vuelta y almorzar en Nueva York. Para la mayoría aumenta la porción de dos horas de vigilia pasadas para crear “transporte”.
+
+En cualquier lugar, la demanda de circulación crece con la aceleración de los vehículos y con mayor premura que la posibilidad de satisfacerla. Pasado cierto límite, la industria del transporte cuesta a la sociedad más tiempo del que ahorra. Con aumentos ulteriores en la velocidad de ciertos vehículos, decrece el kilometraje total viajado por los pasajeros, pero no el tiempo que les cuesta mantener el sistema de transportes. La utilidad marginal en el aumento de la velocidad, accesible sólo a un pequeño número de gente, al rebasar un límite conlleva para la mayoría un aumento en la desutilidad total del transporte. La mayoría no sólo paga más, sino que sufre más daños irreparables.
+
+Pasada la barrera crítica de la velocidad en un vehículo, nadie puede ganar tiempo sin que, obligadamente, lo haga perder a otro. Aquel que exige una plaza en un avión, proclama que su tiempo vale más que el del prójimo. En una sociedad en donde el tiempo para consumir o usar se ha convertido en un bien precioso, servirse de un vehículo, cuya velocidad exceda esta barrera crítica, equivale a poner una inyección suplementaria del tiempo vital de otros al usuario privilegiado de vehículos.
+
+La velocidad sirve para medir la dosis de la inyección que transforma en ganancia de tiempo para unos pocos la gran pérdida de tiempo de muchos. Inevitablemente esta carrera contra el tiempo y contra la muerte de los ricos deja heridos tras de sí. Presenta problemas éticos de orden más universal que la diálisis renal o los injertos de vísceras, que a tantos sublevan.
+
+Al rebasar cierto límite de velocidad, los vehículos motorizados crean distancias que sólo ellos pueden reducir. Crean distancias a costa de todos, luego las reducen únicamente en beneficio de algunos. Una carretera abierta en el desierto pone la ciudad al alcance de la vista del campesino hambriento, pero ciertamente no al alcance de su mano. La nueva ruta _express_ extiende a Chicago, absorbiendo a los motorizados hacia los nuevos suburbios y dejando que el centro de la ciudad degenere en arrabales de asfalto para los otros.
+
+El desplazamiento en masa no es cosa nueva; nuevo es el desplazamiento diario de masas de gente sobre distancias que no pueden cubrirse a pie; nueva es la dependencia de los vehículos para hacer el trayecto diario de ida y vuelta. El uso diario de la silla de posta, el _rickshaw_ y el _fiacre_ , sirvió en su tiempo para comodidad de una ínfima minoría, que no quería ensuciarse los pies ni fatigarse, pero no para aventajar el paso del caminante. El tránsito diario de masas aparece solamente con el ferrocarril. En Francia, entre 1900 y 1950, aumentó casi 100 veces el kilometraje por pasajero. La existencia del ferrocarril hizo posible la expansión de las fábricas, creando, desde un principio, una nueva forma de discriminación. Hizo posible que el director empleara en la fábrica gente que se resistía a una distancia mayor de la que se puede cubrir a pie, creando con esto un “mercado de compra” para la mano de obra. Los ferrocarriles con su capacidad enorme de transporte comenzaron luego a transformar el espacio, permitiendo el crecimiento de la urbe, del arrabal y de la fábrica, que se hizo más gigantesca.
+
+El impacto directo de los primeros ferrocarriles recayó sobre la estructura del espacio: en sus primeros años el tren pudo acentuar los privilegios establecidos, creando la primera clase, que los ricos usaban en vacaciones y para sus negocios, mientras que los pobres se vieron obligados a usar la tercera todos los días. Pero la velocidad aún no determinaba las distinciones. Fue a finales de siglo cuando las cosas cambiaron. La velocidad se convirtió en factor de discriminación. El tren expreso ya corría tres veces más rápido que el tren lechero y era más costoso. Pasados otros 20 años, con el uso común del automóvil, el hombre de la calle comenzó a ser su propio chofer. Los beneficios de la velocidad, logrados por todas partes, llegaron a constituir la base para los privilegios reservados a las nuevas élites.
+
+El porcentaje de gente que emplea hoy chofer es más o menos el mismo que lo empleaba hace dos generaciones; sólo que hoy el salario que éste gana lo pagan las empresas, los ministerios y los sindicatos. Pero además de usar chofer, esta gente es la misma que usa aviones y helicópteros, vive cerca de las arterias de transporte y trabaja en lugares próximos al restaurante, al barbero y a las tiendas. Mucho más de lo que pudo hacerlo el tren, los nuevos niveles de velocidad agrupan las zonas burocráticas favorecidas, los espacios residenciales más atractivos y las estaciones turísticas de lujo, dentro de una órbita cerrada, a la que el acceso que tienen las masas es, primordialmente, a través de la televisión. En los países de Europa oriental donde el número de lugares privilegiados para quienes disponen de coches es menor, su importancia relativa es, quizás, mayor.
+
+Hoy vemos la formación de una jerarquía de diferentes circuitos de transporte, los cuales determinan el acceso a sus servicios de acuerdo con la velocidad que desarrollan y, por tanto, cada uno define su propia clase de usuarios. Cada uno de estos circuitos, si es de velocidad superior, reduce el acceso a menor número de personas, conecta puntos más distantes entre sí y devalúa los circuitos de menor velocidad.
+
+Dime a qué velocidad te mueves y te diré quién eres. Si no puedes contar más que con tus propios pies para desplazarte, eres un marginado, porque, desde medio siglo atrás, el vehículo se ha convertido en signo de selección social y en condición para la participación en la vida nacional. Dondequiera que la industria del transporte ha hecho franquear a sus pasajeros una barrera crítica de velocidad, inevitablemente establece nuevos privilegios para la minoría y agobia a la mayoría.
+
+A todos los niveles, para que la acumulación de poder pueda ser factible, tiene que crear su propia justificación. Así es como un hombre queda justificado al consumir fondos públicos para aumentar la cantidad anual de sus viajes, sumándolos a los fondos públicos ya consumidos anteriormente y al extender la duración de sus estudios. Allí donde se cree que el saber puede capitalizarse y se puede medir el valor productivo por los años de escolaridad de un individuo, inevitablemente se llega a justificar que éste capitalice su vida utilizándola más intensivamente al usar transportes más veloces.
+
+En los países ricos, quienes ganan mucho tienen el mejor transporte y mayor probabilidad de tener éxito en los estudios que justifican los demás privilegios. Pero no es necesario usar el salario o el título académico como pasaporte que permita la entrada a un avión. Hay factores de orden ideológico que pueden igualmente abrir o cerrar la puerta de la cabina. Si bien es cierto que la LÍNEA JUSTA de Mao, para extenderse en China, necesita actualmente de aviones a reacción, esto no puede significar sino la emergencia de un espacio/tiempo propio de los cuadros del partido y diferente al espacio/tiempo en el que viven las masas. En la China Popular la supresión de los niveles intermedios ha hecho más eficaz y más racional la concentración del poder, pero simultáneamente ha recalcado también cómo el tiempo del hombre que guía su búfalo vale mucho menos que el tiempo del hombre que trae ideas y se hace transportar en jet. La velocidad vehicular concentra la potencia energética y el poder en las posaderas de unos cuantos: es estructuralmente demagógica y elitista, independientemente de las intenciones que tenga quien se hace propulsar velozmente. Es un hecho: los caballos de fuerza no pueden sino pisotear la equidad. Además, hacen perder tiempo.
+
+# La aceleración dimensión técnica que expropia el tiempo
+
+La velocidad reduce el tiempo en un doble sentido: disminuyendo el que necesita el pasajero para cubrir 1 000 kilómetros y reduciendo el que podría emplear en otra cosa que no fuera el desplazamiento. La velocidad superior de ciertos vehículos favorece a algunas personas, pero la dependencia general de los vehículos veloces consume el tiempo de todos. Cuando la velocidad rebasa cierta barrera empieza a aumentar el tiempo total devuelto por la sociedad a la circulación.
+
+El efecto que tienen los vehículos superpotentes sobre el presupuesto cotidiano del tiempo disponible de individuos y de sociedades se conoce mal. Lo que las estadísticas nos muestran es el precio en dólares por kilómetro o la duración en horas por desplazamiento. Muy poca es la información sobre los presupuestos de tiempo en el transporte. Hay pocos datos estadísticos de cómo la circulación carcome el tiempo, de cómo el automóvil devora espacio, de cómo se multiplican los recorridos necesarios, de cómo se alejan terminales codiciadas y de cómo al hombre motorizado le cuesta adaptarse al transporte y reponerse de él.
+
+Ningún estudio señala los costos indirectos del transporte, por ejemplo, el precio que se paga por residir en un sector con circulación de fácil acceso, los gastos implicados en protegerse del ruido, de la contaminación y de los peligros de la circulación.
+
+Sin embargo, la inexistencia de una contabilidad nacional del tiempo social no debe hacernos creer que es imposible establecerla, ni debe impedirnos utilizar lo poco que ya sabemos al respecto.
+
+Lo que sí sabemos con seguridad es que en todas partes del mundo, en cuanto la velocidad de los vehículos que cubren los desplazamientos diarios rebasa un punto de alrededor de los 20 kilómetros por hora, la escasez del tiempo relacionada con el desarrollo del transporte general comienza a aumentar. Una vez que la industria alcanza este punto crítico de concentración de vatios por cabeza, el transporte hace del hombre el fantasma que sabemos, un desatinado que constantemente se ve obligado a alcanzar dentro de las próximas 12 horas una meta que por sus propios medios físicos no puede alcanzar. En la actualidad, la gente se ve obligada a trabajar buena parte del día para pagar los desplazamientos necesarios para dirigirse al trabajo. Dentro de una sociedad, el tiempo devuelto al transporte crece en función del máximo de la velocidad de los transportes públicos. Por tener medios de transporte público más modernos, Japón ya precede a Norteamérica en velocidad y en el tiempo perdido en gozarla.
+
+El tiempo carcomido por la circulación; el hombre privado de su movilidad y sometido a depender de las ruedas; la arquitectura al servicio del vehículo; todo esto es consecuencia de la reorganización del mundo sujeta a la aceleración prepotente. No cambia mucho el asunto si la máquina es pública o privada. Inevitablemente con el aumento de la velocidad crece la escasez de tiempo: pasando del coche al tren, que le da el mismo servicio, el usuario trabaja dos o tres horas al día para pagar más impuestos en lugar de trabajar para pagar su Ford. Inevitablemente aumenta la programación: en vez de tener que añadir dos horas de trabajo como chofer de su propio coche al trabajo diario en la fábrica o en la oficina, ahora tiene que adaptar su día a los horarios de los diferentes medios de transporte público. Así como los vehículos ocupan el espacio y reducen los lugares donde la gente pueda parar o vivir, así igualmente ocupan más horas cada año, además imponen su ritmo al proyecto de cada día.
+
+# El monopolio radical del transporte
+
+Como indiqué anteriormente, para poder entender la disfunción que analizamos hay que distinguir entre la circulación, el tránsito y el transporte. Por _circulación_ designo todo desplazamiento de personas. Llamo _tránsito_ a los movimientos que se hacen con energía muscular del hombre y _transporte_ a aquellos que recurren a motores mecánicos para trasladar hombres y bultos. Sin duda, desde tiempos inmemoriales el animal ha compartido el hambre del ser humano y fue su dócil vehículo. Es cosa del pasado: el aumento de los hombres cada vez lo excluye más de un mundo superpoblado y ahora los motores mecánicos generan la forma inhumana de los movimientos.
+
+Dentro de esta perspectiva, se diferencian dos formas de producción de la circulación. El transporte, que es la forma basada en la utilización intensiva del capital; el tránsito, la forma basada en el trabajo intensivo del cuerpo humano. El transporte es prevalentemente un producto de la industria, el tránsito no lo es, ni puede serlo. Quien transita en el acto es eminentemente su propio dueño, quien usa transporte es pasajero o usuario, inevitablemente cliente de una industria. El transporte que usa es un bien con valor de cambio, sujeto a la escasez. Se somete al juego del mercado, organizado como un “juego con suma cero”, de tal manera que si unos ganan los otros pierden. El tránsito, por definición, tiene un valor de uso, que normalmente es del transeúnte. No se ve necesariamente afectado por algún valor de cambio. El niño puede visitar a su abuela sin pagar a nadie, pero puede, si quiere, llevar un bulto para el vecino de la señora, cobrando por la molestia de llevarlo. Hay penuria de tránsito únicamente al negar a los individuos la posibilidad de utilizar su capacidad innata de moverse; no se les puede privar del medio de locomoción que usan. Por esto el tránsito en sí no es fácil de organizar como un “juego con suma cero”. Por su naturaleza, al mejorar el tránsito de un miembro de la colectividad, mejora la suerte del conjunto. Todo esfuerzo por perfeccionar el tránsito toma la forma de una operación en la que finalmente todo el mundo sale ganando. En cambio, de toda lucha por acelerar el transporte (por encima de cierta barrera), inevitablemente resulta en un aumento de la injusticia. El transporte más rápido para algunos inevitablemente empeora la situación de los demás.
+
+Las paradojas, contradicciones y frustraciones de la circulación contemporánea se deben al monopolio ejercido por la industria de los transportes sobre la circulación de las personas. La circulación mecánica no solamente tiene un efecto destructor sobre el ambiente físico, ahonda las disfunciones económicas y carcome el tiempo y el espacio. Además de todo esto, inhibe a la gente de servirse de sus pies, incapacitando a todos por igual. En Los Ángeles no hay destino para el pie: el coche dictó su forma a la ciudad.
+
+El dominio del sistema industrial de circulación sobre el sistema personal se establece cuando, y sólo entonces, los medios de transporte circulan a velocidad prepotente. La velocidad, al volverse obligatoria, arruina el tránsito en favor del transporte motorizado. Dondequiera que el ejercicio de privilegios y la satisfacción de las necesidades más elementales va unida al uso del vehículo prepotente, se impone una aceleración de los ritmos personales. La industria tiene el monopolio de la circulación cuando la vida cotidiana llega a depender del desplazamiento motorizado.
+
+Este poderoso control que ejerce la industria del transporte sobre la capacidad innata que tiene todo hombre para moverse, crea una situación de monopolio más agobiante que el monopolio comercial de Ford sobre el mercado de automóviles o el monopolio político que ejerce la industria automovilística en detrimento de los medios de transporte colectivos. Por su carácter disimulado, su atrincheramiento, su poder para estructurar la sociedad, este monopolio es radical: obliga a satisfacer de manera industrial una necesidad elemental hasta ahora satisfecha de forma personal. El consumo obligatorio de un bien de cambio, el transporte motorizado, restringe las condiciones para poder gozar de un valor de uso superabundante, la capacidad innata de tránsito. La reorganización del espacio en favor del motor vacía de poder y de sentido la capacidad innata de moverse.
+
+La circulación nos sirve aquí de ejemplo para formular una ley económica y política general: cuando un producto excede cierto límite en el consumo de energía por cabeza, ejerce el _monopolio radical_ sobre la satisfacción de una necesidad. Este monopolio se instituye cuando la sociedad se adapta a los fines de aquellos que consumen el total mayor de quanta de energía, y se arraiga irreversiblemente cuando se empieza a imponer a todos la obligación de consumir el quántum mínimo sin el cual la máquina no puede funcionar. El monopolio radical que ejerce una industria sobre toda una sociedad no es efecto de la escasez de bienes reservados a una minoría de clientes; es más bien la capacidad que tiene esta industria de convertir a todos en usuarios.
+
+En toda América Latina los zapatos son escasos. Mucha gente no los usa jamás. Caminan descalzos o con sandalias, huaraches o caites que ellos mismos se fabrican; sin embargo, nunca la falta de zapatos ha limitado su tránsito. Pero, unas dos generaciones atrás, se convirtió en ideal de los nacionalistas calzar al pueblo. Se empezó a obligar a la gente a calzarse, prohibiéndoles comulgar, graduarse o hacer gestiones públicas ante burócratas, presentándose descalzos. El poder del burócrata para definir lo que es bueno para el pueblo inevitablemente le da el poder de establecer nuevas jerarquías.
+
+Como el calzado, las escuelas han sido siempre un bien escaso. Pero el solo hecho de admitir una minoría privilegiada no ha logrado que la escuela sea un obstáculo para la adquisición de saber por parte de la mayoría. Ha sido necesario establecer la escuela gratuita y obligatoria para que el educador, convertido en tamiz entre el saber y las masas, pudiera definir al subconsumidor de sus tratamientos como despreciable autodidacta.
+
+La industria de la construcción podría servirnos de tercer ejemplo de lo que es un monopolio radical. La mayoría de nuestra gente sabe aun crearse un ambiente físico y construir su casita. No es la casa del rico o el palacio de gobierno lo que impide que lo haga hoy, sino la ley que presenta la casa profesionalmente construida como modelo la que impide la autoconstrucción moderna a la mayoría.
+
+Los elementos que constituyen a una industria gran consumidora de energía en monopolio radical, se ponen de manifiesto si tratamos de realizar los ideales que hoy rigen la circulación. Imaginemos que se organiza un sistema de transportes para uso diario, que realmente sea _rápido, gratuito, igualmente accesible a todos_. En un mundo hipermoderno, dotado de un sistema semejante, todos los transportes serían pagados con fondos públicos, es decir, con fondos recaudados por medio de impuestos. La imposición, a su vez, no sería solamente mayor para quienes ganan más, sino paraquienes viven o tienen negocios más cercanos a las terminales. Además, en este sistema, quien llegara primero sería también primero en ocupar su plaza, sin prioridad reconocida ni al médico, ni a quien va de fiesta, ni al directivo. Un mundo utópico semejante bien pronto se manifestaría como una pesadilla, en la que todos serían igualmente prisioneros del transporte. Cada uno privado del uso de sus pies, incapaz de competir con los vehículos, se convertiría en agente de la proliferación ulterior de la red de transportes. La única alternativa que le quedaría se impone por sí sola: insistir en que la velocidad de los vehículos disponibles se reduzca a un nivel que permita al hombre competir con ella por sus propias fuerzas.
+
+# El límite inasequible
+
+Hay que preguntarse por qué la investigación insistentemente continúa orientada hacia el desarrollo de los transportes cada vez más dañinos, en vez de determinar las condiciones óptimas de la circulación. En mi opinión, hay una razón obvia. No se pueden identificar las condiciones para una circulación óptima sin decidir de antemano que la circulación en cuestión debe ser la locomoción de las personas y no de los vehículos. Ahora bien, para poder asentar las metas de un sistema de transportes en tal premisa, hay que tomar en consideración que las personas tienen una capacidad innata de moverse sin que para ello necesiten de la ayuda de políticos e ingenieros. Aunque pueda parecer extraño al hombre común, es precisamente a esta movilidad natural del ser humano a la que no dan significación formal los grandes equipos de profesionales, quienes prepararon la mayoría de los grandes estudios sobre la reorganización de la circulación necesaria durante los próximos 10 años.
+
+Asentada la premisa de que el hombre nace con alta movilidad, característica de su ser y tradicionalmente satisfactoria, se impone el problema de cómo salvaguardar esta movilidad natural, a pesar de las medidas que se tomen para “mejorarla”. Una de las formas que garanticen el disfrute de la movilidad natural consiste en imponer un límite a la industria del transporte, límite que, a cierto nivel, tome la forma de restricción de la velocidad. El obstáculo mayor para la discusión racional del tema es el orden de magnitud de la velocidad en el que se encuentra este límite.
+
+El usuario comprende que algunas velocidades deben excluirse, comprende que la generalización del avión supersónico le impediría el descanso y el sueño y, con mucha probabilidad, a sus nietos les quitaría el oxígeno necesario para vivir. Sin dificultad comprende que existen velocidades máximas, pero no ha meditado en la posibilidad de velocidades óptimas. Las discusiones sobre velocidades que lleven a una circulación óptima le parecen arbitrarias o autoritarias. Del otro lado, al ciclista o al mulatero la discusión le parece carente de sentido. Para ambos, lo que podrían llegar a identificar como velocidad óptima en la circulación, es distinto a lo que ellos conocen por experiencia. Una velocidad cuatro o seis veces mayor a la de un peatón representa un margen demasiado bajo para que el usuario del sistema de transportes lo considere y es demasiado elevado para tres cuartas partes de la humanidad que todavía se mueve por sus propias fuerzas. Es aquí donde está el obstáculo para la politización del asunto.
+
+La gente que planifica el alojamiento, el transporte o la educación de los demás pertenece toda a la clase de los usuarios. La competencia que reivindica se basa en el valor reconocido al producto de sus agencias: los “milagros médicos”, la velocidad o los certificados escolares. Sociólogos o ingenieros pueden dar cuenta del embotellamiento en Calcuta o en Caracas, en términos informativos. Hasta saben trazar planos para la sustitución de coches por autobuses, metros o aerotrén. Pero inevitablemente son gente que cree poder aportar algo que los demás no tienen: un vehículo, un plan o un sistema. Son personajes profesionalmente adictos a la solución industrial de problemas creados por una industria. Su fe en la potencia, en la fuerza de concentración de la energía, les impide tomar conciencia de la potencia, superior en mucho, inherente a la renuncia. El ingeniero es incapaz de concebir la renuncia a la velocidad, el retardo general de la circulación, como medio de abolir el espasmo energético que ahora entorpece los transportes. No quiere elaborar sus programas sobre el postulado de prohibir en la ciudad todo vehículo motorizado que aventaje la marcha de una bicicleta.
+
+Desde su Land Rover, el consejero para el desarrollo se compadece del peruano que lleva sus marranos al mercado. Se rehúsa a reconocer las ventajas que le da el hecho de ir a pie: se olvida de que si bien este hombre pasará en el camino tres días enteros del mes, la mayoría de sus familiares no tienen que salir del pueblo. En contraste, cada uno de los miembros de la familia del norteamericano, en Saint Louis Missouri, está obligado a pasar cuatro horas diarias en el servicio de los transportes. No sorprende, pues, que como benefactor de la humanidad subdesarrollada ponga empeño en proveer a los indios de la sierra de “privilegio” semejante. Para el ingeniero del desarrollo no existe nada que sea sencillamente _bueno_ , sueña con lo mejor, lo más rápido, lo más costoso y, por tanto, acrecentando el medio aleja el fin.
+
+La mayoría de los peruanos y mexicanos, para no hablar de los chinos, se encuentran en la actitud opuesta. El límite crítico de la velocidad se coloca para ellos muy por delante de lo que conocen por experiencia propia. Sí, hay unos cuantos que guardan de por vida el recuerdo de alguna escapada motorizada; recuerdan el día en que, en el camión del ejército, los transportaron a una manifestación en el zócalo o en Pekín; recuerdan la visita del cacique en su coche. Pero aun estas raras ocasiones, en las que se movieron sobre la pista a una velocidad de 50 kilómetros, en una hora no recorrieron más de 30 kilómetros. No asimilan la experiencia de haber recorrido tal distancia en tan poco tiempo. En Guerrero y en Chiapas, dos estados mexicanos característicos, en 1970 menos de 1% de la población jamás había recorrido 15 kilómetros en menos de una hora. Los caminos de tercera sin duda hacen más cómodo el desplazamiento, hacen posible los recorridos más largos, pero no los _aceleran_ , pasando el límite. Permiten a todos moverse juntos, llevan al campesino al mercado sin separarlo de su marrano y sin ocasionarle al puerco pérdida de peso, pero no los hacen llegar más que seis veces más pronto que si hubiesen ido a pie.
+
+El orden de magnitud donde se coloca el punto límite crítico de la velocidad es muy bajo para que el usuario lo tome en serio y muy alto para afectar al campesino. De esta manera se sitúa para ambos en el punto ciego de su campo visual. Al campesino le parecería volar como un pájaro si pudiera trasladarse de su casa a un campo a 25 kilómetros de distancia en una hora o menos, mientras que el usuario olvida que la enorme mayoría de los habitantes de Londres, París, Nueva York y Tokio emplean más de una hora por cada 10 kilómetros que se desplazan. El hecho de que la velocidad crítica para la circulación esté situada en un punto ciego común al campo visual del usuario y del campesino, es lo que hace tan difícil presentar el asunto a la discusión pública. El usuario está intoxicado por el consumo de altas dosis de energía industrial y se le toca un nervio vivo al mencionar el punto, mientras que el campesino no ve la razón de defenderse de algo que no conoce.
+
+A esta dificultad general para politizar el asunto de las velocidades se añade otro obstáculo aún más palmario. El usuario de transportes no es cliente de las carreteras únicamente. Es casi siempre un hombre moderno, lo que quiere decir que igualmente es cliente encadenado a otros sistemas públicos, tales como la escuela, el hospital y el sindicato. Está condicionado a creer que sólo los especialistas pueden comprender el porqué de las “características técnicas” según las cuales funcionan los sistemas: sólo el médico puede identificar y curar su calentura, y sólo el maestro titulado debe enseñarle a leer a su hijo. Igualmente está acostumbrado a confiar en los expertos, y a que sólo ellos comprendan _por qué_ el tren suburbano parte a las 8:15 y a las 8:41 o por qué los coches se tienen que hacer cada vez más complejos y costosos sin que para él mejore la circulación. La idea de que por un proceso político se podría encontrar una característica técnica tan elemental como la “velocidad crítica”, aquí bajo estudio, le parece fruto de la imaginación ingenua de un abuelo, de un inculto, de un _luddita_[^n01] o de un demagogo irresponsable. Su respeto al especialista, a quien no conoce, se ha transformado en ciega sumisión a las condiciones que éste ha establecido. La mistificación propia y típica del hombre-cliente es el segundo obstáculo para el control popular de la circulación.
+
+Hay un tercer obstáculo a la construcción de la circulación: tal reconstrucción por iniciativa mayoritaria es potencialmente un explosivo social. Si en un solo campo mayor las masas llegaran a entender hasta qué punto han sido fantoches de una ilusión tecnológica, la misma mutación de conciencia podría fácilmente extenderse a otros campos. Si fuese posible identificar públicamente un valor natural máximo para las velocidades vehiculares, como condición para el tránsito óptimo, análogas intervenciones públicas en la tecnoestructura serían entonces mucho más fáciles. La estructura institucional total está tan integrada, tan tensa y frágil, que desde cualquier punto crítico se puede producir un derrumbe. Si el problema del tránsito se pudiera resolver por la intervención popular, y sin referencia a los expertos en el campo del transporte, entonces se podría aplicar el mismo tratamiento a las cuestiones de la educación, de la salud, del urbanismo y hasta de las Iglesias y de los partidos. Si, para todos los efectos y sin ayuda de expertos, los límites críticos de velocidad los determinaran las asambleas representativas del pueblo, entonces se cuartearían las bases mismas del sistema político. Así, la investigación que propongo es fundamentalmente política y subversiva.
+
+# Sobre los grados del moverse
+
+El hombre se mueve con eficacia sin ayuda de ningún implemento. Caminando hace su sendero. La locomoción de cada gramo de su propio cuerpo o de su carga, sobre cada kilómetro recorrido en 10 minutos, le consume 0.75 calorías. Comparándolo con una máquina termodinámica, el hombre es más rentable que cualquier vehículo motorizado, que consume por lo menos cuatro veces más calorías en el mismo trayecto. Además es más eficiente que todos los animales de un peso comparable. El tiburón o el perro le ganan, pero sólo en poco. Con este índice de eficiencia de menos de una caloría por gramo, históricamente organizó su sistema de circulación, prevalentemente basado en el tránsito. Exploró el mundo, creó culturas, sostuvo comercios y, por cuanto podamos saber, no gastó más que 3.5% del tiempo social en moverse fuera de su hogar o de su campamento. Sólo algunos pueblos, en raros momentos de su historia, probablemente consagraron más de este porcentaje del tiempo común en moverse o en ocuparse con sus vehículos y motores animales, por ejemplo, los mongoles en sus guerras.
+
+Hace un siglo el hombre inventó una máquina que lo dotó de eficiencia aún mayor: la bicicleta. Se trataba de una invención novedosa, a base de materiales nuevos combinados en una tecnología ingeniosa, e impensados en tiempos del joven Marx.
+
+El uso de la bicicleta hace posible que el movimiento del cuerpo humano franquee una última barrera. Le permite aprovechar la energía metabólica disponible y acelerar la locomoción a su límite teórico. En terreno plano, el ciclista es tres o cuatro veces más veloz que el peatón, gastando en total cinco veces menos calorías por kilómetro que éste. El transporte de un gramo de su cuerpo sobre esta distancia no le consume más que 0.15 calorías. Con la bicicleta, el hombre rebasa el rendimiento posible de cualquier máquina y de cualquier animal evolucionado.
+
+Además, la bicicleta no ocupa mucho espacio. Para que 40 000 personas puedan cruzar un puente en una hora moviéndose a 25 kilómetros por hora, se necesita que éste tenga 138 metros de anchura si viajan en coche, 38 metros si viajan en autobús y 20 metros si van a pie; en cambio, si van en bicicleta, el puente no necesita más de 10 metros de anchura. Únicamente un sistema hipermoderno de trenes rápidos, a 100 kilómetros por hora y sucediéndose a intervalos de 30 segundos podría pasar esta cantidad de gente por un puente semejante en el mismo tiempo.
+
+No sólo en movimiento, también estacionado hay una diferencia enorme entre el espacio que ocupa el vehículo potencialmente rápido y la bicicleta. Donde se estaciona un coche caben 18 bicicletas. Para salir del estacionamiento de un estadio, 10 000 personas en bicicleta necesitan una tercera parte del tiempo que necesita el mismo número que abordan autobuses.
+
+Dotado de bicicleta, el hombre puede cubrir una distancia anual superior, dedicándole en total menos tiempo y exigiendo menos espacio para hacerlo y muy poca inversión de energía física que no es parte de su propio ciclo vital.
+
+Además, las bicicletas cuestan poco. Con una fracción de las horas de trabajo que exige al norteamericano la compra de su coche, el chino, ganando un salario mucho menor, compra su bicicleta, que le dura toda la vida, mientras que el coche, cuanto más barato, más pronto hay que reponerlo. Eso mismo puede decirse respecto a las carreteras. Para que un mayor número de ciudadanos pueda llegar hasta su casa en coche, se corroe más el territorio nacional. Inevitablemente el coche está ligado a la carretera, no así la bicicleta. Donde no puede ir montado en ella, el ciclista la empuja. El radio diario de trayectos aumenta para todos por igual sin que por esto disminuya para el ciclista la intensidad de acceso. El hombre con bicicleta se convierte en dueño de sus propios movimientos, sin estorbar al vecino. Si hay quien pretenda que en materia de circulación es posible lograr algo mejor, es ahora cuando debe probarlo.
+
+La bicicleta es invento de la misma generación que creó el vehículo de motor, pero las dos invenciones son símbolos de adelantos hechos en direcciones opuestas por el hombre moderno. La bicicleta permite a cada uno controlar el empleo de su propia energía; el vehículo de motor inevitablemente hace de los usuarios rivales entre sí por la energía, el espacio y el tiempo. En Vietnam, un ejército hiperindustrializado no ha podido derrotar a un pueblo que se desplaza a la velocidad de la bicicleta. Esto debería hacernos meditar: tal vez la segunda forma del empleo de la técnica sea superior a la primera. Naturalmente, queda por ver si los vietnamitas del norte están dispuestos a permanecer dentro de esos límites de velocidad que son los únicos susceptibles de respetar los valores mismos que hicieron posible su victoria. Hasta el momento presente los bombarderos americanos les han privado de gasolina, de motores, de carreteras y los han obligado a emplear una técnica también moderna, mucho más eficaz, equitativa y autónoma que la que Marx hubiese podido imaginar. Queda por ver si ahora, en nombre de Marx, no se lanzan a una industrialización, cuantitativamente tan superior a lo que Marx pudo prever, que sea imposible la aplicación de los ideales que él formuló.
+
+# Motores dominantes contra motores auxiliares
+
+Los hombres nacieron dotados de movilidad más o menos igual. Esta capacidad innata de movimiento aboga en favor de una libertad igual en la elección de su destino. La noción de equidad puede servir de base para defender este derecho fundamental contra toda limitación. Dentro de esta perspectiva, poco importa cuál sea la amenaza al libre ejercicio del derecho de moverse y elegir su propio destino: la prisión, la prohibición de cruzar fronteras, la reclusión dentro de un ambiente urbano que impida la movilidad innata de la persona con la sola finalidad de transformarlo en usuario. El hecho de que nuestros contemporáneos, en su mayoría, estén atados a su butaca por su cinturón de seguridad ideológica, no basta para que el derecho fundamental a la libertad de movimientos se vuelva obsoleto. La movilidad humana es el único patrón válido para medir la contribución que cualquier sistema de transporte haga a la circulación. Si por el transporte el tránsito se ve restringido, el transporte hace declinar la circulación.
+
+Para distinguir el transporte que mutila el derecho del movimiento de aquel que lo ensancha, hay que reconocer que el vehículo puede entorpecer la circulación triplemente: rompiendo su flujo, aislando categorías jerarquizadas de destinación y aumentando la pérdida de tiempo vinculada con la circulación. Se ha visto que la clave de las relaciones entre el transporte y la calidad de la circulación es la velocidad del vehículo. También se ha visto que, pasado cierto límite de velocidad, el transporte afecta la circulación de tres maneras: la entorpece al saturar de vías y coches un ambiente físico; transforma el territorio en una trama de circuitos cerrados y estancos, y sustrae al individuo del tiempo y el espacio de existir, convirtiéndolo en presa de la velocidad.
+
+Lo contrario es cierto también: bajo determinado nivel de velocidad, los vehículos motorizados pueden complementar o mejorar el tráfico, permitiendo a las personas hacer cosas que no podrían hacer a pie o en bicicleta. Los motores pueden usarse para transportar al enfermo, al lisiado, al viejo o al simplemente perezoso.
+
+Las motocicletas pueden transportar personas pasando sobre montículos, pero lo pueden hacer en forma sosegada solamente si no aventajan a una mayoría que tiene que subir a pie. Los trenes pueden extender el radio de vivencia para una mayoría, pero pueden hacerlo sólo si con ello ofrecen igual oportunidad a todas las personas de estar más cercanas entre sí. Un sistema de transporte bien desarrollado, a velocidades tope de 25 kilómetros por hora, hubiera permitido al policía Fix perseguir a Phileas Fogg alrededor del mundo no en 80 días, sino en 40. Pero en un sistema así, el tiempo empleado para viajar pertenece en forma dominante al viajero: más baja la velocidad, menor es la expropiación del tiempo ajeno que practica el viajero.
+
+La coexistencia de vehículos movidos sólo a fuerza de energía metabólica humana y de otros auxiliados por motores, será ponderada únicamente si se concede preferencia absoluta a la autonomía de movimiento del hombre y si se protege la geografía humana contra aquellas velocidades que la distorsionan en geografía vehicular.
+
+Se puede desarrollar un sistema de transportes con características óptimas para el tráfico siempre que el transporte motorizado se mantenga limitado a velocidades subsidiarias del tránsito autónomo. El límite a la potencia, y por tanto a la velocidad de los motores, en sí mismo no protege a los más débiles contra la explotación de los ricos y poderosos. Éstos siempre podrán idear medios para vivir y trabajar en mejores localidades, viajar en gran lujo y hacerse transportar sobre los hombros de sus esclavos. Pero al fijar velocidades máximas dentro de ciertos límites es posible reducir, y hasta corregir disparidades, combinando medios políticos con recursos tecnológicos. Una revolución política puede eliminar la institución de la esclavitud; sin limitar la velocidad no puede eliminar la nueva explotación que el sistema de transporte impone. Si no hay velocidades máximas determinadas, no pueden superarse las disparidades, ni siendo propiedad del Estado los medios de transporte, ni aplicando mejores técnicas para su control. Una industria del transporte sirve para la producción del tráfico total únicamente si no ejerce un monopolio radical sobre la productividad personal que la tecnología moderna ha elevado a un nuevo orden.
+
+# Equipo insuficiente superdesarrollo y tecnología madura
+
+La combinación de transportes y tránsito que constituye la circulación nos indica cuál es la potencia en vatios per cápita socialmente óptima y señala la necesidad de someterla a límites elegidos políticamente. Asimismo nos ofrece un ejemplo de la convergencia de metas en el desarrollo socioeconómico y un criterio para distinguir a los países que están insuficientemente equipados de los que están destructivamente superindustrializados.
+
+Un país se puede clasificar de _subequipado_ cuando no puede dotar a cada ciudadano de una bicicleta o proveer una transmisión de cinco velocidades a cualquiera que desee pedalear llevando a otros. Está subequipado si no puede proveer buenos caminos para la bicicleta o transportes públicos gratuitos para aquellos que quieren viajar horas seguidas. No existe una razón técnica, económica o ecológica para que por el año de 1975 se tolere semejante retraso, consecuencia de un equipo insuficiente. Sería un escándalo si la movilidad natural de los hombres se viera, contra su voluntad, forzada al estancamiento a un nivel prebicicleta.
+
+Un país puede clasificarse como _superindustrializado_ cuando su vida social está dominada por la industria del transporte que ha llegado a determinar sus privilegios de clase, a acentuar la escasez de tiempo y a mantener a los hombres más firmemente en los carriles trazados para ellos.
+
+Más allá del subequipado y del superindustrializado está el sitio del mundo de la _eficacia posindustrial_ , en donde la modalidad industrial de producción complementa la producción social sin monopolizarla. En otras palabras, hay un sitio para un mundo de madurez tecnológica. En términos de circulación, éste es el mundo de aquellos que han ensanchado su horizonte cotidiano a 13 kilómetros, montados en su bicicleta. Al mismo tiempo es el mundo marcado por una variedad de motores subsidiarios disponibles para cuando la bicicleta no basta y cuando un aumento en el empuje no obstaculice ni la equidad ni la libertad. También es el mundo del viaje largo, un mundo donde cualquier lugar está abierto a cualquier persona, a su albedrío y a su velocidad, sin prisa o temor, por medio de vehículos que cruzan las distancias sin roturar la tierra sobre la que el hombre ha caminado con sus pies por cientos de miles de años.
+
+El mundo superindustrializado no admite diferencias en el estilo de la producción y de la política. Impone sus características técnicas a las relaciones sociales. El mundo de la madurez industrial permite una variedad de elecciones políticas y culturales. Esta variedad, por supuesto, disminuye en la medida en que una comunidad permite a la industria crecer a costa de la producción autónoma. El razonamiento solo no puede ofrecer la medida para fijar el nivel de eficacia posindustrial y la madurez tecnológica que se ajuste a una sociedad concreta. Únicamente puede indicar, en término dimensional, el radio dentro del cual deben ajustarse estas características tecnológicas. Solamente un proceso político, dentro de una comunidad histórica, puede decidir cuándo dejan de valer la pena la programación, la distorsión del espacio, la escasez del tiempo y la desigualdad. El razonamiento puede _identificar_ la velocidad como un factor crítico en el transporte, pero no puede _fijar_ límites políticos factibles.
+
+Las velocidades tope en el transporte de personas se hacen operantes sólo si reflejan con claridad el interés propio de una comunidad política. La expresión común de este interés no es posible en una sociedad en la que una clase monopoliza no sólo los transportes, sino igualmente las comunicaciones, la medicina, la educación o el armamento. No tiene importancia que este poder lo ejerzan los propietarios legales o los gerentes atrincherados en la industria o si ésta es legalmente propiedad de los trabajadores. Este poder debe incautarse y someterse al sano juicio del hombre común. Su reconquista comienza al reconocer que el conocimiento experto ciega a los burócratas reservados frente a la forma evidente de disolver la crisis de la energía, así como los cegó para reconocer la solución evidente para resolver la guerra en Vietnam.
+
+De donde nos encontramos ahora parten dos caminos hacia la madurez tecnológica. Uno es el camino de la liberación de la abundancia, el otro el de la liberación de la dependencia. Ambos tienen el mismo destino: la reestructuración del espacio que ofrece a cada persona la experiencia, constantemente renovada, de saber que el centro del mundo es donde ella vive.
+
+Los hombres que tienen los pies en la tierra, que dominan su morada, que ejercen su poder innato de moverse, saben dónde está el centro de la Tierra. Saben vivir en una vecindad, conocer a sus vecinos, detenerse a hablar con el hombre que encuentran en la esquina, pasear y sentarse en una banca de la acera.
+
+El tráfico de la abundancia atropella y zarandea a los ricos. La _liberación_ de esta _abundancia_ empieza con el dominio sobre la aceleración destructora del tiempo ajeno. Los veloces son empujados de un lado a otro, son lanzados de una vía rápida a otra y sólo tropiezan con otros usuarios propulsados hacia rumbos diferentes. Ven las caras anónimas de los demás en el cruce de dos circuitos. Es éste un mundo de órbitas sin centro.
+
+La soledad de la abundancia se quebrantará cuando los usuarios rompan la servidumbre al transporte supereficiente. La liberación de la abundancia se hará cuando rompan los circuitos veloces que extienden el territorio y tomen de nuevo posesión de la tierra con sus pies.
+
+_La liberación de la dependencia_ comienza en el otro extremo. Rompe con la opresión de la población y del valle, deja detrás el tedio de los horizontes estrechos y sofocantes y el agobio de un mundo encerrado en sí. Expander la vida más allá del radio de la tradición, sin inseminarla por los vientos de la aceleración, es una meta que cualquier país pobre podría alcanzar en pocos años. Sin embargo, es una meta que podrán alcanzar sólo aquellos que rechazan la oferta del desarrollo de un monopolio industrial, sobre la producción hecha en nombre de una ideología de consumo indefinido de energía.
+
+Lo que ahora amenaza tanto a los países ricos como a los países pobres es precisamente lo contrario. Más que los jeques árabes y más que las compañías petroleras internacionales, la crisis energética recientemente “descubierta” aventaja a las clases gobernantes y a sus lacayos profesionales. En lugar de identificar el mínimo de carburante necesario para la mayor movilidad personal, ellos tratan de obligarnos a consumir el máximo de medios de transporte que puede hacerse funcionar con el carburante disponible. Los ingenieros de tráfico imponen límites de 80 kilómetros por hora en la ruta, porque a tal velocidad la eficiencia de los motores es máxima, y límites de 40 en los puntos congestionados, porque así el número máximo de vehículos cabe en cada kilómetro de asfalto. Aumentan los reglamentos y los horarios, y los privilegios para doctores, policías y potentados. El límite tecnocrático en favor del transporte está así en oposición diametral al límite político que se debería escoger en protección del tránsito humano. Así, empero, también se hace más evidente la contradicción entre la racionalización del transporte veloz y la calidad de la circulación. Entre más duros, vejatorios y evidentes se hacen los sacrificios impuestos a la mayoría por los veladores del modo de producción industrial, más probable se hace la emergencia de una conciencia mayoritaria en favor de la limitación de toda circulación a una velocidad del orden de 25 kilómetros por hora, lo que para la gran mayoría implicaría más equidad, libertad y acceso mutuo.
+
+La protección de la movilidad personal autónoma y sin clases contra el monopolio radical de la industria es posible únicamente donde la gente se empeñe en un proceso político, basado en la protección del tráfico óptimo. Esta protección, a su vez, exige reconocer aquellos quanta de energía que la sociedad industrial ha desatendido y sobre los cuales basa su propio desarrollo. El consumo estricto de estos quanta puede conducir a quienes lo respeten a una era posindustrial tecnológicamente madura.
+
+La liberación que para los países pobres será barata, costará a los ricos, y éstos no pagarán el precio sino hasta que la aceleración de su sistema de transporte triture el tráfico hasta paralizarlo. Un análisis concreto del tráfico traiciona la verdad que subyace en _la crisis de la energía_ : el impacto sobre el ambiente social de quanta de energía industrialmente empaquetado es degradante, agotador y esclavizante. Estos efectos se hacen sentir antes que la amenaza de la contaminación del ambiente físico y de la extinción de la raza humana. El punto crucial en el que estos efectos son reversibles no es, sin embargo, cuestión de deducción sino de decisión política, posiblemente sólo donde la voz de la mayoría puede limitar el poder y la velocidad de sus gobernantes.
+
+# Bibliografía
+
+Durante 1974 y 1975 se llevaron a cabo seminarios sobre “Las alternativas a la aceleración y la mejora del tráfico” en el Cidoc, en Cuernavaca. La lista que sigue es el resultado de los trabajos previos de este seminario. Sólo se reseñan aquellos títulos que, además de haberse mostrado útiles en pasadas sesiones de estudio, pueden ser más fácilmente localizados por aquellos que deseen proseguir la línea de investigación presentada en este ensayo.
+
+Albion, R. G., _Naval and Maritime History, Annotated Bibliography,_ Mystic, Conn., 1972.
+
+Anderson, Romola, y Roger Anderson, _The Sailing Ship: Six Thousand Years of History_ , Harrap, Londres, 1926.
+
+Banks, A., _Cross-Polity Time Series Data_ , MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.
+
+Barkin, David, “El consumo y la vía chilena al socialismo; reflexiones en torno a la decisión automotriz”, versión preliminar, _Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos,_ Santiago de Chile, 1972.
+
+Bernstein, M. T., _Steamboats on the Ganges,_ Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1960.
+
+Bivar, A. D. H., “The Stirrup and Its Origins”, _Oriental Art_ , vol. I, 1955, pp. 62-65.
+
+Blaisdel, R., y cols., _Sources of Information in Transportation_ , Northwestern University Press (The Transportation Center), Evanston, Ill., 1964.
+
+Bowden, Frank Philip, “Friction”, en _Encyclopedia Britannica_ , vol. 9, pp. 840A-841.
+
+Branch, Melville C., _Comprehensive Urban Planning: A Selected Annotated Bibliography with Related Materials_ , Sage Publication, 1973. Para material de transporte, _cf_. pp. 251-272.
+
+Braudel, Fernand, “La Lenteur des Transports”, en _Civilisation Materielle et Capitalisme_ , XV-XVIII Siècle, Armand Colin, París, 1967, pp. 314-329.
+
+------, “Vicissitudes des Routes”, en _La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen_ , Armand Colin, París, 1949, pp. 242-259.
+
+Brunot, Ferdinand, _Histoire de la Langue Française des Origines à nos Jours_. Para referencias al transporte, _cf_. esp. tomo VI, pp. 357-360, y tomo VII, pp. 201-231.
+
+Buchanan, C. D., _Mixed Blessing: The Motor Car in Britain_ , Londres, 1958.
+
+Buffet, B., _L’Eau Potable à travers les Âges_ , Lieja, 1950.
+
+Cavailles, Henri, _La Route Française, son Histoire_ , París, 1950.
+
+Chermayeff, Serge, y Alexander Tzonis, _Shape of Community_ , Penguin, 1971.
+
+Claxton, E. C., “The Future of the Bicycle in a Modern Society”, _Journal of the Royal Society of Arts_ , enero de 1968, pp. 114-135.
+
+Cook, Walter L., _Bike Trails and Facilities, A Guide to Their Design, Construction and Operation_ , American Institute of Park Executives, Wheeling, W. Va., 1965.
+
+Copeland, John, _Roads and Theri Traffic_ , _1750-1858_ , Newton Abbot, 1968.
+
+Counter, C. F., _The History and Development of the Cycles, As Illustrated by the Collection of cycles in the Science Museum_ , Londres, 1955.
+
+Davenas, Paul, _Les Messageries Royales_ , París, 1937.
+
+Deffontaines, P., “Sur la Répartition Géographique des Voitures à Deux Roues et à quatre Roues”, _Travaux du Premier Congrès International de Folklore_ , París, 1937, Tours, Arbault, 1938, p. 117.
+
+Deischel, Erwin, _Umweltbeanspruchung und Umweltschaeden dur den Verkehr in der BDR_ , Munich, 1971.
+
+Dollfus, C., _Histoire de la Locomotion Terrestre_ , París, 1935-1936.
+
+Ekholm, Gordon F., “Wheeled Toys in Mexico”, _American Antiquity_ , vol. 2, 1946, pp. 222-228.
+
+Farvar, M. Taghi, y John Milton, _The Careless Technology; Ecology and International Development_ , The Natural History Press, Garden City, N. Y., 1972.
+
+Forbes, R. J., “Land Transport and Road Building, 1000-1900”, _Janus_ , vol. 46, 1957, p. 100.
+
+--------, _Notes on the History of Ancient Roads and Their Construction,_ Amsterdam, 1964 (segunda edición).
+
+Foster, George M., _Culture and Conquest; America’s Spanish Heritage_ , Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1960.
+
+Fromm, Gary (ed.), _Transport Investment and Economic Development_ , The Brookings Institution Transport Research Program, Washington, 1969.
+
+Fuller, Buckminster, _World Resource Inventory_ , Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1965. _Cf_. esp. vol. 4, parte 4.
+
+Fuller, Dudley, “Bearing, Antifriction”, en _Encyclopedia of Science and Technology_ , vol. 2, McGraw Hill, Nueva York, 1971, pp. 124-131.
+
+Giedion, Siegfried, _Mechanization Takes Command_ , Norton, Nueva York, 1969.
+
+Ginsburg, Norton, _Atlas of Economic Development_ , University of Chicago Press, 1961. _Cf_. esp. pp. 100-101 y 60-77.
+
+Goetz, Wilhelm, _Verkehrswege im Dienste des Welthandels: Eine Historich-Geographische Untersuchung,_ Stuttgart, 1888.
+
+Haldane, J. B. S., “On Being the Right Size”, en James R. Newman (ed.), _The World of Mathematics,_ vol. II, Simon and Schuster, Nueva York, 1956.
+
+Hall, Edward T., _The Hidden Dimension,_ Doubleday, Nueva York, 1969.
+
+Hannen, Bruce, “Options for Energy Conservation”, inédito, febrero de 1973, Biblioteca Cidoc.
+
+Hasebrok, Johannes, _Griechische Wirtschaftgeschichte und Gesellschaftgeschichte bis zur Perserzeit,_ Tubinga, 1931.
+
+Haudricourt, André G., “Contribution à la Géographie et à l’Èthnologie de la Voiture”, _Revue de Géographie Humaine et Ethnologie,_ 1948, pp. 54-64.
+
+Heichelheim, Fritz M., _An Ancient Economic History, from the Paleolithic Age to the Migration of the Germanic, Slavic and Arabic Nations,_ tres volúmenes, Leiden, 1938.
+
+Herendeen, R., _Use of Input/Output. Analysis to Determine the Energy Cost of Goods and Services,_ mimeografiado, 22 pp., University of Illinois (Center for Advanced Computer Studies), Urbana, 20 de febrero de 1973.
+
+Hirst, E., _Energy Efficiency for Passenger Transportation and for Freight Transportation,_ Oak Ridge National Laboratories, 1971.
+
+Hornell, J., _Water Transport: Origins and Early Evolution_ , Cambridge University Press, 1946.
+
+Hoskins, Halford, _British Routes to India,_ Nueva York, 1928.
+
+Hunter, Holland, _Soviet Transport Experience, Its Lessons for Other Countries,_ The Brookings Institution Transports Research Program, Washington, 1968.
+
+Jope, E. M., “Vehicles and Harness”, en Singer, _A History of Technology,_ vol. 2, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 537.
+
+Kalmus, Ludwig, _Weltgeschichte des Post mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des deutschen Sprachgebietes,_ Viena, 1937.
+
+Kirkland, Edward, “Men, cities and Transportation”, en _A Study of New England History 1820-1900,_ dos volúmenes, Cambridge, Mass., 1948.
+
+Kohl, Johann Georg, _Der Verkehr und die Ansiedlungen der Menschen in Ihrer Abhaengigkeit von der Gestaltung der Erdoberflaeche,_ Leipzig, 1841.
+
+Lansing, John B., Robert Marans, y cols., _Car Ownership, Annual Mileage, and the Journey to Work,_ Ann Arbor, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1970. _Cf_. esp. pp. 137-151.
+
+Lapin, Howard, _Structuring the Journey to Work,_ Philadelphia University Press, 1964.
+
+Lefebvre des Noettes, R., _L’Attelage et le Cheval de Selle à travers les Âges; Contribution l’Histoire de l’Esclavage,_ Picard, París, 1931.
+
+--------, _De la Marine Antique a la Marine Moderne: La Revolution du Governail,_ París, 1935.
+
+Lewis, Richard S., y Bernard I. Spinrad, _The Energy Crisis,_ Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Chicago, 1972.
+
+Liepmann, Kate K., _The Journey to Work, Its Significance for Industrial and Community Life,_ Londres, 1944.
+
+Linder, Staffan Burestam, _The Harried Leisure Class,_ Columbia University Press, Nueva York, 1971.
+
+Lisco, Thomas E., “The Future of Urban Transportation; Mass Transportation, Cinderella in Our Cities”, _The Public Interest,_ 1970.
+
+López, R. S., y J. W. Raymond, _Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents,_ Columbia University Press, Nueva York, 1955.
+
+Mackaye, Benton, “Townless Highways for the Motorist”, _Harper’s Magazine,_ agosto de 1931.
+
+Macmurray, David F. E., _Aspects of Time and the Study of Activity Routines,_ Thesis for the M.S. in city planning, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.
+
+Manheim, Marvin L., “Principles of Transport System Analysis”, _Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Forum,_ 1966, pp. 9-21.
+
+Marsh, George Perkins, _The Earth As Modified by Human Action,_ 3a. ed., Nueva York, 1888.
+
+Meyer, Balthasar H. (ed.), _History of Transportation in the United States before 1860,_ Washington, 1917.
+
+Meyer, John R., “Transportation, Economic Aspects”, en _Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,_ vol. 16, pp. 134-140.
+
+Mott, George Fox, “Transportation in Contemporary Civilization”, en _Transportation Renaissance, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_ , vol. 345, Filadelfia, 1963, pp. 1-5.
+
+Mott, G. F., “Vehicles for Land Transport”, en _Science and Civilization in China,_ vol. 4 (Physics and Physical Technology), parte II (Mechanical Engineering), Cambridge University Press, 1965, pp. 243-281.
+
+Needham, Joseph, “Power Sources and Their Employment, (1) Animal Traction”, en _ibid_., pp. 303-328.
+
+Olsson, Gunnar, “Distance and Human Interaction”, _A review Bibliography,_ Science Research Institute, Filadelfia, 1965.
+
+Ostwald, W., _Energetische Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft,_ Leipzig, 1960.
+
+Ottley, George, _A bibliography of British Railway History_ , Allen and Unwin, Londres, 1965.
+
+Owen, Wilfred, _Strategy for Mobility,_ Brookings Institution, Washington, 1964.
+
+Perraton, Jean, “Planning for the Cyclist in Urban Areas”, _The Town Planning Review,_ vol. 39, núm. 2, julio de 1968, pp. 149-162.
+
+Platt, John, “Hierarchical Restructuring”, _Bulletin of Anatomic Scientists,_ noviembre de 1970.
+
+Polanyi, Karl (ed.), _Trade and Market in Early Empires,_ The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1957.
+
+Robbins, Michael, _The Railway Age,_ Routledge and Kegan Paul, Penguin, Londres, 1964.
+
+Russeau, Pierre, _Histoire des Transports, Arthème Fayard,_ París, 1961.
+
+Sauer, Carl O., _Agricultural Origins and Dispersal,_ Bowman Memorial Lectures, Series Two, Nueva York, 1952.
+
+Sauvy, Alfred, _Les Quatre Roues de la Fortune; Essai sur L’Automobile,_ París, 1968.
+
+Schnore, Leo F., “Transportation, Comutation”, en _Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,_ vol. 16, pp. 140-144.
+
+Sherrington, Charles E. R., _A Hundred Years of Inland Transportation, 1830-1933_ , Londres, 1934; reimpresión Kelly, 1969.
+
+Smerk, George M., _Readings in Urban Transportation,_ Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1968.
+
+Smith, William, _The History of the Post Office in British North America, 1639-1870_ , Cambridge University Press, 1920.
+
+Spengler, Joseph, “On the Progress of Quantification in Economics”, en Harry Woolf (ed.), _A History of the Meaning of Measurement in the Natural and Social Sciences,_ Bobbs Merrill, Nueva York, 1961, pp. 128-146.
+
+Stone, Tabor R., _Beyond the Automobile; Reshaping the Transportation Environment,_ Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1971.
+
+Strube Erdmann, Leon, _Vialidad imperial de los incas,_ Universidad de Córdoba, Argentina, 1963.
+
+Stutz, Frederick P., _Research on Intra-Urban Social Travel: Introduction and Bibliography, Exchange Bibliography,_ núm. 173, Council of Planning Librarians, Monticello, Mich., febrero de 1971.
+
+Sundquist, James L., “A Policy for Urban Growth: Where Sall They Live?”, _The Public Interest,_ 1970.
+
+Taylor, George, _The Transportation Revolution,_ Nueva York, 1951.
+
+Terrazas de la Peña, Eduardo, “Necesidad de un incremento en la intensidad del uso del espacio”, texto presentado en el Congreso regional sobre política de desarrollo urbano, México, julio de 1972, Cidoc.
+
+“Transportation Renaissance”, _The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_ , vol. 345, Filadelfia, 1963.
+
+Turner, John F. C., “Housing for People or Housing by People”, mimeografiado, 10 pp., MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1970.
+
+Westergaard, John, “Journey to work in London Region”, TPR, abril de 1957.
+
+Wheeler, James O., _Research on the Journey to Work: Introduction and Bibliography, Exchange Bibliography,_ núm. 65, Council of Planning Librarians, Monticello, Mich., enero de 1969.
+
+White, Leslie, _The Science of Culture; Energy and the Evolution of Culture,_ Grove Press, Nueva York, 1949. _Cf_. esp. pp. 363-393.
+
+White, Lynn, “The Agricultural Revolution of the Early Middle Age’s”, en _Medieval Technology and social Change,_ Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 39-78.
+
+Wilson, George W., y cols., _The Impact of Highway Investment of Development,_ The Brookings Institution Transport Research Program, Washington, 1966.
+
+Wilson, S. S., “Bicycle Technology”, _Scientific American,_ marzo de 1973, pp. 81-91.
+
+Yurick, Sol, “The Political Economy of Junk”, _Monthly Review,_ vol. 22, núm. 7, diciembre de 1970, pp. 22-37.
+
+
+[^n01]: En 1811, en el Condado de Nottingham, en Inglaterra, bandas de artesanos que habían sido desplazados por las máquinas empezaron a irrumpir en las fábricas de telas y a destruir los telares mecánicos. Se llamaban a sí mismos _Ludds_ o “ludditas”, según el nombre de un personaje legendario, John Ludd, supuestamente oriundo de Leicester y que, alrededor de 1780, en un acto de coraje, destruyó uno de los primeros telares mecánicos.
+
diff --git a/contents/book/energy/index b/contents/book/energy/index
index bc41336..9ee0340 100644
--- a/contents/book/energy/index
+++ b/contents/book/energy/index
@@ -3,5 +3,3 @@
 * **#@LANG_publicationdate@#:** 1974
 * **#@LANG_comments@#:**
 * **#@LANG_langorig@#:** #@LANG_lang_en@#
-
-{{tag>available}}
diff --git a/contents/book/es.bib b/contents/book/es.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2213997
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/es.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-awareness-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {},
+  year = {1969},
+  date = {1969},
+  origdate = {1969},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/awareness:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-08}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/gender/en.bib b/contents/book/gender/en.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60dfc7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/gender/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-gender-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Gender},
+  year = {1982},
+  date = {1982},
+  origdate = {1982},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/gender:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/gender/en.md b/contents/book/gender/en.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5aa90f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/gender/en.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+  title: "Gender"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1982"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
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+  titlepage: true
+---
diff --git a/contents/book/gender/es.bib b/contents/book/gender/es.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0125b57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/gender/es.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-gender-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {El género vernáculo},
+  year = {1982},
+  date = {1982},
+  origdate = {1982},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/gender:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/gender/es.md b/contents/book/gender/es.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aad2205
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/gender/es.md
@@ -0,0 +1,722 @@
+---
+  title: "El género vernáculo"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1982"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
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+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
+
+# Introducción
+
+Defino la ruptura con el pasado, descrita por otros, como la transición al modo de producción capitalista, como el paso de la égida del género al régimen del sexo. Considero que la desaparición del género vernáculo es la condición imprescindible del desarrollo del “capitalismo” y de un estilo de vida totalmente sometido a la mercancía industrial. Según el _Diccionario ideológico de la lengua española_, género es el “accidente gramatical que sirve para indicar el sexo de las personas o de los animales y el que se atribuye a las cosas”. Y María Moliner dice por su parte: “Tal división responde a la naturaleza de las cosas solamente cuando esas palabras se aplican a animales, los cuales pueden ser machos (género masculino) y hembras (género femenino)”. Yo he adoptado este término para traducir la diferencia que existe entre los comportamientos humanos masculinos y femeninos —diferencia que es universal en las culturas vernáculas—. Los lugares, los tiempos, las herramientas, las tareas, los modos de hablar, los gestos, las percepciones asociados con los hombres difieren de los que se asocian con las mujeres. Esta asociación constituye el género _social_, propio de una época y de un lugar. El género es vernáculo porque el conjunto de tales asociaciones es tan propio de una población tradicional (la _gens_ latina) como lo puede ser su habla vernácula.
+
+Por lo tanto empleo el término “género” en un sentido nuevo, a fin de designar una dualidad que anteriormente era tan evidente que no se denominaba, y que en la actualidad nos resulta tan lejana que frecuentemente se confunde con el sexo. El “sexo” es el resultado de la polarización de las características comunes que desde el final del siglo XVIII se atribuyen a todos los seres humanos. A diferencia del género vernáculo —que refleja la asociación cultural de una cultura material dual, concreta y local, con los hombres y mujeres que viven bajo su potestad—, la división sexual de la mano de obra, de la libido, de la personalidad o de la inteligencia procede del diagnóstico (“discriminación”, en griego) de las desviaciones respecto a una norma abstracta que con este propósito ha sido definida. Es posible estudiar el sexo en términos científicos precisos. El género muestra una complementariedad enigmática y asimétrica. Únicamente la metáfora logra expresarla.
+
+La distinción entre la historia bajo la égida del género y la historia bajo el régimen del sexo se produjo a partir de una controversia entre Barbara Duden y yo. Originalmente nuestra discusión estaba relacionada con el aspecto económico y antropológico de las tareas domésticas en el siglo XIX. Hablo del asunto en _El trabajo fantasma_[^f0]  [^f1] —primera tentativa de sentar las bases de una “Historia de la escasez”, de la cual este trabajo representa la segunda etapa. En el debate con Barbara Duden, no sé cuál de los dos, si ella o si yo, condujo al otro hacia una perspectiva nueva sin que hubiéramos de renunciar por eso a nuestras posiciones mutuamente críticas. Con Lee Hoinacki la colaboración fue de otro tipo. Como en numerosas ocasiones a lo largo de 20 años, nos reunimos para comunicarnos recíprocamente lo que habíamos aprendido durante el año anterior. Pasamos dos semanas en su casa, en el campo, y revisó la primera versión de mi texto. Lo discutimos, sopesamos sus enunciados y tomó una forma nueva. No sabría decir quién de los dos es el responsable de tal o cual giro de la frase. Pero de algo estoy seguro: sin su colaboración, este texto no tendría la forma presente.
+
+En este texto he incorporado la sustancia de muchos de mis cursos sobre la historia de la sociedad en el siglo XII que hube de impartir como profesor invitado en la Universidad de Kassel. Quiero expresar mi agradecimiento a Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker y a los estudiantes por haber tenido el valor y la paciencia para formular provechosas críticas.
+
+También quiero expresar mi agradecimiento a varias personas por todo lo que contribuyeron durante las conversaciones que sostuvimos. Norma Swenson me hizo reconocer la principal debilidad de mi _Némesis médica:_ su perspectiva unisex. Las reflexiones de Claudia von Werlhof respecto al punto ciego de la percepción económica me llevaron a distinguir los dos aspectos del asunto: la economía fantasma y el dominio vernáculo, ambos paralelamente descuidados, pero indudablemente negados. Debo a Signar Groeneveld la distinción entre topología vernácula y topología industrial, en la que me apoyo. Las conversaciones con Ludolf Kuchenbuch me aportaron una imagen nueva de la pareja conyugal preindustrial. Mis viejos amigos Ruth y Lenz Kriss-Rettenbeck (ambos etnógrafos e historiadores del arte), con quienes comparto diversos “maestros” —del periodo que se extiende entre Hugo de San Víctor y Gustav Künstler— me apoyaron y animaron más de lo que sabría expresar. Susan Hunt se ofreció voluntariamente a dactilografiar mi texto mientras trabajaba en su propia obra sobre el género y el sexo. Este ensayo y su obra estaban destinados a estudiantes de los cursos que impartí en la universidad californiana de Berkeley durante el otoño de 1982, sobre el tema “Constituir historias de género”. Apliqué la mano final a este ensayo junto con el doctor P. Wapneswski, rector del Instituto de Estudios Avanzados de Berlín, y con estudiantes de este establecimiento.
+
+Finalmente, quiero agradecer muy particularmente a Maud Sissung, cuyas cualidades como traductora siempre he valorado, pero quien en este libro se superó para darme la prueba de que la fuerza de lo vernáculo irriga incesantemente la lengua. A ella le debo un texto que aun siendo distinto del original es el equivalente exacto.
+
+_Cuernavaca, 1982_
+
+
+# Sexismo y crecimiento económico
+
+NO SÉ de ninguna sociedad industrial donde las mujeres estén en igualdad económica con los hombres. A las mujeres siempre les toca la menor parte de todo lo que la economía es capaz de medir. Las obras que exponen este sexismo económico se han multiplicado recientemente. Documentan la explotación sexista, denuncian su injusticia, la describen como una nueva versión de un mal milenario y proponen teorías explicativas que combinan con estrategias reparadoras. Los patrocinios institucionales —las Naciones Unidas, el Consejo Mundial de Iglesias, los gobiernos, las universidades— promueven la proliferación de reformadores profesionales, que forman un sector nuevo del crecimiento. Primero, el proletariado; luego, los subdesarrollados y actualmente las mujeres movilizaron por turno el interés de los “concernidos”. Ya nadie puede hablar de discriminación sexual sin que se le impute de inmediato una toma de posición respecto a la economía política del sexo: o bien se aboga por una “economía no sexista”, o bien se pretende lavar de toda culpa la economía sexista que es la nuestra. Ninguna de esas posiciones es la mía, aunque funde mi tesis en la existencia de esta discriminación. Para mí, la búsqueda de una “economía no sexista” resulta tan absurda como repugnante la economía sexista. Voy a demostrar la naturaleza intrínsecamente sexista de la economía mediante la exposición de la naturaleza sexista del postulado que es la base de la economía, “ciencia de los valores que presupone la escasez”.
+
+Mostraré que todo crecimiento económico implica la destrucción del _género vernáculo_ (capítulos III-V) y se alimenta de la explotación del _sexo económico_ (capítulo II). Me propongo estudiar el _apartheid_ económico y la subordinación de las mujeres, sin caer en las trampas de la sociobiología ni del estructuralismo, que respectivamente presentan esta discriminación como algo “natural” o “culturalmente” inevitable. En calidad de historiador, quiero remontarme a los orígenes de esta servidumbre _económica_ de las mujeres; en calidad de antropólogo, quiero entender lo que esta nueva sujeción revela sobre el parentesco; en calidad de filósofo, quiero clarificar lo que este esquema reiterativo nos dice sobre los axiomas de las ideas heredadas, es decir, sobre los axiomas que constituyen el fundamento de la universidad contemporánea y sus ciencias sociales.
+
+No me ha sido fácil dar forma a mis ideas. Más de lo que podía sospechar al inicio, el habla ordinaria de la era industrial _a la vez_ ignora el género y es sexista. Yo sabía que el género es dual, pero la perspectiva sin género que impone necesariamente el lenguaje industrializado distorsionaba constantemente mis ideas. Estaba atrapado en una red deformante de palabras dominantes, de _palabras clave_. Actualmente veo que estos vocablos clave, elementos característicos del lenguaje moderno, son claramente distintos de los términos técnicos, como por ejemplo “automóvil” o “avión supersónico”. Y he aprendido que las palabras de esta especie pueden sumergir el vocabulario de un lenguaje tradicional. Cuando esto sucede hablo de criollización tecnológica. Sin embargo, un vocablo como “transporte”, es una palabra clave. Designa una pretendida necesidad fundamental; significa algo que es diferente del “transporte público”, algo que es un medio técnico o una opción política.[^f2]
+
+El examen de las lenguas modernas revela que la utilización usual de las palabras clave es poderosa y persuasiva. Algunas son etimológicamente antiguas, pero han adquirido un sentido nuevo, que no tiene relación con el anterior. Tal es el caso de “familia”, “hombre”, “trabajo”. Otras se acuñaron recientemente, aunque al principio sólo para un uso especializado. Se fueron deslizando en el habla cotidiana y asumieron muy vastas connotaciones: “rol”, “sexo”, “energía”, “producción”, “desarrollo”, “consumidor”, para dar ejemplos que todos conocen. Estas palabras clave asumen la apariencia del sentido común en los idiomas de la era industrial. Toda lengua moderna posee las suyas, que dan a cada sociedad su óptica única de la realidad social e ideológica del mundo contemporáneo. Este conjunto de palabras clave es homólogo en todos los idiomas modernos de los países industrializados. La realidad que traducen es básicamente la misma en cualquier parte. Las mismas autopistas llevan a las mismas escuelas y establecimientos comerciales donde se elevan las mismas antenas de televisión que transforman los paisajes y las sociedades disímiles y les dan una monotonía uniforme. Paralelamente, los textos dominados por las palabras clave se traducen fácilmente del inglés al japonés o al malasio.
+
+Los términos técnicos universales que se han convertido en palabras clave, como “Coca-Cola”, “proletariado” o “medicina”, tienen el mismo significado en todas las lenguas modernas. Pero otros términos que han aparecido en campos lingüísticos distintos se corresponden casi exactamente unos con otros cuando se les emplea como si fueran palabras clave: por ejemplo, “humanidad” y _Menschheit_. Así, el estudio de las palabras clave exige cierta comparación entre las lenguas.[^f3]
+
+Para explicar el surgimiento y la supremacía de las palabras clave en un idioma, tuve que distinguir entre el habla vernácula, que se adquiere progresivamente por interacción con las personas que expresan lo que piensan, y la _lengua materna inculcada_, que se adquiere a través de las personas contratadas para hablar con nosotros y por nosotros. Las palabras clave son características de la lengua materna inculcada. Logran reprimir el habla vernácula con mayor eficacia que las reglas gramaticales porque su aparente sentido _común_ aplica un barniz seudovernáculo sobre la realidad mecanizada. Por lo tanto, en la formación de un lenguaje industrializado las palabras clave son más importantes que los términos técnicos, porque cada palabra clave denota un punto de vista común al conjunto del que todas proceden. Su característica principal es que efectivamente excluyen al género. Es por esto que para comprender el género y distinguirlo del sexo (que es una palabra clave), es necesario apartarse o desconfiar de todos los términos que pueden ser palabras clave.
+
+Así pues, cuando emprendí este ensayo me vi en un dilema lingüístico: no podía emplear los vocablos con su “resonancia” tradicional de “género” y no quería aceptarlos con su connotación sexista actual. Percibí esta dificultad cuando quise usar la versión original de este texto para mis cursos del año universitario 1980-1981. Nunca antes tantos colegas o amigos tra taron como entonces de hacerme desistir de un proyecto. Muchos me aconsejaban que me ocupara en un tema menos trivial o menos ambiguo o menos escabroso; otros consideraban que en atención a la actual crisis del feminismo no les correspondía a los hombres hablar sobre las mujeres. Tras oírlos atentamente, me pareció que sus motivos procedían del hecho de que mis razonamientos interferían en sus sueños: el sueño feminista de una economía igualitariamente neutra, exenta de roles obligatoriamente sexuados; el sueño izquierdista de una economía política que sólo supiera de seres “humanos”;[^f4] el sueño futurista de una sociedad moderna donde las personas gozarían de flexibilidad, donde podrían decidir a su antojo si habrían de ser dentistas, machos, protestantes o genetistas; todas las elecciones merecerían el mismo respeto. Lo que perturbaba los sueños de unos y otros era que yo hablara simplemente de la economía a la luz de la discriminación hacia las mujeres, pues todos los deseos que estos sueños expresan se ajustan a un mismo patrón: el de una economía unisexualizada, sin género (capítulo VII).
+
+Una sociedad industrial sólo puede existir si impone un postulado unisex: ambos sexos están hechos para el mismo trabajo, perciben la misma realidad y tienen las mismas necesidades[^f5] —la vestimenta es sólo una dife rencia desdeñable—. El postulado de la escasez, fundamental en la economía, también está basado en este postulado unisex. Los hombres y las mujeres no serían capaces de competir por el “trabajo” si éste no se hubiera redefinido como una actividad que conviene a los humanos, sin distinción de sexo. La teoría económica está fundada en la existencia de este _humano_ desprovisto de género, “agenérico”. Así, una vez que la escasez es aceptada, el postulado unisex se propaga. Toda institución moderna, desde la escuela a la familia, del sindicato al tribunal, retoma por su cuenta el postulado de la escasez, y por lo tanto disemina en la sociedad el elemento que lo funda: el postulado unisex. De esta manera, los niños y las niñas tienen desde ese momento la necesidad del sistema educativo para crecer. En las sociedades tradicionales, solían llegar a la edad adulta sin que las condiciones de su crecimiento hubieran sufrido escasez alguna. En la actualidad, las instituciones de enseñanza les señalan que el conocimiento y la habilidad son bienes deseables pero escasos, y por ende objeto de competencia entre los hombres y las mujeres. Pero la educación, ejemplo _típico_ de una necesidad moderna, va todavía más lejos: postula la escasez de un valor _unisex;_ enseña que el niño o la niña que de ella “se benefician” son primordialmente seres humanos para quienes es necesaria una educación a-genérica. Las instituciones económicas, desde entonces, se fundan en la suposición de la escasez de valores a-genéricos deseables —o necesarios— para seres económicos neutros que pertenecen a ambos sexos biológicos.[^f6]
+
+Inexorablemente, las instituciones económicas transforman ambos géneros en algo nuevo: seres neutros económicos que sólo difieren, de manera incidental, por su sexo. Un bulto característico, aunque accesorio, bajo los pantalones de mezclilla, es todo lo que distingue, en adelante, a los dos tipos de trabajadores, y sin embargo privilegia a uno respecto al otro. La discriminación _económica_ de las mujeres no habría podido existir sin la abolición del género y la construcción social del sexo.[^f7] Es esto lo que quiero demostrar. Y si esto es verdad, es decir, si el crecimiento económico destruye el género intrínsecamente, irremisiblemente, si en consecuencia el crecimiento económico es sexista, entonces el sexismo no disminuirá sino “al precio” de una contracción de la economía. La condición necesaria, aunque todavía insuficiente, para producir el declive del sexismo, es la reducción de la relación monetaria y la expansión de las formas de subsistencia fuera del mercado, fuera de la economía.
+
+Hasta hoy, dos realidades motivaban poderosamente la adopción de medidas de crecimiento negativo: la degradación del medio ambiente[^f8] y la contraproductividad paradójica.[^f9] Una tercera se viene a añadir ahora: es necesario el crecimiento negativo para reducir el sexismo. Esta proposición habrá de chocar a los críticos que, con las mejores intenciones posibles, desde hace un año intentan apartarme de mi actual argumentación, unos porque temen que yo me exponga al ridículo, otros porque temen que su sueño del crecimiento combinado con la igualdad habrá de parecer una fantasía. Sin embargo, pienso que ha llegado el tiempo de trastornar las estrategias sociales, de reconocer que la paz entre los hombres y las mujeres, cualquiera que sea la forma que puede asumir, depende de la contracción de la economía y no de su expansión. Hasta hoy en día, ni la buena voluntad ni la lucha, la legislación o la tecnología, han podido contrarrestar la explotación sexista que es característica de la sociedad industrial. Demostraré que en una sociedad donde impera el mercado es insostenible interpretar esta degradación económica de uno de los sexos como la exacerbación del machismo. Siempre que la igualdad de los derechos ha sido promulgada y puesta en vigor, siempre que la paridad de los sexos se ha puesto de moda, estas innovaciones han dado la impresión de una victoria de las élites que las propusieron y obtuvieron, pero la mayoría de las mujeres nada ganó con ellas e incluso a veces las padeció.
+
+El ideal de la igualdad económica de los sexos está en vías de morir, como también el ideal del crecimiento que habría de reducir la distancia entre el Norte y el Sur, en términos del producto nacional bruto. En vez de seguir apegados al sueño de un crecimiento no sexista, la razón exige orientarse hacia una contracción de la economía —en cuanto política que permita el surgimiento de una sociedad menos sexista, aunque no pueda dejar de serlo del todo—. Bien sé que una sociedad industrial sin jerarquía sexista no es más concebible que una sociedad preindustrial sin _género_, es decir, sin una división clara entre lo que los hombres y lo que las mujeres hacen, dicen, ven. Estas son quimeras que han sido creadas por uno o por el otro sexo. Pero la reducción de la relación monetaria, es decir, a la vez de la producción mercantil y de la sujeción a tal producción, _no es_ quimérica. Ciertamente implica la renuncia a las expectativas y conductas cotidianas que hoy se consideran “naturales”. Incluso entre aquellos que saben que los dos términos de la alternativa son el retroceso o el horror, muchos ven en ello una elección imposible. No obstante, cada vez son más las personas informadas y los expertos —algunos convencidos, otros oportunistas— que reconocen que esta reducción es necesaria. Se empieza a ver que la condición de la sobrevivencia es el desprendimiento progresivo del nexo monetario. Sin “crecimiento negativo” es imposible mantener el equilibrio ecológico, alcanzar la justicia entre las regiones del mundo y la paz entre los pueblos. Y esta tendencia tendrá que ser mucho más acentuada en los países ricos que en los países pobres. Lo máximo a lo que pueden aspirar es a que haya igual acceso a los recursos escasos del mundo, en un nivel quizá comparable al que existe actualmente en las naciones más pobres. La traducción fáctica de tal proposición, su instalación específica, exigiría una alianza multiforme entre muchos grupos que poseen vocaciones diferentes, a fin de buscar la recuperación de los ámbitos de comunidad que englobo con el término de “ecología política radical”.[^f10] Para incorporar en esta alianza a aquellos que deploran la pérdida del género, tendré que demostrar que existe un vínculo entre el crecimiento negativo y la reducción del sexismo.
+
+La demostración de la relación entre el sexismo y la economía requiere la construcción de una teoría. Esta teoría es una condición necesaria para la realización de una historia de la escasez.[^f11] Como se verá, yo prefiero esclarecer mi razonamiento teórico mediante ejemplos, antes que cargarlo de datos. Los datos, cuando existen, los proporciono en las notas. En virtud de la novedad del acercamiento teórico y de la pobreza de los estudios empíricos realizados de acuerdo con esta perspectiva, a veces he tenido que emplear un nuevo lenguaje. No obstante, hasta donde me ha sido posible, he elegido vocablos antiguos que he empleado de forma nueva, a fin de expresar con precisión tanto la teoría como los hechos probados.
+
+La estructura teórica me autoriza a contraponer dos modos de existencia que yo denomino, respectivamente, el _reino del género vernáculo_ y el _régimen del sexo económico_. Estos términos indican por sí mismos que en ellos hay dos formas duales que son de naturaleza _muy_ distinta.[^f12] Por “género” yo entiendo la dualidad que coloca respectivamente a hombres y mujeres en circunstancias y condiciones que les impiden decir, hacer, querer o percibir “la misma cosa”. Por “sexo económico” entiendo la dualidad que propende hacia la meta ilusoria de la igualdad económica de los hombres y las mujeres. En esta última construcción de la realidad, como lo demostraré, la dualidad misma es casi por completo artificial.
+
+Este ensayo reviste la forma de un epílogo, el epílogo de la era industrial y sus quimeras. Al redactarlo, volví a ver de manera nueva —que sobrepasa mis conjeturas de 1971 en _La convivencialidad_— lo que nuestra era ha destruido irremediablemente. En cuanto al futuro, no sé ni diré nada, lo ignoro.
+
+
+# El sexo económico
+
+ES UN HECHO evidente que las mujeres sufren discriminación económica. Quince años de investigaciones de las feministas, con base en una masa enorme de pruebas, lo han demostrado sin lugar a dudas. Pero falta realizar todavía dos tareas capitales. La primera consiste en diferenciar tres campos inherentes a toda economía moderna. Al hacer esta diferenciación, aparecerán tres formas de discriminación que se han confundido hasta hoy. La segunda tarea consiste en comprender la diferencia entre estas tres formas de discriminación _económica_ de las mujeres, y la subordinación patriarcal de las mujeres en sociedades donde no existe el nexo monetario. Examinaré aquí los tres distintos tipos de discriminación en relación con las mujeres, a fin de comprender sus respectivas formas. Una vez reconocido el predominio de uno de estos tipos de discriminación económica en una variedad del trabajo femenino, será posible saber en cuál de las tres “economías” fundamentales se inserta este trabajo. En efecto, como un espejo, la estructura de la discriminación sexista refleja la división de la “economía” en las sociedades industriales avanzadas. La economía, que reposa en los intercambios codificados entre productores y consumidores de bienes o de servicios, se divide en el sector estadísticamente aparente y el sector no aparente —dominios señalados y ocultados de la discriminación de las mujeres en el trabajo—. Existe una tercera economía, a la vez invisible y oculta, que es el tercer ámbito de la discriminación de las mujeres: el trabajo fantasma.
+
+## La economía aparente
+
+En el curso de los años, la discriminación de las mujeres en los puestos de trabajo remunerados, gravables y estadísticamente registrados, no se ha hecho más severa sino más variada.[^f13] Actualmente, 51% de las norteamericanas forma parte de la población activa. En 1880 solamente lo era 5%. En la actualidad, constituyen 42% de la fuerza de trabajo, en comparación con 15% entonces. Por último, 50% de las mujeres casadas se ganan la vida afuera, contra 5% hace un siglo. Hoy en día, todas las profesiones y las carreras están abiertas legalmente para las mujeres, mientras que en 1880 en la mayoría se las excluía. Hoy en día, las mujeres tienen empleo durante aproximadamente 28 años, en 1880 la cifra era de cinco años como término medio. ¿Se habrá de inferir que hemos progresado considerablemente en la vía de la igualdad económica? Veamos lo que nos dice un parámetro significativo: el de los salarios. El salario medio anual de una mujer que trabaja tiempo completo aún fluctúa en torno a una proporción mágica (3/5) de los ingresos medios de un hombre: 59% ± 3% —el mismo porcentaje que hace un siglo—.[^f14] Ni el acceso a la enseñanza, ni las estipulaciones legales o la retórica revolucionaria —política, tecnológica, sexual—–han modificado la relación de inferioridad entre las ganancias femeninas y las masculinas.[^f15] Lo que a primera vista se podría interpretar como una serie de avances hacia la equidad, en la perspectiva de la mujer media, no es de hecho más que una serie de sucesos por los cuales a un número creciente de mujeres se les ha incorporado silenciosamente en la población que profesionalmente sufre una discriminación en razón de su sexo. Los ingresos medios de la vida de trabajo de una mujer con diploma universitario continúan siendo comparables con los de un hombre que acaso terminó el bachillerato.
+
+Me ha tomado tiempo asimilar el alcance de estas cifras y datos. Al principio reaccioné como lo había hecho años antes cuando vi los datos respecto a la “eficacia” de la medicalización. En ese momento me negué a creer que desde 1880 la expectativa de vida de un norteamericano de edad madura no había cambiado ostensiblemente. No podía entender cómo un incremento, en dólares contantes, de 25 veces en las sumas aportadas a la medicina, de las cuales una parte desproporcionada se dedicaba al tratamiento y prevención de las enfermedades de las personas que se encontraban en la segunda mitad de vida, no había conducido a un aumento considerable de la esperanza de vida. Es verdad que la tasa de supervivencia infantil se ha elevado notablemente; que muchas más personas alcanzan los 45 años; que los cuerpos maltrechos por los accidentes pueden reconstituirse mediante el plástico y el aluminio; que muchas enfermedades infecciosas han sido aniquiladas. Pero la esperanza de vida de un ciudadano de edad madura no se ha modificado significativamente. La medicina tiene un papel mínimo en el aumento o disminución de la supervivencia en el umbral de la muerte. Nuestras sociedades constantemente soslayan el hecho de que el dinero, la cirugía, la química y la buena voluntad fracasan en la lucha contra la muerte. Esto forma parte de aquellas cosas que al parecer tienen que ser negadas mediante el ritual o el mito.[^f16]
+
+Aunque totalmente distinta, la discriminación económica contra las mujeres en cuanto grupo constituye una realidad que rehúsan ver muchos de nuestros contemporáneos, a quienes sin embargo animan las mejores intenciones. En la misma medida que la poliomielitis y la difteria han desaparecido, la exclusión de las muchachas en los liceos y las universidades ha desaparecido. Así como los cinturones de seguridad ofrecen protección en los accidentes, los circuitos interiores de televisión protegen contra las violaciones. De igual manera que existen programas destinados a la salud de los pobres, hay becas de estudios destinadas al acceso de las mujeres en los más altos niveles académicos. Y, sin embargo, ni un solo programa ha modificado la expectativa de vida de los adultos ni la diferencia en los ingresos de los sexos.[^f17] He aquí una realidad que es difícil encarar.
+
+La diferencia invariable entre los ingresos de uno y otro sexo no es más que un aspecto de la discriminación económica en relación con las mujeres en el terreno del trabajo, del mismo modo que el estancamiento de la esperanza de vida de los adultos no es más que un aspecto del fracaso de la medicina moderna en mejorar la “salud”. Se podría objetar que _de hecho_ los colosales esfuerzos del sistema médico moderno han alargado la esperanza de vida de los adultos en la medida en que un mundo de _smog_ y _stress_ habría descendido por debajo de la de muchos países pobres. De igual manera, se podría objetar que las luchas combinadas de legisladores, sindicatos, feministas e idealistas han evitado que aumente la diferencia de ingresos en una sociedad que se ha vuelto cada vez más sexista. Sería posible estimar que tal visión pesimista de la sociedad industrial está absolutamente fundada. Multitud de señales atestiguan que la rápida declinación de la esperanza de vida, para todas las edades, que desde hace 20 años se observa en la URSS,[^f18] no es sino la anticipación de una tendencia similar en los países industrializados; paralelamente, el retroceso en relación con tantos pretendidos progresos relacionados con la igualdad de oportunidades, consecuencia directa de la crisis actual del empleo, es en realidad una tendencia que no se invertirá jamás.[^f19] Pero independientemente de que se adopte la actitud optimista o la pesimista, una cosa parece empíricamente clara: la proporción de los ingresos que se niega a la mitad de la población por motivo de su sexo parece ser un factor tan invariable como la esperanza de vida de los adultos —o incluso, según algunos, como la incidencia total del cáncer, en cuanto fenómeno social de la raza humana—.
+
+Las investigaciones que las mujeres llevaron a cabo durante los años sesenta abordaban dos grandes temas: la violencia física que contra ellas ejercen violadores, maridos y médicos, y las condiciones de trabajo de las obreras. Los esquemas que estas dos orientaciones académicas revelan son extremadamente uniformes y deprimentes. En todos los países la discriminación y la violencia aumentan al mismo ritmo que el desarrollo: mientras más dinero aporta su trabajo, menos ganan las mujeres y más son víctimas de violaciones.[^f20] Esta configuración social, durante tanto tiempo negada, desde hace 10 años se ha venido aceptando con hipocresía. En relación con el trabajo, la primera ola de las investigaciones que realizaron las mujeres en el seno de las universidades norteamericanas, trataba principalmente sobre la condición obrera de las mujeres: bajos salarios, opciones potenciales limitadas, nivel profesional degradante, poca representación en el aparato sindical y precariedad en el empleo. En 1981, la Organización Internacional del Trabajo indicaba que en el mundo entero la mayoría de las mujeres tienen empleos urbanos no sindicados, y esto en un número reducido de categorías; cuando pertenecen a un sindicato, los contratos colectivos rara vez las toman en cuenta, e incluso cuando un sindicato está principalmente constituido por mujeres, los cuadros que las representan durante las negociaciones son de hombres. Es evidente que los numerosos estudios sobre este hecho son inútiles, que en ningún lugar el progreso económico ha hecho disminuir la diferencia de las remuneraciones. Estas investigaciones sólo llevan a la inútil multiplicación de los datos; benefician a quienes con ellas acumulan distinciones académicas y proporcionan fundamentos cada vez más firmes a esos teóricos que en la redundancia quieren ver la explicación.[^f21]
+
+En conjunto, la investigación feminista de la posguerra al principio surgió de los movimientos de las mujeres y se orientaba a la acción. Las adeptas de la retórica liberal reclamaban igualdad de oportunidades, junto con programas de ayuda; otras se nutrían en los libros sacrosantos, rumiaban a Marx, Freud y Reich a fin de obtener la aprobación de un _establishment_ alternativo. Se descubría la “reproducción”.[^f22] Los derechos de las mujeres y los derechos de los trabajadores parecían compatibles con el desarrollo y el progreso. A pesar de sus debilidades y monotonías, estas investigaciones siguen siendo fundamentales para nuestra comprensión del funcionamiento de la sociedad industrial. Revelaron la sorprendente homogeneidad de la discriminación de las mujeres en el seno de la esfera del trabajo, sin importar los países o los ámbitos: socialistas o capitalistas, ricos o pobres, latinos o anglosajones, católicos, protestantes o shintos. En los niveles comparables de ingresos, las mujeres sufrían el mismo menoscabo en Francia que en Japón, por ejemplo. El esquema que las excluye de las remuneraciones privilegiadas es más uniforme que el que preside la discriminación hacia los negros o los judíos. Por añadidura, en ninguna parte del mundo las mujeres han podido instaurar un régimen femenino; existe la Tanzania de Nyerere, el Israel de Begin, pero no se ve ninguna Amazonia.
+
+## La economía inaparente
+
+Hay muchos tipos de actividades económicas que los gobiernos y sus economistas no revelan —sean o no capaces de hacerlo—. En algunos casos son incapaces de obtener los datos; en otros, no sabrían cómo designarlos o evaluarlos, aun cuando quisieran ponerlos al descubierto. Esta acumulación de actividades que los economistas excluyen de sus estadísticas habituales da lugar a una plétora de designaciones. Algunos lo llaman el sector informal, otros el sector cuaternario, aún otros el “sector D”, que ocupa el cuarto rango de importancia económica, tras el sector primario de la “extracción”, el sector secundario de la “manufactura” y el sector terciario de los “servicios”. Hay quienes hablan de economía doméstica, de economía moderna del trueque, de economía de las “transferencias en especie” o de mercado no monetario. También hay algunos que hablan de zonas de actividades individuales, espontáneas o de ayuda mutua.[^f23] Los marxistas no vacilan en etiquetar este tipo de trabajo: lo llaman “reproducción social” y, con base en esto, se dividen en sectores, cada cual pretendiendo saber mejor que los demás el significado del término. Para terminar de confundirlo todo, hacia mediados de los años setenta se puso de moda entre las feministas denominar “trabajo de mujeres” aquellas actividades, y designar “amos de casa” a los hombres que lo ejercieran —calca inversa del sexismo—.
+
+No es fácil evaluar el volumen de esta economía no oficial. Representa un montón de actividades que se pagan con dinero contante, pero no mediante un salario legalmente declarado que otorga el derecho a las prestaciones de la seguridad social —y también se retribuyen en especie—. Está constituida en su mayor parte por un comercio fuera del mercado oficial, por intercambios de favores o retribuciones monetarias de servicios que en su totalidad escapan al fisco o a la estadística. En Yugoslavia hay que regalarle un pollo al médico estatal para que se ocupe de uno, y en Polonia huevos de gallina al funcionario del estado civil que expide los permisos de matrimonio. En la URSS, más de tres cuartas partes de los huevos, la leche, el queso y las legumbres que consumen los hogares provienen del mercado paralelo; los libros se adquieren clandestinamente o en forma de _samizdat_. En los Estados Unidos, las transacciones que escapan a todo control son las de los cultivadores californianos de marihuana —cuyas cosechas valen miles de millones de dólares— y las de los importadores clandestinos de heroína afgana, todas las cuales incluyen los sobornos a los policías. Pero todavía existen otras formas: los trabajos agrícolas temporales, la vendimia o la cosecha de cítricos, por ejemplo, que efectúan los inmigrantes mexicanos ilegales, o el intercambio de favores: tú cuidas del jardín de un abogado, por ejemplo, y él a cambio cuida que tu casa, la cual edificaste sin el permiso de construcción, escape a la inspección administrativa; o el mecánico que remplaza el carburador del automóvil del contador a cambio de que, por su lado, le llena su declaración de impuestos. Todas estas transacciones, que son acuerdos particulares entre contratantes de buena fe, participan de la economía inaparente. En algunas el dinero interviene, mientras que otras se realizan a base del trueque. Son todas de carácter económico, pero ninguna estadística las toma en cuenta. Las hay legales y delictivas. Algunas perjudican al cliente más de lo que podrían hacerlo los servicios profesionales, y otras lo perjudican menos. Algunas otras proporcionan ventajas financieras, en contraste con la pesadez de las reglamentaciones oficiales, mientras que otras representan una explotación pura y simple. Pero todas constituyen intercambios evidentes de servicios, de productos o de dinero, y por lo tanto están relacionadas con un modelo mercantil.
+
+Se ha intentado evaluar el volumen de esta economía clandestina, al menos por comparación con el producto nacional bruto. El gobierno británico estima en 7.5% del PNB (¡y no solamente de los salarios!) la consecuente pérdida fiscal.[^f24] Esta cifra no representa más que una pequeña porción del mercado que escapa a su control. El fisco norteamericano (Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D. C.) evaluaba en 135 billones de dólares el producto de las actividades de los individuos o de las empresas que no fueron gravadas por las agencias federales en el año 1976. Esta cifra se encuentra en un informe sobre el volumen de los ingresos sin gravar, pero no toma en cuenta la evasión fiscal mediante el artificio de los honorarios profesionales, de las pérdidas ficticias y de otras astucias legales, todas las cuales pueden alcanzar en total una cantidad similar. Según evaluaciones recientes, en los Estados Unidos esta economía ignorada crece más rápidamente que la economía oficial, sobrepasando inclusive la tasa de inflación.[^f24] Si a esto se suman las transacciones monetarias (pero que escapan a las estadísticas) y no monetarias en los Estados Unidos, el total iguala indudablemente el volumen de la economía —excluyendo el sector militar— con base en el cual los economistas establecen globalmente sus indicadores, sus previsiones y sus recomendaciones. Y mientras que en la economía oficial, base de las deducciones fiscales y de los estudios estadísticos, la mano de obra en gran medida se emplea en la creación artificial del seudo trabajo que produce artículos inútiles y servicios superfluos, suscitando controles sociales fútiles e intermediarios económicos parásitos, en la economía inaparente la eficacia media es superior, según las estimaciones. Fue gracias al vigor de su “mercado negro” que un país como Italia pudo atravesar 10 años durante los cuales los economistas no cesaban de vaticinarle una bancarrota inminente, y que los países socialistas pudieron sobrevivir a una gestión tan catastrófica que teóricamente debería haber hundido sus economías.
+
+Una cosa es indudable en todo esto: incluso al eliminar con esmero del mercado inaparente todas las actividades de subsistencia y todas las tareas domésticas típicamente femeninas (las cuales no están incluidas en el modelo mercantil), esta economía que anteriormente no se percibía, que crece proporcionalmente con mayor rapidez que el PNB oficial, contiene una parte de discriminación sexista que sólo ocasionalmente se ha abordado. Sin embargo, en este sector, donde se crean nuevos empleos mientras que el “desempleo” oficial aumenta, las mujeres están en peligro de caer en una situación todavía peor que en el sector oficial. Aquí no tienen curso las estipulaciones legales contra la discriminación o por la igualdad de derechos. En comparación con los “informales”, los obreros agrícolas, los vendedores de drogas y los sobornados, cuyas actividades son ilegales aunque lucrativas, las mujeres deben conformarse con la prostitución, el pequeño chantaje o la guarda de objetos robados. Los recursos típicos de las “informales” honestas son ser sirvienta y mecanógrafa a domicilio.[^f26]
+
+La corriente de la escuela de Chicago que a sí misma se denomina “nueva economía doméstica”[^f27] y los recientes estudios de orientación política que abordan la economía inaparente, por lo menos tienen algo en común: reconocen que el trabajo del “mercado negro” que no proporciona ingresos fiscales, y los trabajos domésticos, que tampoco lo hacen, aun cuando a veces reciben una compensación monetaria, no dejan de contribuir al PNB, y en una proporción muy importante. Pero esto los lleva a inventar categorías nuevas que de hecho confunden una vasta gama de actividades inaparentes con el trabajo de las mujeres, tanto en el hogar como en la cama. La debilidad teórica de estas nuevas nociones reside en su incapacidad de trazar distinciones nítidas, pero, además, esta corriente de Chicago disimula perniciosamente la situación de las mujeres.[^f28] Ellas saben muy bien que se las excluye más efectivamente de la economía inaparente que del empleo asalariado donde deben pagar impuestos, pero que están _encadenadas_ por la discriminación a los trabajos domésticos. Aunque la perspectiva de los economistas de Chicago resulta molesta, esta distinción formal entre dos actividades económicas es capital para las mujeres. Al considerar los trabajos domésticos como un “tipo ideal” de la actividad económica, revela las dos características que los distinguen del trabajo que depende del sector económico comercial: se imputa su valor y no es posible “desintermediarlos”.[^f29]
+
+## El trabajo fantasma
+[^f30]A mediados de los años setenta, los estudios femeninos relacionados con el análisis económico cambiaron de orientación. Algunos tropezaron con nociones que no entraban en ninguna de las categorías vigentes en historia, economía, etnología o antropología. La cuestión de los salarios se consideraba secundaria respecto a algo muchísimo más importante: ¿cómo explicar que las mujeres en toda sociedad industrial, además de sufrir la discriminación en el empleo, son obligadas, fuera de las horas laborales, a llevar a cabo una variedad nueva de trabajo _económicamente_ necesario, pero sin percibir _remuneración alguna?_ Se hacía patente que las mujeres pierden cuando buscan un empleo, cuando piden una promoción, cuando intentan conservar un empleo “provechoso”. Sucedía que fuera del trabajo asalariado —que durante el siglo XIX se hizo reglamentario— y paralelamente a éste, una nueva forma de actividad había nacido. En ésta, las mujeres tenían que trabajar mucho más que los hombres y de manera diferente. En el empleo se les pagaba —y paga— menos de lo justo; por añadidura, se veían obligadas a desempeñar formas de trabajo que no existían antes del nacimiento del salariado.[^f31]
+
+Los historiadores del trabajo doméstico han aportado las mejores pruebas de la nueva economía subterránea. Sus investigaciones me hicieron comprender que la diferencia entre los trabajos domésticos de ayer y hoy no puede describirse fielmente mediante el lenguaje tradicional, y tampoco expresarse satisfactoriamente con la jerga de las ciencias sociales. Los trabajos domésticos de la mujer moderna no tienen su origen en los de las mujeres del pasado. Y ésta es incapaz de concebir que su antepasada no hubiera tenido la obligación de trabajar en una economía subterránea. Tal como son descritas por los nuevos historiadores de los trabajos domésticos, las actividades típicas del ama de casa[^f32] en su apartamento moderno no tienen absolutamente nada que ver con lo que hacían las mujeres antes de la sociedad industrial; estas actividades no pueden ser analizadas adecuadamente como si fueran del sector informal, ni tampoco como categorías dogmáticas de la “reproducción social”.
+
+Al examinar con atención estos fenómenos que los antropólogos y los historiadores del trabajo doméstico han descrito, vi que el mercado contemporáneo del trabajo, tanto el aparente como el inaparente, no es más que la punta del iceberg: la mayor parte del trabajo se realiza en la economía subterránea. Cuando aumenta el empleo, en las diferentes formas de salariado, las penosas tareas informales se extienden también. Y los trabajos domésticos modernos son una parte típica, aunque no exclusiva, de esta realidad subterránea, que no solamente es inaparente, sino también imperceptible para los faros económicos. Como la nomenclatura corriente no permite hacer la distinción, yo contrapondré al trabajo que se realiza en la economía aparente e inaparente, la economía subterránea del “trabajo fantasma”, que es su complemento.[^f33]
+
+Al contrario de la producción de bienes y servicios, el trabajo doméstico lo realiza el consumidor de la mercancía misma, el hogar consumidor. Llamo “trabajo fantasma” a toda actividad mediante la cual el consumidor transforma la mercancía comprada en un bien utilizable. Con el término “trabajo fantasma” designo el tiempo, la labor y el esfuerzo que hay que gastar para añadir a la mercancía comprada ese valor adicional sin el cual ésta es inutilizable. Este término designa las actividades que la gente tiene que realizar si es que quiere satisfacer sus necesidades mediante mercancías. Al introducir el término “trabajo fantasma”, distingo, por ejemplo, la confección de un plato de huevos hoy en día y en el pasado. Cuando el ama de casa moderna va al mercado, compra los huevos; regresa al hogar en su automóvil, toma el ascensor hasta el séptimo piso, enciende la estufa, toma la mantequilla del refrigerador y cocina los huevos; cada uno de sus gestos añade valor a la mercancía. No sucedía lo mismo con su abuela. Ésta iba a buscar los huevos al gallinero, disponía la manteca que ella misma había fundido, hacía fuego con ramas que los niños recogían en el bosque comunal, y añadía a los huevos un poco de sal que había comprado. Este ejemplo, que puede parecer romántico, muestra claramente la diferencia. Ambas mujeres cocinan huevos, pero sólo una utiliza mercancías y bienes cuya producción depende de una fuerte inversión de capital: automóvil, ascensor, estufa eléctrica con todos sus accesorios. La abuela desempeña las tareas específicas de su género y así crea la subsistencia; la otra debe resignarse a llevar la carga doméstica del trabajo fantasma.[^f34]
+
+La transformación de las tareas domésticas no es para nada superficial, sino muy profunda. El aumento creciente del nivel medio de vida hace que estos trabajos dependan cada vez más de los bienes de capital porque introduce en el hogar muchas máquinas y novedades. La inversión de una familia canadiense media en sus enseres domésticos —y lo mismo se podría decir de todo hogar moderno— es en nuestros días superior a la inversión material media de una fábrica para un puesto de trabajo manual en las dos terceras partes de las naciones del mundo. De allí resulta que los trabajos domésticos son más sedentarios, y que la incidencia de las várices ha disminuido. Para una minoría de las mujeres, esto ha significado un trabajo interesante, remunerador, así como ratos de ocio “para cultivarse o divertirse”. Pero los nuevos trabajos domésticos también son más solitarios, monótonos, impersonales y bastante más contaminantes. El consumo de valium y el embrutecimiento ante la pantalla de la televisión se encuentran entre los paliativos de este tipo de estrés suave.[^f35] El trabajo doméstico se ha convertido en el paradigma de la nueva actividad _económica_ no retribuida que en la sociedad de la computadora y el microprocesador es económicamente más fundamental que el trabajo productivo —ya sea que esta producción figure o no en los informes de los economistas—.
+
+El trabajo fantasma sólo se hizo posible cuando el hogar se convirtió en un recinto organizado para la función económica que consiste en dar a las mercancías un “valor agregado”. No podía hacerse típicamente femenino sino desde el momento en que los hombres cambiaron el hogar por la fábrica o la oficina. Desde entonces, el hogar tenía que subsistir con lo que un salario podía comprar —un salario para el ingeniero y, forzosamente, varios para la familia del obrero—. La mujer de éste lavaba ropa ajena en casa, su hija se colocaba como sirvienta. Agregar valor a lo que el salario producía, y esto de forma no retribuida, se convirtió en el trabajo de las mujeres. Sus ocupaciones fueron definidas en términos que correspondían al nuevo empleo que se les asignaba. Las dos variedades de trabajo, el trabajo remunerado y el trabajo fantasma, proliferaron con la industrialización. Las dos funciones nuevas, la del sostén de la familia y la de la persona mantenida, dividieron al conjunto de la sociedad. La ropa de mezclilla y la fábrica definían a la primera, a la segunda el delantal y la cocina. Y cuando la mujer encontraba un trabajo salariado, se le compadecía y se le pagaba menos.
+
+Aunque en el siglo XIX las novedades tecnológicas revolucionaron las condiciones del trabajo fuera de casa, no influyeron mucho en el quehacer doméstico, aunque sí enclaustraron todavía más a la mujer en el hogar. Puesto que ella sólo tenía que dar vuelta a una llave para obtener agua, ya no se reunía con sus amigas en la fuente. Aunque económicamente el trabajo de las mujeres asumía una forma sin precedente, técnicamente no parecía haber una ruptura con el pasado. A principios del siglo XX, las instalaciones higiénicas interiores y las nuevas energías domésticas, el gas y la electricidad, cuya utilización sería casi universal en las zonas urbanas de los Estados Unidos hacia 1920 y en las pequeñas ciudades hacia 1930, no eran entonces más que posibilidades tecnológicas, en su conjunto. Sólo recientemente, durante el segundo cuarto de ese siglo, la técnica pudo transformar la realidad material de los trabajos domésticos; simultáneamente, la radio y luego la televisión comenzaron a remplazar las conversaciones en el seno de las comunidades. La industria empezó entonces a producir maquinas para el trabajo fantasma. Si bien gracias al progreso industrial el trabajo fabril requería menos mano de obra, los trabajos domésticos, sin que por eso disminuyeran, se hacían tributarios de una inversión de capital que se multiplicó desmesuradamente.[^f36]
+
+Se suele describir el progreso económico como un proceso creador de puestos de trabajo, creador de _empleos_. Pero también se puede describir con igual legitimidad como un proceso mediante el cual más mercancías se ofrecen en el mercado; cada una ha sido convertida en una necesidad y cada una exige un _input_ creciente de trabajo fantasma antes de poder satisfacer una necesidad.[^f37] El desarrollo, en su sentido usual, es una operación en la que la producción se basa en una fuerte inversión de capital. Pero es posible definirlo como un proceso mediante el cual el trabajo fantasma se vuelve necesario, sobre la base de una inversión creciente de capital, a fin de alcanzar un nivel mínimo de bienestar.[^f38] Muy probablemente, el volumen del trabajo asalariado productivo no aumentará más, en ningún lugar del mundo, y los empleos estériles que se inventan de la nada con el propósito de dar ocupación a la gente —el sector terciario e incluso “cuaternario” de servicios— ya no serán retribuidos de manera tan exorbitante como hasta hoy ha sido. La automatización disminuirá el volumen global del trabajo asalariado y conducirá a la comercialización de mercancías que requerirán todavía más —no menos— labor gratuita del comprador-utilizador. Esta parte oculta del crecimiento económico, el crecimiento previsible del trabajo fantasma, paralelamente con la reducción del volumen del trabajo salariado, acarreará un nuevo tipo de discriminación de las mujeres: la discriminación en el trabajo fantasma.
+
+El trabajo fantasma no es el dominio exclusivo de las mujeres. Es patentemente tan unisex como el trabajo asalariado. También los hombres agregan, sin retribución alguna, un valor a la producción industrial. El marido que estudia obsesivamente un tema árido y difícil con la intención de prepararse para los exámenes que le permitirán subir en el escalafón, el habitante de los suburbios que pierde horas para transportarse a la fábrica o a la oficina, también hacen su parte de trabajo fantasma. Ciertamente, el “consumidor” por excelencia es el hogar, que la mujer dirige —eufemismo para expresar que allí sufre y trabaja—. Pero hablar de la _discriminación_ de las mujeres en el seno del trabajo fantasma no tendría sentido si sólo ellas cargaran con todo el peso. Sin embargo, esta discriminación existe, y de manera aún más intensa que en el trabajo asalariado. De manera menos mensurable pero mucho más masiva que en el trabajo asalariado, hay en la sujeción al trabajo fantasma una diferencia entre los sexos. Las mujeres están atadas a éste de forma más amplia, están obligadas a consagrarle más tiempo, tienen menos posibilidades para librarse de él, su carga no disminuye cuando consiguen un empleo fuera de casa, y a ellas se las penaliza más cuando se niegan a realizarlo. La parte que se le roba a las mujeres en virtud de la discriminación en el empleo, ya sea declarado o no declarado, no es más que una pequeña fracción de lo que deberían percibir por el trabajo fantasma que realizan sin retribución en su hogar.
+
+El dominio educativo proporciona un buen ejemplo de esto. En el pasado, los niños crecían sin pasar por un proceso “económico”: lo que el niño o la niña aprendían en casa no era poca cosa. Todos aprendían la lengua vernácula y las habilidades indispensables para la vida vernácula. Con rarísimas excepciones, jamás hubiera sido posible describir el hecho de criar a un niño como un proceso de capitalización de la mano de obra. Todo ha cambiado hoy en día. Los padres se han convertido en educadores auxiliares en el seno del sistema educativo. Son responsables de impartir los básicos _inputs_, o insumos, de capital humano, para utilizar la jerga de la economía, gracias a los cuales su vástago podrá ser calificado de _homo œconomicus_. Lógicamente, al economista del dominio educativo le interesa que la madre inyecte en su hijo la mayor cantidad de _input_ posible, sin costo alguno para el sistema. Como lo expresa un economista:
+
+… cuando los niños entran en la escuela, entre ellos existen importantes diferencias respecto a la capacidad verbal y matemática. Estas diferencias reflejan, primero, la diversidad de sus aptitudes naturales y, luego, la cantidad de capital humano que el niño adquirió antes de la edad de seis años. Los _stocks_ almacenados de capital humano reflejan, a su vez, diversos _inputs_ de tiempo y otros recursos provenientes de los padres, maestros, hermanos y del niño mismo. El proceso de adquisición de un capital preescolar es análogo a la adquisición posterior de capital humano mediante la enseñanza escolar y la formación laboral.[^f39]
+
+
+Las aportaciones de tiempo y esfuerzos que la madre aporta gratuitamente a la capitalización de su hijo, en este pasaje se describen precisamente como la fuente primera de la formación de un capital humano. Es una afirmación grotesca; sin embargo hay que reconocer la veracidad de su contenido en una sociedad donde se considera que hay escasez de talento y que por lo tanto debe producirse económicamente. El trabajo fantasma de la madre constituye una actividad económica de la que dependen en última instancia la ganancia bruta de autofinanciamiento, los salarios y la plusvalía del capital. Y la “operativización” del trabajo fantasma constituye paulatinamente la nueva estrategia del desarrollo que no puede designarse más adecuadamente que como la _colonización del sector informal_.
+
+Sin embargo, no es posible medir el trabajo fantasma con unidades monetarias, aunque es posible traducir esta actividad, actualmente impuesta en forma de trabajo fantasma, como trabajo realizado contra salario. Fue esto lo que se intentó en relación con el transporte laboral. Con base en un modelo sueco, ciertos sindicatos austriacos consiguieron de los patrones que se incluyera el transporte en el tiempo de trabajo. Les hicieron ver que esos largos desplazamientos son imposiciones laborales —pues las fábricas no están situadas en lugares de acceso fácil para los trabajadores, sino allí donde el terreno es barato y las autopistas numerosas, y donde las residencias patronales pueden implantarse en las cercanías—.[^f40] El trabajo fantasma del obrero que acude a su lejana fábrica, por ejemplo, consiste en ir a recoger la mano de obra (es decir, a sí mismo) con su auto personal, y en fungir de chofer para conducir hasta el lugar de trabajo a la máquina humana que el patrón alquila, mediante contrato, ocho horas por día. Por añadidura, este trabajo fantasma requiere de una fuerte inversión de capital. Una buena parte de lo que gana cotidianamente el trabajador se dedica a la compra y mantenimiento del vehículo, y a los impuestos que financian las autopistas por donde circula. Estos traslados, ya sea que se efectúen en automóvil, autobús o bicicleta, representan trabajos fantasma. Ciertos pequeños sindicatos han ganado juicios en esta materia. A sus miembros se les consideró como choferes que llevaban hasta el sitio de trabajo la máquina humana que ellos mismos eran. Pero si esta clase de argumentación se generalizara, si por doquier los trabajadores recibieran un salario por la labor, no retribuida hoy en día, que realizan cuando se “capitalizan” para su empleo y aseguran su traslado de ida y vuelta, el sistema industrial dejaría de funcionar.[^f41]
+
+Al igual que los hombres, las mujeres podrían exigir que su trabajo fantasma se transformara en trabajo retribuido. Pero desde el momento en que se compara el valor del trabajo fantasma y el del trabajo asalariado en términos monetarios, la naturaleza paradójica del primero se vuelve evidente. Es posible decir que en toda economía moderna (excluyendo al sector militar), el _input_ del trabajo fantasma es superior al _input_ del trabajo retribuido.[^f42]Por ejemplo, la cantidad de tiempo que se gasta en producir bienes y servicios, respondan o no al deseo del cliente, es sin duda inferior al tiempo que se invierte en hacerlos consumibles. Con la nueva economía de los autoservicios, la proporción del trabajo fantasma no puede sino aumentar de manera dramática. Ésta es la razón por la que no puede pagarse el trabajo fantasma —no porque no sea un trabajo, sino porque las correspondientes retribuciones rebasarían el volumen global de los salarios—.
+
+Se equivocan las feministas cuando sostienen que a las mujeres se les debería pagar en proporción a la labor que consagran a preparar, para el consumo, aquello que la familia adquiere con sus ingresos. Lo más que pueden esperar es un premio de consolación, que no una retribución fantasma. La realización gratuita del trabajo fantasma es la condición única, fundamental, de la dependencia de la familia respecto a las mercancías. Aunque éstas fueran producidas por robots, la sociedad industrial no podría prescindir del trabajo fantasma. En relación con el dinero representa lo que el neutrón es al electrón. Difiere tanto del “empleo” productivo que fabrica mercancías para los demás, como de la pequeña explotación agrícola y de otras actividades domésticas tradicionales, cuyo rendimiento es poco pero que requieren de poca inversión monetaria.
+
+Hoy, el trabajo fantasma se disimula detrás de casi todo lo que se llama _self help_, es decir, el autoservicio. Es un término moderno que todavía ayer podía haber designado, de manera velada, la masturbación. El autoservicio divide en dos al sujeto: una mano lava a la otra. Su utilización por las agencias norteamericanas de ayuda internacional hizo que el término se extendiera en el contexto del desarrollo internacional. Con este término se proyecta en el consumidor la distinción tradicionalmente establecida por los economistas, para quienes todas las actividades son de producción o son de consumo, las “relaciones” son productivas o reproductivas. Se le enseña a producir con la mano derecha aquello que su mano izquierda supuestamente necesita. Se le enseña a realizar lo máximo con lo mínimo, a mejorar las mercancías más indigentes por medio de la mayor cantidad posible de trabajo fantasma. No sólo se conciben incesantemente nuevos productos, concebidos para el trabajo fantasma, para el autoservicio, sino que con la intervención creciente de las computadoras se remplaza a los asalariados, que dejan de ser útiles y son impulsados hacia el trabajo fantasma.[^f43] Como resultado, el trabajo fantasma deja de ser la actividad femenina por excelencia. Con el paso de los años, el trabajo fantasma es más patentemente unisex, y de ser el campo donde se oprime a las mujeres, se transforma en el campo principal donde se las discrimina.[^f44]
+
+Hoy en día los papás de la clase media reivindican las tareas culinarias o “maternales”. Quieren “asar los bistés” para los invitados, pasar una hora jugando con el bebé. Pero con el pretexto de querer participar en las “tareas domésticas”, abren un nuevo espacio para la competencia y el resentimiento entre los sexos. Anteriormente, las mujeres se sentían obligadas a luchar para obtener la igualdad de oportunidades en el salariado. Actualmente, los hombres comienzan a reivindicar la satisfacción del trabajo fantasma del hogar. En el curso de los últimos 20 años, la discriminación en el empleo se ha extendido más y las mujeres lo han padecido de manera más aguda, al mismo tiempo que han obtenido la garantía legal de la igualdad y de las oportunidades en el empleo. Actualmente, la escasez del empleo relega a cada vez más hombres al trabajo fantasma, por lo que la discriminación contra las mujeres en su propio hogar habrá de ser todavía más grave.
+
+Los estudios recientes presentan el siguiente panorama.[^f45] La discriminación de las mujeres en el empleo y en el trabajo fantasma es un fenómeno mundial, y seguramente pasa lo mismo en el sector inaparente o subterráneo, aunque se haya estudiado poco. La discriminación en el empleo y fuera del empleo se extiende al mismo tiempo que aumenta el PNB, del mismo modo que se extienden los demás efectos secundarios: estrés, contaminación, frustración. Sea cual fuere la forma que asuma, la discriminación no se ve afectada ostensiblemente por el medio cultural, la política, el clima o la religión. Los estudios sobre la discriminación revelan un cuadro poco diferente del que muestran los estudios sobre el cáncer del seno o del útero: igual que el PNB _per capita_, lo que cambia según el lugar geográfico es la manera como se considera y discute la enfermedad, más que el esquema de su aparición. Las mujeres australianas tienen estadísticas admirables; las italianas cultivan un cinismo apacible. Las barreras que separan a las mujeres de los empleos lucrativos y las trampas que las encierran en las cocinas se explican de manera diferente en Japón y en la URSS pero su importancia y profundidad son comparables por doquier. En este caso también, la formación escolar proporciona un buen ejemplo. Con igual bagaje —mismos años de estudios, mismas disciplinas—, en todas partes las mujeres ganan menos que los hombres. Por añadidura, mientras mayor sea el nivel de instrucción de las mujeres, más se las confina en su puesto, en comparación con los hombres; en todas partes sucede que tienen menos posibilidades de encaminarse por una vía diferente. Las luchas de los años sesenta abrieron la oficina del director para la mujer, o entreabrieron la trampa de la cocina, pero sobre todo en beneficio de las “hermanas” de las clases privilegiadas. Algunas mujeres más en el quirófano o en una cátedra universitaria, algunos maridos domésticos que lavan los platos: estas raras “conquistas” simplemente hacen que resalte todavía más la discriminación de las mujeres en general, y la hacen todavía más dolorosa para la mayoría. Su resentimiento contra los hombres aumenta, incluso fuera de la esfera del trabajo.
+
+## La feminización de la pobreza
+
+Aunque la discriminación sexista es mundial, parece ser diferente en los países pobres. Ni los ingresos ni la discriminación económica son iguales en las sociedades del Tercer Mundo. La discriminación sexista se dirige sobre todo a las mujeres que han podido beneficiarse, de un modo u otro, del crecimiento económico. La esposa de un dentista de Oaxaca termina por apreciar su nueva marginación económica. A diferencia de la esposa de un médico neoyorquino, la mexicana, cuyo hogar posee dos automóviles, deja su casa al cuidado de una sirvienta cuando sale a una reunión feminista. Sólo el Tercer Mundo capitalista ofrece un medio ambiente propicio para la mujer parásito, cuyo surgimiento había previsto en 1911 la feminista sudafricana Olive Schreiner. A diferencia de su homóloga neoyorquina, puede florecer como “ama de casa”. Su situación es totalmente incomprensible para la lejana prima que vive con el sacamuelas de una aldea provinciana. Cada martes, esta mujer acude al mercado, caminando detrás de su marido. Allí vende sus jitomates mientras que éste arranca dientes y vende “menjurjes”. Ella está sometida a su marido, pero no depende económicamente de él.[^f46]
+
+En América Latina, la inmensa mayoría de los hombres y las mujeres no vive ni como la primera ni como la segunda pareja mexicana que acabo de evocar. La existencia para muchos se reduce a la pobreza modernizada de los arrabales. El hogar gasta casi todo lo que gana. Pero sus ganancias han aumentado con mucha mayor lentitud que el ritmo con que el progreso ha destruido el valor de utilización de su medio de vida. En el curso de una generación, se han visto privados de aquellos recursos ambientales que a sus padres les permitían procurarse casi todo lo que necesitaban sin recurrir al mercado, y simultáneamente han olvidado la mayor parte de las habilidades necesarias para la subsistencia. Al contrario de sus primos, que cruzaron la frontera ilegalmente para trabajar en Texas como obreros agrícolas, y que luego lograron llegar a Nueva York para vivir entre los escombros del South Bronx, los habitantes de los arrabales del Tercer Mundo todavía creen que obtendrán su parte del progreso; aún creen en la retórica del _Brandt report_ o de Fidel Castro. No pueden aún comprender por qué, en el South Bronx, los “latinos” se unen contra la modernización de la pobreza[^f47] e intentan evitar que los educadores, trabajadores sociales y las campañas de salud penetren en su barrio. Sin distinción económica de sexo, se han hecho dependientes de las mercancías que hay que comprar en un mundo que es incapaz de ofrecerles empleo: la fuente del dinero. Privados de las posibilidades tradicionales de subsistencia, también se les niegan los puestos de trabajo que el desarrollo crea a cuentagotas—.[^f48] Así, hombres y mujeres se encuentran en el mismo callejón sin salida que el ama de casa neoyorquina: se les excluye de los empleos que permiten vivir y, al mismo tiempo, de la subsistencia. Para estos pobres modernizados de los países más pobres, la discriminación económica todavía no es enteramente sexista.
+
+La exportación del trabajo fantasma de los países ricos a los países pobres es un hecho que se sigue desconociendo. Los especialistas de la economía no lo reconocen porque la insuficiencia de su terminología los paraliza —sus conceptos no les permiten identificar en el trabajo fantasma una entidad _sui generis—_. No pueden distinguir entre las actividades de una granjera y las de un ama de casa norteamericana que intenta sazonar la comida chatarra, así como tampoco entre las actividades de subsistencia que están dirigidas a la producción de valores de uso, y la economía del arrabal, cuyos habitantes hacen su guarida con las cajas y los desechos de otra gente. Claudia von Werlhof denomina la producción de esta variedad de existencia subterránea el “ángulo muerto” de la economía. Al miembro de la pareja que es mantenido por el salario, la sociedad moderna le obliga a convertirse en una “fuente de acumulación primitiva”. Cuestión que de inmediato suscita la pregunta respecto al tipo ideal de consorte: ¿es igual el ama de casa que está obligada a realizar el trabajo fantasma, al habitante del arrabal sudamericano, o se ha convertido éste, dentro de la economía mundial, en el nuevo “encargado del hogar”, desprovisto de género, de su socio del Norte?[^f49]
+
+La discriminación económica de las mujeres aparece cuando se instala el desarrollo. Posteriormente, ya no desaparece; nada indica que lo hará jamás. La discusión con Frank Hubby me hizo llegar a la conclusión de que luchar por crear la igualdad económica entre humanos neutros, que no se distinguen más que por el sexo, es similar a querer encontrar la cuadratura del círculo con regla y escuadra. Eudoxio lo intentó, esforzándose por comparar los números irracionales entre sí. Pero el problema frustró los esfuerzos de los matemáticos hasta el siglo XIX, cuando Lindemann probó que no existe una solución. Demostró que π no es un número algebraico, y de esta manera nos permitió entender por qué los números reales son inconmensurables. La ciencia económica podría encontrarse en la misma situación que las matemáticas en el pasado. Ante el fracaso evidente y reiterado por crear la igualdad económica, tendríamos que considerar otra eventualidad —que el paradigma del _homo œconomicus_ no se puede aplicar a lo que en realidad son los hombres y las mujeres, a quienes no es posible reducir a un ser que sería lo “humano”, a un neutro económico de uno u otro sexo—. La existencia económica y el género por lo tanto serían literalmente “incomparables”.
