findByUser( $user ); return $oathUser && $oathUser->getKey(); } /** * Encrypt an aray of variables to put into the user's session. We use this * when storing the user's password in their session. We can use json as the * serialization format because $plaintextVars is an array of strings. * @param array $plaintextVars array of user input strings * @param int $userId passed to key derivation functions so each user uses * distinct encryption and hmac keys * @return string encrypted data packet */ public static function encryptSessionData( array $plaintextVars, $userId ) { $keyMaterial = self::getKeyMaterials(); $keys = self::getUserKeys( $keyMaterial, $userId ); return self::seal( json_encode( $plaintextVars ), $keys['encrypt'], $keys['hmac'] ); } /** * Decrypt an encrypted packet, generated with encryptSessionData * @param string $ciphertext Encrypted data packet * @param string|int $userId * @return array of strings */ public static function decryptSessionData( $ciphertext, $userId ) { $keyMaterial = self::getKeyMaterials(); $keys = self::getUserKeys( $keyMaterial, $userId ); return json_decode( self::unseal( $ciphertext, $keys['encrypt'], $keys['hmac'] ), true ); } /** * Get the base secret for this wiki, used to derive all of the encryption * keys. When $wgOATHAuthSecret is rotated, users who are part way through the * two-step login will get an exception, and have to re-start the login. * @return string */ private static function getKeyMaterials() { global $wgOATHAuthSecret, $wgSecretKey; return $wgOATHAuthSecret ?: $wgSecretKey; } /** * Generate encryption and hmac keys, unique to this user, based on a single * wiki secret. Use a moderate pbkdf2 work factor in case we ever leak keys. * @param string $secret * @param string|int $userid * @return array including key for encryption and integrity checking */ private static function getUserKeys( $secret, $userid ) { $keymats = hash_pbkdf2( 'sha256', $secret, "oath-$userid", 10001, 64, true ); return [ 'encrypt' => substr( $keymats, 0, 32 ), 'hmac' => substr( $keymats, 32, 32 ), ]; } /** * Actually encrypt the data, using a new random IV, and prepend the hmac * of the encrypted data + IV, using a separate hmac key. * @param string $data * @param string $encKey * @param string $hmacKey * @return string $hmac.$iv.$ciphertext, each component b64 encoded */ private static function seal( $data, $encKey, $hmacKey ) { $iv = MWCryptRand::generate( 16, true ); $ciphertext = openssl_encrypt( $data, 'aes-256-ctr', $encKey, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, $iv ); $sealed = base64_encode( $iv ) . '.' . base64_encode( $ciphertext ); $hmac = hash_hmac( 'sha256', $sealed, $hmacKey, true ); return base64_encode( $hmac ) . '.' . $sealed; } /** * Decrypt data sealed using seal(). First checks the hmac to prevent various * attacks. * @param string $encrypted * @param string $encKey * @param string $hmacKey * @return string plaintext * @throws Exception */ private static function unseal( $encrypted, $encKey, $hmacKey ) { $pieces = explode( '.', $encrypted ); if ( count( $pieces ) !== 3 ) { throw new InvalidArgumentException( 'Invalid sealed-secret format' ); } list( $hmac, $iv, $ciphertext ) = $pieces; $integCalc = hash_hmac( 'sha256', $iv . '.' . $ciphertext, $hmacKey, true ); if ( !hash_equals( $integCalc, base64_decode( $hmac ) ) ) { throw new Exception( 'Sealed secret has been tampered with, aborting.' ); } return openssl_decrypt( base64_decode( $ciphertext ), 'aes-256-ctr', $encKey, OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, base64_decode( $iv ) ); } }