+
+# El género vernáculo
+
+FUERA de la sociedad industrial, es raro el trabajo unisex, sí es que existe. Pocas cosas pueden ser hechas indistintamente tanto por las mujeres como por los hombres. Por regla general, éstos no pueden realizar los trabajos femeninos. En París, a principios del siglo XVIII, el soltero desde lejos se anunciaba con su hedor y su aspecto sombrío. Los archivos notariales nos revelan que los hombres solos a su muerte no dejaban ni sábanas ni camisas. Y en tiempos de Luis XIV, al hombre que no tuviera una mujer —esposa hermana, madre o hija— que cuidara de su casa, le era difícil sobrevivir. De él no se podía esperar que confeccionara su ropa, que la lavara y remendara; le era imposible alimentar a las gallinas, ordeñar una cabra; si era pobre, tenía que olvidarse de la mantequilla, la leche, los huevos. No era capaz de preparar sus alimentos, aunque dispusiera de los ingredientes necesarios.[^f50] Y en nuestros días, en el México rural que tan bien conozco, una mujer moriría de vergüenza antes de dejar a un hombre cocer los frijoles.
+
+El nativo sabe desde lejos, aunque apenas pueda vislumbrarlos, si unas personas que ve trabajando son mujeres u hombres. En cualquier momento del año y a cualquier hora del día, tanto el lugar donde realizan su actividad como sus herramientas revelan su sexo. Según la manera de cargar un bulto: en la cabeza o al hombro, sabrá a qué género pertenecen. Si ve gansos en un campo segado, sabe que una niña los cuida, y si ovejas, que un niño está cerca. Si alguien hace lo que _nosotros_ consideramos un trabajo propio del otro género, muestra ser un extranjero. O entonces un esclavo, privado de toda dignidad. El género está en la manera de caminar, está en el gesto más pequeño, y no solamente entre las piernas. Puerto Rico está a sólo tres horas de vuelo de Nueva York. Dos terceras partes de la población han estado en el continente. Y, sin embargo, todavía hoy en día, en el interior de la isla, las mujeres navegan los caminos como goletas mecidas por los alisios, mientras que los hombres caminan contoneándose al ritmo de los machetes, ellas y ellos con el inconfundible estilo jíbaro. Es obvio que no pueden ser de la cercana isla de Santo Domingo, y menos ^aún _gringos _ de los Estados Unidos. En muchos puertorriqueños sobrevive el género vernáculo durante decenios, no solamente en el barrio de Harlem, sino también cuando habitan entre los blancos sureños o los negros del Bronx.[^f51]
+
+El género no es el sexo y es más que el sexo. Traduce una polaridad social que es en sí fundamental y distinta entre dos lugares, entre dos momentos. Lo que se hace o lo que no se hace difiere de un valle a otro, igual que las maneras de hacer las cosas y de hablar de ellas. La terminología que emplean los especialistas de antropología social con frecuencia reviste la forma de una máscara unisex que oculta una realidad que tiene dos rostros. En las ciencias sociales aún no existe el equivalente de lo que en el ámbito de la epistemología y la física hicieron Bohr y Heisenberg. Que la luz responde tanto al paradigma de la partícula como al de la onda, que ninguna de estas dos teorías puede explicar por sí sola su realidad compleja y que tampoco una perspectiva más amplia permite entenderla con mayor claridad, estas son ideas hoy en día comunes. En cambio, para muchos todavía resulta novedoso que un acercamiento similar sea necesario en las ciencias sociales.[^f52]
+
+Se manipulan alegremente los términos de “cultura” y de “comportamiento” en cuanto se empieza a estudiar _al_ puertorriqueño. En Nueva York los especialistas se preparan para entender la “cultura puertorriqueña”. El trabajador social se esfuerza en ocuparse de “ellos”. Se ignoran y se confunden la distinción nítida y los sutiles matices que contienen cada uno de estos términos, en menoscabo de las tradiciones seculares. El educador neoyorquino intenta ayudar al “niño” puertorriqueño. No entiende que la infancia sólo ha podido nacer con la desaparición del género. Y el educador rara vez reflexiona en el hecho de que está a punto de transformar el género en simple sexo —cuando es capaz de reflexionar en ello—. La simbiosis de las ciencias sociales y las instituciones modernas es así un instrumento eficaz para reducir a sexo el género. Mostraré más adelante que esta ruptura constituye la característica antropológica decisiva que distingue a nuestro tiempo de todos los demás.
+
+Antes de lanzarme en esta primera exploración del género, indicaré tres escollos en los que es fácil encallar antes de haber alcanzado alta mar. Estas observaciones preliminares habrán de proporcionar un útil acercamiento al sexo económico.
+
+## Una complementariedad ambigua
+
+Solamente un extranjero puede percibir la cultura de un grupo. Para los del grupo hay hombres, hay mujeres, y luego una tercera realidad: los extranjeros, que pueden ser individuos de otro país, esclavos, animales domésticos, intocables, monstruos. Si al fuereño se le percibe como a un ser sexuado, su sexo, o más exactamente su género, se percibe más o menos por analogía con el de los “nuestros”, hombres y mujeres. El parentesco sólo se forma a partir de las relaciones entre hombres y mujeres; resulta de la correspondencia entre los géneros. Hombres y mujeres se avienen no solamente en virtud sino a pesar del contraste singular entre ambos. Se corresponden como la mano derecha a la izquierda.[^f53] La correspondencia entre varón y hembra y la dualidad entre derecha e izquierda vienen al caso para permitirme disipar ciertos malentendidos. En muchas culturas, la mano izquierda es la menos fuerte, la menos hábil; ha padecido siglos de descrédito. El empleo de la mano derecha no es algo que simplemente se admite, o experimenta, sino una norma inculcada. Se regaña al pequeño zurdo, se castiga la mano culpable, se la sujeta a la espalda —y puede suceder que se la mutile—. La asimetría orgánica se ha convertido en un hecho. La predominancia neurológica que se traduce en sensibilidad táctil, en fuerza o en habilidades mayores, ha sido transformada en un ideal de dominación diestra. La izquierda se ha adaptado a la derecha, se ha convertido necesariamente en su auxiliar. Ésta es la analogía que constantemente se emplea para sostener la idea de que “sociobiológicamente, la hembra se adapta al macho”.[^f54]
+
+Pero precisamente mi propósito _no es ése_. La correspondencia significa algo muy diferente. Fuera de la sociedad de los botones y enchufes, hombres y mujeres dependen constantemente de la interacción de las dos manos para sobrevivir. En algunas sociedades se insiste particularmente en el uso de la mano derecha. En otras, entre los chinos, por ejemplo, la etiqueta, el buen gusto y la visión del mundo exigen la predominancia alternada de la derecha y la izquierda, mediante una orquestación detallada y sutil.[^f55] En otras sociedades, en el pueblo nyoro de África, por ejemplo, el zurdo está predestinado a formar parte del grupo sagrado de los adivinos. Pero sea cual sea el poder, la habilidad o la dignidad que se atribuyen preferentemente a una de las manos, con más frecuencia a la derecha que a la izquierda, las dos manos se conjugan en las acciones y los gestos. La tradición prescribe rigurosamente qué mano debe usar el chamán zurdo para hacer la ofrenda. Las dos manos siempre actúan juntas de acuerdo con dos programas, ninguno de los cuales es jamás la imagen inversa del otro. Así, este tipo único de dualidad siempre es ambiguo.
+
+Las tradiciones más antiguas sitúan la propiedad fundamental de nuestra existencia en este tipo singular de bifurcación. Constituye una complementariedad ambigua, tan diferente de un reflejo en el espejo como de una sombra. En cuanto dualidad, es tan distinta de la pareja positivo/negativo de una fotografía, como de la correspondencia determinista de la doble hélice del ADN. Yo veo ahí la base de la metáfora y del discurso poético —única forma adecuada para expresarla—. Los gemelos, el ombligo/cordón umbilical, el _yin/yang_, son algunas de las representaciones mitológicas mediante las cuales esta dualidad busca expresarse.[^f56]
+
+Hoy en día debería ser menos oscura una de las dificultades de la oposición entre género y sexo. Es posible considerar el género vernáculo como la base de una complementariedad ambigua, y el sexo de los neutros económicos como una tentativa moderna de negar o de trascender esta base. Al reducir toda interacción a intercambio, las ciencias sociales han construido tanto los fundamentos de esta negación como los de la legitimidad de un análisis _económico_ de las relaciones entre hombres y mujeres. _Es por esto que hablo de “sexo económico”_. Efectivamente, se requieren dos tipos distintos de lenguaje para hablar de lo que existía en el pasado y de lo que hoy prevalece.[^f57]
+
+## El sexismo sociobiológico
+
+Quise iniciar esta introducción al género y al sexo en la historia mediante la analogía de las dos manos, porque ésta es contundente. Además, tal analogía evoca de inmediato una segunda dificultad, la cual no es fundamental, al contrario de la primera, sino contingente —está ligada a corrientes de pensamiento que están de moda actualmente—. En los Estados Unidos, hoy es prácticamente imposible analizar el género en conjunción con el comportamiento, sin provocar una reacción defensiva en dos campos: el de las feministas marxistas y el de los sociobiólogos. Mi tesis se ubica fuera de este remolino. Sobre todo, no me rebajaré a debatir con aquellos a quienes seduce la retórica de Lionel Tigre, E. O. Wilson o Alain de Benoist y compañía. Con ellos alterna el llamado _establishment_ liberal de los Estados Unidos, grupo al que no le interesa discutir la distinción que yo establezco entre género y sexo. La sociobiología del sexo, que tiene su origen en los bastiones de Harvard y de la Sorbona, remplaza la sociobiología de la raza que seducía al conde de Gobineau. Cuando vemos lo que el sexismo revela, el racismo parece ser su homólogo precoz y titubeante. Las teorías racistas sirvieron de apoyo a los propósitos colonizadores de los europeos, y las ideas sexistas contemporáneas sirven para acreditar la farsa moderna del sujeto unisex en todo el mundo. El nuevo sexismo responde a las expectativas de las pintorescas élites que hoy dirigen las economías poscoloniales.
+
+Los sociobiólogos no tienen más que un postulado, a pesar de los matices que presentan, así como una sola tesis, cuyo poderoso atractivo consiste en su ingeniosa simplicidad.[^f58] Los lectores de sus obras no logran siempre entrever que más allá de oscuras discusiones tejidas con algoritmos matemáticos y temerarias estadísticas, no hay nada. La argumentación de los sociobiólogos se reduce a esto: entre los primates, la hembra se adapta al macho;[^f59] el hombre primitivo domina a su mujer; la civilización no hace más que institucionalizar esta primacía. De tal forma, se fundamenta científicamente la deducción de que este patrón regular de la dominación masculina y de la sumisión femenina está inscrito en los genes. Los roles de los sexos resultan de la dominación genética del macho.
+
+Sin embargo, si rechazo la controversia con esta escuela de pensamiento sexista, no es por la debilidad de sus argumentos, sino más bien por el estilo que adoptan estos biócratas para presentar su teoría. Su estilo tiene mucho en común con el estilo del racismo, desde Gobineau a Rosenberg —es un alegato “científico” que únicamente se dirige a los convencidos—. No sólo las tesis y deducciones del racismo y del sexismo son por así decirlo intercambiables, sino que sus respectivas imágenes del hombre y de la mujer son astillas del mismo palo. En ambos casos, los humanos representan “culturas”, es decir, seres sin género cuyas categorías se diagnostican para luego clasificarlas de acuerdo con una jerarquía. En el nivel más bajo de la escala está la piel oscura, el bajo coeficiente intelectual, el sexo femenino y otras deficiencias genéticas. Por lo tanto, dejo la discusión con los nuevos sociobiócratas para aquellos cuya óptica científica los hace imputar “necesidades” en vez de medir “inferioridades”; para los educadores, terapeutas, ginecólogos y trabajadores sociales que se han adiestrado con el propósito de degradar a los otros, convirtiéndolos en consumidores de sus servicios, en virtud del diagnóstico científico que ellos mismos han elaborado. Velando por los propios intereses y por las perspectivas risueñas que destilan, tienen que distanciarse del nuevo sexismo sociobiológico, enemigo de la igualdad de las “necesidades”.[^f60]
+
+## La trampa del rol de los sexos
+
+La noción del rol de los sexos se ha extendido sobremanera desde hace 15 años.[^f61] Es el origen de los juegos de sociedad, de los tratados científicos, de los métodos pedagógicos y de los discursos políticos. La preocupación del rol de los sexos parece crecer con el PNB. En los países ricos, la elección, adopción y transmisión del propio rol causan gran inquietud. Ahora bien, todavía más que las novedosas ideas de la sociobiología, la teoría del rol sociológico obstaculiza el análisis del género. Efectivamente, los conceptos respecto al rol impiden percibir lo que recubre el género, tanto en la expresión como en la acción.
+
+La distinción entre el género vernáculo y el rol de los sexos es comparable a la distinción entre el habla vernácula y la lengua materna inculcada, entre la subsistencia y la existencia económica o monetaria. Si contrapongo estos términos es porque parten de presupuestos distintos. El habla vernácula, el género y la subsistencia son característicos de una finitud morfológica de la vida comunitaria que está basada en el postulado implícito —el cual con frecuencia se expresa ritualmente y se representa mitológicamente— de que la comunidad, al igual que el cuerpo, no puede rebasar su talla. La lengua materna inculcada, el sexo y la sujeción a los bienes de consumo proceden del postulado de un universo abierto donde toda correlación de las necesidades y de los medios supone la escasez. El género implica una complementariedad fundamental en el mundo que “nos” encierra en éste, aunque esta clausura sea ambigua y frágil. Al contrario, el sexo implica una apertura ilimitada, un universo donde siempre hay algo más.
+
+De hecho, el discurso sobre el género tiene que recurrir al lenguaje metafórico; el género no puede significar inequívocamente lo mismo en distintos ámbitos. Y esa totalidad dual y específica que la complementariedad de los géneros engendra —un “mundo”, una “sociedad”, una “comunidad”— es a la vez modelada y limitada, asimétricamente, por sus componentes. Sólo la morfología permite percibir el género: su existencia depende de la dimensión y de la forma del mundo dual que estructura.[^f62] Para construir la delicada arquitectura de su concha, el caracol añade una tras otra las espirales crecientes, y luego cesa de hacerlo bruscamente y comienza enroscamientos decrecientes. Sucede que una sola espiral más larga le daría a la concha una dimensión 16 veces mayor. En vez de contribuir al bienestar de la criatura, la sobrecargaría. A partir de entonces, cualquier aumento de su productividad tan sólo serviría para paliar las dificultades creadas por el agrandamiento de la concha más allá de los límites de su finalidad. Una vez que el límite del crecimiento de las espirales se rebasa, los problemas por el sobrecrecimiento se multiplican geométricamente, mientras que la capacidad biológica del caracol en el mejor de los casos sólo puede crecer de forma aritmética. Así, el género fija límites a la forma social que estructura, una forma que se expresa en todos los aspectos de la existencia, pero antes que todo en el parentesco.
+
+Ahora bien, el término “rol sexual” en su acepción usual implica precisamente lo contrario, la noción tácita de un individuo de plástico, cuya existencia sin género es más o menos modelada por el “sexo”. Desde hace un siglo, el estudio de lo que distingue las actividades de los hombres de las actividades de las mujeres proviene de las observaciones en torno al rol de los sexos —incluso en la época en que el término mismo todavía no se conocía—.[^f63]
+
+Melville J. Herskovits ilustró bien esta confusión cuando en 1947 afirmó: “No hay fase alguna de la vida de los pueblos iletrados que haya atraído más la atención que la división sexual del trabajo, y ha habido muchos intentos de explicarla”.[^f64] He aquí una frase repleta de afirmaciones sin fundamento: la frontera que los separa de nosotros es _nuestra_ alfabetización; todos los pueblos tienen una existencia _económica_—el _homo sapiens_ es siempre el _homo œconomicus_— y por lo tanto todos actúan a partir del postulado de la escasez; el autor sabe lo que el “trabajo” es; en última instancia, la división sexual que prepara para el trabajo es el gran misterio que la antropología moderna debe intentar explicar. La larga lista de obras que Herskovits evoca ha crecido considerablemente desde entonces, pero son apenas unas cuantas las que aclaran la distinción entre sexo y género.
+
+El estudio de los roles de los sexos ha creado confusión. Resulta evidente al examinar las obras de tres periodos en los que el “trabajo de las mujeres” estaba de moda: la etnografía victoriana, la antropología cultural del _New Deal_ y los estudios feministas recientes. Los victorianos creían en la evolución social y buscaban su confirmación en los escritos de los viajeros y misioneros. Las conductas extrañas, inesperadas, los fascinaban tanto como las extraordinarias especies que Darwin había descubierto en las islas Galápagos. Pero a diferencia de sus predecesores, los victorianos sentían la necesidad de clasificar lo que encontraban. Los comportamientos, al igual que los fósiles, debían ser colocados en categorías que se pudieran ordenar de acuerdo con las etapas evolucionistas, cuya culminación era la burguesía inglesa victoriana, compuesta por los más civilizados, los más aptos para sobrevivir. En los Estados Unidos, las mujeres y los eclesiásticos conjuntamente sacaron de estos relatos la prueba del rol eterno de la mujer como guardiana del hogar, rol eterno de su _naturaleza_ —don que se entrega a los hombres— quienes deben emprender la ardua conquista de la _Naturaleza_ en aras de las mujeres. La antropología del rol de los sexos hizo su aparición en calidad de prueba científica de aquello que Ann Douglas ha llamado la mentira sentimental. En este contexto, el trabajo de las mujeres era la huella del maltrato que el sexo débil había sufrido en las sociedades primitivas. Por lo tanto el progreso significaba el encierro de la mujer dentro de una decorosa domesticidad, acompañado de la especialización gradual de la posición y vocación de ambos: el varón mantendría el hogar mediante su dura labor; su esposa estaría libre de la carga de la producción.[^f65]
+
+Durante las dos generaciones siguientes, el interés por el trabajo femenino fue muy tibio, pero entre 1935 y 1937 volvió a resurgir con vigor. En menos de dos años se publicaron tres estudios que habrían de convertirse en clásicos. Margaret Mead destacaría el hecho de que el sexo biológico por sí mismo no podía ser el origen de las diferencias socioculturales que se ven por doquier en la estructura de la personalidad de los hombres y las mujeres.[^f66] Buscó elucidar estas diferencias recurriendo a los conceptos psicológicos de su época, los cuales en fin de cuentas estaban fundados en la familia norteamericana. Ese mismo año, Ralph Linton centraría su investigación en el contraste entre los comportamientos femenino y masculino. Describió la plasticidad casi ilimitada de los roles sexuales que una cultura puede otorgar a sus miembros. Le interesaba más el comportamiento que la personalidad. Finalmente, George Murdock[^f67] emprendería la edición de su _Atlas etnográfico_. Ante todo le interesaba el “trabajo” y cómo se distribuye entre los hombres y las mujeres. Gracias a sus tablas y cuadros, es posible ver de inmediato que en Okinawa ambos sexos participaban en la manufactura de la cerámica, pero los hombres en una proporción mucho mayor que las mujeres; entre los drusos, sólo las mujeres hacen cerámica, y entre los coreanos, los hombres. Se muestra la participación hombres/mujeres en 11 tipos de actividad y nueve niveles diferentes, en cientos de culturas diferentes. Pero el acento que Mead pone en la personalidad, Linton en la conducta y Murdock en el trabajo, en vez de clarificar la distinción entre el género y el rol sexual, sólo la oscurece.
+
+Hacia mediados de siglo, el interés por las actividades distintivas de las mujeres nuevamente decrece. La modernización está a la orden del día. Por primera vez, los responsables políticos acuden a los antropólogos, solicitándoles que identifiquen los obstáculos para el progreso. Y precisamente durante estos decenios —cuando la participación en la vida del grupo investigado se perfeccionó como método para informar con detalle y delicadeza sobre quién hace qué en una aldea o una choza— el comportamiento vinculado con el género se consideró sobre todo como un obstáculo para el desarrollo, un estereotipo del rol sexual, una causa de la baja productividad y un ingrediente esencial de la pobreza. Las investigaciones anglonorteamericanas realizadas por mujeres en torno a la situación de las mujeres cambiaron totalmente la situación: representaron una tercera ola de interés en la materia, esta vez con la perspectiva feminista. De hecho, la perspectiva masculina que coloreaban las investigaciones de las dos grandes etapas anteriores se convirtió en objeto de estudio para aquellas investigaciones. Pronto los trabajos de varias generaciones de antropólogos dieron clara prueba de su incapacidad casi grotesca para siquiera sospechar lo que las mujeres hacen. Sin embargo, es evidente que estos nuevos estudios en su conjunto solamente han reforzado, aunque con la perspectiva femenina, los mismos postulados fundamentales sobre el género como forma primitiva de rol sexual, postulados que, primero de manera implícita y luego explícitamente, habían guiado a los antropólogos anteriores.[^f68] En su conjunto estos estudios también camuflan el género; pretenden ser auténticamente modernos —es decir, paradójicamente contraproductivos.
+
+# El género y la cultura
+
+LAS HERRAMIENTAS son intrínsecas a las relaciones sociales. Cada persona, cuando actúa, se relaciona con su sociedad mediante las herramientas que domina eficazmente. En la medida que las domina, la forma de estas herramientas —las de las mujeres o las de los hombres— determina la imagen que se hace cada quien de sí mismo. En todas las sociedades preindustriales, al conjunto de tareas específicas que son propias de uno de los géneros, corresponde un conjunto de herramientas igualmente específicas. Incluso las herramientas que pertenecen a toda la comunidad no pueden ser utilizadas sino por la mitad de sus miembros. Al tomar una herramienta y al servirse de ella, las personas se relacionan esencialmente con el género que manipula esa herramienta preferentemente. La relación entre los géneros es por lo tanto y ante todo social. Las distintas herramientas determinan la complementariedad material de la vida.
+
+La separación de las herramientas puede conducir a una división extrema de los dominios. Pierre Clastres, quién vivió con los guayaki, en un capítulo conmovedor de su libro habla de un mundo así dividido en la selva amazónica. Allí, el dominio de las mujeres se organiza en torno a la canasta que cada una hubo de tejer tras la primera menstruación, y el de los hombres, en torno a su arco. No existe autoridad personal por encima de ambos dominios.[^f69] La división, constantemente experimentada, engendra la tensión que da cohesión a esta sociedad. Si alguna mujer toca el arco de un cazador éste pierde su virilidad y deviene _pané_. Su arco ya no le servirá, perderá su potencia sexual y será excluido de la caza; o bien habrá de languidecer y morirá, o bien habrá de vivir tras las chozas de las mujeres, recolectando su comida en una canasta desechada.
+
+## El género y las herramientas
+
+Pero no es necesario buscar en ámbitos exóticos los vínculos culturales entre el género y la herramienta. Nuestro pasado reciente nos puede proporcionar ejemplos que son a la vez más convincentes y más accesibles: los utensilios de nuestros abuelos, principalmente. Cuando yo me encontraba escribiendo este capítulo, fui huésped de una mujer del Québec nacionalista, una artista en su género: repostera que trabaja con sus instrumentos culinarios tradicionales. En su _boutique_, no lejos de Sherbrooke, además de sus pasteles, a sus clientes les ofrece un espacio que es una versión moderna del _studium_ medieval, un lugar de reflexión y discusión. A mí me invitó a leer estas páginas ante personas interesadas en esta materia. Una docena de viejos instrumentos agrícolas decoraban los muros del comedor. La anfitriona los había coleccionado porque eran de procedencia local y a ella le parecían bellos. Todos examinamos estas reliquias rurales, ninguna de las cuales tenía más de un siglo de antigüedad. Forzosamente tenían que tener algún nombre, pero la mayoría de los nombres habían sido olvidados y nadie supo adivinar la función de algunas de las herramientas. El propósito de otras era evidente: cavar, serrar, aunque todo el mundo ignoraba para qué cultivo o cuál madera habían sido destinadas. Y ni uno solo de los jóvenes franconorteamericanos presentes tenía la menor idea del género al que estaban vinculados los diferentes utensilios; si se habían destinado a la mano del hombre o a la de la mujer. La única persona que pudo decirlo fue una dama de avanzada edad.
+
+Mientras que en Norteamérica, incluso en Québec, a las herramientas se las ha despojado de género, éste sobrevive todavía en muchos terruños de Europa, aunque de manera desigual. En cierto lugar, los hombres manipulan la guadaña y las mujeres la hoz. En otro, ambos emplean la hoz, pero ésta difiere según el género. En Estiria, por ejemplo, la hoz de los hombres tiene filo, pues sirve para cortar, mientras que la de las mujeres tiene la hoja dentada y su curvatura es mayor, pues sirve para recoger las espigas. El gran inventario del trabajo campesino de Wiegelman[^f70] recoge cientos de ejemplos similares en una extraordinaria diversidad de lugares. En algunos valles de los Alpes, ambos géneros usan la guadaña, pero la mujer siega el forraje, mientras que el hombre, el centeno. Allá, solamente la mujer puede tocar los cuchillos de la cocina; acá, los dos pueden cortar el pan, pero una lo rebana y otro lo taja, con el filo del cuchillo hacia el pecho. Casi por doquier, los hombres son quienes siembran, pero en una región del alto Danubio son las mujeres quienes siembran y trillan —este lugar constituye una excepción, pues los hombres no tocan las semillas—. Aún más que los cultivos, al género se vinculan los animales. En cierto lugar, las mujeres alimentan a las vacas, pero jamás a las bestias de tiro. Más al oriente, las mujeres ordeñan las vacas de su granja, mientras que los hombres ordeñan las del patrón. A pocas horas de camino, sólo las muchachas desempeñan esta tareas. Los vínculos entre el género y la herramienta sobrevivieron durante la época en que las guerras devastaron a Europa, que sus ciudades fueron destruidas, que el crecimiento económico transformó la vida rural. Aunque imperan los pesticidas químicos, las segadoras-trilladoras y la televisión, ciertos utensilios presentan el anacronismo de seguir siendo típicos de uno de los géneros.
+
+Sin embargo, en su conjunto, el vínculo ha sido destruido, y con mayor ahínco en la Europa oriental que en la occidental. Sólo permanece en la memoria de los ancianos. Hará unos 10 años que un campesino serbio me relataba cómo se preparaba el forraje en la generación anterior. Describía la forma de recolectar, transportar y almacenar el heno como si hubiera sido un ballet, en el cual los hombres y las mujeres tenían sus pasos de danza respectivos. Mientras hablaba, la misma escena se desarrollaba ante nuestra vista, pero al estilo moderno. Toda la tarea se había transformado en una labor unisex que los “trabajadores” llevaban a cabo. El anciano miraba con una mezcla de tristeza y orgullo a la muchacha que conducía el tractor de la aldea. Había desaparecido al volante de la máquina el género que había perdurado a través de los siglos, adaptándose a condiciones siempre nuevas. Ha sido ampliamente demostrado que el vínculo del género masculino y el buey ha sobrevivido desde la prehistoria. Ni una sola de las antepasadas de la joven tractorista jamás hubo de alimentar a los bueyes o de uncirlos a la yunta. Esta característica de su género se remonta a la época en que su raza todavía no poseía la lengua eslava y aún vivía en puntos diferentes de Europa.
+
+## El género en los tributos feudales en el comercio y en los oficios artesanales
+
+Toda vida “primitiva” está fundada en esta separación de las herramientas.[^f71] Se puede observar tal división en la vida del cazador-recolector y también en la del agricultor-pastor, desde el periodo neolítico hasta los tiempos modernos. En las sociedades no urbanas, con raras excepciones, la línea divisoria de los géneros es nítida y patente. La economía de subsistencia coincide con la existencia del género. De allí resulta la fuerte propensión a considerar que el género es típico de la vida tribal y campesina. El género social por ende no se estudia —si es que se estudia— más que por los antropólogos. Los historiadores ignoran que el género impera en todas las épocas históricas, que forma parte integral de todas las grandes civilizaciones, y que si su dominio a veces se relajó, esto no sucedió salvo dentro de las élites decadentes, y aún así durante breves periodos.[^f72] La historia de la desaparición del género, durante los siglos XIX y XX, aún está por escribirse. No será posible poner al descubierto la descomposición del género en la sociedad industrial hasta que no se reconozca el capital interés histórico de esta cuestión. Aquí estudio tres ejemplos.
+
+### Los tributos feudales
+
+En la Edad Media, los campesinos, ya fueran aparceros o propietarios, estaban sujetos al pago del tributo señorial. Puesto que por lo general vivían al margen de la economía monetaria, era ése su solo excedente real, el único valor económico que producían. Calificar de “producción” sus demás actividades sería erróneo, pues este término implica hoy en día una transferencia de valor y de consumo que, para el campesino medieval, sólo podía consistir en el tributo. Aparte de esto, no hacía prácticamente nada que “rindiera”. Es esta ausencia de diferenciación entre las funciones de producción y de consumo la que contrapone de manera más nítida la subsistencia a la existencia económica.
+
+Gracias a cientos de contratos establecidos entre los campesinos y su señor durante los siglos IX al XII sabemos que el tributo se pagaba a la vez con productos y con trabajo. Y este tributo frecuentemente se exigía de manera específica a uno u otro de los géneros. Muchos contratos detallan lo que se debía por parte de cada uno de los géneros. Por ejemplo, Ingmar paga a la abadía con 15 días de trabajo (acompañado de dos bestias de tiro), más una oveja cada dos años; su mujer —o en caso de su muerte, una sirvienta— entregaría cinco pollos cada otoño. Los términos del contrato indican claramente que en el pago participan dos competencias que no son intercambiables, y que entre ambas no existe denominador común. Los “productos de las mujeres” y los “productos de los hombres” son dos cosas inconfundiblemente distintas. En cuanto a la Iglesia, lo que ésta prohíbe durante los días feriados no es el “trabajo servil” indeterminado. Especifica claramente que los _hombres_ no pueden cazar, talar árboles o levantar cercas; las _mujeres_ no pueden desyerbar, trasquilar ovejas o podar árboles. Ambos géneros por lo tanto no pueden producir indistintamente el excedente que se destina al tributo. Tanto el producto como las tareas obligatorias están vinculados a uno u otro género.[^f73]
+
+### El comercio
+
+El comercio también puede tener género. Y el comerciante no siempre es el hombre. Asimismo, la noción de que las mujeres sólo comercian en el mercado de la aldea, mientras los hombres vagabundean mucho más lejos, concuerda poco con la realidad. En Malasia, en el Sahel occidental, y en el Caribe no español, son las mujeres quienes se ocupan de los negocios en el hogar. Los circuitos comerciales de las mujeres están basados en sus contactos con su parentela, y los hombres no pueden en ningún caso insertarse en ellos. Ya sea que el comerció involucre la cerámica o la joyería, es la mujer quien viaja a las lejanas aldeas, y el hombre el que cuida el hogar. Puede suceder que para mantener a su marido en casa, la comerciante le imponga una segunda esposa, bajo la amenaza de abandonarlo si se niega a aceptarla —amenaza que todavía hoy en día se ejerce en el Senegal—. Bien sabe el hombre que lo que ella vende a él nadie se lo compraría si tomara el lugar de su mujer, y que además el hogar necesita esos ingresos. Al igual que el tributo feudal, también las mercancías tienen género. En el norte de Birmania hace falta haber perdido la razón para comprar en el mercado joyas vendidas por un hombre; éstas sólo pueden ser falsificaciones destinadas a los turistas.[^f74]
+
+### La artesanía
+
+También los trabajos manuales tienen género, y con frecuencia de forma compleja. No se trata nada más de aquellos que conciernen a la subsistencia: la cocina o las conservas alimenticias para el hogar, el hilado y el tejido del arnés del camello de la familia; sino las artesanías que se destinan a la venta. Éstas también están marcadas por el género. En los bazares de África septentrional, una costurera no puede remplazar a un sastre; y sin tener que indagar, bien se sabe que allí no puede haber mujer zapatera alguna. La vista aguzada para la percepción del género puede ver en un simple retazo de tela un esquema tan sutil pero tan real como una filigrana. Enfurtir, teñir, cortar, acabar, cada función exige diversas colaboraciones, algunas de las cuales se deben solamente a las mujeres, otras sólo a los hombres —sinfonía a cuatro manos de donde surge el objeto terminado—.
+
+Dos estudios recientes sobre los oficios en la Edad Media destacan el hecho de que muchos gremios permitían a las mujeres llegar a ser “maestras”. Así, en Colonia, durante el siglo XIV, la corporación de la seda (hilado y tejido) era únicamente femenina. Pero lo más sorprendente es que era posible encontrar mujeres en los gremios de los oficios netamente masculinos: en el siglo XIV hay mujeres a la cabeza de fundiciones que emplean más de una veintena de obreros y poseen herramientas pesadas, martillos accionados por molinos hidráulicos. Sucedía que por ser miembros del gremio, las viudas podían conservar en la familia el taller del difunto esposo. Sin embargo, sería absurdo deducir, con base en el estatus de tales “gerentes”, que las mujeres trabajaban el hierro codo a codo con los aprendices o compitiendo con ellos.[^f75]
+
+El tributo feudal, el comercio y los oficios artesanales no son más que ejemplos de dominios relacionados con la historia del género en las civilizaciones avanzadas. Pero el género no está limitado únicamente al presente de una época histórica dada, a las herramientas y a las actividades que tejen su vida cotidiana. También la memoria conserva la huella dual. Cuando una cultura celebra su pasado, asigna ciertas tareas a los hombres y otras a las mujeres. En Minot (norte de Borgoña) la misma mujer baña a los recién nacidos y a las personas que mueren. Desde épocas muy remotas, en las ocasiones solemnes siempre se preserva el género. Todavía hoy en día en Tracia, aunque los hombres pueden hablar de los difuntos y sus actos, sólo las mujeres pueden hablar a los muertos. Son ellas únicamente quienes se quejan, quienes lloran el deceso, quienes invocan la protección de los desaparecidos. Este acto, caracterizado por el género, tiene sus raíces en un pasado muy lejano.
+
+El género no es un rasgo pintoresco de la existencia primitiva que la vida urbana, la “producción” o las complejas operaciones del mercado hacen forzosamente desaparecer del tejido social. En las sociedades de avanzada cultura, el género florece. En la vida urbana medieval, al conjugarse con la especialización de los oficios y los artesanados, forma configuraciones nuevas y complejas mucho más difíciles de dilucidar que la división primitiva a la cual se han apegado los antropólogos.
+
+Nadie se ha arriesgado todavía a hacer la “historia del género”: al contrario de toda nueva “historia de la mujer”, éste sería un tema difícil de cernir. Resulta demasiado vasto para los historiadores del “sexo” y, en la historia de los “humanos”, desde Tucídides a la fecha, todo lo que de él se conserva es una sonrisa —la del gato de Cheshire—.
+
+## El género y el parentesco
+
+Los historiadores eluden la discusión del género al asignarle un reino puramente prehistórico —y por ende perteneciente a la antropología—. Pero también los antropólogos poseen sus mecanismos de evasión. Como los médicos que pierden de vista al enfermo para concentrarse en la enfermedad, descuidan el género al centrar su interés en el parentesco. Tal actitud se remonta al propio Lewis Henry Morgan, padre del estudio de los sistemas de parentesco, elaborados a mediados del siglo XIX. Al describir estos sistemas como estructuras de relaciones complejas entre individuos sexualmente divididos en hombres y mujeres, Morgan y los antropólogos ulteriores tienden a atenuar un hecho evidente: antes que todo, el parentesco estructura los ámbitos del género en su complementariedad. Son parientes aquellos que, en términos netamente definidos, pueden relacionarse a pesar de la línea de separación de los géneros. La esencia del parentesco consiste en fijar quién es quién en relación con quién, lo que es mucho más importante que establecer un marco en el que a ciertos hombres se les otorga el poder sobre ciertas mujeres. Además, el parentesco presupone dos géneros, entre los cuales se establece un vínculo. El género no solamente expresa lo que es un ser, sino lo que es en cierto momento, en qué lugar y con qué herramientas y palabras divide el espacio, el tiempo y las técnicas. La fascinación que ejerce el tabú del incesto en los científicos que han surgido de familias “normales”, les impide ver la división de los géneros que yace bajo el parentesco. Explicar el género a partir del parentesco es bastante similar a reconstituir un cuerpo a partir de sus radiografías. El género no es algo que se puede inferir del parentesco, ni tampoco reducir, según la moda estructuralista, a un aspecto de una dualidad cósmica.[^f76]
+
+Sin embargo, no puedo dejar de pensar que al hacer así del género una dualidad entre otras, se elude la obligación de buscar sus orígenes. Robert Graves habla de esta búsqueda imprescindible de _sus_ orígenes que debe conducir al poeta a los nidos de la Diosa Blanca, los nidos de la Pesadilla adornada “con el plumaje de aves proféticas y regados de mandíbulas y entrañas de poetas”. La tarea es aventurada y temible, tanto para el poeta como para el humano moderno desprovisto de género. El primero deberá atravesar los extensos yermos sin senderos de los pantanos y montes; el segundo, las ruinas y los desiertos fuera de los caminos trillados y de los lugares comunes.
+
+## El género y la unión conyugal
+
+Aunque con frecuencia la disfrazan, cubriéndola con densos velos, los antropólogos hacen de la pareja conyugal el meollo de su investigación. Postulan que como en su propio caso, tras todo ser hay procreadores ligados matrimonialmente. Su percepción sexuada de su origen personal, su etnocentrismo, deforman el objeto estudiado —y esto es lo que no comprenden—. Tanto el historiador como el antropólogo son prisioneros de esta idea preconcebida, que les impide ver lo que hace única y singular a la pareja moderna. Por esta razón el estudio del género y de la actividad genital debe empezar con el reconocimiento de que la palabra “matrimonio” está tan privada de género como los vocablos “rol” o “intercambio”.
+
+En el siglo XII nace en las sociedades occidentales un tipo único de existencia, una “cosa pública” basada en la apropiación del excedente que se produce en los hogares constituidos por parejas conyugales. Sabemos que tal apropiación puede lograrse de diversas maneras. Karl Polanyi y sus alumnos han propuesto una tipología para estas formas. Pero la pareja conyugal, en cuanto unidad que produce un excedente, crea un tipo particular. El nuevo factor esencial no es el tamaño de la familia que comparte el mismo techo, ni la capacidad de organizar a los parientes, sirvientes, invitados o esclavos en el seno de esta unidad, sino la función _económica_ de la pareja. La etnología no conoce nada comparable a esta especie de familia, condición antropológica _sine qua non_, que es común en todas las formas sucesivas y aparentemente distintas que produjeron en Europa y en el mundo occidental la acumulación de los excedentes y su organización por el Estado. Desde el punto de vista antropológico, la occidentalización puede definirse como la convergencia de numerosas estructuras de parentesco diferentes en el modelo del hogar conyugal.
+
+A lo largo de este proceso de fusión, los dos sentidos del vocablo “matrimonio” se asimilaron progresivamente entre sí. Por una parte, el matrimonio designa los ritos y las festividades de las nupcias que en casi todas las sociedades existen y, por otra, designa el estado matrimonial, que no se encuentra en muchas sociedades. En la Europa medieval, el matrimonio adquirió una importancia mayor. Aquello que esencialmente había sido una ceremonia destinada a vincular conjuntamente a dos familias emparentadas por un tejido complejo de alianzas, se convirtió en el suceso mediante el cual dos individuos se unen de por vida, dentro de la nueva unidad económica de la pareja, una entidad fiscalizable. Pero tal deslizamiento fue encubierto por el hecho de que el “matrimonio” vino a significar indistintamente las nupcias y la resultante unidad de la pareja conyugal.
+
+Hay un rasgo que es importante señalar retrospectivamente, y es que en estos primeros tiempos de la producción conyugal, las actividades cotidianas creadoras del excedente estaban estrictamente determinadas por el género. Las prescripciones de la Iglesia con frecuencia interpretaban esta división y la reforzaban. Pero a medida que la pareja conyugal se iba convirtiendo en la unidad fiscalizable fundamental, el excedente creado perdía su género tradicional. La mujer ya no acudía ella misma a entregar al señor los huevos; como representante de la familia, al hombre ahora le tocaba pagar el tributo. Es cierto que las tareas obligatorias durante mucho tiempo diferenciaron todavía a los géneros. Pero cada vez más los tributos asumían una forma monetaria, las monedas locales eran remplazadas por las del Estado moderno, y la pareja conyugal mostraba ser una unidad productiva flexible, superior a cualquier otra forma anterior de organización familiar. Por estar fundada en el género, siguió subsistiendo en gran medida por sí misma, mientras que la capacidad creciente del Estado y de la Iglesia para imponer funciones genéricas nuevas, extrañas o contrarias a las normas tradicionales, hizo a la pareja capaz de adaptarse al rápido cambio tecnológico. El surgimiento de la producción del hogar conyugal es la condición antropológica de la formación inicial, en Europa, de campesinos y ciudadanos urbanos que son diferentes a los agricultores, comerciantes y artesanos del resto del mundo.
+
+La extensión de la producción intragenérica, pero conyugal, no fue más que la primera etapa del proceso que creó la separación de Europa respecto a todas las demás culturas. En la Europa cristiana la unión conyugal constituía una homogeneidad fundamental, a pesar de que se asumía de diversas maneras en las sociedades. Hubo variaciones según las épocas y los lugares, y muchas comunidades permanecieron fuera de la corriente general —incluso, en algunos casos, hasta después de la segunda Guerra Mundial—. Este matrimonio económicamente productivo fue un _primer_ paso; no implicaba la desaparición del género. Durante 500 años, del siglo XIII hasta principios del siglo XIX, se extendió un tipo de matrimonio donde el hombre y la mujer, socios en la producción matrimonial, conservaban las tareas de su respectivo género. Tanto la estructura feudal como la organización mercantilista de la cosa pública, están fundadas en el excedente producido por la pareja conyugal, todavía con género.[^f77]
+
+Pero he aquí que en el siglo XIX, y de forma bastante brusca, las tareas intragenéricas del hogar son remplazadas por la división _económica_ del trabajo asalariado y del trabajo fantasma, que se asignan de forma discriminatoria en función de las características sexuales, recién descubiertas, de los cónyuges. Sólo al llegar esta segunda etapa, los socios conyugales, económicamente distintos y privados de su género, se convierten en la base de la producción industrial. Y las parejas de esta especie habrán de proporcionar a los antropólogos que han nacido dentro de su marco, la norma de la “estructura libidinal” y la percepción que de ésta tendrán. Para ellos, que ven en el parentesco el resultado de una preferencia y de una asociación sexuales, el género sólo puede carecer de sentido, cuando no les resulta absolutamente aterrador.
+
+# Los dominios del género y el medio vernáculo
+
+EN LA SOCIEDAD del género, ni el espacio ni el tiempo son neutros. Lo que Einstein denominó el “espacio-tiempo” es en la cultura vernácula una función de dos movimientos ambiguos, cada cual en sí único. Cada género se desplaza a su propio ritmo en su camino propio, y el medio vernáculo forma una especie de contrapunto de esta sutil danza. Es por esto que una parte del medio vernáculo siempre permanecerá en el punto ciego de los hombres. Lo que saben de esta parte velada no lo aprenden sino indirectamente. _Aquí_, los hombres no tienen el derecho a la palabra; _allá_, lo tienen las mujeres. Ser hombre significa estar consciente de que las mujeres saben cosas que los hombres ignoran, que poseen vocablos para designarlas y cierto poder sobre ellas.
+
+## Espacio tiempo y género
+
+Los lugares y las horas determinan quién hace qué, quién usa qué y en qué momento. El género determina que la mujer berebere se apoye contra la pared oriental de una habitación, mientras que la parte externa de la misma pared está reservada al hombre. El trazado de la línea de separación de los géneros determina en qué territorios, en qué ocasiones y hasta en qué grado los dos géneros pueden entremezclarse. En cierto valle de los Alpes, ambos se reúnen en la era, él con el mayal y ella con la criba. Río abajo, este espacio es dominio exclusivo de los hombres. De la misma manera que se encuentran separados, así los géneros se entremezclan distintamente según la cultura y la época.[^f78] A veces gobiernan territorios totalmente separados, a veces se entrelazan como los arabescos celtas del _Libro de Kells_. Hay lugares donde una canasta no se teje, una hoguera no se enciende, sin la dualidad de las manos masculinas y femeninas. Cada cultura conjuga los géneros a su manera, desde la cuna a la tumba. Existen lugares donde los muchachos y las muchachas viven todos juntos, comunitariamente, durante algunos años, tras lo cual se instalan en sus respectivos territorios.
+
+A lo largo de su notable obra sobre las “maneras de hacer” en la cocina, el lavado de la ropa y la costura en Minot, una pequeña aldea francesa, Yvonne Verdier describe, desde el punto de vista femenino, esta sutil textura. Así, cuando se mata al cerdo, únicamente a la mujer le toca elegir el animal que será sacrificado, pero es el hombre quien fija el día de la matanza. Como si se tratara de un minueto, ambos ejecutan decenas de pasos bien armonizados. Las mujeres preparan la longaniza y los hombres salan la manteca. Pero, mientras que en Minot solamente las mujeres menopáusicas pueden sacar la carne salada de la despensa, en una aldea próxima no pueden penetrar este espacio masculino. Cada aldea baila al son de su propia música.
+
+Recientemente, en su obra sobre _El marido y la mujer en la sociedad rural_ francesa,[^f79] Martine Segalen ha desbrozado un campo nuevo describiendo sus ritmos complementarios. Analiza de forma detallada la correspondencia recíproca de las tareas específicas de los géneros, y las distingue de manera explícita de los roles, del estatus y del rango. Examina con óptica femenina la arquitectura de las granjas y los trabajos de los agricultores; recoge proverbios y fotografías e interpreta pinturas antiguas y estudios etnológicos para reconstituir, partiendo de las pautas de comportamiento que sobrevivieron, cómo eran las cosas a mediados del siglo XIX. Descubre relaciones entre hombres y mujeres mucho menos regidas por la familia y el parentesco que por las necesidades de hogares basados en la interdependencia armoniosa de las manos femeninas y masculinas. Describe a hombres y mujeres que realizan sus tareas cotidianas más como miembros de su género que como los elementos constitutivos individuales de una pareja apareada gracias al matrimonio. La pareja no pesa mucho en el hogar rural francés del siglo XIX. Tanto el mito de la brutal dominación masculina como el del romántico idilio campesino tergiversan la realidad.
+
+Según Martine Segalen, es el hogar lo que media entre el individuo y la comunidad rural, y no ambos cónyuges, la pareja. Si el hogar se desintegra y sus miembros no actúan de conformidad con las exigencias de sus respectivos géneros, será la comunidad quien castigará directamente al individuo ofensor. Por ejemplo, en el norte de Francia la hortaliza debe binarse en el mes de abril; ésta es tarea de la mujer. Si para el primero de mayo la tierra aún no ha sido removida, ante su ventana aparecerá un maniquí de paja con una azada en los brazos. En cuanto al bruto que golpea a su mujer, será objeto de una cencerrada: se le paseará en una carreta por toda la aldea, embarrado de lodo, entre las burlas de las personas y el estrépito de ollas y cacerolas. Si, al contrario, un hombre se deja pegar por su esposa, también tendrá derecho al paseo, pero atado sobre un asno, montado al revés y con la cola de la bestia en las manos.[^f80]
+
+Mientras la separación de los géneros sea la regla, se mantendrán estas prácticas, que han asegurado eficazmente la supervivencia de esta comunidad específica. Han sido acuñados diversos términos para designar la adhesión normativa a un código que ha sido sancionado por la supervivencia. La antropología rural habla de la “ética de la subsistencia”. E. P. Thompson emplea el concepto de “economía moral”, respecto a las poblaciones que por lo general son más urbanas. Constituyen términos sólidos, pues nos permiten comparar el sentimiento de lo que se considera correcto bajo la égida del género, con una posible norma moderna, norma que corresponde a los postulados de la escasez. Estos dos términos afirman que el derecho de todo aldeano, de todo miembro del pueblo a la supervivencia pura y simple es la regla suprema del comportamiento _común_, y para nada el derecho aislado de un individuo. Expresan una actitud, una orientación que protege a los más débiles del naufragio. Enuncian el derecho a una decorosa existencia consuetudinaria, aunque tal derecho no se formule sino cuando hay que luchar para defenderlo. Pero la “ética de la subsistencia” o la “economía moral” son nociones modernas que hablan de pautas de comportamiento apropiado, que a lo largo de la historia se han dado dentro del género. Por lo tanto, yo mismo prefiero no retomar los términos de “moralidad” o de “ética” en su acepción neutra actual, y buscar otros términos para hablar del imperativo que otorga a los géneros sus normas.
+
+Para nuestros contemporáneos es difícil reconstituir el sentimiento de haber faltado al propio género, a la vez porque este sentimiento es tan vernáculo y por lo tanto tan “agramático” como el dominio del género mismo, y porque se ha disipado al mismo tiempo que el género. No se trata de sentir vergüenza o culpa, al menos en el sentido actual de estos vocablos. Yves Castan ha investigado lo que la gente de Languedoc llamaba la _honnêteté_ (la probidad) en el periodo de 1715 a 1780.[^f81] Estudió las minutas de los escribanos forenses relacionadas con delitos de alteración de la paz pública. Pudo explorar de esta manera uno de las raros inventarios del habla común de la gente sencilla desprovista de instrucción. Una parte de su trabajo muestra de qué forma la probidad obligaba a actuar conforme al género, hasta en las cosas más insignificantes. Por ejemplo, cuando llegaban visitas a casa, era _ella_ quien tenía que ir por los vasos, preparar la ensalada, servir el vino sin que pareciera que escuchaba la conversación y sin participar en ella. Era ésa la conducta que se esperaba de una mujer, pues en cuanto tal, ella para defender los intereses del hogar tenía medios mucho más eficaces que la discusión directa entre los hombres. Si ella se inmiscuyera en la conversación, cometería una falta en relación con su género, pues perdería el poder real que poseen las murmuraciones y los comadreos.[^f82] En cambio, le tocaba proteger el hogar contra el cobrador de impuestos, gritando que se encontraba sola en casa —en cuyo caso éste no podía traspasar el umbral—. También debía tomar partido por sus hijos en un altercado, aunque ellos fueran totalmente culpables. La probidad le exigía, cuando fuera necesario, atacar al enemigo con uñas y dientes. En cuanto al hombre, la probidad le exigía exactamente lo contrario. De él se esperaba, en el caso en que la mujer hubiera defendido al vástago, que lo castigara, a veces moliéndolo a palos brutalmente.[^f83]
+
+Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie ha explorado la relación entre el hogar y el género en la misma región del sur de Francia, pero en una época mucho más antigua. Analizó los registros que mantuvo el futuro papa Benedicto XII cuando, siendo un joven obispo e inquisidor, sometió a varias docenas de habitantes de una pequeña aldea de las montañas —Montaillou— de quienes se sospechaba que eran herejes cátaros, a hábiles y rigurosos interrogatorios. De manera extremadamente sutil, los obligó a revelar innumerables detalles sobre su vida cotidiana, registrando palabra tras palabra las respuestas de esos campesinos y pastores de los Pirineos septentrionales. Con base en estas respuestas, de una antigüedad de seis siglos y medio, Le Roy Ladurie realizó su trabajo. Yo no sé de otro documento que proporcione una visión a la vez de primera mano y tan exhaustiva de una comunidad, respecto a lo que la gente sentía sobre sus hogares y su territorio común, sobre lo que esperaban y toleraban unos de los otros. Cada una de las víctimas de esta inquisición vuelve a la vida como persona, no solamente cuando se comporta de una manera que el obispo aceptaría, sino sobre todo cuando obedece los imperativos de su género en formas que el inquisidor desea saber detalladamente. Y, página tras página, la _domus_, la “casa”, en el sentido más poderoso del término, significa el techo bajo el cual, y el territorio en el que dos géneros interactúan: la cocina, los bienes y la tierra, los hijos y la familia en un sentido extendido, incluyendo los esclavos y los huéspedes.
+
+Más que la gente, la _domus_ parece ser el sujeto de la historia —la unidad social básica—. La casa, a la vez construcción y familia, vincula a hombres y mujeres a sus posesiones, las cuales determinan sus relaciones genéricas recíprocas. Cuando se exploran los interrogatorios judiciales de estos aldeanos occitanos del siglo XIII, resulta evidente que aún no tienen la obsesión de la tierra y su tenencia, cosa que será típica del campesino europeo tras la Edad Media; para ellos, la _domus_ es lo que importa, más todavía que el cónyuge o el hijo. No es la familia, en el sentido restricto del término, la que subsiste en la autarquía, sino la _domus;_ es ésta la que se reproduce en su descendencia. Aquí, en Montaillou, las mujeres de la casa se encargan del fogón, de la cocina, de la hortaliza, de la pastura de los animales y de acarrear el agua. Los hombres cuidan los campos, los bosques y las ovejas, con la ayuda ocasional de una mujer de la _domus_ o de una sirvienta contratada para ello. La vida material es creada por el hogar, el principal sujeto activo, a través de sus hombres y mujeres.[^f84]
+
+En las tierras etruscas del centro de Italia, una misma palabra latina sirve para designar el sujeto central de la historia, la _domus_, y sus divinidades tutelares, los _lares_. Son dioses antiguos, cuyos órganos sexuales, ya sea el falo o la vulva, están señaladamente representados. Juntos protegen las márgenes de los campos. Se les venera tradicionalmente en las encrucijadas, aunque sus efigies se conservan sobre el fogón. Son objeto de un culto diurno, aunque surjan de las profundidades de la tierra, residencia de los muertos, para velar por el orden de la casa. Y la casa misma, el “hogar”, la fundación doméstica en torno al fogón, también se denomina _lar_. Este vocablo podría servir como un término técnico para designar aquella realidad de la cual la _domus_ es un ejemplo específico.
+
+## El cuerpo y el género
+
+El género modela los cuerpos como los cuerpos modelan el espacio, y a su vez son modelados por sus configuraciones. El cuerpo en acción, con sus movimientos y sus ritmos, sus gestos y sus cadencias, modela el hogar; éste es algo más que un refugio, una tienda de campaña o una casa. Vivir en algún lado significa hacer la propia casa allí, tanto trayendo hijos al mundo como plantando árboles y construyendo muros. En la cultura vernácula, habitar y vivir son coincidentes. Al manejar las herramientas que están ligadas al género de manera específica y patente, la vida vernácula teje un capullo genérico en un nicho biológico. Toda vida es morada, formación de una morada. Los vestigios de las moradas sobreviven del mismo modo que las osamentas. Los espacios inhabitados pronto se convierten en un desierto.
+
+Construirse un hogar significa invadir los territorios de otra vida, la vida salvaje, a fin de crear campos, pastizales, lugares para cultivar las formas domésticas de la vida —los cereales, los asnos y las bacterias sin las cuales la mantequilla no puede cuajar—. Entre los nichos ecológicos posibles, la vivienda constituye una clase aparte, pero su carácter particular ha quedado más oscurecido que iluminado por el reciente discurso ecológico. El movimiento ecológico ciertamente engendró un sentido común nuevo, pero también alentó sutilmente el sexismo al enriquecer un lenguaje neutro o, dicho de otro modo, sexista. Los términos de la ecología, de reciente ingreso en el vocabulario de las palabras clave, deben utilizarse con prudencia.
+
+El hogar no es un nido ni tampoco un garaje. El ecologista es capaz de llamar a estos tres “nichos” o “hábitats”. Para el filósofo se trata de sitios en tres tipos de espacios, cada cual creado en virtud de una especie diferente de acción. El nido (biológico), el garaje (técnico) y la habitación (histórica) engendran espacios heterogéneos. Por instinto, el animal “marca” su territorio. El nido es la modalidad espacial de la reproducción instintiva de la especie. El garaje es exactamente lo contrario, pues ha sido concebido para estacionar los vehículos, partiendo de la suposición de la escasez de espacio. El nido, por su parte, supone la porosidad del espacio y la vitalidad de la materia.
+
+El apartamento moderno procede del mismo tipo de espacio para el cual se diseñan los garajes. Se construye económicamente, es decir, mediante la agregación de módulos espacio-temporales sin género, y su función consiste en responder a las necesidades imputadas a sus habitantes. Y por lo general está vinculado a sistemas de transporte. Tanto el garaje como el apartamento han sido construidos racional y económicamente con el propósito de almacenar durante la noche un recurso productivo. Ambos ofrecen seguridad para, y contra, lo que allí se guarda: sus muros están asegurados contra los ocasionales daños que los niños y las defensas de los autos pueden causar, así como niños y autos están asegurados contra los accidentes. El apartamento es un almacén que sirve para confinar a las personas, a quienes se considera frágiles y peligrosas. Es imposible para los ocupantes “hacerse su hogar” allí; el espacio está estructurado y equipado para el trabajo fantasma, únicamente. Es un domicilio a donde llegan los cables y las vías urbanas, el cartero y el policía, a fin de comunicar a aquellos que todavía se encuentran sanos espiritual y físicamente, aquellos civiles que sobreviven “en libertad” gracias al valium, a la televisión y a sus fantasías sexuales. Es el lugar reservado para el comercio carnal entre humanos sin género, el único sitio donde los dos sexos aún pueden compartir el retrete.[^f85]
+
+En Montaillou, en Minot o en la aldea mexicana de hoy en día, el hogar no es un territorio delimitado por animales que se reproducen porque sus genes lo exigen, ni una vivienda especialmente destinada a compañeros sexuales, mezquinamente dispuesta en un espacio económico. Es una vivienda que está hecha _por_ la gente, no _para_ ella, es un espacio engendrado por los cuerpos de aquellos que la habitan, es el vestigio ambiental de la vida vernácula. No es un ámbito para el engendramiento ni una cómoda caja fuerte; es el reflejo de los hombres y las mujeres en su medio ambiente. Por tal razón, _estar en casa_ significa algo diferente para ambos géneros.
+
+## La procreación y el género
+
+Así como un tejido nace del entrelazamiento, en ángulo recto, de la urdimbre ininterrumpida y de la trama transversal, las acciones que engendran el hogar, las acciones que engendran el espacio vital, son necesariamente diferentes según los géneros. Los hombres y las mujeres se crean su hogar mediante cada uno de sus movimientos. Pero sólo la mujer crea la sucesión ininterrumpida de la vida. No importa que la cultura sea matriarcal o patriarcal, que sean las mujeres o los hombres quienes detenten el poder, vivir y habitar significan para las mujeres, y para ellas únicamente, parir cuerpos, dar la vida. En cierta cultura, los hombres construyen el refugio, levantan bardas o hacen terrazas de cultivo en las colinas; en otra, las mismas tareas las realizan las mujeres. Pero solamente las mujeres pueden dar vida a otros cuerpos. Importa poco la representación del creador que la mitología local impone —madre, padre o andrógino; poco importa el nombre que se le dará al hijo—, el de su madre, padre o tío. Este espacio particular, y el tiempo que le corresponde, que hacen del hogar algo más que un nido o garaje, _solamente_ es creado por las mujeres, porque sólo ellas procrean cuerpos.
+
+Son éstas ideas que pueden parecer poéticas, oscuras o románticas, hasta que recordamos que en el espacio del departamento moderno las mujeres se encuentran doblemente _desplazadas_, y que ellas lo dicen claramente. La invasión y la usurpación del espacio normativo frustran a las mujeres en su carne de una manera que los hombres no pueden experimentar. La arquitectura unisex es necesariamente sexista. Su concepción amenaza a las mujeres en dos sentidos, en su carne y en sus ritmos: se obstaculiza su potencial contribución a la creación del hogar y se les excluye del contexto específico de su género; sufren más que los hombres por ambas razones. Para ellas, crear “su hogar” no equivale más que a cambiar los muebles de lugar. Despojadas de su propio dominio, han sido privadas de la posibilidad de traer hijos al mundo en el seno de su género, en el seno de su contexto de mujeres en su hogar.
+
+Al ser transformadas en productoras económicas —remuneradas o no, en un empleo o en la casa—, a las mujeres se les priva, tanto como a los hombres, de las condiciones ambientales que les permitirían vivir en un lugar _habitándolo_, y al hacerlo, crear su hogar. En la medida que las mujeres y los hombres se vuelven más productivos económicamente, menos poseen un medio de vida. Pero esta pérdida de un hogar intragenérico, el cual ha sido remplazado por “módulos habitacionales”, priva a las mujeres de la amplitud indispensable para crear una existencia generadora de espacio. Cada cual en su soledad procrea individuos en un espacio económico neutro, en un mundo hecho de ladrillos espacio-temporales estandarizados. En este sentido, el espacio de un departamento y el de la sala de partos de un hospital son igualmente rígidos y carentes de género; el parto en el seno del género es allí imposible. Aquellas que han querido dar a luz en casa, en su apartamento, y que lo recuerdan gratamente, aunque con cierta desilusión, en comparación con la estancia en una maternidad, saben que la topología de su cuerpo no está hecha ni para parir camadas ni para la reproducción estandarizada; no está hecha para el nido ni para la línea de montaje; está hecha para crear, al parir, el espacio y el tiempo vernáculos.
+
+El espacio vernáculo no sólo da forma al paisaje y a la casa, no sólo está en contacto con el pasado y aún más allá, sino que también se extiende en el cuerpo mismo, y esto de manera diferente en hombres y mujeres. De ahí resulta que la arquitectura económica, que está desprovista de género y que forma un espacio-tiempo internacional rígidamente definido, _invierte_ a las mujeres, transformando al género femenino en el segundo sexo. La “perspectiva clínica”, como la ha llamado Michel Foucault, que se desarrolló durante el siglo XIX, vacía el cuerpo del género.[^f86]
+
+Hay estudios recientes que han analizado con cuidado las etapas de esta extirpación corporal del género, la cual se da a la par de una reconstitución anatómica de la mujer en cuanto ser humano singular, dotado de órganos sexuales aunque escasa capilaridad. Pero la innovación decisiva de esta “humanización” polarizada de la mujer es el nuevo sitio que se le ha asignado al alumbramiento, el cual es objeto de estudio y de reglamentación pública. Aproximadamente hasta 1780 los tratados médicos y la legislación civil consideran que éste pertenece al dominio de las mujeres. La cesación de las menstruaciones, la confirmación del embarazo, el mal parto, el aborto, el alumbramiento, la lactancia, como también el infanticidio y los cuidados del bebé, todo ello es asunto de las mujeres. No es que estas cosas sean privadas o secretas, pero están relacionadas con el género. No se llama al médico más que para los partos verdaderamente difíciles, a fin de que la mujer no se arriesgue, si hay un accidente, a ser acusada de haber matado a su bebé, aunque por lo general las autoridades no se conmueven por el deceso de un recién nacido. En la lengua como en el discurso médico y legal, traer al mundo hijos es claramente asunto de las mujeres.
+
+Es sólo en la última generación del _Ancien Régime_ cuando evoluciona la percepción de las mujeres como fuente de vida. Durante este periodo, la lengua jurídica traspasa el umbral de la vulva de la misma manera que antiguamente el inquisidor había traspasado el de la _domus_. Se empieza a ver en el feto al ciudadano futuro. La ley se emplea en regir la matriz a fin de proteger la vida que contiene. El principal agresor, la amenaza contra el ciudadano o el futuro soldado, en adelante será la madre, particularmente si es pobre o no tiene marido. Hacia 1785, la policía prusiana inicia el registro de las mujeres solteras cuya regla ha cesado. Las plantas abortivas clásicas se encuentran entre los primeros fármacos cuya venta se prohíbe, o que sucesivamente los farmacéuticos sólo entregarán bajo prescripción; en los jardines públicos, la policía arranca las plantas de ruda.
+
+El vientre materno es declarado territorio público. Las parteras sólo pueden ejercer su oficio tras seguir estudios formales y obtener un diploma. Tal transformación de la vecina experimentada en partera especializada, con licencia o ilegal, es uno de los acontecimientos clave del profesionalismo mutilador. Y la lengua refleja este cambio. El alumbramiento deja de ser un acontecimiento femenino que las mujeres viven entre sí. En el vocabulario de la policía médica la matriz se convierte en el órgano especializado que produce hijos. A las mujeres se les describe como matrices ambulantes.
+
+A mediados del siglo XIX, los ginecólogos comienzan a colonizar el nuevo territorio del vientre materno incluso antes de iniciarse los dolores del parto. Hacia fines de siglo, ante todo se preocupan por desinfectar el canal por donde saldrá el vástago, a fin de protegerlo contra las enfermedades que la madre podría comunicar durante el parto. En el siglo XVIII, mientras más pobre fuera una mujer, más se podía sospechar que intentaría abortar; en el siglo XIX se le considera particularmente propensa a infectar al hijo. De cualquier modo, su pobreza proporciona el pretexto para aislarla de la compañía de otras mujeres y hacerla parir en un establecimiento, cosa que al mismo tiempo la pone a disposición de los futuros médicos para que se entrenen en la práctica. Y a principios del siglo XX, más precozmente en Massachusetts que en Berlín o en Milán, el parto neutro de hospital —hasta entonces considerado como una precaución contra las vilezas o las enfermedades de las mujeres— empieza a ser presentado como un beneficio para la madre misma. La intrusión del cuidado médico fuera del género opera una metamorfosis en el vientre materno, haciendo de éste una especie de garaje prenatal. Yo veo en esta vigilancia profesional intensiva del embarazo el ritual solemnizador de la victoria final del espacio-tiempo imperial sobre el espacio-tiempo vernáculo.[^f87]
+
+En este ensayo quiero mostrar la oposición entre una existencia genérica y una economía sexista. Pero no intento dilucidar por qué un régimen sexista opera perseverantemente en contra de las mujeres. La razón principal de esta limitación que me impongo es que pienso que solamente una filosofía auténtica del género podría proporcionar una explicación satisfactoria —y tal filosofía aún no existe—. No obstante, si yo intentara explicar por qué la pérdida del género es más perjudicial para las mujeres, comenzaría por el análisis de los efectos distintos y diversos que el espacio-tiempo imperial y fuera de género produce en el cuerpo de los hombres y de las mujeres.
+
+## La influencia del género
+
+El género es vernáculo. Es tan resistente y adaptable, tan precario y vulnerable como el habla vernácula. Es obliterado, al igual que ésta, por la Instrucción, y su existencia rápidamente se olvida o incluso se niega. Son muchos quienes hoy en día no se acuerdan más del género que del habla vernácula, e incluso no serían capaces de imaginarlos. Para el bachiller, el habla vernácula de sus padres es un dialecto en comparación con la lengua materna que se le ha enseñado en la escuela. Para la joven egresada de la universidad que regresa con su diploma a la provincia mexicana, el género de su madre puede muy bien parecer como una servidumbre de la cual _ella misma_ ha escapado.
+
+El profundo contraste entre el habla vernácula y la lengua materna inculcada, con frecuencia es evidente para los padres e inasequible para los hijos. Ellos perciben que estos dos medios de expresión oral pertenecen a mundos irreconciliables. Pero la diferenciación entre el género y el sexo es todavía más difícil de captar. Efectivamente, ahí encontramos dos especies de dualidades cuyas complementariedades respectivas se sitúan en planos diferentes. Una y otra son, en verdad, construcciones sociales. Yo adjunto al género como al sexo los epítetos “masculino” o “femenino”, porque ambos son construcciones sociales que implican la referencia a una distinción biológica; pero género y sexo no son dualidades del mismo orden. El género es sustantivo; el sexo, adjetivo.
+
+El género es una realidad primordial. Es también una entidad social que exige un complemento; jamás está completo en sí mismo. Los géneros no se comprenden sino juntos, como el yin y el yang. Como en el símbolo yin/yang, solamente desde fuera se puede ver que lo negro y lo blanco forman un todo. No sucede lo mismo con el sexo en el neutro económico. Aquí el sexo es un atributo secundario, la propiedad de un individuo, una característica del ser humano. El rol de los sexos es algo que se adjunta a la existencia de lo humano. Ciertamente, el individuo no alcanza a percibir su sexo como un rol más, como una vestimenta entre otras, una prenda de trabajo o de gala. Este rol no se puede cambiar a voluntad: las mujeres, hundidas en el suyo, bien lo saben. Pero se quiera o no, tener un rol sexual —ya sea aceptado o padecido— es otra cosa enteramente que pertenecer a un género. Decir que se es hombre o mujer es totalmente diferente de decir que se es del sexo masculino o femenino. A diferencia del género, que significa que se es un círculo o bien un cuadrado, el sexo es un rol básico sobre el cual se pueden edificar otros roles. En el ámbito vernáculo se nace o se crece en el seno del género; pero el rol del sexo se adquiere. Podemos reprocharle a nuestros padres o a la sociedad el habernos “asignado” un rol sexual, pero no podemos culpar a nadie por el hecho de que poseamos un habla vernácula o un género vernáculo.
+
+## El género y el universo conceptual
+
+Por doquier muchachos y muchachas asumen precozmente sus respectivos géneros. Al llegar el destete, ya poseen maneras típicamente diferentes. En el Mashrik, corazón del Islam entre Egipto y Persia, donde no se desteta a los infantes antes de la edad de dos años —y los niños después que las niñas—, existen docenas de dichos relacionados con las formas distintas de mimar a un género o al otro. En ciertas lenguas, donde los hombres y las mujeres emplean un término diferente para designar al mismo tío, esa palabra propia de su género es frecuentemente una de las primeras que aprenden y pronuncian. Y los deberes propios de cada género son inculcados desde la más tierna edad. Entre los bembas, a los nueve años una niña sabe reconocer 40 variedades de hongos, mientras que un niño distingue los cantos de las aves.[^f88] Vemos aquí que la división cognitiva más fundamental en la evolución de los conceptos es la del género. Sin embargo, desde hace tres generaciones la epistemología psicológica se desentiende del tema. La identificación y la oposición del género forman parte del desarrollo empírico inicial, que todavía no es verbal. Piaget ha creado para estas primeras distinciones el calificativo “infralógicas”, a fin de significar que no sólo son prelógicas. Pero al parecer la más profunda, la del género, lo evade.
+
+El recién nacido no puede llegar a formar un concepto más que captando físicamente lo que está “ahí”. No es capaz de discernir sino extendiendo los brazos, tocando, asiendo, abrazando. No se trata de movimientos “espontáneos”, de simples reflejos biológicos en los que no interviene la cultura. Los ojos de la madre, que miran de modo diferente al niño y a la niña, imprimen desde entonces un ritmo diferente en los ojos del bebé. Así, el bebé adquiere su primer contacto, su aprehensión inicial del mundo, mediante su cuerpo y bajo el dictado del género, de conformidad con su sexo biológico. Allí donde el género impera, crecer no significa jamás convertirse en un “humano”, solamente un neutro lógico, en un _niño_ de género no especificado.
+
+Cuando desde la cuna hombres y mujeres captan el mundo según dos maneras complementarias, desarrollan dos modelos distintos de conceptualización del universo. Un estilo de percepción ligado con un género que corresponde a un dominio de herramientas y de tareas propias de este género. Los dos géneros no sólo ven las mismas realidades con una perspectiva y con matices diferentes, sino que aprenden precozmente que toda cosa tiene su envés.
+
+Los vocablos clave fuera de género del discurso contemporáneo nos obligan a describir la bilateralidad ambigua de la realidad vernácula como una guerra de sexos inaugurada por Adán y Eva. Hoy en día la reacción ante la alteridad ya no es el miedo sino la comparación envidiosa. Los rituales que orquestan la danza de la vida, marcando los cuerpos, entremezclando los géneros y luego separándolos, nos los presentan como una educación sexual primitiva. La extraña aberración que nos impulsa a imaginar a “la madre” que habla de Yocasta acarrea un mito _monstruoso_, una visión tan anormal como la de atribuir a un muchacho las pasiones de Edipo. El sexo y el género no pueden cohabitar en el mismo universo conceptual. La intención de conjugarlos necesariamente conduce al sexismo científico de la antropología.
+
+En este ámbito, casi siempre la perspectiva corresponde al observador _masculino_, y por lo tanto es más que extensamente sexista —cosa que hoy se sabe muy bien—. La aplastante mayoría de los etnógrafos son hombres. Las raras mujeres que trabajan en esta disciplina son discípulas o rivales de sus colegas masculinos. Para un investigador es tentador interrogar de preferencia a los _hombres_, quienes, por lo demás, con mayor frecuencia que las mujeres, saben una lengua vehicular —el hausa que se habla en el mercado, el árabe de la escuela coránica, el francés si han servido en el ejército—, lo cual reduce las dificultades de la comunicación verbal. Además, resulta decepcionante interrogar a las mujeres, porque, como observa Edwin Ardener: “Las jóvenes ríen, las viejas gruñen, encuentran las preguntas ridículas, rehúsan hablar con un extraño”. Por añadidura, los hombres impiden llegar a ellas, con el pretexto de que las mujeres son peligrosas, están impuras, o hay que protegerlas. En consecuencia, es a los hombres a quienes los etnógrafos hacen las preguntas que confirman sus propios modelos, y sus interlocutores, aunque modifican o adornan tales axiomas, o equivocan su sentido o acomodan sus respuestas para que cuadren con el tema. Puesto que las preguntas se hacen en un idioma que no toma en cuenta el género, evidentemente resulta que el género no aparece en las respuestas.
+
+Desde hace poco tiempo, las investigadoras han proporcionado una descripción “complementaria”, un espejo feminosexista, en el cual ellas leen una suerte de imagen invertida de la visión masculina a que ha sido reducida la realidad genérica por la “ciencia”. Su investigación se halla centrada sobre todo en el contraste entre la óptica femenina y la óptica masculina, en la manera en que las mujeres manejan el símbolo y el poder. Pero como estos nuevos estudios abordan principalmente la dominación y la sujeción en las sociedades no europeas, también están ubicados en una perspectiva sin género. En último análisis, la dominación y la sujeción no son más que asuntos de poder, ya sea que resida aquí o allá; implican la competencia por valores o posiciones que desconocen el género. Desde el momento que se postula la escasez de estos valores, y su igual conveniencia para hombres y mujeres, la lucha por tales valores es inevitablemente estudiada desde una perspectiva “sexista”, aun cuando sea bajo la forma inversa del “feminosexismo”.
+
+Edwin Ardener es uno de los raros antropólogos que han tratado de separar el estudio de la dominación masculina del análisis de universos conceptuales asimétricos donde la complementariedad es ambigua —sin negar por eso la importancia de tal asimetría—.[^f89] En su investigación de las mujeres bakweri, da constancia que son ellas las que definen las fronteras de su mundo, de modo y manera que viven como mujeres —aunque solamente hasta cierto punto— dentro de aquello que para los hombres es lo “salvaje” y para los antropólogos un laberinto aparentemente impenetrable. “Para ellas, la sociedad no esta forzosamente separada de la naturaleza; ellas no proporcionan necesariamente un modelo unitario de la sociedad, que las contenga a la vez a ellas mismas y a los hombres. Pueden concebir perfectamente un modelo en el que las mujeres y la naturaleza son exteriores respecto a los hombres y a la sociedad.”
+
+Por desgracia, Ardener emplea términos tales como “sociedad”, “salvaje”, “naturaleza” sin insistir en el hecho de que para él son metáforas.[^f90] Sus críticos por lo tanto se han esforzado en mostrar que estos términos están impregnados de ideología, con base en la forma en que fueron usados por los pensadores de la Ilustración. No son capaces de captar el argumento de Ardener —a saber, que no poseemos términos aptos par expresar, en prosa, la simetría de las percepciones en el seno del género—.
+
+En última instancia, el prejuicio sexista de tantos antropólogos resulta de algo mucho más fundamental que la intervención de informadores masculinos, el enfoque elegido por las investigadoras o los malentendidos. Los prejuicios contra el género están inscritos en la antropología porque ésta pretende ser una ciencia. Su lógica científica hace de ella una herramienta analítica para estudiar a los hombres y a las mujeres en calidad de _anthropoi_, para reducir el género al sexo y para hacer de una complementariedad que solamente son capaces de describir los poetas de una cultura, un sistema de dos contrarios homogéneos. Cosa que plantea una cuestión más fundamental: si la antropología no es capaz de captar el género como sujeto, ¿cómo puede explorar el dominio vernáculo?[^f91]
+
+## El género y el habla
+
+La manera distinta mediante la cual cada género aprehende la realidad encuentra su expresión en el lenguaje. El niño y la niña a los cinco años no emiten los mismos sonidos, aunque sus órganos vocales son similares anatómicamente. Al pasar del balbuceo al habla, adoptan la forma y el estilo conveniente para su género, y esto incluso durante sus juegos.[^f93]
+
+Al igual que lo que pasa con el “trabajo de las mujeres”, el “lenguaje de las mujeres” también ha atraído el interés académico en tres olas sucesivas.[^f94] La curiosidad al respecto nace a fines del siglo XIX, época en que cualquier posible prueba de la alteridad constitucional de las mujeres resultaba para muchos atrayente. Por entonces el lenguaje femenino era uno de aquellos descubrimientos que habían surgido de la iniciativa clínica que había definido a _priori_ una realidad y una existencia humanas totalmente nuevas, desde el punto de vista anatómico, psicológico y de comportamiento. Esta definición ubicaba a las mujeres, en cuanto segundo sexo, en una sociedad de neutros, una sociedad estandarizada de acuerdo con una norma común. Todo aquello que pudiera probar que las mujeres se apartaban de esa norma era agua para el molino de los profesionales que con ello obtenían ganancias: ginecólogos, clérigos, profesores de economía doméstica y trabajadores sociales que se obligaban a definir “necesidades” para las que sólo ellos podían formular un diagnóstico y prescribir una terapia normativa.
+
+Pero el interés del siglo XIX en el habla femenina fue efímero.[^f95] A pesar de que cada vez más lingüistas competentes han explorado toda suerte de variantes de la lengua —según la edad, el estatus, el grado de instrucción o el coeficiente intelectual—, las distinciones lingüísticas entre el habla de las mujeres y el habla de los hombres han sido relativamente despreciadas. Los estudios de la segunda ola de interés que registraron correctamente las singularidades del comportamiento lingüístico de las mujeres tendían por lo general a describirlo como un “dialecto” particular de las mujeres, algo subalterno en comparación con una entidad superior que sería la lengua “real”. Durante los años setenta, las mujeres mismas exploraron este ámbito. Pudieron hallar en cada dimensión y área del habla moderna incontables pruebas de la dominación masculina.[^f96]
+
+Sin importar el idioma —francés, alemán o inglés—, las estadísticas muestran que los hombres hablan más alto y con mayor frecuencia que las mujeres, son más propensos a interrumpir, a imponer el tema de la conversación y a callar a los demás hablando más fuerte. En cuanto a las mujeres, éstas tienden a sonreír con complacencia, a abstenerse de hablar, a tartamudear, si bien para disimular su inseguridad también son capaces de imitar y superar a los hombres. En ese caso adoptan su vocabulario y sintaxis, sus estrategias y argumentos. Pero mientras más unisex son las palabras y los temas, resulta más patente que tanto las expresiones estridentes como el mutismo soñador colocan a las mujeres en el segundo sexo lingüístico. La educación mixta y la fábrica, la mesa de conferencias y el cóctel han hecho sexista el habla, así como el mercado laboral lo ha hecho con el trabajo.[^f97]
+
+Todavía hoy en día, en muchos sitios del mundo, los hombres y las mujeres no solamente hablan de cosas diferentes, sino que el lenguaje mismo se los impone. Por ejemplo, fuera de la oficina, la fábrica o la arena política, las mujeres japonesas rara vez tocan —mucho menos que las euro peas— los temas que interesan a los hombres. Sin embargo, cuando lo hacen, sus expresiones difieren de las de los hombres. Y la diferencia es tanta que sería inútil buscar frases equivalentes en el habla masculina y femenina. Cinco minutos de conversación tocante a un jardín o a una fiesta se reducen, en un intercambio verbal entre hombres, a tres vocablos que como respuesta tienen un gruñido inarticulado.[^f98]
+
+El estudio regional del lenguaje específico de un género aporta una visión parcial del ámbito multidimensional del género. Una encuesta que recientemente se llevo a cabo en una aldea española mostró que los hombres hablan sobre el trabajo en el campo, sobre el ganado, el comercio y el oficio, mientras que las conversaciones de las mujeres giran en torno a observaciones sobre las personas y sus motivos, sobre la existencia y las necesidades del hogar. Pero los temas mismos, como las herramientas que se utilizan, no son suficientes para revelar de qué manera se percibe el mundo. Las diferencias fonológicas, la entonación, la sintaxis, el vocabulario, las referencias nominales y pronominales, distinguen al habla masculina del habla femenina.[^f99] No es posible conjeturar lo que estas diferencias podrían revelar acerca de la complementariedad simbólica, si se las admitiera más como constituyentes del lenguaje que como rasgos marginales. En una lengua vernácula de Madagascar, se considera prestigioso el lenguaje de los hombres precisamente porque es indirecto y esquiva la confrontación.[^f100] El orador hábil ha de recurrir a un estilo alusivo convenido. Aquello que a un blanco neoyorquino le podría parecer vacilante y vago, para el hombre de raza merina queda muy claro. En esta sociedad, el comercio es asunto de las mujeres. Ellas discuten agresivamente los precios, gritan tras los niños, ponen a todos en su sitio, divulgan a voz en cuello las conductas reprobables. Las mujeres se hacen respetar porque son capaces de expresar sin reservas lo que sienten. El lenguaje femenino y el lenguaje masculino revelan la complejidad de la dominación relativa del género, incluso mejor que la utilización de las herramientas.[^f101]
+
+Son de lo más frágil y vulnerables los rasgos masculinos y femeninos del lenguaje, aun cuando éste se encuentre en pleno vigor. En el pasado, se los ha visto desaparecer, particularmente cuando un habla se convierte en el instrumento de un imperio, en una lengua del comercio o de la administración. Son estos rasgos masculinos y femeninos los que primero peligran cuando una lengua se estandariza; lo que de ellos queda se reduce a un simple género gramatical vaciado de sus antiguas dualidades, y cuya utilidad primordial consiste en permitir la expresión discriminatoria. Cuando el habla vernácula desaparece por absorción en una lengua materna inculcada, su dualidad lingüística se reduce solamente a diferentes esquemas, entonaciones y temas de conversación, y a la dominación masculina del género gramatical. Esto se puede comprobar dondequiera que el proceso haya sido estudiado, dondequiera que el género vernáculo haya sido abolido por la relación monetaria, y el habla vernácula por la alfabetización, la escolarización y la televisión. En el suroeste de Luisiana, la lengua indígena _koasati_ que se hablaba en el pasado poseía sutiles y claras diferencias en el habla masculina y en el habla femenina.[^f102] Pero tras la segunda Guerra Mundial, sólo los ancianos recordaban aquellas distinciones, aquella facilidad, lentitud y dulzura propia del habla femenina. Hoy en día éstas emplean las formas masculinas. Las femeninas solamente sobreviven en calidad de curiosidades, cuando se recuerdan las expresiones de las mujeres del pasado. Así, la transición al predominio masculino —al igual que en el nuevo “medio de comunicación” unisex que tan perfectamente se adapta al estilo de vida industrial— se observa en el lenguaje, sin importar el número de “géneros” gramaticales que éste pueda poseer.
+
+
+# El género a través del tiempo
+
+COMO el lenguaje, la cultura evoluciona. ¿No implica ésta por sí misma una evolución _sui generis_? Si el término “cultura” tiene un significado que todos los antropólogos admiten, es éste: forma de comportamiento que no está inscrita en el programa genético, que no está totalmente sometida al instinto. La cultura traduce un nivel de la vida que no puede explicarse en términos biológicos. El bagaje genético y la herencia cultural evolucionan según leyes opuestas. La selección natural opera a base de una variación no orientada que conduce a una divergencia genética; la evolución cultural transmite a la sucesiva generación rasgos modelados por la generación actual. La evolución biológica extiende nuevas ramas que no pueden fecundarse entre sí, que una vez que se solidifican jamás podrán reunirse. La evolución cultural responde a la forma opuesta, la anastomosis:[^f103] como los de un río, sus brazos se dividen, se extienden serpenteando y vuelven a unirse. La evolución biológica queda grabada; la cultura implica el recuerdo de las cosas pasadas que no sobreviven más que en el mito y en la historia.
+
+En el Museo Nacional de México se puede ver una bella ilustración de este sistema fluvial: la presentación de una serie de _malacates_[^t01]. Éstos son pequeños discos de cerámica con una perforación en el centro donde se inserta el huso para hilar, y que sirven de contrapeso. Cada año los arados mexicanos exhuman miles de ellos, de todas las épocas, incluso de las más lejanas. Un arqueólogo del museo los ha dispuesto como un sistema reticular de afluentes: comenzando por las formas muy antiguas, arcaicas y diversas, los malacates se adaptan, intercambian ciertos rasgos, se vuelven más elaborados, práctica y artísticamente. Se puede ver que en tal región, el malacate permanece sin cambiar durante siglos y luego, bruscamente, se hace mestizo, incorporando un detalle característico de un valle distante. Me encanta contemplar esta red y preguntarme si fue hombre o mujer quien introdujo aquel nuevo detalle.[^f104]
+
+En algunos casos, la modificación pudo haber sido el fruto del azar: el malacate se mella accidentalmente, y alguien se da cuenta de que la muesca lo hace más práctico. Pero es más probable que esta mejora haya venido de afuera: que un forastero al pasar por allí haya dejado su malacate, o que un esclavo capturado trajera consigo un modelo diferente. Ese malacate con la extraña muesca fue examinado, probado y adoptado. Pero el peso del huso cambia. La mano que lo hacía girar aprende un nuevo movimiento y la otra mano responde con una nueva torsión del hilo. Un nuevo movimiento de una mano produce nueva respuesta de la otra mano. Puesto que en las culturas los utensilios corresponden forzosamente a un género únicamente, aquello que se denomina “cambio cultural” jamás sobreviene, inicialmente, sino en el dominio de _un_ género; seguidamente tiene lugar una reacción correspondiente en el otro género. En la evolución cultural, como en una danza, siempre hay uno que manda y otro que sigue, a veces con un gesto, a veces con un paso.
+
+Hace miles de años, en la vertiente meridional de la Sierra Madre se comenzó a cultivar una nueva forma de maíz cuyos primeros granos debieron haber llegado de muy lejos. Este nuevo maíz era azul, y mucho más productivo que la antigua variedad. Tenía que ser plantado a mayor profundidad, así que la coa cambio de manos, pasando de las de la mujer a las del hombre. Pero el nuevo maíz, que un nuevo dios protegía, requería un nuevo metate también, uno mayor, para que las mujeres pudieran molerlo. Si la antropología cultural se ubicara a sí misma en la perspectiva del género, sólo con base en los datos ya recopilados sería capaz de decirnos mucho sobre la evolución técnica y cultural.
+
+## El género y la transgresión
+
+En periodos largos, la línea divisoria de los géneros puede cambiar de ruta. Y también, en ciertas condiciones, puede —incluso debe— ser transgredida. Es esto lo que distingue a las usurpaciones que un género inflige en el otro, de las desviaciones de los animales relacionadas con su comportamiento sexual. Pero he de decir que hay algo más importante que la diferencia entre el sexo animal y el género social: es la diferencia entre las usurpaciones mutuas de los géneros y la desaparición de su línea divisoria. Esta desaparición del género, la característica antropológica _por excelencia_ de las culturas industriales, tiene que ser cuidadosamente diferenciada de la transgresión del género.
+
+La violación de la frontera entre los géneros aparece claramente cuando en el curso del tiempo una herramienta cambia de manos. Pero solamente podemos especular sobre los numerosos factores que han podido intervenir para modificar el entorno del género. Es probable que el cambio con frecuencia sea el resultado de un descubrimiento tecnológico: un utensilio o un elemento que, hasta ese momento, era extranjero pero no tabú, accede al dominio de un género. Así sucedió con el burro, que los antiguos mexicanos desconocían, y que fue introducido por los españoles. No podía ser exclusivo de los hombres, ni de las mujeres, y no era tabú —nada prohibía que ambos géneros lo tocaran—. Pero pronto, en las montañas de guerrero, entre los indios este animal pasó a manos de los hombres exclusivamente y así fue descubierto culturalmente. El descubrimiento cultural, o como frecuentemente se le llama, la evolución tecnológica, siempre ha sido un proceso de domesticación vinculado con un género. Inevitablemente, el empleo del asno hizo más que enriquecer el equipo del hombre: amplió la provincia territorial de un género, introduciendo una asimetría nueva entre el dominio de los hombres y el de las mujeres, y con toda seguridad aligeró el trabajo de éstas, al tiempo que redujo su estatus público.
+
+Para los antiguos mexicanos, el burro fue algo totalmente sorprendente, pero no tabú. Yo prefiero reservar este término “tabú” para una prohibición que afecta a _ambos géneros_, aunque de manera muy diferente, prohibición que mediante su “¡No!” absoluto, mantiene a los géneros en el seno de su _gens_. Por haber comido el fruto del único árbol prohibido, Adán y Eva son expulsados del jardín del Edén junto con toda su descendencia. La violación de un tabú acarrea terribles consecuencias para toda la comunidad; exige un sacrificio extraordinario, un redentor. Pero traspasar la línea de separación de los géneros no es tabú, es algo que denominaré _pané_. El género les dicta a los hombres guayaki: “No tocarás ninguna canasta; _ésa_ pertenece al dominio de la mujer”. Lo que para el género femenino es adecuado, para él es _pané_.
+
+Tanto el _tabú_ como el _pané_ son prohibiciones, pero las cosas que respectivamente prohíben se encuentran en espacios diferentes. El tabú es una amenaza desde fuera contra el dúo genérico, donde hombres y mujeres de la _gens_ dicen “nosotros”. _Pané_ implica la otra cara de la luna, la otra mitad del mundo, aquella parte de la realidad que sólo conozco a través de su reflejo en la apariencia, la palabra, la acción del género opuesto.
+
+Desde siempre y por doquier, la barrera entre los géneros se ha traspasado, aunque no haya cambiado ni de tamaño ni de lugar. Los motivos más comunes son los desastres, las calamidades. En la Edad Media, el pesado arado del que tiraba un caballo herrado y guarnecido era casi un símbolo del género masculino. Las mujeres jamás se hubieran atrevido a acercarse a la herramienta o al animal. Pero a finales del siglo XIV, en un periodo de 15 años diversas miniaturas provenientes del norte de Francia muestran a mujeres tras el arado. Sucedía que la peste había diezmado a la población, mientras que la guerra segaba a los hombres que habían sobrevivido. Por lo tanto, las mujeres tenían que labrar la tierra en espera de que sus hijos varones llegaran a la edad de relevarlas.[^f105]
+
+Las calamidades públicas y también las desgracias personales pueden conducir a un campesino a despreciar las conveniencias y hacer el trabajo de una mujer. Hasta hace poco tiempo, en el norte de Suecia los hombres no podían entrar en los establos. En ese lugar cálido, las muchachas vivían y dormían junto al ganado y, durante el largo invierno, ellas y las amigas que las venían a visitar tenían la seguridad de que estarían a salvo entre mujeres. Pero el viudo que no tenía hija ordeñaba él mismo su vaca al abrigo de los muros del establo, cosa que jamás habría hecho afuera, a la vista de todo el mundo. Si amenaza con caer una tormenta mientras las mujeres cosechan el heno en un prado alpino, el granjero y sus hijos acuden a ayudarlas —pero jamás le pedirían a un obrero agrícola realizar esa tarea—. Aparentemente, tener rango superior en una comunidad implica mayor libertad para traspasar las conveniencias. Pero estas excepciones no hacen más que confirmar la regla general; fueron dignas de atención y mención porque se las consideró notables, y hoy constituyen una fuente para el estudio del género.
+
+Paradójicamente, el travestismo también confirma la separación de los géneros, y por eso mismo sirve para informar al historiador. Las violaciones espontáneas de esta frontera rara vez son obra de grupos, y siempre se ven con terror. En Alemania, durante las guerras campesinas, nada aterrorizaba tanto a los nobles como la furia de las mujeres que habían tomado las armas. En ciertos casos, hombres disfrazados de mujeres pusieron al enemigo en fuga antes de que empezara el combate.[^f106]
+
+Pero el travestismo también puede ritualizarse, convertirse en un acontecimiento público periódico. Durante las fiestas del carnaval, desde Sicilia a Escandinavia, era obligado que las mujeres hicieran de hombres, los hombres hicieran de mujeres, y los hombres también de mujeres que hicieran de hombres. Hay quienes han sugerido que las mascaradas a veces eran empleadas para suscitar agitaciones políticas. Especialmente en el siglo XVIII, tales inversiones tradicionales de los géneros dieron ocasión para burlarse del “progreso de la civilización” que a la población le disgustaba, para oponer resistencia al maestro escolar o al clérigo. La sátira y la comedia utilizaron con gran libertad estas violaciones de la frontera entre los géneros. Estudios recientes que se han consagrado a la cultura de las diversiones, fiestas, mascaradas y tumultos ponen al descubierto precisamente la utilización política del travestismo a fin de proteger la economía moral, la existencia intragenérica de las muchedumbres.[^f107] Estas inversiones también servían para satirizar y por lo tanto para refrenar la dominación relativa de un género. Ridiculizaban a los hombres al poner a las mujeres ocasionalmente en la cima, de manera pública y divertida. Al contrario, en un pueblo mexicano actual donde sigue vigente el temor a los brujos, la danza de hombres disfrazados de viejas que persiguen a jovencitos disfrazados de coyotes da inicio a la celebración anual de una jornada de diversiones que alivia la angustia latente.[^f108]
+
+Pero el travestismo posee una función todavía más profunda. En casi todas las culturas, ciertos sacerdotes deben vestirse de mujeres, ciertos actos mágicos se relacionan con ritos sodomitas, la persona condenada lleva vestidos del sexo opuesto, el héroe cultural debe desafiar la división de los géneros. Se trata de otras tantas maneras de subrayar esta separación: su perspectiva pública inversa la hace todavía más evidente. De manera mágica, el travestismo sorprende a los demonios guardianes, manteniéndolos a distancia al mismo tiempo que los satisface. Refleja la inserción del género en lo más profundo de la experiencia mística.
+
+## La exaltación de lo heterosexual
+
+La sexología moderna nubla la óptica del historiador respecto al travestismo tradicional. Sus categorías interesan al sexo, y no al género.[^f109] Esto se ve bien en el vocabulario que se usa para describir a los homosexuales. Solo un número limitado de sociedades posee términos para clasificar a sus miembros según el género que les atrae _eróticamente_. En este sentido, el tipo de clasificación vigente en las sociedades europeas modernas es único. El hecho de que el amor entre hombres o entre mujeres haya sido más o menos frecuente en ciertos lugares y ciertas épocas no autoriza al historiador a concluir que todas las sociedades han considerado al “homosexual” un ser singular. Antes del renacimiento europeo, una persona no se definía a sí misma ni como homosexual ni como autor —podía preferir más a los muchachos que a las chicas, o podía ser hábil para escribir versos—. Podía entregarse a la pederastia de la misma manera que a la ira asesina. Sus contemporáneos le llamaban pederasta o asesino, pero estos términos no poseían el contenido _diagnóstico_ que los términos modernos revisten. El que un hombre amara a los hombres no lo volvía intrínsecamente “otro”. Se reconocían las prácticas homosexuales y cada cultura tenía su manera de considerarlas —diversión juvenil, inversión ritual, vicio risible o merecedor de atroz castigo—. Pero en el reino del género el homosexual no podía concebirse como una entidad singular. El desviado europeo moderno es tan singular como la pareja conyugal heterosexual.
+
+Dos importantes estudios recientes han examinado la historia de la homosexualidad como una propensión que se percibe socialmente distinta del comportamiento sexual mismo. D. S. Baily ha mostrado que la tradición cristiana preescolástica no veía en la homosexualidad una desviación sexual “característica” de ciertas personas. Legisladores, teólogos o moralistas condenaban las prácticas amorosas entre gente del mismo sexo y, siguiendo al apóstol san Pablo, abominaban de los grupos que hacían ostentación de tales prácticas. Con base en el estudio crítico de gran cantidad de documentos, John Boswell nos permite seguir las etapas que condujeron a ver a los homosexuales como un grupo dotado de una naturaleza desviada.[^f110] Es obvio que no podía haber allí tal “desviación” si al mismo tiempo no hubiera surgido la norma heterosexual —base de la consagración de la producción conyugal—. Pero todavía no se ha escrito la historia paralela del “heterosexual”. Por lo tanto, hay que utilizar al “homosexual” como un espejo donde se puede ver la conquista del Occidente por el régimen heterosexual.
+
+Aquí no puedo hacer más que evocar la relación compleja entre la Iglesia y la transformación del género en sexo. Tomemos el primer ejemplo de la historia de Montaillou, donde el inquisidor interroga al subdiácono Arnaud, a quien se acusa de sodomía. Sus respectivos criterios divergen radicalmente. Arnaud considera sus actos desde la perspectiva del género, mientras que el inquisidor los enfoca con la óptica naciente del sexo _contra natura_.[^f111] Lo que desconcierta totalmente al religioso es que el superior quiera tratarlo como hereje porque es sodomita. Expresa con toda buena fe: “Yo creía … con la sencillez de mi corazón, que la sodomía y la simple fornicación ciertamente eran pecados mortales, pero mucho menos graves que el desfloramiento de vírgenes, que el adulterio y el incesto”. El tal Arnaud era de familia noble y urbana. Poseía cierto refinamiento y una cultura asaz “lite raria”. En esa época en que era extremadamente raro poseer un libro, podía prestar libros a sus amigos. Entre sus tomos, no había únicamente biblias y calendarios, sino también clásicos; poseía un Ovidio, autor que transmite explícitamente lo que la Antigüedad sabía sobre la teoría y la práctica del arte de amar. Y aunque no había sido jamás ordenado sacerdote, Arnaud realizaba sus funciones clericales con evidente devoción. La perplejidad que sus respuestas muestran refleja todavía el punto de vista intragenérico. No alcanza a entender que el inquisidor (el futuro papa Benedicto XII) pueda interpretar su sodomía como una desviación. Para él aquélla significaba una manera entre otras de aplacar la concupiscencia.
+
+La historia del vocablo “ _bougre”_ con que por entonces se designaba en Francia al sodomita puede ilustrar este conflicto. Originalmente había sido un término eclesiástico. Designaba a los búlgaros que se habían convertido al cristianismo en el siglo IX, entrando en la comunidad católica de Constantinopla, entonces separada del papado. Posteriormente, la designación pasó de estos cristianos “separados” a los bogumiles, secta gnóstica que se extendió desde Tracia a Bulgaria y de allí hasta los Balcanes, dejando sus huellas en forma de grandes y sobrias tumbas de piedra. Si se había acuñado para designar a cristianos, incluso cismáticos, ahora la palabra se refería a un grupo extranjero y no cristiano. Tres siglos después se desplazaba nuevamente y servía para calificar a esos primos de los bogumiles que eran los “albigenses” o los “cátaros”. Estos languedocianos, nacidos en el corazón de la cristiandad, habitaban la vertiente septentrional de los Pirineos, el baluarte de Europa contra el Islam. Hogar tras hogar fueron seducidos por el espíritu del gnosticismo; las creencias, los ritos y las costumbres de los cátaros eran calificados indiferentemente de “herejías” o _bougreries_.
+
+Precisamente por entonces la Iglesia tenía amplios motivos para temer la expansión de un adversario espiritual. A unos cuantos siglos se remontaban la doctrina, el clero, la organización y el método necesarios para cuidar _pastoralmente_ de los hogares constituidos por almas individuales. Las iglesias habían pasado de ser lugares de culto público y de enseñanza religiosa, a agencias para cuidar personalmente de las almas —transformación que se había iniciado con Carlomagno—. Tal solicitud pastoral implicaba, ante todo, el fomento y la regulación de los hogares _conyugales_. [^f112] Se olvida que sólo fue en la alta Edad Media cuando el matrimonio lentamente se convirtió en un sacramento —es decir, un asunto sujeto a la autoridad de la Iglesia—. De ahí resultaron innumerables conflictos entre los antiguos modelos vernáculos del género y los nuevos modelos católicos. La solicitud pastoral de la Iglesia debilitó el dominio del género local que había sobrevivido autolimitándose, y suscitó simultáneamente una átmósfera de resistencia a la administración eclesiástica de un _género_ católico. Era propicio el momento para la propagación de una “herejía” que pudiera ofrecer a los aldeanos una fe “católica” donde no intervenía una autoridad y una vigilancia superiores que imponían un género de su cosecha.
+
+La cruzada en el siglo XIV contra los herejes de Languedoc se dirigió a la red de caseríos de la región de Albi que habían abrazado creencias heterodoxas que eran atrayentes porque estaban regidas _localmente_. Estos hogares cátaros eran considerados cánceres que proliferaban en el cuerpo de la Iglesia. La inquisición acudía al terreno para interrogar a la gente una por una, investigando si el veneno se había difundido por el conducto de una _domus_ emparentada. Hasta entonces, los miembros de los hogares habían sido quienes iban a la iglesia; ahora, mediante un movimiento inverso, ésta traspasaba el umbral de las casas. El inquisidor diagnostica la desviación y se encarga de su tratamiento. Sabueso religioso, el teólogo husmea al _bougre_, todo aquel que huele a herejía. En tal contexto, el término _bougre_ se emplea de manera doblemente novedosa: imputa un comportamiento criminal a una natualeza pervertida, y ya no solamente el gozo que experimenta una naturaleza pecaminosa que transgrede la ley divina.
+
+Para salvaguardar el sentimiento religioso, la Iglesia remplazó la normalización católica del comportamiento cotidiano; a su misión de hombres consagrados al servicio litúrgico, los clérigos sustituyeron la de pastores y confesores de fieles constituidos por los dos _sexos_ —a partir de entonces, la _bougrerie_ sexual se convertía en herejía teológica—. Para el pastor, ahora representado por la imagen de un gallo célibe sobre el campanario, velando sobre un rebaño compuesto por dos sexos, el _bougre_ se había convertido en el enemigo irredimible, aquel que se debía condenar a la hoguera.
+
+El _plebanus_ que cuida desde lo alto del campanario al rebaño que se le ha confiado, es el prototipo del profesional de los servicios. Tiene a su cargo las almas, posee el instrumento que le permite leer las conciencias. Se le ha formado para que considere toda alma igualmente digna y dotada de una conciencia que es necesario explorar y formar.
+
+El obispo inquisidor de Aviñón habla en nombre de la Iglesia, de una nueva Iglesia en pleno auge que sucesivamente, cuando llegue a secularizarse y dividirse, habrá de asumir su forma contemporánea de estructura profesional. Este prelado pertenece a la Iglesia que ha transformado el ritual de la penitencia en un acto de confesión anual, a la Iglesia que desde hace un siglo apenas —a partir del Concilio de Letran de 1215— ha impuesto a todos los creyentes decir sus pecados a su párroco una vez al año. A esta nueva regla correspondía una fórmula original que refleja una nueva perspectiva, la perspectiva homogeneizadora del sexo: _Omnes utriusque sexus fideles_ —todos los fieles, hombres y mujeres, en adelante deberán comparecer ante su pastor una vez al año para acusarse—. A fin de que éste estuviera preparado para oír su confesión, en el siglo precedente se habían redactado manuales especiales —aparentemente Arnaud no los conocía—. Éstos indicaban a los confesores cuáles son las preguntas que deben hacer a los fieles para ayudarlos a discernir las transgresiones que en lo sucesivo se calificarán de pecaminosas. Ahora las mujeres tendrán que obedecer con toda franqueza como mujeres y los hombres como hombres. Y los nuevos manuales cada vez con mayor precisión definían lo que esto significa para los humanos en general, sin consideración para la línea de separación específica de los géneros en cada lugar, y ocasionalmente contradiciéndola. La ley eclesiástica no era, en sí, sexista, porque reservaba el poder, los privilegios y la ordenación para los hombres —en esto no hacía más que reflejar sus orígenes—. Pero _inauguraba_ el sexismo rigiendo las conciencias de almas que eran todas igualmente inmortales y capaces de cometer el mismo pecado con cuerpos diferentes. Al afirmar que en términos del pecado eran iguales las transgresiones de la misma ley por hombres y mujeres, sentaba las bases de los códigos sexistas.[^f113]
+
+La confesión obligatoria de los pecados en la intimidad del confesionario es algo radicalmente nuevo, es el primer paso, sin duda el más importante, hacia la educación universal. Es casi lo contrario de la penitencia pública, largo y penoso ritual, que tenía lugar frecuentemente ante el portal de la Iglesia, y al cual se sometían irlandeses y escoceses en la época de su conversión, a principios de la Edad Media. Ese antiguo orden penitencial era asunto de los hombres. Expresaba la sumisión pública y voluntaria de los recién conversos a las leyes nuevas de los misioneros. Ranulf había matado al asesino de su padrastro. Había actuado como le correspondía a un hijo; según las antiguas leyes de su clan; no tomar venganza habría sido imperdonable. Pero según la nueva ley de Jesucristo, debió haber perdonado al asesino. Haciendo penitencia por haber recaído en el paganismo, Ranulf permaneció de pie ante la Iglesia durante 17 años, bajo la canícula del verano y los hielos del invierno. Pero el nuevo orden confesional traslada la penitencia del espacio exterior al espacio interior; obliga a toda “alma” a crear este espacio dentro de sí misma, y a hacerlo de conformidad con las reglas arquitectónicas decretadas por la ley eclesiástica. Contrariamente a la penitencia pública, que se cumple de _una vez por todas_, durante un periodo, a causa de un crimen de sangre, la confesión constituye el relato anual de las transgresiones secretas de las leyes formuladas por una institución católica, es decir, universal, la Madre Iglesia. La confesión crea un tribunal de la conciencia, un “foro interno”. Una vez al año, el pecador abre la cámara íntima de su alma a un juez público, nombrado por la Iglesia, el cual en secreto absoluto escucha al culpable que se acusa. El varón consagrado, el juez sacerdotal, escucha cada año al alma sin género y evalúa sus transgresiones a una ley escrita que define lo que es un comportamiento sexuado.
+
+Es aleccionador el ejemplo del adulterio. En cada sistema de parentesco, la infidelidad significa algo diferente —para la mujer jamás significa el mismo tipo de crimen que para el hombre—. Pero el criterio de la transgresión de la ley de la Iglesia ahora lo convierte en un pecado único. Hombres y mujeres son iguales en el pecado, si bien en cuanto miembros de sus géneros respectivos hayan cometido un crimen diferente. La sexualidad empieza a tomar la forma de un concepto fuera del género: es un conjunto de pecados contra el sexto mandamiento que la Iglesia ha definido así: “No cometerás adulterio”. Al considerar este proceso, hay que cuidarse de no confundir la nueva capacidad del alma para aplicar los decretos de la Iglesia en su foro interno, con el sentido de la rectitud y de la “honestidad” que mantiene intacta la separación entre los géneros. La conciencia se afina mediante la interiorización de una ley positiva para el _humano_, mientras que la “honestidad” es el resultado de la formación del ser dentro de su género; la conciencia procede de la educación, el género procede de lo inverso de la educación. El _speculum confessoris_ nace en el siglo XIII y se desarrolla: gracias a esta herramienta, el confesor puede sondear el alma del penitente, hacer las preguntas convenientes, juzgar si la respuesta es correcta. Así, el reino de la honestidad vernácula se ve eclipsado progresivamente por los mandamientos de la conciencia. Si durante un milenio las mujeres no tuvieron la palabra en una Iglesia gobernada por los hombres, he aquí que ante el sacerdote ellas son iguales a los hombres respecto a la penitencia, en el seno de un régimen sexista. La ley unisex hace a esta cohabitación sexista: decreta que el hombre y la mujer son iguales como pecadores, aunque aun así el lugar natural del hombre es superior. Los textos mediante los cuales la Iglesia se esfuerza en reglamentar la frecuencia, las circunstancias y las posiciones de las relaciones sexuales,[^f114] contrastan de manera tajante con la tradición del _Ars amatoria_ de Ovidio que, según el registro del inquisidor, Arnaud había prestado a un amigo días antes de su proceso. A través de estas reglas se puede ver la formación de un nuevo tipo de misión, para el cual la Iglesia se consideraba investida: penetrar en los hogares, los lechos, las almas. Había comenzado la derrota del género por la propagación del sexo, la reglamentación de la “honestidad” por una ley normativa.
+
+En el corazón de Europa, el periodo que se extiende desde el siglo XII hasta finales del XVIII podría llamarse la época de la “honestidad” bajo la sombra creciente de la conciencia.[^f115] Con la penetración de la conciencia en las sociedades que hasta entonces habían sido regidas únicamente por la “honestidad”, las imágenes del “hombre” y de la “mujer” tenían que modificarse inevitablemente. Sin duda alguna, la dama a quien el trovador dedica su canción es una especie nueva de mujer, es su “amante”, que para él está más allá del matrimonio y el parentesco. Con frecuencia es una mujer educada; y en el mejor de los casos representa un tipo de mujer que sólo una minoría es capaz de imaginar. Que esta minoría no hubo de ser pequeña es cosa que se transparenta en la capacidad de ciertos habitantes de Montaillou, gente sencilla, para distinguir entre las mujeres que han amado y las que han querido _(adamari)_.
+
+## La iconografía del sexo
+
+Marina Warner ha propuesto otra vía para seguir las transformaciones de la imagen de la mujer. Ha sondeado el inmenso acopio iconográfico de la virgen. Ha intentado descubrir la visión de la mujer a través de las representaciones de la Virgen María. Claramente, a finales de la Edad Media, la virgen no es ya más la “bendita _entre_ todas las mujeres”; por entonces aparece simplemente como una persona “de su sexo”.
+
+En el estilo y el carácter de sus representaciones pictóricas, no solamente en la Edad Media sino también durante dos milenios, yo veo una guía de la ruta que conduce de la _Théotokos_ del ábside griego a las cursis ilustraciones que decoran las recámaras de los cónyuges. María jamás fue representada como una diosa. Desde sus primeras imágenes en las catacumbas de Priscilla, a las miles de efigies pintadas que el arte románico nos ha legado, una cosa la distingue de todas las otras efigies femeninas que jamás fueron pintadas o esculpidas: los artistas han querido representarla como una mujer histórica a quien le tocó un destino sin igual. Había sido la mujer elegida entre todas las mujeres para ser la madre virgen, para dar a luz a Dios. Había sido la nueva Eva, puesto que el fruto de su vientre fue la fuente de un nuevo principio entre los hombres. Pero esta visión ya no prevalece en los retratos góticos y, con más razón aún, en los posteriores. Poco a poco, la virgen se despoja del género, abandona su aura mítica que había tomado prestada de la diosa, así como la serie de vigorosos calificativos teológicos con que la habían adornado los Padres de la Iglesia. Se transforma en un modelo de la “mujer”, un tipo que se opone al “hombre”.[^f116] Dante formula claramente esta idea cuando, en el trigésimo tercer canto del _Paraíso_, le dice a la virgen _umile ed alta più che criatura_…
+
+Los cuentos pueden relatar lo que la historia no es capaz de describir. Contaré cómo la Madre de Dios se transformó en Nuestra Señora. Cuando ella se convirtió en el prototipo de “la mujer” —no habiendo sido jamás una diosa, no siendo ya un icono ni tampoco la figura sentimental del arte barroco— las otras figuras que poblaban las catedrales románicas también emprendieron su propio camino. Muchas habían ingresado en la Iglesia al mismo tiempo que una población que se había convertido, al mismo tiempo que su _gens_. Ya en el presbiterio, algunas de las bestias que eran las guardianas del género local fueron vestidas con las ropas de los mártires o recibieron los atributos de un santo eclesiástico. Otras encontraron un nicho en la decoración vegetal esculpida en la piedra, conservando sus cuernos o sus escamas. La muchacha de la leyenda que fue arrojada al dragón recibió el hábito de santa Margarita y fue colocada arriba del altar, junto al dragón encadenado. Los dioses fluviales y los sátiros, los gnomos y las tormentas personificadas, todos encontraron su lugar, ya en un capitel, ya en el bestiario esculpido de un friso, y muchos en los portales y los asientos, en forma de piedras angulares o soportes. En una sola columna se asociaban hirsutos monstruos nórdicos, leones sasánidas, quiméricos pavorreales sacados de un manuscrito con estampas y cantidad de personajes bíblicos. La Iglesia se sentía cómoda en la seguridad de poder abrazar el cielo, el infierno y la tierra, y todo lo que vuela y se arrastra. A lo largo de cinco siglos, su método empírico fue: _Ecclesia omnia benedicat_ —“la Iglesia bendice todo y a todos”—. En el siglo XI, el Diablo mismo se había convertido más en una farsa que en una amenaza. Mitos y costumbres de cosecha local enriquecían el ritual y hacían de la catedral un invernadero donde se mantenían vivos los frutos del pasado. La presencia de estos ejércitos de símbolos bautizados era testimonio del poder del mensaje de la Iglesia, y la posibilidad de una infinita diversidad de existencias vernáculas bajo la égida de la religión.[^f117]
+
+Esta fraternidad, dentro de la Iglesia del periodo románico, de espíritus locales recientemente domesticados, de dioses de importación “bautizados”, de cabezas de gorgonas revestidas con un nuevo significado, de profetas y de apóstoles “legítimos”, esta fraternidad hay que representársela claramente si se quiere comprender lo que significó el éxodo de estos recientes huéspedes, que inevitablemente se habría de producir. Para empezar tuvieron lugar las fulminaciones del austero y rígido reformador del mona-quismo, Bernardo de Claraval, contra los monjes que toleraban en sus claustros efigies que acaso fueran necesarias para conducir a almas más simples y sencillas hacia la pura luz de la fe. Luego, un siglo más tarde, la Iglesia acoge a la Inquisición y en adelante se preocupará más de la conciencia que de la creencia, esforzándose por destruir el ámbito de estos huéspedes. Los antiguos guardianes de la “honestidad” ya no habrían de tener un hogar bajo los austeros arcos de la moralidad gótica. La cacería de los disidentes de toda especie desalojó a los antiguos dioses de los contrafuertes y los nichos desde donde habían vigilado, durante generaciones, las convenciones locales que la fe católica había amparado.
+
+Los dragones y gnomos, basiliscos y seres salvajes fueron expulsados de las naves al tiempo que la arquitectura pasaba del románico al gótico. Ya no podían alojarse en los pilares, ahora más angostos y largos. Pero en el exterior siguieron aferrados a la Iglesia durante más de un siglo. Como gárgolas se extendían sobre el vacío, a punto de iniciar el vuelo, derramando agua por sus fantásticas fauces. Los teólogos, absortos en la cuestión de la conciencia, ya no podían bendecirlos. Al acercarse el Renacimiento, ciertos eruditos interpretaron la supervivencia de esta chusma disparatada como vestigios de la cábala, y en ellos buscaron símbolos, emblemas, tipos. Pero las gárgolas efectivamente emprendieron el vuelo y, durante tres siglos, fueron a vagar por los campos, convertidas en criaturas nunca antes vistas: santos depuestos, mártires cojos, dragones de roídas alas, que se comportaban como hatos de animales domésticos que hubiesen retornado al estado salvaje, como gatos errantes en una ciudad bombardeada. Estos extraños espíritus dieron origen a una nueva especie de sacerdotes, por lo general llamados “brujos”.
+
+Una parte de la historia del género se podría encontrar en las historias que podrían contar de su éxodo algunos de estos espíritus transformados en fantasmas o en diablos.[^f118] Por ejemplo, Shela-na-gig, una pequeña figura en cuclillas de Escocia. Este tipo de encuclillada se conoce en todo el mundo. Los iconógrafos las llaman encuclilladas _obscenas_. Algunas son masculinas, pero la mayoría femeninas. Exhiben una vulva abierta, en una posición que sugiere un poder. En Egipto se llama “Bes” a esta representación, que era la de un genio hogareño que protegía a las mujeres en el parto. Originalmente fue una divinidad sudanesa que descendió el Nilo para dominar a sus semejantes, en todas las márgenes mediterráneas, durante el periodo de las antiguas dinastías. En su _Historia natural_, Plinio testifica que un cultivo a punto de cosecharse se salvará de una tormenta de granizo si una mujer que está menstruando se acuesta allí de espaldas con el sexo al descubierto. A veces, sólo el amuleto sería suficiente. También consigna que en cualquier día del mes una mujer tiene la capacidad de ahuyentar la tempestad en alta mar. La acuclillada ha subsistido hasta nuestros días, como lo muestran cientos de ejemplos. Al final del periodo románico, en las iglesias se mezcla con una hermana del Mediterráneo: la sirena de doble cola o Melusina. Y desde las Islas del Norte, otra acuclillada baja hasta Francia. Tiene la forma de Eva, nuestra madre común. Ésta es Shela-na-gig, que debió haber tomado su lugar en el santuario cuando una tribu irlandesa, o un clan escocés, ingresó en la Iglesia en una fecha precoz. En sus orígenes fue también un espíritu guardián del género, un poderoso antídoto contra los maléficos espíritus masculinos. Pero al ingresar en el cosmos cristiano, se convirtió en el símbolo de todo lo que en la Tierra vive y en consecuencia asumió el rostro de Eva, el origen de la vida. En cuanto Eva, se halla esculpida en el pilar central del portal occidental, el de la fachada. En consecuencia orienta su desnudez hacia el poniente, la noche, la dirección desde donde todos los espíritus y potencias del mal amenazan al pueblo de Dios. Ella sola es suficientemente poderosa como para proteger a la multitud de fieles y a las figuras zoomorfas en el interior de la Iglesia. Pero a veces otras dos figuras en cuclillas, una de ellas itifálica, cuidan del portal occidental, en cuyo caso la primera pareja original aparece siempre encima, en el tímpano. Shela-na-gig con el rostro de Eva es el paradigma de la hierofanta tradicional que ha sido bautizada por la Iglesia. Todas las acuclilladas son hierofantas, revelaciones de la potencia y la protección de lo sagrado. En calidad de Eva, la acuclillada es elevada al rango de protectora de un pueblo católico.
+
+Pero si Shela-na-gig como Eva representa el apogeo del poder de las acuclilladas, su destierro de la Iglesia la despoja de su nimbo sagrado —a ella y a todas las demás—. Estas figuras que los doctos humanistas transforman en emblemas eruditos son símbolos, no hierofantes; ningún demonio se atemorizaría con las sirenas de doble cola que en las _loggias_ de Rafael abundan. Los teólogos de entonces convierten a la sirena en una alegoría de la lujuria, a la que presentan como un vicio seductor. Vuelta uno de los siete pecados capitales, la lujuria atormentará en lo sucesivo a la conciencia. Se le ha dolorosamente arrebatado su carácter sagrado como guardiana de la línea de separación de los géneros. Pero lo que resulta más importante es que apartada de la manzana de Eva, de la conversación con la serpiente y con Adán, sin la diáfana transparencia con la que reveló su poder sagrado, y expulsada de la Iglesia, la acuclillada ha sobrevivido. Con su género dislocado pero aún no suprimido, se convierte en una de las representaciones de la brujería y como tal sobrevive en la cocina y en la caverna.
+
+Durante el medio milenio a través del cual habían sostenido dócilmente los pilares, portales y púlpitos, la acuclillada, el macho cabrío, el dragón, el gigante y el enano vieron debilitarse su género sagrado. Las bendiciones indiferenciadas de la Iglesia lo habían borrado. Ahora los nuevos teólogos aprendieron a distinguir esmeradamente entre los _sacramentos_ —ni más ni menos que siete, universales, imprescindibles para la salvación— y las antiguas bendiciones, que formarían el estrato de las cosas sacramentales, claramente de segunda categoría. Para los nuevos doctores, los antiguos espíritus de las conveniencias locales en el mejor de los casos no eran más que símbolos, en todo caso intrusos, cuando no parásitos. Los antiguos duendes bajaron de los campanarios, fueron obligados por la fuerza a abandonar los claustros y, mientras huían, se metamorfosearon. Ya no dioses paganos sino diablos cristianos, ya no custodios irredentos sino espíritus apóstatas, ya no hierofantes ambiguos sino espectros con olor a azufre, comenzaron su errancia. Habían perdido el poder de exorcizar los temores vernáculos, pero todavía podían rondar el campo. Expulsadas por la Iglesia de Aviñón, las sombras domeñadas del pasado regresaron a las plazas de las aldeas, a los ríos y a las montañas en la forma de demonios exangües y mutilados con nombres cristianos, creando una nueva amenaza para un clero que ahora estaba al servicio de un nuevo orden.
+
+Jean Delumeau ha descrito el nuevo temor característico de esta situación peculiar durante el ocaso de la Edad Media. La confusión, la angustia, el terror de la gente que había perdido simultáneamente la tranquilidad de su fe cristiana y los símbolos vernáculos de la rectitud que las guiaba, dieron origen a una situación religiosa sin precedente. Se había roto la cadena de los sacerdotes y adivinos que anteriormente sancionaban ritualmente la existencia intragenérica, y los sacerdotes cristianos que los remplazaron se transformaron en pastores encargados de administrar y normalizar esta existencia. Se había creado un vacío, que exigía un nuevo rito. Su celebrante sería la bruja, la sacerdotisa de la época del género dislocado. Es posible que ésta haya sido tan singular como el estado conyugal en el seno del género, característica de ese tiempo, tan nueva como el homosexual, tan extraña como pretendían sus perseguidores. Sea como fuere, la lucha que se entabló contra ella creó la unión de la Iglesia y el brazo secular del nuevo Estado.[^f119]
+
+# Del género dislocado al sexo económico
+
+EL PROPÓSITO de este ensayo no es hacer una historia del género sino de elaborar conceptos que nos permitan disociar el género del sexo. La historia de la escasez es lo que me interesa. Pero primero tengo que hablar de la desaparición del género y del patriarcado, en conjunción con el auge del individualismo no genérico y sexista. He señalado que a finales de la Edad Media un nuevo orden económico se instaló en las almas mediante la conciencia. Ésta debilitó a los guardianes del género vernáculo varios siglos antes de que el sexo viniera a remplazar al género. Un largo periodo de _dislocación_ del género media entre la sujeción de las parejas en el yugo conyugal y su polarización industrial en el trabajo salariado y el trabajo fantasma. Este periodo del género dislocado difiere considerablemente según los lugares. Es el material con que se teje la ciudad medieval, sin el cual la aldea “europea” característica no existiría. En Florencia, el factor importante para el surgimiento del sexo social, en el curso de solamente dos siglos, es el comercio. En Milán, e inclusive en Ámsterdam, es la _workhouse_, el asilo-taller de fines del siglo XVII. Y en ciertas aldeas, a pesar de la escuela pública, el género dislocado ha sobrevivido hasta nuestros tiempos.[^f120]
+
+La etapa del género dislocado puede llamarse de diversas maneras. Cuando se dice que es la guerra contra la subsistencia, se pone al descubierto la acción que ejerce el Estado-nación. Cuando se dice que es el cercado de las tierras comunales, se destaca el aspecto ambiental que igualmente lo define: la supresión de los derechos adquiridos sobre la propiedad o la producción de bienes comunes que permiten anclar los ámbitos del género en los recursos productivos, a fin de asegurar el trabajo económico, retribuido o gratuito. Pero para hacer justicia a los procesos que operan, también habría que llamarla la era de la brujería, el periodo del alumbramiento del sexo. Se inicia con la formación de la conciencia y termina cuando el sexismo se vuelve banal.
+
+Para las poblaciones que viven en un régimen de subsistencia, la pérdida del género es una experiencia central que los historiadores incapaces de ver el género disfrazan, describiéndola como una “transición a un modo de producción capitalista” —cosa que oculta el hecho de que un _novum_ ahistórico surgió de esta mutación, un productor sujeto al consumo y necesariamente sexista—.
+
+Las sociedades precapitalistas están fundadas en el género.[^f121] Ésta es la condición de la subsistencia, lo es también de la supervivencia. Las sociedades donde el reino del género se ha hundido _son_ sociedades capitalistas; sus sujetos sin género son productores individuales. Curiosamente, esta transformación decisiva aún no ha sido reconocida como lo que es: la condición antropológica principal de la transición de las economías precapitalistas a la sujeción de las necesidades cotidianas a la mercancía, sujeción que se denomina “capitalismo”. El pasaje al capitalismo coincide antropológicamente con la declinación que lleva al género dislocado hasta el régimen del sexo.
+
+“Capitalismo” es un término curioso.[^f122] Era desconocido para Marx cuando Engels lo usó por primera vez en 1870. Proudhon lo había empleado ocasionalmente en algún texto, pero fue Sombart quien le dio su familiar resonancia. Fernand Braudel juzga necesario disculparse por su utilización en el título de su obra monumental: _Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècles_.[^f123] La obra de Braudel constituye un magnífico fresco de la vida económica posterior a la Reforma y anterior a la Revolución francesa. Ante nosotros hace desfilar tres siglos de vida económica, institucional y política. Revive la Europa posmedieval, territorio pletórico de ferias, mercados, talleres, donde se multiplican las rutas del comercio y los gremios. Insiste en destacar que eso que nosotros llamamos “capital”, “capitalista”, “capitalismo”, penetra muy lentamente en la producción, el intercambio y la adquisición de necesidades. Escruta minuciosamente los cambios que podrían explicar esta penetración y los motivos por los cuales la acumulación exponencial del capital se había convertido en un factor de la existencia cotidiana de la mayoría de la gente antes de inaugurarse el siglo XIX. Muestra que la dependencia creciente en relación con el mercado, las condiciones legales de la acumulación a largo plazo y la expansión del espacio económico en el extranjero son las condiciones convergentes sin las cuales la producción industrial capitalista jamás habría podido llegar a predominar. Pero, a lo largo de estos tres volúmenes, la pérdida del género no figura más que de manera implícita, jamás de manera expresa. El autor pasa por alto totalmente la universalidad de la existencia intragenérica en las sociedades precapitalistas y el debilitamiento del género en la transición al capitalismo. Para él, el género no es un factor histórico esencial.
+
+Escribir la historia de los cimientos en los que reposa nuestro mundo es muy distinto a tratar de contar la historia de lo que ha desaparecido. Para el historiador que mira hacia el pasado por un espejo retrovisor, la guada ña y la hoz son instrumentos agrícolas locales que solían usarse en las cosechas; las _técnicas_ se adoptan cuando sobreviene la modernización. Cuando la investigación histórica se interesa en las mentalidades y en los sentimientos, suele centrarse en la enajenación, la soledad, la explotación que se dan a la par con las nuevas técnicas. Examina los sufrimientos que en las personas infligen la nueva economía de mercado, la mecanización y el hambre. El otro sufrimiento, el que experimentan por la pérdida del género, el cual se evacua con las aguas negras en el nuevo sistema de plomería, es el aspecto oculto del triste cuento. ¿Qué perdió la _mujer_ al mismo tiempo que la hoz? ¿Qué debió abandonar el _hombre_ al mismo tiempo que la guadaña? Para contar la historia de estas pérdidas de toda especie un historiador tiene que estudiar los sentimientos vernáculos que han dejado huella muy tenue, tiene que describir la muerte de una realidad genérica que ha escapado a sus colegas, a pesar de haber existido durante milenios.
+
+A fin de prepararme en esta tarea, me esforcé en apoyar la reflexión teórica en una especie de telón de fondo donde ciertos decorados estaban esbozados con más vigor que otros. Varios de estos ilustraban la dislocación de la _domus_—y por ende del género— en beneficio de la pareja conyugal, es decir, de la dualidad sexuada. Añadiré todavía una escena a mi descripción del alumbramiento del sexo económico. Es la de una aldea luterana de Wurtemberg que dejó testimonios de las reacciones de los hombres y las mujeres al ser confrontados por vez primera con la obligación del trabajo fuera del género.
+
+Entre 1800 y 1850 en esta aldea se registró la cantidad anormalmente alta de 48 peticiones de divorcio. David Sabean ha intentado interpretar los motivos aducidos, en la medida de que eran enteramente nuevos.[^f124] Para entender lo que había sucedido, tuvo que examinar las transformaciones económicas de la región en el curso de aquel medio siglo: construcción de la vía férrea, modificación de la tenencia de la tierra, abandono forzado de la pequeña explotación agrícola familiar a cambio de los cultivos frutales con mayor rendimiento. Los huertos frutales (ciruela y manzana) y la remolacha remplazaron a los pequeños cultivos diversificados. Ahora bien, éstos requerían más mano de obra. Súbitamente las mujeres tuvieron que participar en el trabajo de los hombres a fin de asegurar un ingreso familiar suficiente para comprar lo que hasta entonces la hortaliza había proporcionado. Al mismo tiempo debieron acortar el tiempo que dedicaban a sus propias ocupaciones en la cocina. Los procesos de divorcios reflejan la profunda perturbación que estas innovaciones causaron en la vida de los hombres y las mujeres, sus sentimientos de impotencia, su incapacidad para comprender las implicaciones de sus decisiones aparentemente racionales. Las mujeres se quejaban de que los hombres repentinamente habían empezado a darles órdenes respecto al trabajo, algo totalmente nuevo para ellas. Aunque las ocupaciones definidas por el género de las mujeres pudieran haber parecido subordinadas al trabajo de los hombres, la idea de que los hombres pudieran dar órdenes a las mujeres que hacían su trabajo había sido inconcebible hasta entonces. Otra queja de las mujeres: mientras que los hombres tenían tiempo de relajarse en la taberna tras terminar de trabajar al ritmo de la yunta, ellas estaban continuamente apresuradas, tanto en los campos, manejando la azada, como en la cocina. De esta manera aparecía una nueva especie de envidia, una envidia destinada a perdurar como una característica central de la vida moderna, una envidia plenamente “justificada” en el contexto de la labor unisex, aunque impensable en el contexto del género. La queja recurrente entre los hombres: su esposa no valía lo que su madre; en el pasado comían alimentos ricos y variados; actualmente tenían que contentarse con _spaezli_, pastas de huevo, día tras día. Había bajado el telón para la coproducción conyugal fundada en el género dislocado. En este microcosmos podemos ver vívidamente cómo habría de escribirse el nuevo guión de la era industrial. Para que la obra se animara, la escena tendría que poblarse de actores heterosexuales que al mismo tiempo fueran seres neutros económicos —es decir, trabajadores—.
+
+En todas las versiones de este drama moderno, generalmente hay un breve intermedio entre el género y el sexo, que separa el reino del género, donde el hogar obtiene su subsistencia gracias a la repartición de tareas realizadas por dos pares de manos no intercambiables, del régimen de la economía industrial, donde manos desprovistas de género producen mercancías a cambio de un salario. Durante este intermedio protoindustrial, el hogar se ve sujeto al trabajo unisex que tiene que realizarse en casa.[^f125] De esta manera, el hogar se transforma en un molino donde se tritura el género hasta que de él no queda más que el sexo. Los sufrimientos que esta molienda del género ocasiona tanto en los hombres como en las mujeres casi nunca se han registrado. Puedo dar dos razones para explicar tal carencia. Por una parte, la experiencia _nueva_ del sufrimiento económico se convirtió en el cemento de la unión del proletariado. Todos los “trabajadores” padecieron la misma desorientación, soledad, dependencia. Tales sentimientos propiciaron la aparición de intérpretes políticos y de la élite de una nueva clase. El diagnóstico de la aflicción universal se convirtió en el campo exclusivo de los nuevos profesionales: educadores, médicos y demás ingenieros sociales, quienes prosperan produciendo programas, terapias y guías. Los obvios intereses del jefe revolucionario como del comerciante de remedios sociales excluían toda tentativa de _comprender_ el dolor de la pérdida. Por otra parte, la obliteración del género, al tiempo que empobrecía a las personas, las hacía sufrir, pero de modo diferente de un lugar a otro. Pocos habrían podido traducir verbalmente las sutilezas del dolor vernáculo en todas sus formas.
+
+Mientras se montaba el escenario del trabajo en la fábrica y se construía un decorado económico moderno, pero antes de que se reescribiera el guión de los nuevos e inusitados roles sexuales, se improvisaron teorías críticas para este teatro de vanguardia. El genio de Marx y de Freud sólo puede apreciarse cuando se considera cuán tempranamente definieron las reglas del desarrollo del drama moderno. Ambos forjaron los conceptos definitivos que habrían de usarse para describir _y_ poner en escena al nuevo tipo de actor, el “hombre” industrial. Siete siglos antes, la Iglesia había imputado un pecado carente de género a almas carentes de género. Ahora, el poder sin género de humanos sin género en un cosmos sin género se convertía en la característica trascendental de las categorías utilizadas en un nuevo tipo de metafísica. Hacia mediados del siglo XIX, de manera simultánea pero cada cual por su parte, diversos sabios redefinieron la _vis viva universi_ (la fuerza viva del universo) como energía, algunas veces cautiva, otras libre. Se atribuye a Helmholtz la proeza de haber imaginado la idea pensable. Durante el mismo decenio, la mano de obra, que los anglosajones denominan _labor force_, se convirtió en una palabra clave. En fin, una generación más tarde, Freud, quien retoma textualmente ciertas frases de Helmholtz, atribuiría al ser humano una energía psíquica en la forma de la _libido_—a veces cautiva, a veces libre—. Los nuevos canonistas fabricaron su teoría del hombre laico y de su salvación a partir de postulados derivados de la química y la mecánica de fluidos. Según ellos, hay una energía sin género que circula, en calidad de capital, por los conductos sociales y, en calidad de libido, por los canales psicológicos. Así, desde hace tres cuartos de siglo las palabras clave que condicionan nuestra existencia son “energía”, “trabajo” y “sexualidad”. Pero ahora que otra palabra, “crisis”, les está haciendo sombra, acaso ha llegado el tiempo de cuestionar públicamente su realidad.
+
+Toda sociedad necesita un pasado. Para tener el sentido del presente, los vivientes tienen que poseer un pasado propio. No existe un “nosotros”, una primera persona del plural, al margen de su mito de la creación. En todas las épocas las sociedades mantuvieron vivo su “nosotros” de doble género mediante los rituales, las fiestas, los tabúes. Tampoco la sociedad industrial sería capaz de existir sin su mito de la creación.
+
+La máquina que teje el pasado de la sociedad industrial es la historia. Desde hace un siglo la historia ha venido fabricando una continuidad entre el presente sin género y el pasado intragenérico, legitimando el sexo como descendiente del género. Mediante una metodología que constantemente afina, la nueva ciencia ha interpretado la historia a partir de categorías sexistas, a fin de dar un pasado a nuestro mundo económico. Sin esta reconstrucción económica de un pasado intragenérico, el mundo contemporáneo de la economía sexista no habría podido ser presentado como una realidad seductora, especialmente para aquellas que jamás han dejado de practicar la discriminación. Mediante miles de sintéticos lazos sentimentales, la historia ata el mundo contemporáneo a un reino del género que de hecho había abandonado al emprender su frenético viaje. Los historiadores han tejido un tapiz que debe hacernos sentir cómodos en nuestro medio ambiente sexista, pero lo han tejido con fibras industriales. Sesudas obras pretenden mostrar el pasado como la simiente, una forma primitiva del presente, y demostrar que sus lenguas, costumbres, instituciones son seguramente las formas ancestrales, embrionarias de las nuestras. En nuestras bibliotecas abundan los volúmenes que atribuyen una estructura de clase a la ciudad-Estado griega, que veía en el sofista que pregona sus artificios el precursor del educador moderno, que describen la vida sexual _(¡sic!)_ en Mesopotamia. El presente ensayo busca contrarrestar esta perspectiva _centralista_ de la historia. Aunque de manera voluntaria no me incluyo entre los historiadores “científicos”, pues no aplico al pasado palabras clave, ni conceptos forjados por la utopía, creo que honro a los muertos mediante una investigación razonada, documentada y crítica.
+
+He intentado hacer comprensible la ruptura entre el género y el sexo, hacer perceptible el abismo que separa el presente del pasado. He querido poner al descubierto la falsa genealogía del sexo que subyace en la historia económica. Esta ficción es indispensable para una sociedad sexista que no puede admitir que carece de una legítima ascendencia. Sin embargo, es falso que el sexo proceda del género. Los orígenes de ambos son sociales, pero sus matrices no tienen ningún parentesco. La matriz del sexo es el _alma mater;_ la matriz del género solamente se puede hallar más allá de “la gruta de los siete durmientes”, “alojada en las hendiduras de las rocas y en las ramas de inmensos tejos huecos” (Robert Graves, _La diosa blanca_).
+
+Ya sean hijas de la matriz del género o pupilas de la matriz del sexo, las mujeres tienen que enfrentarse a los hombres. Pero cada matriz las dota de un poder relativo diferente. En el reino del género, hombres y mujeres dependen colectivamente unos de otros. Su mutua dependencia fija límites al conflicto, a la explotación, a la derrota. La cultura vernácula representa una tregua entre ambos géneros —y a veces una cruel tregua—. Allá donde los hombres mutilan el cuerpo de las mujeres, el gineceo sabe cómo vengarse cruelmente de ellos y de sus sentimientos. Contrastando con esta tregua, el régimen de la escasez impone una guerra sin fin, donde las mujeres pierden constantemente, siempre de manera nueva. Mientras que en el régimen del género las mujeres podían estar a veces subordinadas, en _todo_ régimen económico siempre son el segundo sexo, _y nada más que eso_. Las mujeres siempre están en desventaja en los juegos donde las apuestas ignoran el género y donde el _ex aequo_ no existe. Allí donde se despoja a los géneros, donde los neutros se enfrentan, el hombre siempre prevalece. No es por lo tanto sorprendente que hoy en día sea la mujer quien “descubra” la transformación del género producida por la economía. Típicamente, la mujer se queja de ser “invisible”, tanto para los demás como para sí misma. En el régimen de la economía, no es capaz de percibirse como una compañera en igualdad, ni tampoco reconocerse en el género. Los pomposos argumentos de las ciencias políticas, fundados en un conjunto de nociones que postulan la igualdad entre todos los hombres, no la toman en cuenta. La utopía feminosexista de la “tierra de las mujeres” ni siquiera supone la pobre camaradería que impera en los vestidores deportivos masculinos, y las tentativas de reconstitución del pasado de las mujeres con la ayuda de nociones clave son caricaturas de las investigaciones históricas científicas. Pero al menos, al tratar de escapar en vano de este doble callejón sin salida, los estudios feministas tuvieron el mérito de proporcionar un punto de apoyo para la palanca capaz de derribar el “tinglado” científico.
+
+En este ensayo no he pretendido explicar por qué la sociedad pone al hombre en la cima e impone un _handicap_ a la mujer. Puse límites a mi curiosidad a fin de tener la libertad de escuchar con mayor atención lo que cuentan las perdedoras, no para aprender más sobre ellas sino para aprender más sobre el campo de batalla que es la economía. La sociedad industrial crea dos mitos, uno sobre su origen sexuado, otro sobre su progresión hacia más igualdad. Ambos mitos son engañifas, como lo revela la experiencia personal del neutro del segundo sexo.
+
+He querido mostrar que la lucha contra el sexismo converge con la lucha contra la destrucción del medio ambiente y con la oposición al monopolio radical de los bienes y los servicios sobre las “necesidades”; que estos tres movimientos convergen porque proceden de la misma causa: la recesión; que la constatación que cada quien haga, por razones propias, de que la reducción de la economía no es una simple necesidad negativa sino condición positiva para una mejor existencia, puede conducir de una convergencia teórica a una acción publica concertada. Yo pienso que estas tres acciones representan tres aspectos de una tentativa para recobrar los ámbitos de comunidad, que significan exactamente lo contrario que los recursos económicos. Es por esto que he querido esbozar una teoría que permita clarificar los conceptos necesarios para una historia de la escasez.
+
+La transición histórica de la subsistencia intragenérica a la sujeción a productos escasos justifica mi tesis. La escasez es histórica, tan histórica como el género o el sexo. El régimen de la escasez no podía surgir más que con base en el postulado de que el “hombre” es individualista, posesivo y, en el ámbito de su supervivencia económica, un _neutrum œconomicum_ rapaz. Tal postulado, encarnado en las instituciones, desde el matrimonio hasta la escuela, transforma al sujeto de la historia. Este sujeto no es ya la _gens_ o los lares que designan la complementariedad ambigua y asimétrica de un conjunto de mujeres y hombres que se fijan, ellos mismos, sus límites. El sujeto deviene una construcción ideológica que se fabrica mediante una falsificación del “nosotros”, una construcción como las clases sociales, la nación, la sociedad o la pareja unida. Pienso que para elaborar una teoría sobre la acción necesaria para la recuperación de los ámbitos de comunidad, un historiador tendría que explorar la etiología de esta metamorfosis del sujeto de la historia.
+
+No tengo ninguna estrategia que ofrecer. Rehúso especular sobre las probabilidades de algún tratamiento curativo. No quiero que la sombra del porvenir oscurezca los conceptos con los cuales yo intento captar lo que es y lo que ha sido. Tal como el asceta y el poeta que al meditar sobre la muerte celebran con gratitud el exquisito regalo de la vida, todos debemos afrontar la triste pérdida del género. Creo que entonces será posible que nazca un arte de vivir contemporáneo, siempre que nuestra aceptación austera y lúcida del doble gueto de los neutros económicos nos incite a renunciar a las comodidades del sexo económico.
+
+
+
+[^f0]: Las notas al pie, destinadas a los estudiantes del curso que impartí en Berkeley y durante el otoño de 1982, y a los lectores que desean continuar la  reflexión más allá de mi texto, son más bien anotaciones. Proponen orientaciones de lectura, de investigación, iluminación y prolongan los temas.
+
+[^f1]: _Valores vernáculos_. De los cinco ensayos que componen _El trabajo fantasma_, el segundo y el tercero tratan de la diferencia entre el habla vernácula y la lengua materna inculcada. Fueron producto de las prolongadas conversaciones que mantuve con el padre Devi P. Pattanayak, cuando yo estudiaba bajo su tutela en el Central Institute of Indian Languages Manacagangotei de Mysore. Respecto a los fundamentos de esta distinción, véase su obra _Aspects of Applied Linguistics_, Asia Publishing House, Nueva York, 1981. Se encuentra una prolongación de esta discusión en las actas del seminario internacional “In Search of Terminology”, enero de 1982, Central Institute of Indian Languages, Mysore 570006, India. Mis dos participaciones se convirtieron en capítulos de la obra que actualmente preparo sobre los valores vernáculos, con la perspectiva de una historia de la escasez. (Respecto al término “vernáculo”, véase la nota 51.)
+
+[^f2]: _Palabras clave_. La obra de Raymond Williams, _Keywords_: _A Vocabulary of Culture and Society_, Oxford University Paperback, Nueva York, 1976, me parece única en su género, y me dio la pista de las palabras clave. El autor nos hace compartir su sorpresa y pesar ante la precariedad de las palabras en las cuales había fundado el rigor de su pensamiento. Guiado por él, me esfuerzo en: _1)_ explorar los nuevos tipos de palabras clave; _2)_ discernir las condiciones bajo las cuales una red de palabras clave puede implantarse en el habla cotidiana. Al respecto me he inspirado eficazmente en _The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness_, Vintage Books, Nueva York, 1974, de Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger y Hansfried Keliner. Para una introducción a un tipo de semántica histórica específicamente alemán, véase Irmline Veit-Brause, “A note on _Begriffsgeschichte_” en _History and Theory_, 20, núm. 1, 1981, pp. 61-67. Respecto a las redes específicamente modernas de ciertos términos, estoy en deuda con Michel Foucault, _Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings_, _1972-1977_, Pantheon, Nueva York, 1981, y su obra anterior: _L’archéologie du savoir_, Gallimard, París, 1969. Respecto a la semántica comparativa de las palabras clave en las principales lenguas de Europa oriental, véase Johann Knobloch _et al_., eds., _Europäische Schlüsselwörter_, 3 vols., Max Hüber, Munich, 1963-1967.
+
+[^f3]: _Campos semánticos_. Para una bibliografía crítica internacional de las monografías y los diccionarios que exploran los campos semánticos, véase H. Gipper y J. Schwartz, _Bibliographisches Handbuch zur Sprachinhaltsforschung. Schrifttum zur Sprachinhaltsforschung in alpahabetischer Folge nach Verfassem, mit Besprechungen und Inhaltshinweisen_, Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Colonia, 1961. La obra sólo se completó hasta la letra L, pero dos índices temáticos de esta primera mitad existen ya. Como las palabras clave en el siglo XX revisten la apariencia de un sentido comúnmente admitido que trasciende cada lengua, su estudio requiere con frecuencia realizar comparaciones. Para el inglés, el instrumento principal es _A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary_, R. W. Burchfield, ed., 3 vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, que contiene las palabras que “entraron en el lenguaje durante el periodo de las entregas de la obra” (el _Oxford English Dictionary_, o OED), es decir, de 1884 (primer fascículo de la letra A) a 1928 (último fascículo del diccionario), así como aquellos que entraron en la lengua inglesa en Gran Bretaña y el extranjero desde 1928 hasta la fecha. _The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles_, revisado y editado por C. T. Onions, tercera edición totalmente revisada, con etimologías corregidas por G. W. S. Friedrichsen y anexos revisados y corregidos, 2 vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973, presenta en forma abreviada todos los elementos del OED, incluyendo los términos (y sus acepciones) arcaicos, obsoletos, dialectales o de la lengua vulgar del pasado. Es siempre útil H. L. Mencken, _The American Language: An Inquiry into the Development of English in the United States_, cuarta edición y los dos suplementos actualizados y anotados por Raven I. McDavid, Jr., asistido por David W. Maurer Knopf, Nueva York, 1980; de esta obra existe una edición de bolsillo abreviada que consta de un solo volumen. Para el francés, Paul Robert, _Dictionnaire alpha-bétique et analogique de la langue française_, Société du Nouveau Littré, París, segunda edición revisada y aumentada, 1977. El _Petit Robert 1_ es una excelente edición abreviada del _Grand Robert_ de seis volúmenes. Un intento de crear un equivalente francés histórico y exhaustivo del OED y de sus suplementos es el _Trésor de la langue française. Dictionnaire de la langue du XIXe et du XXe siècle (1789-1960)_ de Paul Imbs, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, París, obra iniciada en 1971 y que está por aparecer. Desgraciadamente, a partir del tomo tres el campo de esta obra ha sido severamente reducido. Para el español, yo prefiero a J. Corominas, _Diccionario crítico etimológico_, Gredos, Madrid, 1954-1957. Las adiciones, rectificaciones e índices se encuentran en el 4° tomo de la reimpresión Francke, Berna, 1979. La mayoría de los artículos contiene una bibliografía. En alemán, el _Deutsches Wörterbuch_ de Jakob y Wilhelm Grimm (en 1854 empezaron a aparecer los 16 volúmenes, que actualmente se encuentran en proceso de revisión) es apenas accesible. Es una obra práctica la de Hermann Paul, _Deutsches Wörterbuch_, quinta edición enteramente revisada y aumentada por N. Werner Betz Niemeyer, Tubinga, 1966. Puesto que el pensamiento alemán se interesa particularmente en la historia de las ideas y en la historia de los conceptos, en el idioma alemán existen dos grandes obras de referencia que no tienen igual en otras lenguas y que con frecuencia resultan útiles en la investigación de las palabras clave en las lenguas europeas: Joachim Ritter, ed., _Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie_, Schwabe, Basilea, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, comenzado en 1971, obra que contendrá 10 volúmenes (seis ya han aparecido); Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck, ed., _Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland_, E. Klett, Stuttgart, comenzado en 1972 y en proceso de publicación, obra que estará integrada por 130 monografías en torno a temas y conceptos sociopolíticos. Para el italiano, Salvatore Battaglia, _Grande Dizionario della lingua italiana_ (director de redacción Giorgio Barberi Squarotti), Unione Tipografico Turín, comenzado en 1961 y en proceso de publicación, ya han aparecido los volúmenes uno al ocho; éste es un diccionario histórico de la lengua italiana, y sus índices permiten la consulta práctica de numerosas citas, antiguas y modernas. Para contraponer los sinónimos vernáculos con el “sentido único” de las palabras clave, hube de recurrir a Carl Darling Buck, _A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages: A Contribution to the History of Ideas_, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949.
+
+[^f4]: _Lo humano_. Hasta el siglo XVIII, humano era todo lo que estaba relacionado con la especie humana, pero todo _humano_ era un hombre, una mujer o un niño. El término “humanidad” había tenido una evolución diferente, aunque relacionada. A partir del siglo XIV, tuvo el significado de cortesía, civilidad (como el italiano _umanità_). A partir el siglo XVI adoptó también el sentido de bondad, generosidad. El empleo del término “humanidad” para designar al género humano, su acepción más común en nuestros días, sólo comienza en el siglo XVIII. Lo “humano” hoy en día posee este sentido abstracto. Además, califica a la _falibilidad excusable_, el error humano. Véase al respecto Williams, _op. cit_., en la nota 2, pp. 121 ss. Para una bibliografía sobre el concepto y el término, véase Michael Landmann, _Philosophical Anthropology_, Westminster Press, Filadelfia, 1974.
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+[^f5]: _Individualismo fuera de género_. Los historiadores, incluyendo los que estudian las ideas económicas, no se han dado cuenta de que la desaparición del género crea el tema de la ciencia económica. Marcel Mauss fue el primero en ver que “nuestras sociedades occidentales sólo recientemente han hecho del hombre un _animal económico_” (1909). El hombre occidental es el _homo œconomicus_. Decimos que una sociedad se ha “occidentalizado” cuando sus instituciones son restructuradas en previsión del mercado, es decir, de la producción de mercancías para satisfacer las necesidades básicas. Véase al respecto Karl Polanyi, _The Great Transformation_, Beacon Press, Boston, 1944; traducción francesa, Gallimard, París, 1983. Respecto a la influencia de Polanyi, véase S. C. Humphreys, “History, Economics and Anthropology: The Work of Karl Polanyi”, _History and Theory_, 9, núm. 2, 1968, pp. 165-212. La definición nueva del hombre en cuanto sujeto y cliente de una economía _disembedded_ (“desincrustada”, separada de las relaciones sociales) tiene su historia. Para una iniciación a esta historia, recomiendo Louis Dumont, _Homo æqualis_, Gallimard, París, 1977. La percepción que de sí mismo tiene el ser como individuo _humano_ y la exigencia de una satisfacción institucional igualitaria de las necesidades, constituyen una ruptura respecto a todas las demás formas premodernas de la aprehensión de sí. Pero tanto los motivos como la forma de esta discontinuidad radical de la conciencia de sí siguen siendo muy controvertidos. Para una orientación en torno a esta discusión, véase Marshall Sahlins, _Culture and Practical Reason_, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976; traducción francesa: _Au cœur des sociétés. Raison utilitaire et raison culturelle_, Gallimard, París, 1980. Sahlins define la diferencia entre el ayer y el hoy como un “modo distintivo de producción simbólica” que es propio de la civilización occidental. No he de discutir este punto. Pero sostengo que existe una profunda discontinuidad entre todas las formas antiguas de la existencia y el individualismo occidental, y que este cambio constituye una ruptura fundamental. Reside principalmente en la _pérdida del género_. Esta pérdida del género social no ha sido tomada en consideración por la historia del individualismo. Una historia del individualismo económico debe comenzar con Élie Halévy, _La Formation du radicalisme philosophique_, 3 vols., Félix Alcan, París, 1900-1903; está agotada la edición francesa, que jamás ha sido reeditada; existe una reedición reciente en inglés, _The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism_, Faber & Faber, Londres, 1972. Halévy describe detalladamente las vías muy contradictorias que siguieron los diversos discípulos de Bentham. Califica a Bentham y a sus discípulos de “radicales” por haber roto deliberadamente con las corrientes filosóficas anteriores. Sobre la profunda transformación de la estructura de la personalidad que dio origen a la clase obrera inglesa entre 1790 y 1830, véase E. P. Thompson, _The Making of the English Working Class_, Random Press House, Nueva York, 1966. El utilitarismo podía conducir a la defensa de un paternalismo burocrático fundado en la intervención legislativa, o a la preconización del individualismo anárquico y de la doctrina del _laissez-faire_. Halévy muestra que los discípulos de Bentham se dividieron entre ambas orientaciones. Véase también Leszek Kolakowski, _Main Currents in Marxism: Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution_, 3 vols., Oxford University Press, Londres, 1978. La historia social de nuestros tiempos que ha sido interpretada por el marxismo es la historia del conflicto entre grupos que se adhieren a estas corrientes opuestas surgidas de los principios utilitaristas. Dumont ( _op. cit_) estudia los rasgos fundamentales comunes a las corrientes utilitaristas. Procede con un sólido análisis de los textos de Mandeville, Locke, Smith y Marx. Todos estos ven en el “humano” un “individuo” determinado por necesidades fundamentales basadas en el postulado de la escasez universal. La significación del “individuo” es expuesta en C. B. MacPherson, _The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke_, Oxford University Press, Londres, 1962; traducción francesa: _La Théorie politique de l’individualisme possessif de Hobbes à Locke_, Gallimard, París, 1971, _The Real World of Democracy (idem_, 1966) y _Democratic Theory: Essays on Retrieval (idem_, 1972). El autor funda firmemente su intuición en el rasgo común fundamental de los individuos que subyace en todo el pensamiento democrático moderno, a saber, su carácter _posesivo_. Muestra que todos los humanismos del siglo XIX y del XX se basan en el valor supremo del individuo posesivo, que evoluciona personalmente, con libertad —en la medida en que la libertad se ve como una posesión, donde el individuo se libera de todos los lazos no económicos que lo ligan con sus semejantes—. Por mi parte, estimo que una característica adicional constituye con igual derecho el sujeto de la teoría y la práctica sociales modernas: _el individuo posesivo no tiene género_, antropológicamente es un simple neutro sexuado. Lógicamente, como he de mostrarlo, sólo el individuo que es a la vez posesivo y sexuado responde al postulado de la escasez en que está fundada toda economía política. La “identidad” institucional del _homo œconomicus_ excluye el género. Es un _neutrum œconomicum_. La desaparición del género es por ende un dato primordial de la historia de la escasez y de las instituciones que la estructuran.
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+[^f6]: _Individualismo envidioso_. El individuo contemporáneo, sin género y posesivo, que es el sujeto de la economía, gobierna su vida en función de consideraciones de utilidad marginal. Toda decisión económica está relacionada con una percepción de la escasez y en consecuencia tiende hacia una forma de envidia que era desconocida en el pasado. Las instituciones _productivas_ modernas nutren el individualismo envidioso al mismo tiempo que lo ocultan —las instituciones del pasado, orientadas hacia la subsistencia, buscaban reducirlo y denunciarlo—. Ésta es la tesis de Paul Dumouchel y Jean-Pierre Dupuy en sus respectivos ensayos en _L’enfer des choses: René Girard et la logique de l’économie_, Seuil, París, 1979. Los autores ponen al descubierto el contraste tipológico entre las instituciones modernas que engendran y luego disfrazan la envidia, y aquellas que tenían la función inversa —a las que han remplazado—. Cada cual, en su exposición, aplica en la economía los resultados del análisis literario que René Girard desarrolla en _Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque_, Grasset, París, 1961. Véase también, del mismo autor, _La violence et le sacré_, 1972\. Girard busca en la novela del siglo XIX las pruebas de la transformación histórica del deseo: la evolución de las “necesidades” que se basa en una comparación envidiosa con lo que otro desea. En lugar de aplicar las categorías freudianas a los personajes de Dostoievski, analiza a Freud a través de los ojos de los hermanos Karamazov. Con esta perspectiva, el llamado progreso económico muestra ser la propagación del deseo triangular o “mimético”. La historia del individualismo económico coincide con la modernización de la envidia. En el presente ensayo, pretendo investigar la aparición de un tipo de envidia que es característica de las relaciones entre los sexos y que nace en la sociedad cuando el género desaparece. Respecto al tema de la envidia, cuya historia aún no ha sido escrita, véase el texto fundamental de la antropología de la envidia: George M. Foster, “Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Goods”, _American Anthropologist_, 67, núm. 2, abril de 1965, pp. 293-315, y “The Anatomy of Envy: A Study in Symbolic Behavior”, _Current Anthropology_, 13, núm. 2, abril, 1972, pp. 165-202. “Cuando experimenta la amenaza constante que la envidia representa para él mismo y para la sociedad, el hombre siente temor: teme las consecuencias de su envidia y las consecuencias de la envidia de los demás. De ahí resulta que en toda sociedad la gente recurre a ciertas formas culturales, simbólicas o no, a fin de neutralizar, reducir o dominar los peligros que ven surgir de la envidia, particularmente su temor de la envidia.” Respecto a la percepción de la envidia en la Antigüedad clásica, véase Svend Ranulf, _The Jealousy of the Gods and Criminal Law in Athens: A Contribution to the Sociology of Moral Indignation_, 2 vols., Williams & Norgate, Londres, 1933-1934. Respecto a la _hybris_ que suscita la Némesis: David Greene, _Greek Political Theory: The Image of Man in Thucydides and Plato_, University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, Chicago, 1965, y E. R. Dodds, _The Greeks and the Irrational_, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968, especialmente el capítulo 2. Respecto a la actitud relacionada con la envidia al final de la Antigüedad clásica, es interesante un estudio sobre el aspecto contrario: R. A. Gauthier, _Magnanimité: l’idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne_, Vrin, París, 1951. Sobre la visión cristiana del “vicio” de la envidia, véase el artículo “Envidia” de Édouard Ranwez en _Dictionnaire de spiritualité_, Beauchesne, París, comenzado en 1932, en proceso de edición, pp. 744-785; también, Lester K. Little, “Pride Goes Before Avarice: Social Changes and the Vices in Latin Christendom”, _The American Historical Review_, 76, febrero, 1971, pp. 16-49. En torno a la iconografía medieval de la envidia, Mireille Vincent-Cassy, “L’envie au Moyen Âge”, _Annales ESC_, 35, núm. 2, marzo-abril de 1980, pp. 253-271, y “Quelques réflexions sur l’envie et la jalousie en France au XIVe siècle”, en Michel Mollat, _Études sur l’histoire de la pauvreté (moyen âge-XVIe siècle)_, publicaciones de la Sorbonne, París, 1974, serie Études, tomo 8, pp. 487-503. Una “historia de la envidia” no podría tener nada en común con las investigaciones realizadas por los psicólogos o los sociólogos modernos que imputan a la gente de otros tiempos lo que consideran ser la “envidia”. He aquí dos ejemplos de esta especie de estudios: Melanie Klein, _Envy and Gratitude_, Delacorte Press, Nueva York, 1957, especialmente pp. 176-235 (traducción francesa: _Envie et gratitude et autres essais_, Gallimard, París, 1968, que parte del postulado freudiano de la envidia innata que las mujeres tienen respecto al pene; y Helmut Schoeck, _Envy: A Theory of Social Behaviour_, Harcourt, Brace and World, Nueva York, 1970 (traducción alemana: _Der Neid und die Gesellschaft_, Herder, Friburgo, 4a edición, 1974), que pasa totalmente por alto el hecho de que la emoción y la percepción de la envidia poseen una historia. Entre los hombres y las mujeres, la denigración y la maledicencia no son fenómenos nuevos, pero la institucionalización de la inagotable comparación envidiosa entre individuos desprovistos de género es históricamente inédita.
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+[^f7]: _Sexo y sexismo_. La palabra _sexo_ viene del latín _sexus_, que pertenece a la familia _secare_ (cortar) cuya raíz _sec_\- indica división: sec-ción, seg-mento. Gramaticalmente, la palabra _sexus_ siempre debe acompañarse del calificativo _virilis_ (masculino) o _muliebris_ (femenino). Durante la Ilustración, cuando lo “humano” asumió la forma de un ideal, la lengua francesa restringe el término a las mujeres. La _Enciclopédie_ de Diderot le da 10 líneas: _“El sexo_ en sentido absoluto, o más bien _el bello sexo_, es el epíteto que se da a las mujeres … las más caras delicias del ciudadano apacible… cuya feliz fecundidad perpetua los amores y las gracias …” Será solamente durante el último cuarto del siglo XIX cuando el término tomará un sentido común para hombres y mujeres, aunque sin dejar de implicar diferencias morfológicas y psicológicas. Pero designa en ellos y ellas una especie de sistema de canalización de una energía agenérica que Freud habría de llamar “libido”. El sexo moderno desconoce el género, tal como lo muestra claramente el término “sexualidad”. Paradójicamente, en su función de palabra clave, el sexo es agenérico. Y la formación de la sexualidad agenérica es una de las condiciones necesarias para la aparición del _homo œconomicus_. Ésta es la razón por la que contrapongo el _sexo económico_ al _género vernáculo_. Pienso que el primero muestra la polaridad de caracteres comunes, el segundo, una dualidad complementaria. Tanto el género como el sexo son realidades sociales que no tienen más que una tenue relación con la anatomía. El sexo económico individualizado es todo lo que queda del género social en el seudo género del humano contemporáneo _sexuado_. El género no puede florecer en un medio ambiente estructurado por la economía. Y, sin embargo, la expoliación del medio ambiente social apropiado para el género vernáculo sigue siendo ignorada por los ecologistas. Es evidente que aquí empleo los términos _género_ y _sexo_ en calidad de “tipos ideales”, en el sentido weberiano. Véase Max Weber, _Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre_, Mohr, Tubinga, 1922 (traducción francesa: _Essais sur la théorie de la science_, Plon, París, 1965). Un tipo ideal ( _Idealtypus_) es una construcción conceptual ( _ein Gedankenbild_) que no es una realidad histórica y ni siquiera una “verdadera” realidad. No puede servir como medida de una situación o de una acción real. Es un concepto _limitante_ ideal al que se le _compara_ la situación o la acción real para explicar algunos de los componentes importantes de éstas. Tal como yo los empleo, “género” y “sexo” son conceptos limitantes ideales que designan una polaridad: la transformación industrial de la sociedad que se convierte en un sistema “sexualizante” y ya no más “generizante”. Tanto para el género como para el sexo, la anatomía no es más que la materia prima, pues ambos transforman los órganos genitales en realidades sociales. El género transforma al pene en incontables tipos de _phalloi_; el sexo no produce más que el internacional, el amenazador, el envidiado “pene”. (Respecto a la homogenización análoga de la matriz y la vagina, véanse notas 87 y 90). Gayle Rubin (véanse notas 22 y 76) subraya el hecho de que en los grupos _humanos_ la existencia de sistemas genéricos es universal, sea cual fuere la muy amplia diversidad estructural de tales sistemas. Y no obstante, independientemente de su configuración única, cada sociedad posee una ideología que expone la inmutabilidad de las categorías del género. Estoy de acuerdo con ello, pero he de añadir que la sociedad _sexuada_ posee una ideología que expone la irrevocable decadencia del género (respecto al patriarcado como oposición del sexismo, véase la nota 21). En torno a la gama de sutiles variaciones de los símbolos del género, véanse las notas 116 y 117, así como L. Kriss-Rettenbeck, _“Feige”; Wort, Gebärde, Amulett_, Munich, 1955, y M. L. Wagner, “Phallus, Horn und Fisch. Lebendige und verschüttete Vorstellungen und Symbole, vornehmlich im Bereich des Mittelmeerbeckens”, en _Domum Natalicium_, Carol Jaberg, Zurich, 1973, pp. 77-130.
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+[^f8]: _Degradación del medio ambiente_. Cada vez son más evidentes los límites que modifican los postulados fundamentales de la economía política. Aunque la ecología, en cuanto ciencia y sistema de ideas, tiene una historia todavía reciente, va ganando en madurez. Hace referencia cada vez más a su propia historia, signo de una disciplina que se hace “adulta”. El término _Ökologie_ (que en francés se adoptó al principio con la ortografía _Œcologie_) fue creado en 1866 por E. Haeckel en una investigación sobre la morfología general de los organismos que realizó con base en una perspectiva evolucionista darwiniana. Robert P. McIntosh, “The Background and Some Current Problems of Theoretical Ecology”, _Synthese_, 43, 1980, pp. 195-255, proporciona una historiografía crítica y analítica de la ecología en las ciencias biológicas. La ecología como ciencia política tiene un origen mucho más reciente. En torno a la discusión sobre el tema, véase William Ophuls, _Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: Prologue to a Political Theory of Steady State_, W. H. Freeman, New York, 1977. En mi concepto, la ecología no habrá de madurar si no incorpora dos distinciones que actualmente descuida: la distinción jurídica entre los _ámbitos de comunidad_ y los _recursos productivos_ (véase nota 10) y la distinción entre los ámbitos complementarios y el espacio agenérico.
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+[^f9]: _Contraproductividad_. La _contraproductividad_ es un indicador social que mide la frustración particular que produce el consumo obligatorio de una mercancía o de un servicio en un grupo o una clase. Algunos ejemplos: las frustraciones causadas por los transportes, que en la medida que se multiplican y se hacen más rápidos producen mayor pérdida de tiempo; por el tratamiento médico, más nefasto que la enfermedad; por la educación pública o los medios de información que más que nada embrutecen; por la tutela política o social que engendra a drogadictos de la “asistencia institucional”. Es posible ver en este fenómeno una medida de la _intensidad_ de las privaciones que las instituciones modernas infligen — _por necesidad técnica_— a la mayoría de sus clientes, por no cumplir con los objetivos para las que fueron creadas y financiadas por el erario —por ejemplo, la rapidez de los transportes—. La contraproductividad no es el congestionamiento, que también genera insatisfacción, sino la gran cantidad de cosas que estorban su funcionamiento, ya sean los vehículos, las materias que se imparten en las escuelas o las terapias. Yo veo en la contraproductividad el resultado de un _monopolio radical de las mercancías sobre los valores vernáculos_, que yo aún llamaba “valores de uso” en _La convivencialidad_, véase vol. I, 2006, particularmente el apartado _El equilibrio múltiple_, y en _Energía y equidad_. En último análisis, este monopolio radical procede de la transformación de los ámbitos de comunidad —por ejemplo, aquellos donde el derecho tradicional reconocía el “derecho del paso” peatonal— en utilidades públicas necesarias para la producción o la circulación de las mercancías. Escribí _Némésis médica_, véase vol. I, 2006, para ilustrar cómo la contraproductividad opera claramente en los niveles de la técnica, de la estructura social y del símbolo cultural. Como lo demuestran JeanPierre Dupuy, _Valeur sociale et encombrement du temps. Monographie du séminaire d’économétrie_, CNRS, París, 1975, y Jean-Pierre Dupuy y Jean Robert, _La trahison de l’opulence_, PUF, París, 1976, la contraproductividad no es la medida de las molestias individuales que las iniciativas políticas o técnicas podrían suprimir, sino un indicador social que refleja las particularidades tecnológicas. Wolfgang Sachs ha esclarecido el problema para su previsible discusión pública en _Are Energy-Intensive Life-Images Fading? The Cultural Meaning of the Automobile in Transition_, Technische Universität, Berlín, manuscrito, octubre de 1981. Véanse también las notas 60 y 112.
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+[^f10]: _Reapropiación de los bienes de los ámbitos de comunidad_. El término _communaux_ es antiguo en el francés, y lo es también en otras lenguas: _commons_ en inglés, _Almende_ o _Gemeinheit_ en alemán. Véase Iván Illich, _Das Recht auf Gemeinheit_, Rowohlt, Hamburgo, 1981, especialmente la introducción, y _gli usi civici_ en italiano. Los ámbitos de comunidad eran las tierras a las que todos los habitantes de una comunidad tenían derechos de uso adquiridos, no para extraer una ganancia monetaria sino para asegurar la subsistencia familiar. Los ámbitos de comunidad son esa parte del medio ambiente cuyo usufructo está garantizado por la ley de la costumbre, respecto a las cuales ésta impone formas específicas de respeto comunitario. Pienso exponer en una obra mía sobre los _Valores vernáculos_ (véase nota 1) en la que estoy trabajando, la degradación de los ámbitos de comunidad con el propósito de transformarlos en recursos productivos. Aquellos que luchan por la preservación de la biosfera y aquellos que rechazando un estilo de vida caracterizado por el monopolio de las mercancías sobre las actividades intentan recuperar poco a poco la capacidad de vivir fuera del régimen mercantil de la escasez, convergen actualmente en una alianza nueva en el seno de la cual todas las corrientes tienden a la recuperación y aumento de los _ámbitos de comunidad_. Esta realidad social que está en vías de surgir y converger es llamada por André Gorz el “archipiélago de la convivencialidad”. El instrumento principal para la cartografía de este nuevo mundo es la obra de Valentina Borremans, _Guide to Convivial Tools_, Special Report núm. 13, _Library Journal_, 1180 Sixth Avenue, Nueva York, 1980, guía razonada que registra más de 1 000 bibliografías, catálogos, periódicos, etc. Se pueden encontrar informes periódicos sobre la lucha por los nuevos ámbitos de comunidad en publicaciones como _Trans-National Network for Appropriate Technology_ (Tranet), P. O. Box 567, Rangeley, Maine 04980, Estados Unidos de América, y el _CoEvolution Quarterly_ (director: Stuart Brand, P. O. Box 428, Sausalito, California 94965, Estados Unidos de América).
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+[^f11]: _Escasez_. Empleo aquí este término en el sentido estricto que le dan los economistas desde que L. Walras lo empleó por vez primera con esta precisa significación en 1874. La escasez define el campo en el que las leyes de la economía relacionan a: _1) sujetos_ (individuos posesivos, envidiosos, agenéricos, bien se trate de personas o de compañías); _2) instituciones_ (que nutren simbólicamente a la _mimesis_); y _3) mercancías_, en el seno de un medio ambiente donde los ámbitos de comunidad han sido transformados en _recursos_, privados o públicos. No hay que confundir la escasez en este sentido y lo escaso en su sentido usual de “raro”, cuando se habla de: _1)_ aves _raras_ que interesan a los ornitólogos; _2)_ un régimen alimenticio _frugal_, como el de los camelleros del desierto desde hace siglos; _3)_ una alimentación _deficiente_, según el trabajador social que visita a una familia pobre; _4)_ las _últimas reservas_ de trigo en la aldea francesa del siglo XI (allí la costumbre o la violencia se encargaban de que todos pudieran obtener su parte, por pequeña que fuera). Aunque aún no es realmente una historia de la escasez, una fuente útil de referencias y bibliografías se halla en Bálint Balla, _Soziologie der Knappheit. Zum Verständnis individueller und gesellschaftlicher Mängelzustände_, Enke, Stuttgart, 1978. Niklas Luhman, “Knappheit, Geld und die Bürgerliche Gesellschaft”, _Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft_, 23, 1972, pp. 186-210, identifica cinco características de la “contingencia social” en relación con la creencia contemporánea (que no ha sido impugnada) del régimen de la escasez. Históricamente, el régimen de la escasez llegó a instalarse gracias a la proliferación del dinero como medio (poco abundante) de intercambio; véase Karl Polanyi, “Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies”, en _Essays of Karl Polanyi_, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971, pp. 175-203. El autor diferencia las utilizaciones del dinero: como medio de conservación de los valores, como patrón del valor y como medio de intercambio. Respecto a las teorías psicoanalíticas que pretenden explicar los orígenes de la escasez, véase Ernest Borneman, _Psychoanalyse des Geldes_, Suhrkamp, Francfort de Meno, 1975, compilación de ensayos de 24 autores. Si no se establece filosófica y legalmente la distinción entre los recursos productivos escasos y los ámbitos de comunidad compartidos, la _sociedad rígidamente estatal_ en un futuro cercano habrá de ser un expertocracia oligárquica, no democrática, autoritaria, gobernada por los ecologistas. Al respecto véase la demostración sólidamente argumentada de William Ophuls, _Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity_, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, 1979. La desaparición del género y la intensidad y variedad crecientes de las escaseces son dos caras del mismo proceso de _occidentalización_ (véase nota 5). Por esta razón, yo considero que estos capítulos sobre el género son los estudios preliminares de una historia de la escasez.
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+[^f12]: _Dualidad_. Un método clásico del análisis sociológico consiste en emplear alguna forma de dualidad. La dualidad que propongo no está relacionada con ninguna de las que conozco. En ésta, la complementariedad asimétrica del género se contrapone a la polarización de las características homogéneas que distinguen al sexo social. Si me estuviera dirigiendo a matemáticos, hablaría de pares homomórficos de ámbitos extraídos de espacios heterogéneos. Es posible medir la complejidad del asunto en Lynda Glennon, _Women and Dualism. A Sociology of Knowledge Analysis_, Longman, Nueva York, 1979. Mediante un análisis del contenido de textos feministas, la autora expone las recientes discusiones en torno a la lógica de la dualidad que las feministas han llevado a cabo, y con base en éstas la impugnación de las “leyes” clásicas de la sociología con sus numerosas dualidades analíticas. Centra esencialmente su estudio en las tipologías dicotómicas que han aparecido desde Ferdinand Tönnies, limitándose a citar las anteriores. Según la autora, con la oposición que estableció entre _Gemeinschaft_ y _Gesellschaft_ (1887), Tönnies irrigó el terreno donde se cultivarían las demás dualidades modernas: sociedad de estatus y sociedad de contrato en Maine; forma militar (de lucha) y forma industrial (de cooperación), en Spencer; Estado de conquista y Estado de cultura en Ratzenhofer; polaridad natural y polaridad cultural en Wundt; solidaridad mecánica y orgánica en Durkheim; grupos primarios y grupos secundarios (implícitos) en Cooley; relación comunitaria y relación societaria en MacIver; comunidades locales y cosmopolitas en Zimmerman; régimen de Estado (civilización) y _folk society_ (cultura popular) en Odum; el continuo urbano de la _folk society_ en Redfield; las relaciones familiares y las relaciones contractuales en Sorokin; las sociedades sagradas y las sociedades seculares en Becker… Gracias a Tönnies también se crean otras dualidades más “generales”: primitivo/civilizado; lector/analfabeta; rural/urbano; primacía de lo público o de lo privado, del matriarcado o del patriarcado (véase nota 54). Aquí contrapongo otras dos dualidades, la del género y la del sexo. Sostengo que aparte del hecho de que son dos dualidades sociales relacionadas con una distinción genital, poca cosa tienen en común.
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+[^f13]: _Trabajo y sexo_. “Trabajo” y “empleo” son vocablos claves de nuestro tiempo; véase J. Knobloch, ed ., _op. cit_. en la nota 2, II, pp. 258-354, y O. Brunner, W. Konze y R. Koselleck, eds., _op. cit_. en la nota 3, volumen I, pp. 154-243. El vocabulario relacionado con el trabajo es recien-te y más que nada técnico: Arthur E. Bestor, Jr., “The Evolution of the Socialist Vocabulary”, _Journal of the History of Ideas_, 9, núm. 3, junio, 1948, pp. 259-302. En la mayoría de las lenguas no europeas la traducción del término ha presentado grandes dificultades; existe una bibliografía sobre el tema en Iván Illich, “El derecho al desempleo creador”, _Tecno-Política_, doc. 78/11, apdo. 479, Cuernavaca, Morelos, México. En la época medieval, la relación entre trabajo y retribución es tenue: véase Helmut Stahleder, _Arbeit in der mittelalterlichen Geselschaft_, Neue Schriftenreihe des Stadtarchivs München, Munich, 1972. Las actitudes relacionadas con esta relación han cambiado lentamente con la mecanización: Lynn White, Jr., “Medieval Engineering and the Sociology of Knowledge”, _Pacific Historical Review_, 44, 1975, pp. 1-21. Martín Lutero fue el único que le dio al trabajo un sentido contemporáneo: véase Hildburg Geist, “Arbeit: die Entscheidung eines Wortwertes durch Luther”, _Luther Jahrbuch_ (1931), pp. 83-113. Descubrió que el trabajo en cierto sentido era loable en sí mismo. “Fue el auténtico inventor de la doctrina moderna que afirma que en el trabajo hay algo intrínsecamente digno y meritorio, y que el hombre que labora a pleno sol es más agradable a Dios que el que descansa a la sombra.” (H. L. Mencken, _op. cit_. en la nota 3). La historia de la discriminación sexista en el trabajo coincide con la lenta promoción del empleo salariado al rango de prototipo del trabajo que es digno, gratificante, significativo y accesible para todos. Todavía durante gran parte del siglo XVIII, la fracción relativamente pequeña de los salariados podía subsistir principalmente porque vivía en casa de los patrones: Bronislav Geremek, _Le salariat dans l’artisanat parisien aux XIIIe–XVe siècles_, Mouton, París, 1968. La necesidad de sobrevivir gracias a un salario no es simplemente un signo de pobreza, sino de miseria. Éste es uno de los grandes temas de Michel Mollat, _Études sur l’histoire de la pauvreté, op. cit_. en la nota 6. En la Edad Media, a los pobres se les reconoció un conjunto de derechos legales que no tenía relación alguna con el trabajo: G. Couvrier, _Les pauvres ont ils des droits_? _Recherches sur le vol en cas d’extrême nécessité depuis la Concordia de Gratien (1140) jusqu’a Guillaume d’Auxerre, mort en 1231_, Univ. Gregoriana, Roma/París, 1961. Véase también B. Tierney, _Medieval Poor Law: A Sketch of Canonical Theory and Its Applications in England_, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959. Respecto a las actitudes hacia el trabajo salariado en la Florencia de los Medicis, véase Judit C. Brown y Jordan Goodman, “Women and Industry in Florence”, _Journal of Economic History_, 40, núm. 1, marzo, 1980, pp. 73-80. Este estudio se dirige a dos talleres florentinos, uno edificado en 1561, el otro en 1642. Cuando el sector artesanal creció a partir de fines del siglo XVI, los hombres dejaron la producción textil por los oficios de lujo, más lucrativos. Las mujeres fueron empleadas casi exclusivamente en las industrias de la lana, de la seda y de la tela, que, respondiendo a la nueva demanda, abandonaron la producción de vestidos de lujo y adoptaron la de prendas menos elaboradas cuya confección era más fácil rutinariamente. Así, cierta forma de división de los sexos se instalaba en el trabajo salariado, pero no una división entre actividades destinadas al mercado y las que no lo estaban. Los hombres proporcionaban la fuerza de trabajo artesanal, muy especializada, y las mujeres la mano de obra ordinaria, poco especializada, relacionada con el hilado, el tejido y la costura. A partir de entonces, con la expansión y la generalización del trabajo salariado, la discriminación económica de las mujeres no ha dejado de aumentar. Cada vez más, las mujeres ven en sus ganancias inferiores la prueba constantemente administrada de su inferior valor económico. Por ejemplo, en los Estados Unidos las posibilidades que las mujeres tenían de entrar en diversos sectores eran mucho mayores durante el periodo colonial que a mediados del siglo XIX: véase Elizabeth Anthony Dexter, _Career Women of America_, _1776-1840_, Clifton, N. J., Augustus Kelley, 1972. Para la comparación entre las ganancias y la duración del trabajo es imprescindible la obra de Edith Abbott, _Women in Industry: A Study in American Economic History_, Appleton, Nueva York, 1916. Para obtener materiales más recientes: tablas, estadísticas y bibliografía, véase Valerie Kincade Oppenheimer, _The Female Labor Force in the United States: Demographic and Economic Factors Governing Its Growth and Changing Composition_, Population Monograph núm. 5, University of California, Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1970, y Alice Kessler-Harris, “Women’s Wage Work as Myth and History “, _Labor History_, 19, 1978, pp. 287-307.
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+[^f14]: _La creciente diferencia entre los salarios_. En los Estados Unidos, la diferencia entre los salarios de los hombres y los de las mujeres continúa aumentando, al mismo tiempo que aumentan la legislación antidiscriminatoria y el movimiento de reivindicación feminista organizado. Con la actual _stagflation_ (estancamiento e inflación combinados) podría alcanzar un récord todavía no superado: 55%. Es mayor que hace 20 años, aunque desde 1963 una ley federal supuestamente la combate. En 1956, la ganancia o la remuneración salarial anual media de una mujer empleada tiempo completo era de 2 827 dólares, es decir, 63% de la de un hombre (4 466 dólares); en 1973, la cifra equivalente para una mujer fue de 6 488 dólares, pero la de un hombre aumentó aún más rápido: 11 468 dólares. De esta manera, durante el mandato de Kennedy y la Guerra de Vietnam, la ganancia anual media de las mujeres decreció, no alcanzando más que 57% de la de los hombres. En otros países se puede constatar una diferencia comparable: Austria 64,4% (1975); Canadá 59% (1971); Francia 66.6% (1972); Suecia 86% (1974). Obtuve estas cifras de Ronnie Steinberg Ratner, _Equal Employment Policy for Women: Strategies for Implementation in the USA, Canada and Western Europe_, Temple University Press, Filadelfia, 1978, pp. 20-23. Esta es una compilación de estudios originales relacionados con diversos recursos institucionales, gracias a los cuales las posibilidades de igualdad en el empleo para las mujeres se hicieron “efectivas” durante los años de la posguerra: pero todas estas posibilidades “efectivas” en nada cambiaron la diferencia de los salarios (véase nota 15). Entre las naciones industriales, la única excepción fue Japón. En 1960, el salario medio de una mujer equivalía a 43% del de un hombre; en 1974 a 54%. Pero, simultáneamente, la discriminación _social_ de las mujeres se intensificó. Respecto al fondo de esta evolución, váse Kazuko Tsurumi, _Women in Japan: A Paradox of Modernization_, Sophia University, Institute of International Relations, Tokio, 1977. Para una bibliografía reciente, véase _Women at Work: An ILO News Bulletin_, núm. 2, Ginebra, International Labor Office for Women Worker’s Questions, 1979. Jeanne Mager Stellman, _Women’s Work, Women’s Health: Myths and Realities_, Pantheon, New York, 1977, proporciona útiles datos sobre los salarios de las mujeres, tanto monetarios como no monetarios (asistencia médica, por ejemplo), según los niveles de instrucción. Bibliografía sobre este tema: Mei Liang Bickner, _Women at Work: An Annotated Bibliography_, Manpower Research Center, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles, 2 vols., 1974 y 1977. Una forma de empleo particularmente femenina es el “servicio”, es decir, _las tareas domésticas retribuidas_; de todas las actividades modernas, es a la vez aquella que está más específicamente reservada a las mujeres, y aquella donde la diferencia entre los salarios masculinos y los salarios femeninos es más marcada. La primera gran historia de esta actividad económica —que también nació en el siglo XIX— acompañada de una orientación bibliográfica, se encuentra en la obra de David Katzman, _Seven Days a Week: Women and Domestic Service in Industrializing America_, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, 1978. Compárese con I. Davidoff y R. Hawthorn, _A Day in the Life of a Victorian Domestic Servant_, Allen & Unwin, Londres, 1976, y Pierre Guiral y Guy Thuillier, _La Vie quotidienne des domestiques en France au XIXe siècle_, Hachette, París, 1976. Mundialmente, la cifra de las mujeres que “sirven” es hoy muy superior a lo que era en el siglo XIX, pero la mayor parte está en el Tercer Mundo. Véase, por ejemplo, Elisabeth Jelin, “Migration and Labor Force Participation of Latin American Women: The Domestic Servant in the Cities”, _Signs_, 3, núm. 1, 1977, pp. 129-141. Las mujeres emigran más que los hombres hacia las ciudades. La demanda de sirvientas es literalmente ilimitada. En gran parte de América Latina es posible encontrar sirvientas en hogares ubicados en un nivel social tan bajo que, para hacer una comparación, habría que considerar las condiciones europeas en el siglo pasado.
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+[^f15]: _Estadísticas sobre la discriminación_. Para extraer de los censos norteamericanos todo lo que este tipo de datos puede expresar, consúltese Robert Tsuchigane y Norton Dodge, _Economic Discrimination Against Women at Work_, Heath, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., D. C., 1974. Representa un sobrio análisis estadístico y técnico de la discriminación salarial relacionada con las mujeres en los Estados Unidos. Los autores reconocen la complejidad de traducir los datos cuantitativos al concepto normativo de _discriminación total_. Cuando se trata de la diferencia, en la economía, de las ganancias totales de los hombres y las ganancias totales de las mujeres, la discriminación total se considera como la suma de tres tipos de discriminación: en el salario, en el oficio y en la participación. “… en la medida que, en el mismo empleo, las mujeres ganan menos que los hombres, existe discriminación salarial. Si la proporción de mujeres es mayor en los empleos con bajos salarios que en los empleos con altos salarios, existe discriminación en el oficio. Si la tasa de participación de las mujeres en la fuerza de trabajo es menor que la de los hombres, existe discriminación en la participación” (p. 6). Al comparar las cifras de los censos, particularmente los de 1960 y 1970, los autores constatan una ligera disminución de la discriminación total. ¿Pero de dónde procede? De una ligera disminución de la discriminación en el oficio (un poco más de mujeres tienen empleos mejor pagados), combinada con una disminución notable de la discriminación en la participación (un mayor porcentaje de las mujeres acudió todos los días al trabajo en 1970). En virtud del método de los autores, estas dos modificaciones de los datos hacen que se reduzca significativamente la discriminación total, a pesar de “un aumento considerable y sorprendente de la discriminación en los salarios durante el mismo periodo” (p. 16). Dicho de otra manera: si bien con la expansión de la economía un número creciente de mujeres “trabaja”, y si gracias a la presión de las feministas la diferencia de las ganancias entre la mayoría mal remunerada y la minoría bien retribuida se volvía casi la misma que existe entre los hombres, las mujeres en conjunto reciben actualmente, en relación con un empleo igual, una fracción todavía menor del salario que obtienen los hombres. Moshe Semyonov, “The Social Context of Women’s Labor Force Participation: A Comparative Analysis”, _American Journal of Sociology_, 86, núm. 3, 1980, pp. 534-550, confirma esta tendencia en el mundo entero, partiendo de datos relacionados con 61 sociedades y de amplias fuentes bibliográficas. La integración de un número creciente de mujeres en la mano de obra siempre ha dado por resultado la discriminación profesional. Por doquier, más mujeres “trabajan” y menos de ellas tienen la posibilidad de alcanzar una buena posición y un salario alto. Cuando se escrutan con atención las fuentes especializadas y las publicaciones poco conocidas, se puede ver que lo mismo sucede en la URSS: véase Alastair McAuley, _Women’s Work and Wages in the Soviet Union_, Allen & Unwin, Londres, 1979. La doble carga (tareas domésticas _más_ empleo) es al parecer más pesada allí. Los datos positivos respecto al trabajo de las mujeres soviéticas no conciernen a los salarios: el porcentaje de institutrices y de profesoras es mayor (en la URSS, éstas son profesiones mal remuneradas) y casi un tercio de los diputados son mujeres (desprovistas de poder y generalmente mudas).
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+[^f16]: _Ritos institucionales_. Las instituciones modernas son contraproductivas. En el mejor de los casos, las buenas intenciones de ciertos individuos, ya sean médicos, maestros de escuela o cuadros feministas, hacen que la contraproductividad sea menos amarga. Un ejemplo entre muchos es el del sistema médico, que de hecho no puede más que amenazar la salud. Era éste el argumento de mi _Némesis médica_, que John Bradshaw reformuló de forma todavía más clara en _Doctors on Trial_, Wildwood House, Londres, 1979. De manera general, los servicios institucionales son rituales que ocultan tanto a los proveedores como a los clientes la distancia constantemente creciente entre el mito al _que aspiran y la realidad material que estructuran social-mente;_ véase Iván Illich, _La sociedad desescolarizada_, vol. I, capítulo II: “El ritual del progreso”. Hoy la reivindicación organizada de la igualdad económica para las mujeres, la “empresa feminista”, sigue el mismo esquema. Para apreciar la magnitud de esta empresa informal en el periodo 1960-1975, véase Marija Matich Hughes, _The Sexual Barrier: Legal, Medical, Economic and Social Aspects of Sex Discrimination_, Hughes Press, Washington, 1977. Hasta hoy la acción compensatoria en favor de la igualdad económica de las mujeres ha significado un vano intento de reducir la diferencia de los salarios para la mayoría. Su resultado ha sido la creación de empleos para las mujeres que defienden los derechos de las mujeres, y una considerable mejora del estatus, del salario y de las posibilidades de empleo para aquellas que se encontraban en puestos muy altos de la sociedad, sobre todo profesionales. Esto atestigua, por ejemplo, la creciente participación internacional de las mujeres en el ámbito médico, que ha sido bien documentada por Sandra L. Chaff en _Women in Medicine: A Bibliography of the Literature on Women Physicians_, Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N. J. ,1977. La asistencia técnica a las mujeres ha tenido el mismo efecto contraproductivo —la relativa indigencia de la mayoría— que la asistencia técnica internacional en el desarrollo económico de los países pobres. Para poder realizar la autocrítica necesaria, autocrítica que ha sido incapaz de emprender el sistema médico —como también los sindicatos, las fuerzas armadas y los partidos comunistas—, el feminismo tendría que impugnar seriamente el postulado según el cual sus metas fundamentales pueden lograrse efectivamente (y no sólo ritualmente) en un régimen de escasez. Con frecuencia se cita al sistema médico y al sistema educativo para ilustrar el desarrollo común de todas las instituciones de la era industrial _durante su expansión:_ se les obliga a producir de manera exponencial los símbolos que ocultan el hecho de que sus efectos son contrarios a sus objetivos. Sobre el apoyo sociopolítico paradójico a causas que inevitablemente son contraproductivas, véase la investigación teórica de Jean-Pierre Dupuy, “Épistémologie de l’économie et analyse de systèmes”, en Jacques Lesourne, ed., _la Notion de système dans les sciences contemporaines_, tomo II: _Epistémologie_, Aquisgrán, Librairie de l’Université, Aix-en-Provence, 1981. El crecimiento exponencial necesario para ocultar la contraproductividad no se limita a la medicina, la enseñanza y el transporte. Ya hace más de un siglo que la igualdad económica de las mujeres está en la agenda de cientos de organizaciones: Albert Krichmar, _The Women’s Rights Movement in the United States_, _1848-1970_. _A Bibliography and Sourcebook_, Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N. J., 1972. Decenas de miles de mujeres dedicaron su vida profesional a la lucha por alcanzar esta meta y constantemente registraron progresos en la tarea. Un número mucho mayor todavía invirtió su tiempo, su esfuerzo y su entusiasmo en esta causa. Los tres grandes sistemas modernos del derecho: el derecho romano, el derecho inglés y el derecho islámico, afirman la igualdad económica de las mujeres: Kathleen Newland, _The Sisterhood of Man: The Impact of Women’s Changing Roles on Social and Economic Life around the World_, Norton, Nueva York, 1979. La batalla legal contra la discriminación económica también continúa, y constantemente da a la luz boletines de “victorias”: _Women’s Rights Law Reporter_, Newark, N. J., Rutger’s Law School. Todo esto permanece sin producir efectos mensurables respecto a la única cuestión que cuenta y que cada vez más queda sumergida en las olas de la retórica y las satisfacciones ilusorias: la diferencia entre las ganancias de los hombres y las de las mujeres, que muestra la inferioridad económica de estas últimas.
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+[^f17]: _Las mujeres y el derecho_. Todo derecho consuetudinario, no escrito, es intragenérico (véanse notas 80 a 83). El derecho escrito europeo es patriarcal (véanse nota 21) y el derecho del Estado-nación moderno es infaliblemente sexista. No se han estudiado suficientemente las repercusiones que en el estatus legal de la mujer ha tenido el pasaje del patriarcado al sexismo. _Sexual Divisions and Society: Process and Change_, Tavistock Publications, Londres, 1976, por Diana Leonard Barker y Sheila Allen, eds., reúne diversos estudios interesantes en este sentido, particularmente el de Yves Dézalay, “French Judicial Ideology in Working Class Divorce”, donde el autor comenta: “Las formulaciones jurídicas modernas, en su ambigüedad, confunden las obligaciones profesionales de los hombres y las obligaciones conyugales de las mujeres, definiendo como iguales las obligaciones recíprocas de ambas partes. De hecho, muchos hombres consideran que es por causa de su mujer que deben “matarse” en el trabajo, lo cual para ellos compensa todos los sacrificios que su mujer está obligada a realizar en el matrimonio”. Haría falta un estudio histórico que distinguiera: _1)_ el derecho intragenérico (que destaca la complementariedad ambigua y equilibrada entre los géneros); _2)_ el derecho patriarcal (que desprecia al género femenino), y _3)_ el derecho sexista (que deroga el género en favor de una quimérica igualdad entre los sexos).
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+[^f18]: _Las mujeres en los países socialistas_. En un país industrializado la degradación relativa del valor económico de las mujeres no parece fundamentalmente afectada por la ideología política dominante. Se pueden citar dos estudios recientes: M. P. Sacks, “Unchanging Times: A Comparison of the Everyday Life of Soviet Working Men and Women between 1923 and 1966”, en D. Atkinson, A. Dallin y G. W. Lapidus, eds., _Women in Russia_, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1978, y A. Heitlinger, _Women and State Socialism: Sex Inequality in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia_, Macmillan, Londres, 1979. Aunque son mecanismos diferentes, el plano económico y el mercado financiero son bastante precisos en su desvalorización de las mujeres; véase también A. McAuley, _op. cit_. en la nota 15.
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+[^f19]: _Las mujeres y la recesión estructural_. El deterioro mundial de la actividad económica en los años setenta, y las tímidas recuperaciones que le siguieron, coincidieron con el final de un periodo que había visto un crecimiento neto de la participación de las mujeres en la mano de obra. Sin embargo, este auge de la fuerza de trabajo femenina se vio acompañado del desempleo femenino que se advirtió en todos los países del norte de América y de Europa occidental, con excepción de Gran Bretaña (donde al parecer las cifras oficiales sobre las trabajadoras desempleadas se subestiman en alrededor de 50%). Tal era la situación cuando la reducción general del empleo por todos conocida empezó a hacerse sentir. En la época las mujeres estaban más concentradas que los hombres en un pequeño número de industrias y una gama restringida de actividades, sobre todo el servicio doméstico. Al principio, las mujeres fueron en cierta medida protegidas de la recesión que inicialmente afectó a las industrias de la producción y a los oficios manuales donde ellas eran comparativamente pocas. Pero a medida que la caída se hizo general, las mujeres fueron más vulnerables a los recortes de personal y tuvieron mayores dificultades para volver a encontrar empleo, particularmente en los ámbitos tradicionalmente “masculinos”, donde los hombres ya competían entre sí. Véase Diane Werneke, “The Economic Slowdown and Women’s Employment Opportunities”, _International Labor Review_, 117, núm. 1, enero-febrero, 1978, pp. 37-52. Puede resultar útil la lectura de Marjorie Galenson, _Women and Work: An International Comparison_, Ithaca, Cornell University, 1973, en relación con las comparaciones internacionales sobre los empleos y sus salarios correspondientes. En las estadísticas sobre el desempleo, el número de mujeres actualmente se subestima, porque ellas abandonan más rápidamente que los hombres la búsqueda de empleo, el cual de todos modos tienen menos oportunidades de obtener. Véase Naciones Unidas, _The Economic Role of Women in the ECE Region_, U. N. Publications, Nueva York, 1980.
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+[^f20]: _Violación sexista_. No existe todavía una historia social de la violación, en parte porque aún no se ha establecido una distinción clara entre la _violación moderna, sexista, que se ubica en las condiciones generales de la escasez, consideradas axiomáticamente_, y las formas milenarias de la posesión sexual de una mujer mediante la violencia. Lo que actualmente temen más las mujeres norteamericanas es la violación como expresión física suprema del sexismo moderno —y en el sexismo les asusta su hedor de violación moderna—. Según yo, la violación moderna es el producto implícito de la obliteración del género. No encuentro huella alguna de esta distinción en Susan Brownmiller, _Against Our Will_, Bantam, Nueva York, 1976, aunque implícitamente la reconoce Pamela Foa y Susan Roe Petersen en su contribución a la antología de Mary Vetterlin-Braggin _et al_., _Feminism and Philosophy_, Littlefield, Totowa, N. J., 1971; ambas afirman que la violación, como hecho social, refleja las actitudes de la sociedad respecto a las relaciones heterosexuales (más de esto en la nota 110). E. Shorter sostiene que es necesaria una historia de la violación en “On Writing the History of Rape”, _Signs_, 3, núm. 2, 1977, pp. 471-482, artículo que desató una controversia en la misma publicación. La dificultad de fundamentar estadísticamente lo que anteriormente declaro aparece en la lectura de Allan G. Johnson, “On the Prevalence of Rape in the United States”, _Signs_, 6, núm. 1, 1980, pp. 136-146. El autor protesta vigorosamente contra la afirmación de Shorter de que “los riesgos que corre una mujer normal de ser realmente violada (es decir, de estimar que ha experimentado una violación) son todavía mínimos” en los Estados Unidos. Johnson proporciona las cifras que muestran que una habitante urbana de 12 años corre el peligro de ser violada al menos una vez en su vida por alguien que no es ni su padre ni su marido, con una probabilidad que se puede situar entre uno sobre tres y uno sobre dos. El hecho de que es difícil que se admitan las declaraciones de violación muestra lo ardua que es la empresa de escribir una historia de la violación con base en las estadísticas. Precisamente esto es lo que debiera alentar la reflexión sobre la realidad social actual del miedo a la violación. Es más temida hoy que en el pasado. Las nuevas formas de ultraje sexista unidas a la brutalidad han creado algo diferente. Sucede lo mismo con la prostitución bajo el postulado de la escasez: el sexismo agrava con sus insultos una realidad que existe desde siempre. Para hacerse una idea de esta evolución de un “estado” a una “profesión”, comparárense los dos artículos de Jacques Rossiaud, “Prostitution, jeunesse et société dans les villes du Sud-Est au XVe siècle”, _Annales ESC_, 31, núm. 2, marzo-abril, 1976, pp. 289-325, y “Fraternités de jeunes et niveaux de culture dans les villes du Sud-Est à la fin du Moyen Âge”, _Cahiers d’histoire_, 21, 1967, pp. 67-102. Con la incorporación del “ama de casa” en la economía, mediante su transformación en trabajadora fantasma (mientras que anteriormente contribuía a la subsistencia), la realidad social de la prostituta también cambió radicalmente. La prostituta pertenecía a la minoría de las mujeres que ejercían una actividad que no estaba insertada en el mercado —sus servicios escapaban a la economía, al contrario de los de una señora “legítima” o de una sirvienta que participaban en la subsistencia del hogar. Pero cuando en el siglo XIX las mujeres hubieron de entrar en la economía oficial, sobre todo como trabajadoras fantasmas, la mujer honesta y la prostituta se vieron compitiendo entre sí: una rivalidad enteramente nueva, económica y por ende violenta, que hubo de conducir a la exclusión brutal e institucional de la prostitución, así como a su regulación. Para una introducción a los muy numerosos textos sobre tal proceso, véase Alain Corbin, _Les filles de noce_: _misère sexuelle et prostitution, XIXe et XXe siècles_, Aubier-Montaigne, París, 1978.
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+[^f21]: _Patriarcado y sexismo_. La explicación más común del sexismo es el patriarcado, y muchos autores emplean indiferentemente uno y otro término. Por mi parte me preocupo por distinguir entre ambos (véase también la nota 7). Por “patriarcado” entiendo un esquema de dominación masculina en una sociedad bajo la égida (es decir, en griego, el escudo) del género. Más específicamente, en la historia europea el patriarcado representa la desigualdad del poder en las condiciones de complementariedad asimétrica del género, desigualdad que adquirió su estilo particular en la sociedad mediterránea de tiempos antiguos. Para Julian Pitt-Rivers, _The Fate of Shechem, or the Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean_, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York y Londres, 1977, especialmente el capítulo 7, la política del sexo (que en las sociedades occidentales parece “natural”) se enturbió con la formación del Estado prehomérico. Los sistemas elementales de unión matrimonial, conforme a los cuales las mujeres eran cambiadas por otras mujeres, fueron a la sazón remplazados por un nuevo sistema, donde las mujeres eran cambiadas por una posición política. Jane Schneider, “Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honor, Shame and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies”, _Ethnology_, 10, 1971, pp. 1-24, identifica un conjunto singular de fuerzas ecológicas que fragmentaron a las sociedades pastoriles en pequeñas unidades económicas, las cuales no podían poseer la dimensión y la estratificación interna que eran típicas de las sociedades asiáticas, y que por lo tanto limitaban la capacidad de violencia organizada. En estas condiciones, las mujeres —en cuanto recursos— podían convertirse en causas de disputas, del mismo modo que el agua o los pastizales. Y lo que es más importante, la común preocupación que tenían por el “honor” de sus mujeres, de quienes eran los amos, era lo que frenaba la amenaza constante del conflicto mortal entre padres e hijos. Sherry B. Ortner, “The Virgin and the State”, _Michigan Discussions in Anthropology_, 2, otoño, 1976, pp. 1-16, va más lejos aún: tales condiciones propiciaron la formación de un dominio privado de los hombres que englobaba a las mujeres cuya pureza protegían, dominio que no coincidía simplemente con la esfera doméstica (en contraposición con la esfera pública). Según Jane Schneider, este tipo de dominio masculino y privado sobre la “pureza” de las mujeres es lo que distingue la hegemonía de un género en las sociedades de la cuenca mediterránea, de los sistemas homólogos en otras sociedades. Es por esta razón que yo no excluyo la posibilidad de cernir diferentes estilos de patriarcado, especialmente en el caso del “genero dislocado” (véanse las notas 77, 120 y 121). Entiendo por “patriarcado” una dominación asimétrica en el contexto del género (véase nota 83). Es evidente que el sexismo no es la prolongación, en las sociedades modernas, de aquellas relaciones de fuerza del patriarcado. El sexismo es una degradación individual de la mitad de la humanidad, con base en criterios sociobiológicos (notas 58 y 60) que anteriormente eran inconcebibles. Por esta razón es necesario apreciar la diferencia entre la atribución de un prestigio menor a las mujeres (en los países mediterráneos o en otros lugares) y la degradación individual de la mujer, quien en el régimen del sexo se ve forzada a competir con el hombre. Se encuentra una guía de los textos relacionados con las causas del sexismo en el empleo, en Natalie J. Sokoloff, “Bibliography of Women and Work: The 1970’s”, _Resources for Feminist Research/Documentation sur la recherche feministe_, Toronto, 1981, pp. 57-61. La autora propone interesantes categorías para clasificar las teorías que explican la posición de desventaja de las mujeres en el mercado del trabajo, pero utilizando conceptos que ignoran el género. El artículo no clasifica más que las publicaciones posteriores a 1970 relacionadas con eso que los sociólogos tienden a llamar “el trabajo”, es decir, principalmente el trabajo salariado, y la autora las ordena de acuerdo con las rúbricas siguientes: datos de base; crítica feminista de estos datos; teoría de la adquisición de estatus; teoría del doble mercado de trabajo; teoría de la estratificación de los sexos; sociología radical (marxista); modelos masculinos del mercado de trabajo de los teóricos del capitalismo monopolista contemporáneo; aplicación de estos modelos a las mujeres; feminismo marxista antiguo; mentoras feministas radicales del feminismo marxista de nuevo cuño. El hecho de ignorar la distinción entre género social y sexo social condujo a estos sociólogos a un análisis del conflicto actual igual al que se hacía en el pasado, viéndolo como un conflicto que oponía a dos clases de individuos: las mujeres y los hombres. Esta ignorancia conduce a una brillante mitóloga en dirección opuesta: Mary Daly, _Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism_, Beacon Press, Boston, 1978. Con mayor lucidez que muchos autores, reconoce en eso que yo denomino el sexismo la “religión predominante en todo el planeta” —pero, ahistóricamente, no lo contrapone al patriarcado—.
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+[^f22]: _Reproducción_. El termino “reproducción” forma con el de “producción” una pareja célebre. Actualmente estos conceptos marxistas básicos se han empleado tan extensamente que ya perdieron su sentido preciso. Como dice Agnes Heller, “Paradigm of Production: Paradigm of Work”, _Dialectical Anthropology_, 6, 1981, pp. 71-79: “Los intérpretes de Marx que emplean el concepto de producción en relación con todas las esferas de la interacción humana (‘producción artística’, ‘producción de ideas’) amalgaman dos paradigmas en uno solo … sin tener conciencia del cambio de sentido”. Gayle Rubin ha intentado emplear el concepto de reproducción para el análisis del estatus y de las funciones de las mujeres, en su ensayo “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex”, en Rayna Reiter, ed., _Toward an Anthropology of Women_, Monthly Review Press, Nueva York, 1976, pp. 157-210. A pesar de la crítica que hago en la nota 76, yo saqué provecho de la lectura de este artículo. Véase también Felicity Edholm, Olivia Harris y Kate Young, “Conceptualizing Women”, _Critique of Anthropology_, 9/10, núm. 10, 1977, pp. 101-130. Sin embargo, buena parte de la pretendida “historia de las mujeres” en los Estados Unidos se ha convertido en un vivero de mitos que no podrían sobrevivir al aire libre. Las universitarias feministas buscan un semblante de legitimidad aferrándose a residuos de legitimidad recogidos en teorías marxistoides de segunda mano que han sido desechadas por los especialistas de la historia social. Las feministas norteamericanas intentan construir una historia de los “modos de reproducción”, y las “teorías de la reproducción” (física, social, económica, ideológica) proliferan en todo discurso susceptible de distinguir el género del sexo. Representativa de esta tendencia, con una calidad muy por encima de la media, Heidi I. Hartmann, “The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class and Political Struggle: The Example of Housework”, _Signs_, 6, núm. 3, primavera, 1981, pp. 366-394. Yo empleo el término “reproducción” en relación con la fotografía, la división celular o el vaciado de estatuas. Sólo empleo el término “reproducción social” para hablar del sistema escolar, el cual funciona como una máquina de fotocopias.
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+[^f23]: _La economía inaparente_. Son raras las entidades nuevas que hayan recibido tantas designaciones. Este conjunto de actividades que estorban, falsean o desacreditan las estadísticas económicas oficiales, todavía no han podido ser circunscritas o denominadas de una forma unánimemente aceptada. Los siguientes textos atestiguan la búsqueda de la terminología: Scott Burns, _The Household Economy: Its Shape, Origins and Future_, Beacon Press, Bostón, 1975; Peter M. Gutmann, “The Subterranean Economy”, _Financial Analysts Journal_, noviembrediciembre, 1977, pp. 26-28; Yona Friedman, “Le ‘secteur D’ de l’économie”, _Futuribles_, núm. 15, mayo-junio, 1978, pp. 331-338; Jean-Marie Delatour, “Une forme de dissidence passive: le travail noir”, _Cadres CFDT_, núm. 289, junio-julio-agosto, 1979, pp. 26-29; Rosine Klatzman, “Le travail noir”, _Futuribles_, núm. 26, septiembre, 1979, pp. 26-29; Alessandra Nannei, “La resurrección de la economía subterránea”, _Le Monde Diplomatique_ en español, núm. 19, julio, 1980, pp. 4-5. Este último artículo es un comentario sobre Giorgio Fua, 1976, quien atribuía el auge económico de Italia a su inmensa economía subterránea. Nannei expone las diversas razones que causan que el trabajador de la economía subterránea sea relativamente más explotado. Véase también Dieter Piel, “Das dunkel Gewerbe, Schwarzarbeiter und illegale Verleihfirmen prellen den Staat um Milliarden”, en _Die Zeit_, archivo núm. 38, Hamburgo, 1981, pp. 9-11, y “Schwarzarbeit: Unglaublich was da läuft”, _Spiegel_, 46, Hamburgo, 1981, pp. 62-81. Como carezco del término adecuado, paradójicamente llamo economía “inaparente” a esta masa innominada de actividades. Digo “paradójicamente” porque no existe ningún otro hecho que más se haya intentado explicar en el curso de los años ochenta. Para una bibliografía de los estudios económicos, particularmente en los países del Tercer Mundo, véase Stuart Sinclair, _Bibliography on the “Informal” Sectors_ McGill University, Center of Developing Area Studies, Montreal, 1978. El término “sector informal” es cada vez más utilizado por los economistas, quienes hacen de él una especie de notación estenográfica para designar las actividades cuya productividad económica han logrado formalizar: bazares, pequeños comercios instalados en la vía pública, changarros familiares, mordidas… En otro lugar he sostenido que la formalización económica del sector informal y su control burocrático por los organismos dedicados a promover la iniciativa individual y la ayuda mutua revestirán una función análoga al colonialismo del pasado durante el último cuarto del siglo xx.
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+[^f24]: _Remuneraciones fuera de control e inflación_. Después de 1978, empezó a inquietar crecientemente al fisco de Norteamérica la proporción de las remuneraciones que escapaban a su control, ya sea porque fueran ganancias no declaradas, ya sea porque se trataran de transacciones ocultas. Al respecto citaré a Richard Porter, _Some Notes on Estimating the Underground Economy_, agosto 10, 1979, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, y M. Higgings, _Measuring the Hidden Economy_, Second Report from OCPU, University of Bath, Center for Fiscal Studies, julio de 1980. Edgar L. Feige realizó un intento por construir herramientas de evaluación macroeconómicas: _A New Perspective on Macroeconomic Phenomena. The Theory and Measurement of the Unobserved Sector of the United States Economy: Causes, Consequences and Implications_, agosto, 1980, 63 páginas, manuscrito: “Sostengo que el sector que escapa a la observación es tan vasto que rivaliza con el sector conocido, y tan variable en relación con la remuneración observada, que nos podría proporcionar la clave que nos permitiera comprender el malestar económico contemporáneo”.
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+[^f26]: _Subestimación: lo económico contra lo político_. Las estimaciones del volumen absoluto y relativo de la economía inaparente en el PNB dependen de las actividades que el autor incorpora en sus cálculos. En un polo se sitúan ciertos autores, de los que son representativos Gary S. Becker, _A Treatise on the Family_, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981, y, en Francia, H. Lepage, _Autogestion et capitalisme_, Masson, París, 1978. Estos autores intentan evaluar idealmente los diversos factores que constituyen la economía inaparente, mediante unidades derivadas de las referencias utilizadas para evaluar la economía inaparente. “El valor imputado al trabajo escolar (hecho por los estudiantes) ha aumentado regularmente, yendo de 5% del PNB en 1929, a más de 11% en 1973 … El valor calculado del trabajo voluntario ha aumentado proporcionalmente todavía más, de 0.6% del PNB en 1929 a 2% en 1973 … Pero las notas de consumo del personal mostraron una relativa disminución de casi la mitad, yendo de 2.5% del PNB en 1929, a 1.3% en 1973 … reflejando una reglamentación fiscal más rigurosa.” Estas afirmaciones se encuentran en John W. Kendrick, “Expanding Imputed Values in the National Income and Product Accounts”, _The Review of Incarne and Wealth_, 25, núm. 4, diciembre, 1979, pp. 349-363. En el polo opuesto de estos procedimientos contables, yo propongo un enfoque que es más político que técnico, el del movimiento inglés Power of Women Collective, que existe desde principios de los años setenta. Tal enfoque ha sido definido por Mariarrosa Dalla Costa, _Women and the Subversion of the Community_, y Selma James, _A Women’s Place_, dos panfletos que se publicaron conjuntamente en 1972, Falling Wall Press, Bristol. Ambas autoras se proponen esencialmente la evaluación de la economía no percibida no en términos propios, sino en términos del tiempo perdido, de la labor y las molestias que impone a los desempleados, es decir, por razones obvias, sobre todo a las mujeres. Respecto a su posición, véase la nota 49. Las formulaciones respectivas de Becker y James son tan diferentes que a primera vista parece absurdo confrontarlas. Pero hacerlo cobra sentido cuando se considera que representan dos intentos similarmente infructuosos de evaluar dos ámbitos heterogéneos, empleando términos que entresacan recíprocamente una de la otra: la labor medida en términos de la producción de mercancías, y la labor que desempeñan a fin de satisfacer necesidades básicas utilizando las mercancías (véase nota 30).
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+[^f27]: _“Nueva economía doméstica.”_ La obra de Scott Burns ( _op. cit_. en la nota 23) constituye una buena introducción al tema. Para una bibliografía, véase Richard Berk, “The New Home Economics: An Agenda for Sociological Research”, en Sarah Fenstermaker Berk, ed., _Women and Household Labor_ Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1980. Este ensayo posee el doble interés de relatar la historia de la nueva disciplina y de insertar estrictamente la cuestión en el contexto de las labores domésticas de la mujer contemporánea. Un enfoque paralelo en voga pretende calcular las contribuciones económicas al PNB que representan las actividades “del hogar” en los países subdesarrollados. Los textos se sitúan en la frontera entre la antropología económica y la nueva economía doméstica. Véase por ejemplo Moni Nag, Benjamin White y Creighton Peet, “An Anthropological Approach to the Study of the Economic Value of Children in Java and Nepal”, _Current Anthropology_, 19, núm. 2, 1978, pp. 293-306. En el contexto de los estudios sobre el género, la nueva economía doméstica plantea una cuestión fundamental: permite una polarización sexual de los métodos empleados para evaluar el valor económico de las personas. Cuando los textos asignan a las mujeres un valor económico, casi siempre es un valor _imputado_. Al respecto, Harvey S. Rosen, “The Monetary Value of a Housewife: A Replacement Cost Approach”, _The American Journal of Economics and Sociology_, 33, núm. 1, enero, 1974, pp. 65-73, proporciona una iniciación a los métodos vigentes. El ama de casa produce ingresos monetarios o bienes hogareños. El valor de los ingresos perdidos puede calcularse fácilmente porque hay pérdida de ingresos mensurables. El valor de la producción doméstica, en cambio, debe ser imputado. Tal imputación es imperfecta, pero —según el autor— resulta mejor que la suposición de un valor nulo allí donde no hay una transacción monetaria. “La mayoría de los métodos … dividen las horas durante las cuales el ama de casa trabaja en diversas categorías de empleos y luego las calculan según los _salarios corrientes_ y las suman … Otro método calcula los costos de sustitución; se va al mercado para ver cuánto costaría emplear a alguien para remplazar a la madre de familia … Según un tercer método, el valor de un ama de casa es igual _al costo de sus posibilidades de empleo_ en el mercado de trabajo.” En otro texto he propuesto un _cuarto método_ para este juego de imputación de un valor. He sugerido que se calcule el capital que se invierte en cierto tipo de “industria doméstica” y que se establezca qué salario se paga en un periodo de 24 horas en las industrias vecinas que han invertido el mismo capital por cada puesto de trabajo. Los cuatro métodos permiten determinar el “valor” de un ama de casa de manera derivada. Su estatus como miembro del segundo sexo económico se evalúa, establece y confirma mediante la referencia al trabajo asalariado y al capital. Hay que señalar que a las amas de casa se les ha imputado un valor monetario en relación con su trabajo fantasma en el mismo decenio, el de los años setenta, cuando el trabajo asalariado en gran parte se transformó en una ocupación artificial: una seudo producción de dudoso valor mercantil.
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+[^f28]: _Desempleo ilícito_. En 1982, estar desempleado legalmente entre un relativo privilegio. Durante un decenio, el desempleo ilícito en los Estados Unidos había sido privativo de los negros, las mujeres, los que habían tenido que abandonar los estudios, los que no poseían diplomas de estudios; en la actualidad se empieza a extender a los varones blancos. Las fuentes de ingresos ilícitos se agotan crecientemente: los pequeños oficios o comercios informales, las prestaciones de servicios o necesidades “clandestinas”, incluso las actividades delictivas —fuentes de ingresos que impugnan los profesionistas, los sindicatos, la justicia—. La correlación entre la situación del desempleado ilegítimo y el legítimo forzosamente tiene que plantear un problema político mayor. En una sociedad que pretende ofrecer pleno empleo, muchos de los que realizan tareas no remuneradas no son incluidos entre los desempleados, mientras que muchos de los que trabajan en el sector inaparente están inscritos en el desempleo legal y, con frecuencia, reciben la ayuda correspondiente. No resulta fácil desentrañar si “el concepto de desempleo (_unemployment_) rebasaba la panoplia de las ideas de los primeros reformadores victorianos, sobre todo porque carecían de un término para él (G. M. Young, _Victorian England_), o si … (evitando ese término como victorianos que eran) simplemente demostraban así su incomprensión de los sentimientos populares, tesis que sostendría E. P. Thompson ( _Making of the English Working Class_)”; véase al respecto R. Williams, _Keywords, op. cit_. en la nota 2, pp. 273-275. Sea cual fuere la razón precisa, la división de los ciudadanos entre aquellos que tienen un empleo (los trabajadores), aquellos que no tienen empleo (desempleados) y aquellos que no están en ninguno de los dos casos, no es característica sino hasta mediados del siglo XX. La percepción social de las “personas sin trabajo”, en cuanto categoría derivada, posee una historia, ciertamente breve, que no se toma en consideración. John A. Garraty, _Unemployment in History: Economic Thought and Public Policy_, Harper and Row, (Nueva York, 1978, comenta en su introducción: “ … no se ha escrito todavía una historia general del desempleo … titulo este libro _Unemployment in History_, y no _A History of Unemployment_ … Mi propósito no es describir por qué existía el desempleo, sino cómo se percibía la condición del desempleado y qué actitudes había al respecto, en diversas sociedades desde el principio de la historia”. Por lo tanto, para Garraty el “trabajo” existe desde el momento que la “historia” existe. Y es en este sentido que la obra cojea, a pesar de su interés: ignora el hecho de que el “trabajo” en cuanto categoría dentro de la clasificación de las actividades humanas, y el “trabajador” en cuanto designación de un estatus especial, son ambos términos de reciente origen (véase la nota 13). Tras haber predominado durante un siglo, estas dos nociones actualmente se desvanecen. Los microprocesadores reducen la importancia de la mano de obra en la producción. Por añadidura, las actitudes respecto al _desempleo considerado como una forma de desviación_ tienen que modificarse: mientras más crece el número de personas que obtienen sus ingresos del sector inaparente, más son las medidas implementadas para favorecer el “empleo” que amenaza _sus medios de existencia no observables_. La correlación entre estas fuentes inaparentes y el volumen de los empleos comprobables se convierte en una cuestión política importante. Veamos un buen ejemplo: la conservación de la energía y la transición de las fuentes de energía clásica hacia las fuentes renovables, tienen repercusiones imprevisibles en los niveles y las características del empleo y el desempleo, tal como se miden tradicionalmente. Es verdad que la transición crea empleos. Pero lo importante es saber cuáles son las consecuencias en el volumen y en las características de las fuentes inaparentes de los medios de existencia. Las “tecnologías blandas” a la larga pueden prescindir de la mano de obra organizada. Para una guía autorizada sobre esta cuestión, consúltese Skip Laitner, Center for Renewable Resources, Suite 510, 1001, Connecticut Avenue N. W., Washington, DC 20036. La pérdida de las fuentes inaparentes de sus medios de existencia a muchas personas pronto les podría atemorizar más que el “desempleo”. Es difícil obtener estadísticas sobre estas dos formas fundamentales de privación de actividad. Ciertos autores, todos colaboradores de la _Review of Income and Wealth_, distinguen simplemente entre las actividades económicas y las no económicas. Para ellos, un servicio no mercantil es económico si también puede pagarse. Aun con este criterio restrictivo, llegan a las generalizaciones siguientes: en los Estados Unidos, el sector inaparente casi alcanzó el volumen de todo el sector privado, con más de 1.2 billones de dólares en 1976. Comparado con el sector inaparente (observado), se ha incrementado notablemente en 20 años. En este sector inaparente de la economía, los autores distinguen dos componentes: el monetario y el no monetario. “Descubren” que en relación con el segundo, el primero no es estable sino que fluctúa. De ahí deduzco que la exclusión del mercado ilícito de trabajo (el _desempleo ilícito_) fluctúa de la misma manera que el “desempleo”, pero de acuerdo con un ciclo diferente. Una razón fundamental que me impide estar de acuerdo con estos autores es la siguiente: incluyen en sus cálculos parte de lo que yo llamo el “trabajo fantasma”, y de esta suerte subestiman la economía de mercado inaparente. De manera implícita, estos autores falsifican la naturaleza del trabajo fantasma y subestiman su volumen. Ellos lo ven como no trabajo no económico: consideran que se trata de actividades agradables o deseables ligadas al consumo. Para un enfoque diferente que emplea utensilios conceptuales similares en relación con la economía francesa, particularmente a la economía doméstica, véase Pierre Kende, _Consommation_, 2, 1975, pp. 7-44. Es necesario hacer hincapié en el hecho de que no existen datos sobre el desempleo ilícito que distingan entre hombres y mujeres. Esta ausencia de estudios sólidos sobre la discriminación en la economía inaparente, sobre sus formas y sobre su magnitud, es una laguna en los estudios feministas
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+[^f29]: _Desintermediación_. Éste es un término técnico que originalmente se empleó para designar la actitud de los inversionistas que en vez de pasar por los bancos y las cajas de ahorro, se agrupaban para invertir directamente a fin de obtener mayores ganancias. Paul Hawken, “Disintermediation: An Economics Buzzword that Neatly Explains a Lot of the Good that is Going on”, _CoEvolution Quarterly_, núm. 29, primavera, 1981, pp. 6-13, propone el uso de este término para designar las consecuencias de una extensa gama de actividades donde las personas prescinden cada vez más de las instituciones a fin de obtener lo que realmente quieren, y a mejor precio. Prescinden del especialista, el sindicato, el fisco. Se sustraen al diagnóstico y al tratamiento de los médicos y se las arreglan para morir de cáncer en su propio lecho. Sobre todo “evitan” a los profesionales que controlan y coordinan estos servicios múltiples. La distinción que yo hago entre economía aparente y economía inaparente de hecho corresponde a una distinción entre el polo muy intermediado y el polo muy desintermediado de la economía oficial. Pero las tareas del hogar femeninas no se insertan en ninguno de estos dos polos. Puede existir la “intermediación” en los cuidados a un niño enfermo (por el hospital), pero no de la cocina o del alumbramiento; estos son efectivamente paradigmas del trabajo fantasma. Como tipo ideal, como categoría de las actividades económicas, el trabajo fantasma es diferente del “trabajo” (declarado o no, pagado con dinero o con especies) porque no puede ser desintermediado en virtud de razones culturales.
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+[^f30]: _Trabajo fantasma_. Concebí este término en mis conversaciones con Claudia von Werlhof, (véase nota 49), quien no lo comparte totalmente. Yo designo así el trabajo no remunerado del consumidor que proporciona a una mercancía un valor agregado necesario para hacerla útil a la unidad consumidora misma. Llamo a esta actividad “trabajo” para subrayar que constituye una pesada pérdida de tiempo, y lo califico de “fantasma” para indicar que dicha labor está asociada (y es anterior) al acto del consumo. Llamo _economía fantasma_ al sector de una economía industrial donde prevalece ese trabajo fantasma. Si he tenido que crear estos neologismos es con el fin de evitar la confusión entre este trabajo no retribuido asociado con el consumo y otros dos tipos ideales de actividad —el primero, como el trabajo fantasma, es parte integral de toda economía industrial; el segundo está inscrito en la cultura y el género y por lo tanto es no económico en sentido estricto—. Resultaba imprescindible diferenciar estos tres ámbitos, todos “inaparentes”. Para dar con esta imagen del “trabajo fantasma”, hube de pensar en un iceberg. Sólo su cima emerge y sólo puede observarse de un lado (su otra cara es análoga al sector _inaparente_ de la economía). La mayor parte del iceberg permanece sumergida, sin que pueda observarse su forma, aunque es posible inferir su talla. El iceberg en su totalidad es la economía: flota porque la mayor parte está sumergida; porque en la economía fantasma se lleva a cabo una labor. Todo el iceberg se cristalizó a partir del agua, a partir de la subsistencia intragenérica; salvo marginalmente, no se encuentra ninguno de sus tres ámbitos en las sociedades preindustriales. El iceberg representa la existencia de la humanidad según el postulado de la escasez. Para una crítica al respecto, véase Claudia von Werlhof, “Schattenarbeit oder Hausarbeit? Zur Gegenwart and Zukunft der Arbeit. Eine feministische Kritik an Ivan Illich”, en Th.Olk y H.-U.Olk, _Soziale Dienste im Wandel 2 Professionnelle Dienstleistung und Selbsthilfebewegung, 1982_, Bielefeld, Fakultät für Soziologie, noviembre, 1981.
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+[^f31]: _Labores del hogar_. La lectura de Gisela Bock y Barbara Duden, “Zur Entstehung der Hausarbeit im Kapitalismus”, _Frauen und Wissenschaft_, Courage Verlag, julio, 1977, pp. 118-199, me llevó a constatar que no existía una categoría donde me fuera posible ubicar “naturalmente” las labores del hogar de la mujer moderna. Ambas historiadoras me permitieron ver la diferencia funcional típica entre las actividades domésticas no remuneradas (históricamente nuevas) de las mujeres en todas las sociedades tradicionales, y las actividades domésticas de las mujeres que “se ocupan de la casa” mientras su marido “mantiene” a la familia con su salario. En el primer caso, tenía que hablar de la atribución concreta de tareas, definidas culturalmente, a un género, el de las mujeres; en el segundo caso, me encontraba ante la polaridad sexual de la mano de obra no retribuida, ante la división sexuada de las actividades económicas. A fin de encontrar un término económico (consecuentemente “agenérico”) para designar las actividades económicas no retribuidas que se impusieron de manera desproporcionada a las mujeres a lo largo del siglo XIX, tuve que ubicar las labores del hogar en la categoría del trabajo fantasma. Esto significaba convertirlas en paradigmas del trabajo fantasma, destacando una característica esencial: la discriminación sexual que confina a las mujeres en el trabajo fantasma. En el siglo XIX se pasó de la repartición de las tareas concretas entre los géneros, a la polaridad sexual de la mano de obra. Este paso está implícito en los recientes estudios sobre las mujeres, ya sean históricos o relacionados con las mujeres de las sociedades industriales. Dos obras muestran el nivel de la investigación en lengua inglesa sobre el tema: Sarah Fenstermaker Berk, ed., _Women and Household Labor, op. cit_. en la nota 27, y Nona Glazer-Malbin, “Housework”, _Signs_, 1, núm. 4, 1976, pp. 905-922. Ambas examinan los textos aparecidos de 1950 a 1975 que ven las labores del hogar como una variedad del trabajo, así como aquellos, posteriores a 1970, que estudian la estimación económica de su valor. Véase también Louise A. Tilly y Joan W. Scott, eds., _Women, Work and Family_, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, Nueva York, 1978, y Sandra M. Burman, _Fit Work for Women_, Croom Heim, Londres, 1979. Respecto a la modernización y las labores del hogar, véase C. E. Clark, “Domestic Architecture as an Index to Social History: The Romantic Revival and the Cult of Domesticity in America, 1840-1870”, en _Journal of Interdisciplinary History_, 7, 1976, y Susan J. Kleinberg, “Technology and Women’s Work. The Lives of Working-Class Women in Pittsburgh, 1870-1900”, _Labor History_, 17, 1976, pp. 58-72. Véanse también las notas 36, 37 y 85. Estas notas estaban ya en proceso de editarse cuando recibí las galeras de la obra de Susan Strasser, _Never Done: A History of American Housework_, Pantheon, Nueva York, 1982. Se trata del primer estudio acerca de la realidad histórica de las labores del hogar en los Estados Unidos; el autor nos muestra lo que _hacían_ las mujeres en su hogar, _no_ lo que _supuestamente hacían_; no nos habla de la _función_ sociológica que asumían ni de la _significación_ de su trabajo. La obra abunda en datos y notas precisos, es muy ágil y algunas de sus afirmaciones son particularmente notables.
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+[^f32]: _La mujer en el hogar_. El término “dueña” o “señora” ha sido poco a poco suplantado por la expresión “ama de casa”, pero está se refiere exactamente a la misma realidad. Es posible preguntarse cómo perciben esta realidad las interesadas mismas cuando se escucha, cosa frecuente, a una mujer responder a quien la interroga sobre su profesión: “No trabajo, soy ama de casa”. Al respecto, se puede leer con provecho el excelente y divertido capítulo 7 de la obra de Ann Oakley, _Woman’s Work the Housewife, Past and Present_, Vintage, Nueva York, 1974.
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+[^f33]: _Antropología económica_. Desde 1957, año de la publicación, por Karl Polanyi, C. Arensberg y M. Pearson, eds., de _Trade and Markets in Early Empires_, Glencoe, Nueva York, 1957, muchos textos han intentado responder esta pregunta: “¿De todos los conjuntos de conceptos analíticos posibles, cuál conviene más para la interpretación del comportamiento fuera de los sistemas mercantiles?” El texto de Geroge Dalton, “Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology”, _Current Anthropology_, 10, núm. 1, febrero, 1969, pp. 63-102, constituye una excelente introducción a la materia. Desde su aparición, es evidente que eso que los economistas denominan las decisiones económicas en el seno de los sistemas económicos no define el comportamiento de los “primitivos”, de los campesinos o de los habitantes urbanos del pasado que nos describen los antropólogos y los historiadores. Una de las razones fundamentales de que los conceptos económicos sean _inaplicables_ en el análisis de sociedades diferentes a la sociedad híperconsumidora de mercancías, es que estos conceptos suponen condiciones de escasez (véase la nota 11) y de sujetos sin género (véanse las notas 4 y 5).
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+[^f34]: _La ocultación del trabajo fantasma_. Una prohibición se cierne sobre el reconocimiento de la existencia del trabajo fantasma (el cual no representa una actividad de subsistencia, ni tampoco su sustitución empírica). Para no tener que analizarla, se disfraza a la economía fantasma. Hay cuatro tipos de disfraces. El de la antropología, que generalmente ve las labores del hogar como una supervivencia de las actividades de subsistencia. El de los economistas (véase la nota 26), quienes la amalgaman con el sector informal: la consideran ya sea como una labor gratuita cuya retribución consiste en la satisfacción que procura; ya sea como una actividad en el seno del sector inaparente que percibe una compensación no monetaria. El de los marxistas, que utilizan el concepto comodín de la reproducción para “evacuar” el trabajo fantasma (véase la nota 22). Por último, el de ciertas feministas, que matizan la óptica marxista y se esfuerzan sin descanso en identificar el trabajo fantasma y el trabajo femenino. Al hacerlo, impiden apreciar el hecho de que hay una categoría de la actividad humana: _1)_ exclusivamente característica de los tiempos modernos; _2)_ estructuralmente distinta del trabajo salariado, y todavía más fundamental.
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+[^f35]: _La economía del valium_. La sociología médica describe un “consumo de cuidados médicos” que difiere respecto a los hombres y las mujeres. En la población activa, las mujeres son las mayores consumidoras de las prestaciones médicas costosas y del tiempo necesario para sanar. La medicina se maneja de manera impúdica como una técnica de control de las mujeres. Mientras que los hombres pueden recurrir eficazmente a la “incapacidad” para adjudicarse un descanso, las mujeres intentan, aunque rara vez lo logran, esquivar el trabajo fantasma por motivos de salud. Véase Constance Nathanson, “Illness and the Feminine Role: A Theoretical Survey”, en _Social Science and Medicine_, 9, 1975, pp. 57-62, y M. Barrett y H. Roberts, “Doctors and their Patients: The Social Control of Women in General Practice”, en C. y B. Smart, eds., _Women, Sexuality and Social Control_, Routledge and Paul Kegan, Londres, 1978; véanse también las notas 86 y 87.
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+[^f36]: _Aparatos domésticos_. Ruth Schwarz Cowan, “A Case Study of Technological and Social Change: The Washing Machine and the Working Wife”, en Mary S. Hartman y Lois Banner, eds., _Clio’s Consciousness Raised_, Harper Colophon Books, Nueva York, 1974, pp. 245-253, estudia el hecho de que dos generaciones de norteamericanas gracias a sus aparatos eléctricos pudieron tener una mejor vida hogareña. La tercera generación ha comenzado a sospechar que esta “mejor vida” es engañosa: “El efecto primordial de la difusión de los electrodomésticos ha sido que la burguesía se preocupa más del ámbito doméstico, obligando a las mujeres del hogar a asumir diversas funciones que anteriormente estaban a cargo del personal doméstico pagado, o que se realizaban fuera de casa. Al mismo tiempo, las prioridades temporales han cambiado para ellas; el tiempo que ganan —por ejemplo, en el desempeño de las tareas culinarias— se piensa que lo deben invertir en otras labores, sobre todo en el cuidado de los niños. Si esta hipótesis es correcta, sus implicaciones son inquietantes … porque las ideas que gobiernan los programas de asistencia, entre nosotros y en el extranjero, están basadas en el postulado que supone que para reducir la pobreza en la India es necesario introducir allí la agricultura moderna y el control de los nacimientos. Pero no está claro cómo el empleo de contraceptivos masculinos o de una aspiradora perfeccionada puede ser suficiente para mejorar las relaciones entre los sexos”. Yo mismo había llegado a conclusiones análogas respecto a los efectos de la modernización en la vida cotidiana en _Energía y equidad, Obras reunidas_, vol. I, en la nota 9. Las conclusiones de Ruth Cowan en relación con las labores del hogar son válidas para el trabajo fantasma en general: _1)_ la maquinaria ligada al hogar (tanto el automóvil como la lavadora) constituye principalmente una inversión financiera que lo transforma en una fábrica donde se realiza un trabajo fantasma altamente capitalizado; _2)_ la proliferación de esta maquinaria obliga a dedicar _más_ tiempo, no menos, al trabajo fantasma; _3)_ al hacer las labores del hogar más neutras, menos específicas del género, da al sexismo doméstico bases todavía más sólidas.
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+[^f37]: _Trabajo no remunerado_. Para un estudio de las repercusiones de las labores hogareñas femeninas en el estatuto económico, la mano de obra, los roles de la pareja, la discordia familiar, el tratamiento brutal de las mujeres en el empleo, véase particularmente Susan M. Strasser, “An Enlarged Human Existence? Technology and Household Work in Nineteenth-Century America”, en Sarah Fenstermaker Berk, ed., _op. cit_. en la nota 27, pp. 25-51 (contiene una buena bibliografía). Respecto al tiempo invertido en las actividades domésticas no pagadas, véase Kathryn E. Walker y Margaret E. Woods, _Time Use: A Measure of Household Production of Family Goods and Services_, Center for the Family of the American Home Economics Association, Washington, 1976. El tema de esta investigación es el tiempo que se gasta en ejecutar diversos tipos de labores hogareñas; pretende medir el _output_ de las tareas domésticas en términos del empleo del tiempo. La investigación se limita a una comunidad suburbana al norte de Nueva York, y a parejas, con y sin hijos. No proporciona evaluaciones utilizables en relación con el trabajo fantasma, sino que muestra precisamente cuán difícil es obtenerlas. Respecto a Francia, véase B. Riandey, “L’Emploi du temps des mères de famille en France”, en L. Michel, _Les Femmes dans la société marchande_, PUF, París, 1978.
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+[^f38]: _Trabajo no remunerado_. En _Les trois mondes. Pour une théorie de l’après-crise_, Fayard, París, 1981, Jacques Attali afinó considerablemente sus reflexiones en torno a este aspecto onanista de las economías postindustriales. Sus argumentos favorecen la distinción que yo hago aquí entre la economía fantasma y el sector de producción inaparente (poco importa si este trabajo _productivo_ es remunerado o es compensado con otras ventajas). Pero el autor no insiste por su parte en esta distinción. Para comparar nuestras respectivas posiciones, véase Louis Puiseux, “Les visionnaires de l’après-crise”, _Politique Hebdo_, abril 12, 1981, pp. 8 y ss.
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+[^f39]: _Trabajo no remunerado_. A. Leibowitz, “Home Investment in Children”, en T. W. Schultz, ed., _Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, Human Capital_, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974, pp. 432-451 (la cita que doy está en la p. 451). Frank Stafford ( _ibid_., pp. 453-456) afirma: “Es limitada la eficacia de las medidas de interés público susceptibles de promover un cambio en la repartición de los ingresos. En efecto, si como se afirma, la influencia del medio familiar juega un papel considerable en el nivel de los ingresos, el hecho de mejorar las posibilidades de instrucción no habrá de tener consecuencias apreciables en los ingresos de aquellos que nacen en el seno de familias modestas. Con esta perspectiva, las formas diferentes de garantía de ingresos que podrían otorgar a las madres más tiempo para dedicarse a su hogar, ¿las harían dedicar más tiempo a sus hijos?” (Véanse obras citadas en las notas 26 y 27.) Un modelo probable de lo que sucederá al Estado-benefactor será una sociedad de benevolencia bajo la égida del Estado, basada en la estructuración social de las condiciones que promueven e incitan la iniciativa individual y la ayuda mutua. Suecia, modelo precoz del Estado-benefactor, ha asumido abiertamente esta transformación.
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+[^f40]: _Trabajo no remunerado_. Yo pienso que la distinción entre las políticas que engendran la _ayuda mutua totalitaria_ y las que engendran la _convivencialidad personal_ será una cuestión de moral social prioritaria en los años noventa. Actualmente disponemos de una bibliografía anotada, vivaz y exhaustiva, sobre la oposición entre los medios y los fines en los Estados Unidos: S. H. Cutliff _et al_., _Technology and Values in American Civilization: A Guide to Information Sources_, Gale Research, Detroit, 1980. Para una fenomenología de las diversas vías que puede asumir el cuidado y la protección totales de los seres, véase Valentina Borremans, “L’envers de la santé médicalisée “, en _Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Sozial und Preventivmedizin_, núm. 2-3, 1979.
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+[^f41]: _Trabajo no remunerado_. Al respecto véase la demostración argumentada de Jean Robert, _Le temps qu’on nous vole. Contre la société chronophage_, Seuil, París, 1980. Muchas conversaciones con el autor, desde hace un decenio, me han ayudado a precisar mis ideas sobre el trabajo fantasma.
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+[^f42]: _Trabajo no remunerado_. En el sector militar de una economía moderna, relativamente pocas actividades escapan al escrutinio. Es verdad que el comercio internacional de armas se mantiene en secreto, pero al menos aparece en las cuentas de los gobiernos. Al parecer, sólo en Italia las grandes fábricas de armamentos tienen subcontratantes en el mercado “negro”. También hay que interpretar la tendencia actual a la militarización de las economías postindustriales como un intento de proteger a la economía “aparente” de la economía “inaparente”.
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+[^f43]: _La economía de los autoservicios_. Las consecuencias para las mujeres de la actual transición a la economía de los autoservicios apenas se ha tocado en los estudios sobre el trabajo femenino. En la economía inaparente, las mujeres tienen un _handicap_ todavía mayor que en la economía aparente cuando intentan competir con los hombres por los _jobs_ generadores de ingresos, de estatus y de otras satisfacciones sociales. En la economía fantasma, a la que también los hombres se hallan condenados, éstos contienden con las mujeres por las formas menos fatigantes y las más gratificantes de eso que se denomina el _self help_ (la “autoasistencia”). Attali ( _op. cit_. en la nota 38) define la última fase del sistema industrial como la industrialización de los servicios que cada consumidor se proporciona a sí mismo. La organización de esta producción gratuita absorbe un porcentaje creciente de las actividades retribuidas. Las actividades retribuidas se adjudican el propósito de incitar la demanda de servicios auto-producidos. Yo veo esta tendencia reflejada en un nuevo ideal familiar: la redefinición de la familia como estructura económica “intermediaria”. El hogar se convierte en un lugar de autoservicios. Antes de la industrialización, la familia en gran medida era autosubsistente. Con la industrialización, se convirtió en el sitio donde un valor se añadía a los productos del trabajo asalariado gracias al trabajo fantasma femenino. Actualmente tiende a convertirse en un sitio donde la sociedad inyecta la más pequeña cantidad posible de productos industriales, a fin de que estos sean transformados por el trabajo fantasma de la familia en una variedad de bienes que satisfagan a los miembros del hogar, los mantengan ocupados, dependientes los unos de los otros y disciplinados. Este modelo no es solamente válido para la pareja conyugal tradicional, sino también para las nuevas formas de uniones y de comunidades; puede combinarse con ideales ecológicos, libertarios y descentralizadores. Esta nueva familia postindustrial ya no está organizada alrededor del trabajo asalariado de uno o varios de sus miembros; es una asociación de personas sin género que se entregan en común al trabajo fantasma sexista.
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+[^f44]: _La discriminación en el_ self-help. Gerda R. Wekerie, “Women House Themselves”, _Heresies_, 11, volumen 3, núm. 3, 1981, pp. 14-16, examina los programas de autoconstrucción de viviendas que han sido implementados con patrocinio oficial, y subraya la necesidad de una legislación antidiscriminatoria en este ámbito. Muestra la discriminación constante hacia las mujeres por parte de los organismos encargados de promover los programas de _self-help_. Le Werkgroep Kollektivering, en _Kollektivering van Huishoudelijke Arbeid_, Amsterdam, 1981, señala que en todos los lugares donde en el curso de tres generaciones las labores hogareñas se han vuelto colectivas, las mujeres han resultado perjudicadas.
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+[^f45]: _Estudios feministas_. Ann Oakley proporciona un excelente panorama en _Subject Women: Where Women Stand Today – Politically_, _Economically, Socially, Emotionally_, Pantheon, Nueva York, 1981, estudio histórico y sociológico de la sociedad industrial de finales del siglo XX, centrado en las mujeres, su mundo y su experiencia. La autora intenta una clasificación de las tendencias en el seno de los estudios feministas y de los movimientos de liberación (pp. 317-341). “Si la antropología de las mujeres no ha alcanzado la madurez en el mundo anglófono, por lo menos ha alcanzado una vigorosa adolescencia”, observa Rayna Rapp, “Review Essay: Anthropology”, _Signs_, 4, núm. 3, primavera, 1979, pp. 497-513. Éste es un ensayo que completa la obra de Ann Oakley. La perspectiva crítica alcanza un nuevo nivel, como lo muestra Margrit Eichler, _The Double Standard: A Feminist Critique of Feminist Social Science_, St. Martin’s Press, Nueva York, 1980. Finalmente, tres obras de consulta: Jane Williamson, _New Feminist Scholarship. A Guide to Bibliographies_, Feminist Press, Old Westbury, Connecticut, 1979, estudio selectivo, erudito y crítico; Mary Anne Warren, _The Nature of Woman: An Encyclopedia and Guide to the Literature_, Edgepress, Nueva York, 1980, estudio inteligente y vivaz; Cynthia E. Harrison, _Women in American History: A Bibliography_, Clio American Bibliographie Center, Santa Barbara, California, 1979: 3400 “notas de lectura” que abarcan 550 publicaciones periódicas de 1963 a 1976. Para las bibliografías sobre temas precisos, véase, en la presente obra, la nota correspondiente.
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+[^f46]: _Ciencia estereoscópica_. Respecto a la investigación sobre las mujeres en América Latina, véase June Nash y Helen I. Safa, eds., _Sex and Class in Latin America: Women’s Perspective on Politics, Economics and the Family in the Third World_, Bergin, Nueva York, 1980. En la introducción, June Nash afirma: “Hemos llegado a un estado liminal en las ciencias sociales. Los valores en los que se fundaban nuestros criterios selectivos están siendo cuestionados por personas que, hasta ahora, no habían contado para nada en la _profesión_. Son principalmente las mujeres y los indígenas de las culturas investigadas” (p. 15). Los 16 estudios reunidos en esta antología ilustran tres intentos típicos de combinar una visión nueva basada en las mujeres, con la perspectiva central clásica de las ciencias constituidas. De ahí surge algo que la autora llama _ciencia estereoscópica_, de la cual propongo desprender tres corrientes: _1)_ la investigación _complementaria_, en la que los conceptos y los métodos clásicos se aplican a sujetos hasta entonces selectivamente descartados (por ejemplo, el hecho de que las bachilleres mestizas son obreras); _2)_ la investigación _compensatoria_, en la que el prejuicio teórico (blanco/varón/capitalista/nórdico/etc.) se reconoce y compensa. Característicamente, la investigación compensatoria utiliza categorías gastadas de la historia o de las ciencias sociales clásicas (producción, productividad, explotación…) pero con la perspectiva de “los de abajo”; _3)_ la investigación sobrecompensatoria o _contrastante_, que colorea los conceptos analizados: por ejemplo, las actividades no remuneradas no se consideran formas de explotación más que cuando son femeninas. Estas tres formas de la ciencia estereoscópica ilustran el hecho de que la perspectiva central característica de las ciencias puede ser tanto estereoscópica como monocular. El resultado de este tipo de investigación es un sexismo epistemológico complementario, compensatorio o contrastante (véase la nota 54). He mostrado en otro lugar (“La investigación convivencial”, en _El trabajo fantasma_, en este volumen, en la nota 1), que el investigador que pretende evitar el prejuicio teórico implícito en una perspectiva central, tiene que estar muy consciente de que es necesario emprender una investigación disciplinada, crítica, documentada, pública, y sin embargo no científica. Sólo la investigación no científica, que emplea la analogía, la metáfora, la poesía, puede captar la realidad del género.
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+[^f47]: _Modernización de la pobreza_. Del mismo modo que el “trabajo” (véase nota 13, particularmente Mollat), la “pobreza” ha experimentado una discontinuidad semántica al convertirse en palabra clave moderna. La pobreza moderna es una realidad social diferente de la pobreza del pasado; implica condiciones de escasez. Cuando se dice “pobre mujer” al hablar de la esposa enferma de un millonario, es porque se usa “pobre” en sentido figurado. Hoy, ser “pobre” es lo contrario de ser “rico”, lo cual no era para nada el caso en la Edad Media, donde ser pobre era lo contrario de ser poderoso. Véase Karl Bosl, “Potens und Pauper: Begriffsgeschichtliche Studien zur gesellschaftlichen Differenzierung im frühen Mittelalter und zum Pauperismus des Hochmittelalters”, en _Festschrift O. Brunner_, Gotinga, 1963, pp. 601-687. La pobreza —no solamente en la India, sino también en Europa— fue en ciertas épocas un ideal, un signo de prestigio, una virtud. G. Ladner, “ _Homo viator_: Mediaeval Ideas on Alienation and Order”, _Speculum_, 42, núm 2, abril, 1967, pp. 233-259, describe magistralmente al peregrino, _Homo viator_, situado entre _ordo_ y _abalienatio_. Los “Convegni del Centro di Studi sulla Spiritualità Medievale”, volumen III, _Povertà e Richezza nella Spiritualità del secolo XI a XII_, Todi, 1969, reúnen una docena de ensayos sobre la espiritualidad de la pobreza. Estas actitudes medievales no parecen absurdas más que a quienes olvidan que las sociedades modernas se enorgullecen de su capacidad de empobrecer al mayor número posible de ciudadanos, definiéndolos como beneficiarios de servicios que ya no pueden proporcionarse por ellos mismos. Éste es un mecanismo que se ha descrito con frecuencia; véase principalmente Robert A. Scott, _The Making of Blind Men: A Study of Adult Socialization_, Russell, Sage Foundation, Nueva York, 1969. El autor observa que “ser aceptado entre los ciegos y conducirse como un ciego son cosas que en gran medida son independientes del grado de impedimento visual. Actualmente en los Estados Unidos el estatus de muchos _ciegos_ está relacionado con las buenas relaciones que puedan mantener con cierto organismo que se ocupa de la gente que padece ceguera”.
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+[^f48]: _Las mujeres y el desarrollo económico_. Esther Boserup, _Women’s Role in Economic Development_, St. Martin’s Press, Nueva York, 1974, especialmente el capítulo “Male and Female Farming Systems”, pp. 15-35, expone lo que experimentan las mujeres durante la transición de una cultura rural tradicional a una economía urbana y moderna. Lejos de incorporar a las mujeres en el proceso de producción, el auge de la economía monetaria resulta un obstáculo para su participación como iguales en la creación de la cultura material. La autora compara la degradación económica de las mujeres de América Latina, de Asia y de África. Véase también al respecto Laurel Bossen, “Women in Modernizing Societies”, _American Ethnologist_, 2, núm. 4, noviembre, 1975, pp. 587-591. Para el caso de África, véase Denise Paulme, _Women in Tropical Africa_, University of California, Berkeley, 1971; la autora demuestra que el colonialismo ha destruido la complementariedad entre las ocupaciones de los hombres y las ocupaciones de las mujeres, en las cuatro comunidades que investigó. En todas, el tránsito a una economía monetaria ha conducido a diferencias de estatus hasta entonces desconocidas por los sexos. Jane I. Guyer, “Food, Cocoa, and the Division of Labour by Sex in Two West African Societies”, _Comparative Studies in Society and History_, 22, núm. 3, 1980, pp. 355-373, da en las primeras notas un resumen de la discusión en torno a la división sexuada de la mano de obra durante los años setenta. Aunque prácticamente no cita más que textos que conciernen al África, las cuestiones teóricas en juego quedan claramente al descubierto. En las dos sociedades que estudia, constata el hecho de que la incorporación de las mujeres en la relación monetaria ha confirmado y agravado, respecto a los ingresos, su segregación anterior relacionada con la definición cultural. Se puede encontrar una buena orientación sobre los textos franceses más antiguos en el estudio de Gabriel Gosselin, “Pour une anthropologie du travail rural en Afrique noire”, _Cahiers d’études africaines_, III, núm. 12, 1963, pp. 512-549. Al contrario de lo que pasa con los hombres, la modernización disminuye el número de empleos para las mujeres. En los países socialistas, la modernización hace más pesada la doble carga del empleo/tareas hogareñas. En los países capitalistas, conduce a las mujeres a competir entre sí para obtener las plazas de trabajadoras domésticas. Para la situación en Lima, Perú, véase Elsa M. Chaney, _Domestic Service and Its Implications for Development_, Agency of International Development, Washington, D. C., 1977. Por añadidura, más y más mujeres trabajan para otras mujeres pobres, pues en los 78 países subdesarrollados que fueron estudiados, es creciente el número de hogares que dependen principalmente de las ganancias de una mujer adulta; véase Mary Buvinic y Nadia Youssef, _Women-Headed Households. The Ignored Factor in Development Planning_, International Center for Research on Women, Washington, D. C., 1978. Guía bibliográfica: Mary Buvinic, _Women and World Development. An Annotated Bibliography_, Overseas Development Council, Washington, 1976. En Mona Etienne y Eleanor Leacock, eds. _Women and Colonization. Anthropological Perspectives_, Praeger, Nueva York, 1980, los antropólogos, situándose en una perspectiva histórica, intentan reconstituir la posición de las mujeres en una docena de sociedades antes del surgimiento del sistema capitalista. Finalmente, Valentina Borremans, “La Technique et le fardeau des femmes”, _Les Temps Modernes_, núm. 437, diciembre, 1982 (“Técnica y agobio de las mujeres”, _Ixtus_, núm. 60, noviembre-diciembre, 2006), demuestra que la “investigación _para_ las mujeres”, que intenta proporcionarles tecnologías nuevas, es parte integrante de todas las políticas de desarrollo, resultando siempre, para las mujeres, en el aumento y no en la disminución de sus tareas. Sólo la “investigación _por_ las mujeres”, es decir, conducida por aquellas que emplean las nuevas herramientas o las nuevas técnicas, podrá aliviar la dependencia de las mujeres respecto a los vínculos monetarios y, al mismo tiempo, reducir el sexismo.
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+[^f49]: _“Domesticación” internacional_. Según Claudia von Werlhof, _Las Mujeres y la periferia_, Universität Bielefeld, Fakultät der Soziologie, 1981, se puede explicar el desarrollo económico como el resultado de la sumisión de las mujeres y otros trabajadores marginales al tipo de actividad respecto a la cual son paradigmas las tareas domésticas en los países ricos. La autora señala la tendencia a dividir el trabajo entre los que producen los bienes mercantiles y aquellos que los utilizan (p. 21), y a ubicar a los primeros en la esfera comercial, monetaria, pero no a los segundos (p. 17). La actual restructuración de la economía mundial, con su adaptación a la energía costosa, a los microprocesadores, conjuntamente con la dominación social creciente que ejerce, parecen representar un intento por infundir e imponer mundialmente a los hombres una aptitud para labores que hasta ahora se consideraban características y naturales de las mujeres solamente. A partir de esto, el desarrollo significa la creación de un inmenso sector donde, para poder sobrevivir, los seres marginados deben volverse aptos para reciclar eso que el sector industrial califica de desecho (es decir, las mercancías de calidad inferior o descartadas). En al ámbito internacional, las sociedades “subdesarrolladas” tienden a convertirse en los sectores marginados del mundo industrializado, semejantes a las “amas de casa” de los “asalariados”. Por lo tanto se puede decir que este proceso que se desenvuelve en la periferia de la sociedad industrial es una _Verhausfraulichung_ (literalmente, “domesticación” del trabajo) internacional. André Gorz, en su obra _Adieux au prolétariat. Audelà du socialisme_,Éditions Galilée, París, 1980, pp. 127-146, propone un argumento paralelo, sorprendente a pesar de pasar por alto casi enteramente la cuestión de la discriminación de las mujeres en esta nueva “domesticación” internacional.
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+[^f50]: _Desamparo de los solteros_. Véase Micheline Baulant, “La Famille en miettes: sur un aspect de la démographie du XVIIe siècle”, _Annales ESC_, 27, núms. 4-5, julio-octubre, 1972, pp. 959-968.
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+[^f51]: _Vernáculo_. Éste es un término técnico que ha sido tomado del derecho romano, donde se encuentra desde las primeras estipulaciones hasta su codificación por Teodosio (el Código Teodosiano.) Designa lo contrario de una mercancía: “ _Vernaculum, quidquid domi nascitur, domestici fructus; res quae alicui nota est et quam non emit_” (Du Cange, _Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis_, volumen VIII, p. 283). Era vernáculo todo lo que se confeccionaba, tejía y criaba en casa, no destinado a la venta sino al uso doméstico. Tanto en inglés como en francés se emplea principalmente para designar la lengua “natal”. Pretendo reanimar este término porque no conozco uno mejor. Hablaré de su historia en la obra que estoy preparando sobre los _Valores vernáculos_. Califico de “vernáculo” todo conjunto constituido por dos subconjuntos genéricos. Hablo del _lenguaje vernáculo_, en el que existe una complementariedad entre el modo de hablar de las mujeres y el de los hombres (nota 101); de un _universo vernáculo_ (nota 89), donde los hombres y las mujeres aprehenden complementariamente la realidad social; o de _herramientas vernáculas_, cuando quiero designar el herramental de un grupo que está más o menos nítidamene dividido por el género (nota 70).
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+[^f52]: _Complementariedad y ciencias sociales_. En la física moderna, se ha aprendido a considerar la complementariedad de dos perspectivas. No se puede explicar el fenómeno de la luz únicamente como un fenómeno ondulatorio ni tampoco como un fenómeno corpuscular. En un caso como en el otro, eso significaría excluir un aspecto demasiado importante. Decir que consiste en ambos parece una paradoja. La complementariedad sólo es significativa en virtud de la forma matemática de la teoría en la que aparece. La idea subyacente de complementariedad epistemológica no es nueva. A partir de Euclides, para quien el ojo emitía rayos cuyas extremidades sondeaban el objeto, Tolomeo y luego los grandes escolásticos distinguían _lumen_ de _lux_. _Lux_ es la luz que se percibe subjetivamente; _lumen_ es una corriente que emana del ojo y que ilumina el objeto. Es posible imaginar la realidad vernácula como un inmenso mosaico cuyas piezas poseen cada una su propio color iridiscente, su _lux_. En la _lumen_ del análisis del género, cada “cultura” aparece como una metáfora, una complementariedad metafórica (notas 55 a 57) que vincula dos conjuntos de herramientas distintos (nota 70), dos tipos de espacio-tiempo (notas 78 y 79), dos dominios (notas 85 y 86). Éstos encuentran su expresión en las maneras, distintas pero afines, de ver y comprender el mundo (nota 89) y del que hablan (notas 94 a 101). La ciencia, tanto mono como estereoscópica (nota 46) es un filtro, una pantalla entre la ambigüedad de la luz generada y el ojo del observador. Pero tal filtro es permeable en ambos sentidos a la _lumen_ agenérica que el observador proyecta sobre el objeto, y en el que él (o ella) lo observa. La perspectiva central de la antropología cultural borra la asimetría simbólica que constituye la realidad social de toda realidad vernácula. La _lumen_ monocromática, neutra, de conceptos tales como el _rol_ (notas 63 y 64), el _intercambio_ (nota 33), la _estructura_ (notas 76 y 77), apaga el _Eigenvalue_ de toda realidad vernácula. Lo que el observador científico no capta a través de sus anteojos de diagnosticador no son hombres y mujeres que actúan realmente en una sociedad de subsistencia intragenérica, sino a seres sexuados que una norma cultural abstracta y agenérica desvía y a quienes hay que poner en funcionamiento, evaluar, clasificar y estructurar mediante jerarquías. Puesto que opera partiendo de conceptos que desconocen el género, la antropología cultural es inevitablemente sexista (véase mi comentario sobre Rubin en la nota 7). Y este sexismo es bastante más ofuscador que la antigua arrogancia etnocéntrica.
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+[^f53]: _Derecha e izquierda_. Desde hace algún tiempo, _derecha_ e _izquierda_ son términos que se han vuelto etiquetas en la investigación biológica y neurológica, así como en la mitología popular. (Respecto a la bibliografía de este tema, véase Hubbard y Friend, en la nota 58.) Los textos que citaré hablan del empleo de “derecha” e “izquierda” como términos taquigráficos que designan un dualismo que no es biológico sino _simbólico_. Para una historia y una apreciación del material etnográfico sobre el dualismo simbólico, véase Rodney Needham, ed., _Right and Left: Essays on Symbolic Classification_, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973, que reúne 17 artículos escritos por 17 autores entre 1909 y 1971, precedidos por una importante introducción de Needham. Entre las muchas interpretaciones posibles del simbolismo derecha/izquierda, en la tradición intelectual occidental se ha introducido una visión singular de esta complementariedad. Al respecto véase Otto Nussbaum, “Die Bewertung von Rechts und Links in der Römischen Liturgi”, _Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum_, 5, 1962, pp. 158-171, y Ursula Deitmaringen, “Die Bedeutung von Rechts und Links in theologischen und literarischen Texten bis um 1200”, _Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur_, 98, núm. 4, noviembre, 1969, pp. 265-292.
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+[^f54]: _Sexismo moral/sexismo epistemológico_. La ciencia es sexista en dos sentidos: está dominada por los hombres y se basa en categorías y procedimientos agenéricos —objetivos— (véase la nota 52). Cuando el género surge entre los temas académicos, suele ser en las humanidades, por ejemplo, los estudios sobre las religiones como los de Mircea Eliade, _Le sacré et le profane_, 1965, _La nostalgie des origines_, 1971 (ambas obras: Gallimard, París), y en la crítica literaria: Carolyn G. Heilbrun, _Toward a Recognition of Androgyny_, Knopf, Nueva York, 1973. Califico de “moral” a la primera forma de sexismo, la cual resulta de la personalidad de los académicos, individual o colectivamente. Las feministas estigmatizan el _sexismo moral_, en virtud de lo que hace y también de lo que desprecia: los hombres predominan en el campo científico, los hombres deciden lo que debe considerarse como ciencia, la mayoría de las mujeres científicas son discípulas de estos hombres, y las categorías científicas están totalmente impregnadas de prejuicios masculinos. De tales críticas resulta un feminosexismo a la moda, al que cada vez más también se afilian hombres. La segunda forma de sexismo es más fundamental. Lo llamo _sexismo epistemológico_. Éste expurga del género (femenino y masculino) los conceptos y los métodos de las ciencias (véanse las notas 46 y 52). Se halla implícito en todo discurso científico que confunde género y sexo, y también en el lenguaje corriente, cuando la trama de la conversación está configurada por palabras clave (nota 2). El sexismo moral ha sido seriamente impugnado durante los años setenta. Pero los que lo denunciaron en las ciencias, luego con demasiada frecuencia convinieron más firmemente con el sexismo epistemológico. Un ejemplo flagrante de sexismo moral es el interpretar como algo innato toda diferencia entre los sexos (la derecha/la izquierda, por ejemplo) que puede tener una correlación en biología. En este sentido existe una tendencia tan extendida que ya se había vuelto trivial a finales de los años setenta, cuando el vocabulario científico expresaba el cumplimiento de las expectativas de los hombres de ciencia: derecha = dominación masculina; izquierda = adaptación femenina. Las dos formas de respuesta a esta interpretación (véase bibliografía en la nota 58) eran ambas sexistas epistemológicamente: _1)_ una crítica en el plano moral, abiertamente feminosexista, según la cual, por ejemplo, el título de la nota 53 tendría que ser “Izquierda y derecha”; _2)_ una crítica más sólida, que hacía notar que derecha/izquierda efectivamente indica una dualidad, pero en forma abstracta, haciendo así de la dualidad masculino/femenino una dualidad entre otras y confirmando, por vía del estructuralismo, la inexistencia del género como dualidad _sui generis_ (sobre el estructuralismo, véase la nota 76). Respecto a las tendencias muy recientes en los estudios feministas que auguran el reconocimiento del sexismo epistemológico en la ciencia, véase Lynda Glennon, _op. cit_. en la nota 12. Ella distingue cuatro tipos (parcialmente traslapados) de intentos feministas de lidiar con el sexismo implícito en las dualidades que comúnmente se utilizan como conceptos analíticos en las ciencias sociales.
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+[^f55]: _Yin y yang_. El sinólogo Marcel Granet, de quien Rodney Needham reproduce un ensayo en _Right and Left, op. cit_. en la nota 53, pp. 43-58, hacía notar que en China jamás se encuentran al respecto oposiciones absolutas: el zurdo no es más “siniestro” que el diestro. Innumerables reglas atestiguan el predominio alternado de la derecha y de la izquierda. La diversidad de las épocas y los lugares impone en cada ocasión una elección delicada entre la izquierda y la derecha, pero ésta elección se basa en un sistema muy coherente de representaciones. Ciertamente, es la mano derecha la que se usa más frecuentemente, pero es sin duda por esto que la mano izquierda es preponderante, hecho que atestiguan muchas reglas importantes de la etiqueta. En relación con África, Marcel Griaule ha dado de esta ambigüedad una clásica y sutil descripción en _Dieu d’eau. Entretiens avec 0gotemmêli_, Éditions du Chêne, París, 1948, y posteriormente Fayard, 1966. En la India, R. Panikkar ha dedicado varios textos a esta cuestión. Interpreta la “búsqueda de Cristo” occidental como un _equivalente homomórfico_ (un término no idéntico que realiza una función similar) de la búsqueda brahmánica de los polos que se funden sin mezclarse; véase R. Panikkar, _The Unknown Christ of Hinduism_, Orbis, Nueva York, 1981. En la crítica literaria reciente, la palabra clave con la que se aborda esta cuestión es “androginia”; véase N. T. Bazin, “The Concept of Androgyny: A Working Bibliography”, _Women’s Studies_, 2, 1974, pp. 217-235.
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+[^f56]: _Metáforas mutuas_. Cuando hablo metafóricamente, cuando me desvío del discurso directo para emplear mis propias combinaciones bizarras y sorprendentes de palabras, bien sé que mi interlocutor no me entenderá a menos que perciba claramente el empleo intencional de un término portador de un sentido distinto del literal. Todo lenguaje vernáculo es el resultado de dos formas de hablar diferentes, que corresponden a dos dominios del género, dentro de los cuales el mundo se percibe de manera propia al género en cuestión (véae la nota 101). Aquel (o aquella) que emplea palabras vernáculas corrientes para hablar del ámbito opuesto recurre instintivamente a la metáfora. Sobre la metáfora, véase Warren A. Shibles, _Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and History_, Whitewater, Wisconsin, 1971, pp.10-17. El texto que para mí expone la casi imposibilidad de emplear la lengua del siglo XX para hablar del género (o de lo que de éste sobrevive) es de Luce Irigaray, _Speculum de l’autre femme_, Éditions de Minuit, París, 1974, principalmente las pp. 9-161: “La tache aveugle d’un vieux rêve de symétrie”. Para una magistral introducción al tema, véase William Empson, _Seven Types of Ambiguity_, New Directions, Nueva York, 1947. La relación metafórica misma se puede expresar mediante la metáfora: esto pasa frecuentemente con los símbolos religiosos. Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Bemerkungen über Frazers _The Golden Bough_”, _Synthese_, 17, 1967, pp. 233-253, decía lo siguiente: “… en la especie poner la magia entre paréntesis es magia”, y “la metafísica se convierte en una suerte de magia”. La _gorgona_ es una metáfora de esta especie. Como dice Jean-Pierre Vernant, “L’autre de l’homme: la face de _gorgô_”, en Maurice Olender, ed., _Le Racisme. pour Léon Poliakov_, Éditions Complexe, París / Bruselas, 1981, pp. 141-154. “O, para expresar en otros términos esta reciprocidad, esta simetría tan extrañamente desigual del hombre y del dios, lo que revela la máscara de _gorgo_, cuando te fascina, eres tú mismo, tú mismo en el más allá, cabeza vestida de noche, rostro con la máscara de la invisibilidad que, en la mirada de _gorgo_, se revela como la verdad de tu propia figura”, pp. 153-154. Para el mismo autor, “Figuration de l’invisible et catégorie psychologique du double: le Colossos”, _Mythe et Pensée chez les Grecs_, Maspero, Petite Collection, 2 vols., París, 1971-1974, pp. 251-264, los gemelos son igualmente aterradores, véase por ejemplo Aidan Southall, “Twinship and Symbolic Structure”, en J. S. La Fontaine, ed., _The Interpretation of Ritual_, Tavistock, Londres, 1972, pp. 73-114. En la presente obra, cuando empleo el término “género”, le confiero sentido en tres niveles diferentes: _1)_ en el sentido descriptivo, designo así uno de los dos sólidos subconjuntos de toda realidad vernácula (“maneras de hablar”, tareas, espacios, símbolos) que están más o menos vinculados con las características genitales masculinas o femeninas; _2)_ hablo de un “todo” vernáculo, en la medida en que está constituido por la complementariedad de estos dos subconjuntos; _3)_ epistemológicamente sé que el “género” en este segundo sentido es una metáfora relacionada con la complementariedad simbólica ambigua que constituye a cada uno de los dos “géneros” (en el primero de los sentidos) como metáforas mutuas. En este punto, mi pensamiento procede del concepto escolástico de _relatio subsistens_.
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+[^f57]: _Complementariedad ambigua_. La complementariedad de los géneros es a la vez asimétrica y ambigua. La asimetría implica una desproporción de magnitud, de valor, de poder o de peso —lo cual no crea ambigüedad—. La asimetría indica una posición relativa; la ambigüedad indica el hecho de que los dos géneros no se corresponden exactamente. Respecto a la asimetría de los géneros, véanse las notas 21 y 83. Aquí me refiero a la ambigüedad. La ambigüedad que caracteriza a los géneros es única. Tiene dos caras: los hombres no simbolizan la relación mutua de la misma manera que las mujeres (véase la nota 56). Robert Hertz, autor del primer ensayo de la compilación realizada por Rodney Needham, _op. cit_ en la nota 53, “The Pre-eminence of the Right Hand: A Study in Religions Polarity”, pp. 3-31, intentó incorporar en las ciencias sociales esta noción de complementariedad, en una época en que el concepto comenzaba a dar frutos en las ciencias físicas. Este investigador genial se había dado cuenta de que en las ciencias sociales la polaridad fundamental implicaba a la vez asimetría y ambigüedad. Murió en el frente durante la primera Guerra Mundial y desde entonces su pensamiento ha sido tergiversado. Primero, su “editor”, Marcel Mauss, domesticó las desconcertantes nociones de asimetría y de ambigüedad contenidas en la idea de la complementariedad que Hertz había propuesto, haciendo de esta dualidad nueva, anómala, el fundamento de todo “intercambio”; véase Marcel Mauss, _Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés archaïques_, París, 1925, reeditado en la segunda antología de sus artículos: _Sociologie et anthropologie_, PUF, París, 1950. Luego, Lévi-Strauss vino a decir que Mauss había sido el primero en haber tratado la totalidad del hecho social como un sistema simbólico de intercambios entre individuos y entre grupos, convirtiendo así a Hertz en el maestro de Mauss. La complementariedad _nebulosa, parcialmente incongruente_, que únicamente era posible captar mediante la metáfora y que Hertz sospechaba era el sustrato de la cultura, fue desterrada de las ciencias sociales por conceptos operativos como el rol, la clase, el intercambio y, finalmente, el “sistema” (véase la nota 76). Aquí quiero oponer la complementariedad que constituye la relación entre los géneros a los procesos de intercambio entre parejas formales. La primera tiende idealmente hacia la _relatio subsistens_: significaciones vinculadas metafóricamente y no antitéticamente. Inversamente, el intercambio implica tanto el entendimiento entre actores sociales, como una obligación común que es independiente del objeto mismo del intercambio. El intercambio conduce a las parejas a _ubicarse claramente_ unos respecto a otros, por lo tanto a tender hacia la _jerarquía_ y la _dependencia_. Allí donde el intercambio estructura las relaciones, un denominador común define las posiciones respectivas. Allí donde la ambigüedad constituye dos entidades y al mismo tiempo las relaciona, constantemente engendra nuevas discordancias parciales entre hombres y mujeres, al mismo tiempo que pone en entredicho toda tendencia a la jerarquía y la dependencia.
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+[^f58]: _Mitología sociobiológica_. Al menos parcialmente, la ciencia es una empresa intelectual apegada a sus épocas, a las ideas en boga, y los hombres de ciencia centran sus investigaciones en las cuestiones que les preocupan emocional o políticamente. Esto aparece muy claro en los intentos científicos de establecer un vínculo entre las diferencias humanas, intraespecíficas y orgánicas, y los comportamientos. Stephen Jay Gould, _The Mismeasure of Man_, Norton, Nueva York, 1981, hace la reseña histórica de estos intentos de abstraer la inteligencia, convirtiéndola en una entidad cuantificable que está ubicada en el cerebro y que permite clasificar a los seres. Pero la obra también es una buena introducción a las peripecias de la ideología del determinismo biológico, desde la craneoscopía hasta Peter J. Wilson. Ya en 1944, Gunnar Myrdal hablaba de “la tendencia a admitir sin discusión la causalidad biológica, y a no considerar una explicación social más que a la fuerza”, como de una ideología que se permitía considerar la situación vigente de un grupo como medida del estado que sus miembros _deberían tener_ normalmente. Gould centra su estudio en tal biodeterminismo, cuya popularidad actualmente resurge, como suele suceder en los periodos de retroceso político. Desde mediados de los setenta, millones de personas han aprendido a aceptar la idea de que su intolerancia o su inferioridad social son, al fin y al cabo, hechos científicos; que están insertadas políticamente en los lugares y categorías donde han sido colocadas por la especialización intraespecífica. Respecto a las críticas de estos intentos de volver a elevar las ciencias humanas y sociales a subdisciplinas de la sociobiología, mediante la exageración de los efectos de la herencia en el comportamiento humano, véase William M. Dugger, “Sociobiology for Social Scientists: A Critical Introduction to E. O. Wilson’s Evolutionary Paradigm”, _Social Science Quarterly_, 62, núm. 2, junio, 1981, pp. 221-246, así como la crítica de D. Symons, _The Evolution of Human Sexuality_, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, 1980, que Clifford Geertz publicó en _The New York Review of Books_ del 24 de enero de 1980, pp. 3-4. Sobre el tema de esta nota, véase Helen H. Lambert, “Biology and Equality: A Perspective on Sex Differences”, _Signs_, 4, núm. 1, otoño, 1978, pp. 97-117, y sobre todo el análisis exhaustivo y múltiple de la perspectiva sexista en los estudios de biología humana que se encuentran en la importante antología de M. S. H. Hubbard y Barbara Friend, eds., _Women Look at Biology Looking at Women_, Schenkman, Cambridge, Mass., 1979. Sin embargo, hay que señalar que actualmente hay feministas que piensan que los hombres y las mujeres son subespecies separadas de la especie humana y se comportan de manera intrínsecamente diferente, sin importar la cultura a la que pertenezcan; véase Alice Rossi, “A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting”, _Dedalus_,106, núm. 2, primavera, 1977, pp. 1-31. La exigencia igualitaria del feminismo es capaz de camuflar el matiz racista implícito en el determinismo biosocial —a pesar de que pretenda poseer las mejores intenciones—.
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+[^f59]: _Sociología animal_. La sociología animal es una especie de ciencia ficción a la inversa. Mientras que ésta atribuye un comportamiento reflexivo y significativo a seres que son invenciones de la imaginación, la sociobiología animal atribuye la construcción social a seres subhumanos. Lo que ambas tienen en común con las ciencias sociales es que operan en términos que ignoran el género. El valor ocasionalmente profético de la ciencia ficción, o la confirmación de ciertas teorías del comportamiento mediante la experimentación con animales, simplemente demuestran que las categorías de las ciencias sociales ignoran lo que es característico y exclusivamente humano: la cultura genérica. Al respecto véase Donna Haraway, “Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic”, _Signs_, 4, núm. 1, 1978, pp. 21-60, así como los otros artículos en el mismo número.
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+[^f60]: _El racista y el profesional_. Es deliberada mi comparación entre el racista y el profesional de los servicios, aunque bien sé que muchos de mis lectores se consideran profesionales, y pocos se sienten racistas. Pero es una comparación que me siento obligado a hacer. Recomiendo a los que se interesan en estas ideas mi _Desempleo creador_, véase _Obras reunidas_, vol. I, en especial la segunda mitad de la obra. Más y más estudios sobre el siglo XIX muestran que los profesionales de los servicios inventaron su diagnóstico de las “necesidades” a fin de crear la demanda de las terapias que monopolizaban. Véase al respecto Burton S. Bledstein, _The Culture of Professionalism_, Norton, Nueva York, 1976. En el marco del Estado-nación, que tendía a monopolizar la producción de servicios, incluso antes de que la producción y comercialización de las mercancías se ubicaran en el sector privado, los profesionales “jugaban con los temores del público relacionados con el desorden y la enfermedad, adoptaban con deliberación una oscura jerga, ridiculizaban las tradiciones populares del _self-help_ calificándolas de retrasadas y no científicas, y de tal forma creaban … o intensificaban la demanda de sus servicios” (Christopher Lasch, _The New York Review of Books_, noviembre 24, 1977, pp. 15-18). En este contexto, los profesionales se arrogan el mandato de definir “científicamente” las “deficiencias”; de conducir las investigaciones de acuerdo con esta “misión”; de imputar concretamente estas deficiencias a ciertos individuos con base en un “diagnóstico”; de someter a grupos enteros de la población a pruebas obligatorias; de imponer terapias a aquellos que según ellos requerían ser sanados, corregidos, reciclados. La lógica de este proceso ha sido desmontada con inimitable penetración por John L. McKnight, _The Mask of Love: Professional Care in the Service Economy_, Londres y Boston, Marion Boyars, 1982. El _ethos_ profesional y el _ethos_ racista convergen. Ambos se basan, aunque de forma sutilmente distinta, en el mismo postulado: el diagnóstico biológico permite a la biocracia clasificar socialmente a los seres. Esta convergencia del _ethos_ profesional y de la discriminación biológica, en ninguna parte aparece con tanta claridad como en la historia de la ginecología (véanse las notas 86 y 87). Diversos textos de la antología de Maurice Olender, ed., _Pour Léon Poiakov, op. cit_. en la nota 56, señalan un vínculo entre los prejuicios relacionados con las mujeres y los relacionados con los judíos en la tradición de la Ilustración.
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+[^f61]: _Rol_. El “rol” es un concepto mediante el cual, desde Ralph Linton, _The Study of Man: An Introduction_, Appleton-Century Crofts, Nueva York, 1936, la sociología vincula el orden de una sociedad con el comportamiento característico de los individuos que la integran. Gracias al “rol”, la gente forma parte de una pluralidad que luego es posible analizar mediante conceptos que ignoran el género. Por añadidura, el empleo del “rol” en calidad de categoría de las ciencias sociales excluye la posibilidad de introducir el género en la discusión. El género establece la relación mutua entre dos términos que poseen más _otredad_ que la que jamás podrían tener los simples individuos. La sociología tomó prestado del teatro el concepto de rol. Allí, el rol aparecía como concepto y término técnico desde el momento en que los actores europeos comenzaron a desplazarse en un entarimado, donde las escenas seguían una secuencia de “entrada”, “actuación” y “salida”. El concepto de rol fue tan novedoso para el teatro del siglo XVI como lo ha sido para la sociología del siglo XX. Al respecto, véase Richard Southern, “Fourth Phase: The Organized Stage”, _The Seven Ages of the Theatre_, Hill and Wang, Nueva York, 1963, pp. 155-215. En torno a la influencia que ha tenido en la metodología el concepto de rol, véase W. H. Dray, “Holism and Individualism in History and Social Science”, _Encyclopedia of Philosophy_, bajo la dirección de Paul Edwards, Macmillan, Nueva York, 1967, tomo 4, pp. 53-58.
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+[^f62]: _Morfología social_. En cualquier medio vernáculo, el género es la fuente de una forma social que no puede existir más que dentro de parámetros limitados. En este sentido, el género es la fuente de la autolimitación de las formas sociales. Esta tesis jamás se ha propuesto, y aquí sólo la menciono. En biología, una forma no puede existir más que en el seno de una gama restricta de tamaños. La forma de los congéneres del ratón abarca desde los 25 milímetros hasta el tamaño de una rata; no puede existir un elefante con patas tan pequeñas como las de un ratón. Sobre este tema existe un texto admirable de J. B. S. Haldane, “On Being the Right Size”, en James R. Newman, ed., _The World of Mathematics. A Small Library of the Literature of Mathematics from A’h-mose the Scribe to Albert Einstein_, Simon and Schuster, Nueva York, 1956, volumen 2, pp. 952-957. D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson, en _Growth and Form_, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, edición abreviada de J. T. Bonner, 1971, centra su investigación en las relaciones morfológicas de la forma y el tamaño. Leopold Kohr, _The Breakdown of Nations_, Londres, 1941, inauguró la morfología social buscando las relaciones entre la forma y el tamaño de una sociedad. Discípulo de Kohr, E. F. Schumacher retomó el axioma de su mentor en _Small Is Beautiful_, 1973; traducción francesa con el mismo título, Seuil, París, 1978, con el subtítulo “Una sociedad a la medida del hombre”. Para mí, la _belleza social_ existe allí donde los elementos materiales de una cultura son de un tamaño adecuado para la complementariedad concreta basada en el género. El medio debe permanecer dentro de los parámetros de tamaño que corresponden a su forma (en griego, _morphè_) —condición necesaria para que exista y se mantenga una relación intragenérica entre el dominio de las mujeres y el de los hombres en un medio vernáculo—. Si el medio se deforma más allá de un umbral crítico, la complementariedad genérica se disuelve: entran en escena individuos que desempeñan un rol sexuado en un escenario que ya no está hecho a su medida.
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+[^f63]: _Rol de los sexos_. Respecto al término “sexo”, véase la nota 7; respecto al “rol”, la nota 61. La expresión “rol de los sexos” no entró en el lenguaje corriente sino después de la segunda Guerra Mundial. A los victorianos les fascinaban las _diferencias entre los sexos_ (véase la nota 65). Durante los primeros años del siglo XX, los hombres de ciencia se interesaron particularmente en la diferencia entre hombres y mujeres en términos de inteligencia mensurable (véase Gould, nota 58). Al final de los años veinte, la creación de escalas que permitían medir el cociente de feminidad o de masculinidad que se manifestaba en los rasgos característicos no intelectuales se convirtió en un buen negocio. Para una orientación de lecturas, véase Julia Ann Sherman, _On the Psychology of Women: A Survey of Empirical Studies_, C. Thomas, Springfield, Mass., 1971, y como complemento crítico de esta obra, Joyce J. Walstedt, _The Psychology of Women: A Partially Annotated Bibliography_, KNOW, Pittsburgh, 1972, que también incluye estudios que no son de especialistas. Durante los años treinta, bajo la influencia del psicoanálisis, fueron las diferencias entre las necesidades emocionales las que se identificaron científicamente y se pusieron en operación a fin de que les pudieran servir a los terapeutas, a los trabajadores sociales y a los educadores. Durante los años cincuenta, los investigadores se interesaron más en las diferencias entre las tendencias a la homosexualidad. Para la historiografía de las diferencias entre los sexos, véase Eleanor E. Maccoby y Carol N. Jacklin, _The Psychology of Sex Différences_, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, California, 1974. Sobre la importancia que ha adquirido en las ciencias sociales el rol de los sexos, véase H. A. D. Astin, _Sex Roles: A Research Bibliography_, National Institute of Mental Health, Rockville, Maryland, 1975.
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+[^f64]: _Rol de los sexos_. Melville J. Herskovits, _Economic Anthropology_, Norton, Nueva York, 1965; 1a edición, 1935, con el título _Economic Life of Primitive Peoples_. Durante 30 años, la mayoría de las citas sobre la repartición sexual del trabajo que se encontraban en los manuales de sociología, tanto en inglés como en otras lenguas, consistían en pasajes enteros del séptimo capítulo de esta obra.
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+[^f65]: _Feminismo victoriano_. El feminismo victoriano logró hacer de las relaciones entre los hombres y las mujeres en las sociedades primitivas un tema fascinante en las conversaciones. Pero la evidencia de esa gran variedad de comportamientos entre los “salvajes” fue interpretada por los antropólogos victorianos como la prueba de un esquema evolucionista que conducía finalmente a la norma universal de la familia burguesa; véase Elizabeth Fee, “The Sexual Politics of Victorian Sexual Anthropology”, _Feminist Studies_, 1, 1973, p. 23 ss. Véanse otros estudios recientes sobre el sexismo victoriano en Jill Roe, “Modernization and Sexism: Recent Writings on Victorian Women”, _Victorian Studies_, 20, invierno, 1977, pp. 179-192; Marlene LeGates, “The Cult of Womanhood in Eighteenth-Century Thought”, _Eighteenth-Century Studies_, 10, núm. 1, 1976, pp. 21-39; B. Didier, “L’exotisme et la mise en question du système familial et moral dans le roman, à la fin du XVIIIe siècle: Beckford, Sade, Potocki”, _Studies on Voltaire_, 152, 1976, pp. 571-586. La polarización sexual representa un nuevo tipo de clasificación social que no emplea como principal parámetro el estatus, sino la personalidad (clasificación que habría sido impensable antes de la Ilustración). Es esto lo que me permitió comprender a Karin Hausen, “Family and Role Division. The Polarisation of Sexual Stereotypes in the Nineteenth Century. An Aspect of the Dissociation of Work and Family Life”, en Richard J. Evans y W. R. Lee, eds., _The German Family: Essays on the Social History of the Families in Nineteenth-and Twentieth- Century Germany_, Croom Helm, Londres, Totowa, N. J., Barnes and Noble Books, 1981, pp. 51-83, y también Barbara Welter, “The Cult of True Womanhood 1820-1860”, _American Quarterly_, 18, 1966, pp. 151-174. La polarización sexual ha conducido tanto a una nueva percepción social del cuerpo femenino (notas 86 y 87) como a una nueva percepción del ámbito de la ciudadana: la esfera doméstica. En torno a las etapas de la propagación en los Estados Unidos del valor ideológico de la vida doméstica, y a la colusión de las mujeres y los sacerdotes al respecto —que en virtud de la Independencia se encontraban “desestablecidas”— y sobre la necesidad absoluta de tener una _vida doméstica redentora_ en una sociedad en vías de industrialización, véase la brillante y compleja interpretación de Ann Douglas, _The Feminization of American Culture_, Discus Books/Avon, Nueva York, 1977. Los escritos de las feministas de la época victoriana muestran que éstas no adoptaron las ideas de sus tiempos relacionadas con los logros de las mujeres y con el trabajo femenino; además del ensayo de Jill Roe citado aquí anteriormente, véase Elaine Rose Ognibene, _Women to Women: The Rhetoric of Success for Women, 1860-1920_, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Dissertation, Nueva York, 1979.
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+[^f66]: _Sexo y temperamento_. Margaret Mead, _Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies_, 1935 (publicado en francés con otro ensayo más bajo el título de _Mœurs et Sexualité en Océanie_, Plon, París), 1963, y Erich Fromm y Michael Macoby, _Social Character in a Mexican Village_, Prentice Hall, Nueva Jersey, 1970, marcan respectivamente el principio y probablemente el fin del empleo de las categorías agenéricas del psicoanálisis (Fromm en conjunción con Marx) para explicar cómo el _temperamento o la personalidad social_ modelan las relaciones entre hombres y mujeres en condiciones sociales muy diferentes.
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+[^f67]: _Complementariedad de los roles_. Los victorianos centraron su investigación en las esferas opuestas que la naturaleza había destinado para los humanos masculinos y femeninos (nota 65). Durante la Gran Depresión, los norteamericanos se preocuparon particularmente por la división del trabajo productivo entre los sexos. Como era de esperar, miles de rasgos sociales que se recogieron en cientos de sociedades se clasificaron sistemáticamente; se buscaron constantes, se erigieron conjeturas con base en cuantificaciones significativas, todo lo cual condujo a hipótesis no válidas, aun cuando los datos originales pudieron ser significativos estadísticamente; al respecto véase A. D. Coult y R. Haberstein, _Cross-Tabulations on Murdock’s Ethnographic Sample_, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1965. Para una introducción sencilla a los datos compilados, véase George P. Murdock, “Comparative Data on the Division of Labor by Sex”, _Social Forces_, 15, 1937, pp. 551-553, y para un condensado de esta obra, “Ethnographic Atlas: A Summary”, _Ethnology_, 6, núm. 2, 1967, pp. 109-236. Aunque algo árida y fragmentaria, se puede encontrar información que a veces resulta útil en sus epígonos, en Joel Aronoff y William D. Crano, “A Re-examination of the Cross-Cultural Principles of Task Segregation and Sex Role Differentiation in the Family”, _American Sociological Review_, 40, febrero, 1975, pp. 12-20; Alain Lomax y Conrad M. Arensberg, “A Worldwide Evolutionary Classification of Cultures by Subsistence Systems”, _Current Anthropology_, 18, núm. 4, diciembre, 1977, pp. 659-708; William D. Crano y Joel Aronoff, “A Cross-Cultural Study of Expressive and Instrumental Role Complementarity in the Family”, _American Sociological Review_, 43, núm. 4, agosto, 1978, pp. 463-471. Siempre que se ha querido identificar tendencias universales para justificar la asociación de ciertos tipos de tareas con uno u otro sexo, los resultados han sido banales o incluso nulos. Estadísticamente, las mujeres han sido asociadas con trabajos que según los antropólogos “son repetitivos y pueden ser interrumpidos, no son peligrosos y están basados en técnicas simples”; con tareas “que implican pocos riesgos y se realizan en la proximidad del hogar” y “tienen poco valor social”; tareas “cuyos valores relativos son más resistentes al cambio que las técnicas que se utilizan para realizarlas”. Finalmente, este análisis cultural comparativo ha conducido a “descubrir” ciertas excepciones. Si Murdock calculaba una “tasa _mundial_ de intercambio de tareas” entre hombres y mujeres de 16%, esta tasa alcanza 81% en dos subgrupos de los bontoc igorot occidentales, indígenas de la isla de Luçon, en las Filipinas: Albert S. Bacdayan, “Mechanistic Cooperation and Sexual Equality among the Western Bontoc”, en Alice Schlegel, ed., _Sexual Stratification_, Columbia University Press, Nueva York, 1977, pp. 270-291. Respecto a los mitos que engendran estas hipótesis, la obra crítica más legible y más ágil sigue siendo la de Ann Oakley, _Woman’s Work: The Housewife, Past and Present, op. cit_. en la nota 32.
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+[^f68]: _Subordinación femenina_. Muchos de los estudios de la primera mitad de los años setenta relacionados con las diferencias entre hombres y mujeres, interpretan como un signo de la subordinación de las mujeres el hecho de que fuera de la sociedad industrial no se otorga públicamente el poder y la autoridad a las mujeres. Para los textos sobre este tema, véase Susan Carol Rogers, “Woman’s Place: A Critical Review of Anthropological Theory”, _Comparative Studies in Society and History_, 20, núm. 1, 1978, pp. 123-162, guía muy útil sobre la forma en que la antropología trata las diferencias entre los sexos, así como los estatus relativos de los hombres y las mujeres en los Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña; véase también Naomi Quinn, “Anthropological Studies on Women’s Status”, _Annual Review of Anthropology_, 6, 1977, pp. 181-225. Evalyn Jacobson Michaelson y Walter Goldschmidt proporcionan en “Female Roles and Male Dominance among Peasants”, _Southwestern Journal of Anthropology_, 27, 1971, pp. 330-352, un útil índice de 46 monografías, publicadas entre 1940 y 1965, que analizan las sociedades campesinas y también tratan de los roles y los estatus relacionados con los sexos. Ruby Rohrlich-Leavitt, ed., _Women, Cross-Culturally: Chance and Challenge_, Mouton, La Haya, 1975, y un número enteramente dedicado a “Sex Roles in Cross-Cultural Perspective”, _American Ethnologist_, 2, núm. 4, noviembre, 1975, ofrecen una muestra representativa de los enfoques dentro de la investigación cultural comparativa de las mujeres; para una perspectiva feminomarxista, véase _Critique of Anthropology_, 3, núm. 9/10, 1977, número dedicado a las mujeres. Todos estos estudios casi no emplean más que categorías analíticas que rechazan implícitamente la distinción entre género y sexo, patriarcado y sexismo (nota 21), dominación asimétrica, y repartición jerárquica del poder (nota 83). Además, este rechazo los lleva a dar la primacía a la esfera pública, a admitir la definición “masculina” de la importancia cultural, y a no decir nada de la asimetría del poder que caracteriza la existencia en el seno del género. Esto es lo que efectivamente demuestra Louise A. Tilly, “The Social Sciences and the Study of Woman: A Review Article”, _Comparative Studies in Society and History_, 20, núm. 1, 1978, pp. 163-173, quien comenta la obra de Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo y Louise Lamphere, eds., _Women, Culture and Society_, California, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1974. No obstante, y acaso de manera significativa, los dos únicos estudios importantes sobre las mujeres “primitivas” que fueron publicados durante un periodo de menor interés en la investigación sociológica y antropológica sobre las mujeres (aproximadamente entre 1945 y 1970) se ocupan de la asimetría del poder entre los géneros: P. M. Karberry, _Women of the Grassfields_, HMSO, Londres, 1952; reimpresión: Gregg International, 1970, y Audrey I. Richards, _Chisungu, a Girl’s Initiation Ceremony Among the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia_, Faber & Faber, Londres, 1951. En el ensayo de Ernestine Friedl, “The Position of Women: Appearance and Reality”, _Anthropological Quarterly_, 40, 1967, pp. 97-105, la cuestión de la asimetría del poder se retoma de manera encantadora: dentro de un estilo de vida en que la existencia está centrada en el hogar, el poder que cuenta parece ser el que se ejerce en casa. Mi distinción entre género y sexo, y su dominación relativa en diversas sociedades, podría disipar en gran parte la confusión que hasta ahora ha presidido inevitablemente toda discusión sobre la “subordinación de las mujeres”. Véase particularmente la bibliografía citada en las notas 21 y 83.
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+[^f69]: _La división del género_. Véase Pierre Clastres, _La Société contre l’État_, Éditions de Minuit, París, 1974, pp. 88-111, “L’Arc et le panier”. Existen culturas en la cuales la distancia entre los seres es todavía mayor. Entre los siriono (grupo indígena de Bolivia), los hombres y las mujeres creen que no tienen vínculos recíprocos sino por intermediación de la luna. Véase John Ingham, “Are the Siriono Raw or Cooked?”, _American Anthropologist_, 73, 1971, pp. 1092-1099.
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+[^f70]: _Herramientas y género_. La asociación del género con las herramientas simples ocupa un lugar preferencial en la investigación sobre el género, porque tal asociación se puede observar directamente. No pasa lo mismo, por ejemplo, con la asociación entre el género y las tareas. La lista, o taxonomía, de todas las tareas “asignadas” en una cultura dada, es siempre, al menos parcialmente, creación del observador. Las herramientas son objetos concretos, y el observador siempre puede comprobar directamente si son manejadas por los hombres o por las mujeres. Por esto resulta una laguna sorprendente la ausencia de estudios tocantes a la asociación del género y las herramientas. Aunque hay observaciones al respecto, se dan en el marco de los estudios dedicados a otras materias. Es una buena introducción a este tema Michael Roberts, “Sickles and Scythes: Women’s Work and Men’s Work at Harvest Time”, _History Workshop_, 7, 1979, pp. 3-28. Son ricos y detallados (buena bibliografía) los textos de Günther Wiegelmann, “Zum Problem der Bäuerlichen Arbeitsteilung in Mitteleuropa”, _Geschichte und Landeskunde, Franz Steinbach zum 65. Geburtstag_, Bonn, 1960, pp. 637-671, y “Erste Ergebnisse der ADV-Umfragen zur alten bäuerlichen Arbeit”, _Rheinische Vierteljahresblätter_, 33, 1969, pp. 208-262. Es un útil complemento de los textos anteriores: Maria Bidling-maier, _Die Bäuerin in zwei Gemeinden Württembergs_, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1918, un estudio excepcional para su época, donde la autora compara minuciosamente el trabajo cotidiano de los campesinos antes de la primera Guerra Mundial en una aldea tradicional, y en otra en vías de modernización; véase también Ingeborg Man, _Erntegebrauch in der ländlichen Arbeitswelt des 19. Jahrhunderts. Auf Grund der Mannhardtbefragung in Deutschland von 1865_, Marburg, 1965. Para Hungría, véase Edit Fél y Tamás Hofer, _Proper Peasants: Traditional Life in a Hungarian Village_, Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, volumen 46, Aldine, Chicago, 1969, pp. 101-137, y _Bäuerliche Denkweise in Wirtschaft und Haushalt: eine ethnographische Untersuchung über das ungarische Dorf Atány_, Otto Schwartz, Gotinga, 1972, particularmente la p. 149 y ss. referente a los dichos, gracejos y sarcasmos que censuran los traspasos de la división de los géneros. Allí donde las reglas son estrictas, las excepciones son claras: todavía tras la segunda Guerra Mundial, una viuda que se veía obligada a realizar el trabajo de su difunto esposo recibía ayuda —por ejemplo, la del herrero, que afilaba gratuitamente sus herramientas—. Un bello y rico estudio al respecto, aunque sólo enfoca indirectamente las herramientas: O. Loefgren, “Arbeitsteilung und Geschlechtsrollen in Schweden”, _Ethnologia Scandinavia_, 1975, pp. 49-72. B. Huppertz, _Räume und Schichten bäuerlicher Kulturformen in Deutschland_, Bonn, 1939, esp. pp. 191 y ss. y 281 y ss., quien observa que en ciertas regiones de Alemania los vínculos entre las herramientas y el género, y todavía más entre animales o plantas y el género, han permanecido intactos desde el Neolítico. Sobre los santos católicos que son los guardianes de la asignación correcta de las guadañas y las hoces a un género o al otro, véase Leopold Schmidt, _Gestaltheiligkeit im bäuerlichen Arbeitsmythos: Studien zu den Ernteschnittgeräten und ihre Stellung im europläischen Volksglauben und Volksbrauch_, Verlag des Österreichischen Museums für Volskund, Viena, 1952, sobre todo las pp. 108-177.
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+[^f71]: _División del trabajo_. Una expresión también puede constituir una “palabra clave”. Es el caso de _división del trabajo_. A primera vista, su empleo en la conversación común no parece crear confusión. Y sin embargo, al consultar los manuales y los diccionarios, se observa que tres _categorías distintas_ de actividades humanas se incluyen y confunden en esta locución: _1)_ la división funcional de las tareas productivas (ciudad/campo; zapatero/carpintero; o especialización: los 17 pasos para fabricar una aguja); _2)_ la repartición de las tareas según los géneros en las sociedades tradicionales; _3)_ los roles diferentes y opuestos que se asignan al trabajador salariado y a los que éste mantiene. Por lo tanto no es posible hablar de “división” del trabajo en una descripción histórica o antropológica sin crear un equívoco respecto al sentido de la expresión. Véase Barbara Duden y Karin Hausen, “Gesellschaftliche Arbeit-Geschlechtsspezifische Arbeitsteilung”, en Annette Kuhn y Gerhard Schneider, eds., _Frauen in der Geschichte_, Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann, Düsseldorf, 1979, pp. 11-13. Por esta razón yo evito hablar de la “división del trabajo”.
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+[^f72]: _Élites y género_. La producción, es decir, la creación de excedentes para los demás, se mantuvo en al ámbito del género hasta el siglo XIX. Y el consumo de los excedentes también permaneció en gran medida bajo el signo del género. Vivir de los propios productos del campo no significaba llevar una existencia basada en la satisfacción de necesidades neutras —como sucede con el consumidor moderno—. El hecho de tener un estatus superior no borraba la barrera del género. Incluso el “rango” la hacía más visible, pues los señores y sus damas podían permitirse el ocio de “exhibir” su género. Las incursiones en el otro género a veces eran obligadas (nota 106), a veces deliberadas: Loefgren (nota 70) evoca a las mujeres nobles que montaban a caballo en una sociedad donde por lo general sólo los hombres cabalgaban.
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+[^f73]: _Tributo feudal y género_. La prueba de que durante la alta Edad Media los hombres y las mujeres de una misma familia pagaban el tributo al señor con productos agrícolas distintos la aporta Ludolf Kuchenbuch, “Bäuerliche Gesellschaft und Klosterherrschaft im 9. Jh. Studien zur Sozialstruktur der Familie der Abtei Prum”, en _Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte_, 2 volúmenes, fascículo 66, Wiesbaden, 1978. También ha sido bien demostrado que en el siglo IX algunos individuos, sin importar el sexo, recibieron tierras a cambio de tributos específicos que su familia tenía que aportar. No se ha escrito aún la historia del tributo genérico y su desaparición durante la Edad Media. En torno a la historia del trabajo servil que se imponía el día del Señor, véase Otto Neurath, “Beiträge zur Geschichte der Opera Servilia”, _Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik_, volumen XLI, núm. 2, 1915, pp. 438-465. Respecto a los días estrictamente feriados, véase Pierre Braun, “Les tabous des ‘Feriae’”, _l’Année Sociologique_, 3a serie, 1959, pp. 49-125. Para comprender las dificultades ideológicas que se presentan en el estudio de la división del trabajo según los sexos en el pasado, véase Christopher Middleton, “The Sexual Division of Labour in Feudal England”, _New Left Review_, 113/114, enero-abril, 1979, pp. 147-168. Respecto a la mujer en la aldea medieval, véase Rodney H. Hilton, _The English Peasantry in the Later Middle Ages_, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, pp. 95-110.
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+[^f74]: _Comercio y género_. Sobre esta cuestión véase Sidney W. Mintz, “Men, Women and Trade”, _Comparative Studies in Society and History_, 13, 1971, pp. 247-269. Un marido jamás podía inmiscuirse en los asuntos comerciales de su mujer, aun cuando podía beneficiarse de las ganancias. Mintz examina los estudios de ciencias sociales relacionados con las mujeres que se dedican al comercio, asegurando que sus colegas no aciertan a describirlos más que peyorativamente, pues los asocian con las nociones del abandono de los deberes maternales y con la prostitución. El estudio de Gloria Marshall (seudónimo, N. Sudarksa), “Where Women Work: A Study of Yoruba Women in the Marketplace and the Home”, _Anthropological Papers_, _Museum of Anthropology_, núm. 53, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1973, es rico y detallado. Describe un “mundo al revés”, donde los hombres dependen de las mujeres pero en el hogar mandan sobre ellas. Hay una descripción vivaz de las mujeres comerciantes de San Juan Evangelista (México) en B. Chinas, _The Isthmus Zapotecs (Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology)_, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Nueva York, 1973, que registra la estricta repartición de las tareas y un alto nivel de complementariedad.
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+[^f75]: _Artesanado y género_. Véase Michael Mitterauer, “Zur familienbetrieblichen Struktur im zünftischen Handwerk”, _Wirtschafts- und Sozialhistorische Beiträge. Festschrift für Alfred Hoffmann zum 75. Geburtstag_, 1979, Munich, pp. 190-219, y “Geschlechtsspezifische Arbeitsteilung in vorindustrieller Zeit”, _Beiträge zur historischen Sozialkunde_, 3, 1981, pp. 77-78. El estatus legal de las mujeres en los gremios y los talleres ha sido estudiado recientemente, pero existe poco sobre la especificidad de las herramientas artesanales según los géneros. Pueden sacarse algunos datos en la bibliografía incluida en el ensayo de Edith Ennen, _Die Frau in der mittelalterlichen Stadtgesellschaft Mitteleuropas_, manuscrito, 1980; en Luise Hess, _Die deutschen Frauenberufe des Mittelalters_, Neuer Filser Verlag, Munich, 1940 y en Werner Danckert, _Unehrliche Leute: die verfemten Berufe_, Francke, Berna/Munich, 1963, particularmente sobre los oficios “semiproscritos”.
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+[^f76]: _Estructuralismo_. La materia inmediata de los estudios sobre el género es la correspondencia entre dos conjuntos de lugares, herramientas, necesidades, gestos y símbolos, y entre los que en toda sociedad son llamados los hombres y las mujeres. El estructuralismo se esfuerza justamente en eludir o minimizar el estudio de esta correspondencia y esta complementariedad únicas, clasificándolas en la misma categoría que otras dualidades —caliente/frío, derecha/izquierda, sagrado/profano— en las que se apoyan las leyes de las relaciones internas de un sistema. Para el estructuralismo, el sistema de signos y de símbolos que forma una cultura ha sido engendrado por un núcleo central que no está relacionado con el marco institucional del poder y de la subsistencia de una sociedad. Gracias al análisis de los mitos y los rituales, el antropólogo estructuralista intenta la exploración de este núcleo, que no se puede percibir mediante el análisis sociológico del marco institucional de la sociedad. Para una iniciación al estructuralismo, véase la antología editada por Roger Bastide, _Sens et usage du terme “structure” dans les sciences humaines et sociales_, Mouton, La Haya y París, 1962, y la serie _Qu’est-ce que le structuralisme?_, Seuil, colección Points, París, 1973, especialmente Dan Sperber, _Qu’estce que le structuralisme en anthropologie?_ De forma sutil aunque lógica, el análisis estructuralista refuerza las categorías agenéricas del _rol_ (nota 61) y del _intercambio_ (nota 57) hasta el grado de que para Lévi-Strauss “las mujeres, como las palabras, están destinadas al intercambio”. Una de las razones de la incapacidad del estructuralismo para relacionar el género y el parentesco está implícita en la crítica que le hace Edmund R. Leach en _Political System of Highland Burma_, Londres, 1954 (traducción francesa: _Les systèmes politiques des hautes terres de Birmanie_, Maspero, París, 1972), quien subraya que el sistema de parentesco que es central en el análisis estructuralista no responde ni a la cultura ni al marco institucional, tal como los conciben aquellos que realizan el análisis. En mi concepto, esto es consecuencia de la obstinación estructuralista en ver en la polaridad femenino/masculino una “pareja de términos opuestos” como muchas otras, perpetuando de esta manera la confusión entre la complementariedad analógica y el intercambio. Es difícil criticar el estructuralismo con una perspectiva a la vez marxista y feminista, como lo muestra el brillante ensayo de Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex”, en Rayna Reiter, ed., _Toward an Anthropology of Women, op. cit_. en la nota 22, pp. 157-210, y Felicity Edholm, Olivia Harris y Kate Young, “Conceptualizing Women”, _op. cit_. en la nota 22.
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+[^f77]: _Matrimonio económicamente productivo_. Creo que es posible distinguir tres fases en el tránsito al paradigma de la asociación llamada “matrimonio”: _1)_ la constitución del hogar que paga individualmente un tributo; _2)_ el creciente predominio de la pareja en el seno de este hogar sujeto al tributo, durante el Renacimiento y los inicios del mercantilismo; _3)_ la polarización económica de los sexos en el siglo XIX. La evolución hacia la asociación sexual que en el siglo XX se ha observado, presupone esas etapas por las que pasaron, en periodos diferentes, clases diferentes en regiones diferentes de “Occidente”. Es ésta la conclusión a que llegué tras mis encuentros en Berlín con Barbara Duden y Ludolf Kuchenbuch, con la participación posterior de Uwe Pörsken. Nuestro punto de partida fue la crítica que Kuchenbuch hace de las teorías actuales sobre el feudalismo: Ludolf Kuchenbuch, “Bäuerliche Ökonomie und feudale Produktionsweise. Ein Beitrag zur Weltsystem Debatte aus mediaevistischer Sicht”, en _Perspektiven des Weltsystems. Materialen zu E. Wallerstein “Das moderne Weltsystem”_, publicación del Berliner Institut für vergleichende Sozialforschung, bajo la dirección de J. Blaschke, Francfort del Meno, 1982. La idea de que durante la Edad Media el parentesco empezó a declinar, siendo remplazado por una nueva realidad social, a saber, la pareja conyugal económica, me fue sugerida por Jack Goody, J. Thirsk y E. P. Thomson, eds., _Family and Inheritance, Rural Society in Western Europe, 1200-1900_, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976. También saqué diversas ideas del estudio de Hans Medick y David Sabean, “Call for Papers: Family and Kinship: Material Interest and Emotion”, _Peasant Studies_, 8, núm. 2, primavera, 1979, pp. 139-160. La etimología puede servir como punto de partida para reflexionar sobre esta cuestión. Émile Benveniste, _Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes_,Éditions de Minuit, París, 1969, explica en el volumen I, capítulo 4, que en los más antiguos estratos de las lenguas indogermánicas no existen términos comunes para designar la relación conyugal. Además, los términos del parentesco que describen la relación recíproca se derivan de raíces diferentes. Aristóteles, en la _Política_, I, 2, 3-1253b, afirma que “la unión del hombre y la mujer no tiene nombre”: es _a-nonymós_. Los términos relacionados con el varón son generalmente verbos, y los relacionados con la mujer sustantivos. El verbo _maritare_ no significa otra cosa que _unir_; _mariage_ (francés) es una derivación. El término _matrimonium_ no proviene de _maritare_. Está compuesto a partir del vocablo “madre”, _mater_, y del sufijo - _monium_, que siempre indica un estado jurídico —en este caso, el estado legal de la maternidad—. El término que designa la unidad social y económica constituida por la pareja tuvo una evolución posterior. Una reforma jurídica promulgada por Nerón probablemente contribuyó de manera decisiva a la doctrina que elaboraron los Padres de la Iglesia respecto al paso “de una bisexualidad de acicalamiento a una heterosexualidad de reproducción”. Véase al respecto Paul Veyne, “La famille et l’amour sous le haut Empire Romain”, _Annales ESC_, 33, núm. 1, enero-febrero, 1978, pp. 35-63. En torno a la contribución de la Iglesia a la orientación de la sociedad medieval hacia el casamiento, véase Georges Duby, _Le chevalier, la femme et le prêtre: le mariage dans la France féodale_, Hachette, París, 1981. La sorpresa, perplejidad y confusión que esta nueva forma social engendró las relata Marie-Odile Métral, _Le mariage: les hésitations de l’Occident_, prefacio de P. Ariès, Aubier, París, 1977. Lo que despertó mi interés en el lento proceso de la fusión de los géneros en la productividad conyugal fue el estudio de David Herlihy, “Land, Family and Women in Continental Europe, 701-1200”, en _Traditio, Studies in Ancient and Medieval History_, 18, Fordham University Press, Nueva York, 1962, pp. 89-113. En torno a la adaptación del lenguaje a la nueva unidad reproductiva, véase Giovan-Battista Pellegrini, “Terminologia Matrimoniale”, _Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull’ Alto Medioevo_, _Il matrimonio nella società alto medioevale_, Espoleto, 1971, pp. 43-102. Respecto a la evolución del casamiento, véase Jean-Baptiste Molin y Protais Mutembe, _Le rituel du mariage en France du XIIe au XVIe siècle_, Beauchesne, París, 1974. Respecto a las nuevas formas de registrar la existencia de las parejas, véase Diane Owen Hughes, “Toward Historical Ethnography: Notarial Records and Family History in the Middle Ages”, _Historical Methods Newsletter_, 7, 1973-1974, pp. 61-71. Una buena iniciación a la bibliografía reciente sobre la historia del casamiento en Occidente desde la época romana es la antología de 15 estudios realizada por Jean Gaudemet, _Sociétés et mariage_, CERDIC -Publication, Estrasburgo, 1980. Una notable guía bibliográfica sobre el tema se encuentra en Derek Baker, ed., _Medieval Women_, publicado por la Ecclesiastical History Society, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978. Véase también la notas 110-113 y 120.
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+[^f78]: _Medio y ámbito_. En _Le geste et la parole: technique et langage_, Albin Michel, París, 1964, André Leroi-Gourhan dice en la p. 214 que, “… a diferencia del territorio, no tiene paralelo -la estrecha complementariedad del hombre y la mujer- en el mundo animal superior”. Pero en una sociedad el espacio de los hombres y de las mujeres no es el mismo. Véase Pierre Bourdieu, _Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, précédée de trois études d’ethnologie kabyle_, Droz, Ginebra, 1972. Es sólo en el _haram_, al fondo de la vivienda berebere, que la pareja puede compartir el mismo espacio (p. 67). Todos los demás lugares de la habitación se encuentran marcados por el signo del género. Los sitios que los hombres ocupan se perciben como espacios diferentes de los de las mujeres. Cada tipo de lugar requiere el movimiento y el ritmo temporal correspondiente. El espacio y el tiempo están relacionados con el género, como las herramientas y las tareas. Es un grave error confundir este ambiente formado por dos ámbitos separados, que pertenecen respectivamente a uno de los géneros, con el territorio de los animales. Diferentes culturas se reparten el paisaje de manera diferente. Y como el espacio vernáculo es poroso, varias culturas pueden compartir el mismo paisaje. En el corazón de ese medio se encuentra la casa, la dualidad espacial que transmite la cultura: Clark E. Cunningham, “Order in the Antoni House”, en Rodney Needham, ed., _Right and Left, op. cit_. en la nota 53, pp. 204-238. Por lo tanto el _medio vernáculo_ contrasta a la vez con el _territorio animal_ y el espacio homogéneo de la economía. Respecto a la evolución de las teorías que procuran la definición de este espacio económico, véase Pierre Dockes, _L’espace dans la pensée économique du XVIe au XVIIe siècle_, Flammarion, París, 1969. El medio vernáculo es un espacio intragenérico: la realidad cultural que resulta de la complementariedad asimétrica y ambigua de los _dos ámbitos espaciales del género_. Es un fenómeno que parece haber escapado totalmente a la atención de los filósofos occidentales, como se puede comprobar en la monumental exposición de sus doctrinas relacionadas con el espacio: Alexander Gosztonyi, _Der Raum: Geschichte seiner Probleme in Philosophie and Wissenschaft_, 2 volúmenes, Alber, Friburgo, 1976. El espacio vernáculo está compuesto por una jerarquía de lugares, cada uno de los cuales corresponde a un género. C. Karnoch, “L’étranger, ou le faux inconnu. Essai sur la définition spatiale d’autrui dans un village lorrain”, _Ethnologie française_, I, núm. 2, 1972, pp. 107-122, muestra que hasta 1950 los habitantes de una aldea francesa distinguían el espacio en torno a ellos de acuerdo con tres círculos concéntricos: la aldea, el valle circundante, con un diámetro de travesía de tres horas, y el “país”, constituido por varias aldeas habitadas por “fuereños” que realizaban gran cantidad de matrimonios entre sí. Bajo esta tripartición se encuentra el hogar; más allá, el mundo exterior. Dependiendo del aumento o la disminución periódicos del número de los miembros del hogar, esta manera de percibir el mundo estaba más o menos presente en los diversos medios: Alain Collomp, “Maison, manières d’habiter et famille en haute Provence aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles”, _Ethnologie française_, VIII, núm. 4, 1978, pp. 321-328.
+
+[^f79]: _Espacio y tiempo_. Cada ámbito del género tiene su paisaje y ritmo propios. Se extiende en el espacio y el tiempo. Dos notables estudios pretenden describir la realidad espacio-temporal de las mujeres. El de Yvonne Verdier, _Façons de dire et façons de faire. La laveuse, la couturière, la cuisinière_, Gallimard, París, 1979, es el resultado de una encuesta etnográfica que realizó durante siete años la autora con tres discípulos en Minot, aldea de 360 habitantes en la Costa de Oro, al norte de Dijon. A través de la actual manera de hablar de las mujeres de Minot, así como del estudio de los archivos locales, de las pinturas, de las viejas fotografías, de los dichos y refranes, la autora reconstituye la historia de las mujeres que dirigían a las demás: la mujer que lava (los recién nacidos, la ropa, los muertos); la costurera que inicia a las muchachas; la cocinera que preside ceremonias tales como las bodas y los entierros, impartiéndoles su ritmo. Aparte de la obra de Sidney Mintz, _Worker in the Cane_, Norton, Nueva York, 1958, que me reveló esta variedad de la investigación de campo, no había conocido libro más atractivo de este tipo, con excepción del estudio de Audrey Richards (cita en la nota 68). El de Martine Segalen, _Mari et femme dans la société paysanne_, Flammarion, París, 1980, puede leerse como complemento de la obra de Yvonne Verdier. En éste se hace mayor hincapié en los ritmos complementarios del hombre y la mujer en una granja francesa de hoy en día. Actualmente vivimos el tiempo mecánico y agenérico de los relojes que ritman la existencia, y este tiempo es por lo tanto escaso; los ritmos del género desaparecen. En virtud de los ritmos unisex, con frecuencia las mujeres se ven más _presionadas_ por el tiempo que los hombres, cosa que observó H. Bidlingmaier, _op. cit_. en la nota 70, en la aldea de Lauffen en 1915. Respecto a las consecuencias de ritmos más amplios, véase Evatar Zerubavel, “The French Republican Calendar: A Case Study in the Sociology of Time”, _American Sociological Review_, 42, 1977, pp. 868-877. En torno a la introducción en una región rural del tiempo medido por el reloj, véase Guy Thuillier, “Pour une histoire du temps en Nivernais au XIXe siècle”, _Ethnologie française_, VI, núm. 2, 1976, pp. 149-162. Sobre la relación entre la cultura y el tiempo, véanse los ensayos filosóficos en Paul Ricoeur, ed., _Les cultures et le temps_, Payot, París, 1975. La sociología, la antropología y la etnología del tiempo han dado origen a una vasta literatura moderna, pero debo señalar que hasta ahora se ha descuidado la investigación sobre el género y el tiempo, o sobre el género y el ritmo. Se encuentra una descripción esmerada del espacio de los hombres en una comunidad rural del sur de Francia en Lucienne A. Roubin, “Espace masculin, espace féminin en communauté provençale”, _Annales ESC_, 25, núm. 2, 1970, pp. 537-560; Maurice Agulhon ha comentado con amplitud el tema en “Les chambrées en basse-Provence: histoire et ethnologie”, _Revue historique_, abril-junio 1971, pp. 337-368. Su estudio trata sobre una “sociedad”, una asociación local de hombres, que da testimonio del abismo que existe entre el espacio de los hombres y el espacio de las mujeres. Los cafés, los grupos que preparan el carnaval, los bancos al sol en la plaza de la iglesia se encuentran claramente dentro del ámbito de los hombres. El hombre de mayor edad de la familia es únicamente quien con una hoz especial marcará los límites del campo que será cosechado al día siguiente. Los habitantes de la Provenza del sur de Francia no consideran que el espacio público y el ámbito masculino son una misma cosa, pero de hecho ambos tienden a coincidir. Un importante ensayo de reconstitución del medio ambiente del pasado que, por eso mismo, evoca el género, es el de Ina-Maria Greverus, _Der territoriale Mensch: ein literatur-anthropologischer Versuch zum Heimatphänomen_, Athenaeum, Francfort del Meno, 1972.
+
+[^f80]: _Charivari (cencerrada)_. Para una buena iniciación a los textos que tratan de los métodos de justicia popular, en cuanto guardiana de las costumbres locales, véase Roger Pinon, “Qu’est-ce qu’un charivari? Essai en vue d’une définition opératoire”, _Kontakte und Grenzen. Probleme der Volks-Kultur und Sozialforschung. Festschrift für G. Heilfurt zum 60. Geburtstag_, Otto Schwartz, Gotinga, 1979, pp. 393-405. Los métodos citados incluían verdaderos castigos: la gente arrancaba el techo de una vivienda, derribaba árboles, salaba los pozos, ponía a los culpables en la picota, los boicoteaba, los embadurnaba de chapopote y los hacía rodar sobre montones de plumas. Françoise Zonabend, _La mémoire longue. Temps et histoires au village_, PUF, París, 1980, describe la “emboscada”, visita ritual a los vecinos, la cual indicaba, según fuera más o menos tumultuosa, el concepto que se tenía de la “honestidad” de los anfitriones. Se puede encontrar un repertorio de cantos populares que expresan variados grados de aprobación social en Ilka Peter, _Gasselbrauch und Gasselspruch in Österreich_, Alfred Winter, Salz-burgo, 1981. E. P. Thompson, “ _Rough music_: le charivari anglais”, _Annales ESC_, 27, núm. 2, marzo-abril, 1972, pp. 285-312, describe y analiza los rituales mediante los cuales la sociedadvernácula expresa, con frecuencia cruelmente, su desaprobación de los individuos que habían transgredido no tanto la ley sino los usos y costumbres locales. Estos rituales estaban estructurados por el parentesco y generalmente castigaban una transgresión de la división de los géneros o un comportamiento que estaba en contradicción con el género al que se pertenecía. Véase Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, “The Medieval Italian Mattinata”, _Journal of Family History_, 5, núm. 1, primavera, 1980, pp. 2-27. Sobre el conflicto entre las formas tradicionales de control que se dan entre las parejas y la nueva tentativa de hacer respetar las buenas costumbres durante los encuentros entre muchachos y muchachas, véase Hans Medick, “Spinnstuben auf dem Dorf. Jugendliche Sexualkultur und Feierabendbrauch in der ländlichen Gesellschaft der frühen Neuzeit”, en J. Reulecke y Wolfhard Weber, _Fabrik, Familie, Feierabend: Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte im Industriezeitalter_, Wuppertal, Hamer, 1978.
+
+[^f81]: _La probidad_. En la Francia del siglo XVI, era ésta la cualidad del “ _honnête homme_”, el hombre probo; la rectitud moral, la integridad, la probidad, la dignidad. Propongo usar el término para designar la percepción que un hombre o una mujer tenían de la división de los géneros, como norma que personalmente les concernía. La elección del término me permite hablar de este límite específico sin implicar un motivo particular, cosa que sucedería si empleara términos tales como “vergüenza”, “pecado”, “culpa”, “honor”, etc. Respecto a estos vocablos, véase Carl Darling Buck, _A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal IndoEuropean Languages, op. cit_. en la nota 3. Sobre el proceso mediante el cual _l’honneur_ (el honor), se hizo preeminente en el sentido que típicamente se daba a la _honnêteté_ en Europa, véase Julian Pitt-Rivers, “The Anthropology of Honour” y “Honour and Social Status in Andalucía”, pp. 1-47 de su obra _Fate of Shechem, op. cit_. en la nota 21, y P. Schneider, “Honor and Conflict in a Sicilian Town”, _Anthropological Quarterly_, 42, núm. 3, julio, 1969, pp. 130-155; véase también Pierre Bourdieu, “Le sens de l’honneur. La dialectique du défi et de la riposte. Point d’honneur et honneur. L’éthos de l’honneur”, en _Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, op. cit_. en la nota 78, capítulo I, pp. 13-44, que expone observaciones sobre el África del Norte. Para un estudio clásico, Max Weber, “Rechtsordnung, Konvention und Sitte”, en _Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft_, Mohr, Tubinga, 4a edición revisada, 1956, (traducción francesa: _Économie et société_, Plon, París, tomo 1, 1971). Para la transformación de la _honnêteté_ y del _honneur_ causada por el proceso de la civilización, véase Yves Castan, “La famille: masculin et féminin”, _Honnêteté et relations sociales en Languedoc, 1715-1780_, Plon, París, 1974, pp. 162-207. En el siglo XVIII la ley aún no reglamentaba la vida familiar de la pequeña gente, simplemente la protegía. Pasaría todavía algo de tiempo (tres a cinco generaciones) antes de que el Estado impusiera el casamiento civil y reglamentara la vida familiar (véase la nota 120). El ámbito físico de cada género y el comportamiento conveniente era salvaguardado por el sentido de la honestidad y el honor. Este sentido desaparecería hacia 1780; véase Yves Castan, “Pères et fils en Languedoc à l’époque classique”, _Le XVIIe siècle_, núm. 102-103: “Le XVIIe siècle et la famille”, 1974, pp. 31-43. Nicole Castan, “La criminalité familiale dans le ressort du parlement de Toulouse (1690-1730)”, _Cahiers des Annales_, 33, Armand Colin, París, 1971, pp. 91-107, estudia el honor femenino ( _honnêteté_) contrastándolo con el masculino. La mujer actúa con solidaridad hacia el hogar y puede decir y hacer cosas sin menoscabo de su honor que a los hombres jamás se les perdonarían. El honor exige que oculte los bienes robados; que ahuyente al cobrador de impuestos; que amenace de muerte a quien haya rendido testimonio contra algún miembro de la familia; que se encuentre sola en casa cuando ésta sirva a la prostitución. En la medida en que se codificaba el derecho y que la proliferación de las acciones judiciales remplazaron el control del género por el control civil, las mujeres perdieron su honor a cambio de un nuevo estatus como ciudadanas del segundo sexo. Sobre la cuestión es posible encontrar útiles señalamientos en A. Pointrineau, “Aspects de la crise des justices seigneuriales dans l’Auvergne du XVIIIe siècle”, _Revue d’histoire du droit français et étranger_, 1961, pp. 552-570. Para una orientación general, véase M. Alliot, “L’acculturation juridique”, _Ethnologie générale_,“Encyclopédie de la Pléiade”, 1968, pp. 1180-1247.
+
+[^f82]: _Comadreo_. El _charivari_ (nota 80) y las burlas del carnaval (nota 108), sustentan la honestidad de la comunidad, pero solamente son episódicos. La honestidad es salvaguardada de manera sutil y continua por el “caudal oral” tradicional de la comunidad: máximas, adivinanzas, cuentos, y más que nada, por el comadreo. Su función es salvaguardar el honor de la comunidad. John B. Haviland, _Gossip, Reputation and Knowledge in Zinacantan_, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, muestra cómo, en una aldea mexicana, este caudal oral le permite a la gente reflexionar sobre las reglas vigentes y manipularlas para fines personales. Los comadreos relacionados con los tiempos pasados son para la comunidad una manera de afirmar su arraigo, de crear para sus miembros una historia común. Vinculan a los amigos. Crean una especie de insignia de pertenencia al grupo, puesto que todos deben comprender porque algo resulta escandaloso para éste, así como las reglas tácitas del cuchicheo legítimo; véase Max Gluckman, “Gossip and Scandal”, _Current Anthropology_, 4, núm. 3, junio, 1963, pp. 307-316. Mientras más exclusivo es un grupo, más intenso es el comadreo. Éste mantiene la cohesión y la distinción de los géneros. Fue necesario que el género se dislocara para que el comadreo se volviera “femenino”: Alexander Rysman, “How the ‘Gossip’ Became a Woman”, _Journal of Communication_, 27, núm. 1, 1977, pp. 176-180. El vocablo inglés _gossip_ viene de _god sib_, que antiguamente designaba la relación entre el hombre y la mujer que conjuntamente habían acercado a un recién nacido a la pila bautismal, es decir, en francés, el _compère_ y la _commère_ (el compadre y la comadre). Hacia el siglo XVI, en inglés como en francés, el significado de los vocablos se modificó: el _gossip_ y el compadre se vuelven amigotes, compañeros de juerga. En el siglo XIX, ya sólo las mujeres son _gossips_ que se entregan al _gossip_ (comadres que se entregan al comadreo). Tocante a los chistes, bromas y trucos dirigidos contra los hombres, véase E. Moser-Rath, “Männerfeindliche Tendenzen in Witz und Schwank”, _Zeitschrift für Volkskunde_, 75, núm. 1, 1979, pp. 57-67. Sobre las mujeres españolas que se burlaban de los hombres, véase Yolando Pino-Saavedra, “Wette der Frauen, wer den Mann am besten narrt”, _Fabula_, 15, 1974, pp. 177-191.
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+[^f83]: _Dominación asimétrica_. Susan Carol Rogers, “Female Form of Power and the Myth of Male Dominance. A Model of Female-Male Interaction in Peasant Society”, _American Ethnologist_, 2, núm. 4, noviembre, 1975, pp. 727-756, estudia la transformación del mito de la dominación masculina, que se convierte en realidad durante la época de la industrialización. Según ese autor, la generalización universal del dominio masculino está fundada en definiciones masculinas y es por lo tanto un mito. En conjunto, los textos sobre la modernización de la vida campesina están basados en postulados erróneos respecto al rol de las mujeres. La autoridad habría estado _expresamente_ en manos de los hombres; la autoridad de las mujeres habría sido _relativa_. Pero si se deja de considerar los roles de los hombres y sus formas de autoridad como la norma, si se observa los procedimientos de las mujeres y se advierte que no son menos válidos y significativos que los de los hombres —pero que asumen formas diferentes— sólo entonces se puede percibir que los roles masculinos y femeninos están entremezclados, y se comienza a comprender cómo funcionan las sociedades humanas. En un ensayo de 1942, reeditado en _Steps to an Ecology of Mind_ (traducción francesa: _Vers une écologie de l’esprit_, Seuil, París, 1977), Gregory Bateson insistía en el profundo contraste entre las sociedades donde hay rivalidades y aquellas donde “los individuos reaccionan a lo que los otros hacen, haciendo ellos mismos algo similar” (p.111). En el ámbito de los estudios feministas, al parecer la corriente está siendo revertida: véase Alice Schlegel, ed., _Sexual Stratification: A Cross-Cultural View_, Columbia University Press, Nueva York, 1977. Esta es una compilación de 12 estudios relacionados con otras tantas sociedades, desde las Filipinas a Israel; la discusión sobre la igualdad e inequidad del estatus sexual intenta desenmarañar, mediante la comparación de diversos rasgos, tres dimensiones del rango sexual: recompensas, prestigio y poder. Para la editora, en condiciones de subsistencia, _equilibrio_ es la palabra clave que resume la interdependencia de los ámbitos distintos de los hombres y las mujeres, al menos en el marco de la cultura hopi descrita en las pp.245-269. La igualdad tradicional de las mujeres se ve amenazada por la creciente similitud entre los roles masculinos y femeninos en el hogar y en los empleos, similitud que resulta inevitable en virtud de la integración de los hopi en la economía norteamericana. J. Harris, “The Position of Women in a Nigerian Society”, _Transaction of the New York Academy of Sciences_, serie II, volumen. 2, núm. 5, 1940, observó algo análogo entre los ibo” el equilibrio entre los derechos nominales de los esposos y los derechos colectivos _de facto_ de las esposas ha sido trastornado por la integración económica. Rayna R. Reiter, “Men and Women in the South of France: Public and Private Domains”, _Toward an Anthropology of Women, op. cit_. en la nota 22, pp. 252-282, estudia una aldea de 185 habitantes al pie de los Alpes provenzales. Las mujeres, que trabajan y viven en su esfera doméstica, parecen considerar ésta como más importante que la esfera pública de los hombres (véase la nota 79). No obstante, en la medida que la familia se integra en el Estado moderno, a las mujeres se les define por su rol en la familia, y su “esfera” separada no puede ser ya interpretada como una esfera igual. Según Ernestine Friedl, “The Position of Women: Appearance and Reality”, _Anthropological Quarterly_, 40, 1967, pp. 97-105, el prestigio aparente del hombre puede ocultar el poder de la mujer. Su investigación de la vida de una familia en una aldea griega contemporánea la lleva a esta conclusión: “Puede ser que las actividades masculinas tengan mayor prestigio que las actividades femeninas en todas las sociedades; si esto es verdad, el descubrimiento del poder social relativo de los hombres y de las mujeres podría requerir una investigación al respecto más cuidadosa … Allí donde la familia es la unidad primordial de la estructura social y económica de la comunidad entera, el poder en su seno forzosamente ha de tener importantes consecuencias en la repartición del poder en el seno de toda la sociedad”. En el hogar, las mujeres continuamente les recuerdan a los hombres las penas y angustias que ellas sufren para poder realizar las tareas domésticas que les permiten, a ellos, mostrarse en público con la cabeza en alto. De esa manera les hacen sentir que dependen de ellas. Pero esta dominación asimétrica desaparece forzosamente cuando el predominio de la economía mercantil transforma el hogar en una “unidad de consumo” (véase la nota 122). Bajo el regimen del sexo, la jerarquización de un poder homogéneo remplaza a la dominación asimétrica de los géneros. Dominación, aquí, es un término ambiguo que significa algo diferente según se trate de hombres o de mujeres. El poder, en cambio, es una fuerza homogénea agenérica que cualquiera de los sexos puede ejercer —la diferencia sólo reside en las modalidades y la intensidad—. La asimetría es fundamental en la complementariedad ambigua de los géneros (nota 57). Constituye su existencia y determina el carácter concreto de su relación. En contraste, el poder que puede circular sin consideración del género, al igual que la moneda, tiende a fin de cuentas a la simetría. Y mientras que la asimetría entre los géneros siempre ha inspirado un respetuoso temor, la repartición jerárquica del poder entre iguales teóricos inspira la envidia (notas 5 y 6). Por esta razón, yo considero que el término _poder_, palabra clave que ignora el género, es inapropiada para expresar: _1)_ la exclusión recíproca de sus respectivos ámbitos propios, implícita en el concepto de género (notas 78 y 79); _2)_ la dominación relativa de los ámbitos masculinos sobre los ámbitos de las mujeres, situación cuyas diversas formas el patriarcado autoriza.
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+[^f84]: _El sujeto de la historia_. El ejemplo fue tomado de Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, _Montaillou, village occitan, de 1294 à 1324_, Gallimard, París, 1975. Sin embargo la _domus_ de los Pirineos no es más que una de las formas que ha adoptado el sujeto de la historia. En Francia también puede revestir muchas otras formas. Jean-Louis Flandrin, “La structure des ménages”, _Familles: Parenté, maison, sexualité dans l’ancienne société_, Hachette, París, 1976, pp. 68-91, distingue tres formas típicas en la Francia rural. La primera es la _domus_ del suroeste. En los tiempos feudales, la _domus_ era quien recibía el título de nobleza. El heredero llevaba el título de la casa; era relativamente secundario que fuera hombre o mujer. El principal deber del heredero consistía en dar otro heredero a la casa. La _domus_ era la propiedad de la tierra; anclaba en el pasado de la casa a aquellos que a la sazón la habitaban. Según Flandrin, la granja en la zona central de Francia es casi lo opuesto de la _domus_. Allí, los herederos son quienes trabajan en comunidad la tierra. Flandrin confirma lo que propone Martine Segalen (nota 79): el sujeto de la historia de una propiedad no es la _pareja_ sino el _hogar_. Finalmente, la tercera forma es típica de Normandía, donde los géneros la tejen. Probablemente fue introducida e impuesta por los conquistadores escandinavos. Aquí, la casa está fundada en los vínculos de parentesco de los linajes, y éstos están arraigados en sus respectivos suelos. La “sangre” reivindica la tierra. Al dejar la casa de su difunto marido, la viuda vuelve a recuperar las tierras que había aportado como dote. En estos tres tipos de “casa”, los géneros se entremezclan para tejer la trama social. En Francia, durante mucho tiempo el sujeto final de la historia fue alguna de estas formas de “casa”. El feudalismo tardío y posteriormente el gobierno estatal fueron construidos en Francia a partir del postulado de la unión conyugal económica (véanse las notas 77 y 124) como también en Inglaterra y Alemania, aunque de forma diferente; véase Michael Mitterauer, _Grundtypen alteuropäischer Sozialformen: Haus und Gemeinde in vorindustriellen Gesellschaften_, Forman-Holzboog, Stuttgart, 1979. Hasta una época reciente, este sujeto de la historia tenía una estructura diferente en la mayoría de los demás países y periodos, por ejemplo, el _mir_ ruso. Sobre el sistema de las castas en la India, véase Louis Dumont, _Homo hierarchicus_, Gallimard, París, 1967. Sobre la comunidad aldeana indonesa, véase Clifford Geertz, _The Religion of Java_, University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, Chicago, 1976. Es necesario encontrar un término que permita distinguir el sujeto de la historia intragenérica, del sujeto de la historia en la tradición hegeliana. Propongo _lares_, porque este término no tiene utilización hoy en día, al menos en su sentido exacto. La lectura de G. Radke, _Die Götter Altitaliens_, Münster, 1965, especialmente las pp. 166 ss., me ha sugerido que en sentido estricto debería hablar de _lares compitales_ —aquellos que se veneraban en una capilla que tenía tantas ventanas como hogares (fogones) dentro de los límites (mojones) de la comunidad—.
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+[^f85]: _La vivienda_. John Turner, en _Housing by People_, Marion Boyars, Londres,1976 (traducción francesa: _Le logement est votre affaire_, Seuil, París, 1979), introdujo la diferencia, hoy clásica, entre los dos sentidos principales del vocablo _alojamiento:_ “acción y efecto de alojar o alojarse” y “lugar donde una persona o un grupo de personas se aloja”. Prefiero, para el segundo sentido hablar de “hacerse su casa”. Tocante a este tema debo mucho a las conversaciones que mantuve con Sigmar Groeneveldt (Gotinga) sobre el espacio que modela al hogar y el espacio que se halla más allá de éste; con Franco la Cecla (Bolonia), sobre la oposición entre el umbral que divide y orienta, y los límites que circunscriben el contorno; con Jean Robert (Cuernavaca), cuando él estaba escribiendo _Le temps qu’on nous vole, op.cit_. en la nota 41. Los tres actualmente trabajan, cada quien por su lado, en estudios sobre las condiciones que permitirían engendrar un espacio “viviente” en una sociedad moderna. La oposición entre el espacio-tiempo del género y el espacio-tiempo del sexo (nota 79) ilumina y acrecienta la diferencia entre la arquitectura vernácula y la construcción profesional, que George Gilbert Scott fue el primero en evocar explícitamente en _Secular and Domestic Architecture_, Londres, 1857; más recientemente, Bernard Rudofsky ha llamado la atención sobre la arquitectura “espontánea” en _Architecture without Architects_, Museum of Modern Art, Nueva York, 1964 (traducción francesa: _Architecture sans architectes_, Éditions du Chéne, París, 1977), y _The Prodigious Builders_, Secker and Warburg, Londres, 1977. Dondequiera que las herramientas están asociadas con el género (nota 70), las habitaciones son a la vez el resultado del empleo de esas herramientas y del lugar donde se emplean. Como dice Sibyl Moholy-Nagy en su bella obra _Native Genius in Anonymous Architecture_, Horizon Press, Nueva York, 1957, la historia privada de una cultura se lee en la economía, la diversidad y la permanencia de sus construcciones. Un tercer autor que insiste en la oposición entre el abrigo vernáculo y el hábitat planificado es Paul Oliver, ed., _Shelter and Society_, Barrie and Rockcliff, Londres, 1969. En la introducción del libro yo encuentro aún otro elemento susceptible de aclarar la oposición que señalo entre el abrigo intergéneros, donde los dos ámbitos del género tejen su medio, y el abrigo intersexos, donde cohabitan humanos de uno y otro sexo. Para Oliver, todo abrigo es un _signo_, que al ser interpretado se convierte en _símbolo_. Yo diría que el abrigo vernáculo es el signo ambiguo de una cultura, que al ser interpretado expresa los dos ámbitos del género que la conforman. Sugiero dos bibliografías sobre el tema, una que abarca el mundo entero: Lawrence Wodehouse, _Indigenous Architecture, Worldwide_, Gale Research, Detroit, 1979, y otra relacionada con Inglaterra: Robert de Zouche Hall, _A Bibliography on Vernacular Architecture_, David & Charles, Newton Abbot, 1972. Sobre la vivienda en Italia, principalmente rural: Tina de Rocchi Storai, _Bibliografia degli studi sulla Casa Rurale Italiana_, Olschik, Florencia, 1968, vigésimo quinto volumen de una colección de estudios regionales. Tocante a las medidas tomadas para obstaculizar la arquitectura vernácula en los Estados Unidos, véase David Handlin, _The American Home: Architecture and Society, 1815-1915_, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1979, y Howard J. Boughey, _Blueprints for Behavior. The Intentions of Architects to Influence Social Action through Design_, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1968. Un estudio francés enfoca el pasaje de la arquitectura vernácula al acondicionamiento estatal del espacio; J. M. Alliaume _et al., Politique de l’habitat (1800-1850)_, Corda, París, 1977; contiene un artículo de Anne Thalamy que está relacionado particularmente con nuestro tema: “Réflexions sur la notion d’habitat aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles”. Las diferentes culturas emplean términos que denotan campos semánticos distintos para hablar de las relaciones entre los individuos y las comunidades y su hábitat, y también designan de manera diferente el espacio que se encuentra al traspasar el umbral, ese espacio que la habitación como tal integra. Sobre la variedad de campos semánticos que con este fin existen en diversas lenguas europeas, sobre sus contrastes y sus modificaciones entre el siglo XIX y XX, véase Paul Osswald, _Französisch “campagne” und seine Nachbarwörter im Vergleich mit dem Deutschen, Englischen, Italienischen und Spanischen: ein Beitrag zur Wordfeldtheorie_, Tübingen Beiträge zur Linguistik, Tubinga, 1970.
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+[^f86]: _El cuerpo bajo el régimen del sexo_. El cuerpo como entidad clínica no es lo mismo que la carne viva de los hombres y las mujeres que constituyen una realidad social y vernácula. Ciertas lenguas, el alemán, el inglés y el francés, por ejemplo, designan estos dos aspectos con términos diferentes: _Körper/Leib, body/flesh, corps/chair_. Desde 1972, la nueva serie de la _Ethnologie française_ ha publicado una colección de ensayos que resaltan la historia del cuerpo vernáculo en cuanto realidad social; por ejemplo: J.-P. Desaive, “Le nu hurluberlu”, VI, núm. 3-4, 1976, pp. 219-226; Françoise Piponnier y Richard Bucaille, “La bête ou la belle? Remarques sur l’apparence corporelle de la paysannerie médiévale”, VI, núm. 3-4, 1976, pp. 227-232; Françoise Loux y Philippe Richard, “Alimentation et maladie dans les proverbes français: un exemple d’analyse de contenu”, II, núm. 3-4, 1972, pp. 267-286; véase también F. Loux, _Le jeune enfant et son corps dans la médecine traditionnelle_, Flammarion, París, 1978. Véase también los textos mencionados por John Blacking, _The Anthropology of the Body_, Association of Social Anthropology, Monograph núm. 15, Londres, 1977. Michel Foucault, en _Naissance de la clinique. Une archéologie du regard médical_, PUF, París, 1972, e _Histoire de la sexualité_, tomo I: _la Volonté de savoir_, Gallimard, París, 1976, ha inaugurado la investigación histórica sobre el proceso mediante el cual el nuevo sujeto del Estado tutelar se constituyó a través del discurso del profesionista en torno al cuerpo. La justicia se apresuró a constatar y sancionar el funcionamiento de los órganos sexuales del hombre un siglo antes de que la clínica llegara a ejercer su control sobre los órganos genitales de la mujer; véase Pierre Darmon, _Le Tribunal de l’impuissance: Virilité et défaillances conjugales dans l’ancienne France_, Seuil, París, 1979. El autor describe la colaboración entre la policía y los tribunales especiales a fin de verificar la capacidad de un hombre para realizar el acto sexual. Sobre la medicación del “vientre” femenino, véase la nota 87. El proceso de normalización médica descrito por G. Canguilhem, _Le normal et le pathologique_, PUF, París, 1972, ha conducido al estudio clínico de la normalidad sexual, del cuerpo en calidad de “sexo”. G. J. Barker-Benfield, _The Horrors of the Half-Known Life. Male Attitudes Towards Women and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century America_, Harper and Row, Nueva York, 1976, relata una etapa estremecedora de esta conquista epistemológica del interior del cuerpo. Cuenta la historia del doctor Sim, que mantenía con sus propios fondos un grupo de esclavas negras a fin de practicar intervenciones experimentales en sus conductos uterinos. En 1845 tuvo la idea de poner a la señora Merril en cuatro patas —la “posición de Sim”, como se le llamó desde entonces— y de mantenerle la vagina abierta mediante un mango de cuchara curvo. En su diario anotó: “Al introducir el mango curvo, vi lo que ningún hombre jamás había visto … el espéculo revelaba todo con perfecta claridad … Me sentí como un explorador en el país de la medicina que contempla por vez primera un territorio nuevo e importante”. Uno de sus colegas, el doctor Baldwin, hablaba en los siguientes términos: “El espéculo de Sim ha sido para las afecciones uterinas … lo que el compás para el navegante”. La vagina se convirtió en la entrada de un territorio nuevo para la exploración de la naturaleza. Veinte años más tarde sobrevino “el gran descubrimiento de que la mujer no solamente lo es en virtud de un lugar, sino en virtud de todos los aspectos mediante los cuales puede ser percibida”, que ha descrito Yvonne Knibiehler, “Les médecins et la ‘nature féminine’ au temps du Code civil”, _Annales ESC_, 31, núm. 4, julio-agosto, 1976, pp. 824-845. Véanse también las notas 60 y 87.
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+[^f87]: _Del alumbramiento de la mujer al alumbramiento del niño_. En _Némesis médica_ (véase _Obras reunidas_, vol. I), dediqué todo un capítulo a la medicación de la muerte, el cual ha aniquilado el _arte de morir_ vernáculo. Ya Norma Swenson, del Boston Women’s Health Collective, me había hecho notar que el control médico amenaza por igual al arte de dar la vida. Un manuscrito de Barbara Duden (Berlín) reforzó mi convicción de que con la inversión del nacimiento, el género (engendrado por las mujeres) es transformado en el sexo reproducido por una nueva biocracia, para la cual el vientre materno es un recurso natural. _La vida_ se convierte en el nuevo concepto guía para la ciencia y la administración; véase K. Figlio, “The Metaphor of Organization: A Historiographical Perspective on the Biomedical Sciences of the Early Nineteenth Century”, _History of Science_, 14, 1976, pp. 17-53, especialmente las pp. 25-28. La ciencia de la Ilustración ve en la naturaleza a una mujer cuyos velos han de ser arrancados, que ha de ser desnudada y penetrada por la luz de la razón. Penetrada por esta luminosa razón, la mujer, imagen de la naturaleza, cuando está encinta se convierte en el mecanismo mediante el cual se transmite _la vida_. El _establishment_ pluriprofesional, de donde el Estado saca su legitimidad, depende del control médico de la vida desde su origen. Para un estudio de la expansión del profesionalismo, al menos en los Estados Unidos, véase Burton L. Bledstein, _The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America_, Norton, Nueva York, 1978. Obtuve indicaciones útiles respecto a la procreación tradicional en Jacques Gélis, Mireille Laget y Marie Morel, _Entrer dans la vie: Naissance et enfance dans la France traditionnelle_, Gallimard, París, 1978, y Jean-Louis Flandrin, “Contraception, mariage et relations amoureuses dans l’Occident chrétien”, _Annales ESC_, 24, núm. 12, noviembre-diciembre, 1969, pp. 1370-1390; véase también Alessandra Alimenti y Paola Falteri, “Donna a salute nella cultura traditionale delle classi subalterne: Appunti di una ricerca sulla medicina populare nell’Italia Centrale”, _Donnawomanfemme_, 5, 1977, pp. 75-104, que contiene una bibliografía. Sobre los medios de contracepción tradicionales, véase Jean-Marie Gouesse, “En Basse Normandie aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Le refus de l’enfant au tribunal de la pénitence”, _Annales de démographie historique_, 1973, donde se describe la sorpresa y el escándalo de los confesores ante los hábiles métodos contraceptivos de los campesinos. Sobre el aborto, véase Agnès Fine-Souriac, “La limitation des naissances dans le sud-ouest de la France”, _Annales du Midi_, 40, 1978, pp. 155-188. Sobre las formas tradicionales de infanticidio, véase Regina Schulte, “Kindsmörderinnen auf dem Lande”, en H. Medick y D. Sabean, eds., _Materielles Interesse und Emotion_, Gotinga, 1982, y Patricia Crawford, “Attitudes to Menstruation in Seventeenth-Century England”, _Past and Present_, 91, mayo, 1981, pp. 46-73. Sobre la ampliación del control ginecológico, Barbara Ehrenreich y Deirdre English, _For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Expert’s Advice to Women_, Anchor, Nueva York, 1978. Sobre la creación de parteras profesionales (mujeres y hombres) y la medicación del alumbramiento, véase Ann Oakley, “Wisewoman and Medicine Man: Changes in the Management of Childbirth”, en Juliet Mitchell y Ann Oakley, _The Rights and Wrongs of Women_, Penguin, Londres, 1976, pp. 17-58; Frances E. Kobrin, “The American Midwife Controversy: A Crisis of Professionalization”, _Bulletin of the History of Medicine_, 40, 1966, pp. 350-363; J. Gélis, “Sages-femmes et accoucheurs: l’obstétrique populaire aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles”, _Annales ESC_, 32, núm. 5, septiembre-octubre, 1977, pp. 927-957; Giana Pomata, “Madri illegittime tra Ottocento e Novecento: storie cliniche e storie di vita”, _Quaderni Storici_, 44, 1980, pp. 497-552, número enteramente dedicado a “Parto e maternità, momento della biografia femminile”. Respecto a la ginecología preventiva por la medicación de la contracepción, véase Linda Gordon, _Woman’s Body, Woman’s Rights: A Social History of Birth Control in America_, Grossman, Nueva York, 1976, pp. 159-185. Al mismo tiempo que se “hospitaliza” el nacimiento, se inicia el monopolio de la moralidad sexual. Bien que la tendencia de la época sea a favor o en contra de la contracepción, a los profesionistas les incumbe el decidir cómo y cuándo las mujeres deben tener relaciones sexuales, para su propio bien. Un estudio particularmente fino sobre el control médico en relación con las mujeres, paralelamente con el nuevo lenguaje que comienza a modelar la nueva realidad del cuerpo femenino, ha sido realizado por Jean-Pierre Péter, “Entre femmes et médecins: violence et singularités dans le discours du corps et sur le corps d’après les manuscrits médicaux de la fin du XVIIIe siècle”, _Ethnologie française_, VI, núm. 3-4, 1976, pp. 341-348. Para los Estados Unidos, véase un estudio análogo de Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, “Puberty to Menopause: The Cycle of Feminity in Nineteenth-Century America”, _Clio’s Consciousness Raised, op. cit_. en la nota 36, pp. 25-37.
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+[^f88]: _Asimetría del universo simbólico_. Tomo este ejemplo de A. I. Richards, _Chisungu: A Girl’s Initiation Ceremony among the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, op. cit_. en la nota 68, estudio encantador y apasionante.
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+[^f89]: _Asimetría del universo simbólico_. En la nota 52 (“complementariedad y ciencias sociales”), hice hincapié en la necesidad de abandonar los conceptos que imponen una perspectiva central cuando el objeto que se ha de describir es una realidad genérica. En la nota 46 mostré que no había que confundir las diversas formas de “ciencia estereoscópica”, que actualmente se proponen, con el enfoque necesario para captar el género; en efecto, ya sea que el estudio sea realizado con una perspectiva complementaria, compensatoria o contrastante, siempre se basa en una apreciación agenérica de la realidad. Solamente la investigación que no es explícitamente científica, que emplea la metáfora (nota 56) de forma epistemológica, puede explicar la complementariedad ambigua y asimétrica (nota 57) que constituye el género. He mostrado que en un mundo genérico, no solamente la cultura material —las herramientas (nota 70), el tiempo y el espacio (notas 78 y 79)— sino también la dominación es genérica (nota 83). Indiqué los límites que la terminología de las ciencias políticas impone al análisis del desequilibrio entre los dos ámbitos del género. Pero todavía debo hacer resaltar que en un mundo genérico no solamente los componentes materiales de la cultura sino también las percepciones y las inferencias simbólicas de la cultura son genéricos. La extensión, la perspectiva, los colores, los objetos que las mujeres ven y las cautiva, son captados por los hombres de manera distinta. Un primer artículo de Edwin Ardener, “Belief and the Problem of Women”, que posteriormente se reeditó en Shirley Ardener, ed., _Perceiving Women_, Halsted Press, Nueva York, 1975, pp. 1-17, fue criticado por Nicole-Claude Mathieu, “Notes pour une définition sociologique des catégories du sexe”, _Epistémologie sociologique_, 11-16, 1971-1973, pp. 21-39. En respuesta, Edwin Ardener escribió “The ‘Problem’ Revisited”, que también fue reeditado en Shirley Ardener, ed., _op. cit_. En este segundo artículo, Ardener expone un marco conceptual según el cual los hombres se ven “reducidos al silencio” en ciertos espacios del dominio de las mujeres: son incapaces de captarlos directamente, y también de hablar de ellos conceptualmente. Ardener estima que, en sentido inverso, las mujeres “no tienen voz” en ciertas partes del dominio de los hombres. Actualmente preparo un ensayo sobre el concepto de que este mutismo asimétrico es parte constitutiva de la complementariedad simbólica de los géneros; al respecto véase Rodney Needham, _Reconnaissances_, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1980, pp. 17-40 (“Unilatéral Figures”). Charlotte Hardmann, “Can There Be an Anthropology of Children ?”, _Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford_, 4, 1973, pp. 85-99, considera a los niños como el paradigma de la existencia de grupos que son “reducidos al silencio”, que no son “percibidos”, que son “inasibles” —como las mujeres—, que viven en un segmento autónomo aunque no enteramente incomprensible de la sociedad, y que poseen ciertos valores y formas de interacción exclusivos. Estudia las estratagemas mediante las cuales los antropólogos prescinden en sus textos de la necesidad de reconocer esta existencia “reducida al silencio”. Ciertas nociones que en el artículo se exponen son aplicables al enmudecimiento mutuo de los ámbitos del género.
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+[^f90]: _Naturaleza/cultura_. Para hacer del _género_ un paradigma analítico, resulta esencial distinguir las diversas dualidades corrientes e incluso normativas en la investigación de las ciencias sociales (véanse las notas 12 y 76). Al oponer _naturaleza_ y _cultura_, decía Condorcet, “hemos hecho a la naturaleza cómplice del crimen de desigualdad política”. Respecto a la _naturaleza_ así redefinida, véase Jean Erhard, _L’Idée de nature en France à l’aube des Lumières_, Flammarion, París, 1970. Acaso la dualidad más difícil de desenmarañar de todas, es la del género en relación con la de naturaleza/cultura, porque después de la Ilustración la ciencia busca _naturalizar_ a la vez la experiencia y la ideología, a fin de que la lengua pueda expresarlas (argumento sacado de Figlio, _op. cit_, en la nota 87). Por lo tanto la ciencia debe analizarse de la misma manera que Roland Barthes lo hacía con el mito, como un _collage_ “convincente”, puesto que expresa lo que es “natural”. Parafraseando a Barthes, es posible decir que eso que el mundo (o el conjunto de datos empíricos) da al mito (o a la ciencia) es una realidad histórica definida por la manera en que los hombres la han creado o utilizado; y lo que el mito (o la ciencia) da en cambio es una imagen natural de tal realidad. De ahí resulta que la “naturaleza” investigada se vuelve tan mítica (científicamente desprovista de género) como las categorías agenéricas mediante las cuales se estudia. La antropología debería tomar esto en cuenta cuando se ocupa de las “mujeres”, como lo observa Sherry B. Ortner, “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?”, en Rosaldo y Lamphere, _op. cit_. en la nota 68, pp. 67-87, quien por otra parte se preocupa menos que Ardener de la asimetría del universo conceptual. Sobre todo le interesa encontrar una teoría que explique la subordinación de las mujeres a los hombres, cosa que parece casi universal. No obstante, insiste en el hecho de que toda relación entre la naturaleza y las mujeres proviene de la cultura y no de la naturaleza. Su ensayo ha suscitado un simposio muy animado: Carol P. MacCormack y Marilyn Strathern, eds., _Nature, Culture and Gender_, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980. Esta antología contiene varias comunicaciones fecundas que permiten tomar algo de distancia respecto al paradigma naturaleza/cultura, que tan profundamente se halla inscrito en las ciencias y que tanto se ha popularizado mediante las palabras clave del lenguaje corriente (nota 2). Ciertas sociedades son incapaces de contraponer naturaleza y cultura. Un ejemplo extremo de esto lo presenta M. Strathern, “No Nature, no Culture: The Hagen Case”, _ibid_., pp. 174-222. Entre los hagen (Papuasia-Nueva Guinea) no existe la cultura en el sentido de conjunto de obras del hombre, ni tampoco una naturaleza que haya que domar y hacer productiva. Cuando el género se utiliza de manera diferenciadora, dialéctica, la distinción entre lo masculino y lo femenino siempre crea la noción de humanidad como el “telón de fondo de la similitud común”. Ni el hombre ni la mujer son capaces de representar a la “humanidad” como algo opuesto a la naturaleza, porque la distinción entre ambas se emplea para evaluar zonas donde la acción humana es creadora e individualizante. Para los hagen, todas las representaciones de dominación y de influencia entre los sexos están relacionadas con formas precisas de interacción humana y no con un proyecto de la humanidad respecto a un mundo inferior a lo humano.
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+[^f91]: _Antropología_. La historia de esta palabra es curiosa. Cuando Aristóteles la emplea ( _Ética nicomaquea_, 1225 _a_ 5) significa “chisme”. Para los teólogos, desde Philo a Leibniz, significa otra cosa: la atribución de sentimientos o de motivos humanos a Dios, particularmente cuando se hace con toda humildad y con la conciencia de que el lenguaje metafórico es el único que puede traducir —si bien de forma ambigua— aquello que se quiere decir. En el siglo XVII, el término fue empleado para denominar una nueva ciencia _natural_ cuyo objeto era el _hombre_. En el siglo XIX, accede al rango de ciencia social; respecto a la evolución de la palabra, véase O. Marquard, “Anthropologie (philosophische)”, en J. Ritter, ed., _Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, op. cit_. en la nota 3, pp. 362-374. Me inclino a pensar, como Jürgen Habermas, que la antropología como ciencia filosófica distinta sólo aparece después de la primera Guerra Mundial. Desde entonces, siempre ha empleado una terminología unisex, aun cuando la antropología enfoca su investigación en la distinción entre los hombres y las mujeres. Es imprescindible elaborar una epistemología moderna del género.
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+[^f93]:_Diferenciación sexual del lenguaje_. Desde hace más de 10 años, en el sur de Alemania se ha estado realizando una gran investigación a fin de registrar la lengua que allí se utiliza actualmente; un informe preliminar apareció: Arno Ruoff, _Grundlagen und Methoden der Untersuchung gesprochener Sprache. Einführung in die Reihe Idiomalica_, Niemeyer, Tubinga, 1973. Fue una gran sorpresa para los investigadores descubrir que la principal variable es el género de la persona que habla (p. 247). “Die offenkundige Tatsache, dass sich zwischen Mann und Frau der in allen Bestimmungen gleichen Gruppen die stärksten sprachlichen Unterschiede zeigen, war für uns die _unerwarteste_ Feststellung.” Como lo indica el título, la obra de Barrie Thome y Nancy Henley, eds., _Language and Sex: Difference and Dominance_, Rowley, Mass., Newbury House, 1975, trata sobre la diferencia y la dominación. Respecto a algunos textos sobre el tema, véase Nancy Faires Conklin, “Toward a Feminist Analysis of Linguistic Behavior”, _The University of Michigan Papers in Women’s Studies_, I, núm. 1, 1974, pp. 51-73; respecto a la bibliografía reciente, consúltese Susan Philips, “Sex Differences and Language”, _Annual Review of Anthropology_, 9, 1980, pp. 523-544. Existe una antología de buenos textos en J. Orasanu, M. K. Slater y L. L. Adler, “Language, Sex and Gender”, _The Annual of the New York Academy of Sciences_, 327, 1970, así como en B. L. Dubois y I. Crouch, eds., _The Sociology of the Language of American Women: Proceedings of a Conference at San Antonio_, Trinity University Press, San Antonio, Texas, 1979. Mi primera introducción al tema se la debo a un joven amigo fallecido, Larry M. Grimes: _El tabú lingüístico: su naturaleza y función en el español popular de México_, CIDOC, Cuaderno núm. 64, Cuernavaca, CIDOC, 1971. Su obra es una mina de los vocablos tabú relacionados con el género en el español de México. La mayoría de los sociolingüistas ven la diferencia entre el habla masculina y el habla femenina “como un lingüista trata cualquier variedad de lenguaje”. Yo hago lo contrario. Parto del postulado de que esta diferencia es única, comparada con otras diferencias que los lingüistas exploran. Por experiencia sé que el habla vernácula está compuesta por dos formas distintas de expresión oral, y esto es verdad en todos los aspectos: entonación, gramática, vocabulario; temas principales de conversación y manera de tratarlos; ritmo de los silencios, sonidos no articulados, y miradas. Claro está que cito principalmente los textos que concuerdan con mi hipótesis, que por lo demás está fundada en mis propias observaciones.
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+[^f94]: _Complementariedad de la palabra_. Hablo del “lenguaje de las mujeres” de la misma forma en que hablé ya del “trabajo de las mujeres”, pues no existe un término lingüístico que designe el habla del género. Respecto a la nomenclatura disponible, véase Joshua A. Fishman, “Some Basic Sociolinguistic Concepts”, _Sociology of Language_, Newbury House, Rowley, Mass., 1972, pp. 15-19. El habla respectiva de los géneros no es una variedad de “la” lengua, sino eso que la constituye fundamentalmente de modo complementario. Tratarla como una variedad de la lengua significa introducir automáticamente una norma agenérica, “unisex” y, al mismo tiempo, la idea de una desviación. También implica que existe de manera independiente, al igual que un dialecto; que cualquiera de las dos formas lingüísticas podría existir incluso en la ausencia de su complemento. Las mujeres comprenden el habla de los hombres, pues el habla femenina es su complemento, pero los hombres y las mujeres comprenden de manera distinta el habla de los primeros (notas 89 y 97) y viceversa. Nadie ha podido escuchar jamás una _lengua vernácula_ como tal; ésta es una elaboración del lingüista que describe el comportamiento de _humanos_ estáticos. La _lumen intellectualis_ del lingüista es la del _neutro científico_ (nota 52). Su proyector conceptual y su perspectiva centralizadora amortiguan la diferencia entre los géneros. La codificación y la ortografía jamás han cesado de imponer la forma masculina y de esta manera han categorizado como una desviación la forma de hablar que las mujeres siguen utilizando. Aun cuando la estandardización ha creado una forma de hablar única, mediante la cual hombres y mujeres se vuelven iguales, en la práctica las mujeres tienen un poco menos de igualdad. En las culturas vernáculas son raras las ocasiones en que los hombres y las mujeres hablan entre sí, por lo que no experimentan la desigualdad del habla. Una de las razones de la estandardización de una forma de habla, es la voluntad de crear un lenguaje mediante el cual los hombres y las mujeres puedan conversar como _humanos_. En la práctica, toda conversación mixta conducida en un lenguaje unisex está dominada por los hombres. Véase Don H. Zimmermann y Candace West, “Sex Roles, Interruption and Silence in Conversation”, en M. A. Lowrie y N. F. Conklin, eds., _A Pluralistic Nation: The Language Issue in the United States_, Newbury House, Rowley, Mass., 1978; consúltese también C. West, “Against Our Will: Male Interruptions of Females in Cross-Sex Conversation”, en Orasanu, Slater y Adler, _op. cit_. en la nota 92, pp. 81-100; M. Swacker, “Women’s Verbal Behavior at Learned and Professional Conferences”, en Dubois y Crouch, eds., _op. cit_. en la nota 92, pp. 155-160; B. Eakins y G. Eakins, “Verbal Turn Taking and Exchanges in Faculty Dialogue”, _ibid_., pp. 53-62.
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+[^f95]: _El lenguaje de las mujeres_. La obra capital es: Otto Jespersen, _Language, It’s Nature, Development and Origin_, 1922 (traducción francesa, _Nature, évolution et origines du langage_, Payot, París, 1976, especialmente el capítulo 13: “Femmes”; véase también, de Jespersen, _The Philosophy of Grammar_, 1924 (traducción francesa: _La philosophie de la grammaire_, Éditions de Minuit, París, 1971). Ensayos representativos de la investigación: Antoine M. Badia Margarit, “Note sur le langage des femmes et la méthode d’enquête dialectologique (domaine aragonais)”, _Orbis_, 1, 1952, pp. 15-18; Karl Bouda, “Die tschuktschische Frauensprache”, _Orbis_, 2, 1953, pp. 33-34; Jacobus van Ginneken, “Mannen-en vrouwentaal”, _Onze Taaltuin_, 1934-1935, pp. 289-292 (sobre el empleo de los títulos o rangos en el dialecto de Drente, Holanda).
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+[^f96]: _Subordinación del habla femenina_. El estudio de la dominación ha producido algunas observaciones fundamentales sobre el género. Nancy Faires Conklin, “The Language of the Majority: Women and American English”, en Lowrie y Conklin, eds., _A Pluralistic Nation, op. cit_. en la nota 94, pp. 222-237, afirma que “en toda comunidad existen normas distintas para el comportamiento de los hombres y el de las mujeres, sin exceptuar el comportamiento lingüístico. Hasta hace poco, la visión clásica de las comunidades lingüísticas en cuanto grupos uniformes de hablantes ha encubierto el rol del género en las variaciones de la lengua. En ciertas culturas, los hombres y las mujeres poseen lenguajes sensiblemente distintos: palabras diferentes para nombrar las cosas, una sintaxis diferente. A primera vista el inglés parece diferenciarse poco en relación con el sexo, pero las diferencias, aunque más sutiles, también podrían calificarse de sistemáticas”. Paradójicamente, estas diferencias, que son obvias incluso para los niños, actualmente constituyen un campo de descubrimiento lingüístico. Pero la cuestión primordial está en cuáles son, en la lengua inglesa contemporánea, las diferencias que representan _restos sobrevivientes de formas de expresión relacionadas con el género_, y cuáles son _reflejos del sexismo en el lenguaje_ (nota 101). El género parece subsistir _sistemáticamente_ en el lenguaje, aunque se le impongan cada vez más las formas unisex —en las cuales es siempre el habla masculina la que tiene primacía—.
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+[^f97]: _El rol en el habla y el rol en la lengua_. En _Language and Sex, op. cit_. en la nota 92, Barrie Thorne hace hincapié en la influencia que en los estudios del lenguaje tiene la noción del _rol_. “Eufemísticamente, el término de ‘rol’ tiende a minimizar las diferencias de poder entre hombres y mujeres. Es significativo que la terminología de los roles, que tiende a implicar que se es ‘diferente pero igual’, no se emplea en relación con otras diferencias de poder: no hablamos de los roles raciales, o de los roles de clase … Es evidente que nos hace falta un vocabulario más exacto y más flexible para hablar de las diferencias sociales y culturales entre los sexos.” Este vocabulario técnico más exacto tendría que distinguir entre dos situaciones diferentes: el empleo del habla vernácula y el empleo de la lengua materna enseñada. En el primer caso, cada palabra tienen una resonancia diferente según cuál sea el género que habla. En el segundo caso, se emplea el mismo código del lenguaje inculcado; de manera característica, según el sexo social del género, masculino o femenino, que maneja el lenguaje. Y en el foro sin género de la lengua materna enseñada el habla del hombre siempre predomina.
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+[^f98]: _El habla del género_. J. J. Ottenheimer, “Culture and Contact and Musical Style: Ethno-musicology in the Comore Islands”, _Ethnomusicology_, 14, 1970, pp. 458-462, explora el hecho de que las mujeres cantan canciones distintas de las de los hombres, y Karl Haiding, “Das Erzählen bei der Arbeit and die Arbeitsgruppe als Ort des Erzählens”, en G. Heilfurth y I. Weber-Kellerman, eds., _Arbeit und Volksleben. Deutscher Volkskundekongress 1965 in Marburg_, Otto Schwartz, Gotinga, 1967, pp. 292-302, observa que tradicionalmente los hombres y las mujeres no cuentan las mismas cosas, los mismos chistes. Tienen sus temas de conversación respectivos. Véase Roy Miller, _Japanese Language_, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967, p. 289. Tal como lo muestra el mismo autor en “Levels of Speech _(keigo)_ and the Japanese Linguistic Response to Modernization”, en Donald H. Shively, ed., _Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture_, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1971, pp. 661-667, ambos poseen modos de expresión orales diferentes. Una compleja línea de demarcación separa el habla masculina del habla femenina, que se distinguen claramente por partículas pospuestas diferentes (femenino: _wa_; masculino: _za, ya_). Las mujeres emplean el prefijo honorífico _o-_ delante de palabras que los hombres pronuncian directamente; por ejemplo, las mujeres dicen _o-mizu_ para referirse al agua. Ciertas palabras que designan la misma cosa no tienen ninguna relación etimológica: para decir “delicioso” las mujeres usan _oishi_ y los hombres _umaï_. Véase Richard Bauman y Joel Sherzer, eds., _Exploration in the Ethnography of Speaking_, Cambridge University Press, Nueva York, 1975.
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+[^f99]: _El habla del género_. S. Harding, “Women and Words in a Spanish Village”, en R. Reiter, ed., _Toward an Anthropology of Women, op. cit_. en la nota 22, describe las estrategias que emplean las mujeres de una aldea española para participar en las conversaciones de los hombres, que habitualmente no las incluyen.
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+[^f100]: _El habla del género_. Elinor Keenan, “Norm Makers, Norm Breakers: Use of Speech by Men and Women in a Malagasy Community”, en Bauman y Sherzer, _op. cit_. en la nota 98, pp. 125-143.
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+[^f101]: _El habla del género_. La obra de Yvonne Verdier, _Façons de dire, façons de faire, op. cit_. en la nota 79 es un admirable modelo del enfoque adecuado para estudiar la complementariedad entre los modos de hablar de los géneros.
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+[^f102]: _El habla del género_. Mary R. Haas, “Men’s and Women’s Speech in Koasati”, Language, 20, núm. 3, 1944, pp. 141-149.
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+[^f103]: _Anastomosis_. Cuando hablo de la evolución, evito relacionarla con una teoría: darwiniana, lamarckiana, mendeliana, calificativos todos que al igual que “protestante” o “marxista” han perdido todo sentido. Aquí expongo la transformación que experimenta la cultura vernácula cuando se modifica la configuración del umbral entre los géneros, así como la del espacio-tiempo que ocupan sus ámbitos complementarios. Respecto a las dificultades de relacionar las modificaciones biológicas y las modificaciones culturales, véase Stephen Jay Gould, “‘The Ghost of Protagoras’: A Review of _The Evolution of Culture in Animals_, by John Tyler Bonner, and _Man, the Promising Primate_, by Peter J. Wilson”, _New York Review of Books_, enero 22, 1981, pp. 42-44. Sobre la historia del término “anastomosis” y la legitimidad de su empleo, véase el artículo correspondiente en _Trésor de la langue française, op. cit_. en la nota 3. Sobre la historiografía del “lamarckismo”, resulta útil la consulta de H. Graham Cannon, _Lamarck and Modern Genetics_, Greenwood, Manchester, 1975.
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+[^f104]: _Anastosomosis_. Una organización análoga de formas de la plástica mexicanas (en este caso, estatuillas de barro cocido), con sus vueltas y atajos, sus serpenteos y desdoblamientos, se encuentra en Eduardo Noguera, _La cerámica arqueológica de Mesoamérica_, UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Antropólogicas, México, 1975.
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+[^f105]: _Abandono del género: signo de plagas_. Muchas crónicas medievales señalan que uno de los principales signos de la llegada de una calamidad era el hecho de que se veía a los hombres realizar tareas de mujeres, y viceversa. La gravedad de tal cosa equivalía a lo que en los relatos de las hambrunas se contaba sobre los sobrevivientes que habían tenido que alimentarse con gatos, perros, ratas y raíces, cuando el hombre se había vuelto lobo del hombre. La desaparición de la línea divisoria de los géneros, la transformación de lo incomible en alimento y el surgimiento del individualismo económico son, tomados en conjunto, los signos del hundimiento de la sociedad y la aparición del régimen de la escasez. Es esto lo que describe, por haberlo observado en nuestros tiempos, Raymond Firth en _Social Change in Tikopia_, Macmillan, Nueva York, 1959. En una isla del Pacífico, la hambruna al principio refuerza la solidaridad entre las familias. Las reglas generales que gobiernan las culturas primitivas que Chayanov observó, y más recientemente, Marshall Sahlins en _Stone Age Economics_, Aldine, Chicago, 1972 (traducción francesa: _Âge de pierre, âge d’abondance_, Gallimard, París, 1976), permanecen intactas: al contrario de la escasez (nota 11), la _penuria_ estrecha los lazos sociales y refuerza la regla de que los alimentos solamente se pueden compartir, jamás intercambiar. En la primera etapa de la hambruna, las familias rivalizan más que nunca antes en su generosidad. En la segunda etapa aparecen los primeros signos de la hipocresía: la gente comienza a acumular los víveres en secreto, éstos no se comparten más que con los miembros de la familia. Y cuando inclusive esta repartición cesa, el tejido vernáculo se rompe: nace el _homo œconomicus_, el individuo envidioso. Hasta esta tercera etapa, el abandono del género es pasajero; más allá, el sexo triunfa sobre el género.
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+[^f106]: _Intrusión en el otro ámbito del género_. Véanse por ejemplo las obras citadas en la nota 70. Estas transgresiones individuales causadas por necesidades materiales deben distinguirse del descuido de los deberes del género que el _charivari_ (nota 80) castiga, y del traspaso deliberado de la frontera del género por motivos de “rango”. En ciertos lugares y ciertas épocas, cabalgar con los hombres hacía de una mujer una “dama”. Esta transgresión ocasional era más fácil para las élites (nota 72).
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+[^f107]: _Violación política de la frontera del género_. La violación es siempre un acto “político”. El caso aquí es muy diferente de la _pérdida_ individual del género; por ejemplo, el castigo que despoja a los guayaki de su género, registrado por Pierre Clastres (nota 69); del _abandono_ del género por causa de la guerra, de la hambruna, de la peste; del _derrumbamiento_ del género, que coincide con la desaparición de una cultura (nota 105); de la _intrusión_ ocasional en el ámbito opuesto (nota 106). Llamo “políticas” a aquellas infracciones que constituyen un asalto simbólico contra el orden establecido. Se pueden dividir en tres categorías: _1)_ la provocación: la de las mujeres bemba que abandonan colectivamente las chozas y los hijos, dejándolo todo al cuidado de los hombres a fin de escarmentarlos (véase Richards, nota 68); o incluso, en las estructuras patriarcales, las muchas maneras que las mujeres tienen de imitar, de mofarse y de humillar a los hombres a fin de volver a equilibrar el poder; al respecto se pueden encontrar buenos ejemplos en Natalie Zemon Davis, _Society and Culture in Early Modern France_, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, California, 1975, especialmente el capítulo 5: “Women on Top”, pp. 124-150. _2)_ El acto de ridiculizar la invasión de la cultura local por la civilización burguesa. En esto se ve una utilización política del travestismo que ocurre en los comienzos del desarrollo capitalista: hombres y mujeres, que recientemente han entrado a formar parte de la mano de obra industrial, intentan preservar su economía genérica mediante diversas formas de protesta simbólicas. _3)_ El tercer tipo de transgresión política no viola la frontera entre los géneros sino la división de los sexos. La pornografía, al menos desde Sade, y gran parte de las manifestaciones de los movimientos homosexuales y feministas parece entrar en esta categoría del travestismo. Hasta hace poco tiempo, el carnaval y sus travestismos duales servían para rememorar periódicamente la cesura entre la economía moral del pueblo y la invasión de la economía comercial. Para un ejemplo de nuestros tiempos, véase Gerald Sider, “Christmas Mumming and the New Year in Outport New-foundland”, _Past and Present_, 71, mayo, 1976, pp. 102-125.
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+[^f108]: _Función de la burla_. El estudio del travestismo en el carnaval muestra perfectamente que la burla ritual conserva _intacta_ la línea de separación de los géneros. Los chistes, los dichos, los proverbios y los acertijos tienen la misma función.
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+[^f109]: _El lenguaje del travestismo_. El lenguaje moderno amalgama el género y el sexo (véase la nota 7), creando así la imagen de individuos desprovistos de género que poseen una libido desprovista de género, y que durante su existencia escogen entre diversas formas características. En este lenguaje nuevo se habla del _transexual_, el individuo que cree ser del sexo opuesto al propio, y del _travestido_, quien obtiene satisfacción sexual al adoptar el vestido y/o el comportamiento del otro sexo. También se habla de las tendencias a adoptar formas de comportamiento unisex que disimulan frecuentemente un imaginario sexista o feminosexista inconsciente. Una historia de la transgresión, que debe describir los tipos mencionados en las notas 105 a 108, por lo general se ubica en la perspectiva del sexólogo social; su lenguaje, que ignora el género, parece por ende “natural”. Pero tal óptica necesariamente deforma la realidad y el sentido de los documentos que pretende interpretar. Respecto a la bibliografía, tan extensa como confusa, sobre el tema, véase Vern L. Bullough _et al., An Annotated Bibliography of Homosexuality_, 2 volúmenes, Garland, Nueva York, 1976, particularmente el volumen 1, pp. 37-67 (sobre la historia), y el volumen 2, pp. 351-384 (sobre el travestismo y el transexualismo); del mismo autor, “Transvestites in the Middle Ages”, _The American Journal of Sociology_, 79, núm. 6, 1974, pp. 1381-1394. Sobre la mujer travesti en la tradición cristiana, véase John Anson, “The Female Transvestite in Early Monasticism: The Origin and Development of a Motive”, _Viator_, 5, 1974, pp. 1-32; Marie Delcourt, “Le complexe de Diane dans l’hagiographie chrétienne”, _Revue de l’histoire des religions_, 153, 1958, pp. 1-33; Marina Warner, _Joan of Arc_, Knopf, Nueva York, 1981.
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+[^f110]: _La historia del heterosexual_. El término _homosexual_ figura en el _Oxford English Dictionary_; el término _heterosexual_ únicamente se encuentra en su suplemento. En inglés, los dos vocablos aparecen en 1890. En francés, la fecha de su aparición varía según las fuentes, pero también se puede ubicar a finales de ese siglo. Sin embargo hay que observar que el suplemento del _Nouveau Larousse illustré_, París, 1907, registra al homosexual pero no al heterosexual. En 1957, el _Wolfenden Report_, destinado al Parlamento Británico, claramente distinguía entre la propensión a la homosexualidad y el comportamiento homosexual. Ambos aspectos tienen su historia en las sociedades occidentales, y por primera vez fueron cuidadosamente distinguidos por D. S. Baily, _Homosexuality and the Christian Western Tradition_, Longman, Londres, 1955. Intentó diferenciarlos con claridad y precisión, hablando de “homosexualismo” para designar la conducta y de “homosexualidad” para el temperamento desviado. El descubrimiento histórico del homosexual como un tipo particular de ser humano fue expuesto en una obra reciente de John Boswell, _Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century_, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979. Para una respuesta crítica a su tesis, véase J. D. Adams, _Speculum_, 56, núm. 2, 1981, pp. 350-355; Peter Linehan, _The Times Literary Supplement_, enero 23, 1981, p. 73; Keith Thomas, _The New York Review of Books_, diciembre 4, 1980, pp. 26-29. Sobre la historia de la percepción de algunas mujeres como _lesbianas_, véase Lillian Faderman, _Surpassing the Love of Men: Romantic Friendship and Love between Women from the Renaissance to the Present_, Morrow, Nueva York, 1981, especialmente la bibliografía, pp. 417-480. Carrol Smith-Rosenberg, “The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations between Women in Nineteenth-Century America”, en N. Cott y E. Pleck, eds., _A Heritage of Her Own_, Simon and Schuster, Nueva York, 1979, piensa que entre las mujeres norteamericanas el contacto físico no se cristalizó como una forma aberrante de actividad sexual hasta finales del siglo XIX. Véase también _Frontiers: A Journal of Women’s Studies_, 4, núm. 3, 1979, número especial sobre la historia del lesbianismo. Paralelamente a esta historia del _desviado_, marcada por la exclusión, actualmente se tendría que escribir una historia del _humano normal_, del heterosexual. Mientras no se conozca mejor la ortopedia conceptual que antecede la construcción social del heterosexual, masculino o femenino, no se podrá comprender el carácter _económico_ de la pareja conyugal y de nuestra sociedad sujeta a la producción mercantil.
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+[^f111]: _Sodomía y herejía. Pecado_ contra Dios o _crimen_ entre los hombres, la sodomía sucesivamente se convierte en _herejía_ (separación del cuerpo de la Iglesia): una nueva actitud respecto a la desviación se hace patente. Hasta entonces, la herejía se relacionaba con la negación pública de una doctrina formulada por la Iglesia, o con el rechazo a cumplir con actos rituales prescritos por ésta. Con bastante frecuencia herejía y cisma (separación administrativa respecto a Roma) se confundían. La herejía era contraria a la ortodoxia católica, a la fe, a las creencias. Después el término progresivamente vino a designar una conducta contraria a los preceptos religiosos, al comportamiento estandardizado por la Iglesia. A partir de entonces, todo cristiano que observara sus usos y costumbres vernáculas, tradicionales, podía ser acusado de herejía si contradecía las normas de comportamiento de la Iglesia. Respecto a esta transformación de la herejía, véanse las actas de una conferencia: “Sénéfiance 5”, _Exclus et systèmes d’exclusion dans la littérature et la civilisation médiévales_, CUERMA; Aix-en-Provence, Champion, París, 1978, y V. Branca, _Studi sulle eresie del secolo XII, Studi Storici_, Roma, 5, 2a edición aumentada, 1975, pp. 293-327. Respecto al estado actual de la investigación sobre la participación de las mujeres en la herejía cátara del siglo XII, véase Richard Abels y Ellen Harrison, “The Participation of Women in Languedocian Catharism”, _Medieval Studies_, 41, 1979, pp. 215-251.
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+[^f112]: _Asistencia institucional_. John McKnight dice que la asistencia institucional es la “máscara del amor”. Para mí, la transformación de la solicitud cristiana de la “caridad” en asistencia pública es un caso histórico único. Una sociedad hiperproductora de mercancías necesariamente tiene que ser hiperproductora de asistencias. El ciudadano es necesario sobre todo como objeto de la asistencia que prodigan aquellos que se han adjudicado el monopolio radical de ésta (nota 9). En una sociedad así, la necesidad de la asistencia institucional es la base misma de las profesiones mutilantes (nota 60) y de la ayuda mutua “dirigida”. Bajo el régimen del sexo, la asistencia institucional sustituye al amor y al odio. Tal solicitud equivale al “amor” desprovisto de género. En la alta Edad Media, el cura es quien cuida a las almas (del latín _curare_, cuidar). El término aparece en la Iglesia de Occidente durante la reforma carolingia, para designar aquel a quien el obispo confía una parroquia; véase Maria Bidlingmaier, “Alkuin zwischen Antike und Mittelalter”, _Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie_, 81, 1959, pp. 306-350 y 405-453. En el Oriente cristiano, el sacerdote jamás se convirtió en cura: allí su tarea primordial seguía siendo la celebración de la Eucaristía, no la administración de los sacramentos. Al principio de la Edad Media, la impartición de bendiciones todavía dan mucho quehacer al cura occidental: A. Franz, _Die Kirchlichen Benediktionen im Mittelalter_, 2 volúmenes, Friburgo, 1909; H. Reifenberg, _Sakramente, Sakramentalien und Ritualien im Bistum Mainz seit dem Spätmittelalter: unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Diöizesen Würzburg und Bamberg_, Münster, 1971-1972. La evolución de la teología sacramental (una teología técnica), que se inicia en el siglo XI, corre paralelamente con la evolución de una actitud de apertura a otras técnicas nuevas; la Iglesia oriental ha resistido ambas tendencias. Por ejemplo, novedades mecánicas increíblemente complejas —el órgano y, en el campanario, el reloj— en Occidente se convirtieron en símbolos del nuevo rostro de la “iglesia del cura”; el Oriente por su lado las rechaza; véase Lynn White, Jr., “Cultural Climates and Technological Advances in the Middle Ages”, _Viator_, 2, 1971, pp. 171-201, y Ernst Benz, “I fondamenti cristiani della tecnica occidentale”, _Tecnica, Escatologia e Casistica_, Roma, 1964, pp. 47-88. A partir de entonces, el cura cuidará a sus ovejas bajo la égida de la técnica —prefiguración de múltiples asistencias institucionales modernas—. Sobre la transformación de las actitudes en relación con la técnica durante el segundo cuarto del siglo XII, en este volumen, _El trabajo fantasma_, en la nota 1, “La investigación convivencial”.
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+[^f113]: _Alma Mater_. El monopolio de la asistencia médica por los profesionales (nota 112) se da junto con la redefinición de la institución “tutelar”: la Madre Iglesia (el _Alma Mater_, la madre cuyos pechos prodigan leche). La noción de una institución universal en cuyo seno han de beber todos los que buscan la salvación se remonta a los primeros tiempos del cristianismo. Aparece por vez primera en los escritos de Marción el gnóstico, hacia el año 155. No obstante, ni la imaginería gnóstica ni el panteón pagano entran en la formación de esta idea; al respecto véase Joseph C. Plumpe, _Mater Ecclesia: An Inquiry into the Concept of the Church as Mother in Early Christianity_, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1943. Tampoco se puede vincular la noción al culto de la “diosa madre” de la Roma imperial, _ibid_., pp. 9-14, 28-32. En un principio, la Iglesia romana rechazó la identificación con esta imagen. No era la Iglesia, sino el amor cristiano lo que se definía como maternal, como un amor que engendraba una nueva vida. Pero al final del siglo III y en el siglo IV aparecen muchas referencias a la Iglesia “madre” en los textos de los Padres de la Iglesia: ésta es _fecunda, concipit, generat, parturit_, puede abortar, amamantar a quienes recoge en su seno; experimentar placer, exaltación, tristeza; llora y suspira. Los cristianos beben la leche de la fe de sus pechos. En el siglo v, los obispos tenían a su cargo la _educatio prolis_, la educación de los cristianos —el término _educatio_, en el latín clásico, es una función femenina únicamente—. Véase también Sebastian Tromp, “Ecclesia sponsa, virgo, mater”, en _Gregorianum_, 18, 1937, pp. 3-29. Respecto a la evolución posterior de la imagen, véase Karl Delahaye, _Ecclesia Mater chez les Pères des trois premiers siècles_, Cerf, París, 1964; en la introducción de esta obra, Yves Congar habla del cambio en la utilización de esta imagen de la madre durante la alta Edad Media. El término ya no se empleará para designar las características vivificadoras del amor mutuo entre los cristianos, sino que servirá para justificar jurídicamente la autoridad de la Iglesia institucional cuando ejerce el control sobre las fuentes de la vida. El cura es el guardián de los pechos de la Iglesia: así, la Iglesia se convierte en el modelo de una institución social descrita como una mujer cuyos favores sólo pueden obtenerse por mediación clerical. Ciertamente, en muchas culturas las diosas madres se simbolizan mediante estatuas, grutas, montañas y pozos. Ciertamente, la definición del hombre como niño abandonado es típicamente griega: E. Pöhlmann, “Der Mensch-das Mängelwesen? Zum Nachwirken antiker Anthropologie bei Arnold Gehlen”, _Archiv für Kulturgeschichte_, 52, 1970, pp. 297-312. La Antigüedad clásica describía a la naturaleza como una madrastra forzada por su mezquindad a adoptar la cultura. Pero la correlación en términos de lactación entre el profesionista dispensador de cuidados y la asistencia institucionalizada corresponde a la occidentalización de la cultura europea (nota 5).
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+[^f114]: _El pecado_. El sacramento de la penitencia que se administra en forma de una confesión secreta obligatoria y anual es una de las manifestaciones claras de la transición a una _sociedad de la asistencia institucional_. De la penitencia pública relacionada con los crímenes notorios se pasa a la confesión de los pecados secretos, y de esta manera la Iglesia se otorga el poder de reglamentar los comportamientos privados: Jean-Charles Payen, “La pénitence dans le contexte culturel des XIIe et XIIIe siècles”, _Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques_, 61, 1977, pp. 300 y ss. Dicta oficialmente leyes que gobiernan las relaciones sexuales: dónde, en qué momento, con qué frecuencia y en cuáles circunstancias deben tener lugar; cosas todas que hasta entonces habían sido determinadas por la honestidad local y circunscritas por el _pané_ o el _tabú_ heredados. Este conflicto entre la honestidad vernácula y la ley de la Iglesia fue particularmente bien registrado en diversos textos durante la cristianización de Islandia. Los misioneros llegaron allí con relativa tardanza, cuando las reglas de la Iglesia respecto a la cuestión ya habían cristalizado. Sobre la sustitución de la penitencia pública por la confesión privada, el estudio más sólido es el de Herbert Vorgrimmler, “Busse und Krankensalbung”, 4, fasc. 3, en _Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte_, Friburgo,1978, esp. pp. 89-112. Sobre los libros penitenciales de la época, la mejor obra sigue siendo la de J. Wasserschleben, _Die Bussordnung in der abendländischen Kirche_, 1851; reimpreso por Graz, ed., Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 1958. Las plegarias litúrgicas se decían en latín, pero la confesión se hacía obligatoriamente en lengua vernácula; véase H. Eggers, “Die altdeutschen Beichten”, _Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur_, 77, Niemeyer, Halle,1955, pp. 81, 89-123 y 1959, pp. 78-122. Véase también Jenny M. Jochens, “The Church and Sexuality in Medieval Iceland”, _Journal of Medieval History_, 6, 1980, pp. 377-392, y Elizabeth M. Makowski, “The Conjugal Debat and Medieval Canon Law”, _Journal of Medieval History_, 3, 1977, pp. 99-114. Los esfuerzos desplegados por la Iglesia para enseñar a los fieles a realizar su confesión anual pueden verse como un primer intento de inaugurar una educación individual, aunque universal, y un primer intento de proporcionar al fiel una prestación medica anual, absolutamente indispensable para la salvación de su alma. Los documentos de la época subrayan _medicina_. Esta asistencia “médica” que la Iglesia inauguraba transformó el lenguaje de los médicos; véase J. Agrimi y C. Crisciani, _Medicina del corpore, medicina dell’anima: Note sul sapere del medico fino all’inizio del secolo XIII_, Episteme, Milán, 1978.
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+[^f115]: _La conciencia_. Aquí, la conciencia es la interiorización por parte del ser humano de aquello que lo guía y juzga en la época en la que el tipo ideal es lo inverso del sentido de la honestidad vernácula que impone el género (nota 81). El llamado “proceso de civilización” se pone en marcha gracias a otro desarrollo, que se puede denominar de la “concientización”. Este término fue acuñado en Brasil para designar una especie de formación política de los adultos que buscaba que se responsabilizaran de sus propios asuntos, instrucción organizada principalmente por sacerdotes que popularizaron las categorías marxistas con el propósito de ayudar a los pobres a descubrir que son “humanos” (nota 4). Históricamente, el término sería apropiado para definir una empresa que la Iglesia configuró mediante la institucionalización del sacramento de la penitencia, una empresa que ha tenido una posteridad técnica variada. Yo denomino concientización a todos los rituales elaborados e impuestos con el fin de hacer interiorizar una idea religiosa o profana. La concientización consiste en la colonización y la estandardización de la honestidad y el honor vernáculos, mediante un conjunto de reglas institucionales “católicas” (es decir, universalmente humanas). Me atrevo a decir que en la alta Edad Media constituyó una perversión de la idea cristiana original de reforma. Los primeros cristianos veían en la reforma, en cuanto intento de renovación del mundo mediante la conversión personal, la vocación que los colocaba en un lugar aparte; véase al respecto Gerhart Ladner, _The Idea of Reform_, Gannon, Santa Fe, Nuevo México, 1970. Los cristianos daban al término _reforma_ un contenido enteramente nuevo; no era ni _1)_ la nostalgia de un paraíso perdido, ni _2)_ una utopía milenarista, ni _3)_ un “renacimiento” periódico que concordaba con el de la naturaleza. Estos tres sentidos eran conocidos en la Antigüedad, así como la salvación personal mediante la participación en los “misterios”, pero no se corresponden en absoluto con la idea cristiana de “reforma”. Ésta encontró una de sus expresiones concretas en las primeras prácticas penitenciales. Tales prácticas se reservaban para los hombres, conversos o hijos de conversos, que habían reincidido en formas de violencia que las conveniencias paganas podían haber exigido de ellos, pero que eran parte del mundo que habían prometido abandonar cuando recibieron el bautismo. Al aceptar públicamente un ritual penitencial, daban testimonio público de su reforma interior. En el confesonario la contrición íntima, secreta, y el compromiso de enmienda que la solicitud pastoral había comenzado a inculcar, remplazó a la declaración pública y precisa de las faltas. El “tribunal interno” requería una evaluación cuantitativa en el más allá. Sobre esta mutación cultural de la vida futura, véase Gilbert Chiffoleau, _La comptabilité de l’au-delà: Les hommes, la mort et la religion dans la région d’Avignon à la fin du Moyen Âge_, École Française de Rome, Roma, 1980; difusión en Francia: De Boc-card. Jacques Le Goff, _La Naissance du Purgatoire_, Gallimard, París, 1981, rememora el descubrimiento de un tercer criterio apropiado para este fin, situado entre el Paraíso y el Infierno, que visitaron en sueños ciertos individuos excepcionales (hacia 1220). Sobre la evolución de las representaciones pictóricas de los “tres pisos” del mundo medieval cristiano, véase J. Baltrusaitis, _Cosmographie chrétienne dans l’art du Moyen Âge_, Gazette des Beaux-Arts, París, 1939. La práctica de la confesión introdujo la distinción entre el pecado ( _culpa_, la falta) que conduciría al Infierno si no recibía el perdón sacramental del sacerdote, y el castigo de este pecado, que el perdón no modificaba. Este castigo mensurable de un pecado que ya se ha perdonado puede ser infligido por Dios en la forma de una enfermedad o de un desastre, o ser conmutado eclesiásticamente por la Iglesia mediante la participación en una cruzada, una peregrinación y, posteriormente, por donativos en efectivo. Desde finales del siglo XII, este castigo será experimentado en un nuevo lugar, el Purgatorio, en el caso de que no lo haya sido en el mundo. Así, la gente podía tener la conciencia purificada por la confesión y, al mismo tiempo, torturada por el temor perpetuo del castigo que aún habría de experimentar. Esta evolución separó un poco más todavía a la Iglesia occidental de la Iglesia griega ortodoxa, que rechazó la invención del purgatorio; véase Gilbert Dagron, “La perception d’une différence: les débuts de la querelle du Purgatoire”, _Actes du xe Congrès International d’Études Byzantines_, Atenas, 1979.
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+[^f116]: _La Madona_. La transformación de la Madre Iglesia, que pasa de ser símbolo del amor fértil a ser el símbolo del monopolio de la lactancia (nota 113), se duplica con la modificación de la imagen representativa de la devoción mariana: se pasa del icono de la _Theotokos_ (en griego: “quien engendra a Dios”) al ídolo de la Madona; de la inmensa mujer sobre un fondo de oro en el mosaico de la ábside, a la dama pintada “en perspectiva”. Esta transición simboliza la distancia que comienza a separar a Europa occidental del Oriente cristiano (véanse las notas 112 y 115). Al igual que los caminos recorridos por la “asistencia” (nota 112), la herejía (nota 111) y la conciencia (nota 115), esta transición a otra imagen de María nos permite seguir la pista de la “occidentalización” de Europa (nota 5). Sería un error asignar una fecha a estas transformaciones; no se producen en todas partes en el mismo momento. Son menos visible en los países protestantes que en los países católicos. Y sería ridículo decir que cualquiera de estas transformaciones representó dejar atrás un paraíso perdido, o que el siglo XII marca el fin de un periodo edénico; si centro mi interés en esta época es porque la conozco bien. Finalmente, hay que cuidarse de ver en la “dama” de los trovadores una versión renacentista de la Madona, o en la “feminidad victoriana” una versión profana. No hago estas advertencias sino para subrayar el interés de la obra de Marina Warner, _Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and the Cult of the Virgin Mary_, Knopf, Nueva York, 1976, que intenta leer la evolución de las actitudes relacionadas con el género en las representaciones de la Virgen. Marina Warner estudia principalmente las obras maestras del arte religioso. Un enfoque paralelo consistiría en estudiar las imágenes de María que provienen de la piedad popular (nota 117).
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+[^f117]: _La piedad popular_. El estudio de la piedad popular es distinto del estudio de la religión al que se dedican las ciencias religiosas. En esto se puede encontrar la misma diferencia que existe entre el estudio del habla genérica y el del lenguaje sexuado (nota 101). La piedad popular consiste en todas las oraciones y devociones, todos los rituales, todas las bendiciones y las canciones que expresan los sentimientos vernáculos y las actitudes vernáculas, y en todos y todas el género aparece. Mi guía en el estudio de la piedad popular, principalmente en Europa, ha sido Lenz Kriss-Rettenbeck, _Bilder und Zeichen religiösen Volksglaubens_, Callwey, Munich, 1977, y del mismo autor, en colaboración con Liselotte Hansmann, _Amulett und Talisman: Erscheinungsformen und Geschichte_, Callwey, Munich, 1976. El autor investiga la forma, el contenido y el significado de la piedad _(Frömmigkeit)_ interpretando los exvotos, los objetos piadosos _(Andachtsbilder)_, los gestos, los amuletos y los talismanes. Distingue cuidadosamente entre _piedad_ y _magia_ o _superstición_. La magia no es ni una forma antigua ni una parte de la religión o de la ciencia, y tampoco es importante en la devoción popular. Es un acto de dominación simbólico. La “superstición”, en el sentido medieval, no reside en las “estúpidas creencias de las viejas”, sino en el rechazo a servir a Dios y en el ingreso al campo de su enemigo, el Diablo. Sobre la transformación de la _realidad social de la superstición_, que de ser una perversión medieval de la religión se convierte en el siglo XVIII en una perversión del sentido común, véase Dieter Harmening, _Superstitio: Überlieferungs und theoriegeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur kirchlich-theologischen Aberglaubensliteratur des Mittelalters_, Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlín, 1979. La gran limpia gótica que vació las catedrales suscitó una extraña unión entre la superstición y la magia. Al teólogo y al filósofo del Renacimiento les fascinan la caza de las brujas. Esto por dos razones: _1)_ el fenómeno era de por sí nuevo; _2)_ la brujería y la nueva ciencia que la persigue tienen en común la conjugación de dos aspiraciones: poseer poderes e independizarse de Dios. En el contexto de mi argumento, la historia de la brujería y la de la ciencia contribuyen al estudio del sexo, mientras que al intentar comprender la piedad popular, es posible obtener una visión privilegiada del género. Para un estudio de la piedad popular, véase Raoul Manselli, “Simbolismo magia nell’Alto Medioevo”, en su obra _Simboli e simbologia nell’Alto Medioevo_, Sede del Centro, Espoleto, 1976, pp. 293-329, y _La religion populaire au Moyen Âge: Problèmes de méthode et d’histoire_, Vrin, París, 1975, así como J. Toussaert, _Le Sentiment religieux en Flandre à la fin du Moyen Âge_, Plon, París, 1963. Hay útiles referencias (especialmente sobre la penitencia y la contrición) en Jean-Charles Payen, _Le motif du repentir dans la littérature française médiévale, des origines à 1230_, Droz, Ginebra, 1968. Una obra monumental, con frecuencia irremplazable en el estudio de la devoción en el marco de la fe católica, es el _Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire_, Beauchesne, París, al que se dio inicio en 1932 gracias a la iniciativa de Marcel Viller y cuya publicación prosigue (ha llegado al volumen X, fasc. 67, 3, letra M, y acaso se terminará al final del siglo). Los vínculos entre el cura y la piedad de sus fieles se exponen con claridad en Etienne Delaruelle, _La piété populaire au Moyen Âge_, Bottega d’Erasmo, Turín, 1975. No pude utilizar dos obras muy recientes: M. Ménard, _Une histoire des mentalités religieuses aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles: Mille retables de l’ancien diocèse du Mans_, Beauchesne, París, 1981, y Marie-Hélène Froeschlé-Chopard, _La religion populaire en Provence orientale au XVIIIe siècle_, Beauchesne, París, 1980. Si estimo que es muy importante la investigación en torno a la piedad popular en el siglo XIX, es porque en este periodo los símbolos religiosos fueron utilizados por la Iglesia para bendecir una nueva visión del mundo, una visión sexuada. Esto es lo que muestra, por ejemplo, Gottfried Korff, en “Heiligenverehrung und soziale Frage: zur Ideologisierung der populären Frömmigkeit im spaten 19. Jh”, en G. Wiegelmann ed., _Kultureller Wandel im 19. Jh_., Van den Hoeck and Ruprecht, Gotinga, 1973, pp. 102-111, y también en, “Bemerkungen zum politischen Heiligenkult im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert”, en Günther Stephenson, ed., _Der Religionswandel unserer Zeit im Spiegel der Religionswissenschaft_, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1976, pp. 217-230. Puesto que la penetración de la ideología impuesta por la Iglesia en la religiosidad popular es un tema que me interesa, presidí la constitución de una colección de documentos sobre la piedad popular en América Latina desde 1820; esta colección, dirigida por Valentina Borremans, se encuentra actualmente en la biblioteca de El Colegio de México, Carretera Picacho-Ajusco, Bosques del Pedregal, México, D. F. Ha sido parcialmente registrada en microfilms por Inter Documentation Company, de Leiden (Holanda).
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+[^f118]: _El Diablo_. El estudio iconográfico del Diablo, de los demonios y de los zoomorfos es una manera de reconstituir la imagen de la mujer en la época: “Sénéfiance 6”, _Le Diable au Moyen Âge (doctrine, problèmes moraux, représentations_), coloquio, marzo de 1978, Aix-en-Provence; Champion, París, 1979. Sobre los animales sagrados y diabólicos, sigue siendo útil la obra de W. von Blankenburg, _Heilige und dämonische Tiere_, Koehler, Leipzig, 1942; véase también Dietrich Schmidtke, _Geistliche Tierinterpretationen in der deutschsprachigen Literatur des Mittelalters 1100-1500_, tesis, Berlín, 1968, especialmente pp. 208 y ss. Para la correlación entre las representaciones animales y la imaginería del periodo, véase J. Baltrusaitis, _Le Moyen Âge fantastique: Antiquités et exotismes dans l’art gothique_, Flammarion, París, 1981, nueva edición aumentada; 1a édition: 1955. Sobre la supervivencia de los dioses antiguos en la forma de demonios, véase M. Th. d’Alverny, “Survivance de la magie antique”, _Antike und Orient im Mittelalter_, Miscellanea Mediaevalia I, 1962, pp. 155-178 y, para la bibliografía sobre el tema, J. Seznec, _La survivance des dieux antiques_, Warburg Institute, Londres, 1940; véase también A. A. Barb, “The Survival of Magic Arts”, en Arnaldo Momigliano, ed., _The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century_, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, pp. 100-125. Sobre el “estatus social” de los animales, véase J. Vartier, _Les procès d’animaux du Moyen Âge à nos jours_, Hachette, París, 1970. En torno a la imagen medieval de la mujer, véase el número especial de _Cahiers de civilisation médiévale_, 20, 1977, especialmente Jean Verdon, “Les sources de l’histoire de la femme en Occident aux Xe et XIIIe siècles”, y Chiara Frugoni, “L’iconographie de la femme au cours des Xe-XIIe siècles”, pp. 177-187, cuya conclusión es de notar: “… la iconografía de la mujer es la iconografía de una ausencia”. Respecto a Eva, véase E. Guldan, _Eva und Maria: eine Antithese als Bildmotiv_, Böhlau, Colonia, 1966.
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+[^f119]: _La bruja_. La bruja, personaje histórico, aparece cuando las gárgolas abandonan las torres de las catedrales, y desaparece hacia el fin de la Ilustración; es típica del periodo del género dislocado (nota 120). La bruja conoce las hierbas, realiza abortos, puede ser maga o exorcista o adivina, o incluso, lo cual suele ser lo más frecuente, ser sólo una pobre anciana; pero ante todo su figura es el resumen de la mujer que protesta contra la pérdida del género vernáculo. No es la sacerdotisa de una divinidad local, ni la devota de un ídolo: está asociada al Diablo cristiano, que es tan católico como el Dios al que combate. Los compañeros de la bruja no son espíritus vernáculos que el agua bendita pasó por alto, sino los zoomorfos y los demonios asociados desde ese momento con Satanás. En todos los lugares donde el proceso civilizador se esfuerza en imponer una frontera sintética entre los géneros, aparece la bruja (y también el brujo). Robert Muchembled, _Culture populaire et culture des élites dans la France moderne, XVe-XVIIIe siècles_, Flammarion, París, 1978, muestra la relación entre la brujería y la represión de la subsistencia local por el Estado-nación que se está constituyendo. Jean Delumeau, _La peur en Occident, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles_, Fayard, París, 1968, estudia _quién_ temía _qué_ y _cuándo_, y las expresiones que asumía el temor en las comunidades. Es una nueva forma de temor que se generaliza conforme desaparecen las referencias de la experiencia constituidas por las fronteras del género y que exige símbolos abstractos, siendo _la_ mujer el más importante. La bruja es una reacción característica del género ante la desaparición de la subsistencia local; esto lo pude entrever por vez primera en la obra de Julio Caro Baroja, _Las brujas y su mundo_, Madrid, 1961, traducción francesa: _Les Sorcières et leur monde_, Gallimard, París, 1972.
+
+[^f120]: _La civilización del género dislocado_. Ludolf Kuchenbuch (véanse las notas 73 y 77) es mi guía en la cuestión de la civilización del género dislocado que dominó Occidente entre los siglos XI y XVIII. Designo así la segunda de las cuatro etapas de la formación de la pareja “sexuada” de nuestros tiempos, y la función económica de la pareja en el hogar. _1)_ Durante gran parte del periodo medieval, la unión conyugal no tiene como finalidad la creación de la pareja. El matrimonio con frecuencia tejía lazos complejos entre los miembros de ambas parentelas; entre sus posesiones, su estatus, su descendencia. Asumía una sorprendente variedad de formas; estimulaba la subsistencia y reforzaba la capacidad del campesino para resistir a las exigencias del rey o del señor. _2)_ En el siglo XI apareció un nuevo tipo de casamiento cuya finalidad inmediata era la creación de un vínculo entre los dos coproductores del tributo, cada cual de acuerdo con su género (nota 77). Pero el tributo pierde su género inclusive antes de que se pague en efectivo (nota 73). La Iglesia eleva el consentimiento mutuo al rango de sacramento, y la pareja se convierte en una institución sagrada. El proceso de la civilización (Norbert Elias, _Über den Prozess der Zivilisation_, Francfort, 1939, 2a ed., 1969; traducción francesa en dos volúmenes: _La civilisation des mœurs_, 1974; _La dynamique de l’Occident_, 1975, Calmann-Lévy, París), impuso progresivamente la unión conyugal a las capas sociales inferiores, remplazando las conveniencias sociales, como criterios del comportamiento del género, con las que el catolicismo impone. El _estado conyugal en el seno del género_ permitió al hogar europeo funcionar como una empresa económica única en la historia: _a)_ el género dislocado hacía a los hombres y a las mujeres más capaces de adaptarse a las técnicas nuevas, y por lo tanto de producir bienes eminentemente vendibles; _b)_ sin embargo la familia permanecía relativamente independiente del consumo de los productos mercantiles, puesto que su existencia seguía basada en la subsistencia intragenérica; _c)_ el hogar solo, sin el sólido apoyo de la aldea y de la parentela, no tenía la fuerza suficiente para resistir la expropiación de sus excedentes; la civilización del género dislocado termina en el intervalo protoindustrial (nota 125), que transforma a la pareja en: _3)_ una asociación económica desprovista de género entre un trabajador salariado y una trabajadora fantasma; por lo tanto, yo llamo a este tercer periodo la civilización del sexo económico. _4)_ No me atrevería a acuñar una denominación para el surgimiento actual de los pseudogéneros castrados, quienes tienen sus partidarios teóricos y sus detractores prácticos. Sobre la transición del género vernáculo al género dislocado, véanse las obras citadas en la nota 77; sobre la historia de la familia, véase la nota 121. Sobre la historia legal de la pareja en la civilización del género dislocado, véase sobre todo Gaudemet, _op. cit_ en la nota 77. Velma Bourgeois Richmond, “Pacience in Adversitee: Chaucer’s Presentation of Marriage”, _Viator_, 10, 1979, pp. 323-354, da una lista de los textos relacionados con las dificultades que encuentra el crítico o el escritor modernos cuando trata de decir cuáles eran, en la baja Edad Media, las actitudes ante el sexo, el amor, la reciprocidad de los sentimientos. John K. Yost, “The Traditional Western Concept of Marriage and the Family: Rediscovering Its Renaissance-Reformation Roots”, _Andover Newton Quarterly_, 20, 1980, pp. 169-180, y Alberto Tenenti, “Famille bourgeoise et idéologie au bas Moyen Âge”, en G. Duby y J. Le Goff, eds., _Famille et parenté dans l’Occident médiéval_, Actes du Colloque de Paris 1974, École Française de Rome, edición núm. 30, 1977, pp. 431-440, tratan ambos del descubrimiento de que, en la Florencia de Dante († 1321) y de Boccacio († 1375), el matrimonio podía concebirse como una empresa vitalicia iniciada por la pareja, empresa que tanto al noble como al campesino le tocaba en suerte —en cuanto al letrado, éste tenía que buscar un estado más propicio—. En los tiempos de Leonbattista Alberti (1404-1472), el ciudadano de Florencia se veía obligado a vivir en familia para ser respetado. La unidad aparente de un matrimonio era tan importante como lo es hoy en día la unidad aparente de una sociedad comercial, y por las mismas razones, observa Mary Carruthers en “The Wife of Bath and the Painting of Lions”, _Publications of the Modern Language Association_, 94, 1979, p. 212. Una mina de datos sobre las actitudes respecto a la pareja durante la primera mitad del siglo XVI es el _Heptamerón_, antología de relatos de Margarita d’Angoulême, reina de Navarra. Edward Benson la analiza en “Marriage Ancestral and Conjugal in the _Heptameron_”, _Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies_, 9, 2, 1975, pp. 261-275. En el siglo XVI las transformaciones de la vida económica permiten ganar mucho más al comerciante o al artesano que pueda contar con la ayuda directa de su esposa; por vez primera en la historia, las capacidades y los talentos del cónyuge tienen importancia económica para la pareja. Igualmente, el señor puede exigir un tributo mayor a la pareja campesina que colabora para “producir”. En el _Heptaméron_ es patente que de allí nace la discordia entre los sexos, que no podían saber que la pareja estaba en vías de convertirse en una unidad económica de producción.
+
+[^f121]: _La historia de la familia_. He tomado mucho de esta nueva disciplina para formular la distinción entre el género y el sexo. Para mí resultó fundamental la obra de Philippe Ariès, _L’enfant et la vie familiale sous l’Ancien Régime_, Plon, París, 1960; edición revisada y completada, Seuil, 1973. Ya no es posible hablar de la historia de la familia sin referirse a las ideas de Ariès, sea para criticarlas acremente, sea para deleitarse con ellas, como yo. Respecto a la forma en que fueron recibidas, véase Adrian Wilson, “The Infancy of the History of Childhood: An Appraisal of Philippe Ariès”, _History and Theory_, 19, núm. 1, 1980, pp. 137-153. Yo mismo jamás habría escrito _La sociedad desescolarizada_ (véase vol. I) ni la presente obra, si no hubiera sido por los trabajos de Ariès. Hasta la fecha, la mayoría de los estudios sobre la historia de la familia ignoran el género. Existe una buena orientación respecto a esta nueva disciplina en Michael Anderson, _Approaches to the History of the Western Family, 1500-1914_, Macmillan & Co., Economic History Society, Bristol, 1980. Esta obra esta dividida en tres capítulos, cada uno dedicado a una de las grandes corrientes que se han desarrollado en esta disciplina: _1)_ el estudio demográfico cuantitativo (edad de los esposos y diferencias de edad entre ellos etc.; esquemas de la natalidad y esquemas de la contracepción); _2)_ la evolución de las actitudes relacionadas con la vida doméstica, la vida privada, los sentimientos, el control de la comunidad sobre la familia, así como las diferentes formas de maternidad; _3)_ enfoques nuevos de la historia económica de la familia hasta los tiempos modernos. Como introducción general al tema, al principiante le recomiendo el libro de J.-L. Flandrin, _Familles_, _op. cit_. en la nota 84, donde el autor muy hábilmente correlaciona la demografía, el estudio de las mentalidades y los comportamientos, y la tipología de las estructuras familiares. Una de las mejores iniciaciones es también un número especial de _Annales ESC_, núm. 27, “Famille et société”, París, 1972. Respecto a la relación entre la demografía y las actitudes diferentes, según los niveles sociales, véanse las diversas contribuciones reunidas por C. Tilly, ed., _Historical Studies of Changing Fertility_, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1978. Hay dos notables estudios locales sobre la familia en el siglo XIX, tanto en Inglaterra, D. Levine, _Family Formation in an Age of Nascent Capitalism_, Academy Press, Chatsworth, 1977, como en los Estados Unidos, P. J. Greven, _Four Generations: Population, Land and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts_, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, Nueva York, 1970. Sobre la diversidad de formas familiares que pueden coexistir en una misma región, véase P. J. Greven, _The Protestant Temperament: Patterns of Childbearing, Religions Experience and the Self in Early America_, Knopf, Nueva York, 1977. El proceso mediante el cual la fábrica protoindustrial y el “mantenimieto del orden” convergen para suprimir la forma genérica de la pareja conyugal y remplazarla con el modelo de la polarización sexual de las funciones, es descrita por Jacques Donzelot, _La Police des famillas_, Éditions de Minuit, París, 1977. Sobre las consecuencias del trabajo de las mujeres (asalariado y fantasma), véanse las notas 31 y 48. Una buena bibliografía sobre la historia cultural y social del matrimonio: Natalie Zemon Davis, “La storia delle donne in trasizione: il caso europeo”, _Donnawomanfemme_, 3, 1977, pp. 7-33. También se puede citar al respecto: James Wallace Milden, _The Family in Past Time: A Guide to the Literature_, Garland, Nueva York, 1977, y Gerard Soliday, ed., _History of the Family and Kinship: A Select International Bibliography_, Kraus, Nueva York, 1980.
+
+[^f122]: _Capitalismo_. Hablo de economías “precapitalistas” y “capitalistas” a falta de mejores términos, pero sobre todo en el segundo caso con cierta reticencia. En torno al empleo de estos términos, véase especialmente Edwin Deschepper, “L’histoire du mot ‘capital’ et dérivés” (tesis sostenida en la Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1964), así como Edgar Salin, “Kapitalbegriff und Kapitallehre von der Antike bis zu den Physiokraten”, _Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte_, 23, 1930; consúltese también Jean Dubois, _Le vocabulaire politique et social en France de 1869 à 1872 à travers les oeuvres des écrivains, les revues et les journaux_, Larousse, París, 1963, así como el artículo mucho más sencillo de Bert Hoselitz, “Zur Begriffsgeschichte des Kapitalismus”, _Saeculum_, 18, 1967, pp. 146-163. La transformación social que recubre la oposición entre las sociedades precapitalistas y las sociedades capitalistas, de hecho coincide con la transición del régimen del género al régimen del sexo. Además, la distinción que en el seno del género establezco entre los modos de vida vernáculos y la era del género dislocado, me permite distinguir dos etapas sucesivas en la Europa precapitalista: la etapa de la subsistencia basada en la complementariedad del género vernáculo, en la que la producción mercantil juega un papel netamente secundario; y la etapa del género dislocado, en la que la mayor productividad, resultado del acoplamiento económico de los esposos, incrementa considerablemente la producción mercantil simple. Así, lo que se ha denominado la producción mercantil simple demuestra ser principalmente el excedente que puede derivarse del matrimonio en el seno del género (nota 77). En contraste, en la tercera etapa, la llamada capitalista, las mercancías son el producto de una sociedad que se apoya en un tipo de familia enteramente diferente; son el producto del trabajo económico, es decir, que ignora el género. Este trabajo se pudo imponer porque en la primera etapa de la industrialización la sujeción de la familia a las mercancías capitalistas la forzó a depender del empleo salariado; a finales del siglo XX, habrá de depender la mayor parte del trabajo fantasma (nota 30). El análisis del género me permite también añadir aún otra categoría, además de las dos que distingue Karl Polanyi en _Trade and Market in the Early Empire, op. cit_. en la nota 33, capítulo V, pp. 64-96, y en el ensayo “The Semantics of Money Use”, _Essays, op. cit_. en la nota 11, pp. 175-203. Polanyi establece una distinción entre el intercambio social (incluso el monetario) de los bienes y la venta de mercancías por los comerciantes. Respecto a la recepción de las categorías de Polanyi, véase Humphreys, _op. cit_. en la nota 5. Yo acepto esa distinción, sin relacionarla aquí con el género. Pero contrapongo la mercancía simple, “descubierta” por Aristóteles, a la mercancía capitalista, los bienes industriales o los servicios, pues la primera se origina en el género y la segunda no.
+
+[^f123]: _La revolución industrial_. Véase Fernand Braudel, _Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme_, _XVe–XVIIIe siècles_, 3 volúmenes, Armand Colin, París, 1967-1979, y _Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism_, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977. R. M. Hartwell, ed., _Causes of the Industrial Revolution in England_, Londres, 1967, expone con brevedad las grandes teorías históricas sobre las causas de la industrialización, así como las objeciones a cada una de ellas. Este inventario confirma el desconocimiento de la transformación, antropológicamente decisiva, que significó la desaparición del género vernáculo.
+
+[^f124]: _La desaparición del género rural_. Véase David Sabean, “Intensivierung der Arbeit und Alltagserfahrung auf dem Lande-ein Beispiel aus Württemberg”, _Sozialwissenschaftliche Informationen_, 6, 1977, pp. 148-152. Para una comparación con el siglo XVIII, pero en Francia: Alain Lottin, “Vie et mort du couple: difficultés conjugales et divorces dans le nord de la France aux XVIIeXVIIIe et siècle”, _Le XVIIe Siècle_, núm. 102-103: “Le XVIIe siècle et la famille”, 1974, pp. 59-78.
+
+[^f125]: _El intermedio protoindustrial_. Los especialistas de historia social emplean el término “protoindustrial” para designar los esquemas muy particulares de las culturas populares durante la transición de la producción mercantil simple al modo de producción capitalista en la Europa del siglo XIX; véase P. Kriedte, H. Medick, J. Schlumbohm, _Industrialisierung vor der Industrialisierung_, Van den Hoeck und Ruprecht, Gotinga, 1978, y especialmente Medick, pp. 90-154.
+
+[^t01]: En español en el original.
+
diff --git a/contents/book/gender/index b/contents/book/gender/index
index 3d734a1..aebd0fe 100644
--- a/contents/book/gender/index
+++ b/contents/book/gender/index
@@ -3,5 +3,3 @@
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diff --git a/contents/book/gender/index.md b/contents/book/gender/index.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d41e4a7..0000000
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+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d60f02e
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+++ b/contents/book/h20/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {H2O and the Waters of Forgetfulness},
+  year = {1985},
+  date = {1985},
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+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/h20:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/h20/en.md b/contents/book/h20/en.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42904a0
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@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
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+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {H20 y las Aguas del Pasado},
+  year = {1985},
+  date = {1985},
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b0dbdf
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+  title: "H20 y las Aguas del Pasado"
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diff --git a/contents/book/h20/index b/contents/book/h20/index
index 6840153..887dec1 100644
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index bb3f199..84937ce 100644
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-  author = {: Ivan Illich, Barrie Sanders},
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+  author = {Ivan Illich and Barrie Sanders},
+  title = {ABC: The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind},
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+}
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+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-awareness-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Celebration of Awareness},
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   date = {1969},
   origdate = {1969},
   language = {en},
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+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/awareness:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
+
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-church-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {The Church, Change and Development},
+  year = {1970},
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+  origdate = {1970},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/church:index},
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+}
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+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-conviviality-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Tools for Conviviality},
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+  origdate = {1973},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/conviviality:index},
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+}
+
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-deschooling-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Deschooling Society},
+  year = {1970},
+  date = {1970},
+  origdate = {1970},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
   translator = {},
-  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/abc:index}
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/deschooling:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
 }
 
diff --git a/contents/book/index.en.txt b/contents/book/index.en.txt
index 3cb286d..d1b898e 100644
--- a/contents/book/index.en.txt
+++ b/contents/book/index.en.txt
@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@
 
-* [[en:book:abc/:index|abc/ - ABC - The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind]]
+* [[en:book:abc/:index|1985 - ABC: The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind]] (*ABC - The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind*)
+* [[en:book:awareness/:index|1969 - Celebration of Awareness]]
+* [[en:book:church/:index|1970 - The Church, Change and Development]]
+* [[en:book:conviviality/:index|1973 - Tools for Conviviality]]
+* [[en:book:deschooling/:index|1970 - Deschooling Society]]
diff --git a/contents/book/index.es.bib b/contents/book/index.es.bib
index d1305be..aa7ad8d 100644
--- a/contents/book/index.es.bib
+++ b/contents/book/index.es.bib
@@ -1,11 +1,52 @@
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+}
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+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-awareness-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Alternativas},
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   date = {1969},
   origdate = {1969},
   language = {es},
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+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/awareness:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
+
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-conviviality-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {La convivencialidad},
+  year = {1973},
+  date = {1973},
+  origdate = {1973},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/conviviality:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
+
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-deschooling-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {La sociedad desescolarizada},
+  year = {1970},
+  date = {1970},
+  origdate = {1970},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
   translator = {},
-  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/abc:index}
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/deschooling:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
 }
 
diff --git a/contents/book/index.es.txt b/contents/book/index.es.txt
index 766a41c..3db6d59 100644
--- a/contents/book/index.es.txt
+++ b/contents/book/index.es.txt
@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
 
-* [[es:book:abc/:index|abc/ - ABC - La alfabetización de la Mente Popular]] (*ABC - The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind*)
+* [[es:book:abc/:index|1985 - ABC - La alfabetización de la Mente Popular]] (*ABC - The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind*)
+* [[es:book:awareness/:index|1969 - Alternativas]] (*Celebration of Awareness*)
+* [[es:book:conviviality/:index|1973 - La convivencialidad]] (*Tools for Conviviality*)
+* [[es:book:deschooling/:index|1970 - La sociedad desescolarizada]] (*Deschooling Society*)
diff --git a/contents/book/index.fr.bib b/contents/book/index.fr.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0358587
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/index.fr.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-conviviality-fr,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {La Convivialité},
+  year = {1973},
+  date = {1973},
+  origdate = {1973},
+  language = {fr},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/fr/book/conviviality:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-19}
+}
+
diff --git a/contents/book/index.fr.txt b/contents/book/index.fr.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d52dd0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/index.fr.txt
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+* [[fr:book:conviviality/:index|1973 - La Convivialité]] (*Tools for Conviviality*)
diff --git a/contents/book/index.txt b/contents/book/index.txt
index 3cb286d..8ed9883 100644
--- a/contents/book/index.txt
+++ b/contents/book/index.txt
@@ -1,2 +1,6 @@
 
-* [[en:book:abc/:index|abc/ - ABC - The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind]]
+* [[en:book:abc/:index|1985 - ABC - The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind]]
+* [[en:book:awareness/:index|1969 - Celebration of Awareness]]
+* [[en:book:church/:index|1970 - The Church, Change and Development]]
+* [[en:book:conviviality/:index|1973 - Tools for Conviviality]]
+* [[en:book:deschooling/:index|1970 - Deschooling Society]]
diff --git a/contents/book/medicine/en.bib b/contents/book/medicine/en.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2de2496
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/medicine/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-medicine-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Limits to Medicine - Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health},
+  year = {1976},
+  date = {1976},
+  origdate = {1976},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/medicine:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/medicine/en.md b/contents/book/medicine/en.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f78de71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/medicine/en.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+  title: "Limits to Medicine - Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1976"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
diff --git a/contents/book/medicine/es.bib b/contents/book/medicine/es.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d37356a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/medicine/es.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-medicine-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Némesis Médica},
+  year = {1976},
+  date = {1976},
+  origdate = {1976},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/medicine:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/medicine/es.md b/contents/book/medicine/es.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7ff552
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/medicine/es.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+  title: "Némesis Médica"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1976"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
diff --git a/contents/book/medicine/index b/contents/book/medicine/index
index 16701c3..ccfa25e 100644
--- a/contents/book/medicine/index
+++ b/contents/book/medicine/index
@@ -3,5 +3,3 @@
 * **#@LANG_publicationdate@#:** 1976
 * **#@LANG_comments@#:**
 * **#@LANG_langorig@#:** #@LANG_lang_en@#
-
-{{tag>pending}}
diff --git a/contents/book/mirror/en.bib b/contents/book/mirror/en.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7a0939
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/mirror/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-mirror-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {In the Mirror of the Past - Lectures and Addresses, 1978-1990},
+  year = {1992},
+  date = {1992},
+  origdate = {1992},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/mirror:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/mirror/en.md b/contents/book/mirror/en.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..402bd9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/mirror/en.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+  title: "In the Mirror of the Past - Lectures and Addresses, 1978-1990"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1992"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
diff --git a/contents/book/mirror/es.bib b/contents/book/mirror/es.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4164e6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/mirror/es.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-mirror-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {En el Espejo del Pasado - Conferencias y Discursos, 1978-1990},
+  year = {1992},
+  date = {1992},
+  origdate = {1992},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/mirror:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/mirror/es.md b/contents/book/mirror/es.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..409e597
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/mirror/es.md
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+  title: "En el Espejo del Pasado - Conferencias y Discursos, 1978-1990"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1992"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
diff --git a/contents/book/mirror/index b/contents/book/mirror/index
index c11dee6..61bfd19 100644
--- a/contents/book/mirror/index
+++ b/contents/book/mirror/index
@@ -3,6 +3,3 @@
 * **#@LANG_publicationdate@#:** 1992
 * **#@LANG_comments@#:**
 * **#@LANG_langorig@#:** #@LANG_lang_en@#
-
-
-{{tag>pending compilation}}
diff --git a/contents/book/mirror/tags b/contents/book/mirror/tags
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0f07e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/mirror/tags
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+compilation
diff --git a/contents/book/needs/en.bib b/contents/book/needs/en.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56b3d26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/needs/en.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-needs-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Toward a History of Needs},
+  year = {1977},
+  date = {1977},
+  origdate = {1977},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/needs:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/needs/en.md b/contents/book/needs/en.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0de0e38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/needs/en.md
@@ -0,0 +1,918 @@
+---
+  title: "Toward a History of Needs"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1977"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
+
+
+
+# Introduction
+
+The five essays in this volume reflect a decade's thinking on the industrial mode of production. During this period, I have focused on the processes through which growing dependence on mass-produced goods and services gradually erodes the conditions necessary for a convivial life. In examining a distinct area of economic growth, each essay demonstrates a general rule: Use-values are inevitably destroyed when the industrial mode of production achieves the predominance that I have termed "radical monopoly". These pieces describe how industrial growth produces the modernization of poverty.
+
+Modernized poverty appears when the intensity of market dependence reaches a certain threshold. Subjectively, it is the experience of frustrating affluence which occurs in persons mutilated by their overwhelming reliance on the riches of industrial productivity. Simply, it deprives those affected by it of their freedom and power to act autonomously, to live creatively; it confines them to survival through being plugged into market relations. And precisely because this new impotence is so deeply experienced, it is with difficulty expressed. We are the witnesses of a barely perceptible transformation in ordinary language by which verbs that formerly designated satisfying actions are replaced by nouns that denote packages designed for passive consumption only: for example, "to learn" becomes "acquisition of credits". A profound change in individual and social self-images is here reflected. And the layman is not the only one who has difficulty in accurately describing what he experiences. The professional economist is unable to recognize the poverty his conventional instruments fail to uncover.
+
+Nevertheless, the new mutant of impoverishment continues to spread. The peculiarly modern inability to use personal endowments, communal life, and environmental resources in an autonomous way infects every aspect of life where a professionally engineered commodity has succeeded in replacing a culturally shaped use-value. The opportunity to experience personal and social satisfaction outside the market is thus destroyed. I am poor, for instance, when the use-value of my feet is lost because I live in Los Angeles or work on the thirty-fifth floor.
+
+This new impotence-producing poverty must not be confused with the widening gap between the comsumption of rich and poor in a world where basic needs are increasingly shaped by industrial commodities. That gap is the form traditional poverty assumes in an industrial society, and the conventional terms of class struggle appropriately reveal and reduce it. I further distinguish modernized poverty from the burdensome price exacted by the externalities which increased levels of production spew into the environment. It is clear that these kinds of pollution, stress, and taxation are unequally imposed. Correspondingly, defenses against such depredations are unequally distributed. But like the new gaps in access, such inequities in social costs are aspects of industrialized poverty for which economic indicators and objective verification can be found. Such is not true for the industrialized impotence which affects both rich and poor. Where this kind of poverty reigns, life without addictive access to commodities is rendered either impossible or criminal. Making do without consumption becomes impossible, not just for the average consumer but even for the poor. All forms of welfare, from affirmative action to environmental action, are of no help. The liberty to design and craft one's own distinctive dwelling is abolished in favor of the bureaucratic provision of standardized housing, as in the United States, Cuba, or Sweden. The organization of employment, skills, building resources, rules, and credit favor shelter as a commodity rather than as an activity. Whether the product is provided by an entrepreneur or an apparatchik, the effective result is the same: citizen impotence, our specifically modern experience of poverty.
+
+Wherever the shadow of economic growth touches us, we are left useless unless employed on a job or engaged in consumption; the attempt to build a house or set a bone outside the control of certified specialists appears as anarchic conceit. We lose sight of our resources, lose control over the environmental conditions which make these resources applicable, lose taste for self-reliant coping with challenges from without and anxiety from within. Take childbirth in Mexico today: delivery without professional care has become unthinkable for those women whose husbands are regularly employed and therefore have access to social services, no matter how marginal or tenuous. They move in circles where the production of babies faithfully reflects the patterns of industrial outputs. Yet their sisters in the slums of the poor or the villages of the isolated still feel quite competent to give birth on their own mats, unaware that they face a modern indictment of criminal neglect toward their infants. But as professionally engineered delivery models reach these independent women, the desire, competence, and conditions for autonomous behavior are being destroyed.
+
+For advanced industrial society, the modernization of poverty means that people are helpless to recognize evidence unless it has been certified by a professional, be he a television weather commentator or an educator; that organic discomfort becomes intolerably threatening unless it has been medicalized into dependence on a therapist; that neighbors and friends are lost unless vehicles bridge the separating distance (created by the vehicles in the first place). In short, most of the time we find ourselves out of touch with our world, out of sight of those for whom we work, out of tune with what we feel.
+
+At the invitation of André Schiffrin, my United States publisher, I have selected five essays which review and develop my arguments on these themes. With their publication, I want to close ten years of teaching and writing about the counterproductive myth-making which is latent in all present-day industrial enterprises.
+
+The first essay is a postscript to my book _Tools for Conviviality_ (New York, 1973). It reflects the changes that have occurred during the past decade, both in economic reality and in my own perceptions of it. It assumes a rather large increase in the non-technical, ritual, and symbolic powers of our major technological and bureaucratic systems, and a corresponding decrease in their scientific, technical, and instrumental effectiveness. In 1968, it was still quite easy to dismiss organized lay resistance to professional dominance as nothing more than a throwback to romantic, obscurantist, or elitist fantasies. The grassroots, common-sense assessment of technological systems I then outlined seemed childish or retrograde to the political leaders of citizen activism, and to the "radical" professionals who laid claim to the tutorship of the poor by means of their special knowledge. The reorganization of industrial society around professionally defined needs, problems, and solutions was still the commonly accepted value implicit in ideological, political, and juridical systems otherwise clearly and sometimes violently opposed to one another.
+
+Now the picture has changed. Today, a hallmark of advanced and enlightened technical competence is a self-confident community, neighborhood, or group of citizens engaged in the systematic analysis and consequent ridicule of the "needs", "problems", and "solutions" defined for them by the agents of professional establishments. In the sixties, lay opposition to legislation based upon expert opinion still sounded like anti- scientific bigotry. Today, lay confidence in public policies based upon the expert's opinion is tenuous indeed. Thousands now reach their own judgments and, at great cost, engage in citizen action without any professional tutorship; they gain the scientific information they need through personal, independent effort. Sometimes risking limb, freedom, and respectability, they bear witness to a newly matured scientific attitude. They know, for example, that the quality and amount of technical evidence sufficiently conclusive to oppose atomic power plants, the multiplication of intensive-care units, compulsory education, fetal monitoring, psychosurgery, electroshock treatment, or genetic engineering is also simple and clear enough for the layman to grasp and utilize.
+
+Ten years ago, compulsory schooling was still protected by powerful taboos. Today, its defenders are almost exclusively either teachers whose jobs depend upon it or Marxist ideologues who defend professional knowledge-holders in a shadow battle against the hip-bourgeoisie. Ten years ago, the myths about the effectiveness of modem medical institutions were still unquestioned. Most economics textbooks accepted the belief that adult life expectancy was increasing, that treatment for cancer postponed death, that the availability of doctors resulted in higher infant-survival rates. Since then, people have "discovered" what vital statistics have always shown: that adult life expectancy has not changed in any socially significant way over the last few generations; that it is lower in most rich countries today than in our grandparents' time, and also lower there than in many poor nations. Ten years ago, universal access to postsecondary schooling, to adult education, to preventive medicine, to highways, to a wired global village, was still a prestigious goal. Today, the great myth-making rituals organized around education, transportation, health care, and urbanization have indeed been partly demystified. They have not yet, however, been disestablished.
+
+The second essay is the text of a speech I delivered for the Canadian Foreign Policy Association in 1969. It is a critique of the Pearson Report, a document intended to conclude the first so-called Development Decade and open the second. Herein I called attention to the exasperating impotence that is inflicted upon the poor in those countries which have benefitted most from the importation of the public utilities in which the rich take pride.
+
+The last three essays focus on the kind of social and political paralysis which cripples not just the poor but the vast majority in the industrialized nations. The production of modernized poverty in the shadow of economic expansion is described principally in the areas of transportation, education, and health care. It is from these sectors that I have learned much during this decade.
+
+Shadow prices and increased consumption gaps are important aspects of the new poverty, but my principal interest is directed toward a different concomitant of modernization: the process by which autonomy is undermined, satisfaction dulled, experience flattened out, and needs frustrated for nearly everyone. For example, I have examined the society-wide obstacles to mutual presence which are necessary side effects of energy-intensive transportation. I have wanted to define the power limits of motors equitably used to increase people's access to one another. I recognized, of course, that high speeds inevitably impose a skewed distribution of harriedness, noise, pollution, and enjoyment of privilege. But my emphasis is other than this. My arguments are focused on the negative internalities of modernity-time-consuming acceleration, sick-making health care, stupefying education. The unequal distribution of the ersatz benefits, or the unequal imposition of their negative externalities, are corollaries to my basic argument. In these essays, I am interested in the direct and specific effects of modernized poverty, in human tolerance for such effects, and in the possibility of escaping the new misery.
+
+During these last years I have found it necessary to examine again and again the correlation between the nature of tools and the meaning of justice that prevails in the society that uses them. I have had to observe the decline of freedom in societies where rights are shaped by expertise. I have had to weigh the trade-offs between new tools that enhance the production of commodities and those equally modern ones that permit the generation of values in use; between rights to mass-produced commodities and the level of liberty that permits satisfying and creative personal expression; between paid employment and useful unemployment. And in each dimension of the trade-off between heteronomous management and autonomous action, I find that the language that would permit us to insist on the latter must be recovered with difficulty. I am, like those I seek as my readers, so profoundly committed to a radically equitable access to goods, rights, and jobs that I find it almost unnecessary to insist on our struggle for this side of justice. I find it much more important, and difficult, to deal with its complement: the politics of conviviality. I use this term in the technical sense I gave to it in _Tools for Conviviality_: to designate the struggle for an equitable distribution of the liberty to generate use-values and for the instrumentation of this liberty through the assignment of an absolute priority to the production of those industrial and professional commodities that confer on the least advantaged the greatest power to generate values in use.
+
+New, convivial politics are based on the insight that in a modern society, both wealth and jobs can be equitably shared and enjoyed in liberty only when both are limited by a political process. Excessive forms of wealth and prolonged formal employment, no matter how well distributed, destroy the social, cultural, and environmental conditions for equal productive freedom. Bits and watts --which here stand for units of information and of energy, respectively-- when packaged into any mass-produced commodity in amounts that pass a threshold, inevitably constitute impoverishing wealth. Such wealth is either too rare to be shared or it is destructive of the freedom and liberty of the weakest. With each of these five essays, I have attempted to make a contribution to the political process by which the socially critical thresholds of enrichment are recognized by citizens and translated into society-wide ceilings or limits.
+
+
+
+# Useful Unemployment and its Professional Enemies
+
+_This essay on trade-offs between commodities and use-values in a modern society was written in 1977 and is published here for the first time. John McKnight and Lee Hoinacki have helped me to clarify my thought. I am also indebted here to the work of William Leiss, who, in_ The Limits to Satisfaction _(Toronto, 1976), deals with the correlation of modern needs and commodities._
+
+Fifty years ago, most of the words an American heard were personally spoken to him as an individual, or to somebody standing nearby. Only occasionally did words reach him as an undifferentiated member of a crowd--in the classroom or in church, at a rally or a circus. Words were mostly like handwritten, sealed letters and not like the junk that now pollutes our mails. Today, words that are directed to one person's attention have become rare. Engineered staples of images, ideas, feelings, and opinions, packaged and delivered through the media, assault our sensibilities with round-the-clock regularity. Two points now become evident: (1) what is occurring with language fits the pattern of an increasingly wide range of need-satisfaction relationships; (2) this replacement of convivial means by manipulative industrial ware is truly universal, and is relentlessly making the New York teacher, the Chinese commune member, the Bantu schoolboy, and the Brazilian sergeant alike. In this essay, a postscript to _Tools for Conviviality_, I shall do three things: (1) describe the character of a commodity/market-intensive society in which the very abundance of commodities paralyzes the autonomous creation of use-values; (2) insist on the hidden role that professions play in such a society by shaping its needs; and (3) expose some illusions and propose some strategies for breaking the professional power that perpetuates market dependence.
+
+
+## Disabling Market Intensity
+
+_Crisis_ has come to mean that moment when doctors, diplomats, bankers, and assorted social engineers take over and liberties are suspended. Like patients, nations go on the critical list. _Crisis_, the Greek term that has designated "choice" or "turning point" in all modern languages, now means "driver, step on the gas". Crisis now evokes an ominous but tractable threat against which money, manpower, and management can be rallied. Intensive care for the dying, bureaucratic tutelage for the victim of discrimination, fission for the energy glutton, are typical responses. Crisis, understood in this way, is always good for executives and commissars, especially those scavengers who live on the side effects of yesterday's growth: educators who live on society's alienation, doctors who prosper on the work and leisure that have destroyed health, politicians who thrive on the distribution of welfare which, in the first instance, was financed by those assisted. Crisis understood as a call for acceleration not only puts more power under the control of the driver, while squeezing the passengers more tightly into their safety belts; it also justifies the depredation of space, time, and resources for the sake of motorized wheels, and it does so to the detriment of people who want to use their feet.
+
+But crisis need not have this meaning. It need not imply a headlong rush for the escalation of management. Instead, it can mean the instant of choice, that marvelous moment when people suddenly become aware of their self-imposed cages and of the possibility of a different life. And this is the crisis that, as choice, confronts both the United States and the world today.
+
+### A World-wide Choice
+
+In only a few decades, the world has become an amalgam. Human responses to everyday occurrences have been standardized. Though languages and gods still appear to be different, people daily join the stupendous majority who march to the beat of the very same megamachine. The light switch by the door has replaced the dozens of ways in which fires, candles, and lanterns were formerly kindled. In ten years, the number of switch-users in the world has tripled; flush and paper have become essential conditions for the relief of the bowels. Light that does not flow from high-voltage networks and hygiene without tissue paper spell poverty for ever more people. Expectations grow, while hopeful trust in one's own competence and the concern for others rapidly decline.
+
+The now soporific, now raucous intrusion of the media reaches deeply into the commune, the village, the corporation, the school. The sounds made by the editors and announcers of programmed texts daily pervert the words of a spoken language into building blocks for packaged messages. Today, one must be either isolated and cut off or a carefully guarded, affluent dropout to allow one's children to play in an environment where they listen to people rather than to stars, speakers, or instructors. All over the world, one can see the rapid encroachment of the disciplined acquiescence that characterizes the audience, the client, the customer. The standardization of human action grows apace.
+
+It now becomes clear that most of the world's communities are facing exactly the same critical issue: people must either remain ciphers in the conditioned crowd that surges toward greater dependence (thus necessitating savage battles for a share of the drugs to feed their habit), or they must find the courage that alone saves in a panic: the courage to stand still and look around for another way out than the obvious marked exit. But many, when told that Bolivians, Canadians, and Hungarians all face the same fundamental choice, are not simply annoyed but deeply offended. The idea appears not only foolish but shocking. They fail to detect the sameness in the new bitter degradation that underlies the hunger of the Indian in the Altiplano, the neurosis of the worker in Amsterdam, and the cynical corruption of the bureaucrat in Warsaw.
+
+### Toward a Culture for Staples
+
+Development has had the same effect in all societies: everyone has been enmeshed in a new web of dependence on commodities that flow out of the same kind of machines, factories, clinics, television studios, think tanks. To satisfy this dependence, more of the same must be produced: standardized, engineered goods, designed for the future consumer who will be trained by the engineer's agent to need what he or she is offered. These products, be they tangible goods or intangible services, constitute the industrial staple. Their imputed monetary value as a commodity is determined by state and market in varying proportions. Thus different cultures become insipid residues of traditional styles of action, washed up in one world-wide wasteland: an arid terrain devastated by the machinery needed to produce and consume. On the banks of the Seine and those of the Niger, people have unlearned how to milk because the white stuff now comes from the grocer. (Thanks to more richly endowed consumer protection, it is less poisonous in France than in Mali.) True, more babies get cow's milk, but the breasts of both rich and poor dry up. The addicted consumer is born when the baby cries for the bottle: when the organism is trained to reach for milk from the grocer and to turn away from the breast that thus defaults. Autonomous and creative human action, required to make man's universe bloom, atrophies. Roofs of shingle or thatch, tile or slate, are displaced by concrete for the few and corrugated plastic for the many. Neither jungles, swamps, nor ideological biases have prevented the poor and the socialist from rushing onto the highways of the rich, the roads leading them into the world where economists replace priests. The mint stamps out all local treasures and idols. Money devalues what it cannot measure. The crisis, then, is the same for all: the choice of more or less dependence upon industrial commodities. _More_ will mean the rapid and complete destruction of cultures which are programs for satisfying subsistence activities. _Less_ will mean the variegated flowering of use-values in modern cultures of intense activity. For both rich and poor the choice is essentially the same, although hard to imagine for those already accustomed to living inside the supermarket --a structure different only in name from a ward for idiots.
+
+Present-day industrial society organizes life around commodities. Our market-intensive societies measure material progress by the increase in the volume and variety of commodities produced. And taking our cue from this sector, we measure social progress by the distribution of access to these commodities. Economics has been developed as propaganda for the takeover by large-scale commodity producers. Socialism has been debased to a struggle against handicapped distribution, and welfare economics has identified the public good with opulence --the humiliating opulence of the poor in United States hospitals, jails, or asylums.
+
+By disregarding all trade-offs to which no price tag is attached, industrial society has created an urban landscape that is unfit for people unless they devour each day their own weight in metals and fuels, a world in which the constant need for protection against the unwanted results of more things and more commands has generated new depths of discrimination, impotence, and frustration. The establishment-orientated ecological movement so far has further strengthened this trend: it has concentrated attention on faulty industrial technology and, at best, on exploitation of industrial production by private owners. It has questioned the depletion of natural resources, the inconvenience of pollution, and net transfers of power. But even when price tags are attached that reflect the environmental impact, the disvalue of nuisance, or the cost of polarization, we still do not clearly see that the division of labor, the multiplication of commodities, and dependence on them have forcibly substituted standardized packages for almost everything people formerly did or made on their own.
+
+For two decades now, about fifty languages have died each year; half of those still spoken in 1950 survive only as subjects for doctoral theses. And what distinct languages do remain to witness the incomparably different ways of seeing, using, and enjoying the world now sound more and more alike. Consciousness is everywhere colonized by imported labels. Yet even those who do worry about the loss of cultural and genetic variety, or about the multiplication of long-impact isotopes, do not advert to the irreversible depletion of skills, stories, and senses of form. And this progressive substitution of industrial goods and services for useful but nonmarketable values has been the shared goal of political factions and regimes otherwise violently opposed to one another.
+
+In this way, ever larger pieces of our lives are so transformed that life itself comes to depend almost exclusively on the consumption of commodities sold on the world market. The United States corrupts its farmers to provide grain to a regime which increasingly stakes its legitimacy on the ability to deliver even more grain. Of course, the two regimes allocate resources by different methods: here, by the wisdom of pricing; there, by the wisdom of planners. But the political opposition between proponents of alternate methods of allocation only masks the similar ruthless disregard of personal dignity and freedom by all factions and parties.
+
+Energy policy is a good example of the profound identity in the world-views of the self-styled socialist and the so-called capitalist supporters of the industrial system. Possibly excluding such places as Cambodia, about which I am uninformed, no governing elite nor any socialist opposition can conceive of a desirable future that would be based on per capita energy consumption of a magnitude inferior to that which now prevails in Europe. All existing political parties stress the need for energy- intensive production--albeit with Chinese discipline--while failing to comprehend that the corresponding society will further deny people the free use of their limbs. Here sedans and there buses push bicycles off the road. All governments stress an employment-intensive force of production, but are unwilling to recognize that jobs can also destroy the use-value of free time. They all stress a more objective and complete professional definition of people's needs, but are insensitive to the consequent expropriation of life.
+
+In the late Middle Ages the stupefying simplicity of the heliocentric model was used as an argument to discredit the new astronomy. Its elegance was interpreted as naivete. In our days, use-value-centered theories that analyze the social costs generated by established economics are certainly not rare. Such theories are being proposed by dozens of outsiders, who often identify them with radical technology, ecology, community lifestyles, smallness, or beauty. As an excuse to avoid looking at these theories, the frequent failure of their proponents' experiments in personal living is held against them and magnified. Just as the legendary inquisitor refused to look through Galileo's telescope, so most modern economists refuse to look at an analysis that might displace the conventional center of their economic system. The new analytical systems would force us to recognize the obvious: that the generation of nonmarketable use-values must inevitably occupy the center of any culture that provides a program for satisfactory life to a majority of its members. Cultures are programs for activities, not for firms. Industrial society destroys this center by polluting it with the measured output of corporations, public or private, degrading what people do or make on their own. As a consequence, societies have been transformed into huge zero-sum games, monolithic delivery systems in which every gain for one turns into a loss or burden for another, while true satisfaction is denied to both.
+
+On the way, innumerable sets of infrastructures in which people coped, played, ate, made friends, and made love have been destroyed. A couple of so-called development decades have sufficed to dismantle traditional patterns of culture from Manchuria to Montenegro. Prior to these years, such patterns permitted people to satisfy most of their needs in a subsistence mode. After these years, plastic had replaced pottery, carbonated beverages replaced water, Valium replaced camomile tea, and records replaced guitars. All through history, the best measure for bad times was the percentage of food eaten that had to be purchased. In good times, most families got most of their nutrition from what they grew or acquired in a network of gift relationships. Until late in the eighteenth century, more than 99 per cent of the world's food was produced inside the horizon that the consumer could see from the church steeple or minaret. Laws that tried to control the number of chickens and pigs within the city walls suggest that, except for a few large urban areas, more than half of all food eaten was also cultivated within the city. Before World War II, less than 4 per cent of all food eaten was transported into the region from abroad, and these imports were largely confined to the eleven cities which then contained more than two million inhabitants. Today, 40 per cent of all people survive only because they have access to interregional markets. A future in which the world market of capital and goods would be severely reduced is as much taboo today as a modern world in which active people would use modern convivial tools to create an abundance of use-values that liberated them from consumption. One can see in this pattern a reflection of the belief that useful activities by which people both express and satisfy their needs can be replaced indefinitely by standardized goods or services.
+
+### The Modernization of Poverty
+
+Beyond a certain threshold, the multiplication of commodities induces impotence, the incapacity to grow food, to sing, or to build. The toil and pleasure of the human condition become a faddish privilege restricted to some of the rich. When Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress, Acatzingo, like most Mexican villages of its size, had four groups of musicians who played for a drink and served the population of eight hundred. Today, records and radios, hooked up to loudspeakers, drown out local talent. Occasionally, in an act of nostalgia, a collection is taken up to bring a band of dropouts from the university to sing the old songs for some special holiday. On the day Venezuela legislated the right of each citizen to "housing", conceived of as a commodity, three-quarters of all families found that their self-built dwellings were thereby degraded to the status of hovels. Furthermore--and this is the rub--self-building was now prejudiced. No house could be legally started without the submission of an approved architect's plan. The useful refuse and junk of Caracas, up till then re-employed as excellent building materials, now created a problem of solid-waste disposal. The man who produces his own "housing" is looked down upon as a deviant who refuses to cooperate with the local pressure group for the delivery of mass-produced housing units. Also, innumerable regulations have appeared which brand his ingenuity as illegal or even criminal. This example illustrates how the poor are the first to suffer when a new kind of commodity castrates one of the traditional subsistence crafts. The useful unemployment of the jobless poor is sacrificed to the expansion of the labor market. "Housing" as a self-chosen activity, just like any other freedom for useful employment of time off the job, becomes the privilege of some deviant, often the idle rich.
+
+An addiction to paralyzing affluence, once it becomes ingrained in a culture, generates "modernized poverty". This is a form of disvalue necessarily associated with the proliferation of commodities. This rising disutility of industrial mass products has escaped the attention of economists, because it is not accessible to their measurements, and of social services, because it cannot be "operationalized". Economists have no effective means of including in their calculations the society-wide loss of a kind of satisfaction that has no market equivalent. Thus, one could today define economists as the members of a fraternity which only accepts people who, in the pursuit of their professional work, can practice a trained social blindness toward the most fundamental trade-off in contemporary systems, both East and West: the decline in the individual-personal ability to do or make which is the price of every additional degree of commodity affluence.
+
+The existence and nature of modernized poverty remained hidden, even in ordinary conversation, as long as it primarily affected the poor. As development, or modernization, reached the poor--those who until then had been able to survive in spite of being excluded from the market economy--they were systematically compelled to survive through buying into a purchasing system which, for them, always and necessarily meant getting the dregs of the market. Indians in Oaxaca who formerly had no access to schools are now drafted into school to "earn" certificates that measure precisely their inferiority relative to the urban population. Furthermore--and this is again the rub--without this piece of paper they can no longer enter even the building trades. Modernization of "needs" always adds new discrimination to poverty.
+
+Modernized poverty has now become the common experience of all except those who are so rich that they can drop out in luxury. As one facet of life after another becomes dependent on engineered supplies, few of us escape the recurrent experience of impotence. The average United States consumer is bombarded by a hundred advertisements per day and reacts to many of them--more often than not--in a negative way. Even well-heeled shoppers acquire, with each new commodity, a fresh experience of disutility. They suspect they have purchased something of doubtful value, perhaps soon to become useless or even dangerous, and something that calls for an array of even more expensive complements. Affluent shoppers organize: they usually begin with demands for quality control, and not infrequently generate consumer resistance. Across the tracks, slum neighborhoods "unplug" themselves from service and "care", from social work in South Chicago and from textbooks in Kentucky. Rich and poor are almost ready to recognize clearly a new form of frustrating wealth in the further expansion of a market-intensive culture. Also, the affluent come to sense their own plight as it is mirrored in the poor, though for the moment this intimation has not developed beyond a kind of romanticism.
+
+The ideology that identifies progress with affluence is not restricted to the rich countries. The same ideology degrades nonmarketable activities even in areas where, until recently, most needs were still met through a subsistence mode of life. For example, the Chinese--drawing inspiration from their own tradition--seemed willing and able to redefine technical progress, to opt for the bicycle over the jet plane. They seemed to stress local self-determination as a goal of inventive people rather than as a means for national defense. But by 1977, their propaganda was glorying in China's industrial capacity to deliver more health care, education, housing, and general welfare --at a lower cost. Merely tactical functions are provisionally assigned to the herbs in the bag of the barefoot doctor, and to labor-intensive production methods. Here, as in other areas of the world, heteronomous--that is, other-directed--production of goods, standardized for categories of anonymous consumers, fosters unrealistic and ultimately frustrating expectations. Furthermore, the process inevitably corrupts the trust of people in their own and their neighbors' ever surprising autonomous competences. China simply represents the latest example of the particular Western version of modernization through intensive market dependence seizing a traditional society as no cargo cult did even at its most irrational extreme.
+
+### The History of Needs
+
+In both traditional and modern societies, an important change has occurred in a very short period: the means for the satisfaction of needs have been radically altered. The motor has sapped the muscle; instruction has deadened self-confident curiosity. As a consequence, both needs and wants have acquired a character for which there is no historical precedent. For the first time, needs have become almost exclusively coterminous with commodities. As long as most people walked wherever they wanted to go, they felt restrained mainly when their _freedom_ was restricted. Now that they depend on transportation in order to move, they claim not a freedom but a _right_ to passenger miles. And as ever more vehicles provide ever more people with such "rights", the freedom to walk is degraded and eclipsed by the provision of these rights. For most people, wants follow suit. They cannot even imagine liberation from universal passengerhood, that is, the liberty of modern man in a modern world to move on his own.
+
+This situation, by now a rigid interdependence of needs and market, is legitimated through appeal to the expertise of an elite whose knowledge, by its very nature, cannot be shared. Economists of rightist as well as leftist persuasion vouch to the public that an increase in jobs depends on more energy; educators persuade the public that law, order, and productivity depend on more instruction; gynecologists claim that the quality of infantlife depends on their involvement in childbirth. Therefore, the near-universal extension of market intensity in the world's economies cannot be effectively questioned as long as the immunity of the elites that legitimate the nexus between commodity and satisfaction has not been destroyed. The point is well illustrated by a woman who told me about the birth of her third child. Having borne two children, she felt both competent and experienced. She was in the hospital and felt the child coming. She called the nurse, who, instead of helping, rushed for a sterile towel to press the baby's head back into the womb and ordered the mother to stop pushing because "Dr. Levy has not yet arrived".
+
+But this is the moment for public decision, for political action instead of professional management. Modern societies, rich or poor, can move in either of two opposite directions. They can produce a new bill of goods--albeit safer, less wasteful, more easily shared--and thereby further intensify their dependence on consumer staples. Or, they can take a totally new approach to the interrelationship between needs and satisfactions. In other words, societies can either retain their market-intensive; economies, changing only the design of the output, or they can reduce their dependence on commodities. The latter alternative entails the adventure of imagining and constructing new frameworks in which individuals and communities can develop a new kind of modern tool kit. This would be organized so as to permit people to shape and satisfy an expanding proportion of their needs directly and personally.
+
+The first direction represents a continuing identification of technical progress with the multiplication of commodities. The bureaucratic managers of egalitarian persuasion and the technocrats of welfare would converge in a call for austerity: to shift from goods, such as jets, that obviously cannot be shared, to so-called "social" equipment like buses; to distribute more equitably the decreasing hours of employment available and ruthlessly limit the typical work week to about twenty hours on the job; to draft the new resource of unemployed life-time into retraining or voluntary service on the model of Mao, Castro, or Kennedy. This new stage of industrial society, though socialist, effective, and rational, would simply usher in a new state of the culture that downgraded the satisfaction of wants into the repetitive relief of imputed needs through engineered staples. At its best, this alternative would produce goods and services in smaller quantities, distribute them more equitably, and foster less envy. The symbolic participation of people in deciding what ought to be made might be transferred from a buck in the market to a gawk in the political assembly. The environmental impact of production could be softened. Among commodities, services, especially the various forms of social control, would certainly grow much faster than the manufacture of goods. Huge sums are already being spent on the oracle industry so that government prophets can spew out "alternative" scenarios designed to shore up this first choice. Interestingly, many of them have already reached the conclusion that the cost of the social controls necessary to enforce austerity in an ecologically feasible but still industry-centered society would be intolerable.
+
+The second choice would ring down the curtain on absolute market dominance and foster an ethic of austerity for the sake of widespread satisfying action. If in the first alternative austerity would mean the individual's acceptance of managerial ukases for the sake of increased institutional productivity, austerity in the second alternative would mean that social virtue by which people recognize and decide limits on the maximum amount of instrumented power that anyone may claim, both for his own satisfaction and in the service of others. This convivial austerity inspires a society to protect personal use-value against disabling enrichment. Under such protection against disabling affluence many distinct cultures would arise, each modern and each emphasizing the dispersed use of modern tools. Convivial austerity so limits the use of any tool that tool ownership would lose much of its present power. If bicycles are owned here by the commune, there by the rider, nothing is changed about the essentially convivial nature of the bicycle as a tool. Such commodities would still be produced in large measure by industrial methods, but they would be seen and evaluated differently. Now, commodities are viewed mostly as staples that directly feed the needs shaped by their designers. In the second option, they would be valued either as raw materials or as tools that permitted people to generate use-values in maintaining the subsistence of their respective communities. But this choice depends, of course, on a Copernican revolution in our perception of values. At present, we see consumer goods and professional services at the center of our economic system, and specialists relate our needs exclusively to this center. In contrast, the social inversion contemplated here would assign use-values created and personally fostered by people themselves to the center. It is true that people have recently lost the confidence to shape their own desires. The world-wide discrimination against the autodidact has vitiated many people's confidence in determining their own goals and needs. But the same discrimination has also resulted in a multiplicity of growing minorities who are infuriated by this insidious dispossession.
+
+
+## Disabling Professions
+
+These minorities already see that they--and all autochthonous cultural life--are threatened by megatools which systematically expropriate the environmental conditions that foster individual and group autonomy. And so they quietly determine to fight for the usefulness of their bodies, memories, and skills. Because the rapidly increasing multiplication of imputed needs generates ever new kinds of dependence and ever new categories of modernized poverty, present-day industrial societies take on the character of interdependent conglomerates of bureaucratically stigmatized majorities. Among this great mass of citizens who are crippled by transport, rendered sleepless by schedules, poisoned by hormone therapy, silenced by loudspeakers, sickened by food, a few form minorities of organized and active citizens. Now these are barely beginning to grow and coalesce for public dissidence. Subjectively, these groups are ready to end an age. But to be dispatched, an age needs a name that sticks. I propose to call the mid-twentieth century the Age of Disabling Professions. I choose this designation because it commits those who use it. It exposes the antisocial functions performed by the least challenged providers--educators, physicians, social workers, and scientists. Simultaneously, it indicts the complacency of citizens who have submitted themselves to multifaceted bondage as clients. To speak about the power of disabling professions shames their victims into recognizing the conspiracy of the lifelong student, gynecological case, or consumer, each with his or her manager. By describing the sixties as an apogee of the problem-solver, one immediately exposes both the inflated conceit of our academic elites and the greedy gullibility of their victims.
+
+But this focus on the makers of the social imagination and the cultural values does more than expose and denounce; by designating the last twenty-five years as the Age of Dominant Professions, one also proposes a strategy. One sees the necessity of going beyond the expert redistribution of wasteful, irrational, and paralyzing commodities, the hallmafk of Radical Professionalism, the conventional wisdom of today's good guys. The strategy demands nothing less than the unmasking of the professional ethos. The credibility of the professional expert, be he scientist, therapist, or executive, is the Achilles' heel of the industrial system. Therefore, only those citizen initiatives and radical technologies that directly challenge the insinuating dominance of disabling professions open the way to freedom for nonhierarchical, community-based competence. The waning of the current professional ethos is a necessary condition for the emergence of a new relationship between needs, contemporary tools, and personal satisfaction. The first step toward this emergence is a skeptical and nondeferential posture of the citizen toward the professional expert. Social reconstruction begins with a doubt raised among citizens.
+
+When I propose the analysis of professional power as the key to social reconstruction, I am usually told that it is a dangerous error to select this phenomenon as the crux for recovery from the industrial system. Does not the shape of the educational, medical, and planning establishments actually reflect the distribution of power and privilege of a capitalist elite? Is it not irresponsible to undermine the trust of the man in the street in his scientifically trained teacher, physician, or economist precisely at the moment when the poor need these trained protectors to gain access to classroom, clinic, and expert assistance? Ought not the indictment of the industrial system to expose the income of stockholders in drug firms or the perquisites of power-brokers that belong to the new elites? Why spoil the mutual dependence of clients and professional providers, especially when increasingly--as in Cuba and the United States--both tend to come from the same social class? Is it not perverse to denigrate the very people who have painfully acquired the knowledge to recognize and service our needs for welfare? In fact, should not the radically socialist professional leaders be singled out as those most apt for the ongoing societal task of defining and meeting people's "real" needs in an egalitarian society?
+
+The arguments implicit in these questions are frequently advanced to disrupt and discredit public analysis of the disabling effects of industrial welfare systems which focus on services. Such effects are essentially identical and clearly inevitable, no matter what the political flag under which they are imposed. They incapacitate people's autonomy through forcing them--via legal, environmental, and social changes--to become consumers of care. These rhetorical questions represent a frantic defense of privilege on the part of those elites who might lose income but would certainly gain status and power if, in a new form of market-intensive economy, dependence on their services were rendered more equitable.
+
+A further objection to the critique of professional power drives out the devil with Beelzebub. This objection singles out as the key target for analysis the defense conglomerates seemingly at the center of each bureaucratic-industrial society. The developed argument then posits the security forces as the motor behind the contemporary universal regimentation into market- dependent discipline. It identifies as the principal need-makers the armed bureaucracies that have come into being since, under Louis XIV, Richelieu established the first professional police: that is, the professional agencies that are now in charge of weaponry, intelligence, and propaganda. Since Hiroshima, these so-called services appear to be the determinants for research, design production, and employment. They rest upon civilian foundations, such as schooling for discipline, consumer training for the enjoyment of waste, habituation to violent speeds, medical engineering for life in a world-wide shelter, and standardized dependence on rations dispensed by benevolent quartermasters. This line of thought sees state security as the generator of a society's production patterns, and views the civilian economy as, to a large extent, either the military's spin-off or its prerequisite.
+
+If an argument constructed around these notions were valid, how could such a society forgo atomic power, no matter how poisonous, oppressive, or counterproductive a further energy glut might be? How could a defense-ridden state be expected to tolerate the organization of disaffected citizen groups who unplug their neighborhoods from consumption to claim the liberty to small-scale use-value-intensive production that happens in an atmosphere of satisfying and joyful austerity? Would not a militarized society soon have to move against need-deserters, brand them as traitors, and, if possible, expose them not just to scorn but to ridicule? Would not a defense-driven society have to stamp out those examples that would lead to nonviolent modernity, just at the time when public policy calls for a decentralization of commodity production reminiscent of Mao and for more rational, equitable, and professionally supervised consumption?
+
+This argument pays undue credit to the military as the source of violence in an industrial state. The assumption that military requirements are to blame for the aggressiveness and destructiveness of advanced industrial society must be exposed as an illusion. No doubt, if it were true that the military had somehow usurped the industrial system, if it had wrenched the various spheres of social endeavor and action away from civilian control, then the present state of militarized politics would have reached a point of no return--at least, of no potential for civilian reform. This is in fact the argument made by the brightest of Brazil's military leaders, who see the armed forces as the only legitimate tutor of peaceful industrial pursuit during the rest of this century.
+
+But this is simply not so. The modern industrial state is not a product of the army. Rather, its army is one of the symptoms of its total and consistent orientation. True, the present industrial mode of organization can be traced to military antecedents in Napoleonic times. True, the compulsory education of peasant boys in the 1830s, the universal health care for the industrial proletariat in the 1850s, the growing communications networks in the 1860s, as well as most forms of industrial standardization, are all strategies first introduced into modern societies as military requirements and only later understood as dignified forms of peaceful, civilian progress. But the fact that systems of health, education, and welfare needed a military rationale to be enacted into law does not mean that they were not thoroughly consistent with the basic thrust of industrial development, which, in fact, was never nonviolent, peaceful, or respectful of people.
+
+Today, this insight is easier to gain. First, because since Polaris it is no longer possible to distinguish between wartime and peacetime armies, and second, because since the war on poverty peace is on the warpath. Today, industrial societies are constantly and totally mobilized; they are organized for constant public emergencies; they are shot through with variegated strategies in all sectors; the battlefields of health, education, welfare, and affirmative equality are strewn with victims and covered with ruins; citizens' liberties are continually suspended for campaigns against ever newly discovered evils; each year new frontier dwellers are discovered who must be protected against or cured of some new disease, some previously unknown ignorance. The basic needs that are shaped and imputed by all professional agencies are needs for defense against evils.
+
+Today's professors and social scientists who seek to blame the military for the destructiveness of commodity-intensive societies are people who, in a very clumsy way, are attempting to arrest the erosion of their own legitimacy. They claim that the military pushes the industrial system into its frustrating and destructive state, thereby distracting attention from the profoundly destructive nature of a market-intensive society which drives its citizens into today's wars. Both those who seek to protect professional autonomy against citizen maturity and those who wish to portray the professional as victim of the militarized state will be answered by a choice: the direction in which free citizens wish to go to supersede the world-wide crisis.
+
+### The Waning of the Professional Age
+
+The illusions that permitted the installation of professions as arbiters of needs are now increasingly visible to common sense. Procedures in the service sector are often understood for what they are--Linus blankets, or rituals that hide from the provider-consumer caboodle the disparity and antipathy between the ideal for the sake of which the service is rendered and the reality that the service creates. Schools that promise equal enlightenment generate unequally degrading meritocracy and lifelong dependence on further tutorship; vehicles compel everyone to a flight forward. But the public has not yet clarified the choices. Projects under professional leadership could result in compulsory political creeds (with their accompanying versions of a new fascism), or the experience of citizens could dismiss our hubris as yet another historical collection of neo-Promethean but essentially ephemeral follies. Informed choice requires that we examine the specific role of the professions in determining who in this age got what from whom and why.
+
+To see the present clearly, let us imagine the children who will soon play in the ruins of high schools, Hiltons, and hospitals. In these professional castles turned cathedrals, built to protect us against ignorance, discomfort, pain, and death, the children of tomorrow will re-enact in their play the delusions of our Age of Professions, as from ancient castles and cathedrals we reconstruct the crusades of knights against sin and the Turk in the Age of Faith. Children in their games will mingle the Uniquack which now pollutes our language with archaisms inherited from robber barons and cowboys. I see them addressing each other as chairman and secretary rather than as chief and lord. Of course, adults will blush when they slip into managerial pidgin with terms such as policy-making, social planning, and problem-solving.
+
+The Age of Professions will be remembered as the time when politics withered, when voters guided by professors entrusted to technocrats the power to legislate needs, the authority to decide who needed what, and a monopoly over the means by which those needs should be met. It will be remembered as the Age of Schooling, when people for one-third of their lives were trained to accumulate needs on prescription and for the other two-thirds were clients of prestigious pushers who managed their habits. It will be remembered as the age when recreational travel meant a packaged gawk at strangers, and intimacy meant training by Masters and Johnson; when formed opinion was a replay of last night's talk-show, and voting, an endorsement to a salesman for more of the same.
+
+Future students will be as much confused by the supposed differences between capitalist and socialist school, health-care, prison, or transportation systems as today's students are by the claimed differences between justification by works as opposed to justification by faith in the late Reformation Christian sects. They will also discover that the professional librarians, surgeons, or supermarket designers in poor or socialist countries toward the end of each decade came to keep the same records, use the same tools, and build the same spaces that their colleagues in rich countries had pioneered at the decade's beginning. Archaeologists will periodize our life-span not by potsherds but by professional fashions, reflected in the mod-trends of United Nations publications.
+
+It would be pretentious to predict whether this age, when needs were shaped by professional design, will be remembered with a smile or a curse. I hope, of course, that it will be remembered as the night when father went on a binge, dissipated the family fortune, and obligated his children to start anew. Sad to say, it will much more probably be remembered as the time when a whole generation's frenzied pursuit of impoverishing wealth rendered all freedoms alienable and, after first turning politics into the organized gripes of welfare recipients, extinguished it in expert totalitarianism.
+
+### Professional Dominance
+
+Let us first face the fact that the bodies of specialists that now dominate the creation, adjudication, and satisfaction of needs are a new kind of cartel. And this must be recognized in order to outflank their developing defenses. For we already see the new biocrat hiding behind the benevolent mask of the physician of old; the pedocrat's behavioral aggression is shrugged off as the overzealous, perhaps silly care of the concerned teacher; the personnel manager equipped with a psychological arsenal presents himself in the guise of an old-time foreman. The new specialists, who are usually servicers of human needs that their specialty has defined, tend to wear the mask of love and to provide some form of care. They are more deeply entrenched than a Byzantine bureaucracy, more international than a world church, more stable than any labor union, endowed with wider competencies than any shaman, and equipped with a tighter hold over those they claim than any mafia.
+
+The new organized specialists must, first, be carefully distinguished from racketeers. Educators, for instance, now tell society what must be learned and write off what has been learned outside school. By this kind of monopoly, which enables tyrannical professions to prevent you from shopping elsewhere and from making your own booze, they at first seem to fit the dictionary definition of gangsters. But gangsters, for their own profit, corner a basic necessity by controlling supplies. Educators and doctors and social workers today--as did priests and lawyers formerly--gain legal power to create the need that, by law, they alone will be allowed to serve. They turn the modern state into a holding corporation of enterprises that facilitate the operation of their self-certified competencies.
+
+Legalized control over work has taken many different forms: soldiers of fortune refused to fight until they got the license to plunder; Lysistrata organized female chattels to enforce peace by refusing sex; doctors in Cos conspired by oath to pass trade secrets only to their offspring; guilds set the curricula, prayers, tests, pilgrimages, and hazings through which Hans Sachs had to pass before he was permitted to shoe his fellow burghers. In capitalist countries, unions attempt to control who shall work what hours for what pay. All these trade associations are attempts by specialists to determine how their kind of work shall be done and by whom. But none of these specialists are professionals in the sense that doctors, for instance, are today. Today's domineering professionals, of whom physicians provide the most striking and painful example, go further: they decide what shall be made, for whom, and how it shall be administered. They claim special, incommunicable knowledge, not just about the way things are and are to be made, but also about the reasons why their services ought to be needed. Merchants sell you the goods they stock. Guildsmen guarantee quality. Some craftspeople tailor their product to your measure or fancy. Professionals, however, tell you what you need. They claim the power to prescribe. They not only advertise what is good but ordain what is right. Neither income, long training, delicate tasks, nor social standing is the mark of the professional. Their income can be low or taxed away, their training compressed into weeks instead of years; their status can approach that of the oldest profession. Rather, what counts is the professional's authority to define a person as client, to determine that person's need, and to hand that person a prescription which defines this new social role. Unlike the hookers of old, the modern professional is not one who sells what others give for free, but rather one who decides what ought to be sold and must not be given for free.
+
+There is a further distinction between professional power and that of other occupations: professional power springs from a different source. A guild, a union, or a gang forces respect for its interest and rights by a strike, blackmail, or overt violence. In contrast, a profession, like a priesthood, holds power by concession from an elite whose interests it props up. As a priesthood offers the way to salvation in the train of an anointed king, so a profession interprets, protects, and supplies a special this-worldly interest to the constituency of modem rulers. Professional power is a specialized form of the privilege to prescribe what is right for others and what they therefore need. It is the source of prestige and control within the industrial state. This kind of professional power could, of course, come into existence only in societies where elite membership itself is legitimated, if not acquired, by professional status: a societywhere governing elites are attributed a unique kind of objectivity in defining the moral status of a lack. It fits like a glove the age in which even access to parliament, the house of commons, is in fact limited to those who have acquired the title of master by accumulating knowledge stock in some college. Professional autonomy and license in defining the needs of society are the logical forms that oligarchy takes in a political culture that has replaced the means test by knowledge-stock certificates issued by schools. The professions' power over the work their members do is thus distinct in both scope and origin.
+
+### Toward Professional Tyranny
+
+Professional power has also, recently, so changed in degree that two animals of entirely different colors now go by the same name. For instance, the practicing and experimenting health scientist consistently evades critical analysis by dressing up in the clothes of yesterday's family doctor. The wandering physician became the medical doctor when he left commerce in drugs to the pharmacist and kept for himself the power to prescribe them. At that moment, he acquired a new kind of authority by uniting three roles in one person: the sapiential authority to advise, instruct, and direct; the moral authority that makes its acceptance not just useful but obligatory; and the charismatic authority that allows the physician to appeal to some supreme interest of his clients that outranks not only conscience but sometimes even the _raison d'état_. This kind of doctor, of course, still exists, but within a modem medical system he is a figure out of the past. A new kind of health scientist is now much more common. He increasingly deals more with cases than with persons; he deals with the breakdown that he can perceive in the case rather than with the complaint of the individual; he protects society's interest rather than the person's. The authorities that, during the liberal age, had coalesced in the individual practitioner in his treatment of a patient are now claimed by the professional corporation in the service of the state. This entity now carves out for itself a social mission.
+
+Only during the last twenty-five years has medicine turned from a liberal into a dominant profession by obtaining the power to indicate what constitutes a health need for people in general. Health specialists as a corporation have acquired the authority to determine what health care must be provided to society at large. It is no longer the individual professional who imputes a "need" to the individual client, but a corporate agency that imputes a need to entire classes of people and then claims the mandate to test the complete population in order to identify all who belong to the group of potential patients. And what happens in health care is thoroughly consistent with what goes on in other domains. New pundits constantly jump on the bandwagon of the therapeutic-care provider: educators, social workers, the military, town planners, judges, policemen, and their ilk have obviously made it. They enjoy wide autonomy in creating the diagnostic tools by which they then catch their clients for treatment. Dozens of other need-creators try: international bankers "diagnose" the ills of an African country and then induce it to swallow the prescribed treatment, even though the "patient" might die; security specialists evaluate the loyalty risk in a citizen and then extinguish his private sphere; dog-catchers sell themselves to the public as pest-controllers and claim a monopoly over the lives of stray dogs. The only way to prevent the escalation of needs is a fundamental, political exposure of those illusions that legitimate dominating professions.
+
+Many professions are so well established that they not only exercise tutelage over the citizen-become-client but also determine the shape of his world-become-ward. The language in which he perceives himself, his perception of rights and freedoms, and his awareness of needs all derive from professional hegemony.
+
+The difference between craftsman, liberal professional, and the new technocrat can be clarified by comparing their typical reactions to people who neglect their respective advice. If you did not take the craftsman's advice, you were a fool. If you did not take liberal counsel, society blamed you. Now the profession or the government may be blamed when you escape from the care that your lawyer, teacher, surgeon, or shrink has decided upon for you. Under the pretense of meeting needs better and on a more equitable basis, the service professional has mutated into a crusading philanthropist. The nutritionist prescribes the "right" formula for the infant and the psychiatrist the "right" antidepressant, and the schoolmaster--now acting with the fuller power of "educator"--feels entitled to push his method between you and anything you want to learn. Each new specialty in service production thrives only when the public has accepted and the law has endorsed a new perception of what ought not to exist. Schools expanded in a moralizing crusade against illiteracy, once illiteracy had been defined as an evil. Maternity wards mushroomed to do away with home births.
+
+Professionals claim a monopoly over the definition of deviance and the remedies needed. For example, lawyers assert that they alone have the competence and the legal right to provide assistance in divorce. If you devise a kit for do-it-yourself divorce, you find yourself in a double bind: if you are not a lawyer, you are liable for practicing without a license; if you are a member of the bar, you can be expelled for unprofessional behavior. Professionals also claim secret knowledge about human nature and its weaknesses, knowledge they are also mandated to apply. Gravediggers, for example, did not become members of a profession by calling themselves morticians, by obtaining college credentials, by raising their incomes, or by getting rid of the odor attached to their trade by electing one of themselves president of the Lion's Club. Morticians formed a profession, a dominant and disabling one, when they acquired the muscle to have the police stop your burial if you are not embalmed and boxed by them. In any area where a human need can be imagined, these new disabling professions claim that they are the exclusive wardens of the public good.
+
+### Professions as a New Clergy
+
+The transformation of a liberal profession into a dominant one is equivalent to the legal establishment of a church. Physicians transmogrified into biocrats, teachers into gnosocrats, morticians into thanatocrats, are much closer to state-supported clergies than to trade associations. The professional as teacher of the current brand of scientific orthodoxy acts as theologian. As moral entrepreneur, he acts the role of priest: he creates the need for his mediation. As crusading helper, he acts the part of the missionary and hunts down the underprivileged. As inquisitor, he outlaws the unorthodox--he imposes his solutions on the recalcitrant who refuse to recognize that they are a problem. This multifaceted investiture with the task of relieving a specific inconvenience of man's estate turns each profession into the analogue of an established cult. The public acceptance of domineering professions is thus essentially a political event. The new profession creates a new hierarchy, new clients and outcasts, and a new strain on the budget. But also, each new establishment of professional legitimacy means that the political tasks of lawmaking, judicial review, and executive power lose more of their proper character and independence. Public affairs pass from the layperson's elected peers into the hands of a self-accrediting elite.
+
+When medicine recently outgrew its liberal restraints, it invaded legislation by establishing public norms. Physicians had always determined what constituted disease; dominant medicine now detemiines what diseases society shall not tolerate. Medicine has invaded the courts. Physicians had always diagnosed who was sick; dominant medicine, however, brands those who must be treated. Liberal practitioners prescribed a cure; dominant medicine has public powers of correction: it decides what shall be done with or to the sick. In a democracy, the power to make laws, execute them, and achieve public justice must derive from the citizens themselves. This citizen control over the key powers has been restricted, weakened, and sometimes abolished by the rise of churchlike professions. Government by a congress that bases its decisions on expert opinions of such professions might be government for, but never by, the people. This is not the place to investigate the intent with which political rule was thus weakened; it is sufficient to indicate the professional disqualification of lay opinion as a necessary condition for this subversion.
+
+Citizen liberties are grounded in the rule that excludes hearsay from testimony on which public decisions are based. What people can see for themselves and interpret is the common ground for binding rules. Opinions, beliefs, inferences, or persuasions ought not to stand when in conflict with the eyewitness --ever. Expert elites could become dominant professions only by a piecemeal erosion and final reversal of this rule. In the legislature and courts, the rule against hearsay evidence is now, _de facto_, suspended in favor of the opinions proffered by the members of these self-accredited elites.
+
+But let us not confuse the public use of expert factual knowledge with a profession's corporate exercise of normative judgment. When a craftsman, such as a gunmaker, was called into court as an expert to reveal to the jury the secrets of his trade, he apprenticed the jury to his craft on the spot. He demonstrated visibly from which barrel the bullet had come. Today, most experts play a different role. The dominant professional provides jury or legislature with his fellow initiate's opinion rather than with factual evidence and a skill. He calls for a suspension of the hearsay rule and inevitably undermines the rule of law. Thus, democratic power is ineluctably abridged.
+
+### The Hegemony of Imputed Needs
+
+Professions could not have become dominant and disabling unless people had been ready to experience as a lack that which the expert imputed to them as a need. Their mutual dependence as tutor and charge has become resistant to analysis because it has been obscured by corrupted language. Good old words have been made into branding irons that claim wardship for experts over home, shop, store, and the space or ether between them. Language, the most fundamental of commons, is thus polluted by twisted strands of jargon, each under the control of another profession. The disseizin of words, the depletion of ordinary language and its degradation into bureaucratic terminology, parallel in a more intimately debasing manner that particular form of environmental degradation that dispossesses people of their usefulness unless they are gainfully employed. Possible changes in design, attitudes, and laws that would retrench professional dominance cannot be proposed unless we become more sensitive to the misnomers behind which this dominance hides.
+
+When I learned to speak, "problems" existed only in math or chess; "solutions" were saline or legal, and "need" was mainly used as a verb. The expressions "I have a problem" or "I have a need" both sounded silly. As I grew into my teens and Hitler worked at "solutions," the "social problem" also spread. "Problem" children of ever newer shades were discovered among the poor as social workers learned to brand their prey and to standardize their "needs." Need, used as a noun, became the fodder on which professions fattened into dominance. Poverty was modernized. Management translated poverty from an experience into a measure. The poor became the "needy."
+
+During the second half of my life, to be "needy" became respectable. Computable and imputable needs moved up the social ladder. It ceased to be a sign of poverty to have needs. Income opened new registers of need. Spock, Comfort, and the vulgarizers of Nader trained laymen to shop for solutions to problems they learned to cook up according to professional recipes. Education qualified graduates to climb to ever more rarefied heights and implant and cultivate there ever newer strains of hybridized needs. Prescriptions increased and competences shrank. In medicine, for example, ever more pharmacologically active drugs went on prescription, and people lost their will and ability to cope with indisposition or even discomfort. In American supermarkets, where it is estimated that about 1,500 new products appear each year, less than 20 per cent survive more than one year on the shelves, the remainder having proved unsellable, faddish, risky, or unprofitable, or obsolete competitors with new models. Therefore consumers are increasingly forced to seek guidance from professional consumer protectors.
+
+Furthermore, the rapid turnover of products renders wants shallow and plastic. Paradoxically, then, high aggregate consumption resulting from engineered needs fosters growing consumer indifference to specific, potentially felt wants. Increasingly, needs are created by the advertising slogan and by purchases made by order from the registrar, beautician, gynecologist, and dozens of other prescribing diagnosticians. The need to be formally taught how to need, be this by advertising, prescription, or guided discussion in the collective or in the commune, appears in any culture where decisions and actions are no longer the result of personal experience in satisfaction, and the adaptive consumer cannot but substitute learned for felt needs. As people become apt pupils in learning how to need, the ability to shape wants from experienced satisfaction becomes a rare competence of the very rich or the seriously undersupplied. As needs are broken down into ever smaller component parts, each managed by an appropriate specialist, the consumer experiences difficulty in integrating the separate offerings of his various tutors into a meaningful whole that could be desired with commitment and possessed with pleasure. The income managers, life-style counselors, consciousness-raisers, academic advisers, food-fad experts, sensitivity developers, and others like them clearly perceive the new possibilities for management and move in to match packaged commodities to the splintered needs.
+
+Used as a noun, "need" is the individual offprint of a professional pattern; it is a plastic-foam replica of the mold in which professionals cast their staple; it is the advertised shape of the brood cells out of which consumers are produced. To be ignorant or unconvinced of one's own needs has become the unforgivable antisocial act. The good citizen is one who imputes standardized needs to himself with such conviction that he drowns out any desire for alternatives, much less for the renunciation of needs.
+
+When I was born, before Stalin and Hitler and Roosevelt came to power, only the rich, hypochondriacs, and members of elite unions spoke of their need for medical care when their temperatures rose. Doctors then, in response, could not do much more than grandmothers had done. In medicine the first mutation of needs came with sulfa drugs and antibiotics. As the control of infections became a simple and effective routine, drugs went more and more on prescription. Assignment of the sick-role became a medical monopoly. The person who felt ill had to go to the clinic to be labeled with a disease name and to be legitimately declared a member of the minority of the so-called sick: people excused from work, entitled to help, put under doctor's orders, and enjoined to heal in order to become useful again. Paradoxically, as pharmacological technique--tests and drugs--became so predictable and cheap that one could have dispensed with the physician, society enacted laws and police regulations to restrict the free use of those procedures that science had simplified, and placed them on the prescription list.
+
+The second mutation of medical needs happened when the sick ceased to be a minority. Today, few people eschew doctors' orders for any length of time. In Italy, the United States, France, or Belgium, one out of every two citizens is being watched simultaneously by several health professionals who treat, advise, or at least observe him or her. The object of such specialized care is, more often than not, a condition of teeth, womb, emotions, blood pressure, or hormone levels that the patient himself does not feel. Patients are no more in the minority. Now, the minority are those deviants who somehow escape from any and all patient-roles. This minority is made up of the poor, the peasants, the recent immigrants, and sundry others who, sometimes on their own volition, have gone medically AWOL. Just twenty years ago, it was a sign of normal health--which was assumed to be good--to get along without a doctor. The same status of nonpatient is now indicative of poverty or dissidence. Even the status of the hypochondriac has changed. For the doctor in the forties, this was the label applied to the gate-crashers in his office--the designation reserved for the imaginary sick. Now, doctors refer to the minority who flee them by the same name: hypochondriacs are the imaginary healthy. To be plugged into a professional system as a lifelong client is no longer a stigma that sets apart the disabled person from citizens at large. We now live in a society organized for deviant majorities and their keepers. To be an active client of several professionals provides you with a well-defined place within the realm of consumers for the sake of whom our society functions. Thus, the transformation of medicine from a liberal consulting profession into a dominant, disabling profession has immeasurably increased the number of the needy.
+
+At this critical moment, imputed needs move into a third mutation. They coalesce into what the experts call a multidisciplinary problem necessitating, therefore, a multiprofessional solution. First, the proliferation of commodities, each tending to turn into a requirement, has effectively trained the consumer to need on command. Next, the progressive fragmentation of needs into ever smaller and unconnected parts has made the client dependent on professional judgment for the blending of his needs into a meaningful whole. The auto industry provides a good example. By the end of the sixties, the advertised optional equipment needed to make a basic Ford desirable had been multiplied immensely. But contrary to the customer's expectations, this "optional" flim-flam is in fact installed on the assembly line of the Detroit factory, and the shopper in Plains is left with a choice between a few packaged samples that are shipped at random: he can either buy the convertible that he wants but with the green seats he hates, or he can humor his girlfriend with leopard-skin seats at the cost of buying an unwanted paisley hardtop.
+
+Finally, the client is trained to need a team approach to receive what his guardians consider "satisfactory treatment." Personal services that improve the consumer illustrate the point. Therapeutic affluence has exhausted the available lifetime of many whom service professionals diagnose as standing in need of more. The intensity of the service economy has made the time needed for the consumption of pedagogical, medical, and social treatments increasingly scarce. Time scarcity may soon turn into the major obstacle to the consumption of prescribed, and often publicly financed, services. Signs of such scarcity become evident from one's early years. Already in kindergarten, the child is subjected to management by a team made up of such specialists as the allergist, speech pathologist, pediatrician, child psychologist, social worker, physical-education instructor, and teacher. By forming such a pedocratic team, many different professionals attempt to share the time that has become the major limiting factor to the imputation of further needs. For the adult, it is not the school but the workplace where the packaging of services focuses. The personnel manager, labor educator, in-service trainer, insurance planner, consciousness-raiser find it more profitable to share the worker's time than to compete for it. A need-less citizen would be highly suspicious. People are told that they need their jobs not so much for the money as for the services they get. The commons are extinguished and replaced by a new placenta built of funnels that deliver professional services. Life is paralyzed in permanent intensive care.
+
+
+## Enabling Distinctions
+
+The disabling of the citizen through professional dominance is completed through the power of illusion. Hopes of religious salvation are displaced by expectations that center on the state as supreme manager of professional services. Each of many special priesthoods claims competence to define public issues in terms of specific serviceable problems. The acceptance of this claim legitimates the docile recognition of imputed lacks on the part of the layman, whose world turns into an echo-chamber of needs. The satisfaction of self-defined preference is sacrificed to the fulfillment of educated needs. This dominance of engineered and managed needs is reflected in the skyline of the city: professional buildings look down on the crowds that shuttle between them in a continual pilgrimage to the new cathedrals of health, education, and welfare. Healthy homes are transformed into hygienic apartments where one cannot be born, cannot be sick, and cannot die decently. Not only are helpful neighbors a vanishing species, but also liberal doctors who make house calls. Workplaces fit for apprenticeship turn into opaque mazes of corridors that permit access only to functionaries equipped with "identities" in mica holders, pinned to their lapels. A world designed for service deliveries is the utopia of citizens turned into welfare recipients.
+
+The prevailing addiction to imputable needs on the part of the rich, and the paralyzing fascination with needs on the part of the poor, would indeed be irreversible if people actually fitted the calculus of needs. But this is not so. Beyond a certain level of intensity, medicine engenders helplessness and disease; education turns into the major generator of a disabling division of labor; fast transportation systems turn urbanized people for about one-sixth of their waking hours into passengers, and for an equal amount of time into members of the road gang that works to pay Ford, Exxon, and the highway department. The threshold at which medicine, education, and transportation turn into counterproductive tools has been reached in all the countries of the world with per capita incomes comparable at least to those prevalent in Cuba. In all countries examined, and contrary to the illusions propagated by the orthodoxies of both East and West, this specific counterproductivity bears no relation to the kind of school, vehicle, or health organization now used. It sets in when the capital intensity of the production process passes a critical threshold.
+
+Our major institutions have acquired the uncanny power to subvert the very purposes for which they were originally engineered and financed. Under the rule of our most prestigious professions, our institutional tools have as their principal product paradoxical counterproductivity--the systematic disabling of the citizenry. A city built around wheels becomes inappropriate for feet, and no increase of wheels can overcome the engineered immobility of such cripples. Autonomous action is paralyzed by a surfeit of commodities and treatments. But this does not represent simply a net loss of satisfactions that do not happen to fit into the industrial age. The impotence to produce use-values ultimately renders counterpurposive the very commodities meant to replace them. The car, the doctor, the school, and the manager are then commodities that have turned into destructive nuisances for the consumer, and retain net value only for the provider of services.
+
+Why are there no rebellions against the coalescence of late industrial society into one huge disabling service-delivery system? The chief explanation must be sought in the illusion-generating power that these same systems possess. Besides doing technical things to body and mind, professionally attended institutions function also as powerful rituals which generate credence in the things their managers promise. Besides teaching Johnny to read, schools also teach him that learning from teachers is "better" and that without compulsory schools, fewer books would be read by the poor. Besides providing locomotion, the bus just as much as the sedan reshapes the environment and puts walking out of step. Besides providing help in avoiding taxes, lawyers also convey the notion that laws solve problems. An ever-growing part of our major institutions' function is the cultivation and maintenance of three sets of illusions which turn the citizen into a client to be saved by experts.
+
+### Congestion versus Paralysis
+
+The first enslaving illusion is the idea that people are born to be consumers and that they can attain any of their goals by purchasing goods and services. This illusion is due to an educated blindness to the worth of use-values in the total economy. In none of the economic models serving as national guidelines is there a variable to account for nonmarketable use-values any more than there is a variable for nature's perennial contribution. Yet there is no economy that would not collapse immediately if use-value production contracted beyond a point; for example, if homemaking were done only for wages, or intercourse engaged in only at a fee. What people do or make but will not or cannot put up for sale is as immeasurable and as invaluable for the economy as the oxygen they breathe.
+
+The illusion that economic models can ignore use-values springs from the assumption that those activities which we designate by intransitive verbs can be indefinitely replaced by institutionally defined staples referred to as nouns: "education" substituted for "I learn," "health care" for "I heal," "transportation" for "I move," "television" for "I play."
+
+The confusion of personal and standardized values has spread throughout most domains. Under professional leadership, use-values are dissolved, rendered obsolete, and finally deprived of their distinctive nature. Love and institutional care become coterminous. Ten years of running a farm can be thrown into a pedagogical mixer and made equivalent to a high school degree. Things picked up at random and hatched in the freedom of the street are added as "educational experience" to things funneled into pupils' heads. The knowledge accountants seem unaware that the two activities, like oil and water, mix only as long as they are osterized by an educator's perception. Gangs of crusading need-creators could not continue to tax us, nor could they spend our resources on their tests, networks, and other nostrums, if we did not remain paralyzed by this kind of greedy belief.
+
+The usefulness of staples, or packaged commodities, is intrinsically limited by two boundaries that must not be confused. First, queues will sooner or later stop the operation of any system that produces needs faster than the corresponding commodity, and second, dependence on commodities will sooner or later so determine needs that the autonomous production of a functional analogue will be paralyzed. The usefulness of commodities is limited by _congestion_ and _paralysis_. Congestion and paralysis are both results of escalation in any sector of production, albeit results of a very different kind. Congestion, which is a measure of the degree to which staples get in their own way, explains why mass transportation by private car in Manhattan would be useless; it does not explain why people work hard to buy and insure cars that cannot move them. Even less does congestion alone explain why people become so dependent on vehicles that they are paralyzed and just cannot take to their feet.
+
+People become prisoners to time-consuming acceleration, stupefying education, and sick-making medicine because beyond a certain threshold of intensity, dependence on a bill of industrial and professional goods destroys human potential, and does so in a specific way. Only up to a point can commodities replace what people make or do on their own. Only within limits can exchange-values satisfactorily replace use-values. Beyond this point, further production serves the interests of the professional producer--who has imputed the need to the consumer--and leaves the consumer befuddled and giddy, albeit richer. Needs satisfied rather than merely fed must be determined to a significant degree by the pleasure that is derived from the remembrance of personal autonomous action. There are boundaries beyond which commodities cannot be multiplied without disabling their consumer for this self-affirmation in action.
+
+Packages alone inevitably frustrate the consumer when their delivery paralyzes him or her. The measure of well-being in a society is thus never an equation in which these two modes of production are matched; it is always a balance that results when use-values and commodities fruitfully mesh in synergy. Only up to a point can heteronomous production of a commodity enhance and complement the autonomous production of the corresponding personal purpose. Beyond this point, the synergy between the two modes of production paradoxically turns against the purpose for which both use-value and commodity were intended. Occasionally, this is not clearly seen because the mainstream ecology movement tends to obscure the point. For example, atomic-energy reactors have been widely criticized because their radiation is a threat, or because they foster technocratic controls. So far, however, only very few have dared to criticize them because they add to the energy glut. The paralysis of human action by socially destructive energy quanta has not yet been accepted as an argument for reducing the call for energy. Similarly, the inexorable limits to growth that are built into any service agency are still widely ignored. And yet it ought to be evident that the institutionalization of health care tends to make people into unhealthy marionettes, and that lifelong education fosters a culture of programmed people. Ecology will provide guidelines for a feasible form of modernity only when it is recognized that a man-made environment designed for commodities reduces personal aliveness to the point where the commodities themselves lose their value as means for personal satisfaction. Without this insight, industrial technology that was cleaner and less aggressive would be used for now-impossible levels of frustrating enrichment.
+
+It would be a mistake to attribute counterproductivity essentially to the negative externalities of economic growth, to exhaustion, pollution, and various forms of congestion. This leads us to confuse the congestion by which things get in their own way with the paralysis of the person who can no longer exercise his or her autonomy in an environment designed for things. The fundamental reason that market intensity leads to counterproductivity must be sought in the relationship between the monopoly of commodities and human needs. This monopoly extends further than what usually goes by the name. A commercial monopoly merely corners the market for one brand of whisky or car. An industry-wide cartel can restrict freedom further: it can corner all mass transportation in favor of internal combustion engines, as General Motors did when it purchased the Los Angeles trolleys. You can escape the first by sticking to rum and the second by purchasing a bicycle. I use the term "radical monopoly" to designate something else: the substitution of an industrial product or a professional service for a useful activity in which people engage or would like to engage. A radical monopoly paralyzes autonomous action in favor of professional deliveries. The more completely vehicles dislocate people, the more traffic managers will be needed and the more powerless people will be to walk home. This radical monopoly would accompany high-speed traffic even if motors were powered by sunshine and vehicles were spun of air. The longer each person is in the grip of education, the less time and inclination he has for browsing and exploration. At some point in every domain, the amount of goods delivered so degrades the environment for personal action that the possible synergy between use-values and commodities turns negative. Paradoxical, or specific, counterproductivity sets in. I will use this term whenever the impotence resulting from the substitution of a commodity for a value in use turns this very commodity into a disvalue in the pursuit of the satisfaction it was meant to provide.
+
+### Industrial versus Convivial Tools
+
+Man ceases to be recognizable as one of his kind when he can no longer shape his own needs by the more or less competent use of those tools his culture provides. Throughout history, most tools were labor-intensive means that could be employed to satisfy the user of the tool, and were used in domestic production. Only marginally were shovels or hammers used to produce pyramids or a surplus for gift-exchange, and even more rarely to produce things for the market. Occasions for the extraction of profits were limited. Most work was done to create use-values not destined for exchange. But technological progress has been consistently applied to develop a very different kind of tool: it has pressed the tool primarily into the production of marketable staples. At first, during the industrial revolution, the new technology reduced the worker on the job to a Charlie Chaplin in _Modern Times_. At this early stage, however, the industrial mode of production did not yet paralyze people when they were off the job. Now women or men who have come to depend almost entirely on deliveries of standardized fragments produced by tools operated by anonymous others have ceased to find the same direct satisfaction in the use of tools that stimulated the evolution of man and his cultures. Although their needs and their consumption have multiplied many times, their satisfaction in handling tools has become rare, and they have ceased to live a life for which their organism acquired its form. At best, they barely survive, even though they do so surrounded by glitter. Their life-span has become a chain of needs that have been met for the sake of ulterior striving for satisfaction. Ultimately man-the-passive-consumer loses even the ability to discriminate between living and survival. The gamble on insurance and the gleeful expectation of rations and therapies take the place of enjoyment. In such company, it becomes easy to forget that satisfaction and joy can result only as long as personal aliveness and engineered provisions are kept in balance while a goal is pursued.
+
+The delusion that tools in the service of market-oriented institutions can with impunity destroy the conditions for convivial and personally manageable means permits the extinction of "aliveness" by conceiving of technological progress as a kind of engineering product that licenses more professional domination. This delusion says that tools, in order to become more efficient in the pursuit of a specific purpose, inevitably become more complex and inscrutable: one thinks of cockpits and cranes. Therefore, it would seem that modern tools would require special operators who were highly trained and who alone could be securely trusted. Actually, just the opposite is usually true, and necessarily so. As techniques multiply and become more specific, their use often requires less complex judgments. They no longer require that trust on the part of the client on which the autonomy of the liberal professional and even that of the craftsman was built. However far medicine has advanced, only a tiny fraction of the total volume of demonstrably useful medical services necessitates advanced training in an intelligent person. From a social point of view, we ought to reserve the designation "technical progress" to instances in which new tools expand the capacity and the effectiveness of a wider range of people, especially when new tools permit more autonomous production of use-values.
+
+There is nothing inevitable about the expanding professional monopoly over new technology. The great inventions of the last hundred years, such as new metals, ball-bearings, some building materials, electronics, some tests and remedies, are capable of increasing the power of both the heteronomous and the autonomous modes of production. In fact, however, most new technology has not been incorporated into convivial equipment but into institutional packages and complexes. The professionals rather consistently have used industrial production to establish a radical monopoly by means of technology's obvious power to serve its manager. Counterproductivity due to the paralysis of use-value production is fostered by this notion of technological progress.
+
+There is no simple "technological imperative" which requires that ball-bearings be used in motorized vehicles or that electronics be used to control the brain. The institutions of high-speed traffic and of mental health are not the necessary result of ball-bearings or electronics. Their functions are determined by the needs they are supposed to serve--needs that are overwhelmingly imputed and reinforced by disabling professions. This is a point that the young Turks in the professions seem to overlook when they justify their institutional allegiance by presenting themselves as the publicly appointed ministers of technological progress that must be domesticated.
+
+The same subservience to the idea of progress conceives of engineering principally as a contribution to institutional effectiveness. Scientific research is highly financed, but only if it can be applied for military use or for further professional domination. Alloys which make bicycles both stronger and lighter are a fall-out of research designed to make jets faster and weapons deadlier. But the results of most research go solely into industrial tools, thus making already huge machines even more complex and inscrutable. Because of this bias on the part of scientists and engineers, a major trend is strengthened: needs for autonomous action are precluded, while those for the acquisition of commodities are multiplied. Convivial tools which facilitate the individual's enjoyment of use-values--without or with only minimal supervision by policemen, physicians, or inspectors--are polarized at two extremes: poor Asian workers and rich students and professors are the two kinds of people who ride bicycles. Perhaps without being conscious of their good fortune, both enjoy being free from this second illusion.
+
+Recently, some groups of professionals, government agencies, and international organizations have begun to explore, develop, and advocate small-scale, intermediate technology. These efforts might be interpreted as an attempt to avoid the more obvious vulgarities of a technological imperative. But most of the new technology designed for self-help in health care, education, or home building is only an alternative model of high-intensity dependence commodities. For example, experts are asked to design new medicine cabinets that allow people to follow the doctor's orders over the telephone. Women are taught to examine their breasts to provide work for the surgeon. Cubans are given paid leaves from work to erect their prefabricated houses. The enticing prestige of professional products as they become cheaper ends by making rich and poor more alike. Both Bolivians and Swedes feel equally backward, underprivileged, and exploited to the degree that they learn without the supervision of certified teachers, keep healthy with out the check-ups of a physician, and move about without a motorized crutch.
+
+### Liberties versus Rights
+
+The third disabling illusion looks to experts for limits to growth. Entire populations socialized to need on command are assumed ready to be told what they do not need. The same multinational agents that for a generation imposed an international standard of bookkeeping, deodorants, and energy consumption on rich and poor alike now sponsor the Club of Rome. Obediently, UNESCO gets into the act and trains experts in the regionalization of imputed needs. For their own imputed good, the rich are thereby programmed to pay for more costly professional dominance at home and to provide the poor with assigned needs of a cheaper and tighter brand. The brightest of the new professionals see clearly that growing scarcity pushes controls over needs ever upward. The central planning of output-optimal decentralization has become the most prestigious job of 1978. But what is not yet recognized is that this new illusory salvation by professionally decreed limits confuses liberties and rights.
+
+In each of the seven United Nations--defined world regions a new clergy is being trained to preach the appropriate style of austerity drafted by the new need-designers. Consciousness-raisers roam through local communities inciting people to meet the decentralized production goals that have been assigned to them. Milking the family goat was a liberty until more ruthless planning made it a duty to contribute the yield to the GNP.
+
+The synergy of autonomous and heteronomous production is reflected in society's balance of liberties and rights. Liberties protect use-values as rights protect the access to commodities. And just as commodities can extinguish the possibility of producing use-values and turn into impoverishing wealth, so the professional definition of rights can extinguish liberties and establish a tyranny that smothers people underneath their rights.
+
+The confusion is revealed with special clarity when one considers the experts on health. Health encompasses two aspects: liberties and rights. It designates the area of autonomy within which a person exercises control over his own biological states and over the conditions of his immediate environment. Simply stated, health is identical with the degree of lived freedom. Therefore, those concerned with the public good should work to guarantee the equitable distribution of health as freedom which, in turn, depends on environmental conditions that only organized political efforts can achieve. Beyond a certain level of intensity, professional health care, however equitably distributed, will smother health-as-freedom. In this fundamental sense, the care of health is a matter of well-protected liberty.
+
+As is evident, such a notion of health implies a principled commitment to inalienable freedoms. To understand this, one must distinguish clearly between civil liberty and civil rights. The liberty to act without restraint from government has a wider scope than the civil rights the state may enact to guarantee that people will have equal powers to obtain certain goods and services.
+
+Civil liberties ordinarily do not force others to act in accord with one's own wishes. I have the freedom to speak and publish my opinion, but no specific newspaper is obliged to print it, nor are fellow citizens required to read it. I am free to paint as I see beauty, but no museum has to buy my canvas. At the same time, however, the state as guarantor of liberty can and does enact laws that protect the equal rights without which its members would not enjoy their freedoms. Such rights give meaning and reality to equality, while liberties give possibility and shape to freedom. One certain way to extinguish the freedoms to speak, to learn, to heal, or to care is to delimit them by transmogrifying civil rights into civic duties. The precise character of this third illusion is to believe that the publicly sponsored pursuit of rights leads inevitably to the protection of liberties. In reality, as society gives professionals the legitimacy to define rights, citizen freedoms evaporate.
+
+
+## Equity in Useful Unemployment
+
+At present, every new need that is professionally certified translates sooner or later into a right. The political pressure for the enactment of each right generates new jobs and commodities. Each new commodity degrades an activity by which people so far have been able to cope on their own; each new job takes away legitimacy from work so far done by the unemployed. The power of professions to measure what shall be good, right, and done warps the desire, willingness, and ability of the "common" man to live within his means.
+
+As soon as all law students currently registered at United States law schools are graduated, the number of United States lawyers will increase by about 50 per cent. Judicare will complement Medicare, as legal insurance increasingly turns into the kind of necessity that medical insurance is now. When the right of the citizen to a lawyer has been established, settling the dispute in the pub will be branded unenlightened or antisocial, as home births are now. Already the right of each citizen of Detroit to live in a home that has been professionally wired turns the auto-electrician who installs his own plugs into a lawbreaker. The loss of one liberty after another to be useful when out of a job or outside professional control is the unnamed but also the most resented experience that comes with modernized poverty. By now the most significant privilege of high social status might well be some vestige of freedom for useful unemployment that is increasingly denied to the great majority. The insistence on the right to be taken care of and supplied has almost turned into the right of industries and professions to conquer clients, to supply them with their product, and by their deliveries to obliterate the environmental conditions that make unemployed activities useful. Thus, for the time being, the struggle for an equitable distribution of the time and the power to be useful to self and others outside employment or the draft has been effectively paralyzed. Work done off the paid job is looked down upon if not ignored. Autonomous activity threatens the employment level, generates deviance, and detracts from the GNP: therefore it is only improperly called "work." Labor no longer means effort or toil but the mysterious mate wedded to productive investments in plant. Work no longer means the creation of a value perceived by the worker but mainly a job, which is a social relationship. Unemployment means sad idleness, rather than the freedom to do things that are useful for oneself or for one's neighbor. An active woman who runs a house and brings up children and takes in those of others is distinguished from a woman who _works_, no matter how useless or damaging the product of this work might be. Activity, effort, achievement, or service outside a hierarchical relationship and unmeasured by professional standards threatens a commodity-intensive society. The generation of use-values that escape effective measurement limits not only the need for more commodities but also the jobs that create them and the paychecks needed to buy them.
+
+What counts in a market-intensive society is not the effort to please or the pleasure that flows from that effort but the coupling of the labor force with capital. What counts is not the achievement of satisfaction that flows from action but the status of the social relationship that commands production--that is, the job, situation, post, or appointment. In the Middle Ages there was no salvation outside the Church, and theologians had a hard time explaining what God did with those pagans who were visibly virtuous or saintly. Similarly, in contemporary society effort is not productive unless it is done at the behest of a boss, and economists have a hard time dealing with the obvious usefulness of people when they are outside the corporate control of a corporation, volunteer agency, or labor camp. Work is productive, respectable, worthy of the citizen only when the work process is planned, monitored, and controlled by a professional agent, who ensures that the work meets a certified need in a standardized fashion. In an advanced industrial society it becomes almost impossible to seek, or even to imagine, unemployment as a condition for autonomous, useful work. The infrastructure of society is so arranged that only the job gives access to the tools of production, and this monopoly of commodity production over the generation of use-values turns even more stringent as the state takes over. Only with a license may you teach a child; only at a clinic may you set a broken bone. Housework, handicrafts, subsistence agriculture, radical technology, learning exchanges, and the like are degraded into activities for the idle, the unproductive, the very poor, or the very rich. A society that fosters intense dependence on commodities thus turns its unemployed into either its poor or its dependents. In 1945, for each American social security recipient there were still 35 workers on the job. In 1977, 3.2 employed workers have to support one such retiree, who is himself dependent on many more services than his retired grandfather could have imagined.
+
+Henceforth, the quality of a society and of its culture will depend on the status of its unemployed: will they be the most representative productive citizens, or will they be dependents? The choice or crisis again seems clear: advanced industrial society can degenerate into a holding operation harking back to the dream of the sixties: into a well-rationed distribution system that doles out decreasing commodities and jobs and trains its citizens for more standardized consumption and more powerless work. This is the attitude reflected in the policy proposals of most governments at present, from Germany to China, albeit with a fundamental difference in degree: the richer the country, the more urgent it seems to ration access to jobs and to impede useful unemployment that would threaten the volume of the labor market. The inverse, of course, is equally possible: a modem society in which frustrated workers organize to protect the freedom of people to be useful outside the activities that result in the production of commodities. But again, this social alternative depends on a new, rational, and cynical competence of the common man when faced with the professional imputation of needs.
+
+
+## Outflanking the New Professional
+
+Today, professional power is clearly threatened by increasing evidence of the counterproductivity of its output. People are beginning to see that such hegemony deprives them of their right to politics. The symbolic power of experts which, while defining needs, eviscerates personal competence is now seen to be more perilous than their technical capability, which is confined to servicing the needs they create. Simultaneously, one hears the repeated call for the enactment of legislation that might lead us beyond an age dominated by the professional ethos: the demand that professional and bureaucratic licensing be replaced by the investiture of elected citizens, rather than altered by the inclusion of consumer representatives on licensing boards; the demand that prescription rules in pharmacies, school curricula, and other pretentious supermarkets be relaxed; the demand for the protection of _productive_ liberties; the demand for the right to practice without a license; the demand for public utilities that facilitate client evaluation of all practitioners who work for money. In response to these threats, the major professional establishments, each in its own way, use three fundamental strategies to shore up the erosion of their legitimacy and power.
+
+### The Self-critical Hooker
+
+The first approach is represented by the Club of Rome. Fiat, Volkswagen, and Ford pay economists, ecologists, and experts in social control to identify the products industries ought not to produce, in order to strengthen the industrial system. Also, doctors in the Club of Kos now recommend that surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy be abandoned in the treatment of most cancers, since these treatments usually prolong and intensify suffering without adding to the life-span of the treated. Lawyers and dentists promise to police as never before the competence, decency, and rates of their fellow professionals.
+
+A variant of this approach is seen in some individuals, or their organizations, who challenge the American Bar Association, American Medical Association, and other power brokers of the establishment. These claim to be radical because (1) they advise consumers against the interests of the majority of their peers; (2) they tutor laymen on how to behave on hospital, university, or police governing boards; and (3) they occasionally testify to legislative committees on the uselessness of procedures proposed by the professions and demanded by the public. For example, in a province of Western Canada doctors prepared a report on some two dozen medical procedures for which the legislature was considering a budget increase. All the procedures were costly, and the doctors pointed out that they were also very painful, that many were dangerous, and that none could be proved effective. For the time being the legislators refused to act on such medical advice, a failure that, provisionally, tends to reinforce the belief in the necessity of _professional_ protection against professional hubris.
+
+Professional self-policing is useful principally in catching the grossly incompetent--the butcher or the outright charlatan. But as has been shown again and again, it only protects the inept and cements the dependence of the public on their services. The "critical" doctor, the "radical" lawyer, or the "advocacy" architect seduces clients away from his colleagues, who are less aware than he of the vagaries of fashion. First liberal professions sold the public on the need for their services by promising to watch over the poorer laymen's schooling, ethics, or in-service training. Then dominant professions insisted on their rightful duty to guide and further disable the public by organizing into clubs that brandish the high consciousness of ecological, economic, and social constraints. Such action inhibits the further extension of the professional sector but strengthens public dependence within that sector. The idea that professionals have a _right_ to serve the public is thus of very recent origin. Their struggle to establish and legitimate this corporate right becomes one of our most oppressive social threats.
+
+### The Alliance of Hawkers
+
+The second strategy seeks to organize and coordinate professional response in a manner that purportedly is more faithful to the multifaceted character of human problems. Also, this approach seeks to utilize ideas borrowed from systems analysis and operations research in order to provide more national and all-encompassing solutions. An example of what this means in practice can be taken from Canada. Four years ago, the Canadian minister of health launched a campaign to convince the public that spending more money on physicians would not change the country's patterns of disease and death. He pointed out that premature loss of life was due overwhelmingly to three factors: accidents, mostly in motor vehicles; heart disease and lung cancer, which doctors are notoriously powerless to heal; and suicide combined with murder, phenomena that are outside medical control. The minister called for new approaches to health and for the retrenchment of medicine. The task of protecting, restoring, or consoling those made sick by the destructive life-style and environment typical of contemporary Canada was taken up by a great variety of new and old professions. Architects discovered that they had a mission to improve Canadians' health; dog control was found to be an interdepartmental problem calling for new specialists. A new corporate biocracy intensified control over the organisms of Canadians with a thoroughness the old iatrocracy could hardly have imagined. The slogan "Better spend money in order to stay healthy than on doctors when you get sick" can now be recognized as the hawking of new hookers who want the money spent on them.
+
+The practice of medicine in the United States illustrates a similar dynamic. There, a coordinated approach to the health of Americans has become enormously expensive without being especially effective. In 1950, the typical wage-earner transferred less than two weeks' pay per year to professional health care. In 1976, the proportion was up to around five to seven weeks' pay per year: buying a new Ford, one now pays more for worker hygiene than for the metal the car contains. Yet with all this effort and expense, the life expectancy of the _adult_ male population has not sensibly changed in the last one hundred years. It is lower than in many poor countries, and has been declining slowly but steadily for the last twenty years.
+
+Where disease patterns have changed for the better, it has been due principally to the adoption of a healthier life-style, especially in diet. To a small degree, inoculations and the routine administration of such simple interventions as antibiotics, contraceptives, or Carman tubes have contributed to the decline of certain diseases. But such procedures do not postulate the need for professional services. People cannot become healthier by being more firmly wedded to a medical profession, yet many "radical" doctors call for just such an increased biocracy. They seem to be unaware that a more rational "problem-solving" approach is simply another version--though perhaps a more sophisticated one--of affirmative action.
+
+### The Professionalization of the Client
+
+The third strategy to make dominant professions survive is this year's radical chic. As the prophets of the sixties drooled about development on the doorsteps of affluence, these mythmakers mouth about the self-help of professionalized clients.
+
+In the United States alone since 1965, about 2,700 books have appeared that teach you how to be your own patient, so that you need see the doctor only when it is worthwhile for him. Some books recommend that only after due training and examination should graduates in self-medication be empowered to buy aspirin and dispense it to their children. Others suggest that professionalized patients should receive preferential rates in hospitals and that they should benefit from lower insurance premiums. Only women with a license to practice home birth should have their children outside hospitals since such professional mothers can, if necessary, be sued for malpractice. I have seen a "radical" proposal that such a license to birth be obtained under feminist rather than medical auspices.
+
+The professional dream of rooting each hierarchy of needs in the grassroots goes under the banner of self-help. At present it is promoted by the new tribe of experts in self-help who have replaced the experts in development of the sixties. The universal professionalization of clients is their aim. American building experts who last fall invaded Mexico serve as an example of the new crusade. About two years ago, a Boston professor of architecture came to Mexico for a vacation. A Mexican friend of mine took him beyond the airport where, during the last twelve years, a new city had grown up. From a few huts, it had mushroomed into a community three times the size of Cambridge, Massachusetts. My friend, also an architect, wanted to show him the thousands of examples of peasant ingenuity with patterns, structures, and uses of refuse not in and therefore not derivable from textbooks. He should not have been surprised that his colleague took several hundred rolls of pictures of these brilliant amateur inventions that make the two-million-person slum work. The pictures were analyzed in Cambridge; and by the end of the year, new-baked United States specialists in community architecture were busy teaching the people of Ciudad Netzahualcoyotl their problems, needs, and solutions.
+
+
+## The Postprofessional Ethos
+
+The inverse of professionally certified lack, need, and poverty is modem subsistence. The term "subsistence economy" is now generally used only to designate group survival which is marginal to market dependence and in which people make what they use by means of traditional tools and within an inherited, often unexamined, social organization. I propose to recover the term by speaking about modern subsistence. Let us call modern subsistence the style of life that prevails in a postindustrial economy in which people have succeeded in reducing their market dependence, and have done so by protecting--by political means--a social infrastructure in which techniques and tools are used primarily to generate use-values unmeasured and unmeasurable by professional need-makers. I have developed a theory of such tools elsewhere (_Tools for Conviviality_, New York, 1973) and proposed the technical term "convivial tool" for use-value-oriented engineered artifacts. I have shown that the inverse of progressive modernized poverty is politically generated convivial austerity that protects freedom and equity in the use of such tools.
+
+A retooling of contemporary society with convivial rather than industrial tools implies a shift of emphasis in our struggle for social justice; it implies a new kind of subordination of distributive to participatory justice. In an industrial society, individuals are trained for extreme specialization. They are rendered impotent to shape or to satisfy their own needs. They depend for commodities on the managers who sign the prescriptions for them. The right to diagnosis of need, prescription of therapy, and--in general--distribution of goods predominates in ethics, politics, and law. This emphasis on the right to imputed necessities shrinks to a fragile luxury the liberty to learn or to heal or to move on one's own. In a convivial society, the opposite would be true. The protection of equity in the exercise of personal liberties would be the predominant concern of a society based on radical technology: science and technique at the service of more effective use-value generation. Obviously, such equitably distributed liberty would be meaningless if it were not grounded in the right of equal access to raw materials, tools, and utilities. Food, fuel, fresh air, or living space can no more be equitably distributed than wrenches or jobs unless they are rationed without regard to imputed need, that is, in equal maximum amounts to young and old, cripple and president. A society dedicated to the protection of equally distributed, modern, and effective tools for the exercise of productive liberties cannot come into existence unless the commodities and resources on which the exercise of these liberties is based are equally distributed to all.
+
+
+
+# Outwitting Developed Nations
+
+_This is the text of a lecture addressed in the summer of 1968 to the Kuchiching meeting of the Canadian Foriegn Policy Association. I have not revised the text even where today I would use different language or a different emphasis. It is a reminder of where my thought has evolved from._
+
+It is now common to demand that the rich nations convert their war machine into a program for the development of the Third World. The poorer four-fifths of humanity multiply unchecked while their per capita consumption actually declines. This population expansion and decrease in consumption threaten the industrialized nations, who may still, as a result, convert their defense budgets to the economic pacification of poor nations. And this in turn could produce irreversible despair, because the plows of the rich can do as much harm as their swords. United States trucks can do more lasting damage than United States tanks. It is easier to create mass demand for the former than for the latter. Only a minority needs heavy weapons, while a majority can become dependent on unrealistic levels of supply for such productive machines as modern trucks. Once the Third World has become a mass market for the goods, products, and processes which are designed by the rich for themselves, the discrepancy between demand for these Western artifacts and the supply will increase indefinitely. The family car cannot drive the poor into the jet age, nor can a school system provide the poor with education, nor can the family refrigerator ensure healthy food for them.
+
+It is evident that only one man in ten thousand in Latin America can afford a Cadillac, a heart operation, or a Ph.D. This restriction on the goals of development does not make us despair of the fate of the Third World, and the reason is simple. We have not yet come to conceive of a Cadillac as necessary for good transportation, or of a heart operation as normal health care, or of a Ph.D. as the prerequisite of an acceptable education. In fact, we recognize at once that the importation of Cadillacs should be heavily taxed in Peru, that an organ-trans- plant clinic is a scandalous plaything to justify the concentration of more doctors in Bogota, and that a betatron is beyond the teaching facilities of the University of Sao Paulo.
+
+Unfortunately it is not held to be universally evident that the majority of Latin Americans--not only of our generation but also of the next and the next again--cannot afford any kind of automobile, or any kind of hospitalization, or for that matter an elementary school education. We suppress our consciousness of this obvious reality because we hate to recognize the corner into which our imagination has been pushed. So persuasive is the power of the institutions we have created that they shape not only our preferences but actually our sense of possibilities. We have forgotten how to speak about modern transportation that does not rely on automobiles and airplanes. Our conception of modern health care emphasizes our ability to prolong the lives of the desperately ill. We have become unable to think of better education except in terms of more complex schools and of teachers trained for ever longer periods. Huge institutions producing costly services dominate the horizons of our inventiveness.
+
+We have embodied our world-view in our institutions and are now their prisoners. Factories, news media, hospitals, governments, and schools produce goods and services packaged to contain our view of the world. We--the rich--conceive of progress as the expansion of these establishments. We conceive of heightened mobility as luxury and safety packaged by General Motors or Boeing. We conceive of improving the general wellbeing as increasing the supply of doctors and hospitals, which package health along with protracted suffering. We have come to identify our need for further learning with the demand for ever longer confinement to classrooms. In other words, we have packaged education with custodial care, certification for jobs, and the right to vote, and wrapped them all together with indoctrination in the Christian, liberal, or communist virtues.
+
+In less than a hundred years industrial society has molded patent solutions to basic human needs and converted us to the belief that man's needs were shaped by the Creator as demands for the products we have invented. This is as true for Russia and Japan as for the North Atlantic community. The consumer is trained for obsolescence, which means continuing loyalty to the same producers who will give him the same basic packages in different quality or new wrappings.
+
+Industrialized societies can provide such packages for personal consumption for most of their citizens, but this is no proof that these societies are sane or economical, or that they promote life. The contrary is true. The more the citizen is trained in the consumption of packaged goods and services, the less effective he seems to become in shaping his environment. His energies and finances are consumed in procuring ever newer models of his staples, and the environment becomes a by-product of his own consumption habits.
+
+The design of the "package deals" of which I speak is the main cause of the high cost of satisfying basic needs. So long as every man "needs" his car, our cities must endure longer traffic jams and absurdly expensive remedies to relieve them. So long as health means maximum length of survival, our sick will get ever more extraordinary surgical interventions and the drugs required to deaden their consequent pain. So long as we want to use school to get children out of their parents' hair or to keep them off the street and out of the labor force, our young will be retained in endless schooling and will need ever increasing incentives to endure the ordeal.
+
+Rich nations now benevolently impose a straitjacket of traffic jams, hospital confinements, and classrooms on the poor nations, and by international agreement call this "development." The rich and schooled and old of the world try to share their dubious blessings by foisting their prepackaged solutions onto the Third World. Traffic jams develop in São Paulo while almost a million northeastern Brazilians flee the drought by walking five hundred miles. Latin American doctors get training at the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York, which they apply to only a few, while amoebic dysentery remains endemic in slums where 90 per cent of the population live. A tiny minority get advanced education in basic science in North America--not infrequently paid for by their own governments. If they return at all to Bolivia, they become second-rate teachers of pretentious subjects at La Paz or Cochabamba. The rich export outdated versions of their standard models.
+
+The Alliance for Progress is a good example of benevolent production for underdevelopment. Contrary to its slogans, it did succeed--as an alliance for the progress of the consuming classes, and for the domestication of the Latin American masses. The alliance has been a major step in modernizing the consumption patterns of the middle classes in South America by integrating them with the dominant culture of the North American metropolis. At the same time, the alliance has modernized the aspirations of the majority of citizens and fixed their demands on unavailable products.
+
+Each car that Brazil puts on the road denies fifty people good transportation by bus. Each merchandised refrigerator reduces the chance of building a community freezer. Every dollar spent in Latin America on doctors and hospitals costs a hundred lives, to adopt a phrase of Jorge de Ahumada, the brilliant Chilean economist. Had each dollar been spent on providing safe drinking water, a hundred lives could have been saved. Each dollar spent on schooling means more privileges for the few at the cost of the many; at best it increases the number of those who, before dropping out, have been taught that those who stay longer have earned the right to more power, wealth, and prestige. What such schooling does is to teach the schooled the superiority of the better schooled.
+
+All Latin American countries are frantically intent on expanding their school systems. No country now spends less than the equivalent of 18 per cent of tax-derived public income on education--which means schooling--and many countries spend almost double that. But even with these huge investments, no country yet succeeds in giving five full years of education to more than one-third of its population; supply and demand for schooling grow geometrically apart. And what is true about schooling is equally true about the products of most institutions in the process of modernization in the Third World.
+
+Continued technological refinements of products which are already established on the market frequently benefit the producer far more than the consumer. The more complex production processes tend to enable only the largest producer to replace outmoded models continually, and to focus the demand of the consumer on the marginal improvement of what he buys, no matter what the concomitant side effects: higher prices, diminished life-span, less general usefulness, higher cost of repairs. Think of the multiple uses for a simple can opener, whereas an electric one, if it works at all, opens only some kinds of cans, and costs one hundred times as much.
+
+This is equally true for a piece of agricultural machinery and for an academic degree. The Midwestern farmer can become convinced of his need for a four-axle vehicle which can go 70 mph on the highways, has an electric windshield wiper and upholstered seats, and can be turned in for a new one within a year or two. Most of the world's farmers do not need such speed, nor have they ever met with such comfort, nor are they interested in obsolescence. They need low-priced transport, in a world where time is not money, where manual wipers suffice, and where a piece of heavy equipment should outlast a generation. Such a mechanical donkey requires entirely different engineering and design than one produced for the United States market. This vehicle is not in production.
+
+Most of South America needs paramedical workers who can function for indefinite periods without the supervision of an M.D. Instead of establishing a process to train midwives and visiting healers who know how to use a very limited arsenal of medicines while working independently, Latin American universities establish every year a new school of specialized nursing or nursing administration to prepare professionals who can function only in a hospital, and pharmacists who know how to sell increasingly more dangerous drugs.
+
+The world is reaching an impasse where two processes converge: ever more men have fewer basic choices. The increase in population is widely publicized and creates panic. The decrease in fundamental choice causes anguish and is consistently overlooked. The population explosion overwhelms the imagination, but the progressive atrophy of social imagination is rationalized as an increase of choice between brands. The two processes converge in a dead end: the population explosion provides more consumers for everything from food to contraceptives, while our shrinking imagination can conceive of no other ways of satisfying their demands except through the packages now on sale in the admired societies.
+
+I will focus successively on these two factors, since, in my opinion, they form the two coordinates which together permit us to define underdevelopment.
+
+In most Third World countries, the population grows, and so does the middle class. Income, consumption, and the wellbeing of the middle class are all growing while the gap between this class and the mass of people widens. Even where per capita consumption is rising, the majority of men have less food now than in 1945, less actual care in sickness, less meaningful work, less protection. This is partly a consequence of polarized consumption and partly caused by the breakdown of the traditional family and culture. More people suffer from hunger, pain, and exposure in 1969 than they did at the end of World War II, not only numerically, but also as a percentage of the world population.
+
+These concrete consequences of underdevelopment are rampant; but underdevelopment is also a state of mind, and understanding it as a state of mind, or as a form of consciousness, is the critical problem. Underdevelopment as a state of mind occurs when mass needs are converted to the demand for new brands of packaged solutions which are forever beyond the reach of the majority. Underdevelopment in this sense is rising rapidly even in countries where the supply of classrooms, calories, cars, and clinics is also rising. The ruling groups in these countries build up services which have been designed for an affluent culture; once they have monopolized demand in this way, they can never satisfy majority needs.
+
+Underdevelopment as a form of consciousness is an extreme result of what we can call in the language of both Marx and Freud _Verdinglichung_, or reification. By reification I mean the hardening of the perception of real needs into the demand for mass-manufactured products. I mean the translation of thirst into the need for a Coke. This kind of reification occurs in the manipulation of primary human needs by vast bureaucratic organizations which have succeeded in dominating the imagination of potential consumers.
+
+Let me return to my example taken from the field of education. The intense promotion of schooling leads to so close an identification of school attendance and education that in everyday language the two terms are interchangeable. Once the imagination of an entire population has been "schooled," or indoctrinated to believe that school has a monopoly on formal education, then the illiterate can be taxed to provide free high school and university education for the children of the rich.
+
+Underdevelopment is the result of rising levels of aspiration achieved through the intensive marketing of "patent" products. In this sense, the dynamic underdevelopment that is now taking place is the exact opposite of what I believe education to be: namely, the awakening awareness of new levels of human potential and the use of one's creative powers to foster human life. Underdevelopment, however, implies the surrender of social consciousness to prepackaged solutions.
+
+The process by which the marketing of "foreign" products increases underdevelopment is frequently understood in the most superficial ways. The same man who feels indignation at the sight of a Coca-Cola plant in a Latin American slum often feels pride at the sight of a new normal school growing up alongside. He resents the evidence of a foreign "license" attached to a soft drink which he would like to see replaced by "Cola-Mex." But the same man is willing to impose schooling--at all costs--on his fellow citizens, and is unaware of the invisible license by which this institution is deeply enmeshed in the world market.
+
+Some years ago I watched workmen putting up a sixty-foot Coca-Cola sign on a desert plain in the Mexquital. A serious drought and famine had just swept over the Mexican highland. My host, a poor Indian in Ixmiquilpan, had just offered his visitors a tiny tequila glass of the costly black sugar-water. When I recall this scene I still feel anger; but I feel much more incensed when I remember UNESCO meetings at which well-meaning and well-paid bureaucrats seriously discussed Latin American school curricula, and when I think of the speeches of enthusiastic liberals advocating the need for more schools.
+
+The fraud perpetrated by the salesmen of schools is less obvious but much more fundamental than the self-satisfied salesmanship of the Coca-Cola or Ford representative, because the schoolman hooks his people on a much more demanding drug. Elementary school attendance is not a harmless luxury, but more like the coca chewing of the Andean Indian, which harnesses the worker to the boss.
+
+The higher the dose of schooling an individual has received, the more depressing his experience of withdrawal. The seventh-grade dropout feels his inferiority much more acutely than the dropout from the third grade. The schools of the Third World administer their opium with much more effect than the churches of other epochs. As the mind of a society is progressively schooled, step by step its individuals lose their sense that it might be possible to live without being inferior to others. As the majority shifts from the land into the city, the hereditary inferiority of the peon is replaced by the inferiority of the school dropout who is held personally responsible for his failure. Schools rationalize the divine origin of social stratification with much more rigor than churches have ever done.
+
+Until this day no Latin American country has declared youthful underconsumers of Coca-Cola or cars to be lawbreakers, while all Latin American countries have passed laws which define the early dropout as a citizen who has not fulfilled his legal obligations. The Brazilian government recently almost doubled the number of years during which schooling is legally compulsory and free. From now on any Brazilian dropout under the age of sixteen will be faced during his lifetime with the reproach that he did not take advantage of a legally obligatory privilege. This law was passed in a country where not even the most optimistic could foresee the day when such levels of schooling would be provided for only 25 per cent of the young. The adoption of international standards of schooling forever condemns most Latin Americans to marginality or exclusion from social life--in a word, underdevelopment.
+
+The translation of social goals into levels of consumption is not limited to only a few countries. Across all frontiers of culture, ideology, and geography today, nations are moving toward the establishment of their own car factories, their own medical and normal schools--and most of these are, at best, poor imitations of foreign and largely North American models.
+
+The Third World is in need of a profound revolution of its institutions. The revolutions of the last generation were overwhelmingly political. A new group of men with a new set of ideological justifications assumed power to administer fundamentally the same scholastic, medical, and market institutions in the interest of a new group of clients. Since the institutions have not radically changed, the new group of clients remains approximately the same size as that previously served. This appears clearly in the case of education. Per pupil costs of schooling are today comparable everywhere since the standards used to evaluate the quality of schooling tend to be internationally shared. Access to publicly financed education, considered as access to school, everywhere depends on per capita income. (Places like China and North Vietnam might be meaningful exceptions.)
+
+Everywhere in the Third World modern institutions are grossly unproductive, with respect to the egalitarian purposes for which they are being reproduced. But so long as the social imagination of the majority has not been destroyed by its fixation on these institutions, there is more hope of planning an institutional revolution in the Third World than among the rich. Hence the urgency of the task of developing workable alternatives to "modern" solutions.
+
+Underdevelopment is at the point of becoming chronic in many countries. The revolution of which I speak must begin to take place before this happens. Education again offers a good example: chronic educational underdevelopment occurs when the demand for schooling becomes so widespread that the total concentration of educational resources on the school system becomes a unanimous political demand. At this point the separation of education from schooling becomes impossible.
+
+The only feasible answer to ever increasing underdevelopment is a response to basic needs that is planned as a long-range goal for areas which will always have a different capital structure. It is easier to speak about alternatives to existing institutions, services, and products than to define them with precision. It is not my purpose either to paint a utopia or to engage in scripting scenarios for an alternate future. We must be satisfied with examples indicating simple directions that research should take.
+
+Some such examples have already been given. Buses are alternatives to a multitude of private cars. Vehicles designed for slow transportation on rough terrain are alternatives to standard trucks. Safe water is an alternative to high-priced surgery. Medical workers are an alternative to doctors and nurses. Community food storage is an alternative to expensive kitchen equipment. Other alternatives could be discussed by the dozen. Why not, for example, consider walking as a long-range alternative to locomotion by machine and explore the demands which this would impose on the city planner? And why can't the building of shelters be standardized, elements be precast, and each citizen be obliged to learn in a year of public service how to construct his own sanitary housing?
+
+It is harder to speak about alternatives in education, partly because schools have recently so completely pre-empted the available educational resources of good will, imagination, and money. But even here we can indicate the direction in which research must be conducted.
+
+At present, schooling is conceived as graded, curricular class attendance by children, for about one thousand hours yearly during an uninterrupted succession of years. On the average, Latin American countries can provide each citizen with between eight and thirty months of this service. Why not, instead, make one or two months a year obligatory for all citizens below the age of thirty?
+
+Money is now spent largely on children, but an adult can be taught to read in one-tenth the time and for one-tenth the cost it takes to teach a child. In the case of the adult there is an immediate return on the investment, whether the main importance of his learning is seen in his new insight, political awareness, and willingness to assume responsibility for his family's size and future, or whether the emphasis is placed on increased productivity. There is a double return in the case of the adult, because he can contribute not only to the education of his children but to that of other adults as well. In spite of these advantages, basic literacy programs have little or no support in Latin America, where schools have a first call on all public resources. Worse, these programs are actually ruthlessly suppressed in Brazil and elsewhere, where military support of the feudal or industrial oligarchy has thrown off its former benevolent disguise.
+
+Another possibility is harder to define, because there is as yet no example to point to. We must therefore imagine the use of public resources for education distributed in such a way as to give every citizen a minimum chance. Education will become a political concern of the majority of voters only when each individual has a precise sense of the educational resources that are owing to him--and some idea of how to sue for them. Something like a universal GI Bill of Rights could be imagined, dividing the public resources assigned to education by the number of children who are legally of school age, and making sure that a child who did not take advantage of his credit at the age of seven, eight, or nine would have the accumulated benefits at his disposal at age ten.
+
+What would the pitiful education credit which a Latin American republic could offer to its children provide? Almost all of the basic supply of books, pictures, blocks, games, and toys that are totally absent from the homes of the really poor, but enable a middle-class child to learn the alphabet, the colors, shapes, and other classes of objects and experiences which ensure his educational progress. The choice between these things and schools is obvious. Unfortunately, the poor, for whom alone the choice is real, never get to exercise this choice.
+
+Defining alternatives to the products and institutions which now pre-empt the field is difficult, not only, as I have been trying to show, because these products and institutions shape our conception of reality itself, but also because the construction of new possibilities requires a concentration of will and intelligence in a higher degree than ordinarily occurs by chance. This concentration of will and intelligence on the solution of particular problems regardless of their nature we have become accustomed over the last century to call research.
+
+I must make clear, however, what kind of research I am talking about. I am not talking about basic research either in physics, engineering, genetics, medicine, or learning. The work of such men as F. H. C. Crick, Jean Piaget, and Murray Gell-Mann may continue to enlarge our horizons in other fields of science. The labs and libraries and specially trained collaborators these men need cause them to congregate in the few research capitals of the world. Their research can provide the basis for new work on practically any product.
+
+I am not speaking here of the billions of dollars annually spent on applied research, for this money is largely spent by existing institutions on the perfection and marketing of their own products. Applied research is money spent on making planes faster and airports safer; on making medicines more specific and powerful and doctors capable of handling their deadly side effects; on packaging more learning into classrooms; on methods for administering large bureaucracies. This is the kind of research for which some kind of counterfoil must somehow be developed if we are to have any chance to come up with basic alternatives to the automobile, the hospital, and the school, and any of the many other so-called "evidently necessary implements for modern life."
+
+I have in mind a different, and peculiarly difficult, kind of research, which has been largely neglected up to now, for obvious reasons. I am calling for research on alternatives to the products which now dominate the market; to hospitals and the professions dedicated to keeping the sick alive; to schools and the packaging process which refuses education to those who are not of the right age, who have not gone through the right curriculum, who have not sat in a classroom a sufficient number of successive hours, who will not pay for their learning with submission to custodial care, screening, and certification or with indoctrination in the values of the dominant elite.
+
+This counterresearch on fundamental alternatives to current prepackaged solutions is the element most critically needed if the poor nations are to have a livable future. Such counterresearch is distinct from most of the work done in the name of "the year 2000," because most of that work seeks radical changes in social patterns through adjustments in the organization of an already advanced technology. The counterresearch of which I speak must take as one of its assumptions the continued lack of capital in the Third World.
+
+The difficulties of such research are obvious. The researcher must first of all doubt what is obvious to every eye. Second, he must persuade those who have the power of decision to act against their own short-run interests or bring pressure on them to do so. And finally, he must survive as an individual in a world he is attempting to change fundamentally so that his fellows among the privileged minority see him as a destroyer of the very ground on which all of us stand. He knows that if he should succeed in the interest of the poor, technologically advanced societies still might envy the "poor" who adopt this vision.
+
+There is a normal course for those who make development policies, whether they live in North or South America, in Russia or Israel. It is to define development and to set its goals in ways with which they are familiar, which they are accustomed to use in order to satisfy their own needs, and which permit them to work through the institutions over which they have power or control. This formula has failed, and must fail. There is not enough money in the world for development to succeed along these lines, not even in the combined arms and space budgets of the superpowers.
+
+An analogous course is followed by those who are trying to make political revolutions, especially in the Third World. Usually they promise to make the familiar privileges of the present elites, such as schooling and hospital care, accessible to all citizens; and they base this vain promise on the belief that a change in political regime will permit them to sufficiently enlarge the institutions that produce these privileges. The promise and appeal of the revolutionary are therefore just as threatened by the counterresearch I propose as is the market of the now dominant producers.
+
+In Vietnam a people on bicycles and armed with sharpened bamboo sticks have brought to a standstill the most advanced machinery for research and production ever devised. We must seek survival in a Third World in which human ingenuity can peacefully outwit machined might. The only way to reverse the disastrous trend to increasing underdevelopment, hard as it is, is to learn to laugh at accepted solutions in order to change the demands which make them necessary. Only free men can change their minds and be surprised; and while no men are completely free, some are freer than others.
+
+
+
+# In Lieu of Education
+
+_During the late sixties I conducted a series of seminars at the Centro Intercultural de Documentacion (CIDOC) in Cuernavaca, Mexico, that dealt with the monopoly of the industrial mode of production and with conceptual alternatives that would fit a postindustrial age. The first industrial sector that I analyzed was the school system and its presumed output, education. Seven papers written during this period were published in 1971 under the title_ Deschooling Society. _From the reactions to that book I saw that my description of the undesirable latent functions of compulsory schools (the "hidden curriculum" of schooling) was being abused not only by the promoters of so-called free schools but even more by schoolmasters who were anxious to transmogrify themselves into adult educators._
+
+_The following essay was written in mid-1971. I here insist that the alternative to the dependence of a society on its schools is not the creation of new devices to_ make people learn what _experts have decided they need to know; rather, it is the creation of a radically new relationship between human beings and their environment. A society committed to high levels of shared learning and personal intercourse, free yet critical, cannot exist unless it sets pedagogically motivated constraints on its institutional and industrial growth._
+
+For generations we have tried to make the world a better place by providing more and more schooling, but so far the endeavor has failed. What we have learned instead is that forcing all children to climb an open-ended education ladder cannot enhance equality but must favor the individual who starts out earlier, healthier, or better prepared; that enforced instruction deadens for most people the will for independent learning; and that knowledge treated as a commodity, delivered in packages, and accepted as private property once it is acquired must always be scarce.
+
+People have suddenly become aware that public education by means of compulsory schooling has lost its social, its pedagogical, and its economic legitimacy. In response, critics of the educational system are now proposing strong and unorthodox remedies that range from the voucher plan, which would enable each person to buy the education of his choice on an open market, to shifting the responsibility for education from the school to the media and to apprenticeship on the job. Some individuals foresee that the school will have to be disestablished just as the Church was disestablished all over the world during the last two centuries. Other reformers propose to replace the universal school with various new systems that would, they claim, better prepare everybody for life in modern society. These proposals for new educational institutions fall into three broad categories: the reformation of the classroom within the school system; the dispersal of free classrooms throughout society; and the transformation of all society into one huge classroom. But these three approaches--the reformed classroom, the free classroom, and the world-wide classroom--represent three stages in a proposed escalation of education in which each step threatens more subtle and more pervasive social control than the one it replaces.
+
+I believe that the disestablishment of the school has become inevitable and that this end of an illusion should fill us with hope. But I also believe that the end of the "age of schooling" could usher in the epoch of a global schoolhouse that would be distinguishable only in name from a global madhouse or a global prison in which education, correction, and adjustment became synonymous. I therefore believe that the breakdown of the school forces us to look beyond its imminent demise and to face fundamental alternatives in education. Either we can work for new and fearsome educational devices that teach about a world which progressively becomes more opaque and forbidding for man, or we can set the conditions for a new era in which technology would be used to make society more simple and transparent, so that all men could once again know the facts and use the tools that shape their lives. In short, we can disestablish schools or we can deschool culture.
+
+
+## The Hidden Curriculum
+
+In order to see clearly the alternatives we face, we must first distinguish learning from schooling, which means separating the humanistic goal of the teacher from the impact of the invariant structure of the school. This hidden structure constitutes a course of instruction that remains forever beyond the control of the teacher or of the school board. It necessarily conveys the message that only through schooling can an individual prepare for adulthood in society, that what is not taught in school is of little value, and that what is learned outside school is not worth knowing. I call it the hidden curriculum because it constitutes the unalterable framework of the schooling system, within which all changes in the visible curriculum are made.
+
+The hidden curriculum is always the same regardless of school or place. It requires all children of a certain age to assemble in groups of about thirty, under the authority of a certified teacher, for some 500 or 1,000 or more hours per year. It does not matter whether the curriculum is designed to teach the principles of fascism, liberalism, Catholicism, socialism, or liberation, so long as the institution claims the authority to define which activities are legitimate "education." It does not matter whether the purpose of the school is to produce Soviet or United States citizens, mechanics, or doctors, so long as you cannot be a legitimate citizen or doctor unless you are a graduate. It makes no difference where the meetings occur--in the auto repair shop, the legislature, or the hospital--so long as they are understood as attendance.
+
+What is important in the hidden curriculum is that students learn that education is valuable when it is acquired in the school through a graded process of consumption; that the degree of success the individual will enjoy in society depends on the amount of learning he consumes; and that learning _about_ the world is more valuable than learning _from_ the world. The imposition of this hidden curriculum within an educational program distinguishes schooling from other forms of planned education. All the world's school systems have common characteristics as distinguished from their institutional output, and these are the result of the common hidden curriculum of all schools.
+
+It must be clearly understood that the hidden curriculum translates learning from an activity into a commodity for which the school monopolizes the market. The name we now give to this commodity is "education," a quantifiable and cumulative output of a professionally designed institution called school, whose value can be measured by the duration and the costliness of the application of a process (the hidden curriculum) to the student. The grammar school teacher with an M.A. commands a greater salary than one with fewer hours of academic credit, regardless of the relevance of the degree to the task of teaching.
+
+In all "schooled" countries knowledge is regarded as the first necessity for survival, but also as a form of currency more liquid than rubles or dollars. We have become accustomed, through Karl Marx's writings, to speak of the alienation of the worker from his work in a class society. We must now recognize the estrangement of man from his learning when it becomes the product of a service profession and he becomes the consumer.
+
+The more education an individual consumes, the more "knowledge stock" he acquires and the higher he rises in the hierarchy of knowledge capitalists. Education thus defines a new class structure for society within which the large consumers of knowledge--those who have acquired greater quantities of knowledge stock--can claim to be of superior value to society. They represent gilt-edged securities in a society's portfolio of human capital, and access to the more powerful or scarcer tools of production is reserved to them.
+
+The hidden curriculum thus both defines and measures what education is, and to what level of productivity it entitles the consumer. It serves as a rationale for the growing correlation between jobs and corresponding privilege--which translates into personal income in some societies and into direct claims to time-saving services, further education, and prestige in others. (This point is especially important in the light of the lack of correspondence between schooling and occupational competence established in studies such as Ivar Berg's _Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery_ [New York, 1970].)
+
+The endeavor to put all men through successive stages of enlightenment is rooted deeply in alchemy, the Great Art of the waning Middle Ages. John Amos Comenius (1592-1670), a Moravian bishop, self-styled pansophist, and pedagogue, is rightly considered one of the founders of modern schools. He was among the first to propose seven to twelve grades of compulsory learning. In his _Didactica magna_, he described schools as devices to "teach everybody everything" and outlined a blueprint for an assembly-line production of knowledge, which according to his ideas would make education cheaper and better and make growth into full humanity possible for all. But Comenius was not only an early efficiency expert; he was an alchemist who adopted the technical language of his craft to describe the art of rearing children. The alchemist sought to refine base elements by conducting their distilled spirits through seven successive stages of sublimation, so that for their own and all the world's benefit they might be transmuted into gold. Of course, the alchemists failed no matter how often they tried, but each time their "science" yielded new reasons for their failure, and they tried again.
+
+Pedagogy opened a new chapter in the history of the Ars Magna. Education became the search for an alchemic process that would bring forth a new type of man, who would fit into an environment created by scientific magic. But no matter how much each generation spent on its schools, it always turned out that the majority of people were unfit for enlightenment by this process and had to be discarded as unprepared for life in a man-made world.
+
+Educational reformers who accept the idea that schools have failed fall into three groups. The most respectable are certainly the great masters of alchemy who promise better schools. The most seductive are the popular magicians who promise to make every kitchen into an alchemical laboratory. The most sinister are the new masons of the universe who want to transform the entire world into one huge temple of learning.
+
+Notable among today's masters of alchemy are certain research directors employed or sponsored by the large foundations who believe that schools, if they could somehow be improved, could also become economically more feasible than those that are now in trouble, and simultaneously could sell a larger package of services. Those who are concerned mainly with the curriculum claim that it is outdated or irrelevant. So, the curriculum is filled with new packaged courses on African Culture, North American Imperialism, Women's Lib, Pollution, or the Consumer Society. Passive learning is wrong--it is, indeed--so students are graciously allowed to decide what and how they want to be taught. Schools are prison houses; therefore principals are authorized to approve teachouts, moving the school desks to a roped-off Harlem street. Sensitivity training becomes fashionable, so we import group therapy into the classroom. School, which was supposed to teach everybody everything, now becomes all things to all children.
+
+Other critics insist that schools make inefficient use of modern science. Some would administer drugs to make it easier for the instructor to change the child's behavior. Others would transform school into a stadium for educational gaming. Still others would electrify the classroom. If they are simplistic disciples of McLuhan, they replace blackboards and textbooks with multimedia happenings; if they follow Skinner, they claim to be able to modify behavior more efficiently than old-fashioned classroom practitioners.
+
+Most of these changes have, of course, some good effects. The experimental schools have fewer truants. Parents do have a greater feeling of participation in a decentralized district. Pupils assigned by their teacher to an apprenticeship often do turn out more competent than those who stay in the classroom. Some children do improve their knowledge of Spanish in the language lab because they prefer playing with the knobs of a tape recorder to conversing with their Puerto Rican peers. Yet all these improvements operate within predictably narrow limits, since they leave the hidden curriculum intact.
+
+Some reformers would like to shake loose from the hidden curriculum of public schools, but they rarely succeed. Free schools that lead to further free schools produce a mirage of freedom, even though the chain of attendance is often interrupted by long stretches of loafing. Attendance through seduction inculcates the need for educational treatment more persuasively than reluctant attendance enforced by a truant officer. Permissive teachers in a padded classroom can easily render their pupils impotent to survive once they leave.
+
+Learning in these schools often remains nothing more than the acquisition of socially valued skills defined, in this instance, by the consensus of a commune rather than by the decree of a school board. New presbyter is but old priest writ large.
+
+Free schools, to be truly free, must meet two conditions: first, they must be run in such a way as to prevent the reintroduction of the hidden curriculum of graded attendance and certified students studying at the feet of certified teachers. And more important, they must provide a framework in which all participants, staff and pupils, can free themselves from the hidden assumptions of a schooled society. The first condition is frequently stated in the aims of a free school. The second condition is only rarely recognized and is difficult to state as the goal of a free school.
+
+
+## The Hidden Assumptions of Education
+
+It is useful to distinguish between the hidden curriculum, which I have described, and the occult foundations of schooling. The hidden curriculum is a ritual that can be considered the official initiation into modern society, institutionally established through the school. It is the purpose of this ritual to hide from its participants the contradictions between the myth of an egalitarian society and the class-conscious reality it certifies. Once they are recognized as such, rituals lose their power, and this is what is now beginning to happen to schooling. But there are certain fundamental assumptions about growing up--the occult foundations--which now find their expression in the ceremonial of schooling, and which could easily be reinforced by what free schools do.
+
+On first sight, any generalization about free schools seems rash. Especially in the United States, in Canada, and in Germany of 1971, they are the thousand flowers of a new spring. About those experimental enterprises which claim to be _educational institutions_, generalizations can be made. But first we must gain some deeper insight into the relationship between schooling and education.
+
+We often forget that the word "education" is of recent coinage. It was unknown before the Reformation. The education of children is first mentioned in French in a document of 1498. This was the year when Erasmus settled in Oxford, when Savonarola was burned at the stake in Florence, and when Dürer etched his _Apocalypse_, which speaks to us powerfully about the sense of doom hanging over the end of the Middle Ages. In the English language the word "education" first appeared in 1530--the year when Henry VIII divorced Catherine of Aragon and when the Lutheran Church separated from Rome at the Diet of Augsburg. In Spanish lands another century passed before the word and idea of education became known. In 1632 Lope de Vega still refers to "education" as a novelty. That year, the University of San Marcos in Lima celebrated its sixtieth anniversary. Learning centers did exist before the term "education" entered common parlance. You "read" the classics or the law; you were not educated for life.
+
+During the sixteenth century the universal need for "justification" was at the core of theological disputes. It rationalized politics and served as a pretext for large-scale slaughter. The Church split, and it became possible to hold widely divergent opinions of the degree to which all men were born sinful and corrupt and predestined. But by the early seventeenth century a new consensus began to arise: the idea that man was born incompetent for society and remained so unless he was provided with "education." Education came to mean the inverse of vital competence. It came to mean a process rather than the plain knowledge of the facts and the ability to use tools which shape a man's concrete life. Education came to mean an intangible commodity that had to be produced for the benefit of all, and imparted to them in the manner in which the visible Church formerly imparted invisible grace. Justification in the sight of society became the first necessity for a man born in original stupidity, analogous to original sin.
+
+Schooling and education are related to each other like Church and religion, or in more general terms, like ritual and myth. The ritual created and sustains the myth; it is mythopoeic, and the myth generates the curriculum through which it is perpetuated. "Education" as the designation for an all- embracing category of social justification is an idea for which we cannot find (outside Christian theology) a specific analogue in other cultures. And the production of education through the process of schooling sets schools apart from other institutions for learning that existed in other epochs. This point must be understood if we want to clarify the shortcomings of most free, unstructured, or independent schools.
+
+To go beyond the simple reform of the classroom, a free school must avoid incorporating the hidden curriculum of schooling which I have described above. An ideal free school tries to provide education and at the same time tries to prevent that education from being used to establish or justify a class structure, from becoming a rationale for measuring the pupil against some abstract scale, and from repressing, controlling, and cutting him down to size. But as long as the free school tries to provide "general education," it cannot move beyond the hidden assumptions of education.
+
+Among these assumptions is what Peter Schrag calls the "immigration syndrome," which impels us to treat all people as if they were newcomers who must go through a naturalization process. Only certified consumers of knowledge are admitted to citizenship. Men are not born equal but are made equal through gestation by Alma Mater. They must be guided away from their natural environment and pass through a social womb in which they are formed sufficiently to fit into everyday life. Free schools often perform this function better than schools of a less seductive kind.
+
+Free educational establishments share with less free establishments another characteristic: they depersonalize the responsibility for education. They place an institution _in loco parentis_. They perpetuate the idea that teaching, if done outside the family, ought to be done by an agency, for which the individual teacher is but an agent. In a schooled society even the family is reduced to an "agency of acculturation." Educational agencies that employ teachers to perform the corporate intent of their boards are instruments for the depersonalization of intimate relations.
+
+Of course, many free schools do function without accredited teachers. By doing so, they represent a serious threat to the established teachers' unions. But they do not represent a threat to the professional structure of society. A school in which the board appoints people of its own choice to carry out its educational endeavor even though they hold no professional certificate, license, or union card is not thereby challenging the legitimacy of the teaching profession any more than a madam, operating in a country which for _legal_ operation demands a police license, challenges the social _legitimacy_ of the oldest profession by running a private house.
+
+Most teachers who teach in free schools have no opportunity to teach in their own name. They carry out the corporate task of teaching in the name of a board, the less transparent function of teaching in the name of their pupils, or the more mystical function of teaching in the name of "society" at large. The best proof of this is that most teachers in free schools spend even more time than their professional colleagues planning with a committee how the school should educate. When they are faced with the evidence of their illusion, the length of committee meetings drives many generous teachers from public into free school and after one year beyond it.
+
+The rhetoric of all educational establishments states that they form men for something, for the future. But they do not release them for this task before they have developed a high level of tolerance to the ways of their elders: education _for_ life rather than _in_ everyday life. Few free schools can avoid doing precisely this. Nevertheless, they are among the most important centers from which a new life-style will radiate, not because of the effect their graduates will have, but rather because elders who choose to bring up their children without the benefit of properly ordained teachers frequently belong to a radical minority and because their preoccupation with the rearing of their children sustains them in their new style.
+
+
+## The Hidden Hand in an Educational Market
+
+The most dangerous category of educational reformers are those who maintain that knowledge can be produced and sold much more effectively on an open market than on one controlled by the school. These people argue that skills can be easily acquired from skill models if the learner is truly interested in their acquisition, that individual entitlements can provide a more equal purchasing power for education. They demand a careful separation of the process by which knowledge is measured and certified. These seem to me obvious statements. But it would be a fallacy to believe that the establishment of a free market for knowledge would constitute a radical alternative in education.
+
+The establishment of a free market would indeed abolish what I have previously called the hidden curriculum of present schooling--its age-specific attendance in a graded curriculum. Equally, a free market would at first give the appearance of counteracting what I have called the occult foundations of a schooled society: the "immigration syndrome," the institutional monopoly of teaching, and the ritual of linear initiation. But at the same time a free market in education would provide the alchemist with innumerable hidden hands to fit each man into the multiple tight little niches a more complex technocracy can provide.
+
+Many decades of reliance on schooling have turned knowledge into a commodity, a marketable staple of a special kind. Knowledge is now regarded simultaneously as a first necessity and as society's most precious currency. (The transformation of knowledge into a commodity is reflected in a corresponding transformation of language. Words that formerly functioned as verbs are becoming nouns that designate possessions. Until recently "dwelling" and "learning" and "healing" designated activities. They are now usually conceived as commodities or services to be delivered. We talk about the manufacture of housing or the delivery of medical care; people are no longer regarded as fit to heal or house themselves. In such a society people come to believe that professional services are more valuable than personal care. Instead of learning how to nurse grandmother, the teen-ager learns to picket the hospital that does not admit her.) This attitude could easily survive the disestablishment of school, just as affiliation with a church remained a condition for office long after the adoption of the First Amendment. It is even more evident that batteries of tests measuring complex knowledge packages could easily survive the disestablishment of school--and along with them the compulsion to oblige everybody to acquire a minimum package of knowledge stock. The scientific measurement of each person's worth and the alchemistic dream of each person's "educability to his full humanity" would finally coincide. Under the appearance of a free market, the global village would turn into an environmental womb where pedagogic therapists controlled the complex placenta by which each human being was nourished.
+
+At present schools limit the teacher's competence to the classroom. They prevent him from claiming man's whole life as his domain. The demise of school would remove this restriction and give a semblance of legitimacy to the lifelong pedagogical invasion of everybody's privacy. It would open the way for a scramble for "knowledge" on a free market, which would lead us toward the paradox of a vulgar, albeit seemingly egalitarian, meritocracy.
+
+Schools are by no means the only or the most efficient institutions that pretend to translate information, understanding, and wisdom into behavioral traits the measurement of which is the key to prestige and power. Nor are schools the first institutions used to convert education into an entitlement. The Chinese mandarin system, for example, was for centuries a stable and effective incentive for education in the service of a relatively open class whose privilege depended on the acquisition of measurable knowledge. Promotion to a scholarly rank did not provide entitlement to any of the coveted jobs, but it did provide a ticket for a public lottery at which offices were distributed by lot among the certified mandarins. No schools, much less universities, developed in China until that country began to wage war with European powers. The testing of independently acquired measurable knowledge enabled the Chinese Empire for three thousand years, alone among nation states in having neither a true church nor a school system, to select its governing elite without establishing a large hereditary aristocracy. Access to this elite was open to the emperor's family and to those who passed tests.
+
+Voltaire and his contemporaries praised the Chinese system of promotion through proven learning. Civil service testing was introduced in France in 1791, only to be abolished by Napoleon. It would be fascinating to speculate what would have happened had the mandarin system been chosen to propagate the ideals of the French Revolution, instead of the school system, which inevitably supported nationalism and military discipline. As it happened, Napoleon strengthened the polytechnic, residential school. The Jesuit model of ritual, sequential promotion in a cloistered establishment prevailed over the mandarin system as the preferred method by which Western societies gave legitimacy to their elites.
+
+Principals became the abbots in a world-wide chain of monasteries in which everybody was busy accumulating the knowledge necessary to enter the constantly obsolescent heaven on earth. Just as the Calvinists disestablished monasteries only to turn all of Geneva into one, so we must fear that the disestablishment of school may bring forth a world-wide factory for knowledge. Unless the concept of learning or knowledge is transformed, the disestablishment of school will lead to a wedding between the mandarin system--which separates learning from certification--and a society committed to provide therapy for each man until he be ripe for the gilded age.
+
+
+## The Contradiction of Schools as Tools of Technocratic Progress
+
+Education for a consumer society is equivalent to consumer training. The reform of the classroom, the dispersal of the classroom, and the diffusion of the classroom are different ways of shaping consumers of obsolescent commodities. The survival of a society in which technocracies can constantly redefine human happiness as the consumption of their latest product depends on educational institutions (from schools to ads) that translate education into social control.
+
+In rich countries such as the United States, Canada, or the Soviet Union, huge investments in schooling make the institutional contradictions of technocratic progress very evident. In these countries the ideological defense of unlimited progress rests on the claim that the equalizing effects of open-ended schooling can counteract the disequalizing force of constant obsolescence. The legitimacy of industrial society itself comes to depend on the credibility of schools, and it does not matter if the GOP or the Communist Party is in power. Under these circumstances the public is avid for books like Charles Silberman's report to the Carnegie Commission, published as _Crisis in the Classroom_ (New York, 1970). Such research inspires confidence because of its well-documented indictment of the present school, in the light of which the insignificant attempts to save the system by manicuring its most obvious faults can create a new wave of futile expectations.
+
+Neither alchemy nor magic nor masonry can solve the problem of the present crisis "in education." The deschooling of our world-view demands that we recognize the illegitimate and religious nature of the educational enterprise itself. Its hubris lies in its attempt to make man a social being as the result of his treatment in an engineered process.
+
+For those who subscribe to the technocratic ethos, whatever is technically possible must be made available at least to a few whether they want it or not. Neither the privation nor the frustration of the majority counts. If cobalt treatment is possible, then the city of Tegucigalpa must have one apparatus in each of its two major hospitals, at a cost that would free an important part of the population of Honduras from parasites. If supersonic speeds are possible, then some must travel at such speeds. If the flight to Mars can be conceived, then a rationale must be found to make it appear a necessity. In the technocratic ethos poverty is modernized: not only are old alternatives closed off by new monopolies, but the lack of necessities is also compounded by a growing distance between those services that are technologically feasible and those that are in fact available to the majority.
+
+A teacher turns "educator" when he adopts this technocratic ethos. He then acts as if education were a technological enterprise designed to make man fit into whatever environment the "progress" of science creates. He seems blind to the evidence that constant obsolescence of all commodities comes at a high price: the mounting cost of training people to know about them. He seems to forget that the rising cost of tools is purchased at a high price in education: they decrease the labor-intensiveness of the economy and make learning on the job impossible, or at best the privilege of a few. All over the world the cost of educating men for society rises faster than the productivity of the entire economy, and fewer people have a sense of intelligent participation in the commonweal.
+
+Further investments in school everywhere render the futility of schooling monumental. Paradoxically, the poor are the first victims of more school. The Wright Commission in Ontario had to report to its government sponsors that postsecondary education is inevitably and without remedy the disproportionate taxing of the poor for an education that will always be enjoyed mainly by the rich.
+
+Experience confirms these warnings. For several decades a quota system in the Soviet Union favored the admission to the university of sons of working parents over sons of university graduates. Nevertheless, the latter are overrepresented in Russian graduating classes much more than they are in those of the United States.
+
+In poor countries, schools rationalize the economic lag of an entire nation. The majority of citizens are excluded from the scarce modern means of production and consumption, but long to enter the economy by way of the school door. The legitimization of hierarchical distribution of privilege and power has shifted from lineage, inheritance, the favor of king or pope, and ruthlessness on the market or on the battlefield to a more subtle form of capitalism: the hierarchical but liberal institution of compulsory schooling, which permits the well-schooled to impute guilt to the lagging consumer of knowledge for holding a certificate of lower denomination. Yet this rationalization of inequality can never square with the facts, and populist regimes find it increasingly difficult to hide the conflict between rhetoric and reality.
+
+For ten years Castro's Cuba has devoted great energies to rapid-growth popular education, relying on available manpower, without the usual respect for professional credentials. The initial spectacular successes of this campaign, especially in diminishing illiteracy, have been cited as evidence for the claim that the slow growth rate of other Latin American school systems is due to corruption, militarism, and a capitalist market economy. Yet now the logic of hierarchical schooling is catching up with Fidel and his attempt to school-produce the New Man. Even when students spend half the year in the cane fields and fully subscribe to the egalitarian ideals of _compañero_ Fidel, the school trains every year a crop of self-conscious knowledge consumers ready to move on to new levels of consumption. Also Dr. Castro faces evidence that the school system will never turn out enough certified technical manpower. Those licensed graduates who do get the new jobs destroy by their conservatism the results obtained by noncertified cadres who muddled into their positions through on-the-job training. Teachers simply cannot be blamed for the failures of a revolutionary government that insists on the institutional capitalization of manpower through a hidden curriculum guaranteed to produce a universal bourgeoisie.
+
+On March 8, 1971, an act of the United States Supreme Court made it possible to begin the legal challenge of the hidden curriculum's legitimacy in that country. Expressing the unanimous opinion of the Court in the case of _Griggs et al vs. Duke Power Company_, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger stated that "diplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense proposition that they are not to become masters of reality." The Chief Justice was interpreting the intent of Congress in the equal-opportunities section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the Court was ruling that any school degree or any test given prospective employees must "measure the man for the job" and not the "man in the abstract." The burden of proving that educational requirements are a "reasonable measure of job performance" rests with the employer. In this decision, the Court ruled only on tests and diplomas as means of racial discrimination, but the logic of the Chief Justice's argument applies to any use of an educational pedigree as a prerequisite for employment. Employers will find it difficult to show that schooling is a necessary prerequisite for any job. It is easy to show that it is necessarily antidemocratic because it inevitably discriminates. The Great Training Robbery so effectively exposed by Ivar Berg should now face repeated challenges from students, employers, and taxpayers.
+
+
+## The Recovery of Responsibility for Teaching and Learning
+
+A revolution against those forms of privilege and power that are based on claims to professional knowledge must start with a transformation of consciousness about the nature of learning. This means, above all, a shift of responsibility for teaching and learning. Knowledge can be defined as a commodity only so long as it is viewed as the result of institutional enterprise or as the fulfillment of institutional objectives. When a man recovers the sense of personal responsibility for what he learns and teaches, this spell can be broken and the alienation of learning from living be overcome.
+
+The recovery of the power to learn or to teach means that the teacher who takes the risk of interfering in somebody else's private affairs also assumes responsibility for the results. Similarly, the student who exposes himself to the influence of a teacher must take responsibility for his own education. For such purposes educational institutions--if they are needed at all--ideally take the form of facility centers where one can get a roof of the right size over his head and access to a piano or a kiln and to records, books, or slides. Schools, television stations, theaters, and the like are designed primarily for use by professionals. Deschooling society means above all the denial of professional status to the second oldest profession, namely, teaching. The certification of teachers now constitutes an undue restriction on the right to free speech; the corporate structure and professional pretensions of journalism an undue restriction on the right to a free press. Compulsory-attendance rules interfere with free assembly. The deschooling of society is nothing less than a cultural mutation by which a people recovers the effective use of its constitutional freedoms: learning and teaching by men who know they are born free rather than treated to freedom. Most people learn most of the time when they do whatever they enjoy; most people are curious and want to give meaning to whatever they come in contact with; and most people are capable of personal, intimate intercourse with others unless they are stupefied by inhuman work or turned off by schooling.
+
+The fact that people in rich countries do not learn much on their own constitutes no proof to the contrary. Rather it is a consequence of life in an environment from which, paradoxically, they cannot learn much precisely because it is so highly programmed. They are constantly frustrated by the structure of contemporary society in which the facts that are the basis for making decisions have become more elusive. They live in an environment where tools that can be used for creative purposes have become luxuries, an environment where the channels of communication allow a few to talk to the many.
+
+
+## A New Technology Rather Than A New Education
+
+During the Kennedy years, a peculiar image appeared: knowledge stock. It then gained wide currency in economic thought through Kenneth Boulding. This valuable social good is viewed as the cumulative accretion of the mental excrement of our brightest and best. We here succeed in imagining an anal "capital" that replaces the heaps of earth or gold of previous capitalisms. Instead of bankers and brinksmen, scientists and information storage and retrieval specialists guard it. Meanwhile, thanks to its accruement in a critical mass, it produces interest. A special kind of marketing specialist called an "educator" distributes the stock by channeling it toward those privileged enough to have access to the higher reaches of the international knowledge exchange called "school." Here, these acquire knowledge-holding certificates, which increase the possessor's social value. In some societies, this value translates principally into increased personal income, while in those where knowledge capital is considered too valuable to end up as private property, the value translates into power, rank, and privilege. Such singular treatment is rationalized by the pomp due the guardians of such stock when they put it to further use.
+
+Such a view also affects the manner in which we think of modern technology's development. A contemporary myth would make us believe that the sense of impotence with which most men live today is the consequence of a technology that cannot but create huge systems. But it is not technology that makes systems huge, tools immensely powerful, channels of communication one-directional. Quite the contrary. Properly controlled, technology could provide each man with the ability to understand his environment better and to shape it powerfully with his own hands, and would permit him full intercommunication to a degree never before possible. Such an alternative use of technology constitutes the central alternative in education.
+
+If a person is to grow up he needs, first of all, access to things, to places, and to processes, to events and to records. He needs to see, to touch, to tinker with, to grasp whatever there is in a meaningful setting. This access is now largely denied. When knowledge became a commodity, it acquired the protections of private property, and thus a principle designed to guard personal intimacy became a rationale for declaring facts off limits for people without proper credentials. In schools teachers keep knowledge to themselves unless it fits into the day's program. The media inform, but exclude those things they regard as unfit to print. Information is locked into special languages, and specialized teachers live off its retranslation. Patents are protected by corporations, secrets are guarded by bureaucracies, and the power to keep others out of private preserves--be they cockpits, law offices, junkyards, or clinics--is jealously guarded by professions, institutions, and nations. Neither the political nor the professional structure of our societies. East and West, could withstand the elimination of the power to keep entire classes of people from facts that could serve them. The access to facts that I advocate goes far beyond truth in labeling. Access must be built into reality, while all we ask of advertising is a guarantee that it does not mislead. Access to reality constitutes a fundamental alternative in education to a system that only purports to teach about it.
+
+Abolishing the right to corporate secrecy--even when professional opinion holds that this secrecy serves the common good--is, as shall presently appear, a much more radical political goal than the traditional demand for public ownership or control of the tools of production. The socialization of tools without the effective socialization of know-how in their use tends to put the knowledge capitalist into the position formerly held by the financier. The technocrat's only claim to power is the stock he holds in some class of scarce and secret knowledge, and the best means to protect its value is a large and capital-intensive organization that renders access to know-how formidable and forbidding.
+
+It does not take much time for the interested learner to acquire almost any skill that he wants to use. We tend to forget this in a society where professional teachers monopolize entrance into all fields and thereby stamp teaching by uncertified individuals as quackery. There are few mechanical skills used in industry or research that are as demanding, complex, and dangerous as driving a car, a skill that most people quickly acquire from a peer. Not all people are suited for advanced logic, yet those who are make rapid progress if they are challenged to play mathematical games at an early age. One out of twenty kids in Cuernavaca can beat me at Whiff'n'Proof after a couple of weeks training. In four months all but a small percentage of motivated adults at our CIDOC center were able to learn Spanish well enough to conduct academic business in the new language.
+
+A first step toward opening up access to skills would be to provide various incentives for skilled individuals to share their knowledge. Inevitably, this would run counter to the interest of guilds and professions and unions. Yet multiple apprenticeship is attractive; it provides everybody with an opportunity to learn something about almost anything. There is no reason why a person should not combine the abilities to drive a car, repair telephones and toilets, act as a midwife, and function as an architectural draftsman. Special-interest groups and their disciplined consumers would, of course, claim that the public needs the protection of a professional guarantee. But this argument is now steadily being challenged by consumer-protection associations. We have to take much more seriously the objection that economists raise to the radical socialization of skills: that "progress" will be impeded if knowledge--patents, skills, and all the rest--is democratized. Their arguments can be faced only if we demonstrate to them the growth rate of futile diseconomies generated by any existing educational system.
+
+Access to people willing to share their skills is no guarantee of learning. Such access is restricted not only by the monopoly of educational programs over learning and of unions over licensing but also by a technology of scarcity. The skills that count today are know-how in the use of tools that were designed to be scarce. These tools produce goods or render services that everybody wants but only a few can enjoy, and which only a limited number of people know how to use. Only a few privileged individuals out of the total number of people who have a given disease ever benefit from the results of sophisticated medical technology, and even fewer doctors develop the skill to use them.
+
+The same results of medical research have, however, also been employed to create a basic tool kit that permits army and navy medics, with only a few months of training, to obtain results under battlefield conditions that would have been beyond the expectations of full-fledged doctors during World War II. On an even simpler level, any peasant girl could learn how to diagnose and treat most infections if medical scientists prepared dosages and instructions specifically for a given geographic area.
+
+All these examples illustrate the fact that educational considerations alone suffice to demand a radical reduction of the professional structure that now impedes the relationship between the scientist and the majority of people who want access to science. If this demand were heeded, all men could learn to use yesterday's tools, rendered more effective and durable by modem science, to create tomorrow's world.
+
+Unfortunately, precisely the contrary trend prevails at present. I know a coastal area in South America where most people support themselves by fishing from small boats. The outboard motor is certainly the tool that has changed the lives of these coastal fishermen most dramatically. But in the area I have surveyed, half of all outboard motors that were purchased between 1945 and 1950 are still kept running by constant tinkering, while half the motors purchased in 1965 no longer run because they were not built to be repaired. Technological progress provides the majority of people with gadgets they cannot afford and deprives them of the simpler tools they need.
+
+Metals, plastics, and ferroconcrete used in building have greatly improved since the 1940s and ought to provide more people the opportunity to create their own homes. But while in 1948 more than 30 per cent of all one-family homes in the United States were owner-built, by the end of the 1960s the percentage of those who acted as their own contractors had dropped to less than 20 per cent.
+
+The lowering of the skill level through so-called economic development has become even more visible in Latin America. Here most people still build their own homes from floor to roof. Often they use mud in the form of adobe and thatchwork of unsurpassed utility in the moist, hot, and windy climate. In other places they make their dwellings out of cardboard, oil drums, and other industrial refuse. Instead of providing people with simple tools and highly standardized, durable, and easily repaired components, all governments have gone in for the mass production of low-cost buildings. It is clear that not one single country can afford to provide satisfactory modern dwelling units for the majority of its people. Yet everywhere this policy makes it progressively more difficult for the majority to acquire the knowledge and skills they need to build better houses for themselves.
+
+
+## Self-chosen "Poverty"
+
+Educational considerations permit us to formulate a second fundamental characteristic that any postindustrial society must possess: a basic tool kit that by its very nature counteracts technocratic control. For educational reasons we must work toward a society in which scientific knowledge is incorporated in tools and components that can be used meaningfully in units small enough to be within the reach of all. Only such tools can socialize access to skills. Only such tools favor temporary associations among those who want to use them on specific occasions. Only such tools allow specific goals to emerge in the process of their use, as any tinkerer knows. Only the combination of guaranteed access to facts and of limited power in most tools renders it possible to envisage a subsistence economy capable of incorporating the fruits of modem science.
+
+The development of such a scientific subsistence economy is unquestionably to the advantage of the overwhelming majority of the people in poor countries. It is also the only alternative to progressive pollution, exploitation, and opaqueness in rich countries. But as we have seen, the dethroning of GNP cannot be achieved without simultaneously subverting GNE--Gross National Education, usually conceived as manpower capitalization. An egalitarian economy cannot exist in a society in which the right to produce is conferred by schools.
+
+The feasibility of a modern subsistence economy does not depend on new scientific inventions. It depends primarily on the ability of a society to agree on fundamental, self-chosen antibureaucratic and antitechnocratic restraints.
+
+These restraints can take many forms, but they will not work unless they touch the basic dimensions of life. (The decision of the United States Congress against development of the supersonic transport plane is one of the most encouraging steps in the right direction.) The substance of these voluntary social restraints would be very simple matters that could be fully understood and judged by any prudent man. (The issues at stake in the SST controversy provide a good example.) All such restraints would be chosen to promote stable and equal enjoyment of scientific know-how. The French say that it takes a thousand years to educate a peasant to deal with a cow. It would not take two generations to help all people in Latin America or Africa to use and repair outboard motors, simple cars, pumps, medicine kits, and ferroconcrete machines if their design did not change every few years. And since a joyful life is one of constant meaningful intercourse with others in a meaningful environment, equal enjoyment does translate into equal education.
+
+At present a consensus on austerity is difficult to imagine. The reason usually given for the impotence of the majority is stated in terms of political or economic class. What is not usually understood is that the new class structure of a schooled society is even more powerfully controlled by vested interests. No doubt an imperialist and capitalist organization of society provides the social structure within which a minority can have disproportionate influence over the effective opinion of the majority. But in a technocratic society the power of a minority of knowledge capitalists can prevent the formation of true public opinion through control of scientific know-how and the media of communication. Constitutional guarantees of free speech, free press, and free assembly were meant to ensure government by the people. Modern electronics, photo-offset presses, time-sharing computers, and telephones have in principle provided the hardware that could give an entirely new meaning to these freedoms. Unfortunately these things are used in modem media to increase the power of knowledge bankers to funnel their program-packages through international chains to more people, instead of being used to increase true networks that would provide equal opportunity for encounter among the members of the majority.
+
+Deschooling the culture and social structure requires the use of technology to make participatory politics possible. Only on the basis of a majority coalition can limits to secrecy and growing power be determined without dictatorship. We need a new environment in which growing up can be classless, or we will get a brave new world in which Big Brother educates us all.
+
+
+
+# Tantalizing Needs
+
+_This essay reproduces the original text of my_ Encyclopaedia Britannica _lecture at the University of Edinburgh in early 1974. In this lecture I explored, in the mirror of medicine, what options are left to a community paralyzed in the grip of its tools. By describing the obviously sickening power of the medical system, I drew attention to the paradoxically counterproductive effectiveness of our entirely commodity-centered culture. I developed the theme of this lecture through three successive versions of a book. Medical Nemesis:_ The Expropriation of Health _(London, 1974; Paris, 1975; New York, 1976). I present the Edinburgh lecture here in the hope that it will remind the readers of_ Medical Nemesis _that the author's purpose in writing on medicine was to illustrate the political and institutional inversion of present-day industrial society at large._
+
+Within the last decade the medical establishment has become a major threat to health. The depression, infection, disability, and dysfunction that result from its intervention now cause more suffering than all accidents in traffic and industry. Only the organic damage done by the industrial production of food can rival the ill-health induced by doctors. In addition, medical practice sponsors sickness by the reinforcement of a morbid society which not only industrially preserves its defectives but breeds the therapist's client in a cybernetic way. Finally, the so-called health professions have an indirect sickening power, a structurally health-denying effect. They transform pain, illness, and death from a personal challenge into a technical problem and thereby expropriate the potential of people to deal with their human condition in an autonomous way.
+
+
+## The Backlash of Progress
+
+This ultimate backlash of hygienic progress transcends all technical iatrogenesis; it exceeds the sum of protected malpractice, managerial negligence, and professional callousness against which judicial redress has become increasingly difficult; it is rooted deeper than the maldistribution of resources for which political remedies are still being tried; it is more global than all diseases of medical trial and error. The professional expropriation of health care is the outcome of an unchecked engineering endeavor; it results in the heteronomous maintenance of life on high levels of unhealth and is experienced as a new kind of horror which I call medical nemesis.
+
+During the last twenty years, the United States price index has risen by about 74 per cent, but the cost of medical care has escalated by 330 per cent. While public expenditure for health care has increased tenfold, out-of-pocket payments for health services have risen threefold and the cost of private insurance eighteenfold. The cost of community hospitals has increased 500 per cent since 1950. The bill for patient care in major hospitals has risen even faster, tripling in eight years. Administrative expenses have multipled by a factor of seven, laboratory costs by a factor of five. Building a hospital bed now costs $65,000, of which two-thirds goes toward mechanical equipment written off or made redundant within ten years or less. Yet during this same period of unprecedented inflation, life expectancy for adult American males has declined.
+
+The National Health Service in England has had a comparable rate of cost inflation, though it has avoided some of the more astonishing misallocations that fuel public criticism in the United States. Life expectancy in England has not yet declined, but the chronic diseases of middle-aged men have shown an increase as they did a decade earlier in the United States. In the Soviet Union, physicians and hospital days per capita have tripled over the same period. In China, after a short honeymoon with modern deprofessionalization, the medical-technological establishment has recently grown even faster. The rate at which people become dependent on physicians appears to bear no relation to their form of government. These trends do not represent declining marginal utilities. They are an example of the economics of addiction in which marginal disutilities rise with increasing investment. But, by itself, addiction is not yet nemesis.
+
+In the United States, central-nervous-system agents are the fastest-growing sector of the drug market, making up 31 per cent of total sales. Over the last twelve years, the rise in per capita consumption for liquor was 23 per cent, for illegal opiates, about 50 per cent, and for prescribed tranquilizers, 290 per cent. Some people have tried to explain that this pattern is due to the peculiar way United States physicians receive their lifelong in-service training: in 1970, United States drug companies spent $4,500 in advertising per doctor to reach each of the 350,000 practitioners. Surprisingly, the per capita use of tranquilizers correlates with personal income all over the world, although in many countries the cost of the "scientific education" of the doctor is not included in the price of the drug. But serious as the rising addiction to doctors and drugs might be, it is only one symptom of nemesis.
+
+Medicine cannot do much for illnesses associated with aging. It cannot cure cardiovascular disease, most cancers, arthritis, multiple sclerosis, or advanced cirrhosis. Some of the pain the aged suffer can sometimes be lessened. Most treatment of the old which requires professional intervention not only heightens their pain but, if it is successful, also protracts it. One is therefore surprised to discover the extent to which resources are spent on the treatment of old age. While 10 per cent of the United States population is over sixty-five, 28 per cent of healthcare expenditures are made on behalf of this minority. The old are outgrowing the remainder of the population at a rate of 3 per cent, while the per capita cost of their care is rising at a rate of 6 per cent. Gerontology takes over the GNP. This misallocation of manpower, resources, and social concern will generate unspeakable pain as demands swell and resources dry up. Yet it too is only a symptom, and nemesis transcends even ritual waste.
+
+Since Nixon and Brezhnev agreed on scientific cooperation in the conquest of space, cancer, and heart disease, coronary-care units have become symbols of peaceful progress and arguments for rising taxes. They require three times the equipment and five times the staff needed for normal patient care; 12 per cent of graduate nurses find jobs in such units. They also demonstrate the meaning of professionally conducted embezzlement. Large-scale studies that compare the results of patient care in these units with the home treatment of comparable patients have not yet demonstrated any advantage. The therapeutic value of heart-control stations is probably the same as that of space flights: seen on television, both provide a rain-dance for millions, who learn to trust science and cease to care for themselves. I happened to be in both Rio de Janeiro and Lima when Dr. Christiaan Barnard was touring there. In both Brazil and Peru, he was able to fill the major football stadium twice in one day with crowds who hysterically acclaimed his macabre ability to exchange human hearts. Shortly afterwards, I saw well-documented testimonies proving that the Brazilian police have become the first to use life-extension equipment in the torture chamber. Inevitably, when care or healing is transferred to organizations or machines, therapy becomes a death- centered ritual. But nemesis transcends even human sacrifice.
+
+
+## Backfiring Remedies
+
+Prevention of sickness by the intervention of professional third parties has become a fad. Demand for it is growing. Pregnant women, healthy children, workers, or old people are submitted to periodic check-ups and increasingly complex diagnostic procedures. In the process, people are strengthened in their conviction that they are machines whose durability depends on social design. A review of two dozen studies shows that these diagnostic procedures have no impact on mortality and morbidity. In fact, they transform healthy people into anxious patients, and the health risks associated with these attempts at automated diagnosis outweigh any theoretical benefits. Ironically, the serious asymptomatic disorders which this kind of screening alone can discover are frequently incurable illnesses in which early treatment aggravates the patient's morbid condition. But nemesis transcends even terminal torture.
+
+To a point, modern medicine was concerned with therapeutic engineering--the development of strategies for surgical, chemical, or behavioral intervention in the lives of people who are or who might become sick. As it appears that these interventions do not become more effective just because they become more costly, a new level of health engineering has been pushed into the foreground. Health systems are now biased in favor of curative and preventive medicine. New health systems are proposed that are biased in favor of environmental health management. The obsession with immunity gives way to a nightmare of hygiene. As the health-delivery system continually fails to meet the demands made upon it, conditions now classified as illness might well soon be classified as criminal deviance. Imposed medical intervention might be replaced by compulsory re-education or self-criticism. The convergence of individual and environmental hygienic engineering now threatens mankind with a new epidemic in which constantly backfiring countermeasures are absorbed into the plague. This sickening synergy of the technical and nontechnical functions of medicine is what I call hygienic, medical, or tantalizing nemesis.
+
+
+## Industrial Nemesis
+
+Much suffering has always been man-made: history is the record of enslavement and exploitation. It tells of war, and of the pillage, famine, and pestilence which come in its wake. War between commonwealths and classes has so far been the main planned agency of man-made misery. Thus, man is the only animal whose evolution has been conditioned by adaptation on two fronts. If he did not succumb to the elements, he had to cope with use and abuse by others of his kind. To be capable of this struggle on two frontiers, he replaced instincts by character and culture. A third frontier of possible doom has been recognized since Homer, but common mortals were considered immune to its threat. Nemesis, the Greek name for the doom which threatened from this third direction, was the fate of a few heroes who had fallen prey to envy of the gods. The common man grew up and perished in a struggle with nature and neighbor. Only the elite would challenge the limits set by nature for man.
+
+Prometheus was not Everyman, but a deviant. Driven by _pleonexia_, or radical greed, he transgressed the boundaries of the human condition. In _hubris_, or measureless presumption, he brought fire from heaven, and thereby brought Nemesis on himself. He was put into irons on a Caucasian rock. An eagle preyed on his liver, and heartlessly healing gods kept him alive by regrafting his liver each night. The encounter with Nemesis made the classical hero an immortal reminder of inescapable cosmic retaliation. He became a subject for epic tragedy, but certainly not a model for everyday aspiration. Now Nemesis has become endemic; it is the backlash of progress. Paradoxically, it has spread as far and as wide as the franchise, schooling, mechanical acceleration, and medical care. Everyman has fallen prey to envy of the gods. If the species is to survive, it can do so only by learning to cope on this third frontier.
+
+Most man-made misery is now the by-product of enterprises originally designed to protect the common man in his struggle with the inclemency of the environment and against wanton injustice inflicted by the elite. The main source of pain, disability, and death is now engineered--albeit nonintentional--harassment. The prevailing ailments, helplessness, and injustice are now the side effects of strategies for progress. Nemesis is now so prevalent that it is readily mistaken for part of the human condition. Common to all previous ethics was the idea that the range of human action was narrowly circumscribed. _Techne_ was a measured tribute to necessity and not the road to mankind's chosen action. The desperate disability of contemporary man to envisage an alternative to industrial aggression upon the human condition is an integral part of the curse from which he suffers.
+
+The attempt to reduce nemesis to a political or biological process frustrates any diagnosis of the current institutional crisis. Any study of the so-called limits-to-growth controversy becomes futile if it reduces nemesis to a threat which can be met on the the two traditional frontiers. Nemesis does not lose its specific character simply because it has been industrialized. The contemporary crisis of industrial society cannot be understood without distinguishing between intentionally exploitative aggression of one class against another and the inevitable doom implicit in any disproportionate attempt to transform the human condition. Our predicament cannot be understood without distinguishing between man-made violence and the destructive envy of the cosmos; between the servitude of man to man and the enslavement of man to his gods, which are, of course, his tools. Nemesis cannot be reduced to a problem within the competence of engineers or political managers.
+
+Schooling, transportation, the legal system, modern agriculture, and medicine serve equally well to illustrate how engendered frustration works. Beyond a certain point, the degradation of learning into the result of intentional teaching inevitably compounds a new kind of impotence of the poor majority with a new kind of class structure which discriminates against them. All forms of compulsory, planned learning have these implicit side effects, no matter how much money, good will, political growth, or pedagogic rhetoric is expended in the process; no matter if the world is filled with classrooms or if it is itself transformed into one.
+
+Beyond a certain level of energy, used for the acceleration of any one person in traffic, the transportation industry immobilizes and enslaves the majority of nameless passengers, and provides only questionable marginal advantages to an Olympian elite. No new fuel, technology, or public control can keep the rising mobilization of society from producing increased harriedness, paralysis, and inequity.
+
+Beyond a certain level of capital investment in agriculture and food processing, malnutrition must become pervasive; the green illusion racks the liver of the consumer more effectively than Zeus's eagle. No biological engineering can prevent this result.
+
+Beyond a certain point, the production and delivery of medical care produces more ailments than it can heal. Social security guarantees painful survival more democratically and effectively than the most pitiless gods.
+
+Progress has come with a vengeance which cannot be called a price. The down payment was on the label and can be stated in measurable terms. The compound installments accrue under forms of suffering that exceed the notion of "price." They have led entire societies into a debtors' prison, in which increasing torture for the majority overwhelms and cancels out any possibility of returns that might still benefit a few.
+
+The peasant who switches from weaving his cloth, building his home, and making his tools to the purchase of ready-made clothes, cement beams, and tractors can no longer be satisfied unless he contributes to world-wide nemesis. His neighbor who continues to try to survive on traditional cloth, shelter, and production can no longer live in a world in which industrial nemesis has come to prevail. This double bind is the issue I want to explore. Exasperating greed and blind boldness have ceased to be heroic; they have become part of the social duty of industrialized Everyman. In entering the contemporary market economy, usually by taking the road through schooling, the citizen joins the chorus summoning nemesis. But he also joins a horde of furies unleashed upon those who remain outside the system. The so-called marginal participants who do not fully enter into the market economy find themselves deprived of the traditional means of coping with nature and neighbor.
+
+At some point in the expansion of our major institutions, their clients begin to pay a higher price every day for their continued consumption, in spite of evidence that they will inevitably suffer more. At this point in development, the prevalent behavior of society corresponds to that traditionally recognized in addicts. Declining returns pale in comparison with increasing marginal disutilities. _Homo economicus_ turns into _Homo religiosus_. His expectations become heroic. The vengeance of economic development not only outweighs the price at which this vengeance was purchased; it also outweighs the compound tort done by nature and neighbor. Classical Nemesis was punishment for the rash abuse of a privilege. Industrialized nemesis is retribution for dutiful participation in society.
+
+War and hunger, pestilence and sudden death, torture and madness remain man's companions, but they are now shaped into a new _Gestalt_ by the nemesis overarching them. The greater the economic progress of any community, the greater the part played by industrial nemesis in the pain, discrimination, and death suffered by its members. Therefore, it seems that the disciplined study of the distinctive character of nemesis ought to be the key theme for research among those concerned with health care, healing, and consoling.
+
+Industrial nemesis is the result of policy formation and decision-making which inevitably produce counterintuitive misadventures. It is the result of a management style which remains a puzzle for the planners. As long as these misadventures are described in the language of science and economics, they remain odd surprises. The language for the study of industrial nemesis must still be forged; it must be capable of describing the contradictions inherent in the thought processes of a society which values operational verification above intuitive evidence.
+
+
+## The Hubris of Tantalus
+
+Medical nemesis is but one aspect of the more general "counterintuitive misadventures" characteristic of industrial society. It is the monstrous outcome of a very specific dream of reason, namely "tantalizing" hubris. Tantalus was a famous king whom the gods invited to Olympus to share one of their meals. He purloined ambrosia, the divine potion that gave the gods unending life. For punishment, he was made immortal in Hades and condemned to suffer unending thirst and hunger. When he bows toward the river in which he stands, the water recedes, and when he reaches for the fruit above his head, the branches move out of his reach. Ethologists might say that hygienic nemesis had programmed him for compulsory counterintuitive behavior.
+
+Craving for ambrosia has now spread to the common mortal. Scientific and political optimism have combined to propagate the addiction. To sustain it, a priesthood of Tantalus has organized itself, offering unlimited medical improvement of human health. The members of this guild pass themselves off as disciples of healing Asklepios, while in fact they peddle ambrosia. People demand of them that life be improved, prolonged, rendered compatible with machines and capable of surviving all modes of acceleration, distortion, and stress. As a result, health has become scarce to the degree that the common man makes health dependent upon the consumption of ambrosia.
+
+Mankind evolved only because each of its individuals came into existence protected by various visible and invisible cocoons. Each one knew the womb from which he had come, and oriented himself by the stars under which he was born. To be human and to become humane, the individual of our species had to find his destiny in his unique struggle with nature and neighbor. He was on his own in the struggle, but the weapons and the rules and the style were given to him by the culture in which he grew up. Cultures evolved, each according to its own viability; and with culture grew people, each learning to keep alive in a common cocoon. Each culture was the sum of rules by which the individual came to terms with pain, sickness, and death, interpreted them, and practiced compassion toward others faced by the same threats. Each culture set up the myths, the rituals, the taboos, and the ethical standards needed to deal with the fragility of life.
+
+Cosmopolitan medical civilization denies the need for man's acceptance of these evils. Medical civilization is planned and organized to kill pain, to eliminate sickness, and to struggle against death. These are new goals, which have never before been guidelines for social life and which are antithetical to every one of the cultures that medical civilization encounters when it is dumped on the so-called poor as part and parcel of their economic progress. The health-denying effect of medical civilization is thus equally powerful in rich and in poor countries, even though the latter are often spared some of its more sinister aspects.
+
+### The Killing of Pain
+
+For an experience to be pain in the full sense, it must fit into a culture. Precisely because each culture provides a mode for suffering, culture is a particular form of health. The act of suffering is shaped by culture into a question that can be stated and shared.
+
+Medical civilization replaces culturally determined competence in suffering with a growing demand by each individual for the institutional management of his pain. A myriad different feelings, each expressing some kind of fortitude, are homogenized into the political pressure of anesthesia consumers. Pain becomes an item on a list of complaints. As a result, a new kind of horror emerges. Conceptually it is still pain, but the impact on our emotions of this valueless, opaque, and impersonal hurt is something quite new.
+
+In this way, pain has come to pose only a technical question for industrial man: What do I need to set in order to have my pain managed or killed? If the pain continues, the fault is not with the universe, God, my sins, or the devil, but with the medical system. Suffering is an expression of consumer demand for increased medical outputs. By becoming unnecessary, pain has become unbearable. Given this attitude, it now seems rational to flee pain rather than to face it, even at the cost of addiction. It also appears reasonable to eliminate pain, even at the cost of health. It seems enlightened to deny legitimacy to all nontechnical issues that pain raises, even at the cost of disarming the victims of residual pain. For a while it can be argued that the total amount of pain anesthetized in a society is greater than that of pain newly generated. But at some point, rising marginal disutilities set in. The new suffering is not only unmanageable, but it has lost its referential character. It has become meaningless, questionless torture. Only the recovery of the will and ability to suffer can restore health to pain.
+
+### The Elimination of Sickness
+
+Medical interventions have not affected total mortality rates; at best they have shifted survival from one segment of the population to another. Dramatic changes in the nature of disease afflicting Western societies during the last one hundred years are well documented. First industrialization exacerbated infections, which then subsided. Tuberculosis peaked over a fifty-to-seventy-five-year period and declined before either the tubercle bacillus had been discovered or antituberculosis programs had been initiated. It was replaced in Britain and the United States by major malnutrition syndromes--rickets and pellagra--which peaked and declined and were replaced by diseases of early childhood, which in turn gave way to duodenal ulcer in young men. When that declined, the modern epidemics took their toll: coronary heart disease, hypertension, cancer, arthritis, diabetes, and mental disorders. At least in the United States death rates from hypertensive heart disease seem to be declining. Despite intensive research, no connection can be demonstrated between these changes in disease patterns and the professional practice of medicine.
+
+The overwhelming majority of modern diagnostic and therapeutic interventions that demonstrably do more good than harm have two characteristics: the material resources for them are extremely cheap, and they can be packaged and designed for self-use or application by family members. The technology that is significantly health-furthering or curative in Canadian medicine costs so little that it could be made available in the entire subcontinent of India for the amount of money now squandered there on modern medicine. On the other hand, the skills needed for the application of the most generally used diagnostic and therapeutic aids are so simple that the careful observation of instructions by people who personally care would guarantee more effective and responsible use than medical practice can provide.
+
+Neither a decline in any of the major epidemics of killing diseases, nor major changes in the age structure of the population, nor falling and rising absenteeism at the workbench has been significantly related to sick-care or even to immunization. Medical services deserve neither credit for longevity nor blame for the threatening population pressure. Longevity owes much more to the railroad and to the synthesis of fertilizers and insecticides than it owes to new drugs and syringes. Professional practice is both ineffective and increasingly sought out. This technically unwarranted rise in medical prestige can only be explained as a magical ritual for the achievement of goals beyond technical and political reach. It can be countered only through legislation and political action that favor the deprofessionalization of health care.
+
+The professionalization of medicine does not imply and should not be read as implying negation of specialized healers, of competence, of mutual criticism, or of public control. It does imply a bias against mystification, against transnational dominance of one orthodox view, against disbarment of healers chosen by their patients but not certified by the guild. The deprofessionalization of medicine does not mean denial of public funds for curative purposes; it does mean a bias against the disbursement of any such funds under the prescription and control of guild members rather than under the control of the consumer. Deprofessionalization does not mean the elimination of modern medicine, nor an obstacle to the invention of a new medicine, nor necessarily a return to ancient programs, rituals, and devices. It means that no professional shall have the power to lavish on any one of his patients a package of curative resources larger than that which any other could claim on his own. Finally, the deprofessionalization of medicine does not mean disregard for the special needs that people manifest at special moments of their lives: when they are born, break a leg, marry, give birth, become crippled, or face death. It only means that people have a right to live in an environment that is hospitable to them at such high points in their experience.
+
+### The Struggle Against Death
+
+The ultimate effect of medical nemesis is the expropriation of death. In every society the image of death is the culturally conditioned anticipation of an uncertain date. This anticipation determines a series of behavioral norms during life and the structure of certain institutions. Wherever modem medical civilization has penetrated a traditional medical culture, a novel cultural ideal of death has been fostered. The new ideal spreads by means of technology and the professional ethos which corresponds to it.
+
+In primitive societies, death is always conceived as the intervention of an actor: an enemy, a witch, an ancestor, or a god. The Christian and the Islamic Middle Ages saw in each death the hand of God. Western death had no face until about 1420. The Western ideal of death which comes to all equally from natural causes is of quite recent origin. Only during the autumn of the Middle Ages does death appear as a skeleton with power in its own right. Only during the sixteenth century did European peoples develop the "arte and crafte to knowe ye Will to Dye." For the next three centuries peasant and noble, priest and whore prepared themselves throughout life to preside at their own death. Foul death, bitter death, became the end rather than the goal of living. The idea that natural death should come only in healthy old age appeared only in the eighteenth century as a class-specific phenomenon of the bourgeoisie. The demand that doctors struggle against death and keep valetudinarians healthy has nothing to do with their ability to provide such services; Aries has shown that the costly attempts to prolong life appeared at first only among bankers, whose power was compounded by the years they spent at a desk.
+
+We cannot fully understand contemporary social organization unless we see in it a multifaceted exorcism of all forms of evil death. Our major institutions constitute a gigantic defense program waged on behalf of "humanity" against all those people who can be associated with what is currently conceived of as death-dealing social injustice. Not only medical agencies but welfare, international relief, and development programs are enlisted in this struggle. Ideological bureaucracies of all colors join the crusade. Even war has been used to justify the defeat of those who are blamed for wanton tolerance of sickness and death. Producing "natural death" for all men is at the point of becoming an ultimate justification for social control. Under the influence of medical rituals contemporary death is again the rationale for a witch-hunt.
+
+
+## The Recovery of Health
+
+Rising irreparable damage accompanies present industrial expansion in all sectors. In medicine these damages appear as iatrogenesis. Iatrogenesis can be direct, as when pain, sickness, and death result from medical care; or it can be indirect, as when health policies reinforce an industrial organization that generates ill-health: it can be structural when medically sponsored behavior and delusion restrict the vital autonomy of people by undermining their competence in growing up, caring, and aging; or when it nullifies the personal challenge arising from their pain, disability, and anguish.
+
+Most of the remedies proposed for reducing iatrogenesis are engineering interventions, therapeutically designed in their approach to the individual, the group, the institution, or the environment. These so-called remedies generate second-order iatrogenic ills by creating a new prejudice against the autonomy of the citizen.
+
+The most profound iatrogenic effects of the medical technostructure result from its nontechnical social functions. The sickening technical and nontechnical consequences of the institutionalization of medicine coalesce to generate a new kind of suffering: anesthetized and solitary survival in a world-wide hospital ward.
+
+Medical nemesis cannot be operationally verified. Much less can it be measured. The intensity with which it is experienced depends on the independence, vitality, and relatedness of each individual. As a theoretical concept, it is one component in a broad theory explaining the anomalies that plague health-care systems in our day. It is a distinct aspect of an even more general phenomenon which I have called industrial nemesis, the backlash of institutionally structured industrial hubris. This hubris consists of a disregard for the boundaries within which the human phenomenon remains viable. Current research is overwhelmingly oriented toward unattainable "breakthroughs." What I have called counterfoil research is the disciplined analysis of the levels at which such reverberations must inevitably damage man.
+
+The perception of enveloping nemesis leads to a social choice. Either the natural boundaries of human endeavor must be estimated, recognized, and translated into politically determined limits, or the alternative to extinction will be compulsory survival in a planned and engineered hell.
+
+In several nations the public is ready for a review of its health-care system. The frustrations that have become manifest in private-enterprise systems and in socialized care have come to resemble each other frighteningly. The differences between the criticisms by the Russians, French, Americans, and English have become trivial. There is a serious danger that these evaluations will be performed within the coordinates set by post-Cartesian illusions. In rich and in poor countries the demand for reform of national health care is dominated by demands for equitable access to the wares of the guild, for professional expansion and subprofessionalization, for more truth in the advertising of progress, and for lay control of the temple of Tantalus. The public discussion of the health crisis could easily be used to channel even more power, prestige, and money to biomedical engineers and designers.
+
+There is still time in the next few years to avoid a debate which would reinforce a frustrating system. The coming debate can be reoriented by making hygienic nemesis the central issue. The explanation of nemesis requires simultaneous assessment of both the technical and the nontechnical aspects of medicine, and must focus on it as both industry and religion. The indictment of medicine as a form of institutional hubris exposes precisely those personal illusions that make the critic dependent on health care.
+
+The perception and comprehension of nemesis have therefore the power of leading us to policies which could break the magic circle of complaints that now reinforce the dependence of the plaintiff on the health engineering and planning agencies that he sues. Recognition of nemesis can provide the catharsis to prepare for a nonviolent revolution in our attitudes toward evil and pain. The alternatives to a war against these ills is a search for the peace of the strong.
+
+Health designates a process of adaptation. It is not the result of instinct, but of autonomous and live reaction to an experienced reality. It designates the ability to adapt to changing environments, to growing up and to aging, to healing when damaged, to suffering, and to the peaceful expectation of death. Health embraces the future as well, and therefore includes anguish and the inner resources to live with it.
+
+Man's consciously lived fragility, individuality, and relatedness make the experience of pain, of sickness, and of death an integral part of his life. The ability to cope with this trio autonomously is fundamental to his health. To the degree that he becomes dependent on the management of his intimacy, he renounces his autonomy and his health _must_ decline. The true miracle of modern medicine is diabolical. It consists in making not only individuals but whole populations survive on inhumanly low levels of personal health. That health should decline with increasing health-service delivery is unforeseeable only by the health manager, precisely because his strategies are the result of his blindness to the inalienability of health.
+
+The level of public health corresponds to the degree to which the means and responsibility for coping with illness are distributed among the total population. This ability to cope can be enhanced but never replaced by medical intervention in the lives of people or the hygienic characteristics of the environment. That society which reduces professional intervention to the minimum will provide the best conditions for health. The greater the potential for autonomous adaptation to self and to others and to the environment, the less management of adaptation will be needed or tolerated.
+
+The recovery of a healthy attitude toward sickness is neither Luddite nor romantic nor utopian; it is a guiding ideal which will never be fully achieved, which can be achieved with modem devices as never before in history, and which must orient politics to avoid encroaching nemesis.
+
+
+
+# Energy and Equity
+
+> "El socialismo puede llegar sólo en bicicleta."
+>
+> -- _Jose Antonio Viera-Gallo. Assisant Secretary of Justice in the government of Salvador Allende
+
+_This text was first published in_ Le Monde _in early 1973. Over lunch in Paris the venerable editor of that daily, as he accepted my manuscript, recommended just one change. He felt that a term as little known and as technical as "energy crisis" had no place in the opening sentence of an article that he would be running on page 1. As I now reread the text, I am struck by the speed with which language and issues have shifted in less than five years. But I am equally struck by the slow yet steady pace at which the radical alternative to industrial society--namely, low-energy, convivial modernity--has gained defenders._
+
+_In this essay I argue that under some circumstances, a technology incorporates the values of the society for which it was invented to such a degree that these values become dominant in every society which applies that technology. The material structure of production devices can thus irremediably incorporate class prejudice. High-energy technology, at least as applied to traffic, provides a clear example. Obviously, this thesis undermines the legitimacy of those professionals who monopolize the operation of such technologies. It is particularly irksome to those individuals within the professions who seek to serve the public by using the rhetoric of class struggle with the aim of replacing the "capitalists" who now control institutional policy by professional peers and laymen who accept professional standards. Mainly under the influence of such "radical" professionals, this thesis has, in only five years, changed from an oddity into a heresy that has provoked a barrage of abuse._
+
+_The distinction proposed here, however, is not new. I oppose tools that can be applied in the generation of use-values to others that cannot be used except in the production of commodities. This distinction has recently been re-emphasized by a great variety of social critics. The insistence on the need for a balance between convivial and_ industrial _tools is, in fact, the common distinctive element in an emerging consensus among groups engaged in radical politics. A superb guide to the bibliography in this field has been published in_ Radical Technology _(London and New York, 1976), by the editors of_ Undercurrents. _I have transferred my own files on the theme to Valentina Borremans, who is now working on a librarians' guide to reference materials on use-value-oriented modern tools, scheduled for publication in 1978. (Preliminary drafts of individual chapters of this guide can be obtained by writing to Valentina Borremans, APDO 479, Cuernavaca, Mexico.) The specific argument on socially critical energy thresholds in transportation that I pursue in this essay has been elaborated and documented by two colleagues, Jean-Pierre Dupuy and Jean Robert, in their two jointly written books._ La Trahison de Topulence _(Paris, 1976) and_ Les Chronophages _(Paris, 1978)._
+
+
+## The Energy Crisis
+
+It has recently become fashionable to insist on an impending energy crisis. This euphemistic term conceals a contradiction and consecrates an illusion. It masks the contradiction implicit in the joint pursuit of equity and industrial growth. It safeguards the illusion that machine power can indefinitely take the place of manpower. To resolve this contradiction and dispel this illusion, it is urgent to clarify the reality that the language of crisis obscures: high quanta of energy degrade social relations just as inevitably as they destroy the physical milieu.
+
+The advocates of an energy crisis believe in and continue to propagate a peculiar vision of man. According to this notion, man is born into perpetual dependence on slaves which he must painfully learn to master. If he does not employ prisoners, then he needs machines to do most of his work. According to this doctrine, the well-being of a society can be measured by the number of years its members have gone to school and by the number of energy slaves they have thereby learned to command. This belief is common to the conflicting economic ideologies now in vogue. It is threatened by the obvious inequity, harriedness, and impotence that appear everywhere once the voracious hordes of energy slaves outnumber people by a certain proportion. The energy crisis focuses concern on the scarcity of fodder for these slaves. I prefer to ask whether free men need them.
+
+The energy policies adopted during the current decade will determine the range and character of social relationships a society will be able to enjoy by the year 2000. A low-energy policy allows for a wide choice of life-styles and cultures. If, on the other hand, a society opts for high energy consumption, its social relations must be dictated by technocracy and will be equally degrading whether labeled capitalist or socialist.
+
+At this moment, most societies--especially the poor ones--are still free to set their energy policies by any of three guidelines. Well-being can be identified with high amounts of per capita energy use, with high efficiency of energy transformation, or with the least possible use of mechanical energy by the most powerful members of society. The first approach would stress tight management of scarce and destructive fuels on behalf of industry, whereas the second would emphasize the retooling of industry in the interest of thermodynamic thrift. These first two attitudes necessarily imply huge public expenditures and increased social control; both rationalize the emergence of a computerized Leviathan, and both are at present widely discussed.
+
+The possibility of a third option is barely noticed. While people have begun to accept ecological limits on maximum per capita energy use as a condition for physical survival, they do not yet think about the use of minimum feasible power as the foundation of any of various social orders that would be both modern and desirable. Yet only a ceiling on energy use can lead to social relations that are characterized by high levels of equity. The one option that is at present neglected is the only choice within the reach of all nations. It is also the only strategy by which a political process can be used to set limits on the power of even the most motorized bureaucrat. Participatory democracy postulates low-energy technology. Only participatory democracy creates the conditions for rational technology.
+
+What is generally overlooked is that equity and energy can grow concurrently only to a point. Below a threshold of per capita wattage, motors improve the conditions for social progress. Above this threshold, energy grows at the expense of equity. Further energy affluence then means decreased distribution of control over that energy.
+
+The widespread belief that clean and abundant energy is the panacea for social ills is due to a political fallacy, according to which equity and energy consumption can be indefinitely correlated, at least under some ideal political conditions. Laboring under this illusion, we tend to discount any social limit on the growth of energy consumption. But if ecologists are right to assert that nonmetabolic power pollutes, it is in fact just as inevitable that, beyond a certain threshold, mechanical power corrupts. The threshold of social disintegration by high energy quanta is independent from the threshold at which energy conversion produces physical destruction. Expressed in horsepower, it is undoubtedly lower. This is the fact which must be theoretically recognized before a political issue can be made of the per capita wattage to which a society will limit its members.
+
+Even if nonpolluting power were feasible and abundant, the use of energy on a massive scale acts on society like a drug that is physically harmless but psychically enslaving. A community can choose between Methadone and "cold turkey"--between maintaining its addiction to alien energy and kicking it in painful cramps--but no society can have a population that is hooked on progressively larger numbers of energy slaves and whose members are also autonomously active.
+
+In previous discussions, I have shown that, beyond a certain level of per capita GNP, the cost of social control must rise faster than total output and become the major institutional activity within an economy. Therapy administered by educators, psychiatrists, and social workers must converge with the designs of planners, managers, and salesmen, and complement the services of security agencies, the military, and the police. I now want to indicate one reason why increased affluence requires increased control over people. I argue that beyond a certain median per capita energy level, the political system and cultural context of any society must decay. Once the critical quantum of per capita energy is surpassed, education for the abstract goals of a bureaucracy must supplant the legal guarantees of personal and concrete initiative. This quantum is the limit of social order.
+
+I will argue here that technocracy must prevail as soon as the ratio of mechanical power to metabolic energy oversteps a definite, identifiable threshold. The order of magnitude within which this threshold lies is largely independent of the level of technology applied, yet its very existence has slipped into the blind-spot of social imagination in both rich and medium-rich countries. Both the United States and Mexico have passed the critical divide. In both countries, further energy inputs increase inequality, inefficiency, and personal impotence. Although one country has a per capita income of $500 and the other, one of nearly $5,000, huge vested interest in an industrial infrastructure prods both of them to further escalate the use of energy. As a result, both North American and Mexican ideologues put the label of "energy crisis" on their frustration, and both countries are blinded to the fact that the threat of social breakdown is due neither to a shortage of fuel nor to the wasteful, polluting, and irrational use of available wattage, but to the attempt of industries to gorge society with energy quanta that inevitably degrade, deprive, and frustrate most people.
+
+A people can be just as dangerously overpowered by the wattage of its tools as by the caloric content of its foods, but it is much harder to confess to a national overindulgence in wattage than to a sickening diet. The per capita wattage that is critical for social well-being lies within an order of magnitude which is far above the horsepower known to four-fifths of humanity and far below the power commanded by any Volkswagen driver. It eludes the underconsumer and the overconsumer alike. Neither is willing to face the facts. For the primitive, the elimination of slavery and drudgery depends on the introduction of appropriate modern technology, and for the rich, the avoidance of an even more horrible degradation depends on the effective recognition of a threshold in energy consumption beyond which technical processes begin to dictate social relations. Calories are both biologically and socially healthy only as long as they stay within the narrow range that separates enough from too much.
+
+The so-called energy crisis is, then, a politically ambiguous issue. Public interest in the quantity of power and in the distribution of controls over the use of energy can lead in two opposite directions. On the one hand, questions can be posed that would open the way to political reconstruction by unblocking the search for a postindustrial, labor-intensive, low-energy and high-equity economy. On the other hand, hysterical concern with machine fodder can reinforce the present escalation of capital-intensive institutional growth, and carry us past the last turnoff from a hyperindustrial Armageddon. Political reconstruction presupposes the recognition of the fact that there exist _critical per capita quanta_ beyond which energy can no longer be controlled by political process. A universal social straitjacket will be the inevitable outcome of ecological restraints on _total energy use_ imposed by industrial-minded planners bent on keeping industrial production at some hypothetical maximum.
+
+Rich countries like the United States, Japan, or France might never reach the point of choking on their own waste, but only because their societies will have already collapsed into a sociocultural energy coma. Countries like India, Burma, and, for another short while at least, China are in the inverse position of being still muscle-powered enough to stop short of an energy stroke. They could choose, right now, to stay within those limits to which the rich will be forced back through a total loss of their freedoms.
+
+The choice of a minimum-energy economy compels the poor to abandon fantastical expectations and the rich to recognize their vested interest as a ghastly liability. Both must reject the fatal image of man the slaveholder currently promoted by an ideologically stimulated hunger for more energy. In countries that were made affluent by industrial development, the energy crisis serves as a pretext for raising the taxes that will be needed to substitute new, more "rational," and socially more deadly industrial processes for those that have been rendered obsolete by inefficient over expansion. For the leaders of people who are not yet dominated by the same process of industrialization, the energy crisis serves as a _historical imperative_ to centralize production, pollution, and their control in a last-ditch effort to catch up with the more highly powered. By exporting their crisis and by preaching the new gospel of puritan energy worship, the rich do even more damage to the poor than they did by selling them the products of now outdated factories. As soon as a poor country accepts the doctrine that more energy more carefully managed will always yield more goods for more people, that country locks itself into the cage of enslavement to maximum industrial outputs. Inevitably the poor lose the option for rational technology when they choose to modernize their poverty by increasing their dependence on energy. Inevitably the poor deny themselves the possibility of liberating technology and participatory politics when, together with maximum feasible energy use, they accept maximum feasible social control.
+
+The energy crisis cannot be overwhelmed by more energy inputs. It can only be dissolved, along with the illusion that well-being depends on the number of energy slaves a man has at his command. For this purpose, it is necessary to identify the thresholds beyond which energy corrupts, and to do so by a political process that associates the community in the search for limits. Because this kind of research runs counter to that now done by experts and for institutions, I shall continue to call it counterfoil research. It has three steps. First, the need for limits on the per capita use of energy must be theoretically recognized as a social imperative. Then, the range must be located wherein the critical magnitude might be found. Finally, each community has to identify the levels of inequity, harrying, and operant conditioning that its members are willing to accept in exchange for the satisfaction that comes of idolizing powerful devices and joining in rituals directed by the professionals who control their operation.
+
+The need for political research on socially optimal energy quanta can be clearly and concisely illustrated by an examination of modern traffic. The United States puts between 25 and 45 per cent of its total energy (depending upon how one calculates this) into vehicles: to make them, run them, and clear a right of way for them when they roll, when they fly, and when they park. Most of this energy is to move people who have been strapped into place. For the sole purpose of transporting people, 250 million Americans allocate more fuel than is used by 1.3 billion Chinese and Indians for all purposes. Almost all of this fuel is burned in a rain-dance of time-consuming acceleration. Poor countries spend less energy per person, but the percentage of total energy devoted to traffic in Mexico or in Peru is probably greater than in the United States, and it benefits a smaller percentage of the population. The size of this enterprise makes it both easy and significant to demonstrate the existence of socially critical energy quanta by the example of personal mobility.
+
+In traffic, energy used over a specific period of time (power) translates into speed. In this case, the critical quantum will appear as a speed limit. Wherever this limit has been passed, the basic pattern of social degradation by high energy quanta has emerged. Once some public utility went faster than 15 mph, equity declined and the scarcity of both time and space increased. Motorized transportation monopolized traffic and blocked self-powered transit. In every Western country, passenger mileage on all types of conveyance increased by a factor of a hundred within fifty years of building the first railroad. When the ratio of their respective power outputs passed beyond a certain value, mechanical transformers of mineral fuels excluded people from the use of their metabolic energy and forced them to become captive consumers of conveyance. This effect of speed on the autonomy of people is only marginally affected by the technological characteristics of the motorized vehicles employed or by the persons or entities who hold the legal titles to airlines, buses, railroads, or cars. High speed is the critical factor which makes transportation socially destructive. A true choice among practical policies and of desirable social relations is possible only where speed is restrained. Participatory democracy demands low-energy technology, and free people must travel the road to productive social relations at the speed of a bicycle.[^n01]
+
+
+## The Industrialization of Traffic
+
+The discussion of how energy is used to move people requires a formal distinction between transport and transit as the two components of traffic. By _traffic_ I mean any movement of people from one place to another when they are outside their homes. By _transit_ I mean those movements that put human metabolic energy to use, and by _transport_, that mode of movement which relies on other sources of energy. These energy sources will henceforth be mostly motors, since animals compete fiercely with men for their food in an overpopulated world, unless they are thistle eaters like donkeys and camels.
+
+As soon as people become tributaries of transport, not just when they travel for several days, but also on their daily trips, the contradictions between social justice and motorized power, between effective movement and higher speed, between personal freedom and engineered routing, become poignantly clear. Enforced dependence on auto-mobile machines then denies a community of self-propelled people just those values supposedly procured by improved transportation.
+
+People move well on their feet. This primitive means of getting around will, on closer analysis, appear quite effective when compared with the lot of people in modern cities or on industrialized farms. It will appear particularly attractive once it has been understood that modern Americans walk, on the average, as many miles as their ancestors--most of them through tunnels, corridors, parking lots, and stores.
+
+People on their feet are more or less equal. People solely dependent on their feet move on the spur of the moment, at three to four miles per hour, in any direction and to any place from which they are not legally or physically barred. An improvement on this native degree of mobility by new transport technology should be expected to safeguard these values and to add some new ones, such as greater range, time economies, comfort, or more opportunities for the disabled. So far this is not what has happened. Instead, the growth of the transportation industry has everywhere had the reverse effect. From the moment its machines could put more than a certain horsepower behind any one passenger, this industry has reduced equality among men, restricted their mobility to a system of industrially defined routes, and created time scarcity of unprecedented severity. As the speed of their vehicles crosses a threshold, citizens become transportation consumers on the daily loop that brings them back to their home, a circuit which the United States Department of Commerce calls a "trip" as opposed to the "travel" for which Americans leave home equipped with a toothbrush.
+
+More energy fed into the transportation system means that more people move faster over a greater range in the course of every day. Everybody's daily radius expands at the expense of being able to drop in on an acquaintance or walk through the park on the way to work. Extremes of privilege are created at the cost of universal enslavement. An elite packs unlimited distance into a lifetime of pampered travel, while the majority spend a bigger slice of their existence on unwanted trips. The few mount their magic carpets to travel between distant points that their ephemeral presence renders both scarce and seductive, while the many are compelled to trip farther and faster and to spend more time preparing for and recovering from their trips.
+
+In the United States, four-fifths of all man-hours on the road are those of commuters and shoppers who hardly ever get into a plane, while four-fifths of the mileage flown to conventions and resorts is covered year after year by the same 1.5 per cent of the population, usually those who are either well-to-do or professionally trained to do good. The speedier the vehicle, the larger the subsidy it gets from regressive taxation. Barely 0.2 per cent of the entire United States population can engage in self-chosen air travel more than once a year, and few other countries can support a jet set which is that large.
+
+The captive tripper and the reckless traveler become equally dependent on transport. Neither can do without it. Occasional spurts to Acapulco or to a party congress dupe the ordinary passenger into believing that he has made it into the shrunk world of the powerfully rushed. The occasional chance to spend a few hours strapped into a high-powered seat makes him an accomplice in the distortion of human space, and prompts him to consent to the design of his country's geography around vehicles rather than around people. Man has evolved physically and culturally together with his cosmic niche. What for animals is their environment he has learned to make into his home. His self-consciousness requires as its complement a life-space and a life-time integrated by the pace at which he moves. If that relationship is determined by the velocity of vehicles rather than by the movement of people, man the architect is reduced to the status of a mere commuter.
+
+The model American male devotes more than 1,600 hours a year to his car. He sits in it while it goes and while it stands idling. He parks it and searches for it. He earns the money to put down on it and to meet the monthly installments. He works to pay for gasoline, tolls, insurance, taxes, and tickets. He spends four of his sixteen waking hours on the road or gathering his resources for it. And this figure does not take into account the time consumed by other activities dictated by transport: time spent in hospitals, traffic courts, and garages; time spent watching automobile commercials or attending consumer education meetings to improve the quality of the next buy. The model American puts in 1,600 hours to get 7,500 miles: less than five miles per hour. In countries deprived of a transportation industry, people manage to do the same, walking wherever they want to go, and they allocate only 3 to 8 per cent of their society's time budget to traffic instead of 28 per cent. What distinguishes the traffic in rich countries from the traffic in poor countries is not more mileage per hour of life-time for the majority, but more hours of compulsory consumption of high doses of energy, packaged and unequally distributed by the transportation industry.
+
+
+## Speed-stunned imagination
+
+Past a certain threshold of energy consumption, the transportation industry dictates the configuration of social space. Motorways expand, driving wedges between neighbors and removing fields beyond the distance a farmer can walk. Ambulances take clinics beyond the few miles a sick child can be carried. The doctor will no longer come to the house, because vehicles have made the hospital into the right place to be sick. Once heavy trucks reach a village high in the Andes, part of the local market disappears. Later, when the high school arrives at the plaza along with the paved highway, more and more of the young people move to the city, until not one family is left which does not long for a reunion with someone hundreds of miles away, down on the coast.
+
+Equal speeds have equally distorting effects on the perception of space, time, and personal potency in rich and in poor countries, however different the surface appearances might be. Everywhere, the transportation industry shapes a new kind of man to fit the new geography and the new schedules of its making. The major difference between Guatemala and Kansas is that in Central America some provinces are still exempt from all contact with vehicles and are, therefore, still not degraded by their dependence on them.
+
+The product of the transportation industry is the _habitual passenger_. He has been boosted out of the world in which people still move on their own, and he has lost the sense that he stands at the center of his world. The habitual passenger is conscious of the exasperating time scarcity that results from daily recourse to the cars, trains, buses, subways,and elevators that force him to cover an average of twenty miles each day, frequently criss-crossing his path within a radius of less than five miles. He has been lifted off his feet. No matter if he goes by subway or jet plane, he feels slower and poorer than someone else and resents the shortcuts taken by the privileged few who can escape the frustrations of traffic. If he is cramped by the timetable of his commuter train, he dreams of a car. If he drives, exhausted by the rush hour, he envies the speed capitalist who drives against the traffic. If he must pay for his car out of his own pocket, he knows full well that the commanders of corporate fleets send the fuel bill to the company and write off the rented car as a business expense. The habitual passenger is caught at the wrong end of growing inequality, time scarcity, and personal impotence, but he can see no way out of this bind except to demand more of the same: more traffic by transport. He stands in wait for technical changes in the design of vehicles, roads, and schedules; or else he expects a revolution to produce mass rapid transport under public control. In neither case does he calculate the price of being hauled into a better future. He forgets that he is the one who will pay the bill, either in fares or in taxes. He overlooks the hidden costs of replacing private cars with equally rapid public transport.
+
+The habitual passenger cannot grasp the folly of traffic based overwhelmingly on transport. His inherited perceptions of space and time and of personal pace have been industrially deformed. He has lost the power to conceive of himself outside the passenger role. Addicted to being carried along, he has lost"" control over the physical, social, and psychic powers that reside in man's feet. The passenger has come to identify territory with the untouchable landscape through which he is rushed. He has become impotent to establish his domain, mark it with his imprint, and assert his sovereignty over it. He has lost confidence in his power to admit others into his presence and to share space consciously with them. He can no longer face the remote by himself. Left on his own, he feels immobile.
+
+The habitual passenger must adopt a new set of beliefs and expectations if he is to feel secure in the strange world where both liaisons and loneliness are products of conveyance. To "gather" for him means to be brought together by vehicles. He comes to believe that political power grows out of the capacity of a transportation system, and in its absence is the result of access to the television screen. He takes freedom of movement to be the same as one's claim on propulsion. He believes that the level of democratic process correlates to the power of transportation and communications systems. He has lost faith in the political power of the feet and of the tongue. As a result, what he wants is not more liberty as a citizen but better service as a client. He does not insist on his freedom to move and to speak to people but on his claim to be shipped and to be informed by media. He wants a better product rather than freedom from servitude to it. It is vital that he come to see that the acceleration he demands is self-defeating, and that it must result in a further decline of equity, leisure, and autonomy.
+
+
+## Net transfer of Life-time
+
+Unchecked speed is expensive, and progressively fewer can afford it. Each increment in the velocity of a vehicle results in an increase in the cost of propulsion and track construction and--most dramatically--in the space the vehicle devours while it is on the move. Past a certain threshold of energy consumption for the fastest passenger, a world-wide class structure of speed capitalists is created. The exchange-value of time becomes dominant, and this is reflected in language: time is spent, saved, invested, wasted, and employed. As societies put price tags on time, equity and vehicular speed correlate inversely.
+
+High speed capitalizes a few people's time at an enormous rate but, paradoxically, it does this at a high cost in time for all. In Bombay, only a very few people own cars. They can reach a provincial capital in one morning and make the trip once a week. Two generations ago, this would have been a week-long trek once a year. They now spend more time on more trips. But these same few also disrupt, with their cars, the traffic flow of thousands of bicycles and pedicabs that move through downtown Bombay at a rate of effective locomotion that is still superior to that of downtown Paris, London, or New York. The compounded, transport-related time expenditure within a society grows much faster than the time economies made by a few people on their speedy excursions. Traffic grows indefinitely with the availability of high-speed transports. Beyond a critical threshold, the output of the industrial complex established to move people costs a society more time than it saves. The marginal utility of an increment in the speed of a small number of people has for its price the growing marginal disutility of this acceleration for the great majority.
+
+Beyond a critical speed, no one can save time without forcing another to lose it. The man who claims a seat in a faster vehicle insists that his time is worth more than that of the passenger in a slower one. Beyond a certain velocity, passengers become consumers of other people's time, and accelerating vehicles become the means for effecting a net transfer of life-time. The degree of transfer is measured in quanta of speed. This time-grab despoils those who are left behind, and since they are the majority, it raises ethical issues of a more general nature than the lottery that assigns kidney dialysis or organ transplants.
+
+Beyond a certain speed, motorized vehicles create remoteness which they alone can shrink. They create distances for all and shrink them for only a few. A new dirt road through the wilderness brings the city within view, but not within reach, of most Brazilian subsistence farmers. The new expressway expands Chicago, but it sucks those who are well-wheeled away from a downtown that decays into a ghetto.
+
+Contrary to what is often claimed, man's speed remained unchanged from the Age of Cyrus to the Age of Steam. News did not travel more than a hundred miles per day, no matter how the message was carried. Neither the Inca's runners nor the Venetian galley, the Persian horseman, or the mail coach on regular runs under Louis XIV broke the barrier. Soldiers, explorers, merchants, and pilgrims moved at twenty miles per day. In Valery's words, Napoleon still had to move at Caesar's slowness: _Napoléon va à la même lenteur que César_. The emperor knew that "public prosperity is measured by the income of the coaches": _On mesure la prospérité publique aux comptes des diligences_, but he could barely speed them up. Paris--Toulouse had required about 200 hours in Roman times, and the scheduled stagecoach still took 158 hours in 1740, before the opening of the new Royal Roads. Only the nineteenth century accelerated man. By 1830, the trip had been reduced to 110 hours, but at a new cost. In the same year, 4,150 stagecoaches overturned in France, causing more than a thousand deaths. Then the railroad brought a sudden change. By 1855, Napoleon III claimed to have hit 96 kilometers per hour on the train somewhere between Paris and Marseilles. Within one generation, the average distance traveled each year per Frenchman increased one hundred and thirty times, and Britain's railroad network reached its greatest expansion. Passenger trains attained their optimum cost calculated in terms of time spent for their maintenance and use.
+
+With further acceleration, transportation began to dominate traffic, and speed began to erect a hierarchy of destinations. By now, each set of destinations corresponds to a specific level of speed and defines a certain passenger class. Each circuit of terminal points degrades those pegged at a lower number of miles per hour. Those who must get around on their own power have been redefined as underdeveloped outsiders. Tell me how fast you go and I'll tell you who you are. If you can corner the taxes that fuel the Concorde, you are certainly at the top.
+
+Over the last two generations, the vehicle has become the sign of career achievement, just as the school has become the sign of starting advantage. At each new level, the concentration of power must produce its own kind of rationale. So, for example, the reason that is usually given for spending public money to make a man travel more miles in less time each year is the still greater investment that was made to keep him more years in school. His putative value as a capital-intensive production tool sets the rate at which he is being shipped. Other ideological labels besides "a good education" are just as useful for opening the cabin door to luxuries paid for by others. If the Thought of Chairman Mao must now be rushed around China by jet, this can only mean that two classes are needed to fuel what his revolution has become, one of them living in the geography of the masses and the other in the geography of the cadres. The suppression of intermediary levels of speed in the People's Republic has certainly made the concentration of power more efficient and rational, but it also underscores the new difference in value between the time of the bullock driver and the time of the jet-driven. Acceleration inevitably concentrates horsepower under the seats of a few and compounds the increasing time-lack of most commuters with the further sense that they are lagging behind.
+
+The need for unequal privilege in an industrial society is generally advocated by means of an argument with two sides. The hypocrisy of this argument is clearly betrayed by acceleration. Privilege is accepted as the necessary precondition for improving the lot of a growing total population, or it is advertised as the instrument for raising the standards of a deprived minority. In the long run, accelerating transportation does neither. It only creates a universal demand for motorized conveyance and puts previously unimaginable distances between the various layers of privilege. Beyond a certain point, more energy means less equity.
+
+
+## The Ineffectiveness of Acceleration
+
+It should not be overlooked that top speeds for a few exact a different price than high speeds for all. Social classification by levels of speed enforces a net transfer of power: the poor work and pay to get left behind. But if the middle classes of a speed society may be tempted to ignore discrimination, they should not neglect the rising marginal disutilities of transportation and their own loss of leisure. High speeds for all mean that everybody has less time for himself as the whole society spends a growing slice of its time budget on moving people. Vehicles running over the critical speed not only tend to impose inequality, they also inevitably establish a self-serving industry that hides an inefficient system of locomotion under apparent technological sophistication. I will argue that a speed limit is not only necessary to safeguard equity; it is equally a condition for increasing the total distance traveled within a society, while simultaneously decreasing the sum total of life-time that transportation claims.
+
+There is little research available on the impact of vehicles on the twenty-four-hour time budget of individuals and societies.[^n02] From transportation studies, we get statistics on the cost of time per mile, on the value of time measured in dollars or in length of trips. But these statistics tell us nothing about the hidden costs of transportation: about how traffic nibbles away at lifetime, about how vehicles devour space, about the multiplication of trips made necessary by the existence of vehicles, or about the time spent directly and indirectly preparing for locomotion. Further, there is no available measure of the even more deeply buried costs of transport, such as higher rent to live in areas convenient to the flow of traffic, or the cost of protecting these areas from the noise, pollution, and danger to life and limb that vehicles create. The lack of an account of expenditures from the social time budget should not lead us to believe, however, that such an accounting is impossible, nor should it prevent our drawing conclusions from the little that we do know.
+
+From our limited information it appears that everywhere in the world, after some vehicle broke the speed barrier of 15 mph, time scarcity related to traffic began to grow. After industry had reached this threshold of per capita output, transport made of man a new kind of waif: a being constantly absent from a destination he cannot reach on his own but must attain within the day. By now, people work a substantial part of every day to earn the money without which they could not even get to work. The time a society spends on transportation grows in proportion to the speed of its fastest public conveyance. Japan now leads the United States in both areas. Life-time gets cluttered up with activities generated by traffic as soon as vehicles crash through the barrier that guards people from dislocation and space from distortion.
+
+Whether the vehicle that speeds along the public freeway is owned by the state or by an individual has little to do with the time scarcity and overprogramming that rise with every increment in speed. Buses use one-third of the fuel that cars burn to carry one man over a given distance. Commuter trains are up to ten times more efficient than cars. Both could become even more efficient and less polluting. If publicly owned and rationally managed, they could be so scheduled and routed that the privileges they now provide under private ownership and incompetent organization would be considerably cut. But as long as any system of vehicles imposes itself on the public by top speeds that are not under political control, the public is left to choose between spending more time to pay for more people to be carried from station to station, and paying less taxes so that even fewer people can travel in much less time much farther than others. The order of magnitude of the top speed that is permitted within a transportation system determines the slice of its time budget that an entire society spends on traffic.
+
+
+## The Radical Monopoly of Industry
+
+A desirable ceiling on the velocity of movement cannot be usefully discussed without returning to the distinction between self-powered _transit_ and motorized _transport_, and comparing the contribution each component makes relative to the total locomotion of people, which I have called _traffic_.
+
+Transport stands for the capital-intensive mode of traffic, and transit indicates the labor-intensive mode. Transport is the product of an industry whose clients are passengers. It is an industrial commodity and therefore scarce by definition. Improvement of transport always takes place under conditions of scarcity that become more severe as the speed--and with it the cost--of the service increases. Conflict about insufficient transport tends to take the form of a zero-sum game where one wins only if another loses. At best, such a conflict allows for the optimum in the Prisoner's Dilemma: by cooperating with their jailer, both prisoners get off with less time in the cell.
+
+Transit is not the product of an industry but the independent enterprise of transients. It has use-value by definition but need not have any exchange-value. The ability to engage in transit is native to man and more or less equally distributed among healthy people of the same age. The exercise of this ability can be restricted by depriving some class of people of the right to take a straight route, or because a population lacks shoes or pavements. Conflict about unsatisfactory transit conditions tends to take, therefore, the form of a non-zero-sum game in which everyone comes out ahead--not only the people who get the right to walk through a formerly walled property, but also those who live along the road.
+
+Total traffic is the result of two profoundly distinct modes of production. These can reinforce each other harmoniously only as long as the autonomous outputs are protected against the encroachment of the industrial product.
+
+The harm done by contemporary traffic is due to the monopoly of transport. The allure of speed has deceived the passenger into accepting the promises made by an industry that produces capital-intensive traffic. He is convinced that high-speed vehicles have allowed him to progress beyond the limited autonomy he enjoyed when moving under his own power. He has allowed planned transport to predominate over the alternative of labor- intensive transit. Destruction of the physical environment is the least noxious effect of this concession. The far more bitter results are the multiplication of psychic frustration, the growing disutilities of continued production, and subjection to an inequitable transfer of power--all of which are manifestations of a distorted relationship between life-time and life-space. The passenger who agrees to live in a world monopolized by transport becomes a harassed, overburdened consumer of distances whose shape and length he can no longer control.
+
+Every society that imposes compulsory speed submerges transit to the profit of transport. Wherever not only privilege but also elementary necessities are denied to those who do not use high-speed conveyances, an involuntary acceleration of personal rhythms is imposed. Industry dominates traffic as soon as daily life comes to depend on motorized trips.
+
+This profound control of the transportation industry over natural mobility constitutes a monopoly much more pervasive than either the commercial monopoly Ford might win over the automobile market, or the political monopoly car manufacturers might wield against the development of trains and buses. Because of its hidden, entrenched, and structuring nature, I call this a _radical monopoly_. Any industry exercises this kind of deep-seated monopoly when it becomes the dominant means of satisfying needs that formerly occasioned a personal response. The compulsory consumption of a high-powered commodity (motorized transport) restricts the conditions for enjoying an abundant use-value (the innate capacity for transit). Traffic serves here as the paradigm of a general economic law: _Any industrial product that comes in per capita quanta beyond a given intensity exercises a radical monopoly over the satisfaction of a need_. Beyond some point, compulsory schooling destroys the environment for learning, medical delivery systems dry up the nontherapeutic sources of health, and transportation smothers traffic.
+
+Radical monopoly is first established by a rearrangement of society for the benefit of those who have access to the larger quanta; then it is enforced by compelling all to consume the minimum quantum in which the output is currently produced. Compulsory consumption will take on a different appearance in industrial branches where information dominates, such as education or medicine, than it will in those branches where quanta can be measured in British thermal units, such as housing, clothing, or transport. The industrial packaging of values will reach critical intensity at different points with different products, but for each major class of outputs, the threshold occurs within an order of magnitude that is theoretically identifiable. The fact that it is possible theoretically to determine the range of speed within which transportation develops a radical monopoly over traffic does not mean that it is possible theoretically to determine just how much of such a monopoly any given society will tolerate. The fact that it is possible to identify a level of compulsory instruction at which learning by seeing and doing declines does not enable the theorist to identify the specific pedagogical limits to the division of labor that a culture will tolerate. Only recourse to juridical and, above all, to political process can lead to the specific, though provisional, measures by which speed or compulsory education will actually be limited in a given society. The magnitude of voluntary limits is a matter of politics; the encroachment of radical monopoly can be pinpointed by social analysis.
+
+A branch of industry does not impose a radical monopoly on a whole society by the simple fact that it produces scarce products, or by driving competing industries off the market, but rather by virtue of its acquired ability to create and shape the need which it alone can satisfy.
+
+Shoes are scarce all over Latin America, and many people never wear them. They walk on the bare soles of their feet, or wear the world's widest variety of excellent sandals, supplied by a range of artisans. Their transit is in no way restricted by their lack of shoes. But in some countries of South America people are compelled to be shod ever since access to schools, jobs, and public services was denied to the barefoot. Teachers or party officials define the lack of shoes as a sign of indifference toward "progress." Without any intentional conspiracy between the promoters of national development and the shoe industry, the barefoot in these countries are now barred from any office.
+
+Schools, like shoes, have been scarce at all times. But it was never the small number of privileged pupils that turned the school into an obstacle for learning. Only when laws were enacted to make schools both compulsory and free did the educator assume the power to deny learning opportunities on the job to the underconsumer of educational therapies. Only when school attendance had become obligatory did it become feasible to impose on all a progressively more complex artificial environment into which the unschooled and unprogrammed do not fit.
+
+The potential of a radical monopoly is unmistakable in the case of traffic. Imagine what would happen if the transportation industry could somehow distribute its output more adequately; a traffic utopia of free _rapid_ transportation for all would inevitably lead to a further expansion of traffic's domain over human life. What would such a utopia look like? Traffic would be organized exclusively around public transportation systems. It would be financed by a progressive tax calculated on income and on the proximity of one's residence to the next terminal and to the job. It would be designed so that everybody could occupy any seat on a first-come, first-served basis: the doctor, the vacationer, and the president would not be assigned any priority of person. In this fool's paradise, all passengers would be equal, but they would be just as equally captive consumers of transport. Each citizen of a motorized utopia would be equally deprived of the use of his feet and equally drafted into the servitude of proliferating networks of transportation.
+
+Certain would-be miracle makers disguised as architects offer a specious escape from the paradox of speed. By their standards, acceleration imposes inequities, time loss, and controlled schedules only because people do not yet live in those patterns and orbits into which vehicles can best place them. These futuristic architects would house and occupy people in self-sufficient units of towers interconnected by tracks for high-speed capsules. Soleri, Doxiadis, or Fuller would solve the problem created by high-speed transport by identifying the entire human habitat with the problem. Rather than asking how the earth's surface can be preserved for people, they ask how reservations necessary for the survival of people can be established on an earth that has been reshaped for the sake of industrial outputs.
+
+
+## The Elusive Threshold
+
+Paradoxically, the concept of a traffic-optimal top speed for transport seems capricious or fanatical to the confirmed passenger, whereas it looks like the flight of the bird to the donkey driver. Four or six times the speed of a man on foot constitutes a threshold too low to be deemed worthy of consideration by the habitual passenger and too high to convey the sense of a _limit_ to the three-quarters of humanity who still get around on their own power.
+
+All those who plan, finance, or engineer other people's housing, transportation, or education belong to the passenger class. Their claim to power is derived from the value their employers place on acceleration. Social scientists can build a computer model of traffic in Calcutta or Santiago, and engineers can design monorail webs according to abstract notions of traffic flow. Since these planners are true believers in problem-solving by industrial design, the real solution for traffic congestion is beyond their grasp. Their belief in the effectiveness of power blinds them to the disproportionately greater effectiveness of abstaining from its use. Traffic engineers have yet to combine in one simulation model the mobility of people with that of vehicles. The _transportation_ engineer cannot conceive of the possibility of renouncing speed and slowing down for the sake of permitting time-and-destination-optimal _traffic_ flow. He would never entertain the thought of programming his computer on the stipulation that no motorized vehicle within any city should ever overtake the speed of a velocipede. The development expert who looks down compassionately from his Land-Rover on the Indian peasant herding his pigs to market refuses to acknowledge the relative advantage of feet. The expert tends to forget that this man has dispensed ten others in his village from spending time on the road, whereas the engineer and every member of his family separately devote a major part of every day to transportation. For a man who believes that human mobility must be conceived in terms of indefinite progress, there can be no optimal level of traffic but only passing consensus on a given technical level of transportation.
+
+Most Mexicans, not to speak of Indians and Chinese, are in a position inverse to that of the confirmed passenger. The critical threshold is entirely beyond what all but a few of them know or expect. They still belong to the class of the self-powered. Some of them have a lingering memory of a motorized adventure, but most of them have no personal experience of traveling at or above the critical speed. In the two typical Mexican states of Guerrero and Chiapas, less than one per cent of the population moved even once over ten miles in less than one hour during 1970. The vehicles into which people in these areas are sometimes crowded render traffic indeed more convenient, but barely faster than the speed of a bicycle. The third-class bus does not separate the farmer from his pig, and it takes them both to market without inflicting any loss of weight, but this acquaintance with motorized "comfort" does not amount to dependence on destructive speed.
+
+The order of magnitude in which the critical threshold of speed can be found is too low to be taken seriously by the passenger, and too high to concern the peasant. It is so obvious it cannot be easily seen. The proposal of a limit to speed within this order of magnitude engenders stubborn opposition. It exposes the addiction of industrialized men to ever higher doses of energy, while it asks those who are still sober to abstain from something they have yet to taste.
+
+To propose counterfoil research is not only a scandal, it is also a threat. Simplicity threatens the expert, who supposedly understands just why the commuter train runs at 8:15 and 8:41 and why it must be better to use fuel with certain additives. That a political process could identify a _natural_ dimension, both inescapable and limited, is an idea that lies outside the passenger's world of verities. He has let respect for specialists he does not even know turn into unthinking submission. If a political resolution could be found for problems created by experts in the field of traffic, then perhaps the same remedy could be applied to problems of education, medicine, or urbanization. If the order of magnitude of traffic-optimal vehicular velocities could be determined by laymen actively participating in an ongoing political process, then the foundation on which the framework of every industrial society is built would be shattered. To propose such research is politically subversive. It calls in question the overarching consensus on the need for more transportation which now allows the proponents of public ownership to define themselves as political adversaries of the proponents of private enterprise.
+
+
+## Degrees of Self-powered Mobility
+
+A century ago, the ball-bearing was invented. It reduced the coefficient of friction by a factor of a thousand. By applying a well-calibrated ball-bearing between two Neolithic millstones, a man could now grind in a day what took his ancestors a week. The ball-bearing also made possible the bicycle, allowing the wheel--probably the last of the great Neolithic inventions--finally to become useful for self-powered mobility.
+
+Man, unaided by any tool, gets around quite efficiently. He carries one gram of his weight over a kilometer in ten minutes by expending 0.75 calories. Man on his feet is thermodynamically more efficient than any motorized vehicle and most animals. For his weight, he performs more work in locomotion than rats or oxen, less than horses or sturgeon. At this rate of efficiency man settled the world and made its history. At this rate peasant societies spend less than 5 per cent and nomads less than 8 per cent of their respective social time budgets outside the home or the encampment.
+
+Man on a bicycle can go three or four times faster than the pedestrian, but uses five times less energy in the process. He carries one gram of his weight over a kilometer of flat road at an expense of only 0.15 calories. The bicycle is the perfect transducer to match man's metabolic energy to the impedance of locomotion. Equipped with this tool, man outstrips the efficiency of not only all machines but all other animals as well.
+
+The invention of the ball-bearing, the tangent-spoked wheel, and the pneumatic tire taken together can be compared to only three other events in the history of transportation. The invention of the wheel at the dawn of civilization took the load off man's back and put it onto the barrow. The invention and simultaneous application, during the European Middle Ages, of stirrup, shoulder harness, and horseshoe increased the thermodynamic efficiency of the horse by a factor of up to five, and changed the economy of medieval Europe: it made frequent plowing possible and thus introduced rotation agriculture; it brought more distant fields into the reach of the peasant, and thus permitted landowners to move from six-family hamlets into one-hundred family villages, where they could live around the church, the square, the jail, and--later--the school; it allowed the cultivation of northern soils and shifted the center of power into cold climates. The building of the first oceangoing vessels by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, under the aegis of developing European capitalism, laid the solid foundations for a globe-spanning culture and market.
+
+The invention of the ball-bearing signaled a fourth revolution. This revolution was unlike that, supported by the stirrup, which raised the knight onto his horse, and unlike that, supported by the galleon, which enlarged the horizon of the king's captains. The ball-bearing signaled a true crisis, a true political choice. It created an option between more freedom in equity and more speed. The bearing is an equally fundamental ingredient of two new types of locomotion, respectively symbolized by the bicycle and the car. The bicycle lifted man's auto-mobility into a new order, beyond which progress is theoretically not possible. In contrast, the accelerating individual capsule enabled societies to engage in a ritual of progressively paralyzing speed.
+
+The monopoly of a ritual application over a potentially useful device is nothing new. Thousands of years ago, the wheel took the load off the carrier slave, but it did so only on the Eurasian land mass. In Mexico, the wheel was well known, but never applied to transport. It served exclusively for the construction of carriages for toy gods. The taboo on wheelbarrows in America before Cortés is no more puzzling than the taboo on bicycles in modern traffic.
+
+It is by no means necessary that the invention of the ball-bearing continue to serve the increase of energy use and thereby produce time scarcity, space consumption, and class privilege. If the new order of self-powered mobility offered by the bicycle were protected against devaluation, paralysis, and risk to the limbs of the rider, it would be possible to guarantee optimal shared mobility to all people and put an end to the imposition of maximum privilege and exploitation. It would be possible to control the patterns of urbanization if the organization of space were constrained by the power man has to move through it.
+
+Bicycles are not only thermodynamically efficient, they are also cheap. With his much lower salary, the Chinese acquires his durable bicycle in a fraction of the working hours an American devotes to the purchase of his obsolescent car. The cost of public utilities needed to facilitate bicycle traffic versus the price of an infrastructure tailored to high speeds is proportionately even less than the price differential of the vehicles used in the two systems. In the bicycle system, engineered roads are necessary only at certain points of dense traffic, and people who live far from the surfaced path are not thereby automatically isolated as they would be if they depended on cars or trains. The bicycle has extended man's radius without shunting him onto roads he cannot walk. Where he cannot ride his bike, he can usually push it.
+
+The bicycle also uses little space. Eighteen bikes can be parked in the place of one car, thirty of them can move along in the space devoured by a single automobile. It takes three lanes of a given size to move 40,000 people across a bridge in one hour by using automated trains, four to move them on buses, twelve to move them in their cars, and only two lanes for them to pedal across on bicycles. Of all these vehicles, only the bicycle really allows people to go from door to door without walking. The cyclist can reach new destinations of his choice without his tool creating new locations from which he is barred.
+
+Bicycles let people move with greater speed without taking up significant amounts of scarce space, energy, or time. They can spend fewer hours on each mile and still travel more miles in a year. They can get the benefit of technological breakthroughs without putting undue claims on the schedules, energy, or space of others. They become masters of their own movements without blocking those of their fellows. Their new tool creates only those demands which it can also satisfy. Every increase in motorized speed creates new demands on space and time. The use of the bicycle is self-limiting. It allows people to create a new relationship between their life-space and their life-time, between their territory and the pulse of their being, without destroying their inherited balance. The advantages of modern self-powered traffic are obvious, and ignored. That better traffic runs faster is asserted, but never proved. Before they ask people to pay for it, those who propose acceleration should try to display the evidence for their claim.
+
+A grisly contest between bicycles and motors is just coming to an end. In Vietnam, a hyperindustrialized army tried to conquer, but could not overcome, a people organized around bicycle speed. The lesson should be clear. High-energy armies can annihilate people--both those they defend and those against whom they are launched--but they are of very limited use to a people which defends itself. It remains to be seen if the Vietnamese will apply what they learned in war to an economy of peace, if they will be willing to protect the values that made their victory possible. The dismal likelihood is that the victors, for the sake of industrial progress and increased energy consumption, will tend to defeat themselves by destroying that structure of equity, rationality, and autonomy into which American bombers forced them by depriving them of fuels, motors, and roads.
+
+
+## Dominant versus Subsidiary Motors
+
+People are born almost equally mobile. Their natural ability speaks for the personal liberty of each one to go wherever he or she wants to go. Citizens of a society founded on the notion of equity will demand the protection of this right against any abridgment. It should be irrelevant to them by what means the exercise of personal mobility is denied, whether by imprisonment, bondage to an estate, revocation of a passport, or enclosure within an environment that encroaches on a person's native ability to move in order to make him a consumer of transport. This inalienable right of free movement does not lapse just because most of our contemporaries have strapped themselves into ideological seat belts. Man's natural capacity for transit emerges as the only yardstick by which to measure the contribution transport can make to traffic: there is only so much transport that traffic can bear. It remains to be outlined how we can distinguish those forms of transport that cripple the power to move from those that enhance it.
+
+Transportation can abridge traffic in three ways: by breaking its flow, by creating isolated sets of destinations, and by increasing the loss of time due to traffic. I have already argued that the key to the relation between transport and traffic is the speed of vehicles. I have described how, past a certain threshold of speed, transport has gone on to obstruct traffic in these three ways. It blocks mobility by cluttering up the environment with vehicles and roads. It transforms geography into a pyramid of circuits sealed off from one another according to levels of acceleration. It expropriates life-time at the behest of speed.
+
+If beyond a certain threshold transport obstructs traffic, the inverse is also true: below some level of speed, motorized vehicles can complement or improve traffic by permitting people to do things they could not do on foot or on bicycle. A well-developed transportation system running at top speeds of 25 mph would have allowed Fix to chase Phileas Fogg around the world in less than half of eighty days. Motors can be used to transport the sick, the lame, the old, and the just plain lazy. Motor pulleys can lift people over hills, but they can do so peacefully only if they do not push the climber off the path. Trains can extend the range of travel, but can do so with justice only if people have not only equal transportation but equal free time to come closer to each other. The time engaged in travel must be, as much as possible, the traveler's own: only insofar as motorized transport remains limited to speeds which leave it subsidiary to autonomous transit can a traffic-optimal transportation system be developed.
+
+A limit on the power and therefore on the speed of motors does not by itself insure those who are weaker against exploitation by the rich and powerful, who can still devise means to live and work at better located addresses, travel with retinue in plush carriages, and reserve a special lane for doctors and members of the central committee. But at a sufficiently limited maximum speed, this is an unfairness which can be reduced or even corrected by political means: by grassroots control over taxes, routes, vehicles, and their schedules in the community. At unlimited top speed neither public ownership of the means of transportation nor technical improvements in their control can ever eliminate growing and unequal exploitation. A transportation industry is the key to optimal production of traffic, but only if it does not exercise its radical monopoly over that personal mobility which is intrinsically and primarily a value in use.
+
+
+## Underequipment, Overdevelopmet, and Mature Technology
+
+The combination of transportation and transit that constitutes traffic has provided us with an example of socially optimal per capita wattage and of the need for politically chosen limits on it. But traffic can also be viewed as but one model for the convergence of world-wide development goals, and as a criterion by which to distinguish those countries that are lamely underequipped from those that are destructively overindustrialized.
+
+A country can be classified as underequipped if it cannot outfit each citizen with a bicycle or provide a five-speed transmission as a bonus for anyone who wants to pedal others around. It is underequipped if it cannot provide good roads for the cycle, or free motorized public transportation (though at bicycle speed!) for those who want to travel for more than a few hours in succession. No technical, economic, or ecological reason exists why such backwardness should be tolerated anywhere in 1975. It would be a scandal if the natural mobility of a people were forced to stagnate on a pre-bicycle level against its will.
+
+A country can be classified as overindustrialized when its social life is dominated by the transportation industry, which has come to determine its class privileges, to accentuate its time scarcity, and to tie its people more tightly to the tracks it has laid out for them.
+
+Beyond underequipment and overindustrialization, there is a place for the world of postindustrial effectiveness, where the industrial mode of production complements other autonomous forms of production. There is a place, in other words, for a world of technological maturity. In terms of traffic, it is the world of those who have tripled the extent of their daily horizon by lifting themselves onto their bicycles. It is just as much the world marked by a variety of subsidiary motors available for the occasions when a bicycle is not enough and when an extra push will limit neither equity nor freedom. And it is, too, the world of the long voyage: a world where every place is open to every person, at his own pleasure and speed, without haste or fear, by means of vehicles that cross distances without breaking with the earth which man walked for hundreds of thousands of years on his own two feet.
+
+Underequipment keeps people frustrated by inefficient labor and invites the enslavement of man by man. Overindustrialization enslaves people to the tools they worship, fattens professional hierarchs on bits and on watts, and invites the translation of unequal power into huge income differentials. It imposes the same net transfers of power on the productive relations of every society, no matter what creed the managers profess, no matter what rain-dance, what penitential ritual they conduct. Technological maturity permits a society to steer a course equally free of either enslavement. But beware--that course is not charted. Technological maturity permits a variety of political choices and cultures. The variety diminishes, of course, as a community allows industry to grow at the cost of autonomous production. Reasoning alone can offer no precise measure for the level of postindustrial effectiveness and technological maturity appropriate to a concrete society. It can only indicate in dimensional terms the range into which these technological characteristics must fit. It must be left to a historical community engaged in its own political process to decide when programming, space distortion, time scarcity, and inequality cease to be worth its while. Reasoning can identify speed as the critical factor in traffic. Reasoning combined with experimentation can identify the order of magnitude at which vehicular speed turns into a sociopolitical determinant. No genius, no expert, no club of elites can set limits to industrial outputs that will be politically feasible. The need for such limits as an alternative to disaster is the strongest argument in favor of radical technology.
+
+Only when the speed limits of vehicles reflect the enlightened self-interest of a political community can these limits become operative. Obviously this interest cannot even be expressed in a society where one class monopolizes not only transportation but communication, medicine, education, and weapons as well. It does not matter if this power is held by legal owners or by entrenched managers of an industry that is legally owned by the workers. This power must be reappropriated and submitted to the sound judgment of the common man. The reconquest of power starts with the recognition that expert knowledge blinds the secretive bureaucrat to the obvious way of dissolving the energy crisis, just as it blinded him to the obvious solution to the war in Vietnam.
+
+There are two roads from where we are to technological maturity: one is the road of liberation from affluence; the other is the road of liberation from dependence. Both roads have the same destination: the social restructuring of space that offers to each person the constantly renewed experience that the center of the world is where he stands, walks, and lives.
+
+Liberation from affluence begins on the traffic islands where the rich run into one another. The well-sped are tossed from one island to the next and are offered but the company of fellow passengers en route to somewhere else. This solitude of plenty would begin to break down as the traffic islands gradually expanded and people began to recover their native power to move around the place where they lived. Thus, the impoverished environment of the traffic island could embody the beginnings of social reconstruction, and the people who now call themselves rich would break with bondage to overefficient transport on the day they came to treasure the horizon of their traffic islands, now fully grown, and to dread frequent shipments from their homes.
+
+Liberation from dependence starts at the other end. It breaks the constraints of village and valley and leads beyond the boredom of narrow horizons and the stifling oppression of a world closed in on itself. To expand life beyond the radius of tradition without scattering it to the winds of acceleration is a goal that any poor country could achieve within a few years, but it is a goal that will be reached only by those who reject the offer of unchecked industrial development made in the name of an ideology of indefinite energy consumption.
+
+Liberation from the radical monopoly of the transportation industry is possible only through the institution of a political process that demystifies and disestablishes speed and limits traffic-related public expenditures of money, time, and space to the pursuit of equal mutual access. Such a process amounts to public guardianship over a means of production to keep this means from turning into a fetish for the majority and an end for the few. The political process, in turn, will never engage the support of a vast majority unless its goals are set with reference to a standard that can be publicly and operationally verified. The recognition of a socially critical threshold of the energy quantum incorporated in a commodity, such as a passenger- mile, provides such a standard. A society that tolerates the transgression of this threshold inevitably diverts its resources from the production of means that can be shared equitably and transforms them into fuel for a sacrificial flame that victimizes the majority. On the other hand, a society that limits the top speed of its vehicles in accordance with this threshold fulfills a necessary--though by no means a sufficient--condition for the political pursuit of equity.
+
+Liberation which comes cheap to the poor will cost the rich dear, but they will pay its price once the acceleration of their transportation systems grinds traffic to a halt. A concrete analysis of traffic betrays the truth underlying the energy crisis: the impact of industrially packaged quanta of energy on the social environment tends to be degrading, exhausting, and enslaving, and these effects come into play even before those which threaten the pollution of the physical environment and the extinction of the race. The crucial point at which these effects can be reversed is not, however, a matter of deduction, but of decision.
+
+
+## Footnotes
+
+[^n01]: I speak about traffic for the purpose of illustrating the more general point of socially optimal energy use, and I restrict myself to the locomotion of persons, including their personal baggage and the fuel, materials, and equipment used for the vehicle and the road. I purposely abstain from the discussion of two other types of traffic: merchandise and messages. A parallel argument can be made for both, but this would require a different line of reasoning, and I leave it for another occasion. _Author's note:_ This note appeared in the original text. I was then preparing two studies that were to complement this text: one on the history of mail delivery, the other on crews and loads throughout history. I renounced both projects to write _Medical Nemesis_. 
+
+[^n02]: Since publication of this text in 1973, much research has been done and published. For a critical guide to the literature see Jean-Pierre Dupuy and Jean Robert, _Les Chronophages_ (Paris, 1977). 
+
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+  year = {1969},
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+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {The Philosophical Foundations of Historiography in Arnold Joseph Toynbee's Work},
+  year = {1951},
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+  origdate = {1951},
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+---
+  title: "The Philosophical Foundations of Historiography in Arnold Joseph Toynbee's Work"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
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+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-unemployment-en,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {The Right to Useful Unemployment and its Professional Enemies},
+  year = {1978},
+  date = {1978},
+  origdate = {1978},
+  language = {en},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/en/book/unemployment:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
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diff --git a/contents/book/unemployment/en.md b/contents/book/unemployment/en.md
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+---
+  title: "The Right to Useful Unemployment and its Professional Enemies"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1978"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
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+---
+
+# Foreword
+
+In the last decade or so I have prepared and published a number of essays[^n01] on the industrial mode of production. During this period, I have focused on the processes through which growing dependence on mass-produced goods and services gradually erodes the conditions necessary for a convivial life. Examining distinct areas of economic growth, each essay demonstrates a general rule: use-values are inevitably destroyed when the industrial mode of production achieves the predominance that I have termed "radical monopoly". This and my previous essays describe how industrial growth produces the modernization of poverty.
+
+Modernized poverty appears when the intensity of market dependence reaches a certain threshold. Subjectively, it is the experience of frustrating affluence that occurs in persons mutilated by their reliance on the riches of industrial productivity. It deprives those affected by it of their freedom and power to act autonomously, to live creatively; it confines them to survival through being plugged into market relations. And precisely because this new impotence is so deeply experienced, it is with difficulty expressed. For example, we are the witnesses of a barely perceptible transformation in ordinary language: verbs which formerly expressed satisfying actions have been replaced by nouns which name packages designed for passive consumption only – "to learn" becomes "to accumulate credits". A profound change in individual and social self-images is here reflected. And the layman is not the only one who has difficulty in accurately expressing what he experiences. The professional economist is unable to recognize the poverty that his conventional instruments fail to uncover. Nevertheless, the new mutant of impoverishment continues to spread. The peculiarly modern inability to use personal endowments, community wealth, and environmental resources in an autonomous way infects every aspect of life where a professionally engineered commodity has succeeded in replacing a culturally shaped use-value. The opportunity to experience personal and social satisfaction outside the market is thus destroyed. I am poor, for example, when the use-value of my feet is lost because I live in Los Angeles or work on the thirty-fifth floor of a sky-scraper.
+
+This new impotence-producing poverty must not be confused with the widening gap between the consumption of rich and poor in a world where basic needs are increasingly shaped by industrial commodities. This gap is the form traditional poverty assumes in an industrial society, and the conventional terms of class struggle appropriately reveal and reduce it. I further distinguish modernized poverty from the burdensome price exacted by the externalities which increased levels of production spew into the environment. It is clear that these kinds of pollution, stress, and taxation are unequally imposed. Correspondingly, defences against such depredations are unequally distributed. But like the new gaps in access, such inequities in social costs are aspects of industrialized poverty for which economic indicators and objective verification can be found. Such is not true for the industrialized impotence that affects both rich and poor. Where this kind of poverty reigns, life without addictive access to commodities is rendered impossible or criminal – or both. Making do without consumption becomes impossible, not just for the average consumer, but even for the poor. All forms of welfare, from affirmitive action to job training, are of no help. The liberty to design and craft one’s own distinctive dwelling is abolished in favour of the bureaucratic provision of standardized housing in the United States, Cuba or Sweden. The organization of employment, skills, building resources, of rules and credit favour shelter as a commodity rather than as an activity. Whether the product is provided by an entrepreneur or an apparatchik, the effective result is the same: citizen impotence, our specifically modern experience of poverty.
+
+Wherever the shadow of economic growth touches us, we are left useless unless employed on a job or engaged in consumption: the attempt to build a house or set a bone outside the control of certified specialists appears as anarchic conceit. We lose sight of our resources, lose control over the environmental conditions which make these resources applicable, lose taste for self-reliant coping with challenges from without and anxiety from within. Take childbirth in Mexico today. Delivery without professional care has become unthinkable for those women whose husbands hold regular employment and, therefore, access to social services, no matter how marginal or tenuous, is denied. They move in circles where the production of babies faithfully reflects the patterns of industrial outputs. Yet their sisters who live in the slums of the poor or the villages of the isolated still feel quite competent to give birth on their own mats; they are still unaware that they face a modern indictment of criminal neglect toward their child. But as professionally engineered delivery models reach these independent women, the desire, competence, and conditions for autononmous behaviour are being destroyed.
+
+For advanced industrial society, the modernization of poverty means that people are helpless to recognize evidence unless it has been certified by a professional – be he a television weather commentator or an educator; organic discomfort becomes intolerably threatening unless it has been medicalized into dependence on a therapist; neighbours and friends are lost unless vehicles bridge the separating distance (created by the vehicles in the first place). In short, most of the time we find ourselves out of touch with our world, out of sight of those for whom we work, out of tune with what we feel.
+
+This essay is a postscript to my book, Tools for Conviviality, published in 1973. It reflects the changes which have occurred during the past decade, both in economic reality and in my own perceptions of it. It assumes a rather large increase in the non-technical, ritual, and symbolic powers of our major technological and bureaucratic systems, and a corresponding decrease in their scientific, technical, and instrumental credibility. In 1968, for example, it was still quite easy to dismiss organized lay resistance to professional dominance as nothing more than a throwback to romantic, obscurantist or élitist fantasies. The grass roots, common sense assessment of technological systems which I then outlined, seemed childish or retrograde to the political leaders of citizen activism, and to the "radical" professionals who laid claim to the tutorship of the poor by means of their special knowledge. The reorganization of late industrial society around professionally defined needs, problems, and solutions was still the commonly accepted value implicit in ideological, political, and juridical systems otherwise clearly and sometimes violently opposed to one another.
+
+Now the picture has changed. A hallmark of advanced and enlightened technical competence is a self-confident community, neighbourhood or group of citizens engaged in the systematic analysis and consequent ridicule of the "needs", "problems", and " solutions " defined for them by the agents of professional establishments. In the sixties, lay opposition to legislation based on expert opinion still sounded like anti-scientific bigotry. Today, lay confidence in public policies based upon the expert’s opinion is tenuous indeed. Now thousands reach their own judgments and, at great cost, engage in citzien action without any professional tutorship; through personal, independent effort, they gain the scientific information they need. Sometimes risking limb, freedom, and respectability, they bear witness to a newly mature scientific attitude. They know, for example, that the quality and amount of technical evidence sufficiently conclusive to oppose atomic power plants, the multiplication of intensive care units, compulsory education, foetal monitoring, psycho-surgery, electro-shock treatment, or genetic engineering is also simple and clear enough for the layman to grasp and utilize.
+
+Ten years ago, compulsory schooling was still protected by powerful taboos. Today, its defenders are almost exclusively either teachers whose jobs depend upon it or Marxist ideologues who defend professional knowledge-holders in a shadow battle against the hip-bourgeoisie. Ten years ago, the myths about the effectiveness of modern medical institutions were still unquestioned. For example, most textbooks accepted the beliefs that adult life expectancy was increasing, that treatment for cancer postponed death, that the availability of doctors produced greater infant survival rates. Since then people have "discovered" what vital statistics have always shown – adult life expectancy has not changed in any socially significant way over the last few generations, is lower in most rich countries today than in our grandparents" time, and lower than in many poor nations. Ten years ago, universal access to post-secondary schooling, to adult education, to preventative medicine, to highways, to a wired global village were still prestigious goals. Today, the great myth-making rituals organized around education, transportation, health care, urbanization have indeed been partly demystified; they have however not yet been disestablished.
+
+Shadow prices and increased consumption gaps are important aspects of the new poverty. But my principal interest is directed towards a different concomitant of modernization – the process through which autonomy is undermined, satisfaction is dulled, experience is flattened out, needs are frustrated for nearly everyone. For example, I have examined the society-wide obstacles to mutual presence which are necessary side effects of energy-intensive transportation. I have wanted to define the power limits of motors equitably used to increase access to one another. I recognize, of course, that high speeds inevitably impose a skewed distribution of harriedness, noise, pollution, and enjoyment of privilege. But my emphasis is other. My arguments are focused on the negative internalities of modernity – such as time-consuming acceleration, sick-making health care, stupefying education. The unequal distribution of these ersatz benefits, or the unequal imposition of their negative externalities, are corollaries to my basic argument. I am interested in the direct and specific effects of modernized poverty, in human tolerance for such effects and in the possibility of escaping the new misery. I share with others a deep desire to see greater justice. I am absolutely opposed to the unjust distribution of what can be genuinely shared with pleasure. But I have found it necessary, these last few years, to examine carefully the objects of any and every redistribution proposal. Today I see my task even more clearly than when I first started talking and writing about the counterproductive mythmaking that is latent in all late industrial enterprises. My aim has been to detect and denounce the false affluence which is always unjust because it can only frustrate. Through this kind of analysis one can begin to develop the theory which would inspire the social regeneration possible for twentieth-century man.
+
+During these last years I have found it necessary to examine, again and again, the correlation between the nature of tools and the meaning of justice that prevails in the society that uses them. I could not help but observe the decline of freedom in societies in which rights are shaped by expertise. I had to weigh the trade-offs between new tools that enhance the production of commodities and those equally modern ones that permit the generation of values in use; between rights to mass-produced commodities and the level of liberties that permit satisfying and creative personal expression; between paid employment and useful unemployment. And in each dimension of the trade-off between heteronomous management and autonomous action I found that the language that would permit us to insist on the latter has to be recovered with pains. I am, of course, like those whom I seek as my readers, so clearly committed to a radically equitable distribution of goods, rights and jobs that I find it almost unnecessary to insist on our struggle for this side of justice. I find it much more important and difficult to deal with its complement: the Politics of Conviviality. I use this term in the technical sense that I have given to it in Tools for Conviviality. There the term designates the struggle for an equitable distribution of the liberty to generate use-values and for the instrumentation of this liberty by the assignment of an absolute priority to the production of those industrial and professional commodities that confer on the least advantaged the greatest power to generate values in use.
+
+Convivial Politics are based on the insight that in a modern society both wealth and jobs can be equitably shared and enjoyed in liberty only when both are limited by a political process. Excessive forms of wealth and prolonged formal employment, no matter how well distributed, destroy the social, cultural, and environmental conditions for equal productive freedom. Bits and watts (which stand for units of information and of energy respectively) when packaged into any mass-produced commodity in amounts that pass a threshold, inevitably constitute impoverishing wealth. Such impoverishing wealth is either too rare to be shared, or it is destructive of the freedom and liberty of the weakest. With each of my essays I have attempted to make a contribution to the political process by which the socially critical thresholds of enrichment are recognized by citizens and translated into society-wide ceilings or limits.
+
+
+## Introduction
+
+Fifty years ago, most of the words heard by an American were personally spoken to him as an individual, or to somebody standing nearby. Only occasionally did words reach him as the undifferentiated member of a crowd – in the classroom or church, at a rally or a circus. Words were mostly like handwritten, sealed letters, and not like the junk that now pollutes our mail. Today, words that are directed to one person’s attention have become rare. Engineered staples of images, ideas, feelings and opinions, packaged and delivered through the media, assault our sensibilities with round-the-clock regularity. Two points now become evident: 1) what is occurring with language fits the pattern of an increasingly wide range of need-satisfaction relationships; 2) this replacement of convivial means by manipulative industrial ware is truly universal, and is relentlessly making the New York teacher, the Chinese commune member, the Bantu schoolboy, and the Brazilian sergeant alike. In this postscript to my essay Tools for Conviviality I shall do three things: 1) describe the character of a commodity/market-intensive society in which the very abundance of commodities paralyzes the autonomous creation of use-values; 2) insist on the hidden role that professions play in such a society by shaping its needs; 3) expose some illusions and propose some strategies to break the professional power that perpetuates market dependence.
+
+## Disabling Market Intensity
+
+Crisis has come to mean that moment when doctors, diplomats, bankers and assorted social engineers take over and liberties are suspended. Like patients, nations go on the critical list. Crisis, the Greek term that has designated "choice" or "turning point" in all modern languages now means "driver, step on the gas". Crisis now evokes an ominous but tractable threat against which money, manpower and management can be rallied. Intensive care for the dying, bureaucratic tutelage for the victim of discrimination, fission for the energy glutton, are typical responses. Crisis, understood in this way, is always good for executives and commissars, especially those scavengers who live on the side effects of yesterday’s growth: educators who live on society’s alienation, doctors who prosper on the work and leisure that have destroyed health, politicians who thrive on the distribution of welfare which, in the first instance, was financed by those assisted. Crisis understood as a call for acceleration not only puts more power under the control of the driver, while squeezing the passengers more tightly into their safety belts; it also justifies the depredation of space, time and resources for the sake of motorized wheels and it does so to the detriment of people who want to use their feet.
+
+But crisis need not have this meaning. It need not imply a headlong rush for the escalation of management. Instead, it can mean the instant of choice, that marvellous moment when people suddenly become aware of their self-imposed cages, and of the possibility of a different life. And this is the crisis, that, as a choice, confronts both the United States and the world today.
+
+### A world-wide choice
+
+In only a few decades, the world has become an amalgam. Human responses to everyday occurrences have been standardized. Though languages and gods still appear to be different, people daily join the stupendous majority who march to the beat of the very same mega-machine. The light switch by the door has replaced the dozens of ways in which fires, candles and lanterns were formerly kindled. In ten years, the number of switch-users in the world has tripled: flush and paper have become essential conditions for the relief of the bowels. Light that does not flow from high-voltage networks and hygiene without tissue paper spell poverty for ever more people. Expectations grow, while hopeful trust in one’s own competence and the concern for others rapidly decline.
+
+The now soporific, now raucous intrusion of the media reaches deeply into the commune, the village, the corporation, the school. The sounds made by the editors and announcers of programmed texts daily pervert the words of a spoken language into the building blocks for packaged messages. Today, one must either be isolated and cut off, or a carefully guarded, affluent drop-out, to allow one’s children to play in an environment where they listen to people rather than to stars, speakers, or instructors. All over the world, one can see the rapid encroachment of the disciplined acquiescence that characterizes the audience, the client, the customer. The standardization of human action grows apace.
+
+It now becomes clear that most of the world’s communities are facing exactly the same critical issue: people must either remain ciphers in the conditioned crowd that surges towards greater dependence (thus necessitating savage battles for a share of the drugs to feed their habit), or they must find the courage that alone saves in a panic: to stand still and look around for another way out than the obvious marked exit. But many, when told that Bolivians, Canadians and Hungarians all face the same fundamental choice, are not simply annoyed, but deeply offended. The idea appears not only foolish but shocking. They fail to detect the sameness in the new bitter degradation that underlies the hunger of the Indian in the Altiplano, the neurosis of the worker in Amsterdam, and the cynical corruption of the bureaucrat in Warsaw.
+
+### Towards a culture for staples
+
+Development has had the same effect in all societies: everyone has been enmeshed in a new web of dependence on commodities that flow out of the same kind of machines, factories, clinics, television studios, think tanks. To satisfy this dependence, more of the same must be produced: standardized, engineered goods, designed for the future consumers who will be trained by the engineer’s agent to need what he or she is offered. These products – be they tangible goods or intangible services – constitute the industrial staple. Their imputed monetary value as a commodity is determined by state and market in varying proportions. Thus different cultures become insipid residues of traditional styles of action, washed up in one world-wide wasteland: an arid terrain devastated by the machinery needed to produce and consume. On the banks of the Seine and those of the Niger, people have unlearned how to milk, because the white stuff now comes from the grocer. (Thanks to more richly endowed consumer protection, it is less poisonous in France than in Mali.) True, more babies get cow’s milk, but the breasts of both rich and poor dry up. The addicted consumer is born when the baby cries for the bottle: when the organism is trained to reach for milk from the grocer and to turn away from the breast that thus defaults. Autonomous and creative human action, required to make man’s universe bloom, atrophies. Roofs of shingle or thatch, tile or slate, are displaced by concrete for the few and corrugated plastic for the many. Neither jungle marshes nor ideological biases have prevented the poor and the socialist from rushing onto the highways of the rich, the roads leading them into the world where economists replace priests. The mint stamps out all local treasures and idols. Money devalues what it cannot measure. The crisis, then, is the same for all: the choice of more or less dependence upon industrial commodities. More dependence means the rapid and complete destruction of cultures which determine the criteria for satisfying subsistence activities. Less means the variegated flowering of use-values in modern cultures of intense activity. Although hard to imagine for those already accustomed to living inside the supermarket, a structure different only in name from a ward for idiots, the choice is essentially the same for both rich and poor.
+
+Present-day industrial society organizes life around commodities. Our market-intensive societies measure material progress by the increase in the volume and variety of commodities produced. And taking our cue from this sector, we measure social progress by the distribution of access to these commodities. Economics has been developed as propaganda for the takeover by large-scale commodity producers. Socialism has been debased to a struggle against handicapped distribution, and welfare economics has identified the public good with opulence – the humiliating opulence of the poor in the schools, hospitals, jails and asylums of the United States and other western countries.
+
+By disregarding all trade-offs to which no price tag is attached, industrial society has created an urban landscape that is unfit for people unless they devour each day their own weight in metals and fuels, a world in which the constant need for protection against the unwanted results of more things and more commands has generated new depths of discrimination, impotence and frustration. The establishment-orientated ecological movement so far has further strengthened this trend: it has concentrated attention on faulty industrial technology, and, at best, on exploitation of industrial production by private owners. It has questioned the depletion of natural resources, the inconvenience of pollution, and net transfers of power. But even when price tags are attached to reflect the environmental impact, the disvalue of nuisance, or the cost of polarization, we still do not see clearly that the division of labour, the multiplication of commodities and dependence on them have forcibly substituted standardized packages for almost everything people formerly did or made on their own.
+
+For two decades now, about fifty languages have died each year; half of all those still spoken in 1950 survive only as subjects for doctoral theses. And what distinct languages do remain to witness the incomparably different ways of seeing, using, and enjoying the world, now sound more and more alike. Consciousness is colonized everywhere by imported labels. Yet, even those who do worry about the loss of cultural and genetic variety, or about the multiplication of long-impact isotopes, do not advert to the irreversible depletion of skills, stories, and senses of form. And this progressive substitution of industrial goods and services for useful but non-marketable values has been the shared goal of political factions and regimes otherwise violently opposed to one another.
+
+In this way, ever larger pieces of our lives are so transformed that life itself comes to depend almost exclusively on the consumption of commodities sold on the world market. The United States corrupts its farmers to provide grain to a regime which increasingly stakes its legitimacy on the ability to deliver ever more grain. Of course, the two regimes allocate resources by different methods: here, by the wisdom of pricing; there, by the wisdom of planners. But the political opposition between proponents of alternate methods of allocation only masks the similar ruthless disregard of personal dignity and freedom by all factions and parties.
+
+Energy policy is a good example for the profound identity in the world-views of the self-styled socialist and the so-called capitalist supporters of the industrial system. Possibly excluding such places as Cambodia, about which I am uninformed, no governing élite nor any socialist opposition can conceive of a desirable future that would be based on per capita energy consumption of a magnitude inferior to that which now prevails in Europe. All existing political parties stress the need for energy-intensive production – albeit with Chinese discipline – while failing to comprehend that the corresponding society will further deny people the free use of their limbs. Here sedans and there buses push bicycles off the road. All governments stress an employment-intensive force of production, but are unwilling to recognize that jobs can also destroy the use-value of free time. They all stress a more objective and complete professional definition of people’s needs, but are insensitive to the consequent expropriation of life.
+
+In the late Middle Ages the stupefying simplicity of the heliocentric model was used as an argument to discredit the new astronomy. Its elegance was interpreted as naivete. In our days, use-value centred theories that analyze the social costs generated by established economics are certainly not rare. Such theories are being proposed by dozens of outsiders, who often identify them with radical technology, ecology, community life-styles, smallness, or beauty. As an excuse to avoid looking at these theories, the frequent failure of their proponents" experiments in personal living are held against them and magnified. Just as the legendary inquisitor refused to look through Galileo’s telescope, so most modern economists refuse to look at an analysis that might displace the conventional centre of their economic system. The new analytical systems would force us to recognize the obvious: that the generation of non-marketable use-values must inevitably occupy the centre of any culture that provides a programme for satisfactory life to a majority of its members. Cultures are programmes for activities, not for firms. Industrial society destroys this centre by polluting it with the measured output of corporations, public or private, degrading what people do or make on their own. As a consequence, societies have been transformed into huge zero-sum games, monolithic delivery systems in which every gain for one turns into a loss or burden for another, while true satisfaction is denied to both.
+
+On the way, innumerable sets of infrastructures in which people coped, played, ate, made friends, and loved have been destroyed. A couple of so-called development decades have sufficed to dismantle traditional patterns of culture from Manchuria to Montenegro. Prior to these years, such patterns permitted people to satisfy most of their needs in a subsistence mode. After these years, plastic had replaced pottery, carbonated beverages replaced water, Valium replaced camomile tea, and records replaced guitars. All through history, the best measure for bad times was the percentage of food eaten that had to be purchased. In good times, most families got most of their nutrition from what they grew or acquired in a network of gift relationships. Until late in the eighteenth century, more than 99 per cent of the world’s food was produced inside the horizon that the consumer could see from the church steeple or minaret. Laws that tried to control the number of chickens and pigs within the city walls suggest that, except for a few large urban areas, more than half of all food eaten was also cultivated within the city. Before World War II, less than 4 per cent of all food eaten was transported into the region from abroad, and these imports were largely confined to the eleven cities which then contained more than two million inhabitants. Today, 40 per cent of all people survive only because they have access to inter-regional markets. A future in which the world market of capital and goods would be severely reduced is as much a taboo today as a modern world in which active people would use modern convivial tools to create an abundance of use-values that liberated them from consumption. One can see in this pattern a reflection of the belief that useful activities by which people both express and satisfy their needs can be replaced indefinitely by standardized goods or services.
+
+### The modernization of poverty
+
+Beyond a certain threshold, the multiplication of commodities induces impotence, the incapacity to grow food, to sing, or to build. The toil and pleasure of the human condition become a faddish privilege restricted to some of the rich. When Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress, Acatzingo, like most Mexican villages of its size, had four groups of musicians who played for a drink and served the population of eight hundred. Today, records and radios, hooked up to loudspeakers, drown out local talent. Occasionally, in an act of nostalgia, a collection is taken up to bring a band of drop-outs from the university for some special holiday to sing the old songs. On the day Venezuela legislated the right of each citizen to "housing", conceived of as a commodity, three-quarters of all families found that their self-built dwellings were thereby degraded to the status of hovels. Furthermore – and this is the rub – self-building was now prejudiced. No house could be legally started without the submission of an approved architect’s plan. The useful refuse and junk of Caracas, up until then re-employed as excellent building materials, now created a problem of solid-waste disposal. The man who produces his own "housing" is looked down upon as a deviant who refuses to cooperate with the local pressure group for the delivery of mass-produced housing units. Also, innumerable regulations have appeared which brand his ingenuity as illegal, or even criminal. This example illustrates how the poor are the first to suffer when a new kind of commodity castrates one of the traditional subsistence crafts. The useful unemployment of the jobless poor is sacrificed to the expansion of the labour market. "Housing" as a self-chosen activity, just like any other freedom for useful unemployment of time off the job, becomes the privilege of some deviant, often the idle rich.
+
+An addiction to paralyzing affluence, once it becomes engrained in a culture, generates " modernized poverty". This is a form of disvalue necessarily associated with the proliferation of commodities. This rising disutility of industrial mass products has escaped the attention of economists, because it is not accessible to their measurements, and of social servicers, because it cannot be "operationalized". Economists have no effective means of including in their calculations the society-wide loss of a kind of satisfaction that has no market equivalent. Thus, one could today define economists as the members of a fraternity which only accepts people who, in the pursuit of their professional work, can practice a trained social blindness towards the most fundamental trade-off in contemporary systems, both East and West: the decline in the individual-personal ability to do or to make, which is the price of every additional degree of commodity affluence.
+
+The existence and nature of modernized poverty remained hidden, even in ordinary conversation, as long as it primarily affected the poor. As development, or modernization, reached the poor – those who until then had been able to survive in spite of being excluded from the market economy – they were systematically compelled to survive through buying into a purchasing system which, for them, always and necessarily meant getting the dregs of the market. Indians in Oaxaca who formerly had no access to schools are now drafted into school to "earn" certificates that measure precisely their inferiority relative to the urban population. Furthermore – and this is again the rub – without this piece of paper they can no longer enter even the building trades. Modernization of "needs" always adds new discrimination to poverty.
+
+Modernized poverty has now become the common experience of all except those who are so rich that they can drop out in luxury. As one facet of life after another becomes dependent on engineered supplies, few of us escape the recurrent experience of impotence. The average United States consumer is bombarded by a hundred advertisements per day, and reacts to many of them – more often than not – in a negative way. Even well-heeled shoppers acquire, with each new commodity, a fresh experience of disutility. They suspect they have purchased something of doubtful value, perhaps soon useless, or even dangerous, and something that calls for an array of even more expensive complements. Affluent shoppers organize: they usually begin with demands for quality control, and not infrequently generate consumer resistance. Across the tracks, slum neighbourhoods "unplug" themselves from service and "care", from social work in South Chicago and from textbooks in Kentucky. Rich and poor are almost ready to recognize clearly a new form of frustrating wealth in the further expansions of a market-intensive culture. Also, the affluent come to sense their own plight as it is mirrored in the poor, though for the moment this intimation has not developed beyond a kind of romanticism.
+
+The ideology that identifies progress with affluence is not restricted to the rich countries. The same ideology degrades non-marketable activities even in areas where, until recently, most needs were still met through a subsistence mode of life. For example, under Mao the Chinese – drawing inspiration from their own tradition – seemed willing and able to redefine technical progress and to opt for the bicycle over the jet plane. They stressed local self-determination as a goal of inventive people, rather than as a means for national defence. But by 1977, their propaganda was glorying in China’s industrial capacity to deliver more health care, education, housing, and general welfare – at a lower cost. Merely tactical functions are provisionally assigned to the herbs in the bag of the barefoot doctor and to labour-intensive production methods. Here, as in other areas of the world, heteronomous – that is, other-directed – production of goods, standardized for categories of anonymous consumers, fosters unrealistic and ultimately frustrating expectations. Furthermore, the process inevitably corrupts the trust of people in their own and their neighbours" ever-surprising autonomous competences. China simply represents the latest example of the particular western version of modernization through intensive market dependence seizing a traditional society as no cargo cult did at its most irrational extreme.
+
+### The history of needs
+
+In both traditional and modern societies, an important change has occurred in a very short period: the means for satisfaction of needs have been radically altered. The motor has sapped the muscle; instruction has deadened self-confident curiosity. As a consequence, both needs and wants have acquired a character for which there is no historical precedent. For the first time, needs have become almost exclusively coterminous with commodities. As long as most people walked wherever they wanted to go, they felt restrained mainly when their freedom was restricted. Now that they depend on transportation in order to move, they claim not a freedom but a right to passenger miles. And as ever more vehicles provide ever more people with such "rights", the freedom to walk is degraded and eclipsed by the provision of these rights. For most people, wants follow suit. They cannot even imagine liberation from universal passengerhood, that is the liberty of modern man in a modern world to move on his own.
+
+This situation, by now a rigid interdependence of needs and market, is legitimated through appeal to the expertise of an élite whose knowledge, by its very nature, cannot be shared. Economists of rightist as well as leftist persuasion vouch to the public that an increase in jobs depends on more energy; educators persuade the public that law, order, and productivity depend on more instruction; gynaecologists claim that the quality of infant life depends on their involvement in childbirth. Therefore, the near-universal extension of market intensity in the world’s economies cannot be effectively questioned as long as the immunity of the élites which legitimize the nexus between commodity and satisfaction has not been destroyed. The point is well illustrated by a woman who told me about the birth of her third child. Having borne two children, she felt both competent and experienced. She was in hospital and sensed the child coming. She called the nurse, who, instead of helping, rushed for a sterile towel to press the baby’s head back into the womb and ordered the mother to stop pushing because, "Dr. Levy has not yet arrived".
+
+But this is the moment for public decision, for political action instead of professional management. Modern societies, rich or poor, can move in either of two opposite directions: they can produce a new bill of goods — albeit safer, less wasteful, more easily shared — and thereby further intensify their dependence on consumer staples. Or, they can take a totally new approach to the inter-relationship between needs and satisfactions. In other words, societies can either retain their market-intensive economies, changing only the design of the output, or they can reduce their dependence on commodities. The latter entails the adventure of imagining and constructing new frameworks in which individuals and communities can develop a new kind of modern toolkit. This would be organized so as to permit people to shape and satisfy an expanding proportion of their needs directly and personally.
+
+The first direction represents a continuing identification of technical progress with the multiplication of commodities. The bureaucratic managers of egalitarian persuasion and the technocrats of welfare would converge in a call for austerity: to shift from goods, such as jets, that obviously cannot be shared, to so-called "social" equipment, like buses; to distribute more equitably the decreasing hours of employment available and ruthlessly limit the typical work week to about twenty hours on the job; to draft the new resource of unemployed life-time into retraining or voluntary service on the model of Mao, Castro, or Kennedy. This new stage of industrial society – though socialist, effective, and rational – would simply usher in a new state of the culture that downgraded the satisfaction of wants into repetitive relief of imputed needs through engineered staples. At its best, this alternative would produce goods and services in smaller quantities, distribute them more equitably, and foster less envy. The symbolic participation of people in deciding what ought to be made might be transferred from a buck in the market to a gawk in the political assembly. The environmental impact of production could be softened. Among commodities, services, especially the various forms of social control, would certainly grow much faster than the manufacture of goods. Huge sums are already being spent on the oracle industry so that government prophets can spew out "alternative" scenarios designed to shore up this first choice. Interestingly, many of them have already reached the conclusion that the cost of the social controls necessary to enforce austerity in an ecologically feasible, but still industry-centred society would be intolerable.
+
+The second choice would bring down the curtain on absolute market dominance, and foster an ethic of austerity for the sake of widespread satisfying action. If in the first alternative austerity would mean the individual’s acceptance of managerial ukazes for the sake of increased institutional productivity, austerity in the second alternative would mean that social virtue by which people recognize and decide limits on the maximum amount of instrumented power that anyone may claim, both for his own satisfaction and in the service of others. This convivial austerity inspires a society to protect personal use-value against disabling enrichment. Under such protection against disabling affluence many distinct cultures would arise, each modern and each emphasizing the dispersed use of modern tools. Convivial austerity so limits the use of any tool that tool ownership would lose much of its present power. If bicycles are owned here by the commune, there by the rider, nothing is changed about the essentially convivial nature of the bicycle as a tool. Such commodities would still be produced in large measure by industrial methods, but they would be seen and evaluated differently. Now, commodities are viewed mostly as staples that directly feed the needs shaped by their designers. In the second option, they would be valued either as raw materials or as tools that permitted people to generate use-values in maintaining the subsistence of their respective communities. But this choice depends, of course, on a Copernican revolution in our perception of values. At present, we see consumer goods and professional services at the centre of our economic system, and specialists relate our needs exclusively to this centre. In contrast, the social inversion contemplated here would assign use-values created and personally valued by people themselves to the centre. It is true that people have recently lost the confidence to shape their own desires. The world-wide discrimination against the autodidact has vitiated many people’s confidence in determining their own goals and needs. But the same discrimination has also resulted in a multiplicity of growing minorities who are infuriated by this insidious dispossession.
+
+## Disabling professions
+
+These minorities already see that they – and all autochthonous cultural life – are threatened by mega-tools which systematically expropriate the environmental conditions that foster individual and group autonomy. And so they quietly determine to fight for the usefulness of their bodies, memories, and skills. Because the rapidly increasing multiplication of imputed needs generates ever new kinds of dependence and ever new categories of modernized poverty, present-day industrial societies take on the character of interdependent conglomerates of bureaucratically stigmatized majorities. Among this great mass of citizens who are crippled by transport, rendered sleepless by schedules, poisoned by hormone therapy, silenced by loudspeakers, sickened by food, a few form minorities of organized and active citizens. Now these are barely beginning to grow and coalesce for public dissidence. Subjectively, these groups are ready to end an age. But to be dispatched, an age needs a name that sticks. I propose to call the mid-twentieth century the Age of Disabling Professions. I choose this designation because it commits those who use it. It exposes the anti-social functions performed by the least challenged providers: educators, physicians, social workers, and scientists. Simultaneously, it indicts the complacency of citizens who have submitted themselves to multi-faceted bondage as clients. To speak about the power of disabling professions shames their victims into recognizing the conspiracy of the life-long student, gynaecological case, or consumer, each with his or her manager. By describing the sixties as an apogee of the problem-solver, one immediately exposes both the inflated conceit of our academic élites and the greedy gullibility of their victims.
+
+But this focus on the makers of the social imagination and the cultural values does more than expose and denounce; by designating the last twenty-five years as the Age of Dominant Professions, one also proposes a strategy. One sees the necessity of going beyond the expert redistribution of wasteful, irrational, and paralyzing commodities, the hallmark of Radical Professionalism, the conventional wisdom of today’s good guys. The strategy demands nothing less than the unmasking of the professional ethos. The credibility of the professional expert, be he scientist, therapist, or executive, is the Achilles" heel of the industrial system. Therefore, only those citizen initiatives and radical technologies that directly challenge the insinuating dominance of disabling professions open the way to freedom for non-hierarchical, community-based competence. The waning of the current professional ethos is a necessary condition for the emergence of a new relationship between needs, contemporary tools, and personal satisfaction. The first step toward this emergence is a sceptical and non-deferential posture of the citizen towards the professional expert. Social reconstruction begins with a doubt raised among citizens.
+
+When I propose the analysis of professional power as the key to social reconstruction, I am usually told that it is a dangerous error to select this phenomenon as the crux for recovery from the industrial system. Is not the shape of the educational, medical, and planning establishments actually the reflection of the distribution of power and privilege of a capitalist élite? Is it not irresponsible to undermine the trust of the man in the street in his scientifically-trained teacher, physician, or economist precisely at the moment when the poor need these trained protectors to gain access to classroom, clinic, and expert? Ought not the industrial system’s indictment expose the income of stockholders in drug firms or the perquisites of power-brokers that belong to the new élites? Why spoil the mutual dependence of clients and professional providers, especially when increasingly – as in Cuba or the United States – both tend to come from the same social class? Is it not perverse to denigrate the very people who have painfully acquired the knowledge to recognize and service our needs for welfare? In fact, should not the radically socialist professional leaders be singled out as the most apt leaders in the ongoing task of society of defining and meeting people’s "real" needs in an egalitarian society?
+
+The arguments implicit in these questions are frequently advanced to disrupt and discredit public analysis of the disabling effects of industrial welfare systems which focus on services. Such effects are essentially identical and clearly inevitable, no matter what the political flag under which they are imposed. They incapacitate people’s autonomy through forcing them – via legal, environmental, and social changes – to become consumers of care. These rhetorical questions represent a frantic defence of privilege on the part of those élites who might lose income, but would certainly gain status and power if, in a new form of a market-intensive economy, dependence on their services were rendered more equitable.
+
+A further objection to the critique of professional power drives out the devil with Beelzebub. This objection singles out, as the key target for analysis, the defence conglomerates seemingly at the centre of each bureaucratic-industrial society. The developed argument then posits the security forces as the motor behind the contemporary universal regimentation into market-dependent discipline. It identifies as the principal need-makers the armed bureaucracies that have come into being since, under Louis XIV, Richelieu established the first professional police: that is, the professional agencies that are now in charge of weaponry, intelligence, and propaganda. Since Hiroshima, these so-called services appear to be the determinants for research, design production, and employment. They rest upon civilian foundations, such as schooling for discipline, consumer training for the enjoyment of waste, habituation to violent speeds, medical engineering for life in a world-wide shelter, and standardized dependence on issues dispensed by benevolent quartermasters. This line of thought sees state security as the generator of a society’s production patterns, and views the civilian economy as, to a large extent, either the military’s spin-off or its prerequisite.
+
+If an argument constructed around these notions were valid, how could such a society forego atomic power, no matter how poisonous, oppressive or counter-productive a further energy glut might be? How could a defence-ridden state be expected to tolerate the organization of disaffected citizen groups who unplug their neighbourhoods from consumption to claim the liberty to small-scale use-value-intensive production that happens in an atmosphere of satisfying and joyful austerity? Would not a militarized society soon have to move against need-deserters, brand them as traitors, and, if possible, expose them not just to scorn but to ridicule? Would not a defence-driven society have to stamp out those examples that would lead to non-violent modernity, just at the time when public policy calls for a decentralization of commodity production reminiscent of Mao, and for more rational, equitable, and professionally supervised consumption?
+
+This argument pays undue credit to the military as the source of violence in an industrial state. The assumption that military requirements are to blame for the aggressiveness and destructiveness of advanced industrial society must be exposed as an illusion. No doubt, if it were true that the military had somehow usurped the industrial system, if it had wrenched the various spheres of social endeavour and action away from civilian control, then the present state of militarized politics would have reached a point of no return; at least of no potential for civilian reform. This is in fact the argument made by the brightest of Brazil’s military leaders, who see the armed forces as the only legitimate tutor of peaceful industrial pursuit during the rest of this century.
+
+But this is simply not so. The modern industrial state is not a product of the army. Rather, its army is one of the symptoms of its total and consistent orientation. True, the present industrial mode of organization can be traced to military antecedents in Napoleonic times. True, the compulsory education for peasant boys in the 1830s, the universal health care for the industrial proletariat in the 1850s, the growing communications networks of the 1860s, as well as most forms of industrial standardization, are all strategies first introduced into modern societies as military requirements, and only later understood as dignified forms of peaceful, civilian progress. But the fact that systems of health, education, and welfare needed a military rationale to be enacted into law, does not mean that they were not thoroughly consistent with the basic thrust of industrial development which, in fact, was never non-violent, peaceful, or respectful of people.
+
+Today, this insight is easier to gain. First, because since Polaris it is no longer possible to distinguish between wartime and peacetime armies and second, because since the War on Poverty, peace is on the war-path. Today, industrial societies are constantly and totally mobilized; they are organized for constant public emergencies; they are shot through with variegated strategies in all sectors; the battlefields of health, education, welfare, and affimative equality are strewn with victims and covered with ruins; citizens" liberties are continually suspended for campaigns against ever newly discovered evils; each year new frontier-dwellers are discovered who must be protected against or cured of some new disease, some previously unknown ignorance. The basic needs that are shaped and imputed by all professional agencies are needs for defence against evils.
+
+Today’s professors and social scientists who seek to blame the military for the destructiveness of commodity -intensive societies are people who, in a very clumsy way, are attempting to arrest the erosion of their own legitimacy. They claim that the military pushes the industrial system into its frustrating and destructive state, thereby distracting attention from the profoundly destructive nature of a market-intensive society which drives its citizens into today’s wars. Both those who seek to protect professional autonomy against citizen maturity, and those who wish to portray the professional as victim of the militarized state, will be answered by a choice: the direction free citizens wish to go in order to supersede the world-wide crisis.
+
+### The waning of the professional age
+
+The illusions that permitted the installation of professions as arbiters of needs are now increasingly visible to common sense. Procedures in the service sector are often understood for what they are – Linus Blankets, or rituals that hide from the provider- consumer-caboodle the disparity and antipathy between the ideal for the sake of which the service is rendered, and the reality that the service creates. Schools that promise equal enlightenment generate unequally degrading meritocracy and life-long dependence on further tutorship; vehicles compel everyone to a flight forward. But the public has not yet clarified the choices. Projects under professional leadership could result in compulsory political creeds (with their accompanying versions of a new fascism), or experiences of citizens could dismiss our hubris as yet another historical collection of neo-Promethean but essentially ephemeral follies. Informed choice requires that we examine the specific role of the professions in determining who in this age got what from whom and why.
+
+To see the present clearly, let us imagine the children who will soon play in the ruins of high-schools, Hiltons – and hospitals. In these professional castles turned cathedrals, built to protect us against ignorance, discomfort, pain, and death, the children of tomorrow will re-enact in their play the delusions of our Age of Professions, as from ancient castles and cathedrals we reconstruct the crusades of knights against sin and the Turk in the Age of Faith. Children in their games will mingle the uniquack which now pollutes our language with archaisms inherited from robber barons and cowboys. I see them addressing each other as chairman and secretary rather than as chief and lord. Hopefully adults will blush when they slip into managerial pidgin with terms such as policy-making, social planning, and problem-solving.
+
+The Age of Professions will be remembered as the time when politics withered, when voters guided by professors entrusted to technocrats the power to legislate needs, the authority to decide who needs what and a monopoly over the means by which these needs shall be met. It will be remembered as the Age of Schooling, when people for one-third of their lives were trained how to accumulate needs on prescription and for the other two-thirds were clients of prestigious pushers who managed their habits. It will be remembered as the age when recreational travel meant a packaged gawk at strangers, and intimacy meant training by Masters and Johnson; when formed opinion was a replay of last night’s talk-show, and voting an endorsement to a salesman for more of the same.
+
+Future students will be as much confused by the supposed differences between capitalist and socialist school, health-care, prison or transportation systems as today’s students are by the claimed differences between justification by works as opposed to justification by faith in the late Reformation Christian sects. They will also discover that the professional librarians, surgeons, or supermarket designers in poor or socialist countries towards the end of each decade came to keep the same records, use the same tools, and build the same spaces that their colleagues in rich countries had pioneered at the decade’s beginning. Archeologists will periodize our life-span not by potsherds but by professional fashions, reflected in the mod-trends of United Nations publications.
+
+It would be pretentious to predict whether this age, when needs were shaped by professional design, will be remembered with a smile or a curse. I hope, of course, that it will be remembered as the night when father went on a binge, dissipated the family fortune, and obligated his children to start anew. Sadly, it will more probably be remembered as the time when a whole generation’s frenzied pursuit of impoverishing wealth rendered all freedoms alienable and, after first turning politics into the organized gripes of welfare recipients, extinguished it in expert totalitarianism.
+
+### Professional dominance
+
+Let us first face the fact that the bodies of specialists that now dominate the creation, adjudication, and satisfaction of needs are a new kind of cartel. And this must be recognized to outflank their developing defences. For we already see the new biocrat hiding behind the benevolent mask of the physician of old; the paedocrat’s behavioural aggression is shrugged off as perhaps silly, overzealous care of the concerned teacher; the personnel manager equipped with a psychological arsenal presents himself in the guise of an old-time foreman. The new specialists, who are usually servicers of human needs that their speciality has defined, tend to wear the mask of and to provide some form of care. They are more deeply entrenched than a Byzantine bureaucracy, more international than a world church, more stable than any labour union, endowed with wider competencies than any shaman, and equipped with a tighter hold over those they claim than any mafia.
+
+The new organized specialists must, first, be carefully distinguished from racketeers. Educators, for instance, now tell society what must be learned and can write off as useless what has been learned outside of school. By this kind of monopoly, which enables tyrannical professions to prevent you from shopping elsewhere and from making your own booze, they at first seem to fit the dictionary definition of gangsters. But gangsters, for their own profit, corner a basic necessity by controlling supplies. Educators and doctors and social workers today – as priests and lawyers formerly – gain legal power to create the need that, by law, they alone will be allowed to serve. They turn the modern state into a holding corporation of enterprises that facilitate the operation of their self-certified competencies.
+
+Legalized control over work has taken many different forms: soldiers of fortune refused to fight until they got the licence to plunder; Lysistrata organized female chattels to enforce peace by refusing sex; doctors in Kos conspired by oath to pass trade secrets only to their offspring; guilds set the curricula, prayers, tests, pilgrimages and hazings through which Hans Sachs had to pass before he was permitted to shoe his fellow burghers. In capitalist countries, unions attempt to control who shall work what hours for what pay. All these trade associations are attempts by specialists to determine how their kind of work shall be done, and by whom. But none of these specialists are professionals in the sense that doctors, for instance, are today. Today’s domineering professionals, of whom physicians provide the most striking and painful example, go further: they decide what shall be made, for whom, and how it shall be administered. They claim special, incommunicable knowledge, not just about the way things are and are to be made, but also about the reasons why their services ought to be needed. Merchants sell you the goods they stock. Guildsmen guarantee quality. Some craftspeople tailor their product to your measure or fancy. Professionals however, tell you what you need. They claim the power to prescribe. They not only advertise what is good, but ordain what is right. Neither income, long training, delicate tasks, nor social standing is the mark of the professional. Their income can be low or taxed away, their training compressed into weeks instead of years; their status can approach that of the oldest profession. Rather, what counts is the professional’s authority to define a person as client, to determine that person’s need, and to hand that person a prescription which defines this new social role. Unlike the hookers of old, the modern professional is not one who sells what others give for free, but rather one who decides what ought to be sold and must not be given for free.
+
+There is a further distinction between professional power and that of other occupations: professional power springs from a different source. A guild, a union, or a gang forces respect for its interest and rights by a strike, blackmail, or overt violence. In contrast, a profession, like a priesthood, holds power by concession from an élite whose interests it props up. As a priesthood offers the way to salvation in the train of an anointed king, so a profession interprets, protects, and supplies a special this-worldly interest to the constituency of modern rulers. Professional power is a specialized form of the privilege to prescribe what is right for others and what they therefore need. It is the source of prestige and control within the industrial state. This kind of professional power could, of course, come into existence only in societies where élite membership itself is legitimated, if not acquired, by professional status: a society where governing élites are attributed a unique kind of objectivity in defining the moral status of a lack. It fits like a glove the age in which even access to parliament, the house of commons, is overwhelmingly limited to those who have acquired the title of master by accumulating knowledge stock in some college. Professional autonomy and licence, in defining the needs of society are the logical forms that oligarchy takes in a political culture that has replaced the means-test by knowledge-stock certificates issued by schools. The professions" power over the work their members do is thus distinct in both scope and origin.
+
+### Towards professional tyranny
+
+Professional power has also, recently, so changed in degree that two animals of entirely different colours now go by the same name. For instance, the practicing and experimenting health scientist consistently evades critical analysis by dressing up in the clothes of yesterday’s family doctor. The wandering physician became the medical doctor when he left commerce in drugs to the pharmacist and kept for himself the power to prescribe them. At that moment, he acquired a new kind of authority by uniting three roles in one person: the sapiential authority to advise, instruct, and direct; the moral authority that makes its acceptance not just useful but obligatory; and the charismatic authority that allows the physician to appeal to some supreme interest of his clients that not only outranks conscience but sometimes even the raison d’état. This kind of doctor, of course, still exists, but within a modern medical system he is a figure out of the past. A new kind of health scientist is now much more common. He increasingly deals more with cases than with persons; he deals with the breakdowns that he can perceive in the case, rather than with the complaint of the individual; he protects society’s interest rather than the person’s. The authorities that, during the liberal age, had coalesced in the individual practitioner in his treatment of a patient are now claimed by the professional corporation in the service of the state. This entity now carves out for itself a social mission.
+
+Only during the last twenty-five years has medicine turned from a liberal into a dominant profession by obtaining the power to indicate what constitutes a health need for people in general. Health specialists as a corporation have acquired the authority to determine what health care must be provided to society at large. It is no longer the individual professional who imputes a "need" to the individual client, but a corporate agency that imputes a need to entire classes of people, and then claims the mandate to test the complete population in order to identify all who belong to the group of potential patients. And what happens in health care is thoroughly consistent with other domains. New pundits jump on the bandwagon of the therapeutic care-provider: educators, social workers, the military, town-planners, judges, policemen, and their ilk have obviously made it. They enjoy wide autonomy in creating the diagnostic tools by which they then catch their clients for treatment. Dozens of other need-creators try: international bankers "diagnose" the ills of an African country and then induce it to swallow the prescribed treatment, even though the "patient" might die; security specialists evaluate the loyalty risk in a citizen and then extinguish his private sphere; dog-catchers sell themselves to the public as pest controllers, and claim a monopoly over the lives of stray dogs. The only way to prevent the escalation of needs is a fundamental, political exposure of those illusions that legitimize dominating professions.
+
+Many professions are so well established that they not only exercise tutelage over the citizen-become-client, but also determine the shape of his world- become-ward. The language in which he perceives himself, his perception of rights and freedoms, and his awareness of needs all derive from professional hegemony.
+
+The difference between craftsman, liberal professional, and the new technocrat can be clarified by comparing the typical reaction of people who neglect their respective advice. If you did not take the craftsman’s advice, you were a fool. If you did not take liberal counsel, society blamed you. Now the profession or the government may be blamed when you escape from the care that your lawyer, teacher, surgeon, or shrink has decided upon for you. Under the pretense of meeting needs better and on a more equitable basis, the service-professional has mutated into a crusading philanthropist. The nutritionist prescribes the "right" formula for the infant, and the psychiatrist the "right" anti-depressant, and the schoolmaster – now acting with the fuller power of "educator" – feels entitled to push his method between you and anything you want to learn. Each new speciality in service production thrives only when the public has accepted and the law has endorsed a new perception of what ought not to exist. Schools expanded in a moralizing crusade against illiteracy, once illiteracy had been defined as an evil. Maternity wards mushroomed to do away with home births.
+
+Professionals claim a monopoly over the definition of deviance and the remedies needed. For example, lawyers assert that they alone have the competence and the legal right to provide assistance in divorce. If you devise a kit for do-it-yourself divorce, you find yourself in a double bind: if you are not a lawyer, you are liable of practice without a license; if you are a member of the bar, you can be expelled for unprofessional behaviour. Professionals also claim secret knowledge about human nature and its weaknesses, knowledge they are also mandated to apply. Gravediggers, for example, did not become members of a profession by calling themselves morticians, by obtaining college credentials, by raising their incomes, or by getting rid of the odour attached to their trade by electing one of themselves president of the Lion’s Club. Morticians formed a profession, a dominant and disabling one, when they acquired the muscle to have the police stop your burial if you are not embalmed and boxed by them. In any area where a human need can be imagined, these new disabling professions claim that they are the exclusive experts of the public good.
+
+### Professions as a new clergy
+
+The transformation of a liberal profession into a dominant one is equivalent to the legal establishment of a church. Physicians transmogrified into biocrats, teachers into gnosocrats, morticians into thanatocrats, are much closer to state-supported clergies than to trade associations. The professional as teacher of the current brand of scientific orthodoxy acts as theologian. As moral entrepreneur, he acts the role of priest: he creates the need for his mediation. As crusading helper, he acts the part of the missionary and hunts down the underprivileged. As inquisitor, he outlaws the unorthodox – he imposes his solutions on the recalcitrants who refuse to recognize that they are a problem. This multi-faceted investiture with the task of relieving a specific inconvenience of man’s estate turns each profession into the analogue of an established cult. The public acceptance of domineering professions is thus essentially a political event. The new profession creates a new hierarchy, new clients and outcasts, and a new strain on the budget. But, also, each new establishment of professional legitimacy means that the political tasks of lawmaking, judicial review, and executive power lose more of their proper character and independence. Public affairs pass from the layperson’s elected peers into the hands of a self-accrediting élite.
+
+When medicine recently outgrew its liberal restraints, it invaded legislation by establishing public norms. Physicians had always determined what constitutes disease; dominant medicine now determines what diseases society shall not tolerate. Medicine has invaded the courts. Physicians had always diagnosed who is sick; dominant medicine, however, brands those who must be treated. Liberal practitioners prescribed a cure: dominant medicine has public powers of correction; it decides what shall be done with or to the sick. In a democracy, the power to make laws, execute them, and achieve public justice must derive from the citizens themselves. This citizen control over the key powers has been restricted, weakened, and sometimes abolished by the rise of church-like professions. Government by a congress that bases its decisions on expert opinions of such professions might be government for, but never by, the people. This is not the place to investigate the intent with which political rule has thus been weakened ; it is sufficient to indicate the professional disqualification of lay opinion as a necessary condition for this subversion.
+
+Citizen liberties are grounded in the rule that excludes hearsay from testimony on which public decisions are based. What people can see for themselves and interpret is the common ground for binding rules. Opinions, beliefs, inferences, or persuasions ought not to stand when in conflict with the eyewitness – ever. Expert élites could become dominant professions only by a piecemeal erosion and final reversal of this rule. In the legislature and courts, the rule against hearsay evidence is now, de facto, suspended in favour of the opinions profferred by the members of these self-accredited élites.
+
+But let us not confuse the public use of expert factual knowledge with a profession’s corporate exercise of normative judgment. When a craftsman, such as a gunmaker, was called into court as an expert to reveal to the jury the secrets of his trade, he apprenticed the jury to his craft on the spot. He demonstrated visibly from which barrel the bullet had come. Today, most experts play a different role. The dominant professional provides jury or legislature with his fellow-initiate’s opinion, rather than with factual evidence and a skill. He calls for a suspension of the hearsay rule and inevitably undermines the rule of law. Thus, democratic power is ineluctably abridged.
+
+### The hegemony of imputed needs
+
+Professions could not have become dominant and disabling unless people were ready to experience as a lack that which the expert imputed to them as a need. Their mutual dependence as tutor and charge has become resistant to analysis because it has been obscured by corrupted language. Good old words have been made into branding irons that claim wardship for experts over home, shop, store, and the space or ether between them. Language, the most fundamental of commons, is thus polluted by twisted strands of jargon, each under the control of another profession. The disseizin of words, the depletion of ordinary language and its degradation into bureaucratic terminology, parallel in a more intimately debasing manner that particular form of environmental degradation that dispossesses people of their usefulness unless they are gainfully employed. Possible changes in design, attitudes, and laws that would retrench professional dominance cannot be proposed unless we become more sensitive to the misnomers behind which this dominance hides.
+
+When I learned to speak, "problems" existed only in mathematics or chess; "solutions" were saline or legal, and "need" was mainly used as a verb. The expressions, "I have a problem", or, "I have a need", both sounded silly. As I grew into my teens and Hitler worked at solutions, the "social problem" also spread. "Problem" children of ever newer shades were discovered among the poor as social workers learned to brand their prey and to standardize their "needs". "Need", used as a noun, became the fodder on which professions fattened into dominance. Poverty was modernized. Management translated poverty from an experience into a measure. The poor became the needy.
+
+During the second half of my life, to be "needy" became respectable. Computable and imputable needs moved up the social ladder. It ceased to be a sign of poverty to have needs. Income opened new registers of need. Spock, Comfort, and the vulgarizers of Nader trained laymen to shop for solutions to problems they learned to cook up according to professional recipes. Education qualified graduates to climb ever more rarefied heights and implant and cultivate there ever newer strains of hybridized needs. Prescriptions increased and competences shrank. For example, in medicine, ever more pharmacologically active drugs went on prescription, and people lost their will and ability to cope with indisposition or even with discomfort. In American supermarkets, where it is estimated that about 1500 new products appear each year, less than 20 per cent survive more than one year on the shelves, the remainder, having proved unsellable, fadish, risky, unprofitable, or obsolete competitors to new models. Therefore, consumers are forced to seek guidance from professional consumer protectors.
+
+Furthermore, the rapid turnover of products renders wants shallow and plastic. Paradoxically, then, high aggregate consumption resulting from engineered needs fosters growing consumer indifference to specific, potentially felt wants. Increasingly, needs are created by the advertising slogan and by purchases made by order from registrar, beautician, gynaecologist, and dozens of other prescribing diagnosticians. The need to be formally taught how to need, be this by advertising, prescription, or guided discussion in the collective or in the commune, appears in any culture where decisions and actions are no longer the result of personal experience in satisfaction, and the adaptive consumer cannot but substitute learned for felt needs. As people become apt pupils in learning how to need, the ability to shape wants from experienced satisfaction becomes a rare competence of the very rich or the seriously under-supplied. As needs are broken down into ever smaller component parts, each managed by an appropriate specialist, the consumer experiences difficulty in integrating the separate offerings of his various tutors into a meaningful whole that could be desired with commitment and possessed with pleasure. The income managers, life-style counsellors, consciousness raisers, academic advisers, food-fad experts, sensitivity developers, and others like them clearly perceive the new possibilities for management and move in to match packaged commodities to the splintered needs.
+
+Used as a noun, "need" is the individual offspring of a professional pattern; it is a plastic-foam replica of the mould in which professionals cast their staple; it is the advertised shape of the brood cells out of which consumers are produced. To be ignorant or unconvinced of one’s own needs has become the unforgivable anti-social act. The good citizen is one who imputes standardized needs to himself with such conviction that he drowns out any desire for alternatives, much less the renunciation of need.
+
+When I was born, before Stalin and Hitler and Roosevelt came to power, only the rich, hypochondriacs, and members of élite unions spoke of their need for medical care when their temperatures rose. Doctors then, in response, could not do much more than grandmothers had done. In medicine the first mutation of needs came with sulfa drugs and antibiotics. As the control of infections became a simple and effective routine, drugs went more and more on prescription. Assignment of the sick-role became a medical monopoly. The person who felt ill had to go to the clinic to be labelled with a disease-name and be legitimately declared a member of the minority of the so-called sick: people were excused from work, entitled to help, put under doctor’s orders, and were enjoined to heal in order to become useful again. Paradoxically, as pharmacological technique – tests and drugs – became so predictable and cheap that one could have dispensed with the physician, society enacted laws and police regulations to restrict the free use of those procedures that science had simplified, and placed them on the prescription list.
+
+The second mutation of medical needs happened when the sick ceased to be a minority. Today, few people eschew doctors" orders for any length of time. In Italy, the United States, France, or Belgium, one out of every two citizens is being watched simultaneously by several health professionals who treat, advise, or at least observe him or her. The object of such specialized care is, more often than not, a condition of teeth, womb, emotions, blood pressure, or hormone levels that the patient himself does not feel. Patients are no more in the minority. Now, the minority are those deviants who somehow escape from any and all patient-roles. This minority is made up of the poor, the peasants, the recent immigrants, and sundry others who, sometimes of their own volition, have gone medically AWOL. Just twenty years ago, it was a sign of normal health – which was assumed to be good – to get along without a doctor. The same status of non-patient is now indicative of poverty or dissidence. Even the status of the hypochondriac has changed. For the doctor in the forties, this was the label applied to the gate-crashers in his office – the designation reserved for the imaginary sick. Now, doctors refer to the minority who flee them by the same name: hypochondriacs are the imaginary healthy. To be plugged into a professional system as a life-long client is no longer a stigma that sets apart the disabled person from citizens at large. We now live in a society organized for deviant majorities and their keepers. To be an active client of several professionals provides you with a well-defined place within the realm of consumers for the sake of whom our society functions. Thus, the transformation of medicine from a liberal consulting profession into a dominant, disabling profession has immeasurably increased the number of the needy.
+
+At this critical moment, imputed needs move into a third mutation. They coalesce into what the experts call a multi-disciplinary problem necessitating, therefore, a multi-professional solution. First, the proliferation of commodities, each tending to turn into a requirement, has effectively trained the consumer to need on command. Next, the progressive fragmentation of needs into even smaller and unconnected parts made the client dependent on professional judgment for the blending of his needs into a meaningful whole. The auto industry provides a good example. By the end of the sixties, the advertised optional equipment needed to make a basic Ford desirable had been multiplied immensely. But contrary to the customer’s expectations, this "optional" flim-flam is in fact installed on the assembly line of the Detroit factory, and the shopper in Plains is left with a choice between a few packaged samples that are shipped at random: he can either buy the convertible that he wants but with the green seats he hates, or he can humour his girlfriend with leopardskin seats – at the cost of buying an unwanted paisley hard top.
+
+Finally, the client is trained to need a team approach to receive what his guardians consider "satisfactory treatment". Personal services that improve the consumer illustrate the point. Therapeutic affluence has exhausted the available life-time of many whom service professionals diagnose as standing in need of more. The intensity of the service economy has made the time needed for the consumption of pedagogical, medical and social treatments increasingly scarce. Time scarcity may soon turn into the major obstacle for the consumption of prescribed, and often publicly financed, services. Signs of such scarcity become evident from one’s early years. Already in kindergarten, the child is subjected to management by a team made up of such specialists as the allergist, speech pathologist, paediatrician, child psychologist, social worker, physical education instructor and teacher. By forming such a paedocratic team, many different professionals attempt to share the time that has become the major limiting factor to the imputation of further needs. For the adult, it is not the school but the work-place where the packaging of services focuses. The personnel manager, labour educator, in-service trainer, insurance planner, consciousness raiser find it more profitable to share the worker’s time than compete for it. A need-less citizen would be highly suspicious. People are told that they need their jobs, not so much for the money as for the services they get. The commons are extinguished and replaced by a new placenta built of funnels that deliver professional services. Life is paralyzed in permanent intensive care.
+
+## Enabling distinctions
+
+The disabling of the citizen through professional dominance is completed through the power of illusion. Hopes of religious salvation are displaced by expectations that centre on the state as supreme manager of professional services. Each of many special priesthoods claims competence to define public issues in terms of specific serviceable problems. The acceptance of this claim legitimates the docile recognition of imputed lacks on the part of the layman, whose world turns into an echo-chamber of engineered and managed needs. This dominance, the satisfaction of self-defined preference, is sacrificed to the fulfilment of educated needs and is reflected in the skyline of the city. Professional buildings look down on the crowds that shuttle between them in a continual pilgrimage to the new cathedrals of health, education, and welfare. Healthy homes are transformed into hygienic apartments where one cannot be born, cannot be sick, and cannot die decently. Not only are helpful neighbours a vanishing species, but also liberal doctors who make house calls. Work places fit for apprenticeship turn into opaque mazes of corridors that permit access only to functionaries equipped with "identities" in mica holders pinned to their lapels. A world designed for service deliveries is the utopia of citizens turned into welfare recipients.
+
+The prevailing addiction to imputable needs on the part of the rich, and the paralyzing fascination with needs on the part of the poor, would indeed be irreversible if people actually fitted the calculus of needs. But this is not so. Beyond a certain level of intensity, medicine engenders helplessness and disease ; education turns into the major generator of a disabling division of labour; fast transportation systems turn urbanized people for about one-sixth of their waking hours into passengers, and for an equal amount of time into members of the road gang that works to pay Ford, Esso, and the highway department. The threshold at which medicine, education, and transportation turn into counterproductive tools has been reached in all the countries of the world with per capita incomes comparable at least to those prevalent in Cuba. In all countries examined, and contrary to the illusions propagated by the orthodoxies of both East and West, this specific counter-productivity bears no relation to the kind of school, vehicle, or health organization now used. It sets in when the capital-intensity of the production process passes a critical threshold.
+
+Our major institutions have acquired the uncanny power to subvert the very purposes for which they were originally engineered and financed. Under the rule of our most prestigious professions, our institutional tools have as their principal product paradoxical counterproductivity – the systematic disabling of the citizenry. A city built around wheels becomes inappropriate for feet, and no increase of wheels can overcome the engineered immobility of such cripples. Autonomous action is paralyzed by a surfeit of commodities and treatments. But this does not represent simply a net loss of satisfactions that do not happen to fit into the industrial age. The impotence to produce use-values ultimately renders counterpurposive the very commodities meant to replace them. The car, the doctor, the school, and the manager are then commodities that have turned into destructive nuisances for the consumer, and retain net value only for the provider of services.
+
+Why are there no rebellions against the coalescence of late industrial society into one huge disabling service delivery system? The chief explanation must be sought in the illusion-generating power that these same systems possess. Besides doing technical things to body and mind, professionally attended institutions function also as powerful rituals which generate credence in the things their managers promise. Besides teaching Johnny to read, schools also teach him that learning from teachers is "better", and that, without compulsory schools, fewer books would be read by the poor. Besides providing locomotion, the bus, just as much as the sedan, reshapes the environment and puts walking out of step. Besides providing help in avoiding taxes, lawyers also convey the notion that laws solve problems. An ever growing part of our major institutions" functions is the cultivation and maintenance of three sets of illusions which turn the citizen into a client to be saved by experts.
+
+### Congestion versus paralysis
+
+The first enslaving illusion is the idea that people are born to be consumers and that they can attain any of their goals by purchasing goods and services. This illusion is due to an educated blindness to the worth of use-values in the total economy. In none of the economic models serving as national guidelines is there a variable to account for non-marketable use-values any more than there is a variable for nature’s perennial contribution. Yet there is no economy that would not collapse immediately if use-value production contracted beyond a point; for example, if homemaking were done only for wages, or intercourse engaged in only at a fee. What people do or make but will not or cannot put up for sale is as immeasurable and as invaluable for the economy as the oxygen they breathe.
+
+The illusion that economic models can ignore use-values springs from the assumption that those activities which we designate by intransitive verbs can be indefinitely replaced by institutionally defined staples referred to as nouns: "education" substituted for "I learn’; "health care" for "I heal’; transportation for "I move’; "television" for "I play".
+
+The confusion of personal and standardized values has spread throughout most domains. Under professional leadership, use-values are dissolved, rendered obsolete, and finally deprived of their distinctive nature. Love and institutional care become coterminous. Ten years of running a farm can be thrown into a pedagogical mixer and made equivalent to a high school degree. Things picked up at random and hatched in the freedom of the street are added as "educational experience" to things funneled into pupils" heads. The knowledge accountants seem unaware that the two activities, like oil and water, mix only as long as they are osterized by an educator’s perception. Gangs of crusading need-catchers could not continue to tax us, nor could they spend our resources on their tests, networks, and other nostrums if we did not remain paralyzed by this kind of greedy belief.
+
+The usefulness of staples, or packaged commodities, is intrinsically limited by two boundaries that must not be confused. First, queues will sooner or later stop the operation of any system that produces needs faster than the corresponding commodity and, second, dependence on commodities will sooner or later so determine needs that the autonomous production of a functional analogue will be paralyzed. The usefulness of commodities is limited by congestion and paralysis. Congestion and paralysis are both results of escalation in any sector of production, albeit results of a very different kind. Congestion, which is a measure of the degree to which staples get in their own way, explains why mass transportation by private car in Manhattan would be useless; it does not explain why people work hard to buy and insure cars that cannot move them. Even less does congestion alone explain why people become so dependent on vehicles that they are paralyzed and just cannot take to their feet.
+
+People become prisoners to time-consuming acceleration, stupefying education and sick-making medicine because beyond a certain threshold of intensity, dependence on a bill of industrial and professional goods destroys human potential, and does so in a specific way. Only up to a point can commodities replace what people make or do on their own. Only within limits can exchange-values satisfactorily replace use-values. Beyond this point, further production serves the interests of the professional producer – who has imputed the need to the consumer – and leaves the consumer befuddled and giddy, albeit richer. Needs satisfied rather than merely fed must be determined to a significant degree by the pleasure that is derived from the remembrance of personal autonomous action. There are boundaries beyond which commodities cannot be multiplied without disabling their consumer for this self-affirmation in action.
+
+Packages alone inevitably frustrate the consumer when their delivery paralyzes him or her. The measure of well-being in a society is thus never an equation in which these two modes of production are matched; it is always a balance that results when use-values and commodities fruitfully mesh in synergy. Only up to a point can heteronomous production of a commodity enhance and complement the autonomous production of the corresponding personal purpose. Beyond this point, the synergy between the two modes of production paradoxically turns against the purpose for which both use-value and commodity were intended. Occasionally, this is not clearly seen because the mainstream ecology movement tends to obscure the point. For example, atomic energy reactors have been widely criticized because their radiation is a threat, or because they foster technocratic controls. So far, however, only very few have dared to criticize them because they add to the energy glut. The paralysis of human action by socially destructive energy quanta has not yet been accepted as an argument for reducing the call for energy. Similarly, the inexorable limits to growth that are built into any service agency are still widely ignored. And yet it ought to be evident that the institutionalization of health care tends to make people into unhealthy marionettes, and that life long education fosters a culture of programmed people. Ecology will provide guidelines for a feasible form of modernity only when it is recognized that a man-made environment designed for commodities reduces personal aliveness to the point where the commodities themselves lose their value as means for personal satisfaction. Without this insight, industrial technology that was cleaner and less aggressive would be used for now-impossible levels of frustrating enrichment.
+
+It would be a mistake to attribute counterproductivity essentially to the negative externalities of economic growth, to exhaustion, pollution and various forms of congestion. This mistake would lead to confusing the congestion by which things get into his way, with the paralysis of the person who can no more exercise his autonomy in an environment designed for things.
+
+The fundamental reason why market intensity leads to counterproductivity must be sought in the relationship between the monopoly of commodities and human needs. This monopoly extends beyond its usual meaning. A commercial monopoly merely corners the market for one brand of whisky or car. An industry-wide cartel can restrict freedom further: it can corner all mass transportation in favour of internal combustion engines, as General Motors did when it purchased the Los Angeles trolleys. You can escape the first by sticking to rum and the second by purchasing a bicycle. I use the term "radical monopoly " to designate something else: the substitution of an industrial product or a professional service for a useful activity in which people engage or would like to engage. A radical monopoly paralyzes autonomous action in favour of professional deliveries. The more completely vehicles dislocate people, the more traffic managers will be needed and the more powerless people will be to walk home. This radical monopoly would accompany high-speed traffic even if motors were powered by sunshine and vehicles were spun of air. The longer each person is in the grip of education, the less time and inclination he has for browsing and exploration. At some point in every domain, the amount of goods delivered so degrades the environment for personal action that the possible synergy between use-values and commodities turns negative. Paradoxical, or specific, counterproductivity sets in. I will use this term whenever the impotence resulting from the substitution of a commodity for a value in use turns this commodity into a dis-value in the pursuit of the satisfaction it was meant to provide.
+
+### Industrial versus convivial tools
+
+Man ceases to be recognizable as one of his kind when he can no longer shape his own needs by the more or less competent use of those tools that his culture provides. Throughout history, most tools were labour-intensive means that could be used to satisfy the user of the tool, and were used in domestic production. Only marginally were shovels or hammers used to produce pyramids or a surplus for gift-exchange, and even more rarely to produce things for the market. Occasions for the extraction of profits were limited. Most work was done to create use-values not destined for exchange. But technological progress has been consistently applied to develop a very different kind of tool: it has pressed the tool primarily into the production of marketable staples. At first, during the industrial revolution, the new technology reduced the worker on the job to a Charlie Chaplin of Modern Times. At this early stage, however, the industrial mode of production did not yet paralyze people when they were off the job. Now women or men, who have come to depend almost entirely on deliveries of standardized fragments produced by tools operated by anonymous others, have ceased to find the same direct satisfaction in the use of tools that stimulated the evolution of man and his cultures. Although their needs and their consumption have multiplied many times, their satisfaction in handling tools has become rare, and they have ceased to live a life for which the organism acquired its form. At best, they barely survive, even though they do so surrounded by glitter. Their life-span has become a chain of needs that have been met for the sake of ulterior striving for satisfaction. Ultimately man-the-passive-consumer loses even the ability to discriminate between living and survival. The gamble on insurance and the gleeful expectation of rations and therapies take the place of enjoyment. In such company, it becomes easy to forget that satisfaction and joy can result only as long as personal aliveness and engineered provisions are kept in balance while a goal is pursued.
+
+The delusion that tools in the service of market-orientated institutions can with impunity destroy the conditions for convivial and personally manageable means permits the extinction of "aliveness" by conceiving of technological progress as a kind of engineering product that licences more professional domination. This delusion says that tools, in order to become more efficient in the pursuit of a specific purpose, inevitably become more complex and inscrutable: one thinks of cockpits and cranes. Therefore, it seems that modern tools necessarily require special operators who are highly trained and who alone can be securely trusted. Actually, just the opposite is usually true, and ought to be so. As techniques multiply and become more specific, their use often requires less complex judgments. They no longer require that trust on the part of the client on which the autonomy of the liberal professional, and even that of the craftsman, was built. However far medicine has advanced, only a tiny fraction of the total volume of demonstrably useful medical services requires advanced training in an intelligent person. From a social point of view, we ought to reserve the designation "technical progress" to instances in which new tools expand the capacity and the effectiveness of a wider range of people, especially when new tools permit more autonomous production of use-values.
+
+There is nothing inevitable about the expanding professional monopoly over new technology. The great inventions of the last hundred years, such as new metals, ball-bearings, some building materials, electronics, some tests and remedies, are capable of increasing the power of both the heteronomous and the autonomous modes of production. In fact, however, most new technology has not been incorporated into convivial equipment, but into institutional packages and complexes. The professionals rather consistently have used industrial production to establish a radical monopoly by means of technology’s obvious power to serve its manager. Counterproductivity due to the paralysis of use-value production is fostered by this notion of technological progress.
+
+There is no simple "technological imperative" which requires that ball-bearings be used in motorized vehicles or that electronics be used to control the brain. The institutions of high-speed traffic and of mental health are not the necessary result of ball-bearings or electronics. Their functions are determined by the needs they are supposed to serve – needs that are overwhelmingly imputed and reinforced by disabling professions. This is a point that the young Turks in the professions seem to overlook when they justify their institutional allegiance by presenting themselves as the publicly appointed ministers of technological progress that must be domesticated.
+
+The same subservience to the idea of progress conceives of engineering principally as a contribution to institutional effectiveness. Scientific research is highly financed, but only if it can be applied for military use or for further professional domination. Alloys which make bicycles both stronger and lighter are a fall-out of research designed to make jets faster and weapons deadlier. But the results of most research go solely into industrial tools, thus making already huge machines even more complex and inscrutable. Because of this bias on the part of scientists and engineers, a major trend is strengthened: needs for autonomous action are precluded, while those for the acquisition of commodities are multiplied. Convivial tools which facilitate the individual’s enjoyment of use-values – without or with only minimal supervision by policemen, physicians, or inspectors – are polarized at two extremes: poor Asian workers and rich students and professors are the two kinds of people who ride bicycles. Perhaps without being conscious of their good fortune, both enjoy being free from this second illusion.
+
+Recently, some groups of professionals, government agencies, and international organizations have begun to explore, develop, and advocate small-scale, intermediate technology. These efforts might be interpreted as an attempt to avoid the more obvious vulgarities of a technological imperative. But most of the new technology designed for self-help in health care, education, or home building is only an alternative model of high-intensity dependence commodities. For example, experts are asked to design new medicine cabinets that allow people to follow the doctor’s orders over the telephone. Women are taught to determine themselves how ripe their breasts are for useless amputation by the surgeon. Cubans are given paid leaves from work to erect their pre-fabricated houses. The enticing prestige of professional products as they become cheaper ends by making rich and poor more alike. Both Bolivians and Swedes feel equally backward, underprivileged, and exploited to the degree that they learn without the supervision of certified teachers, keep healthy without the check-ups of a physician, and move about without a motorized crutch.
+
+### Liberties versus rights
+
+The third disabling illusion looks to experts for limits to growth. Entire populations socialized to need on command are assumed ready to be told what they do not need. The same multinational agents that for a generation imposed an international standard of bookkeeping, deodorants, and energy consumption on rich and poor alike now sponsor the Club of Rome. Obediently, UNESCO gets into the act and trains experts in the regionalization of imputed needs. For their own imputed good, the rich are thereby programmed to pay for more costly professional dominance at home and to provide the poor with assigned needs of a cheaper and tighter brand. The brightest of the new professionals see clearly that growing scarcity pushes controls over needs ever upward. The central planning of output-optimal decentralization has become the most prestigious job of the late seventies. But what is not yet recognized is that this new illusory salvation by professionally decreed limits confuses liberties and rights.
+
+In each of the seven United Nations-defined world regions a new clergy is being trained to preach the appropriate style of austerity drafted by the new need-designers. Consciousness raisers roam through local communities inciting people to meet the decentralized production goals that have been assigned to them. Milking the family goat was a liberty until more ruthless planning made it a duty to contribute the yield to the GNP.
+
+The synergy of autonomous and heteronomous production is reflected in society’s balance of liberties and rights. Liberties protect use-values as rights protect the access to commodities. And just as commodities can extinguish the possibility of producing use-values and turn into impoverishing wealth, so the professional definition of rights can extinguish liberties and establish a tyranny that smothers people underneath their rights.
+
+The confusion is revealed with special clarity when one considers the experts on health. Health encompasses two aspects: liberties and rights. It designates the area of autonomy within which a person exercises control over his own biological states and over the conditions of his immediate environment. Simply stated, health is identical with the degree of lived freedom. Therefore, those concerned with the public good should work to guarantee the equitable distribution of health as freedom which, in turn, depends on environmental conditions that only organized political efforts can achieve. Beyond a certain level of intensity, professional health care, however equitably distributed, will smother health-as-freedom. In this fundamental sense, the care of health is a matter of well-protected liberty.
+
+As is evident, such a notion of health implies a principled commitment to inalienable freedoms. To understand this, one must distinguish clearly between civil liberty and civil rights. The liberty to act without restraint from government has a wider scope than the civil rights the state may enact to guarantee that people will have equal powers to obtain certain goods and services.
+
+Civil liberties ordinarily do not force others to act in accord with one’s own wishes. I have the freedom to speak and publish my opinion, but no specific newspaper is obliged to print it, nor are fellow citizens required to read it. I am free to paint as I see beauty, but no museum has to buy my canvas. At the same time, however, the state as guarantor of liberty can and does enact laws that protect the equal rights without which its members would not enjoy their freedoms. Such rights give meaning and reality to equality, while liberties give possibility and shape to freedom. One certain way to extinguish the freedoms to speak, to learn, to heal, or to care is to delimit them by transmogrifying civil rights into civic duties. The precise character of this third illusion is to believe that the publicly sponsored pursuit of rights leads inevitably to the protection of liberties. In reality, as society gives professionals the legitimacy to define rights, citizen freedoms evaporate.
+
+## Equity in useful unemployment
+
+At present, every new need that is professionally certified translates sooner or later into a right. The political pressure for the enactment of each right generates new jobs and commodities. Each new commodity degrades an activity by which people so far have been able to cope on their own; each new job takes away legitimacy from work so far done by the unemployed. The power of professions to measure what shall be good, right, and done warps the desire, willingness, and ability of the "common" man to live within his measure
+
+As soon as all law students currently registered at United States law schools are graduated, the number of United States lawyers will increase by about 50 per cent. Judicare will complement Medicare, as legal insurance increasingly turns into the kind of necessity that medical insurance is now. When the right of the citizen to a lawyer has been established, settling the dispute in the pub will be branded unenlightened or anti-social, as home births are now. Already the right of each citizen of Detroit to live in a home that has been professionally wired turns the auto-electrician who installs his own plugs into a lawbreaker. The loss of one liberty after another to be useful when out of a job or outside professional control is the unnamed, but also the most resented experience that comes with modernized poverty. By now the most significant privilege of high social status might well be some vestige of freedom for useful unemployment that is increasingly denied to the great majority. The insistence on the right to be taken care of and supplied has almost turned into the right of industries and professions to conquer clients, to supply them with their product, and by their deliveries to obliterate the environmental conditions that make unemployed activities useful. Thus, for the time being, the struggle for an equitable distribution of the time and the power to be useful to self and others outside employment or the draft has been effectively paralyzed. Work done off the paid job is looked down upon if not ignored. Autonomous activity threatens the employment level, generates deviance, and detracts from the GNP: therefore it is only improperly called "work". Labour no longer means effort or toil but the mysterious mate wedded to productive investments in plant. Work no longer means the creation of a value perceived by the worker but mainly a job, which is a social relationship. Unemployment means sad idleness, rather than the freedom to do things that are useful for oneself or for one’s neighbour. An active woman who runs a house and brings up children and takes in those of others is distinguished from a woman who "works", no matter how useless or damaging the product of this work might be. Activity, effort, achievement, or service outside a hierarchical relationship and unmeasured by professional standards, threatens a commodity-intensive society. The generation of use-values that escape effective measurement limits not only the need for more commodities but also the jobs that create them and the paycheques needed to buy them.
+
+What counts in a market-intensive society is not the effort to please or the pleasure that flows from that effort but the coupling of the labour force with capital. What counts is not the achievement of satisfaction that flows from action but the status of the social relationship that commands production – that is, the job, situation, post, or appointment. In the Middle Ages there was no salvation outside the Church, and the theologians had a hard time explaining what God did with those pagans who were visibly virtuous or saintly. Similarly, in contemporary society effort is not productive unless it is done at the behest of a boss, and economists have a hard time dealing with the obvious usefulness of people when they are outside the corporate control of a corporation, volunteer agency, or labour camp. Work is productive, respectable, worthy of the citizen only when the work process is planned, monitored, and controlled by a professional agent, who insures that the work meets a certified need in a standardized fashion. In an advanced industrial society it becomes almost impossible to seek, even to imagine, unemployment as a condition for autonomous, useful work. The infrastructure of society is so arranged that only the job gives access to the tools of production, and this monopoly of commodity production over the generation of use-values turns even more stringent as the state takes over. Only with a license may you teach a child; only at a clinic may you set a broken bone. Housework, handicrafts, subsistence agriculture, radical technology, learning exchanges, and the like are degraded into activities for the idle, the unproductive, the very poor, or the very rich. A society that fosters intense dependence on commodities thus turns its unemployed into either its poor or its dependents. In 1945, for each American Social Security recipient there were still 35 workers on the job. In 1977, 3.2 employed workers have to support one such retiree, who is himself dependent on many more services than his retired grandfather could have imagined.
+
+Henceforth the quality of a society and of its culture will depend on the status of its unemployed: will they be the most representative productive citizens, or will they be dependants? The choice or crisis again seems clear: advanced industrial society can degenerate into a holding operation harking back to the dream of the sixties; into a well-rationed distribution system that doles out decreasing commodities and jobs and trains its citizens for more standardized consumption and more powerless work. This is the attitude reflected in the policy proposals of most governments at present, from Germany to China, albeit a fundamental difference in degree: the richer the country, the more urgent it seems to ration access to jobs and to impede useful unemployment that would threaten the volume of the labour market. The inverse, of course, is equally possible: a modern society in which frustrated workers organize to protect the freedom of people to be useful outside the activities that result in the production of commodities. But again, this social alternative depends on a new, rational, and cynical competence of the common man when faced with the professional imputation of needs.
+
+## Outflanking the new professional
+
+Today, professional power is clearly threatened by increasing evidence of the counterproductivity of its output. People are beginning to see that such hegemony deprives them of their right to politics. The symbolic power of experts which, while defining needs, eviscerates personal competence is now seen to be more perilous than their technical capability, which is confined to servicing the needs they create. Simultaneously, one hears the repeated call for the enactment of legislation that might lead us beyond an age dominated by the professional ethos: the demand that professional and bureaucratic licensing be replaced by the investiture of elected citizens, rather than altered by the inclusion of consumer representatives on licensing boards; the demand that prescription rules in pharmacies, curricula, and other pretentious supermarkets be relaxed; the demand for the protection of productive liberties; the demand for the right to practice without a license; the demand for public utilities that facilitate client evaluation of all practitioners who work for money. In response to these threats, the major professional establishments, each in its own way, use three fundamental strategies to shore up the erosion of their legitimacy and power.
+
+### The self-critical hooker
+
+The first approach is represented by the Club of Rome. Fiat, Volkswagen, and Ford pay economists, ecologists, and experts in social control to identify the products industries ought not to produce, in order to strengthen the industrial system. Also, doctors in the Club of Kos now recommend that surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy be abandoned in the treatment of most cancers, since these treatments usually prolong and intensify suffering without adding to the life of the treated. Lawyers and dentists promise to police, as never before, the competence, decency, and rates of their fellow professionals.
+
+A variant of this approach is seen in some individuals or their organizations, who challenge the American Bar Association, British Medical Association, and other power brokers of the establishment. These claim to be radical because, 1) they advise consumers against the interests of the majority of their peers; 2) they tutor laymen on how to behave on hospital, university, or police governing boards; and 3) they occasionally testify to legislative committees on the uselessness of procedures proposed by the professions and demanded by the public. For example, in a province of Western Canada doctors prepared a report on some two dozen medical procedures for which the legislature was considering a budget increase. All the procedures were costly, and the doctors pointed out that they were also very painful, and many were dangerous, and that none could be proven effective. For the time being the legislators refused to act on such medical advice, a failure that, provisionally, tends to reinforce the belief in the necessity of professional protection against professional hubris.
+
+Professional self-policing is useful principally in catching the grossly incompetent – the butcher or the outright charlatan. But as has been shown again and again, it only protects the inept and cements the dependence of the public on their services. The "critical" doctor, the "radical" lawyer, or the "advocacy" architect seduces clients away from his colleagues, who are less aware than he of the vagaries of fashion. First liberal professions sell the public on the need for their services by promising to watch over the poorer layman’s schooling, ethics or inservice training. Then dominant professions insist on their rightful duty to guide and further disable the public by organizing into clubs that brandish the high consciousness of ecological, economic, and social constraints. Such action inhibits the further extension of the professional sector but strengthens public dependence within that sector. The idea that professionals have a right to serve the public is thus of very recent origin. Their struggle to establish and legitimate this corporate right becomes one of our most oppressive social threats.
+
+### The alliance of hawkers
+
+The second strategy seeks to organize and coordinate professional response in a manner that purportedly is more faithful to the multifaceted character of human problems. Also, this approach seeks to utilize ideas borrowed from systems analysis and operations research in order to provide more national and all-encompassing solutions. An example of what this means in practice can be taken from Canada. Some years ago, the Minister of Health launched a campaign to convince the public that spending more money on physicians would not change the country’s patterns of disease and death. He pointed out that premature loss of life-time was due overwhelmingly to three factors: accidents, mostly in motor vehicles; heart disease and lung cancer, which doctors are notoriously powerless to heal; and suicide combined with murder, phenomena that are outside medical control. The minister called for new approaches to health and for the retrenchment of medicine. The task of protecting, restoring, or consoling those made sick by the destructive life-style and environment typical of contemporary Canada was taken up by a great variety of new and old professions. Architects discovered that they had a mission to improve Canadians" health; dog-control was found to be an inter- departmental problem calling for new specialists. A new corporate biocracy intensified control over the organisms of Canadians with a thoroughness the old iatrocracy could hardly have imagined. The slogan "better spend money in order to stay healthy than on doctors when you get sick" can now be recognized as the hawking of new hookers who want the money spent on them.
+
+The practice of medicine in the United States illustrates a similar dynamic. There, a coordinated approach to the health of Americans has become enormously expensive without being especially effective. In 1950, the typical wage-earner transferred less than two weeks pay per year to professional health care. In 1976, the proportion was up to around five to seven weeks pay per year: buying a new Ford, one now pays more for worker hygiene than for the metal the car contains. Yet with all this effort and expense, the life expectancy of the adult male population has not sensibly changed in the last one hundred years. It is lower than in many poor countries, and has been declining slowly but steadily for the last twenty years.
+
+Where disease patterns have changed for the better, it has been due principally to the adoption of a healthier life-style, especially in diet. To a small degree, inoculations and the routine administration of such simple interventions as antibiotics, contraceptives, or Carman tubes have contributed to the decline of certain diseases. But such procedures do not postulate the need for professional services. People cannot become healthier by being more firmly wedded to a medical profession, yet many "radical" doctors call for just such an increased biocracy. They seem to be unaware that a more rational " problem-solving " approach is simply another version, though perhaps more sophisticated, of affirmative action.
+
+### The professionalization of the client
+
+The third strategy to make dominant professions survive is this year’s radical chic. As the prophets of the sixties drooled about development on the door-steps of affluence these myth makers mouth about the self-help of professionalized clients.
+
+In the United States alone since 1965, about 2700 books have appeared that teach you how to be your own patient, so that you need see the doctor only when it is worthwhile for him. Some books recommend that only after due training and examination should graduates in self-medication be empowered to buy aspirin and dispense it to their children. Others suggest that professionalized patients should receive preferential rates in hospitals and that they should benefit from lower insurance premiums. Only women with a license to practice home birth should have their children outside hospitals since such professional mothers can, if necessary, be sued for malpractice. I have seen a "radical" proposal that such a license to birth be obtained under feminist rather than medical auspices.
+
+The professional dream of rooting each hierarchy of needs in the grassroots goes under the banner of self-help. At present it is promoted by the new tribe of experts in self-help who have replaced the experts in development of the sixties. The universal professionalization of clients is their aim. American building experts who last autumn invaded Mexico serve as an example of the new Crusade. About two years ago a Boston professor of architecture came to Mexico for a vacation. A Mexican friend of mine took him beyond the airport where, during the last twelve years, a new city had grown up. From a few huts, it had mushroomed into a community three times the size of Cambridge, Massachusetts. My friend, also an architect, wanted to show him the thousands of examples of peasant ingenuity with patterns, structures, and uses of refuse not in and therefore not derivable from textbooks. He should not have been surprised that his colleague took several hundred rolls of pictures of these brilliant amateur inventions that make the two-million-person slum work. The pictures were analyzed in Cambridge; and by the end of the year, new-baked United States specialists in community architecture were busy teaching the people of Ciudad Netzahualcoyotl their problems, needs, and solutions.
+
+## The post-professional ethos
+
+The inverse of professionally certified lack, need, and poverty is modern subsistence. The term "subsistence economy" is now generally used only to designate group survival which is marginal to market- dependence and in which people make what they use by means of traditional tools and within an inherited, often unexamined, social organization. I propose to recover the term by speaking about modern subsistence. Let us call modern subsistence the style of life that prevails in a post-industrial economy in which people have succeeded in reducing their market dependence, and have done so by protecting – by political means – a social infrastructure in which techniques and tools are used primarily to generate use-values that are unmeasured and unmeasurable by professional need-makers. I have developed a theory of such tools elsewhere ( Tools for Conviviality, Calder & Boyars, 1973), proposed the technical term "convivial tool" for use-value-orientated engineered artefacts. I have shown that the inverse of progressive modernized poverty is politically generated convivial austerity that protects freedom and equity in the use of such tools.
+
+A retooling of contemporary society with convivial rather than industrial tools implies a shift of emphasis in our struggle for social justice; it implies a new kind of subordination of distributive to participatory justice. In an industrial society, individuals are trained for extreme specialization. They are rendered impotent to shape or to satisfy their own needs. They depend on commodities and on the managers who sign the prescriptions for them. The right to diagnosis of need, prescription of therapy, and – in general – distribution of goods predominates in ethics, politics, and law. This emphasis on the right to imputed necessities shrinks the liberty to learn or to heal or to move on one’s own to fragile luxuries. In a convivial society, the opposite would be true. The protection of equity in the exercise of personal liberties would be the predominant concern of a society based on radical technology: science and technique at the service of a more effective use-value generation. Obviously, such equitably distributed liberty would be meaningless if it were not grounded in the right of equal access to raw materials, tools, and utilities. Food, fuel, fresh air, or living space can no more be equitably distributed than wrenches or jobs unless they are rationed without regard to imputed need, that is, in equal maximum amounts to young and old, cripple and president. A society dedicated to the protection of equally distributed, modern and effective tools for the exercise of productive liberties cannot come into existence unless the commodities and resources on which the exercise of these liberties is based are equally distributed to all.
+
+[^n01]:"Deschooling Society" (1971); "Tools for Conviviality" (1973); "Energy & Equity" (1974); "Medical Nemesis – The Expropriation of Health" (1976); "Disabling Professions" (1977)
+
diff --git a/contents/book/unemployment/es.bib b/contents/book/unemployment/es.bib
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0491f22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/unemployment/es.bib
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+@ARTICLE{acervus-illich-unemployment-es,
+  author = {Ivan Illich},
+  title = {Desempleo Creador: la decadencia de la sociedad profesional},
+  year = {1978},
+  date = {1978},
+  origdate = {1978},
+  language = {es},
+  origlanguage = {en},
+  translator = {},
+  url = {https://illich.acerv.uz/es/book/unemployment:index},
+  urldate = {2024-03-18}
+}
diff --git a/contents/book/unemployment/es.md b/contents/book/unemployment/es.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bcc945
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contents/book/unemployment/es.md
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+---
+  title: "Desempleo Creador: la decadencia de la sociedad profesional"
+  author: "Ivan Illich"
+  date: "1978"
+  lang: ""
+  documentclass: book
+  classoption:
+  - oneside
+  geometry: margin=1.75in
+  fontsize: 12pt
+  fontfamily: ebgaramond-maths
+  newtxmathoptions:
+  - cmintegrals
+  - cmbraces
+  toc: true
+  colorlinks: true
+  linkcolor: RoyalBlue
+  urlcolor: RoyalBlue
+  titlepage: true
+---
+
+Cincuenta años atrás, nueve de cada 10 palabras que oía un hombre civilizado le eran dichas como a un individuo. Sólo una de 10 le llegaba como miembro indiferenciado de una multitud —en el salón de clases, en la iglesia, en mítines o espectáculos—. Las palabras eran entonces como cartas selladas, escritas a mano, bien diferentes de la chatarra que contamina hoy nuestro correo. Actualmente son escasas las palabras que intentan llamar la atención de una persona. Con regularidad de reloj asaltan nuestra sensibilidad imágenes, ideas, sentimientos y opiniones empaquetados y entregados a través de los medios de comunicación, como artículos estandarizados. Dos cosas se han hecho evidentes: _1)_ lo que ocurre con el idioma se ha vuelto paradigmático para una amplia gama de relaciones entre necesidad y satisfacción; _2)_ estos fenómenos son ya universales e igualan al maestro de Nueva York, al miembro de la comuna china, al escolar de Bantú y al sargento brasileño. En este apéndice a mi ensayo sobre la convivencialidad pretendo hacer tres cosas: _a)_ describir el carácter de una sociedad de mercado-de-bienes intensivo, en la que la multiplicidad, especialización y volumen de las mercancías destruye el ambiente propicio para la creación de valores de uso; _b)_ insistir en el papel oculto que juegan las profesiones en una sociedad de este tipo al moldear sus necesidades; _c)_ proponer algunas estrategias para romper el poder profesional que perpetúa esta dependencia del mercado.
+
+# La intensidad inhabilitante del mercado
+
+Actualmente se llama crisis al momento en el que médicos, diplomáticos, banqueros y toda clase de ingenieros sociales asumen los controles y se suspenden las libertades. Lo mismo que los pacientes, las naciones conocen las crisis. Esto se debe a que la crisis, de haber sido una posibilidad de enmendar rumbos, ahora sólo significa el ir y venir de un lado a otro. Remite, en la actualidad, a una amenaza ominosa pero controlable contra la cual puede unirse el dinero, la fuerza laboral y la administración. Un ejemplo típico de este tipo de respuesta podría ser el de una ciudad de 13 000 000 de habitantes, a 2 500 metros sobre el nivel del mar, en la que, ante las cifras alarmantes de escasez y las dificultades en el suministro de agua a la mayoría de sus habitantes que solamente tienen acceso a menos de cinco litros, se declara una crisis que habrá de dar más trabajo a los ingenieros en vez de racionar el consumo de 5% de la gente que utiliza la mitad del agua en sus tinas y albercas. La crisis entendida de esta manera resulta siempre conveniente para los ejecutivos y comisarios, especialmente para los buitres que viven de los efectos secundarios, no deseados, del crecimiento anterior: para los educadores que viven de la alienación de la sociedad, para los doctores que prosperan a base del trabajo y del ocio que han destruido la salud, para los políticos que triunfan gracias a la distribución de un bienestar que, en primera instancia, se les quitó a los mismos que reciben la asistencia.
+
+El término crisis, sin embargo, no debe significar necesariamente esto. No debiera implicar una carrera desatinada en una escalada por la administración. Puede significar el instante de la elección, ese momento maravilloso en que la gente se hace consciente de su propia prisión autoimpuesta y de la posibilidad de una vida diferente. _Ésta_ es la crisis que enfrentan hoy simultáneamente Estados Unidos y el mundo.
+
+## Una elección mundial
+
+En unas cuantas décadas el mundo se ha uniformado. Las respuestas humanas a los sucesos de todos los días se han vuelto estándar. Aunque todavía los idiomas y los dioses parecen diferentes, la gente se une todos los días a la estupenda mayoría que marcha al compás del mismo tambor. El interruptor de la luz, junto a la puerta, ha reemplazado a las múltiples formas en que los fuegos, las velas y los faroles se encendían antiguamente. El número de quienes encienden interruptores de luz se ha triplicado en el mundo en 10 años; el flujo del agua y el papel se han convertido en condiciones esenciales para aliviar los intestinos. La luz que no proviene de las redes de alto voltaje y la higiene que excluye el papel tisú han funcionado como medidores de la pobreza de miles de personas. La intrusión, soporífera a veces, opaca otras, de los medios masivos de comunicación, penetra muy adentro en el barrio, el pueblo, la sociedad, la escuela. Los ruidos leídos por el locutor y los anunciantes de textos programados, pervierten diariamente las palabras de un lenguaje hablado al que convierten en bloques de construcción para mensajes en paquete. Para tener actualmente la posibilidad de que nuestros hijos jueguen en un ambiente en el que una de cada 10 palabras que oyen les sean dirigidas personalmente, deben estar aislados o apartados temporalmente, o bien, deben ser marginados opulentos a los que se protege cuidadosamente. En cualquier parte del mundo se puede notar un rápido enquistamiento de la aceptación disciplinada que caracteriza al auditorio, al cliente, al comprador. La estandarización de la acción humana se va extendiendo.
+
+Se hace evidente ahora que el problema crítico que enfrenta la mayor parte de las naciones del mundo es exactamente el mismo: o la gente se convertirá en cifras de una multitud condicionada que avanza hacia una dependencia cada vez mayor —y necesitará, por lo tanto, de batallas salvajes para obtener un mínimo de las drogas que alimenten su hábito— o bien encontrará el valor, que es lo único que puede salvar el pánico: mantenerse sereno y buscar alrededor otro escape que no sea el obvio ya marcado como salida. Sin embargo, muchas de las personas a quienes se les dice que los bolivianos, los canadienses, los húngaros enfrentan todos la misma elección fundamental, no sólo se sienten molestos, sino que se ofenden profundamente. La idea les parece no solamente loca sino chocante. No logran detectar la similitud en esta nueva degradación amarga que va permeando el hambre del indio del Altiplano, la neurosis del trabajador de Amsterdam y la cínica corrupción del burócrata de Varsovia.
+
+## Hacia una cultura de productos estandarizados
+
+El desarrollo ha tenido los mismos efectos en todas las sociedades: se han visto atrapadas en una nueva trama de dependencia de mercancías que fluyen del mismo tipo de máquinas, fábricas, clínicas, estudios de televisión, _think tanks_. Para satisfacer esta dependencia se tiene que seguir produciendo siempre más de lo mismo: bienes y servicios estandarizados por ingenieros y destinados a los consumidores, quienes, a su vez, son estandarizados por los educadores y promotores para que crean necesitar lo que se les ofrece.
+
+Ya sean tangibles o intangibles, son éstos los productos estandarizados del mundo industrial; asumen valor monetario como mercancías y se determinan tanto por la acción del Estado como por el mercado, aunque el nivel de participación de uno y otro varíe en los diferentes regímenes. Las distintas culturas llegan a ser así residuos insípidos de un estilo de acción tradicional, perdidas en un páramo mundial; un terreno árido, desbastado por la maquinaria necesaria para producir y consumir. En las riberas del Sena y en las del Níger, la gente olvidó cómo ordeñar, porque el líquido blanco les llega envasado. Gracias a una mayor protección al consumidor, en Francia la leche es menos tóxica que en Malí. Es verdad que ahora hay mayor cantidad de criaturas que beben leche de vaca, pero los senos de las mujeres, ricas y pobres, se secan por igual. El adicto nace con el primer grito del niño que tiene hambre, cuando su organismo aprehende la leche artificial, abandonando el seno materno que, de este modo, se atrofia. Todas aquellas acciones humanas, autónomas y creativas, necesarias para el florecimiento del universo del hombre, terminan atrofiándose. Los techos de barro o de paja, de caña o de teja, se han ido reemplazando por techos de concreto para unos pocos y de plástico ondulado para la mayor parte. Ni los obstáculos de la selva ni los matices ideológicos han librado a los pobres y a los socialistas de apresurarse en construir carreteras para los ricos, esas vías que los conducen al mundo donde los economistas han tomado el lugar de los sacerdotes. El cuño de las monedas se traga todos los tesoros locales y los ídolos. El dinero devalúa lo que no puede medir. La crisis, pues, es la misma para todos: la opción entre una mayor o una menor dependencia de bienes de consumo industrial. Una dependencia mayor significa la destrucción rápida y total de las culturas como programas de actividades de subsistencia que produzcan satisfacción; una dependencia menor significa el variado florecimiento de valores de uso en culturas de intensa actividad. La elección es esencialmente la misma para ricos y pobres, aunque imaginarlo siquiera sería extremadamente difícil para quienes ya están acostumbrados a vivir en un supermercado, diferente, pero sólo en nombre, de las instituciones para idiotas.
+
+En las sociedades del industrialismo tardío, toda la vida se organiza en función de las mercancías. Nuestras sociedades de mercado intensivo miden su progreso material de acuerdo con el aumento en el volumen y en la variedad de las mercancías producidas; y, siguiendo esta misma línea, medimos el progreso social de acuerdo con la distribución del acceso a estos bienes y servicios. La economía política se ha convertido en la gran propagandista del servicio de la dominación de los que producen en gran escala. El socialismo se ha degradado al convertirse en una lucha contra la distribución no igualitaria y la economía del bienestar ha identificado el bien público con la distribución de la opulencia y, en su sentido más estricto, con la humillante opulencia del pobre: un día de degradación organizada en un hospital público, cárcel o laboratorio educativo en Estados Unidos, alimentaría a una familia de la India durante un mes.
+
+Al despreciar todos los costos a los que la Economía clásica fijó precios, la sociedad industrial creó un ambiente dentro del cual la gente no puede vivir sin devorar cada día el equivalente de su propio peso en metales, carburantes y materiales de construcción. Creó un mundo en el que la constante necesidad de protegerse contra los resultados negativos del crecimiento ha cavado nuevos abismos de discriminación, de impotencia y de frustración. Nunca olvidaré la afirmación del yanqui frente a un chileno: “Seremos siempre nosotros los que, en un mundo envenenado, tendremos los filtros de aire de mayor potencia”. Hasta ahora, los movimientos ecológicos al servicio del poder sólo han servido para dar más consistencia a esta orientación, al concentrar la atención pública sobre la irresponsabilidad técnica de quienes irrigan zonas habitacionales con subproductos venenosos o mutágenos y, en el mejor de los casos, han desenmascarado los intereses privados que aumentan la dependencia del individuo de necesidades creadas. Pero aún ahora, después de que se han fijado precios y costos para reflejar el impacto sobre el medio ambiente (el desvalor debido a los perjuicios o el costo de la polarización), no hemos sido capaces de percibir con claridad que este proceso sustituyó, por artículos empacados y producidos en serie, todo lo que la gente hacía o creaba por sí misma.
+
+Desde hace algunos años, cada semana muere una u otra forma de expresión. Las que permanecen se uniforman cada vez más. Sin embargo, aun quienes se preocupan por la pérdida de variedades genéticas por la multiplicación de isótopos radiactivos, no advierten el agotamiento irreversible de las habilidades artesanales, de los cuentos y de los sentidos de la forma. Esta situación gradual de valores útiles pero no mercantilizables por bienes industriales y por servicios, ha sido la meta compartida de facciones políticas y de regímenes que, de otro modo, se opondrían violentamente.
+
+Por este camino, trozos cada vez más largos de nuestras vidas se transforman de tal manera que la vida pasa a depender casi exclusivamente del consumo de mercancías. Esto es lo que deberíamos llamar aumento de la intensidad de mercado en las culturas modernas. Desde luego, los diferentes regímenes asignan sus recursos de manera distinta: aquí decide la “sabiduría de la mano escondida” del mercado, allá, la del ideólogo y el planificador. Pero la oposición política entre estos propositores de métodos alternativos para la asignación de los recursos, disfraza solamente el mismo desprecio burdo que tienen todas las facciones y partidos por la libertad y la dignidad personal. La política sobre energéticos en los distintos países nos da un buen ejemplo para estudiar la profunda identidad que existe entre los diferentes promotores del sistema industrial, llámense socialistas o liberales. Si excluimos sitios como Nueva Camboya, sobre la que me falta información, no existe élite en el gobierno ni oposición organizada que conciba un futuro deseable fundado en un instrumental social cuyo consumo de energía per cápita fuera inferior en varios órdenes de magnitud a los niveles que prevalecen hoy en Europa. Todas las corrientes políticas insisten en un presunto imperativo técnico que hace inevitable que el modo de producción moderno sea intensivo también en el uso de la energía. Hasta ahora no existe ningún partido que reconozca que un modo de producción de esta especie castra inevitablemente la capacidad creadora de los individuos y grupos primarios. Todos los partidos insisten en mantener niveles de empleo altos en la fuerza de producción y parecen incapaces de reconocer que los empleos tienden a destruir el valor de uso del tiempo libre. Insisten en que las necesidades de los individuos se definan, en la forma más objetiva y total, por especialistas certificados públicamente para tal competencia, y parecen insensibles a la consecuente expropiación de la vida misma.
+
+A fines de la Edad Media se usó la asombrosa simplicidad del modelo heliocéntrico como un argumento para desacreditar a la nueva Astronomía. Su elegancia se interpretó como ingenuidad. En nuestros días, no son escasas las teorías centradas en el valor de uso, capaces de analizar el costo social generado por la economía establecida. Estas teorías han sido propuestas por muchos _outsiders_ de la economía que ubican sus perspectivas en una nueva escala de valores: la belleza, la sencillez, la ecología, la vida en comunidad. Como una forma recurrente de soslayar estas teorías, la economía moderna y sus practicantes se han dedicado a falsear y magnificar los fracasos que, con frecuencia, han sufrido estos _outsiders_ al experimentar con nuevos estilos de vida personal, y rehúsan mirar siquiera estas teorías —del mismo modo que el inquisidor legendario rehusó mirar a través del telescopio de Galileo—, ya que sus análisis podrían conducir al desplazamiento del centro convencional del sistema económico vigente. Estos distintos instrumentos analíticos podrían conducirlos a poner los valores de uso no mercantilizables en el centro de una cultura deseable donde solamente se asigne un valor a aquellos bienes mercantiles que fomenten una extensión más amplia de esos mismos valores de uso. Pero lo que sigue contando no es lo que la gente hace o crea, sino el producto de las corporaciones públicas o privadas. Todos colaboran por igual en el esfuerzo por transformar nuestras futuras sociedades en un enorme juego de suma cero, en el que cada ganancia y cada gozo de una persona se transforman inevitablemente en pérdida para las otras.
+
+En esta carrera quedaron destrozados innumerables conjuntos de infraestructuras con las que la gente enfrentaba la vida, en las que jugaba, comía, tejía lazos de amistad y hacía el amor. Unas cuantas de las llamadas “décadas de desarrollo” bastaron para desmantelar más de dos tercios de los moldes culturales del mundo. Antes de estas décadas, aquellos moldes permitían que la gente satisfaciera la mayor parte de sus necesidades de acuerdo con un modo de subsistencia. Después de ellas, el plástico reemplazo a la cerámica, las bebidas gaseosas reemplazaron a la limonada, el Valium tomó el lugar del té de camomila, y los discos, el de la guitarra. A lo largo de toda la historia, la mejor medida de los tiempos malos ha sido el porcentaje de alimentos que se debían comprar. En tiempos buenos, la mayor parte de las familias conseguían casi todos sus alimentos de lo que ellos cultivaban o adquirían en un marco de relaciones gratuitas.
+
+Hasta fines del siglo XVIII, el alimento que se producía más allá del horizonte abarcable por la vista del consumidor, que miraba desde un campanario o minarete, era menos de 1% en todo el mundo. Las leyes encami-nadas a controlar el número de aves de corral y de puercos dentro de los muros de la ciudad sugieren que, a excepción de unas cuantas zonas urbanas más extensas, casi la mitad de los alimentos se cultivaban igualmente dentro de la villa. Antes de la segunda Guerra Mundial, los alimentos traídos desde afuera a una región determinada constituían menos de 4% del total que se consumía; además, estas importaciones estaban destinadas, en gran medida, a las 11 ciudades que tenían más de dos millones de habitantes. Actualmente, 40% de la gente sobrevive gracias a que tiene acceso a los mercados interregionales. Concebir hoy día un mundo en el que se redujera radicalmente el mercado mundial en capitales y bienes, representa un tabú por lo menos tan absoluto como concebir un mundo en el que gente autónoma utilizara herramientas convivenciales para liberarse de la necesidad de consumir y para crear valores de uso en abundancia. En este tabú se refleja la creencia de que las actividades útiles por medio de las cuales la gente se expresa y satisface sus necesidades pueden sustituirse indefinidamente por bienes y servicios.
+
+## La pobreza modernizada
+
+Pasado cierto umbral, la multiplicación de mercancías induce a la impotencia, a la incapacidad de cultivar alimentos, de cantar o de construir. El afán y el placer, condiciones humanas, llegan a convertirse en privilegio de algunos ricos caprichosos. En Acatzingo, en la época en que Kennedy lanzó la Alianza para el Progreso, como en la mayoría de los pueblitos mexicanos de su tamaño, existían cuatro bandas de músicos que tocaban a cambio de un trago y servían a una población de 800 personas. Actualmente, los discos y las radios conectadas a altoparlantes anegan todo talento local. Sólo ocasionalmente, en un acto de nostalgia, se reúne dinero para traer una banda de marginados de la universidad para cantar las viejas canciones en alguna fiesta especial. El día en que la legislación venezolana instituyó para cada ciudadano un derecho “habitacional” concebido como mercancía, tres cuartas partes de las familias hallaron que las casitas levantadas con sus propias manos quedaban rebajadas a nivel de cobertizos. Además, y esto era lo más importante, existía ya un prejuicio contra la autoconstrucción. No se podía iniciar legalmente la construcción de una casa sin antes presentar el plano diseñado por un arquitecto diplomado. Los desechos y sobrantes de la ciudad de Caracas, útiles hasta entonces como excelentes materiales de construcción, creaban ahora el problema de deshacerse de desperdicios sólidos. Al hombre que intentaba levantar su propia “morada” se le miraba como un desviado que rehusaba cooperar con los grupos de presión locales para la entrega de unidades habitacionales fabricadas en serie. Además, se promulgaron innumerables reglamentos que tildaron su ingenuidad de ilegal y hasta de delictiva. Este ejemplo ilustra el hecho de que son los pobres los primeros en padecer cuando una nueva mercancía castra uno de los tradicionales oficios de subsistencia. El desempleo útil de los cesantes se sacrifica a la expansión del mercado de trabajo. La construcción de la casa como actividad elegida por uno mismo se convierte en el privilegio de algunos ricos ociosos y extravagantes.
+
+Una vez que se ha incrustado en una cultura la adicción a la opulencia paralizante, genera “pobreza modernizada”. Esta forma de desvalor, que se asocia necesariamente a la multiplicación de productos industriales, escapa a la atención de los economistas porque no puede aprehenderse con sus mediciones, y a la de los servicios sociales porque sus métodos no son operativos para estos casos. Los economistas no disponen de medios efectivos para incluir en sus cálculos lo que pierde la sociedad en relación con cierto goce que no tiene su equivalente en el mercado. Así, se podría actualmente definir a los economistas como los miembros de una cofradía que sólo acepta a aquellas personas que, en el ejercicio de su labor profesional, saben practicar una adiestrada ceguera hacia la consecuencia social más fundamental del crecimiento económico: más allá de cierto umbral, cada grado que se añade en cuanto a la opulencia en mercancías trae como consecuencia un descenso en la habilidad personal para hacer y crear.
+
+Mientras la pobreza modernizada afectó solamente a los pobres, su existencia y su naturaleza permanecieron ocultas, aun en las conversaciones más corrientes. En la medida en que el desarrollo, o la modernización, llegó a los pobres que hasta entonces habían logrado sobrevivir, a pesar de su exclusión de muchos sectores de la economía de mercado, éstos se vieron implacablemente constreñidos a sobrevivir adquiriendo mercancías en un sistema de compras, lo que para ellos significa, siempre y necesariamente, obtener las escorias del mercado. A los indios de Oaxaca, que anteriormente no tenían acceso a las escuelas, los recluta ahora el sistema educativo para que “ganen” unos certificados que miden precisamente su inferioridad en relación con la población urbana. Además, y he aquí el sarcasmo, sin ese pedazo de papel no pueden siquiera ingresar en los oficios de la construcción. Este proceso —la modernización de renovados aspectos de la pobreza de los pobres— sigue ocultándose, culpando a las víctimas por su apreciación indiferente ante el acceso a los privilegios del progreso. Mientras tanto la alianza _non sancta_ entre los productores de mercancías y sus asistentes profesionales sigue cohesionándose sin cuestionamiento.
+
+Un resultado de lo que decimos de fuerte significación social es que ahora la pobreza modernizada se convierte en la experiencia común de todos, a excepción de aquellos que son tan ricos que pueden retirarse a su Arcadia. A medida que las facetas de la vida, unas después de otras, se hacen dependientes de los abastecimientos estandarizados, muy pocos nos libramos de esa experiencia recurrente de pobreza modernizada. En Estados Unidos, el consumidor promedio escucha casi 100 avisos publicitarios diariamente, pero sólo una docena de ellos lo hacen reaccionar y, en la mayoría de los casos, en forma negativa. Aun los compradores bien provistos de dinero, junto con la mercancía novedosa, adquieren una nueva experiencia de desutilidad. Sienten que adquirieron algo de dudoso valor, tal vez inútil a corto plazo o aun dañino, algo que exige también de complementos todavía más costosos. A veces, las actividades de los organismos de protección al consumidor vuelven consciente este proceso porque, si bien empiezan por exigir controles de calidad, pueden conducir a una resistencia radical por parte del consumidor. Hay muchos que se hallan casi dispuestos a reconocer abiertamente la existencia de una nueva forma de riqueza: la riqueza _frustradora_ , producida por la expansión cada vez mayor de una cultura de mercado intensivo. Además, los opulentos llegan a presentir el reflejo de su propia condición en el espejo de los pobres. Sin embargo, esta intuición generalmente no se desarrolla más allá de una especie de romanticismo.
+
+La ideología que identifica el progreso con la opulencia no se restringe, desde luego, a los países ricos. Esa misma ideología degrada las actividades no mercantilizables aun en zonas donde, hasta hace poco, casi todas las necesidades se satisfacían a través de un modo de vida de subsistencia. Los chinos, por ejemplo, inspirándose en su propia tradición, parecían estar dispuestos y ser capaces de redefinir el progreso técnico. Se veían listos para optar por la bicicleta en lugar del jet. Parecía que daban importancia a su propio poder de decisión local como una meta de un pueblo inventivo más que como un medio para la defensa nacional. Pero, en 1977, su propaganda glorifica la capacidad industrial china para dar, a bajo costo, mayor asistencia médica, educación, habitación y bienestar general. Provisionalmente, se asignan funciones meramente tácticas a las hierbas que se encuentran en las bolsas de los médicos descalzos o a los métodos de labor intensiva en la producción. En este caso, como en otros, la producción heterónoma de bienes —es decir, dirigida por otros—, estandarizada para distintas categorías de consumidores anónimos, fomenta las expectativas irreales y, en último término, frustradoras. Además, este proceso corrompe inevitablemente la confianza de la gente en esa siempre sorprendente competencia autónoma que encuentra dentro de sí misma y en su vecino. China representa simplemente el último ejemplo de la particular versión occidental de la modernización por medio de la dependencia de un mercado intensivo, que se apodera de una sociedad tradicional en la misma forma en que algunos cultos irracionales surgieron en comunidades aisladas como resultado de una invasión de esos extraños seres que se mataban en la segunda Guerra Mundial.
+
+## La metamorfosis de las necesidades
+
+Sin embargo, tanto en las sociedades tradicionales como en las modernas ha ocurrido un cambio importante en un periodo muy corto: se han modificado radicalmente los medios socialmente deseables para satisfacer las necesidades. El motor atrofió al músculo, la instrucción escolar mortificó la curiosidad, el médico se hizo necesario para todo hombre en pleno vigor. Como consecuencia de esto las necesidades y los deseos adquirieron un carácter que no tiene precedentes históricos. Por vez primera, las necesidades se volvieron casi exclusivamente colimitantes con las mercancías. La libertad para moverse se degradó en el esfuerzo hecho para producir, distribuir y consumir el derecho al transporte. La búsqueda insistente para crear un ámbito de libertad se eclipsó ante el derecho a consumir. Mientras la gente llegaba donde podía llegar por medio de sus propios pies, no requería para su movilidad sino de la libertad de movimiento; ahora que el hombre se percibe como un ente que debe transportarse, los hombres se distinguen unos de otros por la amplitud y calidad de sus derechos al uso de kilómetro-pasajero. El mundo no es ya ancho y ajeno sino una sucesión de lugares de estacionamientos. Para la mayoría de las personas, los deseos de adquirir siguen a las nuevas necesidades y no pueden imaginar siquiera que un hombre moderno pueda aspirar a liberarse de vivir en esta dependencia de ser transportado. Esta situación que se presenta hoy como una interdependencia rígida entre necesidades y mercado, se legitima por medio de un llamado al peritaje de una élite cuyo conocimiento, debido a su misma naturaleza, no puede compartirse. Los economistas de todo tipo informan al público que el número de empleos depende de los vatios en circulación. Los educadores convencen al público de que la productividad depende del nivel de instrucción. Los ginecólogos insisten en que la calidad de la vida infantil y materna depende de su intromisión en ella. Por lo tanto, no podremos cuestionar efectivamente la extensión casi universal de las culturas de mercado intensivo de mercancías mientras no se haya destruido la impunidad de las élites que legitiman el vínculo entre mercancía y necesidad. Este punto queda muy bien ilustrado en el relato que me hizo una mujer acerca del nacimiento de su tercer hijo. Ya para entonces se sentía con experiencia acerca del parto. Se encontraba en el hospital y sintió que el niño iba a nacer. Llamó a la enfermera quien, en vez de ayudarla, corrió en busca de una toalla esterilizada para empujar la cabeza del niño hacia atrás, de vuelta al útero. La enfermera ordenó a la madre que dejara de pujar porque “el doctor Levy aún no ha venido”.
+
+Ha llegado el momento de tomar una decisión pública. Las sociedades modernas, sean ricas o pobres, pueden tomar dos direcciones opuestas. Pueden producir una nueva lista de bienes —más seguros, con menos desperdicios y más fáciles de compartir— y, por ende, intensificar aún más la dependencia de productos estandarizados. O pueden abordar el problema de relación entre necesidades y satisfacción en una forma completamente nueva. En otras palabras, las sociedades pueden mantener sus economías de un mercado intensivo cambiando solamente el diseño de lo producido, o pueden reducir su dependencia de la mercancía. Esta última solución encierra la aventura de imaginar y construir nuevas infraestructuras en las que individuos y grupos primarios puedan desarrollar un conjunto de herramientas convivenciales. Estarían organizadas de manera que permitieran a la gente formar y satisfacer, directa y personalmente, una creciente proporción de sus necesidades.
+
+La primera opción mencionada representa una continua identificación del progreso técnico con la multiplicación de mercancías. Los administradores burocráticos del _ethos_ igualitario y los tecnócratas del bienestar, coincidirían en un llamado a la austeridad: reemplazar los bienes que —como los jets— no pueden obviamente compartirse, por un equipamiento llamado “social” —como los autobuses—; distribuir más equitativamente las decrecientes horas de empleo de que se dispone y limitar la tradicional semana laboral a 20 horas; diseñar el nuevo tiempo de vida de ocio para ocuparlo en reentrenamientos o servicios voluntarios, a la manera de Mao, Castro o Kennedy. Este nuevo estadio de sociedad industrial —si bien socialista, efectiva y racional— nos introduciría simplemente en un nuevo estado de la cultura que degrada la satisfacción de los deseos al convertirlos en un alivio repetitivo de necesidades imputadas por medio de artículos estandarizados. En el mejor de los casos, esta alternativa produciría bienes y servicios de tal forma que su distribución fuera más equitativa. La participación simbólica de la gente en las decisiones sobre lo que se debiera hacer podría transferirse, de la vociferación en el mercado al voto en la asamblea política. Se podría suavizar el impacto ambiental de la producción. Entre las mercancías, crecerían ciertamente mucho más rápidamente los servicios que la manufactura de bienes. Enormes sumas de dinero se invierten ya en la _industria oracular_ a fin de que los profetas de la administración puedan fabricar escenarios “alternativos” diseñados para apuntalar esta primera opción. Es interesante notar que estos oráculos convergen en un punto: en que sería insoportable el costo social necesario para producir desde arriba la austeridad indispensable en una sociedad ecológicamente factible, pero que aún continúa centrada en la industria.
+
+La segunda opción haría caer el telón sobre la dominación absoluta del mercado y fomentaría un _ethos_ de austeridad en beneficio de una variedad de acciones _satisfactorias._ Si bien en la primera alternativa _austeridad_ quiere decir la aceptación de los ukases administrativos en beneficio de la creciente productividad institucional, en la segunda, _austeridad_ querría significar esa virtud social por la cual la gente reconoce y decide los límites máximos de poder articulado que pueda exigir cualquier persona, a fin de conseguir su propia satisfacción y siempre en servicio de los demás. La “austeridad convivencial” inspira a una sociedad a proteger los valores de uso personales frente al enriquecimiento inhabilitante. Si en un lugar las bicicletas pertenecen a la comuna y en otro a los ciclistas, la naturaleza convivencial de la bicicleta como herramienta no cambia en nada. Tales mercancías seguirían produciéndose en gran medida con métodos industriales, pero se verían y se evaluarían en forma distinta. Actualmente las mercancías se consideran solamente como bienes de consumo que alimentan las necesidades creadas por _sus_ inventores.
+
+Dentro de esta segunda opción, las mercancías se valorizarían por ser materias bases o herramientas que permiten a la gente generar valores de uso para mantener la subsistencia de sus comunidades respectivas. Pero esta opción depende, por supuesto, de una revolución copérnica en nuestra percepción de los valores. Hoy los bienes de consumo y los servicios profesionales constituyen el centro de nuestro sistema económico y los especialistas relacionan nuestras necesidades exclusivamente con ese centro. La inversión social que contemplamos aquí colocaría en el centro de nuestro sistema económico a los valores de uso creados por la misma gente. Es cierto que la discriminación mundial contra los autodidactas ha viciado la confianza de muchas personas para determinar sus propias metas y necesidades. Pero esa misma discriminación ha dado origen a una minoría creciente que está enfurecida por este despojo insidioso.
+
+# Los servicios profesionales inhabilitantes
+
+Estas minorías ven ya la amenaza que encierra para ellas —y para toda vida cultural autóctona— los megainstrumentos que expropian sistemáticamente las condiciones ambientales. Ellas están prontas para poner fin a una Edad. Están resueltas a recuperar su autonomía para fijar sus propias metas, decididas a proteger el dominio sobre su propio cuerpo, su memoria y sus capacidades, determinadas a luchar contra la expropiación sistemática del ambiente vital perpetrada por el sistema industrial en expansión. Aunque es cierto que una mayoría se encuentra baldada por el transporte y son sólo unos cuantos los que están decididos a oponerse a una invasión ulterior de redes de carreteras; aunque una mayoría ve sus sueños y sus capacidades de soñar destruidos por el estrangulamiento de sus ritmos vitales y sólo son unos cuantos los que están dispuestos a pagar el precio necesario para rechazar tal situación; aunque una mayoría de mujeres ven su equilibrio hormonal destruido por la píldora anticonceptiva, y una mayoría de empleados, los espacios de silencio interior contaminados, y sean unos cuantos los que se organizan activamente, cada una de estas minorías representa una categoría de pobreza modernizada en la que potencialmente puede reconocerse la mayoría. El industrialismo tardío justificó la organización de la sociedad como un conglomerado de múltiples mayorías, todas estigmatizadas por las burocracias proveedoras de servicios; no obstante, en el interior de cada una de estas mayorías se desarrollan y crecen minorías activas, que se combinan entre sí en una nueva forma de disidencia.
+
+Pero, para poder dar término a una Edad, ella debe llevar un nombre adecuado. Propongo que se dé el nombre de Edad de las Profesiones Inhabilitantes a estos años medios del siglo XX. Elijo esta designación porque ella compromete a quienes la utilizan. Revela las funciones antisociales ejercidas por los proveedores menos desafiados —por los educadores, los médicos, los asistentes sociales, los científicos y otras bellas personas—. Simultáneamente enjuicia la complacencia de los ciudadanos que se han sometido, como clientes, a esta servidumbre multifacética. Hablar del poder de las profesiones inhabilitantes avergüenza a las víctimas y las lleva a reconocer la conspiración del eterno estudiante, del caso ginecológico o del consumidor, con sus administradores respectivos. Al describir el decenio de los sesenta como el del apogeo de los solucionadores de problemas, se evidencia de inmediato no sólo el orgullo de nuestras élites académicas sino la golosa credulidad de sus víctimas.
+
+Pero, este enfoque en los fabricantes de la imaginación social y en los valores culturales pretende más que exponer y denunciar: al designar los últimos 25 años como la Edad de las Profesiones Tiránicas, también se está proponiendo una estrategia. Se indica la necesidad de ir más allá de la redistribución experta de mercancías de desecho, irracionales y paralizantes, que son la marca del profesionalismo radical. Lo que propongo va obviamente mucho más allá de la crítica de la propia profesión, que ha ido tomando forma, en los últimos años, tanto en América del Norte y Europa como en ciertos países pobres, entre médicos, abogados o maestros, que se autodefinen frecuentemente como profesionales radicales.
+
+Esta estrategia exige nada menos que el desenmascaramiento del _ethos_ profesional. La fe y la confianza en el experto profesional, sea éste científico, terapeuta o ejecutivo, constituye el talón de Aquiles del sistema industrial. Por lo tanto, solamente las iniciativas de los ciudadanos y las tecnologías radicales que desafíen directamente la dominación enervante de las profesiones inhabilitantes podrán abrir el camino hacia la conquista de la libertad mediante una competencia no jerárquica, basada en la comunidad. Invalidar el _ethos_ profesional tal como existe actualmente es condición necesaria para el surgimiento de una nueva relación entre necesidades, herramientas contemporáneas y satisfacción personal. El primer paso para obtener esta invalidación liberadora es que el ciudadano adopte una postura escéptica y condescendiente ante el experto profesional. La reconstrucción social empieza por la duda.
+
+Cada vez que propongo el análisis del poder profesional como la clave para la reconstrucción de la sociedad, se me dice que es un error peligroso escoger este fenómeno como eje de la recuperación del sistema industrial. ¿Acaso las formas organizativas de los establecimientos educativos, médicos y de planificación son otra cosa que el reflejo de la distribución del poder y del privilegio de una élite capitalista? ¿No es irresponsable minar la confianza que el hombre de la calle ha depositado en su protector preparado científicamente, en su médico o en su economista, precisamente en los momentos en que los pobres necesitan protectores, necesitan del acceso al salón de clases, a las clínicas y a los expertos? ¿No debiera enjuiciarse el sistema industrial denunciando con más fuerza a los Rockefeller y a los Stalin? ¿Acaso no es malvado denunciar a la gente que adquirió con tanto esfuerzo el conocimiento necesario para reconocer y servir a nuestras necesidades de bienestar, particularmente si éstos provienen de la misma clase a la que protegen? De hecho, ¿no se debiera señalar y escoger a estas personas como los líderes más aptos para cumplir con las tareas sociales —ya en marcha— y para identificar las necesidades de la gente?
+
+Las argumentaciones contenidas en estas preguntas sólo presentan una defensa frenética de los privilegios de aquellas élites que, incluso pudiendo perder en ingresos, en realidad lograrían mayor estatus y poder si se hiciera más equitativo el acceso a sus servicios en esta nueva forma de economía de mercado intensivo. Una segunda serie de objeciones que se suscitan ante la posibilidad de una sociedad moderna centrada en los valores de uso, es aún más seria: surge de la conciencia del papel central que ha adquirido la seguridad nacional. Esta objeción particulariza, como punto central del análisis, a los conglomerados de la defensa, que aparentemente se hallan en el centro de toda sociedad burocrática-industrial. El argumento expuesto postula que las fuerzas de seguridad son el motor que está detrás de la reglamentación contemporánea universal en lo que atañe a la disciplina que depende del mercado. Identifica como principales fabricantes de necesidades a las burocracias armadas que nacieron cuando, bajo Luis XIV, Richelieu estableció la primera policía profesional, o sea, agencias profesionales que están actualmente a cargo de los armamentos, de la inteligencia y la propaganda. Desde Hiroshima, estos “servicios” han sido, al parecer, los que determinan la investigación, la planificación de la producción y el empleo. Estos servicios descansan sobre bases civiles: como la escolaridad para la disciplina, el entrenamiento del consumidor para el goce de lo inútil, el acostumbrarse a las velocidades violentas, la ingeniería médica para la vida en un refugio que abarca la tierra y la dependencia estandarizada de los temas de actualidad que dispensan benévolos policías de la cultura. Esta línea de pensamiento ve en la seguridad del Estado al generador de los patrones de producción de la sociedad y piensa que la economía civil es, en gran medida, un resultado o un prerrequisito de lo militar.
+
+Si fuera válida una argumentación construida alrededor de esta noción, ¿tendría una sociedad de este tipo la posibilidad de renunciar al poder atómico, aun sabiendo cuán venenoso, tiránico o contraproductivo puede resultar el exceso de energía ulterior? ¿Cómo esperar que un Estado conducido por su defensa tolerara la organización de grupos de ciudadanos descontentos que apartan a sus vecindades del consumo para proclamar la libertad de producir —en pequeña e intensiva escala— valores de uso, libertad dada en una atmósfera de austeridad gozosa y satisfactoria? ¿No tendría una sociedad militarizada que moverse en el acto contra los desertores de necesidades, calificarlos de traidores y, si fuera posible, exponerlos no sólo al desprecio sino al ridículo? ¿No tendría una sociedad conducida por la defensa que suprimir aquellos ejemplos que llevarían a una modernidad no violenta, en estos momentos en que la política pública exige una descentralización de la producción de mercancías (que recuerda a Mao) y un consumo más racional, equitativo y supervisado profesionalmente?
+
+Esta argumentación otorga un crédito indebido a lo militar como fuente de la violencia en un Estado industrial. Debemos denunciar como una ilusión esta presunción de que los requerimientos militares son culpables de la agresividad y destructividad de la sociedad industrial avanzada. Es evidente que si el dominio militar se hubiera anexado de alguna forma el sistema industrial y le hubiera arrancado al control civil las diferentes esferas de iniciativa y de acción sociales, el estado actual de la política hecha por la armada habría alcanzado un nivel irreversible; por lo menos imposible para una reforma civil. Ésta es, de hecho, la argumentación que esgrimen los líderes militares más brillantes de Brasil, quienes ven en las fuerzas armadas a los únicos tutores legítimos de la búsqueda pacífica de la industrialización durante lo que queda de este siglo.
+
+Pero esto simplemente no es así. El Estado industrial tardío no es un producto del ejército. Más bien el ejército es uno de los síntomas de su orientación firme y totalizadora. Es cierto que el presente modo de organización industrial puede tener sus antecedentes militares más remotos en tiempos napoleónicos. Es cierto que la educación obligatoria para los niños campesinos, en 1830, la atención universal de la salud para el proletariado industrial, en 1850, las crecientes redes de comunicación, lo mismo que la mayor parte de las formas de estandarización industrial, fueron estrategias introducidas en la sociedad, en primer lugar, como requerimientos militares, y sólo más tarde se entendieron como formas dignas de progreso pacífico, civil. Pero el hecho de que los _sistemas_ de salud, de educación y de bienestar necesitaran de una lógica militar para promulgarse como leyes, no significa que no tuvieran relación con el empuje industrial básico que, de hecho, nunca fue violento, pacífico o respetuoso de la gente.
+
+Hoy día es más fácil tener esta visión. Primero, porque desde el Polaris, ya no es posible distinguir entre ejércitos de tiempos de paz o de guerra y, segundo, porque desde la guerra contra la pobreza la paz está en pie de guerra. Actualmente, las sociedades industriales están constante y totalmente movilizadas; están organizadas para constantes emergencias públicas; son bombardeadas con estrategias variadas en todos los sectores; los campos de batalla de la salud, la educación, el bienestar y la igualdad están sembrados de víctimas y cubiertos de ruinas; las libertades de los ciudadanos se suspenden continuamente para lanzar campañas en contra de males siempre redescubiertos; cada año se descubren nuevos habitantes fronterizos que deben protegerse o recuperarse de algunos nuevos malestares, de alguna ignorancia previamente desconocida. Las necesidades básicas formuladas e imputadas por todas las agencias profesionales son necesidades para la defensa contra males.
+
+Los profesores y científicos sociales que hoy buscan culpar a los militares por la destructividad de las sociedades mercantilizadas intensamente, son gente que intenta detener, en forma bastante torpe, la erosión de su propia legitimidad. Alegan que los militares empujan al sistema industrial a este estado frustrador y destructivo, y distraen, por este medio, la atención sobre la naturaleza profundamente destructiva de una sociedad de mercado intensivo que lleva a sus ciudadanos a las guerras de hoy. A quienes buscan proteger la autonomía profesional contra la madurez ciudadana y a quienes desean mostrar al profesional como una víctima del Estado militarizado se les responderá con una simple alternativa: la dirección que los ciudadanos libres desean seguir a fin de superar la crisis mundial.
+
+## Hacia el fin de una época
+
+Para el sentido común, son cada vez más evidentes las ilusiones que llevaron a instituir a las profesiones como árbitros de las necesidades. A menudo, la gente ve lo que realmente son los procedimientos en el sector de servicios —por ejemplo, los de las compañías de seguros, o los rituales que ocultan a los ojos de la maraña proveedor-consumidor, la oposición que existe entre el ideal en aras del cual se rinde el servicio y la realidad engendrada por este servicio—. Las escuelas que prometen la misma ilustración para todos, generan una meritocracia degradante y una dependencia de por vida de una tutoría cada vez mayor. Los vehículos compelen a todos a ir cada vez más lejos y a correr más. Pero el público aún no tiene claras las posibilidades de elección. Los proyectos patrocinados por los líderes profesionales podrían desembocar en la aparición de los credos políticos compulsivos (con sus versiones que acompañan a un nuevo tipo de fascismo), o bien, los experimentos que emprendieran los ciudadanos podrían desechar nuestra _hybris_ como si fuese otra colección histórica de locuras, si bien neoprometeicas, esencialmente efímeras. Una opción informada requiere que examinemos el papel específico de las profesiones para determinar quién en esta Edad obtiene qué cosa y por qué.
+
+A fin de ver con claridad el presente, imaginemos a los niños que pronto jugarán entre las ruinas de las escuelas secundarias, de los Hilton y de los hospitales. En estos castillos profesionales convertidos en catedrales, construidos para protegernos de la ignorancia, la incomodidad, el dolor y la muerte, los niños de mañana representarán de nuevo en sus juegos las desilusiones de nuestra Edad de las Profesiones, tal como nosotros reconstruimos las cruzadas de los caballeros contra el pecado y los turcos, en la Edad de la Fe, en antiguos castillos y catedrales. En sus juegos, los niños asociarán el graznido universal que contamina hoy nuestro lenguaje con los arcaísmos heredados de los grandes gángsters y de los vaqueros. Los imagino llamándose unos a otros “Señor Presidente de la Asamblea” o “Señor Secretario” más bien que “Jefe” o “Sheriff”.
+
+Se recordará la Edad de las Profesiones como aquel tiempo en que la política entraba en descomposición cuando los ciudadanos, guiados por profesores, confiaban a tecnócratas el poder de legislar sobre sus necesidades, la autoridad de decidir quiénes necesitaban qué cosa y el monopolio de los medios que satisfacían estas necesidades. Se la recordará como la Edad de la Escolarización, cuando se entrenaba a la gente durante un tercio de sus vidas para que acumularan necesidades prescritas, y durante los dos tercios restantes pasaban a ser clientes de prestigiosos traficantes que dirigían sus hábitos. Se recordará la Edad de las Profesiones como aquella en que los viajes recreativos significaban la mirada fija y empaquetada hacia los extraños y que la intimidad exigía un previo entrenamiento con Masters y Johnson; cuando la opinión formada era un refrito del programa televisivo de la noche anterior, y votar era dar su aprobación a un vendedor sólo para tener más de lo mismo.
+
+Los estudiantes del futuro se sentirán tan confundidos por las supuestas diferencias entre las instituciones profesionales capitalistas y las socialistas, como se sienten los estudiantes de hoy con las pretendidas diferencias entre las últimas sectas cristianas reformadas. Descubrirán también que los bibliotecarios profesionales, los cirujanos, los diseñadores de supermercados en los países pobres o en los países socialistas, a fines de cada decenio, terminan teniendo los mismos registros, utilizando los mismos instrumentos y construyendo los mismos espacios que sus colegas de los países ricos habían introducido en los comienzos de la década. Los arqueólogos no fijarán los periodos de nuestra Edad de acuerdo con los restos de cerámica encontrados en las excavaciones, sino con las modas profesionales reflejadas en las tendencias de las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas.
+
+Sería pretencioso predecir si esta Edad, en la que las necesidades se proyectan profesionalmente y de antemano, se recordará con una sonrisa o con una maldición. Desde luego yo espero que se recordará como la noche en que papá salió de juerga, malgastó la fortuna de la familia y obligó a sus hijos a empezar desde cero. Desgraciadamente, es mucho más probable que se recuerde como los tiempos en que toda una generación se lanzó a una búsqueda frenética de riqueza empobrecedora, permitiendo la alienación de todas las libertades, y que después de haber puesto la política a merced de las garras organizadas de los receptores de bienestar, dejó que se extinguiera en un totalitarismo experto.
+
+## Las profesiones dominantes
+
+Enfrentemos primero el hecho de que las asociaciones de especialistas que actualmente dominan la fabricación, la adjudicación y la satisfacción de necesidades forman un nuevo tipo de cartel. Es importante también saber reconocer las nuevas características esenciales del profesional en el industrialismo tardío. Si no se reconocen, ocurrirá que, inevitablemente, en el momento de la discusión, el nuevo biócrata se ocultará tras la máscara benévola del doctor de familia de antaño; el nuevo pedócrata y sus esfuerzos para “modificar comportamientos”, tomará la forma del inocente maestro de _kindergarden_ que hace unos experimentos interesantes y la lucha que se entable contra el nuevo seleccionador de personal, armado de todo un arsenal psicológico para la degradación, se llevará a cabo ineludiblemente con las antiguas tácticas desarrolladas para defenderse contra el capataz de la fábrica. Se debería bautizar a estos nuevos profesionales con algún término que todavía no tenemos. Las nuevas profesiones se encuentran atrincheradas mucho más profundamente que una burocracia bizantina. Son más internacionales que una Iglesia universal, más estables que un sindicato, dotadas de más capacidades que cualquier chamán y ejercen un dominio más fuerte que el de cualquier mafia sobre aquellos que reclaman controlar.
+
+Sin embargo, debemos distinguir cuidadosamente entre los nuevos especialistas organizados y los chantajistas mafiosos. Por ejemplo, los educadores pueden actualmente decir a la sociedad qué es lo que deben aprender y pueden descalificar todo lo aprendido fuera de la escuela. De acuerdo con esta clase de monopolio, que les permite impedir que usted haga sus compras en cualquier otra parte o que usted fabrique su propio licor, parecería, a primera vista, que les cuadra la definición que hace el diccionario de la palabra gángster. Pero los gángsters arrinconan una necesidad básica controlando los abastecimientos en provecho propio. Actualmente los médicos y los asistentes sociales —como antes los sacerdotes y abogados— obtienen un poder legal para crear necesidades que, de acuerdo con la ley, solamente ellos pueden satisfacer. Convierten al Estado moderno en una corporación que abarca a otras empresas que, a su vez, facilitan el ejercicio de sus capacidades, garantizadas por las mismas empresas.
+
+El control legalizado sobre el trabajo ha tomado muchas formas distintas: los soldados ocasionales rehusaban pelear mientras no habían adquirido licencia para saquear. Lisístrata organizó a las mujeres sometidas, para que, rechazando el sexo, obligaran a sus hombres a la paz. Los doctores de Cos se juramentaron para divulgar sólo a sus hijos los secretos del oficio. Fueron las corporaciones las que establecieron los currícula, los rezos, los exámenes, las peregrinaciones y las pruebas que tuvo que pasar Hans Sachs antes de que se le permitiera calzar a sus vecinos del burgo. En los países capitalistas los sindicatos procuran controlar quiénes han de trabajar, durante cuántas horas y cuál será el salario que percibirán. Todas estas asociaciones representan los esfuerzos que hacen los especialistas para determinar cómo y por quién debiera efectuarse un tipo de trabajo. Pero, ninguno de estos grupos constituyen una profesión en sentido estricto. Las profesiones tiránicas de hoy, de las cuales constituyen un buen ejemplo los médicos, el ejemplo literalmente más doloroso, van mucho más allá: ellos deciden qué es lo que se debe fabricar, por quién y cómo se debe administrar. Ellos proclaman un conocimiento especial, incomunicable, no solamente sobre lo que las cosas son y cómo deben hacerse sino sobre la razón de por qué se deben necesitar sus servicios. Los comerciantes venden los bienes que almacenan. Los hombres del gremio garantizan la calidad. Algunos artesanos confeccionan el artículo de acuerdo con las medidas y el antojo del cliente. Los profesionales le dicen a usted qué es lo que necesita. Reclaman para sí el poder de prescribir. No sólo aconsejan lo que es bueno, sino que decretan lo que es correcto. La característica del profesional no es ni el ingreso, ni una larga preparación, ni las tareas delicadas, ni la condición social. Sus ingresos pueden ser bajos o consumidos por los impuestos, su preparación puede demorar semanas en vez de años. Su estatus puede compararse al de la profesión más antigua de la historia. Más bien, es la autoridad que tiene el profesional para tomar la iniciativa de definir a una persona como cliente, para determinar las necesidades de esa persona y para entregarle una prescripción que lo defina en este nuevo rol social. A diferencia de las prostitutas de antaño, el profesional moderno no es quien vende lo que otros dan gratis, es más bien quien decide lo que debe venderse y no debe entregarse gratuitamente.
+
+Existe otra diferencia entre el poder profesional y el de otras ocupaciones. Este poder proviene de fuentes distintas. Una corporación, un sindicato o una mafia obligan a respetar sus intereses y derechos por medio de las huelgas, del soborno o de la violencia abierta. Una profesión, al igual que un clero, ejerce el poder cedido por una élite cuyos intereses apoya. Tal como un clero ofrece el camino de la salvación siguiendo los pasos de un soberano ungido, una profesión interpreta, protege y suministra un interés especial y de este mundo, a los súbditos de una sociedad moderna. El poder profesional es una forma especial que toma el privilegio de prescribir lo que es correcto para los demás y que, por lo tanto, necesitan. Este poder es la fuente de estatus y de mando en la Edad Industrial tardía. Esta suerte de poder profesional sólo puede existir en las sociedades en las que la pertenencia a la élite misma se adquiere y legitima por medio del estatus profesional. Le viene al dedillo a la Edad en que, hasta el acceso al Parlamento, o sea, a la Cámara de los Comunes, se encuentra, de hecho, restringido a quienes han obtenido el título de maestría que tasa su patrimonio de conocimientos almacenados que se les administraron en la universidad. La autonomía y la licencia profesional para definir las necesidades de la sociedad es la forma lógica que adopta la oligarquía en una cultura política que sustituye las antiguas formas de acreditación por certificados de las universidades. El poder que tienen las profesiones sobre el trabajo que realizan sus miembros es diferente, por lo tanto, no sólo en cuanto a su extensión sino en cuanto a su origen.
+
+## Las profesiones tiránicas
+
+El médico ambulante se convirtió en doctor en medicina cuando dejó el comercio de los medicamentos a los farmacéuticos y se reservó para sí mismo la facultad de prescribir. En ese momento adquirió una nueva forma de autoridad, juntando tres roles en un solo personaje. La autoridad sapiente para aconsejar, instruir y dirigir; la autoridad moral que hace su aceptación no sólo útil sino obligatoria; y la autoridad carismática que permite al médico apelar a cierto interés supremo de sus clientes, que no sólo está por encima de su conciencia sino, a veces, hasta por encima de la razón de Estado. Desde luego que este tipo de doctor aún existe, pero dentro del sistema médico moderno es una figura del pasado. Actualmente es bastante más común un nuevo tipo de científico de la salud aplicada. Cada vez más se ocupa de casos y no de personas; se ocupa de las desviaciones que detecta en el caso, más que de la dolencia que aqueja al individuo; protege el interés de la sociedad más que el interés de la persona. Los tipos de autoridad que se acumularon en la imagen del doctor de antaño, durante los años de liberalismo, y que colaboraban con el facultativo individual en el tratamiento del paciente, los detenta actualmente la corporación profesional al servicio del Estado. Es esta institución la que se adjudica hoy una misión social.
+
+En los últimos 25 años, la medicina se ha convertido, de una profesión liberal, en una profesión dominante al adquirir el poder de indicar lo que constituye una necesidad de salud para la _gente en general_. Los especialistas de la salud, en cuanto corporación, han adquirido la autoridad para determinar qué tipo de atención médica debe suministrarse a la sociedad en general. Ya no es un individuo profesional el que atribuye una “necesidad” a otro individuo como cliente, sino una agencia corporativa la que atribuye una necesidad a capas enteras de la población y es la que, en seguida, se adjudica el mandato de someter a prueba a la población entera a fin de identificar a aquellos que pertenecen al grupo de clientes potenciales. Lo que sucede en la esfera de la atención médica es totalmente coherente con lo que sucede en otros dominios. Cada día, una nueva secta se atribuye una nueva misión terapéutica y esta misión adquiere legitimidad pública. De la misma forma en que los educadores han conquistado el poder de diagnosticar y administrar terapias del comportamiento, los trabajadores sociales, los policías y los arquitectos, al igual que los médicos, gozan de amplia autoridad para crear instrumentos de diagnóstico que utilizan para cazar al cliente, instrumentos que el público ya no osa verificar. Docenas de fabricantes de otras necesidades tratan de imitarlos. Los banqueros internacionales se atribuyen el poder de diagnosticar las necesidades chilenas, bajo Allende o bajo Pinochet, y de definir las condiciones sin las cuales no administrarán las terapias. Los especialistas de la seguridad evalúan el riesgo que representan varias clases de ciudadanos y se atribuyen la competencia de invadir su ámbito privado. Ya no hay manera de parar la escalada de necesidades si no se exponen en forma política aquellas ilusiones que legitiman la tiranía profesional. Muchas profesiones se encuentran tan firmemente establecidas que no solamente ejercen tutoría sobre el ciudadano-vuelto-cliente sino que también conforman su mundo convertido-en-custodia. El lenguaje en que se percibe a sí mismo el ciudadano, su percepción de los derechos y libertades, y su conciencia de las necesidades, derivan de la hegemonía profesional. La diferencia que existe entre el artesano, el profesional liberal y el nuevo tecnócrata puede clarificarse si enfatizamos sus típicas reacciones ante la gente que despreciaba sus respectivos consejos. Si uno despreciaba el consejo del artesano, era un tonto. Si uno despreciaba el consejo liberal, era condenado por la sociedad. Si uno escapa, actualmente de la atención que el cirujano o el psiquiatra han decidido darle, el gobierno o la profesión misma pueden ser inculpadas.
+
+De artesano-mercader o consejero culto, el profesional se ha transformado en un cruzado filántropo que sabe cómo se debe alimentar a los niños, qué alumnos deben continuar estudios más avanzados y qué medicamentos la gente no debe consumir. Del tutor que observaba mientras uno memorizaba la lección, el maestro de escuela se ha transformado en un educador cuya cruzada moralizadora le da título de entrometerse entre uno y cualquier cosa que desee aprender. Aun los empleados de la perrera de Chicago se han transformado en expertos de control canino. Como resultado de este cambio el costo por eliminar un perro se ha elevado en 20 años, de 7.50 a 320 dólares. Mientras tanto, 5.4% de todas las lesiones tratadas en el hospital Cook County —el más grande del mundo— son mordeduras del mejor amigo del hombre.
+
+Los profesionales reclaman un monopolio sobre la definición de las desviaciones y sobre sus remedios. Por ejemplo, los abogados afirman que solamente ellos tienen competencia y derecho _legal_ para dar asistencia en un divorcio. Si uno descubre un método para divorcio “hágalo usted mismo”, se encontrará en un lío doble: si no es abogado queda expuesto a la acusación de practicar sin licencia; si es miembro de un despacho de abogados puede ser expulsado por falta de ética profesional. Los profesionales reclaman también un saber oculto sobre la naturaleza humana y sus debilidades, saber que sólo ellos pueden aplicar con utilidad. Los sepultureros, por ejemplo, no se convirtieron en miembros de una profesión por llamarse empresarios de pompas fúnebres, ni por obtener créditos escolares, ni por aumentar sus ingresos o por liberarse del olor que acompaña su negocio al ser elegido uno de ellos como presidente del Club de Leones. Los empresarios de pompas fúnebres forman una profesión, dominante e inhabilitante, desde el momento que tuvieron la fuerza para lograr que la policía detuviera un entierro si ellos no habían embalsamado y encajonado el cadáver. En cualquier campo donde se pueda inventar una necesidad humana, estas nuevas profesiones inhabilitantes se arrogan el estatus de expertos exclusivos del bien público.
+
+## Las profesiones establecidas
+
+La transformación de una profesión liberal en dominante equivale al establecimiento legal de una Iglesia de Estado. Los médicos transformados en biócratas, los maestros en gnoseócratas, los empresarios de pompas fúnebres en tanatócratas es algo que está mucho más cerca de las “clerecías” subsidiadas por el Estado que de las asociaciones comerciales. El profesional, como maestro de la línea de moda de la ortodoxia científica, actúa como teólogo. Como empresario moral, actúa en el papel del sacerdote: con su actuación crea la necesidad para su mediación. Como cruzado benefactor actúa en el papel de misionero a la caza de marginados. Como inquisidor pone fuera de la ley al no ortodoxo: impone sus soluciones al recalcitrante que rehúsa reconocerse como problema. Esta investidura multifacética, combinada con la labor de aliviar los inconvenientes específicos de la condición humana, hace que cada profesión sea análoga a un culto establecido. La aceptación pública de las profesiones tiránicas es esencialmente un hecho político. Toda afirmación nueva de legitimidad profesional significa que las tareas políticas de legislar, la revisión judicial de casos y el Poder Ejecutivo pierden algo de su independencia y de sus características propias. Los asuntos públicos pasan de las manos de legos escogidos por sus semejantes a las de una élite que se otorga por sus propios créditos.
+
+Cuando la medicina sobrepasó recientemente sus limitaciones liberales, invadió el campo legislativo y estableció normas públicas. Los médicos siempre habían determinado en qué consistían las enfermedades; actualmente la medicina determina cuáles son las enfermedades que la sociedad no tolerará. La medicina invadió las cortes de justicia. Los médicos siempre habían diagnosticado quién era el enfermo; sin embargo, la medicina etiqueta actualmente a los que merecen tratamiento. Los médicos liberales prescribían un tratamiento: la medicina dominante posee poderes públicos de rectificación; ella decide qué habrá de hacerse con los enfermos y cómo disponer de ellos.
+
+En una democracia, el poder de legislar, de aplicar las leyes y de hacer justicia debe derivar de los ciudadanos mismos. Este control ciudadano sobre los poderes clave ha sido restringido, debilitado y hasta abolido por la ascensión de profesiones “clericales”. Un gobierno que dicta sus leyes de acuerdo con las opiniones expertas de tales profesiones puede ser un gobierno _para_ la gente pero nunca _de_ la gente. Éste no es el momento de investigar cuáles fueron las intenciones para debilitar así el poder político. Basta con indicar la descalificación por parte de los profesionales de la opinión del vulgo como condición necesaria para tal subversión.
+
+Las libertades civiles se fundan en la norma que excluye todo testimonio de oídas de las declaraciones en que se basan las decisiones públicas. La máquina legal sólo funciona a partir de lo que la gente puede ver e interpretar por sí misma. Las opiniones, las creencias, las deducciones o persuasiones no se toman en cuenta cuando entran en conflicto con testigos presenciales. Invirtiendo esta norma, las élites de expertos se han vuelto profesiones dominantes. En los aparatos legislativos y en las cortes de justicia se ha descartado, de hecho, el reglamento contra la evidencia que antes proporcionaban testigos orales y oculares y se ha reemplazado por las opiniones que profieren los miembros de estas élites que se autoacreditan.
+
+Pero sería arriesgado confundir el uso público de conocimientos expertos con el juicio normativo entregado al ejercicio corporativo de una profesión. Cuando la corte de justicia citaba a un perito artesanal —por ejemplo un fabricante de armas— para que revelara al jurado los secretos de su oficio, en ese mismo lugar podía instruir al jurado sobre su arte. Determinaba, en una demostración práctica, de qué parte del cargador del revólver había provenido la bala. Hoy día, la mayoría de los expertos desempeñan un papel diferente. El profesional dominante aporta al jurado o a los legisladores la opinión de sus colegas, todos iniciados en la materia, en vez de aportar evidencia basada en hechos y en alguna destreza. Actúa como teólogo al servicio de la corte. Exige que se suspenda el reglamento de los testimonios de oídas, y socava inevitablemente el poder de la ley. De este modo el poder democrático se debilita cada vez más.
+
+## La hegemonía de las necesidades imputadas
+
+Si no fuera porque la gente está pronta a considerar como carencia lo que los expertos le imputan como necesidad, las profesiones no habrían podido llegar a hacerse dominantes e inhabilitantes. La dependencia entre unos y otros (como tutores y alumnos) se ha hecho resistente al análisis, debido a que se halla oscurecida por un lenguaje degenerado. Las buenas palabras de antaño se han transformado en hierros candentes que reclaman el control de los expertos sobre el hogar, la tienda, el comercio y el espacio y sobre todo lo que se da en medio de ellos. El lenguaje, el bien común más fundamental, se halla contaminando así por estas hilachas de jerga, retorcidas, pegajosas, cada una sujeta al control de una profesión. El empobrecimiento de las palabras, el agotamiento del lenguaje cotidiano y su degeneración en terminología burocrática equivale, de manera más íntimamente degradante, a la degradación ambiental tan a menudo discutida. No se pueden proponer cambios posibles en los planes, las actitudes y las leyes si no nos hacemos más sensibles al rechazo de estos nombres erróneos que sólo ocultan la dominación. Cuando yo aprendí a hablar, de _problemas_ se hablaba solamente en las matemáticas o en el ajedrez, de _soluciones_ sólo cuando eran salinas o legales y _necesitar_ se conjugaba, pero casi no se usaba como sustantivo. Las expresiones “Tengo un problema” o “Tengo una necesidad” sonaban tontas. Cuando llegué a mi adolescencia, y Hitler buscaba soluciones, también se extendió “el problema social”. Se descubrieron “niños problema” con matices siempre nuevos entre los pobres, a medida que los trabajadores sociales aprendían a catalogar a sus víctimas y a estandarizar sus “necesidades”. La necesidad, usada como sustantivo, llegó a ser el forraje que engordó a las profesiones hasta la tiranía. Así se modernizó la pobreza. Los nuevos términos transformaron una experiencia personal y comunitaria en asuntos de técnicas: los pobres se hicieron “necesitados”.
+
+Durante la segunda mitad de mi vida, “ser necesitado” llegó a ser algo respetable. Las necesidades, calculables e imputables, promovían en la escala social. Tener necesidades dejó de ser un signo de pobreza. El ingreso económico abrió nuevos registros de necesidades. Spok, Comfort y los divulgadores de Nader entrenaron a los legos en la compra de soluciones a los problemas que habían aprendido a cocinar de acuerdo con recetas profesionales. La educación calificó a los graduados para trepar hacia alturas cada vez más enrarecidas y plantar y cultivar allí cepas siempre nuevas de necesidades híbridas.
+
+Cada vez más un número creciente de medicamentos tuvieron que adquirirse bajo receta autorizada. Aumentó la prescripción y disminuyó la capacidad. Por ejemplo, en medicina, se prescribieron cada vez más medicamentos farmacológicamente activos y la gente perdió su voluntad y su habilidad para enfrentarse a una indisposición o a un malestar. Alrededor de 1 500 productos nuevos aparecen cada año en los estantes de los supermercados norteamericanos: después de un año sólo sobrevive 20%. El resto lo retiran después de un tiempo, habiendo servido a los vendedores como gancho, ya sea para experimentos o por haber sido modas efímeras o por haberse revelado como peligrosos para el consumidor, no económicos para el productor o por haber cedido ante la competencia. Cada vez más, los consumidores se ven forzados a buscar ayuda de los profesionales de la “defensa del consumidor”.
+
+Además, el reemplazo constante de los productos hace que los deseos se vuelvan superficiales y plásticos. Aunque suene paradójico resulta que el consumo elevado va a la par de una nueva forma de indiferencia de parte del consumidor: mientras mayor sea el número, el volumen y la especificidad de las necesidades que se le atribuyen profesionalmente, más grande se vuelve la indiferencia para satisfacer sus propios deseos, que ya no sabe especificar. Cada vez más, las necesidades se crean por _slogans_ comerciales, las compras se hacen por órdenes del decano universitario o de las expertas en belleza o de los ginecólogos, del dietista y de docenas de otros diagnosticadores con poder para prescribir. Resulta lógico que los quiromantes y los astrólogos nunca hayan vivido tanta prosperidad como hoy. Una asignación de este tipo parece casi razonable en una cultura en la que la acción propia no es el resultado de una experiencia personal en busca de una satisfacción, y en la que el consumidor consecuentemente adaptado sustituye las necesidades sentidas por las aprendidas. A medida que la gente se hace experta en el arte de aprender a necesitar, llega a ser cada vez más escasa la capacidad para aprender a moldear los deseos de acuerdo con la experiencia. A medida que las necesidades se parten en pedacitos cada vez más pequeños, cada uno administrado por el especialista apropiado, el consumidor siente dificultad en integrar en un todo significante —que pudiera desearse con empeño y poseerse con agrado— las ofertas que por separado le hacen sus distintos tutores. Los administradores de la empresa, los consejeros del estilo de vida, los asesores académicos, los expertos en dietas de moda, los desarrolladores de la sensibilidad y otros por el estilo, perciben claramente las nuevas posibilidades de control y se movilizan para equiparar los bienes envasados con estas necesidades astilladas.
+
+“Necesidad”, usado como sustantivo, es el sobretiraje individual de un modelo profesional; es la réplica en hule-espuma del molde con el que los profesionales marcan sus artículos; es el molde publicitado del panal de miel con el que se fabrican los consumidores. Ser ignorante o no estar convencido de las propias necesidades se ha vuelto el acto de disolución social imperdonable. El buen ciudadano es aquel que se adjudica necesidades engrapadas con tal convicción que ahoga cualquier deseo de buscar alternativas o de renunciar a estas necesidades.
+
+Cuando yo nací, antes de que Stalin, Hitler o Roosevelt fueran conocidos, sólo los ricos, hipocondriacos y miembros de los sindicatos poderosos, hablaban de necesidad de atención médica cuando les subía la temperatura. Era una necesidad cuestionable, porque los doctores no podían hacer mucho más de lo que había hecho la abuela. En la medicina, la primera mutación de las necesidades llegó con las sulfas y los antibióticos. Cuando el control de las infecciones llegó a ser una rutina simple y efectiva, cada vez más medicamentos pasaron a la lista de las prescripciones. La asignación del papel de enfermo llegó a ser un monopolio del médico. La persona que se sentía _mal_ tenía que ir a una clínica para que la etiquetaran con el nombre de una _enfermedad_ y poder así ser declarada legítimamente miembro de la minoría de los llamados enfermos; o sea, personas excusadas del trabajo, con título para que se les ayudara, puestas bajo las órdenes del doctor y obligadas a que se les cure, a fin de llegar a ser nuevamente útiles. En otras palabras, cuando la técnica farmacológica — _test_ y medicamentos— se volvió tan barata y predecible que la gente podría prescindir del médico, el sacerdocio médico llamó en su auxilio al brazo secular.
+
+La segunda mutación que experimentaron las necesidades médicas ocurrió cuando el enfermo dejó de ser minoría. Actualmente muy pocas personas se libran de estar bajo las órdenes médicas por algún tiempo. Tanto en Italia, como en Estados Unidos, en Francia o en Bélgica, uno de cada dos ciudadanos está siendo observado simultáneamente por más de tres profesionales de la salud, que lo tratan, lo aconsejan o simplemente lo observan. El objeto de esta atención especializada es, en la mayor parte de los casos, una condición de los dientes, del útero, de las emociones, de la presión sanguínea o de los niveles hormonales, que el paciente mismo no percibe. Los pacientes ya no son minoría. Quienes son minoría actualmente son los distintos tipos de desviados que escapan de un modo u otro a los diferentes roles de paciente. Esta minoría la constituyen los pobres, los campesinos, inmigrantes recientes y varios otros que, a veces por deseo propio, se han convertido en desertores del sistema médico. Hace solamente 20 años constituía un signo de salud normal, que presumía bueno, el poder pasársela sin un médico. La misma condición de no paciente se ve hoy como indicativo de desamparo o de disidencia. Incluso la condición de hipocondriaco ha cambiado. Para un profesional liberal, ésta era la etiqueta aplicable a alguien que entraba dando un portazo, o sea, una designación reservada al enfermo imaginario. Ahora, los médicos la utilizan para referirse a la minoría que se les escapa: hipocondriacos son los sanos imaginarios. Ser parte del sistema profesional, como cliente de por vida, no es ya un estigma que separa al incapacitado del ciudadano común. Vivimos hoy en una sociedad organizada para las mayorías desviadas y para sus guardianes. Ser cliente activo de muchos profesionales nos permite tener un lugar bien definido dentro del reino de los consumidores para quienes funciona esta sociedad. De este modo, la transformación de la medicina, de profesión liberal de consulta en profesión dominante e inhabilitante, ha aumentado inconmensurablemente el número de los necesitados.
+
+En este momento crítico, las necesidades atribuidas experimentan su tercera mutación. Se están fundiendo en lo que los expertos llaman un problema multidisciplinario y que, por lo tanto, requiere de una solución multiprofesional. En primer lugar, la multiplicación de las mercancías, que trata cada una de ellas de convertirse en una exigencia para el hombre moderno, logró un entrenamiento eficaz del consumidor para que necesitara cuando se ordenara. Después, la fragmentación progresiva de las necesidades en partes cada vez más pequeñas y más desconectadas logró que el cliente dependiera del juicio profesional para poder combinar sus necesidades en un todo que tuviera sentido. Un buen ejemplo nos lo da la industria automotriz. A fines de los años sesenta, el equipo opcional que se necesitaba para hacer deseable un Ford corriente había aumentado enormemente. La mayor parte de este equipo se instalaba en la misma ciudad de Detroit, y el comprador que vivía en Plains o en cualquier otra ciudad solamente tenía la posibilidad de escoger entre el convertible que deseaba, pero con asientos verdes, y los asientos con piel de leopardo que quería, pero con techo duro. El consumidor, que ya antes había aprendido a depender de la mercancía, ahora tiene que aprender a resignarse a que otros escojan en su lugar.
+
+Por último, el cliente se entrena para que necesite una ayuda-equipo al recibir lo que sus guardianes consideran un “tratamiento satisfactorio”. Los servicios personales que hacen sentirse mejor al consumidor ilustran este punto. La abundancia terapéutica ha agotado el tiempo de vida disponible de muchas personas a quienes los servicios profesionales diagnosticaron de “necesitar aún más”. La intensidad de la economía de servicios ha hecho cada vez más insuficiente el tiempo que se necesita para el consumo de tratamientos pedagógicos, médicos o sociales. La escasez de tiempo puede convertirse muy pronto en el mayor obstáculo para el consumo de servicios prescritos, a menudo financiados por organismos públicos. Síntomas de esta escasez se hacen evidentes desde los primeros años de cualquier persona. Ya en el _kindergarden_ , el niño está sujeto al control de un equipo constituido por especialistas, como el alergista, el patólogo del lenguaje, el pediatra, el psicólogo de niños, el trabajador social, el instructor de educación física y el maestro. Al formar un equipo pedocrático (de poder sobre el niño) de tal tipo, muchos profesionales intentan compartir el tiempo que se ha convertido en el factor más limitante para la atribución de nuevas necesidades. Para el adulto, no es en el colegio, sino en el lugar de trabajo donde se concentran los paquetes de servicios. El administrador del personal, el educador laboral, el entrenador de turno, el planificador de seguros, el animador de conciencias, encuentran más provechoso compartir el tiempo del obrero que competir por él. Un ciudadano sin necesidades sería sospechoso. Se le dice a la gente que necesita de su trabajo no tanto por el dinero que percibe como por las prestaciones que obtiene. Las cosas comunes se extinguieron y se reemplazaron por una nueva matriz hecha de conductos que suministran servicios profesionales. La vida se halla paralizada en un permanente cuidado intensivo. La profecía de Leonardo da Vinci se está cumpliendo: “Los hombres llegarán a tal grado de envilecimiento que estarán contentos de que otros se aprovechen de sus sufrimientos o de la pérdida de su verdadera riqueza: la salud”.[^n01]
+
+# Para terminar con las necesidades
+
+La mutilación del ciudadano a causa del dominio profesional se refuerza con el poder de la ilusión. La esperanza de la salvación por medio de la religión cede paso frente a la esperanza de los servicios profesionales de los que el Estado es el supremo administrador. Cada sacerdote especializado se arroga la capacidad de definir las dificultades de la masa en términos de problemas específicos y solucionables mediante cualquier servicio. Aceptar esta pretensión vuelve a legitimar en el profano, cuyo mundo gira en una cámara de resonancias de necesidades, la dócil aceptación de las necesidades que se le atribuyen. No se trata de mirar un horizonte urbano para ver reflejarse en él este dominio. En todas las alturas, los grandes edificios profesionales dominan a las muchedumbres que van de uno a otro en su ininterrumpida peregrinación a los nuevos santuarios de la salud, de la educación o del bienestar. Las casas “sanas” son, desde entonces, departamentos asépticos donde no se puede nacer, ni enfermarse ni morir decentemente. Los vecinos que nos ayudan, los médicos que vienen a domicilio son especies en vías de desaparición. A los sitios de trabajo apropiados para el aprendizaje se les ha sustituido por opacos laberintos de corredores que sólo se abren delante de funcionarios que llevan colgadas en el reverso de la bata su identidad enmicada. Un mundo concebido para el suministro de servicios es la Utopía de los ciudadanos convertidos en beneficiarios de prestaciones de bienestar.
+
+La mayor adicción a la imputación, la fascinación paralizante que ejerce en los pobres, sería hermosamente irreversible si la gente respondiera realmente al análisis que se hace de sus necesidades. Pero ése no es el caso. Más allá de cierto nivel de intensidad, la medicina engendra la incapacidad y la enfermedad; el sistema de transportes rápidos transforma a los citadinos en pasajeros durante alrededor de una sexta parte de su existencia (con excepción del tiempo de sueño) y, durante otra sexta parte, en condenados que trabajan para pagar a Ford, a Esso y a la administración de las carreteras. El umbral a partir del cual la medicina, la educación o los transportes se vuelven herramientas contraproductivas lo han alcanzado los países donde el impuesto per cápita es comparable, en el mínimo, a Cuba. Contrariamente a las ilusiones propagadas por la línea ortodoxa, en los países del Este y del Occidente esta contraproductividad específica no tiene relación con el _género_ de escuela, de vehículo o de sistema de salud en uso. Llega, en efecto, cuando la intensidad heterónoma sobrepasa, en los procesos de producción, un umbral crítico.
+
+Nuestras principales instituciones han adquirido la extraña capacidad de alcanzar objetivos inversos a aquellos que originalmente se concibieron y financiaron. Bajo la férula de nuestras más prestigiosas profesiones, nuestras herramientas institucionales tienen paradójicamente como principal producto la contraproductividad —la mutilación sistemática de los ciudadanos—. Una ciudad construida alrededor de vehículos se vuelve impropia para los peatones y ninguna multiplicación de los primeros logrará la inmovilidad fabricada de los segundos —de aquellos a quienes han convertido en enfermos—. La acción autónoma está paralizada por un sobrecrecimiento de los productos y de los tratamientos. Pero eso no representa simplemente una pérdida completa bajo las relaciones de satisfacción que, en ellas mismas, no encuentran cómo insertarse en la era industrial. La incapacidad de producir valores de uso vuelve ineficaces los productos precisamente destinados a reemplazarlos. Productos como el transporte automovilizado, la medicina, la enseñanza, la gestión, se transforman en ruido ambiental destructivo para el consumidor que sólo beneficia a los proveedores de servicios.
+
+¿Pero entonces por qué no asistimos a rebeliones contra esta deriva de la sociedad industrial avanzada que termina por ser sólo un inmenso sistema mutilante de suministro de servicios? La principal explicación reside en el poder que tiene éste de engendrar ilusiones. Además, la acción, propiamente material sobre el cuerpo y los espíritus, de las instituciones profesionalizadas funciona igualmente como un poderoso ritual generador de fe en los resultados prometidos por la administración. Además de que le enseña a leer al niño, la escuela le enseña que es “mejor” estudiar con profesores y que, sin la escolaridad obligatoria, los pobres leerán menos libros. Además de que permite desplazarse, el autobús, tanto como el vehículo particular, remodela el entorno y hace pasar de moda el caminar. Además de que ayudan a defraudar al fisco, los consejeros jurídicos comprueban que las leyes resuelven problemas. Una parte, siempre creciente, de las funciones de nuestras principales instituciones es la de mantener y reforzar tres juegos de ilusiones que transforman al ciudadano en cliente que sólo puede alcanzar su salvación mediante los expertos.
+
+## El equívoco entre congestión y parálisis
+
+La primera ilusión avasalladora es la idea de que la gente nació para consumir y que sólo puede alcanzar cualquier objetivo comprando bienes y servicios. Esta ilusión procede de un enceguecimiento inculcado en relación con el “precio” de los valores de uso en una economía. En ninguno de los modelos económicos que las naciones han elegido seguir figuran variables que correspondan a los valores de uso no mercantil o que introduzcan la eterna contribución de la naturaleza. Sin embargo, ninguna economía sobreviviría si la producción de valores de uso se redujera hasta el punto en que, por ejemplo, mantener la casa o cumplir con el deber conyugal se convirtieran en prestaciones remuneradas. Lo que efectúa o fabrica la gente, y que no puede ni quiere vender, es también inconmensurable e inestimable para la economía como el oxígeno para la función respiratoria.
+
+La ilusión de que los modelos económicos pueden ignorar los valores de uso se desprende de la convicción de que estas actividades que designamos mediante verbos intransitivos pueden reemplazarse indefinidamente por productos institucionalmente definidos y designados con sustantivos: la enseñanza reemplaza a “aprendo”; el cuidado de la salud reemplaza a “sano”; los transportes reemplazan a “me desplazo”.
+
+La confusión entre los valores personales y los valores estandarizados se ha extendido a la mayoría de los dominios. Bajo el báculo profesional, los valores de uso se disuelven, caen en desuso y terminan por perder su naturaleza distinta. Cuidado institucional y amor terminan por coincidir en él. Diez años de explotación de una granja se lanzan a una “batidora” pedagógica y, al concluir, equivalen a un diploma universitario. Las cosas que se recogen al azar, y que se incuban en la libertad de la calle, se agregan en tanto “experiencias educativas” a las que se les atiborra a los alumnos. Los contadores del saber parecen ignorar que las dos actividades, al igual que el agua y la gasolina, se mezclan sólo en tanto están emulsionadas —aquí por la percepción de un educador—. Las indulgentes camarillas de buscadores de necesidades no podrían continuar imponiéndonoslas, como tampoco sacándonos dinero de nuestra bolsa para financiar sus exámenes, sus redes y otras imposturas, si no estuviéramos paralizados por esta especie de ávida creencia.
+
+La utilidad de los bienes de consumo o de productos condicionados está intrínsecamente limitada por dos fronteras que no deben confundirse. En primer lugar, las filas de los que esperan detendrán tarde o temprano el funcionamiento de cualquier sistema que secrete necesidades más rápidamente que los productos destinados a satisfacerlas; en segundo lugar, la dependencia en relación con los productos determinará que, a consecuencia de esas necesidades, tarde o temprano la autonomía se paralizará en los dominios en cuestión. La utilidad de los productos está limitada por la _congestión_ y por la _parálisis_. Una y otra son resultantes de la escalada en cualquier sector de producción, tanto como cada una lo es a su manera. La congestión, que permite medir hasta dónde los productos pueden “acelerarse”, explica por qué el coche privado no es de ninguna utilidad para desplazarse a Manhattan; en compensación, no explica por qué la gente se rompe el lomo trabajando con el objeto de pagar las primas de seguros de coches en los que no puede desplazarse. Tomada aisladamente, tampoco explica por qué la gente se dejó esclavizar de tal forma por los vehículos que simplemente perdió el uso de sus extremidades inferiores.
+
+Si la gente se hace cada vez más cautiva de una velocidad que la retrasa, de una instrucción que la embrutece y de una medicina que le desequilibra la salud, es porque más allá de cierto umbral de intensidad la dependencia de bienes industriales y de servicios profesionales destruye la potencialidad del hombre, y la destruye de una manera específica. Los productos sólo pueden reemplazar lo que la gente efectúa o fabrica por símisma hasta cierto punto. Los valores de cambio sólo pueden reemplazar los valores de uso de manera satisfactoria hasta cierto punto. Más allá de ese punto, cualquier producto suplementario sólo beneficia al productor profesional, mientras que desorienta y atonta al consumidor satisfaciéndolo con una necesidad que el primero le ha imputado. El placer que causa la satisfacción de una necesidad sólo toma su plena significación por referencia al recuerdo de una acción autónoma personal. Hay límites más allá de los cuales la multiplicación de los productos altera precisamente en el consumidor la facultad de afirmarse actuando.
+
+Al recibir sólo lo “totalmente hecho”, lo que le prohíbe cualquier posibilidad de actuar por sí mismo, el consumidor se siente inevitablemente frustrado. El grado de bienestar de una sociedad no resulta, en ningún caso, de la adición de dos modos de producción, heterónomo o autónomo, sino de la asociación fructífera de la sinergia entre valores de uso y productos normalizados.
+
+La producción heterónoma de una mercancía sólo realza y completa hasta cierto punto la producción autónoma del objetivo personal correspondiente. Más allá de cierto punto, la sinergia entre los dos modos de producción se vuelve paradójicamente contra el objetivo pretendido a la vez por el valor de uso y por la mercancía. Esto es un hecho que la vasta corriente ecológica generalmente olvida. Así, la crítica de las centrales nucleares se dirige hacia los peligros de las radiaciones o sobre las amenazas de un despotismo tecnocrático. Pero, fuera de eso, son raros aquellos que osan denunciar su contribución a la subordinación de la energía. Al desconocer que la superproducción energética paraliza la acción del hombre, se reclama _otra_ producción energética, pero no _menor_. De la misma forma, los límites inexorables del crecimiento que son inherentes a cualquier organización prestadora de servicios son todavía ampliamente desconocidos. Debería, en consecuencia, ser evidente que la institucionalización de los cuidados de la salud sólo puede fabricar gente con mala salud o que la formación permanente sólo puede engendrar una cultura para gente programada. La ecología sólo proporcionará puntos de referencia en la vía de una modernidad viable cuando tomemos conciencia de que el entorno formado por el hombre en función de productos aminora a tal punto su facultad de reacción personal que esos productos pierden su valor como medios de satisfacción. Si no se comprende esto, la puesta en marcha de una tecnología industrial más limpia, menos agresiva, podría alcanzar niveles todavía más intangibles de saciedad frustrante.
+
+La supremacía del mercado conduce a la contraproductividad. La razón fundamental reside en el monopolio que los productos en serie ejercen sobre la formación de las necesidades. Ese monopolio sobrepasa de lejos lo que habitualmente designamos con ese término. De esa forma, un monopolio comercial impone en el mercado su marca de whisky o de automóvil. Un cartel monopolista puede restringir todavía más la libertad, apoderándose, por ejemplo, de los transportes comunitarios para promover los vehículos privados —como lo ha hecho la General Motors comprando y periclitando los tranvías de San Francisco—. Podemos escapar al primero bebiendo ron y, al segundo, rodando en bicicleta. Sin embargo, empleo el término de “monopolio radical” para designar otra realidad: la sustitución de las actividades útiles a las que se libra, o desearía librarse, la gente, por un producto industrial o de servicio profesional. Un monopolio radical paraliza la acción autónoma en beneficio de prestaciones profesionales. En la medida en que los vehículos desorganicen a la gente y sea necesario regular la circulación, la gente será cada vez más incapaz de volver a su casa a pie. Aunque los motores funcionaran con energía solar, los coches estarían hechos con el aire del tiempo que el monopolio radical ejercería todavía, ya que es inseparable de la circulación de velocidad excesiva. De la misma forma, entre más permanezca una persona bajo la autoridad de la enseñanza, tendrá menos tiempo disponible para reflexionar o descubrir cualquier cosa por sí misma. En todos los dominios existe un umbral más allá del cual la abundancia de bienes ofrecidos al consumo vuelve al medio de tal forma impropio para la acción personal que la sinergia posible entre los valores de uso y los productos se vuelve negativa. Paradójica, específica, la contraproductividad se instala. Emplearé este término cada vez que la impotencia que resulta de la sustitución de un valor de uso por su producto prive precisamente a ese producto de _su_ valor.
+
+## El desconocimiento de las herramientas convivenciales
+
+El hombre deja de ser definible como tal cuando ya no es capaz de modelar sus propias necesidades mediante el empleo más o menos competente de herramientas que le proporcionó su cultura. A lo largo de la historia, las herramientas han sido, antes que nada, instrumentos de trabajo empleados en una producción doméstica. Las palas y los martillos sólo servían marginalmente para otros fines, ya se tratara de levantar pirámides o de fabricar excedentes disponibles para el trueque, los regalos o, de manera más rara, para un intercambio por dinero. Las ocasiones de obtener un beneficio de ellas eran limitadas. El trabajo, por lo general, sólo estaba destinado para crear valores de uso no intercambiables. Sin embargo, el progreso tecnológico se empeñó en realizar un género muy diferente de herramienta: la herramienta destinada a producir lo “vendible”. Eso comenzó con la Revolución industrial: la intervención de la nueva tecnología reducía el trabajo al papel del chaplinesco robot de _Tiempos modernos_. Pero, en ese estado precoz, el modo industrial de producción todavía no paralizaba a la gente una vez que “dejaba la chamba”. Mientras que ahora, hombres y mujeres, al estar prácticamente sujetos al suministro de fragmentos estandarizados producidos por herramientas accionadas por sus anónimos colegas, no encuentran ya, en el mantenimiento de las herramientas, esa satisfacción directa que estimulaba la evolución de los hombres y de sus culturas. Sus necesidades y su consumo se han multiplicado notablemente, mientras que su satisfacción al manejar herramientas se aquieta —y dejan de llevar una existencia a la vista de la cual su organismo adquirió su forma—. En el mejor de los casos, apenas sobreviven, incluso en un medio tornasolado. Toda su vida no es más que un encantamiento de necesidades que sucesivamente son satisfechas con el fin de suscitar las siguientes necesidades —y la necesidad de satisfacerlas—. Ahí, el hombre-consumidor-pasivo termina por perder hasta la capacidad de hacer la diferencia entre vivir y sobrevivir. En lugar de aprovechar la vida, apuesta sobre la propia esperanza de vida, vibra con la esperanza de estar “bien asistido”. En un ambiente así se vuelve fácil olvidar que sólo se está satisfecho y feliz en la medida en que la conciencia personal de su propia necesidad y los “suministros” destinados a satisfacerlas permanecen en equilibrio.
+
+La ilusión de que las herramientas al servicio de instituciones de vocación mercantil pueden impunemente destruir las condiciones de vida que reposan sobre medios convivenciales al alcance de cada uno, permite asfixiar cualquier “conciencia” conceptualizando el progreso tecnológico, que se vuelve entonces promotor de productos que autorizan cualquier escalada de la dominación profesional. Esta ilusión dicta que las herramientas, con el fin de ganar en eficacia en la persecución de propósitos específicos, se vuelven inevitablemente más complejas y misteriosas. Sólo hay que pensar en las carlingas y en las grúas. Parece que las herramientas modernas requieren necesariamente operaciones especiales, dotadas de una alta formación técnica y, por lo tanto, susceptibles de inspirar una confianza verdaderamente fundada.
+
+De hecho, es precisamente lo contrario lo que por lo general es verdad. Entre mayor es la multiplicación de las técnicas, más se parcializan al especializarse, y menos su manejo requiere de una decisión compleja. La confianza del cliente, sobre la que la autonomía del miembro de una profesión liberal o incluso la del artesano se edificaba, ya no es necesaria. A medida que avanzaba la medicina, sólo una muy débil fracción del volumen total de los servicios médicos demostrados útiles exigía una formación avanzada —y una inteligencia notable—. Desde un punto de vista social, deberíamos reservar la designación de “progreso técnico” a los casos en que nuevas herramientas estiraran la capacidad y la eficacia de un mayor número de gente; en particular cuando nuevas herramientas permitieran una producción más autónoma de valores de uso.
+
+No hay nada _inevitable_ en el monopolio profesional que extiende su dominio sobre la nueva tecnología. Las grandes invenciones del último siglo, como las nuevas aleaciones, los rodajes con baleros, algunos materiales de construcción, los circuitos impresos, algunos análisis y medicamentos, son susceptibles de acrecentar el poder de los dos modos de producción, heterónomo y autónomo. Sólo que la mayor parte de la tecnología no se ha incorporado al herramental convivencial sino a condicionamientos y complejos institucionales. Al ser eminentemente capaz de servir a sus amos, los profesionales han puesto la nueva tecnología al servicio de la producción industrial y con ello han adquirido un monopolio radical. La contraproductividad en la que desemboca la parálisis de la producción de valores de uso resulta de esta noción de progreso tecnológico.
+
+No existe “imperativo tecnológico” que exija que el rodamiento con baleros se emplee en los vehículos motorizados o que la electrónica se utilice para controlar el funcionamiento cerebral. La institución de la circulación a gran velocidad o la de la protección de la salud mental _no resultan necesariamente_ de los rodamientos con baleros o de los circuitos impresos. Sus funciones están determinadas por las necesidades de servicio para las cuales se hicieron —necesidades que ante todo imputan y refuerzan los profesionales—. Éste es un hecho que, en las profesiones mismas, parece escapar a los jóvenes turcos radicales cuando, al justificar su fidelidad institucional, se presentan como los sacerdotes públicamente investidos del encargo de domesticar el progreso tecnológico. Es también la sujeción respecto a la idea del progreso la que hace que únicamente se considere a la ingeniería como contribución a la eficacia institucional. Sólo a las investigaciones científicas susceptibles de aplicaciones militares o que refuerzan más el dominio profesional se les asignan gruesos créditos. Las aleaciones gracias a las cuales pueden fabricarse bicicletas a la vez más robustas y ligeras proceden de los estudios emprendidos para hacer a los aviones de propulsión más rápidos y a las armas más mortíferas. Pero es principalmente el herramental industrial el que se beneficia con los resultados de la investigación. En esa forma, máquinas ya de por sí enormes se vuelven todavía más complejas, más incomprensibles para el profano. Este prejuicio, al colorear la visión que los científicos y los técnicos tienen de su tarea, viene a reforzar una tendencia ya predominante: rechaza las necesidades que implican una acción autónoma y multiplican las necesidades que implican la adquisición de bienes de consumo. Las herramientas convivenciales que facilitan el disfrute individual de los valores de uso —y que sólo requieren muy poca, o casi ninguna, vigilancia médica, policiaca o administrativa— sólo tienen cabida en dos extremos: en los trabajadores asiáticos despojados y en los estudiantes y profesores ricos, que son las dos especies de gente que va en bicicleta.
+
+Desde hace poco, ciertos grupos de profesionales, de organismos gubernamentales y de organizaciones internacionales han comenzado a estudiar, desarrollar y preconizar una tecnología “ligera”. Se podría pensar que esos esfuerzos apuntan a escapar de la servidumbre de los imperativos tecnológicos. Pero, en el conjunto, esta nueva tecnología, concebida para la autointervensión en el dominio de la salud, de la enseñanza o de la construcción de viviendas, no es más que otra forma de poderosa sujeción en relación con el suministro de bienes. Así, se pide a los expertos concebir botiquines farmacéuticos familiares que permitan a la gente seguir las directrices que el médico le da por teléfono. Se enseña a las mujeres a descubrir por sí mismas un eventual cáncer de mama con el fin de darle trabajo al cirujano. Los cubanos tienen licencias remuneradas para levantar sus casas prefabricadas. A medida en que el prestigio y la seducción de los productos profesionales se vuelven menos onerosos, terminan por hacer que ricos y pobres se parezcan cada vez más estrechamente entre ellos. Bolivianos y suecos se sienten parecidamente atrasados, subprivilegiados y explotados en la medida en que se instruyen sin profesores diplomados, tienen buena salud sin supervisión médica y se desplazan sin prótesis motorizadas.
+
+## La confusión entre libertades y derechos
+
+La tercera ilusión mutilante consiste en confiar a los expertos el cuidado de fijar límites al crecimiento. Se estima que están listas para ser instruidas con lo que no necesitan las poblaciones socialmente condicionadas para experimentar necesidades “sobre pedido”. Los mismos agentes multinacionales que durante una generación han impuesto tanto a los ricos como a los pobres un nivel internacional de consumo de contabilidad, de desodorantes o de energía, patrocinan al Club de Roma. Dócilmente la UNESCO se pone de su parte y forma especialistas de la imputación de necesidades a nivel regional. Así, supuestamente para su bien, a los ricos se les programa para cubrir los gastos de un crecimiento de dominio profesional costoso en ellos y para asignar a los pobres necesidades menos onerosas y más restringidas. Entre los nuevos profesionales algunos son demasiado clarividentes para constatar que la disminución de los productos refuerza también el dirigismo de las necesidades. La planificación central de la descentralización óptima de la producción se volvió la tarea más prestigiosa de 1977. Pero lo que todavía no se reconoce es que alcanzar la salud de los límites decretados por profesionales termina por confundir libertades y derechos.
+
+En cada una de las siete regiones del mundo definidas por la ONU se ha formado una nueva clerecía para predicar el estilo apropiado de austeridad puesta a punto por los nuevos creadores de necesidades. Los “concientizadores” se esparcen en las comunidades locales para incitar a la gente a que alcance los objetivos de producción descentralizada que se le fijaron. Ordeñar la cabra familiar constituía una libertad; la planificación ha hecho de ello un deber para contribuir al producto nacional bruto.
+
+La sinergia entre producción autónoma y producción heterónoma se refleja en el equilibrio que mantiene la sociedad entre libertades y derechos. Las libertades protegen los valores de uso, como los derechos protegen el acceso a los productos. De igual manera que los productos pueden asfixiar la posibilidad de crear valores de uso y transformarse en riqueza empobrecedora, la definición profesional de derechos puede asfixiar las libertades y asentar una tiranía que sepulte a la gente bajo sus derechos.
+
+Se revela muy claramente la confusión si se considera a los especialistas de la salud. La salud es precisamente el ejercicio de libertades y derechos. La salud designa la zona de autonomía en el seno de la cual una persona rige sus propios estados biológicos y las condiciones de su entorno inmediato. La salud es el grado de libertad vivido. Desde ese momento, los que se preocupan del bien público deberían emplearse en garantizar la distribución equitativa de la salud en tanto libertad, la cual, en su momento, depende de condiciones del entorno que únicamente se realizan por intervenciones políticas organizadas. Más allá de cierto nivel de intensidad, el cuidado de la salud profesional, tan equitativamente distribuido como se quiera, asfixiará la salud en tanto libertad. En este sentido fundamental, el cuidado de la salud es una cuestión de libertad bien protegida.
+
+Es evidente que dicha noción de la salud implica una petición de principio de las libertades inalienables. Es necesario, a este respecto, distinguir claramente entre libertad cívica y derechos cívicos. La libertad de actuar sin que el gobierno ponga trabas tiene un alcance más vasto que los derechos cívicos que el Estado promulga para garantizar a la gente una igual facultad para obtener ciertos bienes y servicios.
+
+Por regla general, las libertades cívicas no constriñen a los otros a actuar conforme a mis deseos. Tengo la libertad de hablar y de dar a conocer públicamente mi opinión, pero ningún periódico está obligado a imprimirla, como tampoco se exige a mis conciudadanos que lean mi publicación. Soy libre de pintar lo que creo bello, pero ningún museo está constreñido a comprar mi tela. Pero, al mismo tiempo, el Estado, en tanto garante de la libertad, puede promulgar —y lo hace— leyes que protegen la igualdad de los derechos sin la cual sus miembros no gozarían de sus libertades. Esos derechos dan significación y realidad a la igualdad, mientras las libertades dan posibilidad y forma a la libertad. Una manera cierta de asfixiar las libertades de hablar, de aprender, de sanar o de cuidar es delimitarlas metamorfoseando los derechos cívicos en deberes cívicos. La tercera ilusión consiste precisamente en creer que la reivindicación pública de los derechos desemboca ineluctablemente en la protección de las libertades. En efecto, entre más inviste la sociedad a los profesionales de la legitimidad de definir los derechos, más se rebajan las libertades del ciudadano.
+
+## El derecho al desempleo creador
+
+En nuestros días, cualquier nueva necesidad profesionalmente comprobada toma, tarde o temprano, la forma de un derecho. Una vez promulgado bajo la presión política, ese derecho engendra nuevos empleos y nuevos productos. En su momento, cada nuevo producto degrada una actividad de la que, hasta aquí, la gente tenía la iniciativa para su propio beneficio; cada nuevo empleo vuelve ilegítimo un trabajo que hasta ese momento efectuaba la gente sin “profesión” —o en lo que no era profesión—. El poder que tienen los profesionales de señalar lo que es bueno, justo, legítimamente fabricable, falsea en “cualquiera” la facultad de vivir “a su medida”.
+
+Cuando todos los estudiantes en derecho actualmente inscritos en las facultades norteamericanas hayan obtenido su diploma, el número de juristas aumentará 50% en Estados Unidos. La obligación del cuidado legal completará la obligación del cuidado médico, y el “seguro judicial” se volverá del mismo género que el “seguro de enfermedad”. Cuando el derecho del ciudadano a las prestaciones de un abogado se haya instituido, será tan oscurantista y asocial desahogar una querella entre particulares como hoy en día dar a luz en su propia cama. Ya el derecho reconocido a los ciudadanos de Detroit de vivir en una vivienda cuya instalación eléctrica se debe a un profesional hace de aquel que “juega a instalar” la suya un delincuente. La pérdida sucesiva de las libertades de ser útil en otra parte que no sea en un “puesto de trabajo” o fuera de un control profesional es una experiencia de las más penosas, aunque innominada, que se ata a la pobreza modernizada. Actualmente el privilegio más significativo de un estatus social eminente podría bien ser la “facultad de no trabajar” siendo útil —negado cada vez más a la gran mayoría—. El derecho del ciudadano a ser cuidado y aprovisionado casi se ha convertido, a fuerza de reivindicarse, en el derecho de las profesiones y de las industrias a elegir su clientela, con, como consecuencia de sus prestaciones y suministros, el deterioro de las condiciones del medio ambiente que volvía útiles las actividades no retribuidas. De ahí la lucha por una distribución equitativa del tiempo y de la facultad de ser útil a sí mismo y a los otros cuando en su oficio o en su puesto ha sido eficazmente paralizado. Cualquier labor no remunerada se desprecia, si no es que se ignora. La actividad autónoma amenaza el nivel del empleo, engendra la desconfianza y falsea el PNB. Se estima, por otra parte, impropio designarla como un “trabajo”. La “labor” no es más el esfuerzo o la tarea, sino la misteriosa inversión que, uncida con el capital, vuelve una fábrica productiva —y remuneradora—. El trabajo no es más la creación de un valor que el trabajador percibe como tal, sino ante todo un “sitio”, es decir, cualquier cosa que nos sitúe socialmente. Carecer de trabajo es estar tristemente ocioso y no tener la libertad para hacer cosas útiles para sí o para el vecino. La mujer activa que cuida la casa, educa a sus hijos y eventualmente se ocupa de los de otras, se distingue de la mujer que “trabaja” por más inútil o perniciosa que pueda ser la producción en la que se emplea. La actividad, el esfuerzo, el cumplimiento, la utilidad fuera del círculo de las relaciones jerárquicas y no señaladas profesionalmente, representan una amenaza para una sociedad de productos mercantiles. Al escapar a la contabilidad nacional, la creación de valores de uso no limita sólo la necesidad de un aumento de productos, sino también de los puestos de trabajo que los elaboran y de los salarios necesarios para comprarlos.
+
+Esforzarse en producir algo agradable, amar lo que uno hace, son nociones vacías de sentido en una sociedad donde sólo cuenta la pareja mano de obra/capital. La sensación de cumplimiento que procura la acción ya no tiene sentido más que cuando lo único que importa es el estatus social en el seno de las relaciones de producción, a saber: el lugar, la situación, el puesto o el nombramiento. En la Edad Media, cuando no había salvación fuera de la Iglesia, los teólogos tropezaban con la cuestión de saber lo que Dios haría de los paganos cuando habían llevado una vida “ejemplar”. De la misma manera, en la sociedad contemporánea, el esfuerzo sólo es productivo si se hace incitado por el patrón, y los economistas tropiezan con la cuestión de la utilidad evidente de las personas que escapan al control de una corporación, de un organismo, de un cuerpo de voluntarios o de un campo de trabajo. El trabajo sólo es productivo, respetable y digno del ciudadano cuando su proceso está planificado, dirigido y controlado por un agente profesional que garantiza que responde a una necesidad “nominalizada”. En una sociedad industrial avanzada, se vuelve imposible no querer ejercer un empleo para librarse a un trabajo autónomo y útil. Osar considerarlo es incluso ir demasiado lejos. La infraestructura de la sociedad está arreglada de tal manera que sólo el puesto da acceso a los medios de producción, y ese monopolio de la creación de bienes sobre la creación de valores de uso no deja de reforzarse cuando el Estado se apodera de ellos. No se puede instruir a un niño sin habilitación específica, restablecer una pierna rota en otra parte que en una clínica. Los trabajos domésticos, el artesanado, la agricultura de subsistencia, la tecnología radical, la enseñanza mutua, etc., se reducen al rango de actividades para los ociosos, los improductivos, los más despojados o los más ricos. Una sociedad que engendra una dependencia intensa en relación con las mercancías transforma así a sus sin-trabajo en pobres o en asistidos. En 1945, por cada norteamericano beneficiario de un retiro había 35 trabajadores empleados. En 1977, sólo había 3.2 trabajadores empleados para mantener a un retirado, él mismo dependiente de mucho más servicios de los que su abuelo retirado habría podido imaginar.
+
+En lo sucesivo, la calidad de una sociedad y de su cultura dependerá del estatus de sus sin-trabajo: ¿serán los ciudadanos productivos más representativos o los asistidos? Una vez más la elección o la crisis parece clara: la sociedad industrial avanzada puede continuar bajo el impulso del sueño integrista de los años sesenta; puede degenerar en un sistema de racionamiento que parsimoniosamente imputa productos y empleos en constante disminución, y que forma siempre más ciudadanos para el consumo estandarizado y para el trabajo inútil. Tal es la línea seguida por la mayor parte de los gobiernos, de Alemania a China, pero, podríamos decir, cada uno según sus medios. En efecto, entre más rico es un país, más urgente parece el deber de racionar el acceso a las plazas y de trabar la actividad útil de los sin-trabajo que perjudicaría al “empleo”. Ciertamente lo inverso es igualmente posible: una sociedad moderna en la que los trabajadores frustrados se organizaran para proteger la libertad de la gente de ser útil sin participar en las actividades llamadas “productivas”, es decir, que suministran productos mercantiles. Pero, también aquí, esta orientación social sólo puede desembocar en una nueva competencia, racional y cínica, en el ciudadano medio confrontado con la imputación profesional de las necesidades.
+
+# En guardia frente al nuevo profesional
+
+Hoy, el nuevo profesional se siente claramente amenazado por la acumulación de pruebas de la contraproductividad de sus prestaciones. La gente comienza a ver que su hegemonía la priva del derecho a mirar en la cosa política. El poder simbólico de esos expertos que, al definir las necesidades, esterilizan las habilidades personales, se percibe ahora como más peligroso que su capacidad para dominar las técnicas, la cual se limita a responder a las necesidades que crean. Simultáneamente se escucha cada vez más reclamar la puesta en marcha de una legislación que podría hacernos salir de una edad dominada por el _ethos_ profesional. Muchas exigencias se plantean en este sentido: sustituir la habilitación por los profesionales o la administración de una investidura por ciudadanos elegidos, y no contentarse con hacer intervenir a algunos representantes de consumidores o usuarios en las instancias de decisión; flexibilizar la reglamentación de las prescripciones en las farmacias, así como la de la formación obligatoria o del reciclaje de adultos; proteger las libertades _productivas_ , incluso y sobre todo si son extraindustriales; derecho para el profano calificado de practicar sin habilitación formal; poner a disposición del ciudadano un “estado” de servicios públicos que le permita saber cuales practicantes trabajan por honorarios. Frente a estas amenazas, las principales instituciones profesionales recurren, cada una a su manera, a tres estrategias fundamentales para paliar la erosión de su legitimidad y de su poder.
+
+## La recuperación por la autarquía
+
+Esta primera actitud es la del Club de Roma. Fiat, Volkswagen y Ford pagan economistas, ecologistas y sociólogos para que determinen las producciones a las que deben renunciar las industrias con el fin de que el sistema industrial funcione mejor —y pueda así reforzarse—. De la misma forma, los médicos del Club de Cos preconizan renunciar a la cirugía, a la radioterapia y a la quimioterapia en el tratamiento de la mayoría de los cánceres, pues sus intervenciones no hacen más que acrecentar y prolongar muchos meses el sufrimiento de los enfermos sin aumentar por ello su esperanza de vida. Abogados y dentistas prometen vigilar como nunca la competencia, la corrección y las tarifas de sus colegas.
+
+Una variante de esta actitud se observa en ciertos individuos o en sus organizaciones que cuestionan la Orden de los médicos y de otros creadores de necesidades. Éstos revindican la etiqueta de radicales porque: _1)_ aconsejan a los consumidores en contra de los intereses de la mayoría de sus pares; _2)_ instruyen a los profanos sobre la manera de conducirse en el consejo de administración de los hospitales, de las universidades o de la policía; _3)_ llegan a dar testimonio, frente a comisiones parlamentarias, de la inutilidad de “acciones” propuestas por profesionales y requeridas por el público. Así, en una provincia del oeste de Canadá, los médicos hicieron una relación de algunas 25 acciones médicas que la legislatura pretendía subvencionar mejor. Se trataba, en todos los casos, de actos costosos; los médicos subrayaron, además, que eran muy dolorosos, que muchos de ellos eran muy peligrosos y que su eficacia no estaba probada en ninguno. Estas recomendaciones médicamente “ilustradas” no se siguieron —fracaso que refuerza provisoriamente la creencia en la necesidad de la protección _profesional_ contra la _hybris_ profesional—.
+
+Que la profesión forme su policía interior, nada es más útil cuando se trata de desenmascarar al incompetente caracterizado —al “carnicero”— o al charlatán puro y simple. Pero se ha probado ampliamente que la profesión sólo protege a los incapaces al reforzar la dependencia del público en relación con sus prestaciones. El médico “crítico”, el jurista “radical”, el promotor y animador del barrio roban clientes a los colegas menos enterados que ellos de lo que está “en el viento”. Las profesiones liberales comenzaron por convencer al público de la necesidad de sus servicios prometiendo velar por la sociedad, por la moralidad o por la formación sanitaria de las capas más pobres. Después, las profesiones dominadoras se arrogaron el “deber” de guiar al público —y de mutilarlo también más— organizándose en clubes que enarbolan los estandartes de las obligaciones ecológicas, económicas y sociales. Esta actitud pone freno a la expansión ulterior del sector profesional, pero refuerza la dependencia del público en el seno del sector mismo. Así, la idea de que los profesionales tienen el _derecho_ de servir al público es de origen muy reciente. Su lucha por establecer y legitimar su derecho corporativo se vuelve una de las amenazas más pesadas contra nuestra sociedad.
+
+## La recuperación por la autoinvestidura
+
+La segunda estrategia se dirige a organizar y coordinar las prestaciones de los profesionales con el fin de cubrir todos los aspectos de los problemas humanos. Con ese objeto, se toman prestadas ideas del análisis sistémico y de las investigaciones operacionales con vistas a suministrar soluciones a la vez más nacionales y más exhaustivas. Lo que eso significa en la práctica se puede ver en Canadá. Hace cuatro años, el Ministerio de la Salud lanzó una campaña para convencer al público de que el aumento de los gastos médicos no abatía de ninguna manera las tasas de enfermedad ni de mortalidad. Subrayó que los decesos prematuros se debían a tres causas mayores: los accidentes, principalmente los accidentes de carretera; las afecciones cardiacas y el cáncer de pulmón, contra los cuales los médicos son notoriamente impotentes; al suicidio o al asesinato, fenómenos que escapan a la esfera médica. El ministro preconizó la investigación de nuevos métodos para abordar las cuestiones de salud, junto con una reducción de los gastos médicos. El deber de proteger, fortificar o consolar a quienes su estilo de vida y el entorno destructores típicos del Canadá contemporáneo han alterado la salud lo recuperaron entonces muchos profesores, antiguos y nuevos. Los arquitectos descubrieron que tenían la misión de mejorar la salud de los canadienses; la necesaria vigilancia de los perros errantes —que son una fuente de accidentes— hizo que se agregaran nuevos especialistas a la perrera. La organización de los canadienses se sometió a los nuevos biócratas como nunca lo había hecho con los antiguos terapeutas. El eslogan: “Más vale gastar para estar bien que pagar al médico cuando se está enfermo” no era, en efecto —lo vemos bien hoy en día—, más que la divisa de camarillas buscando canalizar en su beneficio el dinero de los nuevos prosélitos.
+
+La práctica de la medicina en Estados Unidos ilustra una dinámica similar. La creación de un sistema coordinado de cuidados de salud se ha tragado sumas enormes sin revelarse particularmente eficaz. En 1950, el trabajador norteamericano le consagraba anualmente el equivalente de dos semanas de salario. En 1976, la proporción había alcanzado de cinco a siete semanas de salario: cuando se compra un Ford nuevo, se paga más por la higiene de los obreros que por el metal que contiene el vehículo. A pesar de todos esos esfuerzos, de todos esos gastos, la esperanza de vida de la población masculina adulta no se ha elevado sensiblemente desde hace 100 años. Es más baja que en muchos países pobres y, desde hace 20 años, no ha dejado de descender lenta, pero regularmente.
+
+Ahí, donde se ha asistido a un retroceso de las enfermedades, éste es imputable a la adopción de un estilo de vida más sano, en particular bajo el aspecto de la nutrición. En menor grado, las vacunas y las acciones simples, como la administración automática de antibióticos, la prescripción de anticonceptivos o la interrupción del embarazo por el método de la aspiración, han contribuido al retroceso de ciertas afecciones. Pero dichas acciones no postulan la necesidad de una intervención profesional. No es porque mantiene lazos más estrechos con una profesión médica que la gente tendrá mejor salud. Muchos médicos “radicales” preconizan precisamente una biocracia siempre más vasta. Se les escapa aparentemente que querer “resolver los problemas” de la gente de manera más racional equivale a actuar en su lugar, a expoliarla de la decisión —incluso si es para alcanzar una igualdad compensatoria—.
+
+## La recuperación por la profesionalización del cliente
+
+La tercera estrategia para asegurar la sobrevivencia de las profesiones dominadoras es el más reciente radicalismo en boga. Cuando los profetas de los años sesenta vaticinaban sobre el desarrollo en el umbral de la abundancia, estos creadores de mitos hacían peroratas sobre la autoasistencia de los clientes profesionalizados.
+
+Desde 1965 sólo en Estados Unidos cerca de 2 700 obras aparecieron para enseñar a ser su propio paciente —con el objeto de visitar al médico sólo cuando eso valiera la pena para él—. Algunas de ellas preconizan la formación de la automedicación, coronada por un examen, después del cual sólo los felices laureados tendrían licencia para comprar aspirinas y administrarlas a sus hijos. Otros proponen que los pacientes profesionalizados se beneficien con tarifas preferenciales en los hospitales y de una disminución en sus cotizaciones de su seguro de enfermedades. Sólo podrán dar a luz en su casa las mujeres debidamente acreditadas —su “profesionalización” permitiría, si fuera el caso, perseguirlas por faltas o negligencia médica—. Una de esas proposiciones “radicales” consistía en poner una de esas habilitaciones no bajo auspicios médicos sino feministas.
+
+El sueño profesional de arraigar profundamente cada jerarquía de necesidades reviste los colores de la autoasistencia. Por el momento, sus promotores son la nueva tribu de expertos en autoasistencia que ha venido a reemplazar a los especialistas del desarrollo de los años sesenta. Su objetivo es la profesionalización universal de los clientes. Los expertos norteamericanos de la construcción que, el otoño pasado, invadieron México, ilustran la nueva cruzada.
+
+Hace alrededor de dos años, un profesor de arquitectura de Boston vino a pasar sus vacaciones a México. Un mexicano, amigo mío, lo llevó a ver la nueva ciudad que en 12 años se había desarrollado más allá del aeropuerto de México. Esta aglomeración, que inició con algunas chozas, se ha extendido progresivamente al grado de contar con tres veces más habitantes que Cambridge, Massachusetts. Mi amigo, él mismo arquitecto, quería mostrar al visitante miles de ejemplos de ingenio campesino: la organización, las estructuras, el reúso de materiales de desecho, nada de todo eso se encontraba en los manuales, todo era espontáneo. Su colega tomó cientos de fotografías. Nada más natural. Los amateurs, los no calificados, habían edificado, haciendo funcionar una aglomeración de “cuchitriles” de más de dos millones de habitantes. Las fotografías se analizaron debidamente en Cambridge; al final del año, especialistas norteamericanos recién salidos de los cursos de “arquitectura de comunidades” se empleaban en enseñar a la gente de Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl cuáles eran sus problemas, sus necesidades y las soluciones “adecuadas”.
+
+# El ethos postprofesional
+
+Lo inverso de la necesidad y de la pobreza profesionalmente comprobada es la subsistencia moderna. El término “economía de subsistencia” se aplica en etnología a la forma de sobrevivencia de un grupo, en sí mismo marginal, en relación con la dependencia hacia el mercado, en la que la gente fabrica lo que utiliza mediante herramientas tradicionales y en el seno de una organización social frecuentemente heredada tal cual. En el lenguaje corriente, sin embrago, la “economía de subsistencia” evoca una cultura que organiza la impotencia, engendra ilusiones y favorece a la élite. Shalins demostró que la única sociedad en la que el espacio, el tiempo y la autonomía se agota en su lucha por la sobrevivencia es la industrial. Propongo, sin embargo, no sin vacilación, recuperar el término para hablar de “subsistencia moderna”.
+
+Llamamos “subsistencia moderna” al modo de vida en una economía posindustrial en el seno de la cual la gente logra reducir su dependencia en relación con el mercado, consiguiendo —por medios políticos— una infraestructura en la que técnicas y herramientas sirven, en primer lugar, para crear valores de uso no cuantificados y no cuantificables por los fabricantes profesionales de necesidades. De esas herramientas hablé en otra parte[^n02] proponiendo el término de “herramienta convivencial” para cualquier instrumento concebido con el fin de producir valores de uso. Mostré que el inverso de la pobreza modernizada progresiva es la austeridad convivencial que resulta de una gestión política que protege la igualdad del ejercicio de la libertad en el empleo de dichas herramientas.
+
+Un reherramentación de la sociedad contemporánea mediante herramientas convivenciales y ya no industriales implica, sin embargo, un desplazamiento del interés en nuestra lucha por la justicia social; implica un nuevo género de subordinación de la justicia distributiva a la justicia participativa. En una sociedad industrial, los individuos están formados en una especialización forzada. Se han vuelto impotentes para modelar o para satisfacer sus propias necesidades. Dependen de mercancías “prescritas” para su intención. El derecho al diagnóstico de necesidades, a la participación de la terapia y —de manera general— a la distribución de bienes, predomina en la ética, la política y la legislación. La primacía dada al _derecho_ de tener necesidades imputadas reduce las _libertades_ de aprender, de sanar o de desplazarse por uno mismo al estado de frágiles lujos. Sin embargo, en una sociedad convivencial lo inverso sería verdad. La protección de la equidad en el ejercicio de las libertades individuales es la preocupación dominante de una sociedad fundada en la tecnología radical, donde la ciencia y la técnica sirven para crear de manera más eficaz valores de uso. Es evidente que una libertad tan equitativamente repartida no tendría ningún sentido si no está fundada en el derecho a un acceso igual a las materias primas, a las herramientas y a los procedimientos. La alimentación, el carburante, el aire puro o el espacio vital no pueden distribuirse de manera más eficaz que las herramientas o los puestos de trabajo si se racionan sin consideración de las necesidades imputadas, es decir, hasta un límite igual para todos, jóvenes o viejos, impedido o presidente. Una sociedad fundada en el empleo moderno y eficaz de las libertades productivas no puede existir si el ejercicio de esas libertades no se limita de manera igual para todos.
+
+[^n01]: _"Les Carnets de Leonard de Vinci"_, trad. Louise Servicen, Gallimard, París, 1951.
+
+[^n02]: Ver "La convivencialidad"
+
diff --git a/contents/book/unemployment/index b/contents/book/unemployment/index
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